

## The Persecution and Murder of the Jews, 1933–1945

The Persecution and Murder of the  
European Jews by Nazi Germany,  
1933–1945

Series edited on behalf of the German Federal Archives,  
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and the Chair for Modern History  
at the Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg

In cooperation with Yad Vashem

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Volume 2

edited by

Götz Aly, Susanne Heim, Ulrich Herbert,  
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Dieter Pohl, and Hartmut Weber

English edition also edited by

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The Persecution and Murder of the  
European Jews by Nazi Germany,  
1933–1945

Volume 2

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Executive Editor

Susanne Heim

Coordinator of the English-language edition

Caroline Pearce,

with the assistance of Dorothy Mas

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Alex J. Kay,  
with the assistance of Carla MacDougall

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## Foreword to the English Edition

*The Persecution and Murder of the European Jews by Nazi Germany, 1933–1945* presents a broad range of primary sources in a scholarly edition. A total of sixteen English-language volumes will be published in this series, organized according to chronology and geography. The series documents the horrific historical events embodied by the terms Holocaust and Shoah. This English-language edition reproduces all the materials in the German edition but has been adapted for an English-speaking readership. Apart from those originally written in English, all documents have been translated from the language of the original source.

The foreword to the first volume of the series detailed the criteria for the selection of the documents. These criteria can be summarized as follows. First, the sources used for this edition are written documents and, occasionally, transcribed audio materials, dating from the period of National Socialist rule between 1933 and 1945. The decision was taken not to include memoirs, reports, and judicial documents produced in the period after 1945; however, the footnotes make extensive reference to such retrospective testimonies and historical accounts. Second, the documents shed light on the actions and reactions of people with differing backgrounds and convictions and in different places, and indicate their intentions as well as the frequently limited options available to them. The volumes include a variety of document types such as official correspondence, private letters, diary entries, newspaper articles, and the reports of foreign observers. The documents within each volume are arranged chronologically.

This second volume in the series contains documents on the disenfranchisement and expropriation of the Jews in Germany after 1 January 1938 and in Austria from the Anschluss of March 1938 until the beginning of the Second World War on 1 September 1939. The documentation ranges from legislation on the Aryanization of the German economy to the narrative of a Jewish prisoner about his experiences in a concentration camp. The notes of a young girl describing her fear of the looming November pogroms appear alongside the account of a Jewish aid organization on the growing number of refugees, and the speech in which Hitler makes reference to the annihilation of the Jews in Europe. Events and developments are thus presented from multiple perspectives.

The series has been generously funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as a long-term humanities project. The English edition, which is also DFG funded, is a joint project with the Yad Vashem International Institute for Holocaust Research. In addition to the sponsors, the editors are most grateful to the large number of archivists, public officials, historians, and private individuals who have lent assistance to the project. They have provided the editors with advice and comments on sources and with information for the annotations, including biographical details of the persons featured in the documents. Todd Brown, Alex J. Kay, Kathleen Luft, Jennifer E. Neuheiser, and Nicola Varns translated the German-language documents for this second English-language volume in the series. Carol Sykes translated the French and Spanish-language documents. The Italian-language document was translated by Alex J. Kay, and the Dutch-language document by David Lee. Merle Read provided copy-editing services. Ingo Loose assisted with the documents containing Hebrew words and expressions.

Peter Palm and Giles Bennett created and advised on the map in this volume. Alicia Brudney, Joseph Dunlop, Nora Huberty, Priska Komaromi, Ashley Kirsipel, Benedict Oldfield, Barbara Uchdorf, Ana Lena Werner, and Max Zeterberg contributed to this volume as student assistants. Johannes Gamm was responsible for database management. The following people contributed to the original German volume as student assistants: Romina Becker, Giles Bennett, Natascha Butzke, Florian Danecke, Vera Dost, Ivonne Meybohm, Miriam Schelp, and Remigius Stachowiak. Andrea Löw and Gudrun Schroeter contributed in their capacity as research fellows.

Despite all the care taken, occasional inaccuracies cannot be entirely avoided in such a source collection. We would be grateful for any notifications to this effect. They will be taken into account for future publications. The address of the editorial board is: Institut für Zeitgeschichte München–Berlin, Edition ‘Judenverfolgung’, Finckensteinallee 85/87, 12 205 Berlin, Germany.

Berlin/Munich/Freiburg/Klagenfurt, April 2018

## Editorial Preface

This primary source collection on the persecution and murder of the European Jews should be cited using the abbreviation PMJ. This citation style is also used in the work itself where there are cross references between the individual volumes. The documents are consecutively numbered, beginning anew with each volume. Accordingly, 'PMJ 1/200' refers to document number 200 in the first volume of this edition. The individual documents are presented as follows: title (in bold type), header, document, footnotes.

The titles have been formulated by the editor(s) of the respective volume and provide information on the date of origin of the document, its core message, author, and recipient(s). The header, placed underneath the title, is part of the document itself. It specifies the type of source (letter, draft law, minutes, and so on), the name of the author, the place of origin, the file reference (where applicable), remarks indicating confidential or classified status, and other special features of the document. The location of the ministries or other central agencies in Berlin at the time, for instance the Reich Security Main Office or the Chancellery of the Führer, is not cited. The header also contains details about the addressee and, where applicable, the date of the receipt stamp, and it concludes with the date of origin and reference to the stage of processing of the source, for instance 'draft', 'carbon copy', or 'copy'.

The header is followed by the document text. Salutations and valedictions are printed, though signatures are only included once, in the header. Instances of emphasis by the author in the original document are retained. Irrespective of the type of emphasis used in the original source (for example, underlined, spaced, bold, capitalized, or italicized), they always appear in italics in the printed version. Where necessary, additional particulars on the document are to be found in the footnotes. In order to enhance readability, letters and words are added in square brackets where they are missing in the original due to obvious mistakes, or where the meaning would otherwise be unclear in the translation.

There is a list of abbreviations at the back of the volume. Uncommon abbreviations, primarily from private correspondence, are expanded in a footnote at the first mention in a given document.

Handwritten additions in typewritten originals have been adopted by the editors without further indication insofar as they are formal corrections and most probably inserted by the author. If the additions significantly alter the content – either by mitigating or radicalizing it – this is mentioned in the footnotes, and, if known, the author of the addition(s) is given.

As a rule, the documents are reproduced here in full. Only in exceptional cases, where individual documents are very long, is the document abridged. Such editing is indicated by an ellipsis in square brackets; the contents of the omitted text are outlined in a footnote. One such exceptional case is the diary of Luise Solmitz, which has survived in both a handwritten version and a typewritten version compiled by Luise Solmitz herself after 1945. Since the handwritten version is very difficult to read and contains lengthy entries that are of limited historical interest, excerpts are documented in the presented volume in accordance with the typescript. However, the first entry that

is included in this volume, from 27 January 1938, is reproduced in its entirety from the handwritten version to give a representative example of the diary. The italicized sections indicate passages that are only found in the handwritten version of the diary. The sections in roman type are from the typewritten version. The author occasionally added retrospective annotations to both the manuscript and the typescript; these are marked with curly brackets: {}.

Undated monthly or annual reports are dated to the end of the month or year that they appear. Only in a few exceptional cases is a deviation made from the chronological organization of the documents: in this volume in the case of the life stories of Jewish émigrés written in 1939/1940 for a competition organized by Harvard University. These descriptive texts, which were written soon after the period covered but nonetheless retrospectively, are classified in some cases according to the date of the events portrayed rather than the date of origin. Where there is any uncertainty regarding the date of the documents or whether they constitute originals or copies, reference is made in the footnotes.

The first footnote for each document, which is linked to the title, contains the location of the source and, insofar as it denotes an archive, the reference number, as well as the folio number(s) if available. Reference to copies of archival documents in research institutions and in the German Federal Archives in Berlin are always made if the original held at the location first mentioned was not consulted there. In the case of printed sources, for instance newspaper articles or legislative texts, this footnote contains standard bibliographical information. If the source has already been published in English in a document collection on National Socialism or on the persecution of the Jews, reference is made to its first publication, alongside the original location of the source. The next footnote explains the origins of the document and, where appropriate, mentions related discussions, the specific role of authors and recipients, and activities accompanying or immediately following its genesis. Subsequent footnotes provide additional information related to the theme of the document and the persons relevant to the content. They refer to other – published or unpublished – sources that contribute to historical contextualization.

The footnotes also point out individual features of the documents, for instance handwritten notes in the margin, underlining, or deletions, whether by the author or the recipient(s). Annotations and instructions for submission are referred to in the footnotes where the editors consider them to contain significant information. Where possible, the locations of the treaties, laws, and decrees cited in the source text are provided in the footnotes, while other documents are given with their archival reference number. If these details could not be ascertained, this is also noted.

Where biographical information is available on the senders and recipients of the documents, this is provided in the footnotes. The same applies to persons mentioned in the text if they play an active role in the events described. As a general rule, this information is given in the footnote inserted after the first mention of the name in question in the volume. Biographical information on a particular person can thus be retrieved easily via the index.

The short biographies are based on data found in reference works, scholarly literature, or the Central Database of Shoah Victims' Names established and run by Yad Vashem. In many cases, the information was retrieved by consulting personnel files and

indexes, municipal and company archives, registry offices, restitution and denazification files, or specialists in the field. Indexes and files on persons from the Nazi era held in archives were also used, primarily those of the former Berlin Document Center, the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic (Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik), and the Central Office of the Judicial Authorities of the Federal States for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen) in Ludwigsburg, the last of these now stored in the German Federal Archives.

Despite every effort, it has not always been possible to obtain complete biographical information. In such cases, the footnote in question contains only verified facts such as the year of birth. Where a person could not be identified, there is no footnote reference. Biographical footnotes are not added in the case of extremely well-known individuals such as Adolf Hitler or Joseph Goebbels.

As a rule, in the titles, footnotes, and introduction inverted commas are not placed around terms that were commonplace in National Socialist Germany, such as Führer, Jewish Council, or Aryanization, but German-language terms expressing ideological concepts of race such as *Mischling* are placed in italics. In line with the circumstances of the time, the terms Jew and Jewish are also used for people who did not regard themselves as Jewish but were defined as such on the basis of racial legislation and thus subjected to persecution. References in the documents to the ‘Gestapo’, an acronym of the German GEheime STAatsPOLizei, and to the ‘State Police’ denote one and the same institution: the Secret State Police.

The glossary contains concise descriptions of key terms and concepts that are repeated on multiple occasions or are related to the events and developments described in the volume.

All primary and secondary sources consulted are listed in the footnotes and bibliography. Where English-language versions of these sources are available, these are included. If a document has already been published in English translation but has been retranslated for this volume, this is indicated in a footnote.

The index includes all names referred to in the volume and all places significant to the content of the respective documents. It also contains organizations and institutions, as well as terms and concepts relevant to the volume.

#### *Note on the translation*

British English is used in all translations into English. Where a document was originally written in British or American English, the spelling, grammar, and punctuation of the original have been retained, with silent correction of minor typographical or grammatical errors and insertions in square brackets to clarify the meaning if necessary.

The spelling, grammar, and punctuation of the translated documents broadly conform to the guidelines in *New Hart’s Rules: The Oxford Style Guide* (2014). Accordingly, the ending -ize rather than -ise is preferred throughout.

SS, Wehrmacht, and certain other ranks are given in the original German, as are titles where there is no standard equivalent in English or where there may be confusion with contemporary usage. A table of military and police ranks is included as an appendix,

along with English-language equivalents of these terms and an indication of their position in the National Socialist hierarchy. In addition, administrative ranks and other terms commonly used in German in scholarly literature on the period are presented in German in this volume and explained in the glossary.

All laws and institutions are translated into English in the documents; the German titles of laws can be found in the index. In the introduction and footnotes, foreign-language terms and expressions are added in brackets after the translation where this is considered important for understanding or context.

If a word or phrase appears in German in a non-German document, the German is retained in the translated text and its meaning explained in a footnote or, if necessary, the glossary. The original spelling of foreign organizations is retained in the footnotes. The titles of published works not in the English language are not translated unless the work in question is of contextual or substantial relevance.

In order to avoid confusion between British and American English, dates are spelt out in the order day, month, and year. Foreign proper names are not italicized. Thus, names of institutions, organizations, and places are written in roman type in the footnotes, but legislation and conceptual terms are in italics.

In the titles, footnotes, and translated documents, place names are written according to the contemporary (English) name or the name commonly used in scholarly literature on the period. This also applies to places that have since been renamed, so, for example, 'Danzig' not 'Gdańsk'. Diacritical marks in languages such as Czech and Polish are retained, with the exception of the names of the extermination camps in Eastern Europe, where they have been removed in order to emphasize that these camps were established by the German National Socialist regime. Hebrew and Yiddish terms are described in the footnotes along with any other words requiring explanation.

# Introduction

This volume documents the persecution of the Jews living in the German Reich during the twenty-month period between January 1938 and 31 August 1939. Within this short timespan, the German Reich annexed Austria in March 1938 and the Sudetenland, the border region of the Bohemian basin with a majority German population, in October of the same year. In March 1939 the Wehrmacht occupied Prague, and on 1 September it invaded Poland, thus unleashing the Second World War.

In the months that passed between the Anschluss and the invasion of Poland, and in a development closely linked to the preparations for war, the National Socialist leadership imposed a state of emergency on the German Jews. Civil servants, government ministers, Party functionaries, and neighbours increased discrimination to the point of terror, intensified economic disadvantages to the level of expropriation, and created a climate of desperation through the heightened pressure to emigrate. They forced tens of thousands of Jews with just a few Reichsmarks in their pockets across the border and drove hundreds to suicide. In the pogroms of 9–10 November 1938, what Joseph Goebbels termed ‘the anger of the people’ was manifested by tens of thousands of SA men (Storm Troopers) wreaking havoc. Hundreds of thousands stood by and watched. That night, almost all the synagogues in Germany were destroyed, and in the following days, more than 25,000 Jewish men were sent to concentration camps, where they were held for weeks, humiliated and tormented, and several hundred were murdered.

The November pogroms and the subsequent political decisions regarding anti-Jewish policy are the main focus of this volume. Other central themes include the persecution of 190,000 Austrian Jews following the Anschluss by Germany, as well as the measures that partly expropriated the assets of the persecuted and partly brought them under state control for the purpose of future expropriation. Finally, this volume documents the forcible expulsion of the Jews from Germany. The expansion of the National Socialist state, the pogroms, and Aryanization transformed forced emigration into a chaotic mass exodus. The effects jeopardized Jewish existence across large parts of Europe.

The persecution of the Czech Jews, who came under German rule on 14 and 15 March 1939 and subsequently lived in the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, will be documented in the third volume of this edition. Though Danzig was not part of the Reich before the invasion of Poland but rather a Free City under the control of the League of Nations, the situation of Danzig’s Jews is also dealt with in Volume 2, because the Danzig Senate, dominated by National Socialists since summer 1933, enforced numerous anti-Jewish measures based on German policies. In the Memel Territory, which had been part of Lithuania since 1924, antisemitism began to proliferate with German support, beginning in the mid 1930s, long before the Memel Territory was returned to the Reich on 23 March 1939 as a result of serious threats from the Nazi leadership in Berlin.

## *The Situation of German Jews in Early 1938*

At the end of 1937, around 400,000 Jews were still living in Germany; 130,000 had emigrated in the preceding five years. Most Jews lived in large cities, 140,000 in Berlin alone. Occupational bans, boycotts, and the emigration of the younger generations had greatly altered the social structure: by this time, one in two German Jews was over the age of fifty, with one in four dependent on welfare. While there had been 8,000 Jewish doctors at the beginning of the 1930s, by 1937 only 3,300 remained. People who had once been affluent were forced to move into smaller homes and sell their family's valuables.<sup>1</sup> According to the results of the population census of May 1939, barely 16 per cent of German Jews were still employed (in contrast to 48 per cent in 1933), and more than 70 per cent of all Jews over the age of 14 were by now categorized as being economically independent but without occupation.<sup>2</sup> Contact between Jews and non-Jews became rare. Often both groups avoided each other to prevent awkwardness. Almost all associations had excluded their Jewish members. Signs denying entry to Jews were posted at the entrance to many towns and villages and in parks, bathing resorts and restaurants. As literary critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki recalled, 'there were also restaurants where the management preferred to dispense with such signs at the entrance, and instead empty cups were set down in front of those Jews who nonetheless dared to enter these establishments, sometimes with a slip of paper with the words "Jews out"'.<sup>3</sup>

Non-Jews who continued to maintain contact with Jewish acquaintances had to expect animosity. Many Jewish pupils had already left the state schools before they were officially banned from attending them after the pogroms of 1938 (Docs. 16, 46). Either they could no longer endure the antisemitic taunts and spiteful remarks of their Aryan fellow pupils and teachers or their parents could no longer afford the school fees, which were neither reduced nor waived for Jews, unlike Aryan pupils. According to estimates, in May 1938 only around a quarter of all Jewish primary school-pupils still attended state schools.<sup>3</sup> Until the November pogroms, Jews were not generally barred from theatres, concert halls, and cinemas, but in some places, including Leipzig with its large Jewish

1 Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, vol. 25 (1980), pp. 313–361, here pp. 326 and 341–342, and vol. 26 (1981), pp. 343–409; Hazel Rosenstrauch (ed.), *Aus Nachbarn wurden Juden: Ausgrenzung und Selbstbehauptung 1933–1942* (Berlin: Transit, 1988), p. 70. On Jewish poverty, also see David Kramer, 'Jewish Welfare Work under the Impact of Pauperisation', in Arnold Paucker (ed.), *Die Juden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland / The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933–1943* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1986), pp. 173–188; Salomon Adler-Rudel, *Jüdische Selbsthilfe unter dem Naziregime 1933–1939: Im Spiegel der Berichte der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974), pp. 158–165. In Hamburg, the share of recipients among the Jews in the winter of 1938–1939 was 37 per cent: Uwe Lohalm, *Fürsorge und Verfolgung: Öffentliche Wohlfahrtsverwaltung und nationalsozialistische Judenpolitik in Hamburg 1933 bis 1942* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse, 1998), p. 49.

2 *Berufslose Selbstständige*; a category including those living on their own assets and those in receipt of various pensions and benefits. On the results of the population census, see Peter Longerich, *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews*, new edn, trans. Shaun Whiteside (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 [German edn, 1998]), p. 127, and Joseph Walk, *Jüdische Schule und Erziehung im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt am Main: A. Hain, 1991), pp. 214–215.

3 Marcel Reich-Ranicki, *Mein Leben* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), p. 69, quotation p. 156; Marion A. Kaplan, *Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 38; Adler-Rudel, *Jüdische Selbsthilfe*, p. 28.

community, they were prohibited considerably earlier from taking part in cultural events.<sup>4</sup> In addition to social exclusion, it was above all the emigration of numerous acquaintances or family members that intensified the isolation of those remaining in Germany. Michael Blumenthal, who grew up in Berlin and later became US Secretary of the Treasury, reports that in his family hardly any mention was made of emigration until 1937, but there was indeed talk of the daunting situation of those who had emigrated: 'by early 1938 my parents could no longer avoid the truth. Their isolation from normal German life was nearly total, the degradations and the economic squeeze increased, and there was no longer any mistaking the ominous trend.' By mid 1938, they were 'under the gun'. With a heavy heart, they sold their business for a fraction of its actual worth to a former employee and ultimately emigrated to Shanghai. Victor Klemperer, who stayed in Germany, speculated at the time about his prospects after the end of the Third Reich: 'Probably I would only then face the very greatest loneliness. Because I could never again trust anyone in Germany, never again feel myself uninhibitedly to be German.'<sup>5</sup>

### *Preparation for War and Persecution of the Jews*

As a vague future project, conquest of 'Lebensraum (living space) in the East' was at the centre of National Socialist ideology from an early stage, but it was not until November 1937 that Hitler began to outline a firm strategy for achieving this objective. Due to the guarantees for Poland and Czechoslovakia, Germany's eastward expansion could easily have led to war with Britain and France. For this reason, Hitler's foreign-policy advisor Joachim von Ribbentrop, then German ambassador in London, had tried in the summer of 1937 to approach the goal of expansion towards the East by taking the diplomatic route. The German idea was that the British Empire was to remain inviolate for the time being, and as a quid pro quo the Reich would be given free rein in continental Europe, including expansion to the East. The British interlocutors rejected this idea. However, they did indicate their willingness to consider the demands concerning Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig. They continued to follow their course of appeasement, which pursued the objective of integrating Germany, with limited concessions, into a renewed European framework for lasting peace. In a complementary move, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt made it clear in his so-called Quarantine Speech of 5 October 1937 that the United States would not stand aside and tolerate Germany's expansionist efforts and, in the event of war, would side with the British.<sup>6</sup>

4 Marion A. Kaplan (ed.), *Jewish Daily Life in Germany, 1618–1945* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 338–339.

5 W. Michael Blumenthal, *The Invisible Wall: Germans and Jews. A Personal Exploration* (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1998), pp. 356–359; Victor Klemperer, *I Shall Bear Witness: The Diaries of Victor Klemperer, 1933–1941*, trans. Martin Chalmers (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998 [German edn, 1995]), pp. 305–306 (entry for 23 Feb. 1938).

6 Andreas Hillgruber, *Die gescheiterte Großmacht: Eine Skizze des Deutschen Reiches 1871–1945* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1980), pp. 83–84; Klaus Hildebrand, *Deutsche Außenpolitik 1933–1945: Kalkül oder Dogma?* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1990), p. 54; Klaus Hildebrand, *Das vergangene Reich: Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995), p. 641.

Well into 1938, Hitler still hoped that Britain would tacitly condone the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia. However, he was not willing to abandon the pursuit of his goals in exchange for British neutrality. On 5 November 1937, Hitler called together the leadership of the Wehrmacht, Minister of War Werner von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Hermann Göring, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantin von Neurath for a secret meeting, at which he informed them of the possibility of war against Britain and France. As his war objective, Hitler cited the 'solution to the problem of lack of space'. He outlined various plans for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia and Austria into the German Reich as initial steps on the road to establishing Germany's position as a world power. This, he said, would 'signify [a] gain of foodstuffs for five to six million people', on condition that one million people would be forcibly resettled from Austria and two million from Czechoslovakia. The second step, the push towards the East in the direction of the Soviet Union, was to follow sometime between 1943 and 1945, once the German Wehrmacht was sufficiently rearmed and – after a victorious war in the West – battle-seasoned.<sup>7</sup>

In the subsequent discussion, Neurath, Blomberg, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army Baron Werner von Fritsch raised various objections. As a result, all three men were removed from office in the following months. In early 1938, Hitler did away with the post of minister of war and took personal command of the Wehrmacht. He placed the compliant Wilhelm Keitel at the head of the newly created High Command of the Wehrmacht, named Walther von Brauchitsch commander-in-chief of the army, and appointed Ribbentrop minister of foreign affairs. In addition, he dismissed twelve of the highest-ranking army and air force generals, replacing them with younger careerists, and staffed fifty-one other leadership positions in the Wehrmacht with new men.<sup>8</sup>

At the end of 1937, Hitler had removed Hjalmar Schacht from his post as minister of economics after Schacht had expressed increasingly forthright reservations about the extreme level of national debt resulting from the rapid arms build-up. After an interregnum with Göring in charge, Goebbels's confidant Walther Funk was promoted to the position of minister of economics. One year later, Funk took over – also from Schacht and for the same reason – the additional post of Reichsbank president.

The economic boom in the Reich after 1933 was based on dubious financial policies. In fact, labour, raw materials, and foreign exchange were all in short supply. The concentration of all construction resources on expanding the Siegfried Line fortifications along Germany's western frontier and developing other military projects brought both residential and motorway construction almost to a standstill. The focusing of all production on war led to shortages in consumer goods, particularly in the supply of butter and meat. At the same time, full employment, overtime, and concealed wage hikes had fuelled

7 Hitler's remarks were written down by Colonel Friedrich Hoßbach: *The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946*, vol. 25 (Nuremberg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, 1947), doc. 386-PS, pp. 402–413; Bradley Smith, 'Die Überlieferung der Hoßbach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 38 (1990), pp. 329–336; Gerhard L. Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937–1939* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1994), pp. 34–43.

8 Karl-Heinz Janssen and Fritz Tobias, *Der Sturz der Generäle: Hitler und die Blomberg-Fritsch-Krise 1938* (Munich: Beck, 1994), pp. 148–158.

private consumption again for the first time since 1929. In response to this dilemma, the government resorted to measures such as pay freezes, compulsory labour service, and propaganda promising a bright future. In addition, it intensified the harassment of Jews with a view to pursuing Aryanization. In the main, however, Hitler succeeded in using his high-risk foreign-policy gamble, the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, to obscure the domestic political crisis.<sup>9</sup>

The main problem of the German economy was the shortage of foreign currency. To prepare for war, important raw materials for arms production had to be imported and the Reich grain reserves envisaged by the Four-Year Plan had to be increased to the point where, in the event of war, they would constitute a reliable safeguard against the anticipated British naval blockade. As his speech at the aforementioned secret meeting on 5 November 1937 indicates, Hitler took the question of wartime food supply very seriously. In his view, the Reich had lost the First World War primarily because of the British naval blockade of food. Hunger had then led to mass protests in Germany and thus prompted the 'stab in the back' that civilians on the home front inflicted on the combat front, 'undefeated on the battlefield'. In the coming war, too, only about 80 per cent of the German population's food requirements could be supplied by the domestic agricultural sector. The remainder had to be stockpiled or taken away from others.<sup>10</sup>

In the early years of National Socialist rule, the economic boom and rearmament had been ensured by means of a financial policy involving so-called Mefo bills, a special system of financing through deferred payment devised by Hjalmar Schacht. Twelve million Reichsmarks of Mefo bills were in circulation by early 1938 and were issued in the name of a dummy company, the Metallurgical Research Corporation (Mefo). In early 1938, when the first bills were due, there was a risk that payment could not be honoured. New financial tricks were thus required – this time in the face of Schacht's opposition. The possibility of financing the arms build-up over the long term and placing corresponding government bonds in the domestic capital market did not exist, because in 1938 most cash-rich Germans were not willing to voluntarily lend money to the bankrupt National Socialist state. In times of extreme national debt, the Reichsbank even had to buy up Reich bonds on the Berlin Stock Exchange – in July 1938 alone, in the amount of 465 million Reichsmarks – to prevent a stock market slump that would have exposed to the world the domestic loss of confidence in the Third Reich.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Dietrich Eichholtz, 'Rüstungskonjunktur und Rüstungskrise: Bemerkungen zu materiellen und finanziellen Problemen der wirtschaftlichen Kriegsvorbereitung', in Werner Röhr, Brigitte Berlekamp, and Karl Heinz Roth (eds.), *Der Krieg vor dem Krieg: Politik und Ökonomik der 'friedlichen' Aggressionen Deutschlands 1938/39* (Hamburg: VSA, 2001), pp. 98–117, here p. 104; Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), pp. 255–258.

<sup>10</sup> Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, *Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction*, trans. A. G. Blunden (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002 [German edn, 1991]), pp. 235–252. On 30 June 1939, the Reich nevertheless 5.5 million tonnes of grain reserves: Götz Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State*, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Metropolitan, 2006 [German edn, 2005]), p. 169.

<sup>11</sup> Avraham Barkai, *Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy*, trans. Ruth Hadass-Vashitz (Oxford: Berg, 1990 [German edn, 1988]), pp. 165–167; Albert Fischer, *Hjalmar Schacht und Deutschlands 'Judenfrage'* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1995), p. 85; Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries*, pp. 42–44; Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction*, pp. 241–270.

The shortages of cash and foreign exchange strengthened the Reich government's determination to subjugate Austria and Czechoslovakia in order to commandeer the treasuries of those countries and confiscate the assets of the Jews. During the preceding years, Jewish businessmen had been ruined or forced to sell their companies, but for foreign and domestic economic reasons those responsible were still hesitant to prohibit the Jews from engaging in all business activity. In 1938 that changed.

In the spring of 1938, tax reductions for people with children and various social benefit payments, such as marriage and maternity benefits, were cancelled for Jews.<sup>12</sup> On 1 March, the Reich Ministry of Economics definitively prohibited the awarding of public contracts to Jewish firms. From 1 April 1938, the Law on the Legal Status of the Jewish Religious Communities deprived the Jewish communities of the status of corporations under public law (Doc. 23). This had serious financial implications, as the communities now no longer had the same tax advantages that were granted to Christian religious communities. Henceforth they had to pay taxes on the communities' properties – synagogues, cemeteries, and charitable organizations. At the same time, the communities' income sharply decreased as a result of the pauperization of their members, while the expenditure for social welfare constantly climbed owing to the exclusion of Jews from public welfare. In addition, this law stripped the communities of the right to impose their own taxes. This arbitrary state measure caused horror among those who worked as employees or volunteers in the communities. They interpreted it as a sign that 'the final hour of German Jewry had come'.<sup>13</sup>

In July 1938 the Law on the Amendment of the Commercial Code was enacted.<sup>14</sup> It banned Jews from the real estate business and property administration, as well as the fairground trade and peddling. Many formerly self-employed businessmen and laid-off blue- and white-collar workers had sought refuge precisely in these occupations and thus aggravated non-Jewish competitors. With the Fourth Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law, Jewish physicians lost their licence to practise medicine with effect from 30 September 1938 (Doc. 76).<sup>15</sup> A few were allowed to continue working as 'practitioners for the sick' (*Krankenbehandler*) but could provide medical care only to Jewish patients. In Berlin, of the 1,623 Jewish doctors still practising in the summer of 1938, 426 received this disparaging occupational designation. Two months later, something similar befell Jewish lawyers. Under the Fifth Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law, all 1,753 Jewish lawyers who had been allowed to continue practising, thanks to special provisions for

12 Law on the Amendment of the Income Tax Law, 1 Feb. 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, I, pp. 99–102; Avraham Barkai, *From Boycott to Annihilation: The Economic Struggle of German Jews, 1933–1943*, trans. William Templer (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1989 [German edn, 1987]), p. 117; Joseph Walk (ed.), *Das Sonderrecht für Juden im NS-Staat: Eine Sammlung der gesetzlichen Maßnahmen und Richtlinien – Inhalt und Bedeutung* (Heidelberg/Karlsruhe: Müller Juristischer, 1981), pp. 416, 420, 424, and 426.

13 Kurt Jakob Ball-Kaduri, *Vor der Katastrophe: Juden in Deutschland 1934–1939* (Tel Aviv: Olamenu, 1967), pp. 126–127; Otto Dov Kulka and Eberhard Jäckel (eds.), *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports on Popular Opinion in Germany, 1933–1945*, trans. William Templer (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2010 [German edn, 2004]), p. 337.

14 Law on the Amendment of the Commercial Code for the German Reich, 6 July 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, I, p. 823.

15 Fourth Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law, 25 July 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, I, pp. 969–970.

war veterans, now lost their licences; 172 received permission to act as ‘consultants’ (*Konsulenten*) and represent solely Jewish clients in the future.<sup>16</sup>

This approach, both merciless and finely nuanced, was in keeping with the two guidelines that Göring repeatedly emphasized after the November pogroms. First, if the Jews were to remain compliant, they must ‘still [have] something to lose’. Second, their forced migration was to be accelerated by stripping them, little by little, of the tangible necessities of life.<sup>17</sup>

In the summer months of 1938, the labelling of Jewish businesses in various cities of the Reich provided the impetus for violent attacks on Jews. Mostly it was members of the Storm Troopers (SA) or the Nazi Party (NSDAP) who threatened Jewish shopkeepers, verbally abused or denounced non-Jewish patrons, and thus contributed to the polarization of everyday life. The local authorities occasionally reacted to the antisemitic sentiment stirred up in this way by issuing anti-Jewish rules that were applicable in a particular area, even before the enactment of corresponding regulations that were uniform throughout the Reich. Standardized identifying marks for Jewish shops had already been devised by that time, but their introduction was postponed for the time being upon Hitler’s intervention.<sup>18</sup> The National Socialist activists therefore limited their actions initially to smearing the shops of Jews with paint to identify them as such. In Berlin, however, Jewish shopkeepers had to put their name in letters 25 centimetres high on the display windows at eye level and to all intents and purposes mark their own premises as Jewish operations (Doc. 120). The SS Security Service (SD) reported that ‘the operations against Jewish shops’ had ‘in many cases advanced the process of the Aryanization of the Jewish businesses’ and ‘the idea to emigrate and the will for emigration have been significantly strengthened’.<sup>19</sup>

The most important regulation to terminate German Jews’ economic activities and bring about their subsequent dispossession had been drawn up in Austria immediately after the Anschluss, before the end of March 1938. At Göring’s urging, it was introduced throughout the Reich on 26 April 1938. It stated that Jews (and, where applicable, their non-Jewish spouses) had to report their assets in detail to the relevant tax authority if the total value exceeded 5,000 Reichsmarks (Doc. 29).<sup>20</sup> The official at the Reich Ministry

16 Barkai, *From Boycott*, pp. 121–122; Fifth Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law, 27 Sept. 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, I, pp. 1403–1406.

17 Susanne Heim and Götz Aly, ‘Staatliche Ordnung und “organische Lösung”: Die Rede Hermann Görings “über die Judenfrage” vom 6. Dezember 1938’, *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung*, vol. 2 (1992), pp. 378–404, here p. 387.

18 Bella Fromm, *Als Hitler mir die Hand küßte* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1993), p. 294; Uwe Dietrich Adam, *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1972), pp. 163–164; Cornelia Essner, *Die ‘Nürnberger Gesetze’ oder die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933–1945* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), pp. 246–250; *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, part 1: *Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941*, vol. 5, ed. Elke Fröhlich (Munich: Saur, 2000), p. 121 (entry for 29 Jan. 1938); Christoph Kreutzmüller, *Final Sale in Berlin: The Destruction of Jewish Commercial Activity 1930–1945*, trans. Jane Paulick and Jefferson Chase (New York: Berghahn, 2015 [German edn, 2012]).

19 SD Main Office II 112, report for July 1938, published in Kulka and Jäckel (eds.), *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, pp. 319–320.

20 Hans Safrian and Hans Witek, *Und keiner war dabei: Dokumente des alltäglichen Antisemitismus in Wien 1938* (Vienna: Picus, 2008), pp. 53–58. In the Viennese draft law, the limit above which registration of assets was compulsory was still set at 1,000 Reichsmarks: *ibid.*, p. 55.

of Economics in charge of 'Aryanization matters', Ministerialrat Alf Krüger, author of the book *Die Lösung der Judenfrage in der Wirtschaft* (The Solution to the Jewish Question in the Economy), described the procedure as the 'forerunner to a complete and definitive removal of Jews from the German economy' and, after the registration of assets, estimated the 'seizable' assets of the Jews living in Germany at around 7 billion Reichsmarks. (By way of comparison, the Reich's regular revenues amounted to around 17 billion Reichsmarks in the fiscal year 1938.) The property of non-Jewish spouses and possessions in Germany belonging to Jews of foreign citizenship were regarded as 'unassailable', at least for the time being.<sup>21</sup> However, foreign Jews now had to obtain official permission for purchases and leases, or risk substantial penalties. As a result, foreigners too fell within the scope of German racial legislation.

It is significant that the Regulation on the Registration of Jewish Assets issued on 26 April gave Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan Göring the power to determine how the 'assets subject to the registration requirement would be utilized'. In plain terms, this meant that the German Jews would be forced by the state to invest all their available assets in Reich war bonds. They were not formally dispossessed but rather deprived of the power to control their property. Göring explained the procedure as follows: 'The Jew is excluded from the economy and assigns his assets to the state. He is compensated in return. The compensation is noted in the debt register, and it earns interest at a set rate.' The Jews, 'pensioned off', were to live off this interest (Doc. 146). 'For only then', Göring stated elsewhere, 'is it possible to carry out the Führer's arms programme.'<sup>22</sup>

It soon became apparent how closely interrelated the seizure of Jewish assets was with the national debt and the foreign exchange shortage, which obstructed the preparations for war. Six days before the Jews were required to hand in their declarations of assets on 31 July 1938, Göring ordered the tax offices to examine these forms 'with the greatest expedition' in the search for foreign securities. Then the owners were forced to offer these securities to the Reichsbank for purchase. As a result, many millions of US dollars, British pounds sterling, and Swiss francs flowed into the German war chest in autumn 1938. In the case of the foreign exchange handover as well, the property of the affected Jews was not formally expropriated. They received the officially determined 'equivalent value' in the Reichsmark currency, which had become internationally worthless.<sup>23</sup>

From the perspective of those who were pressing ahead with the economic disenfranchisement of the Jews, Aryanization accomplished three objectives: first, it made possible immediate or future expropriation for the benefit of the German state; second, it served the interests of Aryan medium-sized companies and small tradesmen by limiting their Jewish business competition; third, isolation, humiliation, and exclusion were intended to make life unbearable for Jews in Germany and force them to emigrate.

The goal of all these measures was the rapid pauperization of the Jewish population, yet this very pauperization interfered with the other aim of anti-Jewish policy: mass

21 Secret Decree III Jd. 29/38 of the Reich Ministry of Economics, 25 July 1938, cited in A. J. van der Leeuw, 'Der Griff des Reiches nach dem Judenvermögen', *Rechtsprechung zum Wiedergutmachungsrecht*, vol. 21 (1970), pp. 383–392, here pp. 384 and 387; Barkai, *From Boycott*, p. 113; Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries*, pp. 42–43.

22 Heim and Aly, 'Staatliche Ordnung', p. 392.

23 Reich Ministry of Economics (III Jd. 29/38), 25 July 1938: PA AA, R 99 295.

emigration from Germany. Those Jews who still owned a certain amount of assets had the best chances of emigrating, while those who were destitute, in whose expulsion the institutions of persecution had a particular interest, ran the risk of having to remain in Germany. The German government solved its self-created conflict between the objectives of expropriation and expulsion in its own fashion: it combined expropriation with selective and systematic terror.

### *The Concentration Camp System*

After Heinrich Himmler had become chief of the German police in June 1936, he initiated the construction of a new system of concentration camps. By summer 1937, he had closed the protective custody camps (*Schutzhaftlager*) used in the early years of National Socialist rule. Only Dachau concentration camp near Munich remained in place, and he had it substantially enlarged. In 1936 he had the Sachsenhausen concentration camp built in Oranienburg, near Berlin, describing it as a ‘completely new, modern and contemporary concentration camp, which can be expanded at any time’.<sup>24</sup> This was the first in a series of camps of a new type, which were designed for a considerably larger volume of prisoners. In 1938 the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps moved to Oranienburg. From there it administered all the concentration camps as well as the SS Death’s Head Units, which Himmler vastly reinforced and reorganized, transforming them from guard forces into militarily and ideologically trained units. In 1937 and 1938 additional camps were opened in Buchenwald near Weimar and Flossenbürg in eastern Bavaria. A few months after the Anschluss, the first concentration camp on Austrian territory, in Mauthausen near Linz, followed,<sup>25</sup> and in May 1939 the women’s concentration camp in Ravensbrück was added.

Though the SS initially used the concentration camps primarily to terrorize and intimidate domestic political opponents, this function was pushed into the background with the consolidation of National Socialist dominance. From 1936 the Gestapo, together with the Criminal Police, targeted so-called asocials (*Asoziale*), professional criminals and repeat offenders, people whose work habits and social behaviour did not conform to expected norms. In 1936 and 1937 the Gestapo, with the cooperation of the Criminal Police, sent more than 3,000 beggars, homeless people, prostitutes, and repeat offenders to the concentration camps.<sup>26</sup> Himmler’s Decree on Preventive Measures by the Police to Combat Crime, issued on 14 December 1937, provided a cloak of legality for the arrests

24 Cited in Karin Orth, *Das System der nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager: Eine politische Organisationsgeschichte* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), p. 36.

25 Florian Freund and Bertrand Perz, ‘Mauthausen – Stammlager’, in Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Der Ort des Terrors: Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager*, vol. 4 (Munich: Beck, 2006), pp. 293–346; Michel Fabréguet, *Camp de concentration national-socialiste en Autriche rattachée (1938–1945)* (Paris: H. Champion, 1999).

26 Orth, *Das System*, p. 47; Falk Pingel, *Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft: Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtung im Konzentrationslager* (Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1978), pp. 70–72; Kim Wünschmann, *Before Auschwitz: Jewish Prisoners in the Prewar Concentration Camps* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Nikolaus Wachsmann, *KL: A History of the Nazi Concentration Camps* (New York/London: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

retroactively and, together with the expanded Protective Custody Decree of January 1938, formed the legal basis for Operation 'Work-shy Reich' (Aktion 'Arbeitsscheu Reich') in 1938. After the employment offices had reported persons who were 'unwilling to work' to the Gestapo, Gestapo officials arrested between 1,500 and 2,000 persons in the last week of April 1938 and transferred them to Buchenwald concentration camp.<sup>27</sup> The next mass arrests followed in June and were primarily directed against the homeless, beggars, and those suspected of procurement. This time the Criminal Police, aided and provided with lists by the employment and welfare offices, made the arrests. On the orders of Reinhard Heydrich, at least 200 men who were deemed to be asocials were to be taken into preventive custody in each Criminal Police regional headquarters district (Docs. 31, 88). The number of those actually arrested plainly exceeded the imposed minimum: in total, around 10,000 persons were taken to Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, and Dachau. In both April and June, care was taken to ensure that those arrested were fit for work.

The victims of the 'June Operation' also included 1,500 Jews who had criminal records or were known to the police because of minor offences, often from years earlier.<sup>28</sup> In the first few days of the operation, the grounds for the arrests were still completely unclear. No one knew the criteria according to which unsuspecting individuals were suddenly taken away by the police or where they were taken, and the lack of information led to widespread anxiety. It particularly affected the family members and friends of those Jews who were held for weeks in isolation in the Sachsenhausen camp, with no contact with the outside world. In Buchenwald concentration camp, the detainees were at least allowed to give their family members a sign of life after two weeks.<sup>29</sup> Those who were newly incarcerated had to perform extremely strenuous forced labour, which even robust men could not keep up for long.<sup>30</sup> In Buchenwald, where 7,850 persons, including around 1,250 Jews, were imprisoned after the 'June Operation', an average of six to eight prisoners per day are said to have died, either as a result of ill-treatment or general exhaustion or because they fell into despair and threw themselves against the electrified barbed-wire fence of the camp.

27 Klaus Drobisch and Günther Wieland, *System der NS-Konzentrationslager 1933–1939* (Berlin: Akademie, 1993), pp. 284–286; Wolfgang Ayaß, 'Asoziale' im Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995), pp. 140–147. The Himmler decree, in addition to other documents concerning the persecution of so-called asocials, is published in Wolfgang Ayaß (ed.), 'Gemeinschaftsfremde': *Quellen zur Verfolgung von 'Asozialen' 1933–1945* (Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, 1998).

28 Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, vol. 1: *The Years of Persecution, 1933–1939* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 261; Christian Faludi (ed.), *Die 'Juni-Aktion' 1938: Eine Dokumentation zur Radikalisierung der Judenverfolgung* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2013).

29 Ben Barkow, Raphael Gross, and Michael Lenarz (eds.), *Novemberpogrom 1938: Die Augenzeugenberichte der Wiener Library, London* (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag im Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008), pp. 46 and 64–65.

30 Ayaß, 'Asoziale', pp. 147–165; Patrick Wagner, *Volksgemeinschaft ohne Verbrecher: Konzeptionen und Praxis der Kriminalpolizei in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik und des Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg: Christians, 1996), pp. 279–292; Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, 'Masseneinweisungen in Konzentrationslager: Aktion "Arbeitsscheu Reich", Novemberpogrom, Aktion "Gewitter"', in Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Diestel (eds.), *Der Ort des Terrors: Geschichte der Konzentrationslager*, vol. 1 (Munich: Beck, 2005), pp. 156–164.

The guards often bullied Jewish prisoners in particular. During those weeks, it was reported from Buchenwald:

A Jew, while carrying stones, had taken hold of a stone that weighed around forty pounds. After this he was shouted at, told to just put the thing down and look for a bigger stone. As the Jew was walking away, the guard picked up the smaller stone and hurled it with all his might at the Jew; it struck the Jew on the back of the neck, and he died on the spot. In other ways too, prisoners continually die from the direct consequences of abuse. For example, in July one of the Jewish prisoners died from a double fracture of the renal pelvis, caused by being kicked.

Prisoners who showed signs of exhaustion had to expect the heaviest camp penalties for 'insubordination'. Among the most brutal punishments, inflicted on Jewish prisoners in particular, was the 'gallows': the man selected for torture had his hands tied together behind his back and was then strung up from a tree branch until he lost consciousness.<sup>31</sup>

In the period between November 1936 and the beginning of November 1938, the number of concentration camp prisoners increased fivefold, to 24,000. While predominantly so-called work-shy (*arbeitsscheu*) individuals and career criminals were imprisoned in Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, in the summer of 1938, 4,155 of the 5,500 prisoners in Dachau were sent there for political reasons. The vast majority were Austrians.<sup>32</sup>

The development of the concentration camps into centres for forced labour was intended to act as a general deterrent and to improve work ethic across the board. This development coincided with the construction projects associated with the plans for a colossal reshaping of Berlin and other cities.<sup>33</sup> In Sachsenhausen and its subcamp Neuengamme, the SS set up a brickworks. Himmler and Oswald Pohl, head of the SS Economic Administration, selected a quarry as the site for the Mauthausen camp, and quarries were also chosen as the locations for Flossenbürg concentration camp and Groß-Rosen concentration camp. The site for the Natzweiler-Struthof concentration camp in Alsace was presumably selected on the basis of a suggestion by Albert Speer, whose attention was attracted by the granite deposits there during a tour of inspection in 1940. Between April 1938 and May 1939, various firms for the economic utilization of prisoner labour came into being under the aegis of the SS. Oswald Pohl's SS Economic Administration Main Office consolidated the production centres attached to the concentration camps.<sup>34</sup>

31 Barkow, Gross, and Lenarz (eds.), *Novemberpogrom 1938*, pp. 69–77, quote p. 75.

32 Orth, *Das System*, p. 51; Ulrich Herbert, Karin Orth, and Christoph Dieckmann, 'Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager: Geschichte, Erinnerung, Forschung', in Ulrich Herbert, Karin Orth, and Christoph Dieckmann (eds.), *Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager: Entwicklung und Struktur* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998), pp. 17–40, here p. 28.

33 Susanne Willems, *Der entsiedelte Jude: Albert Speers Wohnungsmarktpolitik für den Berliner Hauptstadtbau* (Berlin: Hentrich, 2000), pp. 22–23.

34 At the end of April 1938, the SS set up the German Earth- and Stoneworks GmbH (DESt); in Jan. 1939, the German Research Institute for Diet and Nutrition (DVA); and in May 1939, the German Equipment Works (DAW): Walter Naasner, *SS-Wirtschaft und SS-Verwaltung: 'Das SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt und die unter seiner Dienstaufsicht stehenden wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen' und weitere Dokumente* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998), p. 214; Orth, *Das System*, pp. 48–49; Jan Erik Schulte, 'Das SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt und die Expansion des KZ-Systems', in Benz and Diestel (eds.), *Der Ort des Terrors*, vol. 1, pp. 141–155, here pp. 143–145.

### *'Specialists for Jewish Affairs' in the Police and SD*

The work of the initially small staff of the SD was limited during the first few years of National Socialist rule to the gathering of information about various groups of alleged or actual opponents of the National Socialist regime. Accordingly, the SD men who were in charge of the 'Jewish question' were at first concerned primarily with the surveillance of Jewish organizations and individuals. In the early stage of its activity, the SD had been repeatedly reconfigured. From 1936, SD Office II (Domestic) contained Central Department II/1, which tracked the activities of 'ideological adversaries' of National Socialism. Subordinate to it was Main Department II/11, which kept the churches and Jews under surveillance. Department II 111 investigated the Freemasons, Department II 112 the German Jews, and Department II 113 'denominational political trends', in particular political Catholicism. Department II 112, soon termed the Department for Jewish Affairs, was subdivided into the sections 'Assimilationists' (II 1121), 'Orthodox and Charitable Jews' (II 1122), and 'Zionists' (II 1123). While the leadership of Department II 112 changed several times between 1935 and 1938, Adolf Eichmann, who had worked in the SD Main Office since 1934, remained in charge of the Zionist affairs section throughout. This ensured the continuity of the SD's role in the persecution of the Jews.<sup>35</sup>

Beginning in autumn 1937, Herbert Hagen ran the SD's Department for Jewish Affairs. Alongside Eichmann, the department was staffed by Dieter Wisliceny and Theodor Dannecker. Gathered together in the same organization, therefore, were the four men who substantially shaped the SD's anti-Jewish policies in the occupied and allied countries over the next seven years, including the practices of deportation and destruction. They not only observed but also developed concepts for the speediest possible dissimulation and expulsion of the Jews. During the period preceding the start of the Second World War, this resulted, on the one hand, in promoting Zionism and lending support to efforts to emigrate and, on the other hand, in repressing the strong assimilationist forces present in German Jewry.

Under Hagen's management, Section II 112 laid claim to a 'certain intellectual leadership'. His employees submitted comments on the anti-Jewish measures that were devised by the ministerial bureaucracy. With growing assertiveness, they also intervened with other authorities, as in the case of the 'Guidelines for Dealing with Jews and Jewish Matters', issued in July 1938 by Count von Helldorf, Berlin's chief of police. In the document, von Helldorf enumerated the legal means by which Jews in Berlin could be discriminated against and intimidated (Doc. 68). His stated objective was 'to compel the Jews to emigrate, not simply to harass them haphazardly with no prospect of achieving this outcome'. The directive was preceded by a lengthy discussion initiated by the power-

35 On the organizational structure and development of the Jewish policies of the SD and Eichmann's role, see Klaus Drobisch, 'Die Judenreferate des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes und des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1933 bis 1939', *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung*, vol. 2 (1992), pp. 230–254; Michael Wildt (ed.), *Die Judenpolitik des SD 1935 bis 1938: Eine Dokumentation* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995); Hans Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, new edn, trans. Ute Stargardt (New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [German edn, 1993]), pp. 15–19; Yaacov Lozowick, *Hitler's Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil*, trans. Haim Watzman (London: Continuum, 2002 [unpublished Hebrew version, 2000]), pp. 21–42; David Cesarani, *Eichmann: His Life and Crimes* (London: William Heinemann, 2004), pp. 39–53.

ful Berlin Gauleiter Joseph Goebbels with the purpose of making Berlin 'free of Jews'. The SD officials successfully rejected Goebbels's expulsion scheme because it was aimed solely at the Reich capital and would deny the Jews further possibilities to earn a living, but without improving their prospects of emigration.

Increasingly, the SD's specialists for Jewish affairs also claimed executive powers, which until then had been the preserve of the Gestapo Central Office (Gestapo). They summoned the representatives of Jewish organizations to report on activities and instructed them to expedite the emigration of the Jews or to make Jewish forced labourers available (Doc. 295). At the insistence of the SD, all Jews who were foreign nationals were removed not only from top positions but also from ordinary employment in Jewish organizations.<sup>36</sup>

At times, confusion arose over the priority of Jewish emigration, as when the Reich Foreign Office advocated curtailing emigration to Palestine because it regarded the founding of a Jewish state, now within reach, as a danger. On another occasion in spring 1938, Himmler briefly took the position that 'Germany [should] not let go of the Jews, its most valuable collateral', in other words, should keep them as hostages.<sup>37</sup> Hitler too hinted at the possibility of hostage-taking when he announced in his speech to the Reichstag at the end of January 1939:

if the international Jewish financiers within and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, the outcome will not be the Bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but rather the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe. (Doc. 248)<sup>38</sup>

All in all, over the course of 1938 the SD's specialists for Jewish affairs succeeded in placing the push for emigration at the centre of the government's anti-Jewish policy, thereby avoiding the feared stagnation of the Jewish exodus.

The Anschluss of Austria offered a welcome opportunity to display initiative. Two days after the entry of German soldiers, Eichmann and Hagen travelled to Vienna. There, Eichmann ran the Central Office for Jewish Emigration (Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung), which the SD had called for as early as 1937.<sup>39</sup> (Its workings are described below, pp. 40–41.) It functioned so efficiently that after only a few months it became the model for the Reich Central Agency for Jewish Emigration (Reichszentrale für jüdische Auswanderung) in Berlin and later for the central offices in Prague and Amsterdam.<sup>40</sup> On 24 January 1939, Göring assigned the leadership of the Reich Central Agency to Heydrich, the chief of the Security Police (Doc. 243), and thus helped Heydrich's SS and police organization attain a dominant position in Jewish policy. Heydrich

36 Longerich, *Holocaust*, p. 103; Work Instructions for Subject Area II 112: RGVA, 500k-1-506, published in Wildt (ed.), *Die Judenpolitik*, pp. 156–160.

37 Cited in Longerich, *Holocaust*, p. 102.

38 Heiko Heinisch, *Hitlers Geiseln: Hegemonialpläne und der Holocaust* (Vienna: Passagen, 2005), pp. 77–89.

39 Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903–1989* (Bonn: Dietz, 2001), p. 212.

40 Gabriele Anderl, 'Die Zentralstellen für jüdische Auswanderung in Wien, Berlin und Prag: Ein Vergleich', *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte*, vol. 23 (1994), pp. 275–299; Gabriele Anderl and Dirk Rupnow, *Die Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung als Beraubungsinstitution* (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2004).

installed one of his closest associates, Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller, as manager of the Reich Central Agency.

In Berlin, Eichmann had not played a pre-eminent role on the SD staff. With his transfer to Vienna, a new stage in his career began. It was here that he asserted his claim that the SD or the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, as opposed to the Vienna Gestapo, should have the final say in all matters of Jewish policy.<sup>41</sup> While the SD had still assisted the Gestapo in the Old Reich and advised it regarding anti-Jewish policy, after the Anschluss of Austria Eichmann and his colleagues were presented with an opportunity to take control themselves. In Berlin they had been generators of ideas for Jewish policy, but in Vienna they became executors of such policy.<sup>42</sup>

Most Jews were less afraid of the SD, which, as an intelligence service, operated more in the background, than of the Gestapo. The Gestapo's officials searched apartments, conducted raids on Jewish institutions, issued instructions to Jewish representatives, and took individuals into 'protective custody'. The Gestapo was *the* central institution of state terror, and the Jews, regarded by the National Socialist authorities as the embodiment of the public enemy, had more to fear than all other Germans.<sup>43</sup>

The precursor of the Gestapo was the Political Police in the Weimar Republic, and Gestapo officials came predominantly from the regular police service, and only rarely from ideologically influenced Nazi special formations. After the National Socialist assumption of power, there had been no extensive purge of the police force, but at the leadership level there were numerous personnel reshuffles. At first the Political Police in Prussia were still under the authority of the Regierungspräsidenten (district governors). From spring 1934 it answered exclusively and directly to the Prussian Minister President, Göring. The number of personnel grew quickly: in 1934, around 2,000 police belonged to the Gestapo, in 1938, around 7,000, and in 1944, 31,000.<sup>44</sup> Though it had been the

41 In summer 1939, Eichmann demanded that the head of the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna (IKG), Josef Löwenherz, ensure that all applications by Jewish organizations were submitted first to the Central Office for Jewish Emigration; the Gestapo took Löwenherz to task on that account. After a tug of war lasting several days, the power struggle ended in compromise: applications dealing with emigration were to be addressed to the Central Office; the Gestapo had decision-making power regarding the authorization of prayer events and organizational matters: See Josef Israel Löwenherz, *Vollständiger Bericht von Dr. Löwenherz über die Tätigkeit Eichmanns und Brunners in Wien-Prag-Berlin*, ed. Tuvia Friedman (Haifa: Institute of Documentation in Israel, 1995), p. 15.

42 Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, pp. 29–32; Löwenherz, *Vollständiger Bericht*, pp. 10 and 15; Doron Rabinovici, *Eichmann's Jews: The Jewish Administration of Holocaust Vienna, 1938–1945*, trans. Nick Somers (Cambridge: Polity, 2011 [German edn, 2000]), pp. 42, 51; undated report (receipt stamp of the Chief of the Security Police: 7 Nov. 1938), 'Betr.: Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung in Wien', BAArch, R 58/486, fols. 29–31; report by Hagen dated 16 May 1939, 'Betr.: jüdische Auswanderung aus der Ostmark', *ibid.*, fols. 52–56.

43 Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (eds.), *Die Gestapo: Mythos und Realität* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2003); Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Drobisch, 'Die Judenreferate'; Eric A. Johnson, *Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans* (New York: Basic, 2000); Carsten Dams and Michael Stolle, *The Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich*, trans. Charlotte Ryland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 [German edn, 2008]).

44 Holger Berschel, *Bürokratie und Terror. Das Judenreferat der Gestapo Düsseldorf 1935–1945* (Essen: Klartext, 2001), p. 42; Dams and Stolle, *The Gestapo*, pp. 33–34.

traditional task of the Political Police to keep track of enemies of the state, the Gestapo enlarged its range of duties step by step. In the understanding of Werner Best, who, as Heydrich's deputy, repeatedly wrote about the relationship between police practice and the National Socialist programme, the Gestapo was supposed to monitor the 'political health of the German racial corpus' and to use all possible means to combat any 'symptoms of disease' in it. It was from this mandate that the Gestapo derived its concept of acting in a preventive way that was, to the greatest possible extent, free of legal constraints and supervisory authorities. This range of action included the imposition of 'protective custody', the infliction of torture, and, when considered necessary, murder.<sup>45</sup>

In June 1936, when Heinrich Himmler was named chief of the German Police, he transferred the leadership of the Main Office of the Security Police to Reinhard Heydrich, who was already running the Gestapo, and thus made him the chief executive of the Criminal Police as well. In addition to the Criminal Police, the Gestapo could draw on the support of other police authorities to which it was authorized to issue directives. When there were large arrest operations, the gendarmerie, urban police, or municipal police frequently acted on behalf of the Gestapo. Both the Polish Jews deported in October 1938 and those persons arrested during the November pogroms were usually marched off by officials of the Order Police, who did not always perform their task with great zeal.

In addition to the ordinary police prisons, the Gestapo had its own 'in-house prisons' in larger cities. It could also put prisoners into the work education camps (*Arbeitserziehungslager*), which were under its control. In the concentration camps, which were administered separately within the SS organization, the Gestapo men established the rule of terror by means of the Political Departments. Despite its strong position in the National Socialist power structure, the Gestapo was capable of uninterrupted surveillance only to a limited extent. This was due, first, to the scope of its duties, which ranged from the surveillance of communists and Catholic activists to the persecution of homosexuals and the disciplining of millions of forced labourers during the war. Second, the Gestapo faced the challenge of procuring information. It depended on paid undercover informants and volunteer or casual informers. More than half of all the investigation proceedings initiated by the Gestapo were traceable to the latter, and they often soon proved unfounded. Anyone who had once attracted the attention of the Gestapo, even if the original suspicion proved incorrect, had to expect that his or her private life would be scrutinized in the greatest detail and that relatives, friends, and colleagues would be interrogated. The outcome was often 'protective custody' for an indefinite period until the matter was settled.<sup>46</sup>

In autumn 1939, the Jewish policies of the SD and the Gestapo were finally combined in the newly established Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) under the leadership of Reinhard Heydrich, who until then had been the chief of the Security Police.

<sup>45</sup> Herbert, *Best*, pp. 163–180.

<sup>46</sup> Hans Buchheim, 'The SS – Instrument of Domination', in Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, and Helmut Krausnick, *Anatomy of the SS State*, trans. Richard Barry, Marian Jackson, and Dorothy Long (London: Collins, 1968 [German edn, 1965]), pp. 127–301, here pp. 172–174 and 241–247; Wachsmann, *KL*.

## *Jews and Antisemitism in Austria*

At the beginning of 1938, between 185,000 and 200,000 Jews lived in Austria, approximately 165,000 of them in Vienna. Their situation differed from that of the German Jews in two major respects: their share of the population was around four times as large as in the Old Reich (2.83 per cent and 0.76 per cent, respectively),<sup>47</sup> and they were considerably poorer on average. The number of Jews had increased rapidly with industrialization and the growth of the city of Vienna. In 1870, 40,000 Jews lived there, in 1890, around 120,000 and in 1920, approximately 200,000, yet their share of the population remained relatively constant at just under 9 per cent.<sup>48</sup>

During the 1848 Revolution, the Jewish intelligentsia had taken the side of the liberal middle class and fought for universal civil rights.<sup>49</sup> Well into the 1850s, 'commerce provided virtually the only career open to Viennese Jews unwilling to convert to Christianity',<sup>50</sup> but this occupational pattern gradually changed as legal and social barriers fell. In the period between emancipation in 1867 and the year 1910, some tens of thousands of Jews moved to Vienna from the eastern borderlands of the Habsburg Monarchy, specifically from Galicia and Bukovina. The majority of the immigrants were very poor and Orthodox in their approach to Judaism. For the most part, even after moving to Vienna they retained their cultural identity and the style of dress and life characteristic of the shtetl.<sup>51</sup>

Some of them, however, made remarkable progress in their working lives in the Vienna of the so-called *Gründerzeit*, the period of industrial and urban expansion in the second half of the nineteenth century: from small trader to family-owned manufacturing firm to industrialist, from 'rag-seller Jew' to textile manufacturer. Other new arrivals from all parts of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy now surged into the liberal professions, which had long been off limits to Jews. They became doctors and lawyers, stockbrokers, journalists. Like the Jews in Berlin, Warsaw, or Budapest, the Viennese Jews, in their pronounced desire for education, differed from the Christian majority population. In 1912, one in three Viennese grammar school (*Gymnasium*) pupils was a Jew, three times more than would have been commensurate with the Jewish share of the population. Around 1900, whereas only 5.3 per cent of the Christians in a given age group attended university (excluding the discipline of theology), the corresponding figure among the Jews was 24.5 per cent. In Vienna and at the German University in Prague, they constituted almost one third of the students.<sup>52</sup>

47 The *Jüdisches Lexikon*, published from 1927, gives much higher figures. It estimates the number of Jews at 225,000 in 1930: *Jüdisches Lexikon: Ein enzyklopädisches Handbuch des jüdischen Wissens in vier Bänden*, vol. IV/2 (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1930), p. 633.

48 Steven Beller, *Vienna and the Jews, 1867–1938: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 44; Klaus Hödl, *Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt: Galizische Juden auf dem Weg nach Wien* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1994), p. 279.

49 Robert S. Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26–30; Sigmund Mayer, *Die Wiener Juden: Kommerz, Kultur, Politik 1700–1900* (Vienna: R. Löwit, 1917), pp. 207–233 and 373–374.

50 Marsha L. Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867–1914: Assimilation and Identity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), p. 47.

51 Bruce F. Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism* (Chapel Hill, NC/London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 65.

52 Brigitte Hamann, *Hitlers Wien: Lehrjahre eines Diktators* (Munich: Piper, 1996), pp. 469–470.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, Vienna was among the European cultural centres that were shaped by the liberal middle class and to a substantial degree also by its Jewish intelligentsia. The Wednesday Psychological Society that gathered around Sigmund Freud, and had many Jews among its members, attained international renown, as did the Vienna Circle, which brought together philosophers and social scientists such as Otto Neurath, Rudolf Goldscheid, Hans Hahn, and Philipp Frank. Numerous Jewish intellectuals found their political home in one of the socialist circles and among the theoreticians of Austro-Marxism, such as Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Bauer. Or they became involved in the social reform movements that championed women's rights, pacifism or improved public education. Hans Kelsen developed his 'pure theory of law' in Vienna; Arnold Schönberg, the twelve-tone technique of composition. In the interwar period, Stefan Zweig regularly invited fellow writers such as Robert Musil, Joseph Roth, and Franz Werfel to his apartment in Vienna for discussions. Jews were decisive in developing private cultural patronage, though this involvement brought some of them to the brink of ruin, including Fritz Warndörfer, the son of a textile manufacturer and the backer of the Wiener Werkstätte design collective. Because of its many Jewish patrons, the Vienna Secession art movement, with which Gustav Klimt, Joseph Maria Olbrich, Ernst Stöhr, and others were associated, was characterized as a *goût juif*, a 'Jewish taste'.<sup>53</sup>

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Austrian antisemitism, based on earlier forms influenced by religious considerations, became a mass movement. Journalists interpreted the stock exchange crash of 1873 and the subsequent crisis as 'requit' for the emancipation of the Jews and polemicized against the alleged robbing of the Christians by Jewish speculators.<sup>54</sup> In 1878 the first Viennese student fraternity excluded its Jewish members because, even if baptized, they were not to be regarded as Germans. Theodor Herzl left the duelling fraternity Albia after the students passed a resolution in 1880 stating that henceforth no Jews should be accepted as members. 'Those who were members already', Herzl reports in an autobiographical sketch, 'were kindly permitted to remain part of the fraternity. I said farewell to these noble youths.'<sup>55</sup> Antisemitism spread rapidly throughout the clubs and associations. In April 1908, for example, the Lower Austrian Gymnastics Association celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its 'de-Jewification' (*Entjudung*) with a 'festive gymnastics display'. In reaction to the discrimination, Jews established associations of their own. For example, in 1883 Jewish university students founded the duelling fraternity Kadimah, whose members were mostly Zionists, in order to defend Jewish honour, if necessary, in duels.

The emergence of the antisemitic Christian Social Association (Christlich-Sozialer Verein) at the end of the 1880s offered a political home to many Austrian antisemites. The leading light of this association, which soon became a political party, was Karl Lueger (1844–1910), later mayor of Vienna. The son of a school caretaker and disabled war veteran, Lueger succeeded in obtaining a doctorate in law. Before he switched to politics,

53 Beller, *Vienna and the Jews*, pp. 14–32.

54 Rudolf Spitzer, *Des Bürgermeisters Lueger Lumpen und Steuerträger* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1988), p. 89; Michael Wladika, *Hitlers Vätergeneration: Die Ursprünge des Nationalsozialismus in der k. u. k. Monarchie* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005), pp. 184–190.

55 Erika Weinzierl, *Zu wenig Gerechte: Österreicher und Judenverfolgung 1938–1945* (Graz: Styria, 1997), p. 22; citation from 'Theodor Herzls Selbstbiographie', in Exekutive der Zionistischen Organisation, *Theodor Herzl: Ein Gedenkbuch zum 25. Todestage* (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1929), pp. 42–46.

he practised law as an energetic advocate for 'ordinary people'. He contended successfully for the position of mayor of Vienna as a tribune of the people, someone who was familiar with the social adversity that existed in the rapidly growing metropolis. He championed the majority of the city's inhabitants who lived in poverty and was known for making witty remarks, being plain-spoken, endorsing a patriarchal social Catholicism, and delivering unreservedly anti-Jewish speeches. 'The influence on the masses', he asserted in 1899:

in our country, is in the hands of the Jews, the greatest part of the press is in their hands, by far the greatest part of all capital, especially high finance, is in Jewish hands, and the Jews practise a kind of terrorism here that is the worst imaginable. For us in Austria, therefore, it is a matter of liberating Christian people from the ascendancy of Jewry.<sup>56</sup>

Lueger's adversary Georg Ritter von Schönerer (1842–1921) was of a similar political ilk. He too had begun his political career as a liberal in 1875 but shifted his allegiance a few years later to the German nationalist movement. He too adopted the role of populist antisemite. He advocated a racially-based hatred of Jews and found approval particularly among Viennese students. As an anti-Catholic and Bismarck admirer who favoured the idea of Greater Germany, however, he was unable to establish an enduring political movement in the Austria of that time. Lueger, in contrast, emerged as a staunch Austrian, whose antisemitism was built not on racial categories but rather on Christian and social anger against the 'Christ killers' and 'money Jews'. Lueger became a successful Austrian politician and modernizer, and he defined Vienna's politics as mayor from 1897 until his death in 1921. After an election loss in 1907, Schönerer withdrew to his country estate and died in 1921. With their differing approaches, both were among the role models of the young Adolf Hitler, then a resident of Vienna.<sup>57</sup>

Alongside the Christian Social Party, founded in 1891, the Social Democrats were the second great political power in Austria in the late nineteenth century. They too opposed liberalism and, to that end, occasionally allied themselves with the Christian Social Party. Though antisemitic agitation in Austria was the work primarily of the political right, anti-Jewish tones could be heard now and then in the Social Democrats' critique of capitalism, too, such as when Social Democrat publications referred to the 'friendly relations' between 'rabid antisemites' and 'bank Jews' and made use of the cliché of the 'stock exchange Jew'. At times the impoverished *Ostjuden* ('Eastern Jews') also came to the attention of the Social Democrats' *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, which characterized them as a 'quaint apparition in a long, dirty, black silk coat with tails of animals on a velvet cap'.<sup>58</sup> Joseph Roth summed it

56 Cited in Hamann, *Hitlers Wien*, p. 411.

57 Gerhard Botz, *Nationalsozialismus in Wien: Machtübernahme, Herrschaftssicherung, Radikalisierung 1938/39* (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2008), p. 17; Spitzer, *Des Bürgermeisters Lueger Lumpen*, p. 88; Richard S. Geehr, *Karl Lueger, Mayor of Fin de Siècle Vienna* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990).

58 Peter Pulzer, 'Spezifische Momente und Spielarten des österreichischen und des Wiener Antisemitismus', in Gerhard Botz, Ivar Oxaal, and Michael Pollak (eds.), *Eine zerstörte Kultur: Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert* (Buchloe: Obermayer, 1990), pp. 121–140, here pp. 131–133; Robert S. Wistrich, 'Sozialdemokratie, Antisemitismus und die Wiener Juden', in Botz, Oxaal, and Pollak (eds.), *Eine zerstörte Kultur*, pp. 169–180; Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 140–149.

up: 'There is no harder lot than that of Ostjuden newly arrived in Vienna. For members of the Christian Social Party, they are Jews. For German nationalists, they are Semites. For Social Democrats, they are non-productive elements.'<sup>59</sup> From the perspective of the Social Democrats, the political Zionists and the Orthodox Jews who had emigrated from Galicia were relics of bygone times.

The Austrian Jews made a stand against the rampant antisemitism. The strongest force of Jewish self-defence was the so-called integrationists, who banded together in 1886 to form the Austrian-Israelite Union (OIU). Like the Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith (CV) in Germany, they espoused an awareness of Jewish identity and the right of Jews to defend themselves against antisemitic attacks. At the same time, they tried to bind the Jewish population to a 'genuine *Austrian patriotism*'.<sup>60</sup> In many associations, notably in the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna (IKG), the Austrian-Israelite Union competed with the Zionists and other Jewish nationalists for the role of opinion leader. While the Zionists made the case for founding a Jewish state in Palestine, the diaspora nationalists regarded the demand for national Jewish autonomy within Austria as the appropriate response to antisemitism.

With the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 that established the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, Hungarians gained a large measure of autonomy in the resulting multinational state. Contrary to expectations, this development did not alleviate ethnic conflicts. The Czechs, Poles, Romanians, Croats, and Germans now really began the struggle for greater independence, initially with the support of the Jews living in the respective regions. Because the individual nationalist movements intensified mutual hostility and simultaneously became ever more antisemitic, the increasingly isolated Jews finally championed a united, strong Austria more decisively than any of the other minorities. As the historian Werner Cahnman reasoned, the Jews were 'the only Austrians in Austria'.<sup>61</sup>

After the First World War, the Republic of Austria rose from the ruins of the Habsburg Empire. The new republic comprised only one eighth of the territory once ruled by the Dual Monarchy. The multinational state of Austria-Hungary had numbered 53 million inhabitants; the First Austrian Republic had barely 7 million. The majority of the citizens were German Austrians, and they were convinced that their greatly scaled-down country was not economically viable and that the Treaty of Saint-Germain from 1919 was intolerable. As in Germany, pronounced revisionist tendencies developed as a consequence of defeat in the First World War. In addition, economic hardship increased the dissatisfaction: hunger in the large cities, a dearth of heating fuel, a housing shortage, overcrowded hospitals, an inoperative infrastructure, hundreds of thousands of unemployed people, and tens of thousands of refugees.<sup>62</sup> In addition, the Spanish flu had also swept through Austria in the winter of 1918–1919 and claimed thousands of victims.

<sup>59</sup> Josef Roth, *Juden auf Wanderschaft* (Berlin: Die Schmiede, 1927), cited in Wistrich, 'Sozialdemokratie', p. 169.

<sup>60</sup> The words of rabbi Dr Sigmund Zins at the founding meeting of the Union: cited in Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna*, p. 157.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>62</sup> Spitzer, *Des Bürgermeisters Lueger Lumpen*, p. 84. In spring 1919, there were still around 20,000 to 25,000 refugees in Vienna, most of whom had fled there during the war: Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 69 and 79.

In the 1919 elections, the Social Democrats gained a majority. In Vienna, Jakob Reumann became the first Social Democratic mayor to control the fate of the city. Despite the substantial successes that 'Red Vienna' soon achieved in the socio-political sphere, the social tensions, and with them a form of antisemitism directed specifically against the *Ostjuden*, continued to have an effect. In September 1921, the *Wiener Morgenzeitung* characterized the atmosphere:

Since the collapse, the good people of Austria have condensed everything into the little word 'Ostjude'. It is a wondrous expression, which alleviates every pain and takes away every shame. [...] Complaints over the rising cost of bread, and the falling morals of women, over bad railway transportation, the lack of coal, the unruliness of school children and the watering down of milk find their solution: out with the Ostjuden!<sup>63</sup>

The Christian Social Party, whose prominent member Anton Jerzabek was also the head of the League of Anti-Semites (*Antisemitenbund*) used greatly exaggerated numerical data to justify its demand for deportation of the *Ostjuden*. Occasionally such proposals also found a sympathetic ear among the Social Democrats. The housing space thus freed up was expected to benefit homeless Viennese families.<sup>64</sup>

However vehement, Austrian antisemitism, as the historian Peter Pulzer emphasizes, was primarily demagogic and verbally radical. Yet it was not backed up by a politically practicable concept. This situation changed with the rise of the Austrian National Socialists. They incorporated into their propaganda of national revolution the old prejudices against Jews, which had always been kept alive in Austria, and in this way they poisoned the political climate: 'Whatever was unwelcome merely had to be labelled as Jewish. Liberalism thus became "Jewish liberalism", the newspapers the "Jewish press" and the First Republic the "Jewish Republic".'<sup>65</sup>

In 1933 the Austrian National Socialists also saw themselves on the brink of seizing power. Their offensive struck the Jews at a moment of social and political weakness. During the period from 1923 to 1934, the Jewish population of Vienna had shrunk by just under one seventh, because the number of births had sharply declined, and many members had emigrated or withdrawn from the religious community.<sup>66</sup>

In 1932 the Austrian-Israelite Union, eager for integration, had lost its supremacy within the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna to the Zionists, who now assumed important positions in the Jewish institutions. At the university, a stronghold of antisemitism, Zionist student organizations enjoyed an increasing influx of new members and fought

63 *Wiener Morgenzeitung*, 21 Sept. 1921, p. 1, cited in Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, p. 80.

64 On the demand for the expulsion of the refugees, see *ibid.*, pp. 83–86.

65 Pulzer, 'Spezifische Momente', pp. 133 and 136.

66 Albert Lichtblau, 'Integration, Vernichtungsversuch und Neubeginn: Österreichisch-jüdische Geschichte 1848 bis zur Gegenwart', in Eveline Brugger et al. (eds.), *Geschichte der Juden in Österreich* (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 2006), pp. 447–565, here pp. 501–504; Albert Lichtblau (ed.), *Als hätten wir dazugehört: Österreichisch-jüdische Lebensgeschichten aus der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1999), p. 58.

back with confrontational methods against Jew-baiting.<sup>67</sup> The decline of the Union, according to the historian Doron Rabinovici, expressed 'the failure of the emancipatory utopia in an antisemitic society'.<sup>68</sup> This held all the more true as the Austrian state assumed increasingly obvious totalitarian and antisemitic features after the National Socialist assumption of power in Germany.

In 1933 Federal Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß dissolved the parliament and continued to govern by emergency decree. He declared Austria a 'corporate state' (*Ständestaat*) and banned all political parties, with the exception of the Fatherland Front, in which the Christian Social Party members had joined together with various paramilitary groups. The Austrian Jews were sympathetic towards the Dollfuß regime, especially as it appeared to offer them protection against German expansionist efforts and Austrian ambitions for union with Germany. Dollfuß had banned the Austrian counterpart to the NSDAP along with all the other political parties and he rejected union with Germany. After his assassination in 1934, appreciative obituaries appeared in Jewish newspapers.<sup>69</sup>

Like Dollfuß, his successor Kurt Schuschnigg emphasized his rejection of antisemitism and reaffirmed that Jews in Austria were due the same rights as all other citizens. In 1934 he banned the antisemitic newspaper *Der Stürmer*. That same year, several representatives of the Austrian Jews were appointed to important federal and regional offices.<sup>70</sup> In 1937 Schuschnigg prevented the Salzburg regional government from prohibiting kosher slaughter. Nonetheless, antisemitism distinctly intensified in Austria in the mid 1930s. The Antisemitic League developed an active propaganda campaign, and with increasing frequency Jews had to expect that they would be turned away as guests in Austrian resorts and rejected as tenants by antisemitic landlords. From time to time, the authorities intervened and prohibited the discrimination. But even in the staffing of public-sector entities, there were cases where applicants had to prove their 'Aryan origin' or present a baptismal certificate.<sup>71</sup>

Apart from a few sizeable enterprises, Jewish businessmen often owned small trading houses, shops, or small firms or worked as independent tailors, cobblers, or goldsmiths.<sup>72</sup> Among university graduates in Vienna, they represented more than 60 per cent of lawyers and around 50 per cent of doctors.<sup>73</sup> After domestic rioting in February 1932, however, many doctors who were Social Democrats, the vast majority of them Jews, were dismissed from Viennese hospitals. In other occupational categories too, dismissals increased markedly. By 1937, among the 22,600 employees of the City of Vienna, only

67 Werner Cahnman, 'Materialien zur politischen Lage der Juden in Österreich und in Ungarn', in Werner Cahnman, *Deutsche Juden: Ihre Geschichte und Soziologie* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2005), pp. 32–49, esp. pp. 33–34.

68 Rabinovici, *Instanzen der Ohnmacht*, p. 42.

69 Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, p. 263.

70 Dr Desider Friedmann to the State Council, Dr S. Frankfurter to the Federal Cultural Council and Dr Jakob Ehrlich to the Vienna Municipal Council: Hugo Gold, *Geschichte der Juden in Wien: Ein Gedenkbuch* (Tel Aviv: Olamenu, 1966), p. 64.

71 Ibid., pp. 69–70.

72 According to Helmut Genschel, *Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1966), p. 161, the proportion of Jews among business owners of firms in Vienna was twice their share of the population.

73 Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, p. 214.

154 were Jews.<sup>74</sup> Jewish businessmen were affected by calls for boycotts issued by the Reich League of Catholic Youth in Vienna, as well as appeals of a similar kind by the *Arischer Geschäfteweiser* (Guide to Aryan Businesses) from 1934/1935.<sup>75</sup>

As a consequence of the heightened occupational discrimination, 60,000 persons were already receiving benefits from the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna in 1936. In addition, the absorption of Jewish refugees from Germany placed new demands on the welfare institutions of the Religious Community. Werner Cahnman summed it up in 1938:

Just how bad the economic situation of the Jewish population is in the neighbourhoods most densely settled by Jews, the inner city, Leopoldstadt, Brigittenau and Alsergrund, can be seen solely from the fact that the buildings in these districts of Vienna have around 20 per cent more occupants than the overall average. Renting out rooms and beds is one of the strongest sources of income for the Jews there. [...] The bitterest poverty of many thus exists alongside the greatest wealth of a few, while the broad class of the moderately affluent is destroyed.<sup>76</sup>

### *The Anschluss of Austria*

The idea of union between Germany and German-Austria can be traced back to the revolutionaries of 1848, who embraced linguistic nationalism. Their dreams of a Greater Germany came to nought in 1849 because of the perseverance of the dynasties and ultimately because of Bismarck's 'Lesser German' solution, which excluded Austria. The prospect of a German Empire that would stretch from Bolzano to Flensburg and from Klagenfurt to Liège thus receded into the distance. For reasons of power politics, the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain, which had been imposed on Austria after the end of the First World War, expressly prohibited union with Germany. The ban conferred new popularity on the Greater German idea of unification.

In the interwar period, German and Austrian interests in unification differed sharply. Since 1918, Austria had been cut off from the Czech industrial regions, the agrarian hinterlands, and the seaport of Trieste. The country was hard hit by the global economic crisis in 1929, and in 1938 it was still suffering from the consequences of decline. The popularity of the idea of Anschluss fluctuated, depending on the economic situation and foreign political power constellations. Only among the monarchists and the communists did it fail to meet with a positive response. In Germany, power-political ambitions made the union attractive. Even in Imperial Germany, many German politicians and economic strategists already regarded Vienna as the 'gate to the south-east'. After the loss of the colonies in the First World War and the global economic crisis of 1929–1933, an economic 'opening' to south-eastern Europe seemed increasingly urgent to them. In 1938 Germany

74 Ibid., p. 270; Rabinovici, *Instanzen der Ohnmacht*, p. 52.

75 Gold, *Geschichte der Juden in Wien*, p. 72; Silvia Maderegger, *Juden im österreichischen Ständestaat 1934–1938* (Vienna: Geyer, 1973).

76 Cahnman, *Deutsche Juden*, p. 108. In 1938 Cahnman wrote a book based on his research. The following year he emigrated to Britain and in 1940 to the USA.

had a labour shortage, while in Austria unemployment was high. Germany attempted to gain ascendancy in the Danube region, and the erstwhile capital of the Habsburg Monarchy was able to regain some of its lost lustre in this way.

In 1933, both the Austrian Social Democrats and the members of the Christian Social Party abandoned the Anschluss idea, because it now would have meant the submission of the country to National Socialist hegemony. Federal Chancellor Dollfuß hoped to win Italy as a guarantor power for Austrian independence. In return, Mussolini's representative in Austria demanded that the Austrian state be brought into line with the fascist model and that social democracy be prohibited. By giving in to this demand, Dollfuß suppressed one of the most significant potential allies on the domestic scene in the struggle against German ambitions for Anschluss and simultaneously made himself dependent on Italy.<sup>77</sup> On 25 July 1934 the Austrian National Socialists staged a coup, murdered Dollfuß, and then foundered.

Under the new Federal Chancellor, Schuschnigg, relations between the two states remained tense. The balance between German–Austrian union and preservation of Austrian independence was a fragile one. At the meeting with Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg retreat on 12 February 1938, Hitler successfully pressed for the Austrian NSDAP to be allowed to act freely within the framework of the Fatherland Front and for the appointment of the Viennese lawyer Arthur Seyss-Inquart as minister of the interior and minister of security.<sup>78</sup>

In view of the growing German pressure, Schuschnigg on 9 March 1938 announced a referendum on the independence of Austria, which was supposed to take place as early as 13 March. When it became evident that, despite all the internal political tensions, the majority of Austrians would heed Schuschnigg's rallying cry 'for a free, German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria', the Reich government threatened to invade. Schuschnigg felt compelled to cancel the popular referendum, and he resigned on 10 March 1938. A few hours later, Seyss-Inquart was named the new federal chancellor. In his final radio address, Schuschnigg declared that he was yielding to force and had ordered the Austrian army not to resist a German invasion. When German troops invaded on the night of 11 March 1938, the majority of the Austrian population greeted them with cheers.

Everywhere in the country, homes and businesses of Jews were looted and searched, with wealthy Jews particularly targeted. Using lists prepared in advance, local National Socialists, sometimes acting jointly with the police, hauled furniture and valuables out of the homes of Jews. At the same time, the 'March Operation', ordered by the highest state and Party offices, began: SS and SA men, as well as policemen, were given the task of 'securing' the assets of the Austrian Jews and seized jewellery, paintings, securities, and carpets in hundreds of homes. The theft of Jewish property turned into a popular sport.

The Viennese Jews especially feared public humiliation in the form of 'scrub gangs' (*Reibparteien*), in which they were forced to scrub the pavements with hand brushes or toothbrushes. Afterwards, to the amusement of the onlookers, the instigators, who were generally SA men or Party members, poured the dirty water over the heads of those they

77 Norbert Schausberger, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Annexion Österreichs', in Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, 'Anschluß' 1938: *Eine Dokumentation* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1988), pp. 1–20, here p. 5; Weinberg, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 90 and 94–95.

78 Schausberger, 'Zur Vorgeschichte', p. 13.

had humiliated. In Vienna, the pogroms associated with the Anschluss continued over the course of several weeks (Doc. 18). In Burgenland, entire Jewish communities were expelled (Doc. 28). In Graz, four Jews lost their lives during the antisemitic excesses. Four Jews had taken their own lives in January 1938 and five the following month. In March the numbers rose to seventy-nine suicides and there were sixty-two in April.<sup>79</sup> Only after six weeks, on 29 April, did Josef Bürckel, the Reich Commissioner for the Reunification of Austria with the German Reich, intervene. He threatened the leaders of the SA units involved in the attacks on Jews with demotion and exclusion from the SA. After that, the violence subsided.

Jewish professors were driven out of the universities and several of them arrested, among them the 82-year-old scholar of language and literature Salomon Frankfurter. Jewish judges lost their positions, and at the end of March 1938 a 'temporary' occupational ban was imposed on Jewish lawyers. Newspapers and theatres were closed or placed under the control of state commissioners, and Jewish editors, actors, and musicians were dismissed. National Socialist organizations took possession of the premises in which Jewish welfare agencies had worked or Jewish associations had met.<sup>80</sup>

Until then, the Jews had viewed themselves as loyal citizens, not always liked but tolerated to a certain extent and confident that their lives were not in danger. Now, however, for them Austria changed within the space of a few days into a veritable seething cauldron. They saw themselves confronted with unfettered Austrian antisemitism and Austrian National Socialists who had prepared – illegally – over the course of many years for the Anschluss and the day of reckoning. Simultaneously, Germans from the Reich appeared on the scene, people whose ambition it was to show the Viennese how to organize the persecution of the Jews by the state in an efficient manner. The discriminatory measures and laws already in force in the Old Reich were not simply adopted in Austria but rather modified in whichever way appeared suitable at the time. The most important difference, however, was the rapidity of the developments. As Bernhard Kahn, the European representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), telegraphed to New York in March 1938, 'what was achieved in Germany in five years in terms of anti-Jewish repressive measures was forced [on the Austrian Jews] within five days'.<sup>81</sup>

In his speech at Heldenplatz (Heroes' Square) in Vienna on 15 March, Hitler announced a referendum that was intended to seal the Anschluss. On 16 March, all associations were prohibited from engaging in any organizational activity prior to the popular referendum. Two days later, Bürckel appointed a *Stillhaltekommissar* ('stillstand commissioner'), who set in motion the *Gleichschaltung* of Aryan associations, clubs, and societies, and the prohibition and freezing of the assets of Jewish ones.<sup>82</sup>

79 Herbert Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung und Selbstbehauptung: Die Juden in Österreich 1938–1945* (Vienna: Herold, 1978), pp. 40–41; Jonny Moser, 'Österreichs Juden unter der NS-Herrschaft', in Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, and Wolfgang Neugebauer (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 1938–1945* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1988), pp. 185–198, here p. 189; Milka Zalmon, 'Forced Emigration of the Jews of Burgenland: A Test Case', *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 31 (2003), pp. 287–323.

80 Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung*, pp. 23–41; Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, pp. 22–23.

81 Telegram from Kahn to Baerwald, 17 March 1938, JDC Archives, AR 1933/44, 439.

82 Angelika Shoshana Duizend Jensen, *Jüdische Gemeinden, Vereine, Stiftungen und Fonds: 'Arisierung' und Restitution*, ed. Österreichische Historikerkommission (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2004), p. 76.

The referendum took place on 10 April, the ostentatiously heralded 'Day of the Greater German Reich'. In the evening, the church bells rang for an hour in every part of the new Reich. In the referendum, according to official data, 99.6 per cent of the eligible voters voted for the 'reunification of Austria with the German Reich'. Voter participation was at a level of 99.7 per cent.<sup>83</sup> On behalf of the Catholic Church, Vienna's Cardinal Theodor Innitzer had acclaimed the bloodless Anschluss immediately after the entry of the German troops and appealed to the faithful for obedience to the authorities. Soon afterwards, the Catholic bishops published a solemn declaration in which they 'joyously' recognized the merits of National Socialism and called for a 'Yes' vote in the popular referendum.

This declaration, so useful to the new holders of power, was based on drafts that Reich Commissioner Bürckel had presented to the church leaders. The statement of the bishops disappointed the Nazis' opponents, in particular the Viennese Jews. The latter had expected that Cardinal Innitzer would protect them, because in previous years he had repeatedly criticized the antisemitic attacks made by Schönerer's supporters. The Vatican, too, was displeased by the kowtowing of the local church dignitaries. When he visited Rome in early April 1938, Innitzer had to justify himself to Pope Pius XI and afterwards make it clear publicly that the statement did not condone what was deemed incompatible with God's laws, freedom and the rights of the Catholic Church.

Like the Catholic bishops, the Protestant High Consistory also welcomed the Anschluss in a pastoral letter. On behalf of the 330,000 Protestant Austrians, the churchmen celebrated the 'Führer' as the 'deliverer of all the Germans here, without distinction of faith, from five years of gravest hardship'. Karl Renner, a Social Democrat and the first chancellor of the Austrian Republic, also spoke out and explained publicly why he was planning to vote 'Yes' in the referendum: 'As a Social Democrat and thus a champion of the nations' right to self-determination, as the first chancellor of the Republic of German-Austria and as the past leader of its peace delegation in Saint-Germain, I will vote Yes.'<sup>84</sup>

In Austria, which was named Ostmark following the Anschluss, all the top positions were filled with Reich German and Austrian NSDAP members or persons regarded as politically reliable. At the middle and lower levels of the civil service, major personnel changes were avoided. The Saar-Palatinate Gauleiter Josef Bürckel had been pressing for the incorporation of the Saarland into the German Reich since 1935. When he was appointed Reich Commissioner for the Reunification of Austria with the German Reich in 1938, his closest colleagues followed him from Saarbrücken. Bürckel brusquely asserted his integration policy and made it clear that the former metropolis of the Habsburg Empire was being downgraded to the status of provincial capital.<sup>85</sup> When Hermann

83 Hanns Haas, 'Der Anschluss', in Tálos, Hanisch, and Neugebauer (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich*, pp. 1–24, here p. 18.

84 Botz, *Nationalsozialismus in Wien*, pp. 157–170 and 184–190; the statement of the Catholic bishops is reproduced on pp. 164–166; an excerpt from the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, in which Renner publicly announced and explained his vote, can be found on pp. 184–185. See also Walter Sauer, 'Österreichs Kirchen 1938–1945', in Tálos, Hanisch, and Neugebauer (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich*, pp. 517–536, here pp. 520–522; Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung*, pp. 24–25.

85 Ernst Hanisch, *Gau der guten Nerven: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in Salzburg 1938–1945* (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1997), p. 33; Maren Seliger, 'NS-Herrschaft in Wien und Niederösterreich', in Tálos, Hanisch, and Neugebauer (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich*, pp. 397–416, here p. 408.

Neubacher, until then general manager of the local residential construction company GESIBA, became mayor of Vienna, he first promised widespread improvements with respect to urban planning. In fact, provision of residential space in Vienna during the following years consisted primarily of expelling the Jews from their homes. Neubacher further attempted to offset Vienna's waning significance after the Anschluss by invoking the city's function as the 'gateway to the south-east'. Eventually, Hitler named him special plenipotentiary for south-eastern Europe.

By the end of 1938, the most important laws in the Reich also applied in Austria.<sup>86</sup> In some instances, however, harmonization was deliberately avoided: for example, the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna, unlike the Jewish communities in the Reich, did not lose the legal status of a corporation under public law, because otherwise the aid money from foreign Jewish organizations would have failed to materialize (Doc. 264). Without these funds, most Austrian Jews would have had no chance to leave the country, and the objective of Jewish policy in Vienna, guided by Adolf Eichmann, at that time was to finance emigration to the greatest possible extent with the resources of foreign Jews.

In February 1939, Bürckel took on the additional function of Gauleiter of Vienna. The office had been held until then by Odilo Globocnik, a long-time activist of the illegal NSDAP in Austria and the Party's liaison to Hitler. Globocnik was dismissed for embezzling Party funds, but soon after the war began, he was appointed SS and police leader of the Lublin district and later became one of the major organizers of the murder of Jews in occupied Poland. Following his appointment as Austrian federal chancellor on 11 March 1938, which had been at Hitler's behest, Arthur Seyss-Inquart officially invited the approaching German troops into the country. From 13 March 1938 until 30 April 1939, Seyss-Inquart had the less evocative title 'Reichsstatthalter in Austria and head of the state government'. The real power resided in Berlin and with Bürckel. The Ostmark Law, which came into effect on 1 May 1939, concluded the administrative integration of former Austria into the German Reich, dissolved the state government, and created seven new Reichsgaue.<sup>87</sup> Seyss-Inquart stayed on initially as minister without portfolio in Vienna before being appointed in October 1939 to serve as the deputy of Governor General Hans Frank in occupied Poland, and in May 1940 as Reich commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories.

### *Aryanization and Expulsion in Austria*

Two men had expedited the interweaving of the Austrian economy with the German one even during the final phase of the 'corporate state': the former 'special envoy' of the Reich in Austria, Franz von Papen, and Hitler's plenipotentiary for economic affairs, Wilhelm Keppler. After the Anschluss, Austria's gold and foreign currency reserves, with a face

86 Moser, 'Österreichs Juden', p. 190; Hanisch, *Gau der guten Nerven*, p. 51; Hans Safrian, 'Expediting Expropriation and Expulsion: The Impact of the "Vienna Model" on Anti-Jewish Policies in Nazi Germany, 1938', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 14 (2000), pp. 390–414.

87 Law on the Structure of the Administration in the Ostmark (Ostmark Law), 14 April 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, I, pp. 777–780.

value of 1.3 billion Reichsmarks, were liquidated, and half of the proceeds flowed into the armaments industry. Keppler was tasked by Göring with accelerating the Aryanization of Jewish companies. In contrast to the booming economy in the Old Reich, where there had been a labour shortage for quite some time, the unemployment rate in Austria was still considerably higher than 20 per cent in 1937. The posting of around 100,000 workers and engineers to Germany encouraged economic harmonization.<sup>88</sup>

In May 1938, experts from the Reich Board for Economic Efficiency began to scrutinize the altogether less modern, less profitable Austrian economy. They regarded it as particularly important to mobilize hidden labour resources in the less productive small businesses. For this purpose, they combined Aryanization and streamlining. After an extensive analysis of the various branches of the economy, around 80 per cent of the Jewish firms were closed down, along with 50 per cent of all retail shops, 83 per cent of the craftsmen's enterprises, and 26 per cent of the industrial firms. Of eighty-six banks, eight remained. Applicable to all branches was the approach that mainly the flourishing firms, in addition to those of strategic importance in economic terms, were to be Aryanized, that is, sold to non-Jewish buyers (Doc. 49). Viewed in this way, Aryanization ultimately pursued three different objectives: first, to transfer to Aryans, on favourable terms, property that had once belonged to Jews; second, to collect the proceeds from these sales to benefit the government coffers; and, finally, to draw the economic and political benefit, specifically through modernizing the Austrian economy at the expense of a group who had 'lost out' to modernization: the Jews.<sup>89</sup>

At first, however, chaos and greed dominated. In the search for property holdings, the Aryanizers had recourse to details that Nazi informers had collected earlier, at a time when the Party was illegal. A few days after the Anschluss, the Vienna Gauleitung of the NSDAP took over Vienna's Non-profit General Construction, Housing and Residential Cooperative. Jews who held leading positions there were dismissed, and the rental agreements of thousands of Jewish tenants were terminated. Around 25,000 mostly self-appointed temporary administrators (*Kommissarische Leiter*) secured for themselves access to Jewish shops and factories. They sold the stock at give away prices to Party friends and interested neighbours.<sup>90</sup>

Göring put a stop to this in order to secure the assets of the Jews for the economy of the Reich, and on 24 April 1938 he arranged for the founding of a state trust organization, the Asset Transfer Office (*Vermögensverkehrsstelle*).<sup>91</sup> Under the guidance of the former

88 Haas, 'Anschluß', p. 6; Norbert Schausberger, *Der Griff nach Österreich: Der Anschluß* (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1978), pp. 463 and 486; Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries*, p. 42; Hans Kernbauer and Fritz Weber, 'Österreichs Wirtschaft 1938–1945', in Tólos, Hanisch, and Neugebauer (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich*, pp. 49–67, here pp. 49 and 54. The estimates on unemployment in Austria range from 21.7 to 35 per cent.

89 Susanne Heim and Götz Aly, 'Die "Ökonomie der Endlösung": Menschenvernichtung und wirtschaftliche Neuordnung', in *Sozialpolitik und Judenvernichtung: Gibt es eine Ökonomie der Endlösung?* (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1987), pp. 11–90, here pp. 26–30.

90 Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung*, p. 29; Jonny Moser, 'Das Unwesen der kommissarischen Leiter: Ein Teilaspekt der Arierisierungsgeschichte in Wien und im Burgenland', in Helmut Konrad and Wolfgang Neugebauer (eds.), *Arbeiterbewegung, Faschismus, Nationalbewusstsein* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1983), pp. 89–97, here p. 94.

91 Oliver Rathkolb, *Jewish Clients in the Vienna 'Postsparkassenamt': Nazi Loot 1938–1945, 2nd Interim Research Report* (Vienna: Österreichische Postsparkasse, 2000), p. 43.

Gauleiter of the illegal NSDAP in Styria, Walter Rafelsberger, the 'unauthorized' commissioners were slowly driven back. The Asset Transfer Office concentrated on small and medium-sized firms and in 1938 seized control of Jewish assets totalling 2 billion Reichsmarks, two thirds of the estimated total property of the Austrian Jews. Large enterprises were Aryanized by Göring's plenipotentiary in Austria, Wilhelm Keppler.

In summer 1939, the Asset Transfer Office publicly exhibited its results. According to the exhibition, of approximately 26,000 firms that had previously belonged to Jews, between 4,400 and 5,000 had been Aryanized and all the others dissolved. Generally, the non-Jewish buyers could acquire the firms cheaply. However, the price they paid was substantially higher than the amount that was credited to the Jewish owner in a blocked account. The difference flowed into a fund of the Austrian provincial government. From this money, subsidies or loans were granted to National Socialist would-be buyers who lacked sufficient capital to purchase a Jewish firm, and in isolated cases the emigration of Jews was facilitated. If large enterprises were disposed of, the Reich treasury pocketed the lion's share of the proceeds.<sup>92</sup>

The head of the Asset Transfer Office, Rafelsberger, also developed clear ideas of what should happen to the people who had been dispossessed if they did not emigrate. In October 1938 he submitted his 'Proposals for the Efficient Conduct of De-Jewification', in which he suggested the creation of three forced labour camps, each intended to hold 10,000 Jews. These camps were to be financed, he said, by means of a special contribution amounting to 10 to 20 per cent of the proceeds from the Aryanization of securities (Doc. 111). The plan failed because Göring and the Reich Minister of Finance claimed the securities, undiminished, for the Reich.

The second important institution for depriving Austrian Jews of their rights was established by the SD in the form of the aforementioned Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Vienna. It was formally headed by the SD official in the SD Main District Danube, Franz Walter Stahlecker, but in fact it was Adolf Eichmann who organized and determined the day-to-day business. First, using lists that had been prepared in Berlin, the SD had all the leading figures of Jewish organizations arrested, and ordered their office documents to be confiscated and sent to Berlin for evaluation (Doc. 116). On 18 March 1938, the SD and the police occupied the office building of the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna and forced the Community officials to stop their work temporarily. On 2 May, when the Religious Community was allowed to resume its operations, many welfare facilities remained permanently closed. Eichmann ordered the compulsory submission of weekly reports and personally redacted the *Zionistische Rundschau*. Speaking to his boss, Hagen, he referred to it as 'his' newspaper (Doc. 34).<sup>93</sup>

92 Dieter Stiefel, 'The Economics of Discrimination', in Dieter Stiefel (ed.), *Die politische Ökonomie des Holocaust: Zur wirtschaftlichen Logik von Verfolgung und 'Wiedergutmachung'* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2001), pp. 9–28, here p. 16; Gerhard Botz, 'Arisierungen in Österreich (1938–1940)', *ibid.*, pp. 29–56, here pp. 43–48; Hans Witek, '"Arisierungen" in Wien: Aspekte nationalsozialistischer Enteignungspolitik 1938–1940', in Tólos, Hanisch, and Neugebauer (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich*, pp. 199–216, here p. 213. The Asset Transfer Office continued to operate in the Reichsgau Vienna until 1945, though from Nov. 1939 as the 'Settlement Office' and later as 'Section III De-Jewification' (Referat III Entjudung).

93 Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, p. 27; Rabinovici, *Instanzen der Ohnmacht*, p. 100; Friedländer, *Nazi Germany*, vol. 1, p. 244.

Established in August 1938, the Central Office for Jewish Emigration brought together under one roof the various institutions from which Jewish emigrants had to request or buy the most diverse certificates and documents before they could leave the country. Under Eichmann's direction, the officials of the customs, foreign exchange, passport, tax, and expropriation offices worked there in close association to accelerate the emigration of the Jews. Lengthy visits to the authorities, which had occasionally been so time-consuming that the visa had already expired by the time the last official stamp was affixed to a given permit, were completed with dispatch in the Central Office (Doc. 224).

The new institution was financed through the emigration tax that affluent Jews had to pay so as to cover the emigration costs of the poorer ones. In addition, leading figures from Austria's Jewish communities were sent abroad to solicit international aid organizations for foreign currency and to develop immigration possibilities (Doc. 301). In the words of Eichmann's boss in Berlin, Hagen, the Central Office guaranteed 'that the Security Service's approach to handling the Jewish question in Austria was absolutely ensured'.<sup>94</sup> How it operated was conveyed by Hannah Arendt with reference to the transcripts of Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, recording the impressions of Jewish functionaries from Berlin whom Eichmann had summoned to Vienna in 1938 to view the Central Office:

At one end you put in a Jew who still has some property, a factory, or a shop, or a bank account, and he goes through the building from counter to counter, from office to office, and comes out at the other end without any money, without any rights, but with a passport on which it says: 'You must leave the country within a fortnight. Otherwise you will go to a concentration camp'.<sup>95</sup>

Eichmann's despotic manner, his blatant cheating of the Jewish representatives and the practice of collective liability forced the Israelite Religious Community to cooperate. He set target figures for emigration, raised them repeatedly, and made the Religious Community and the Zionist Regional Association responsible for ensuring that his goals were met. Eichmann ordained that Desider Friedmann, the head of the Religious Community, would be released from the concentration camp only after the Jewish organizations had reached the specified expulsion quota. Eichmann slapped the office director of the Israelite Religious Community, Dr Josef Löwenherz, at their very first meeting. In the Central Office, the SS sometimes used whips to beat the people who were waiting.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Memorandum from Hagen, re Official Trip II 112 to Main District Danube, 31 August–1 Sept. 1938, RGVA, 500k-1-625.

<sup>95</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking, 1963), p. 46.

<sup>96</sup> Löwenherz, *Vollständiger Bericht*, p. 10; Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, p. 29; Rabinovici, *Instanzen der Ohnmacht*, pp. 111–113 and 147–151.

## *Strategy for the Anschluss*

Austrians, like Germans, celebrated the Anschluss as a historic deed. With the annexation of Austria, Hitler turned the old idea of Greater Germany, popular since the 1848 revolution, into a reality. The expansion improved the economic position of the Reich: in the short term, reserves of labour, foreign exchange, and raw materials could be mobilized for the armaments industry, and over the longer term, Germany's dominant position in south-eastern Europe could be developed. In addition, the annexation of Austria brought Hitler closer to his goal of breaking up Czechoslovakia. As early as the end of May 1938, he ordered that preparations be made for the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 1 October 1938. Discrimination against the German minority in the so-called Sudetenland was treated as a scandal in German media reports and greatly exaggerated. It offered the pretext for stirring up the existing conflicts during the summer months of 1938 in order to justify a military intervention. The main objective from the outset was the subjugation of all of Czechoslovakia. Protection of the approximately 3 million Sudeten Germans was only secondary and mainly used as propaganda.<sup>97</sup>

The Sudeten German Home Front, founded in 1933 and known from 1935 as the Sudeten German Party (SdP), had been systematically forged into a separatist fighting organization under the leadership of Konrad Henlein (1898–1945). In March 1938, Henlein set up the Sudeten German Freikorps and had it trained by the German SA. Where the persuasive power of nationalistic propaganda was not sufficient, Henlein's followers lent a hand, applying social pressure and using threats. In areas with high unemployment, they enticed the undecided with the promise of a job in Sudeten German companies: Rabbi Friedrich Weiß of Teplitz-Schönau described the mixture of carrot and stick used by the SdP:

The open and secret organization developed its cells and methods of operation everywhere, gigantic banners suspended over the streets appealed for affiliation with the home front, German money was alluring. The building caretakers were good informers, good at paving the way. The young people, with few exceptions, went over to the other side with banners waving. The teachers, especially at the state secondary school, were sympathetic or fell into line.<sup>98</sup>

In September 1938, at the highpoint of the Sudeten crisis, war in Europe appeared imminent. The willingness of the British and French governments to accommodate Germany's cravings for power to such an extent that a military confrontation was prevented actually contravened the approach favoured by Hitler: pocketing all of Czechoslovakia at once.<sup>99</sup> But as a result of the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938, the German Reich was able to considerably strengthen its position of power to make the rest of Czechoslovakia dependent on Germany and to procure important potential in northern

<sup>97</sup> Weinberg, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 313–377.

<sup>98</sup> Cited in Wilma Iggers (ed.), *Die Juden in Böhmen und Mähren: Ein historisches Lesebuch* (Munich: Beck, 1986), pp. 345–346; Milena Jesenská, *Alles ist Leben: Feuilletons und Reportagen 1919–1939* (Frankfurt am Main: Neue Kritik, 2008), pp. 170–200.

<sup>99</sup> Hillgruber, *Die gescheiterte Großmacht*, p. 85; Weinberg, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 462–463.

Bohemia for German industry. With the First Vienna Award of 2 November 1938, arbitrated by Germany and Italy, the Reich was able to continue the expansion of its hegemony: Poland was awarded the industrial region of Teschen (Cieszyn), until then part of Czechoslovakia, and Hungary received the regions in southern and eastern Slovakia that had a majority Hungarian population.

At the beginning of the 1930s, 24,000 Jews still lived in the region that became the Reichsgau Sudetenland in autumn 1938. While most non-Jewish Sudeten Germans welcomed or cheered the annexation of the region, around 90 per cent of the Jews residing there fled within a few months, as did most of the Jewish refugees who had temporarily found refuge in the Sudetenland after the Anschluss of Austria (Docs. 102, 103). In addition, hundreds of thousands of Czechs, Slovaks, and politically unwelcome persons were forcibly expelled or voluntarily fled from border regions that Czechoslovakia had been compelled to relinquish by the agreements reached in Munich and Vienna. Two weeks after the Munich Agreement, the journalist Milena Jesenská described the distress of the refugees and the completely overwhelmed Czechs: 'In all of Prague, there is hardly a house in which no refugees have sought shelter. And they are the lucky ones, who have someone here. Thousands, however, simply ran out into the unknown.' Because the Czechs were overburdened in this way, she said, it was foreseeable that their anger and feelings of impotence might soon turn against those who were weakest, the refugees. Jesenská predicted that her fellow Czechs, thus driven into a corner, might shove 'even the innocent into the abyss' and that 'our people [could] reach a profound moral breaking point', from which it would 'not easily recover again'.<sup>100</sup>

In many respects, the events in the Sudetenland resembled what had taken place earlier in Austria: Jews and opponents of the Nazis who had not been able to flee were persecuted and harassed – sometimes by Sudeten German neighbours, but above all by Henlein troops and the Gestapo. The latter proceeded in much the same way as in Austria's Burgenland region, arresting Jews and forcing them on to the other side of the non-fortified land border. In addition, by spring 1939, around 10,000 Social Democrats, communists, and Jews from the Sudetenland were taken to concentration camps.<sup>101</sup>

In the period that followed, all the major anti-Jewish measures from the Reich were carried over to the new Reichsgau. The remaining Jews had to register their assets; as in Austria, commissioners administered the Jewish firms, no matter whether the owners were still in the country or had fled. An asset transfer office organized Aryanization for the benefit of local non-Jews and of citizens of the old Reich, who usually had more capital at their disposal. Jewish retail operations were closed down whenever possible, in the interest of the Sudeten German small and medium-sized businesses; the coal mines of the Petschek group were assigned to the Hermann Göring Works; the largest chemical concern in the Sudetenland was taken over by I. G. Farben.<sup>102</sup>

Before the end of March 1939, Hitler achieved his next objective: to crush Czechoslovakia. In response to German pressure, Prime Minister Jozef Tiso (1887–1947) declared Slovakia, autonomous since the Munich Agreement, an independent state. The Czech part

100 Jesenská, *Alles ist Leben*, pp. 211–213.

101 Jörg Osterloh, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung im Reichsgau Sudetenland 1938–1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), pp. 191–202.

102 Ibid., pp. 344–351 and 406–410.

of the country was occupied by German troops on 15 March 1939, and the next day, in Prague, Hitler proclaimed the establishment of the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The elected president of the state, Emil Hácha (1872–1945), remained nominally in office. Power, however, was in German hands: former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantin von Neurath served as Reich protector. The Sudeten German Nazi functionary Karl Hermann Frank (1898–1946) assumed two positions simultaneously, as state secretary and as Higher SS and Police Leader of Bohemia and Moravia. Immediately after the occupation of the country, emigrants, Jews, and Czechs who were known anti-Nazis were arrested in large numbers, and in various places Jews were openly attacked. The next Central Office for Jewish Emigration was established by Eichmann in Prague in June 1939 (Volume 3 of this series covers the fate of the Czech Jews during this period).

In the shadow of the events in Prague, the German Reich annexed the Memel Territory, too, on 23 March 1939. The northern part of East Prussia, with its predominantly German population, had been separated from the German Reich in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles, initially placed under the mandate of the League of Nations, and then, in 1923, occupied by Lithuanian troops and paramilitary forces. Since 1933, the National Socialist Movement had also gained considerable momentum in the Memel Territory. In autumn 1938, boycott campaigns targeting Jewish shops were on the rise; the Munich Agreement brought a National Socialist coup within reach and caused many Jews to leave the country (Doc. 191). By March 1939, when the region was annexed by Germany, most of the approximately 6,000 Jews who had lived in the city of Memel had already fled. Those who remained behind were subject to the Germans' Jewish policy, and their assets were immediately Aryanized (Doc. 287).<sup>103</sup>

### *Forced Emigration*

Over the course of 1938, it became increasingly clear how difficult the dispossession of the Jews was making the achievement of the other objective, expulsion. The web of compulsory levies, foreign exchange regulations, export bans, and export fees prevented Jews from taking along at least a part of their possessions in order to establish new lives in another country. The target countries, however, refused to grant entry to refugees without means, because they might possibly become a burden on the public welfare system. Shortly after the Anschluss of Austria, almost all these countries tightened their immigration regulations and border controls or introduced immigration bans, which were openly or covertly directed against Jews.<sup>104</sup>

103 Ruth Leiserowitz, 'Memel Territory', in Wolf Gruner and Jörg Osterloh (eds.), *The Greater German Reich and the Jews: Nazi Persecution Policies in the Annexed Territories, 1935–1945*, trans. Bernard Heise (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2015 [German edn, 2010]), pp. 136–156.

104 Susanne Heim, 'Vertreibung, Raub und Umverteilung: Die jüdischen Flüchtlinge aus Deutschland und die Vermehrung des "Volksvermögens"', in Gesellschaft zur Förderung zeitgeschichtlicher Forschungen, *Flüchtlingspolitik und Fluchthilfe* (Berlin: Schwarze Risse; Göttingen: Rote Strasse, 1999), pp. 107–138; Susanne Heim, '"Deutschland muß ihnen ein Land ohne Zukunft sein": Die Zwangsemigration der Juden 1933 bis 1938', in Eberhard Jungfer et al. (eds.), *Arbeitsmigration und Flucht: Vertreibung und Arbeitskräfte regulierung im Zwischenkriegseuropa* (Berlin: Schwarze Risse; Göttingen: Rote Strasse, 1993), pp. 48–81, here pp. 69–74.

Until this point, the Czech government had pursued a comparatively liberal asylum policy. After the Munich Agreement, however, it was no longer willing to take in Jewish refugees, and in October 1938 it began to expel almost all émigrés from Germany and Austria. If they did not comply when called upon to leave the country, the police deported them to the border, usually the Polish one.<sup>105</sup> Similar treatment was endured by the Jews from the Sudetenland, who were forced across the border after the German invasion but sent back by Czech border guards or sent on to Hungary, where they were equally unwanted but still had hope of transit options. Finally, some of them found accommodation on a Danube freighter; most of them were quartered in a camp in the Czech–Hungarian border area.<sup>106</sup> In November 1938, when parts of Slovakia were ceded to Hungary, Jews who had been born in the area that was being surrendered were deported back there by the Slovak Hlinka Guard in the attempt to shift them off into Hungary. Then the Hungarian gendarmerie deported these unwanted people, too, into the no man’s land along the newly drawn Hungarian–Slovak border.<sup>107</sup> Along the western borders of the Reich, the border authorities of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg passed around among themselves the refugees who had entered illegally after the Anschluss of Austria, until the representatives of these countries agreed at a joint conference in April 1939 to put an end to this practice (Doc. 271).<sup>108</sup>

The more difficult the flight from Germany became, the more chaotic were the forms it assumed. In 1933 approximately 37,000 people had left the country permanently, and in the following years up to 1937 the annual total ranged between 20,000 and 24,000.<sup>109</sup> Around 80 to 85 per cent of the emigrants were Jews. In 1938 the number of refugees increased fivefold: that year, around 40,000 Jews emigrated from the Old Reich and almost 60,000 from Austria.<sup>110</sup> Jews left the country in legal and illegal ways, increasingly by sea. It was ever more uncertain at the time of their departure whether the ships would ever reach their destinations, and whether and where their passengers would be allowed to disembark. ‘The year 1938 added a new term to European geography – No

105 Monthly Report of the European Office of the JDC for January 1939, JDC Archives, AR 33/44, 189.

106 Friedländer, *Nazi Germany*, vol. 1, pp. 265–266.

107 ‘Report by Mrs. Marie Schmolka, Manageress of “Hicem” Prague, on her visit to the camp Mischdorf near Bratislava on November 27th, 1938, and other reports from No-Man’s Land’, published in Peter Heumos, ‘Flüchtlingslager, Hilfsorganisationen, Juden im Niemandsland: Zur Flüchtlingsproblematik in der Tschechoslowakei im Herbst 1938’, *Bohemia*, vol. 25 (1984), pp. 245–275, here pp. 272–275.

108 Hans-Dieter Arntz, *Judenverfolgung und Fluchthilfe im deutsch-belgischen Grenzgebiet: Kreisgebiet Schleiden, Euskirchen, Monschau, Aachen und Eupen/Malmedy* (Euskirchen: Kümpel, 1990); Vicky Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore (eds.), *Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States, 1933–1939* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010); Insa Meinen and Ahlrich Meyer, *Verfolgt von Land zu Land: Jüdische Flüchtlinge in Westeuropa 1938–1944* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2013).

109 Strauss, ‘Jewish Emigration’, pp. 326–327; Werner Röder and Herbert A. Strauss (ed.) *Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933*, vols. 1–3 (Munich: Saur, 1980–1983); Debórah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt, *Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 1933–1946* (New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2009).

110 Estimate of the Jewish Religious Community of Vienna, activity report for the period 11 March – 31 Dec. 1938, CAHJP, A/W 106.

Man's Lands of the Jews', a JDC official reported in January 1939.<sup>111</sup> Jewish refugees aboard ships without landing permission and in the no man's land between countries epitomized the marginalization of the Jews (Doc. 233). The best known of these ships was the *St. Louis*, which set sail from Hamburg in May 1939, carrying more than 900 Jewish emigrants, destined for Havana. There the port authorities refused to let the liner land because corrupt officials had sold invalid visas to the passengers (Docs. 290, 292, 297). After protracted negotiations, the passengers were finally accepted in Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The Gestapo promoted the erosion of intergovernmental relationships by forcing Jews with increasing frequency to cross borders illegally, beginning in summer 1938 (Doc. 305). In reaction to such practices, Switzerland threatened to make visas compulsory for all Reich Germans. In lengthy negotiations, the Swiss and German authorities agreed to mark the passports of German Jews with a red 'J' stamp (Doc. 127) – and thus made it generally impossible for Jews to go unnoticed when entering other countries.<sup>112</sup>

During and after the November pogroms, Jews were in mortal danger in Germany. Emigration, which had been regulated to some degree, now became a stampede. Those Jews who had been arrested and then released from concentration camps only on the condition that they leave the country were willing to take almost any risk. The black market prices for steamship tickets and visas soared, and both commercial and humanitarian efforts to aid those wishing to flee experienced a boom. Under the enormously increased pressure, families felt compelled to separate, so that they could leave the country individually or at least get the children to safety. After the British government had offered in the wake of the November pogroms to accept 10,000 children from Jewish families, offices for the organization of such children's transports sprang up in the Reich within a short time (Docs. 202, 213, 272, 288). Alongside Britain, Jewish children were accepted in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Sweden in large numbers.<sup>113</sup> An initiative comparable to the British children's transports was launched shortly afterwards in the USA. There, however, it failed, due to the resistance of opponents of immigration.<sup>114</sup>

After the November pogroms, Jewish organizations, too, abandoned legal avenues and attempted to get Jews out of the country by every route imaginable (Doc. 260).

111 'No Man's Lands of the Jews', 20 Jan. 1939, JDC Archives, AR 1933/44, 541.

112 Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg, *Die Schweiz und die Flüchtlinge zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Zurich: Chronos, 2001), pp. 97–110.

113 According to Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration', p. 328, at least 18,000 children emigrated unaccompanied by their parents and were placed in homes or foster families abroad. McDonald Stewart, quoting the statistics of German Jewish organizations, states that before the war, 9,354 emigrated to Britain, 1,500 to the Netherlands, 1,000 to Belgium, 600 to France, 300 to Switzerland and 450 to Sweden: Barbara McDonald Stewart, *United States Government Policy on Refugees from Nazism, 1933–1940* (New York: Garland, 1982), p. 519. On the children's transports in general, see Barry Turner, ... *And the Policeman Smiled: 10,000 Children Escape from Nazi Europe* (London: Bloomsbury, 1990); Wolfgang Benz, Claudia Curio, and Andrea Hammel (eds.), *Die Kindertransporte 1938/39: Rettung und Integration* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003); Claudia Curio, *Verfolgung, Flucht, Rettung: Die Kindertransporte 1938/39 nach Großbritannien* (Berlin: Metropol, 2006); Vera K. Fast, *Children's Exodus: A History of the Kindertransport* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

114 Zosa Szajkowski, 'The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees from Germany in the 1930s', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. 61, no. 2 (1971), pp. 101–143, here p. 109.

The byways included the chartering of ships that sailed under a neutral flag and took immigrants to Palestine – unless they were captured first by the British Mandate's naval force, which was tasked with halting illegal immigration.<sup>115</sup> Though the SD, reluctant to endanger the legal approach, officially rejected illegal emigration, Berthold Storfer, who expedited illegal emigration from Vienna and chartered ships for the voyage to Palestine, cooperated with Eichmann in a manner that was hardly covert. The Viennese Zionists criticized Storfer on these grounds, but primarily because he opposed the Zionists' selection criteria for immigrants to Palestine: young, healthy, strong.<sup>116</sup>

In the European countries that were unwilling to accept Jewish refugees permanently but also did not want to deport them to Germany, increasing numbers of refugee camps were established, starting in 1938. This was often carried out on the initiative of, or in cooperation with, the local Jewish communities, which hoped to forestall antisemitic reactions in this way. As a rule, Jewish organizations absorbed the costs and took care of the refugees. For example, the Jewish Refugee Relief in Switzerland set up refugee camps near St Gallen and in Basel. In Britain, the Council for German Jewry took on such tasks. The leading representatives of British Jews had promised the government that they would pay for the maintenance of the German Jewish refugees, but they were no longer able to keep this promise after the Anschluss of Austria. In the Netherlands, the local Jews deposited a sum of money with the government as a guarantee for the upkeep of the refugees. In Belgium, the state provided the facilities for the refugees, and the running costs were borne by the Jewish aid organizations (Docs. 233, 241, 269, 271).<sup>117</sup>

In reaction to the rising numbers of refugees, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt convened an international conference barely two weeks after the Anschluss of Austria. It took place from 6 to 15 July 1938 in the French resort of Evian on the banks of Lake Geneva, where representatives of thirty-two countries discussed possibilities for letting in Jewish refugees from the German Reich.<sup>118</sup> Almost all the delegates expressed their regret that the economic situation in their country did not permit them to accept additional refugees; only the Australian delegate openly conceded that Australia had no race problem and did not want to import one, either. During internal negotiations, only the Dominican Republic, ruled by the dictator Rafael Trujillo, held out the prospect of

115 Dalia Ofer, *Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Dalia Ofer, 'Die illegale Einwanderung nach Palästina: Politische, nationale und persönliche Aspekte (1939–1941)', in Gesellschaft zur Förderung Zeitgeschichtlicher Forschungen (ed.), *Flüchtlingspolitik und Fluchthilfe*, pp. 9–38, here p. 15.

116 Rabinovici, *Instanzen der Ohnmacht*, pp. 184–193; Gabriele Anderl, '9096 Leben': *Der unbekannte Judenretter Berthold Storfer* (Berlin: Rotbuch, 2012).

117 Christian Eggers, *Unerwünschte Ausländer: Juden aus Deutschland und Mitteleuropa in französischen Internierungslagern 1940–1942* (Berlin: Metropol, 2002), pp. 20–48; Caestecker and Moore, *Refugees from Nazi Germany*; Louise London, 'British Immigration Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees, 1933–1939', in Werner Mosse (ed.), *Second Chance: Two Centuries of German-speaking Jews in the United Kingdom* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), pp. 485–517, here p. 502.

118 On the history of the conference, see Salomon Adler-Rudel, 'The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, vol. 13 (1968), pp. 235–274; Ralph Weingarten, *Die Hilfeleistung der westlichen Welt bei der Endlösung der deutschen Judenfrage: Das 'Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees' (IGC), 1938–1939* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1981); Tommie Sjöberg, *The Powers and the Persecuted: The Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), 1938–1947* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991).

accepting refugees. Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry and the Reich Foreign Office pointed gleefully to the failure of the conference and asserted that the concern in the democratic countries regarding the fate of the German Jews was merely feigned (Doc. 64).

Even though the participating states at the Evian Conference rejected the further admission of German Jews largely for reasons related to domestic politics and economic policy, the underlying cause was a fundamental, almost unresolvable problem: if countries declared themselves willing to accept impoverished Jewish refugees without any concessions from the German side, then they were aiding and abetting the dispossession and expulsion of the Jews, perhaps not only from Germany but from other states as well. Poland and Romania, for example, had made it plain at the conference that Jewish minorities posed a problem for their countries too, one that the international community of states must address.<sup>119</sup>

Even so, the delegates in Evian founded the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR). Its mission was to find options for the settlement of refugees and to negotiate with the German government concerning the emigration of Jews and the (partial) transfer of their assets. At first the Reich Foreign Office in Berlin categorically refused even to receive the director of the IGCR, the American lawyer George Rublee. But Göring and Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht signalled their willingness after the November pogroms, because they hoped in this way to alleviate the chronic foreign exchange shortage that plagued the Reich despite all the expropriation campaigns and organized looting. In December 1938, Schacht travelled to London for secret negotiations with Rublee. On the German side, the objective was to make the furtherance of emigration consistent with the 'securing of foreign exchange' and to end the boycott of German goods abroad. After Schacht was forced to relinquish the office of Reichsbank president in January 1939, Helmut Wohlthat took over the conduct of the negotiations.<sup>120</sup> As head of the Department of Foreign Exchange Control in the Office of the Four-Year Plan, he had dealt repeatedly with the dispossession of the Jews. While he was negotiating with Rublee, he was directing, along with Friedrich Flick and the Dresdner Bank, the Aryanization of the Petschek group of companies, in the course of which the Reich took possession of coal pits and industrial enterprises valued at several hundred million Reichsmarks.<sup>121</sup>

The concept that was worked out in spring 1939, named the Schacht–Rublee Plan after the two men who led the negotiations, envisaged that two thirds of German Jews would

119 Eliahu Ben Elissar, *La diplomatie du IIIe Reich et les Juifs (1933–1939)* (Paris: Julliard, 1969), p. 243; Henry Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938–1945* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), p. 35; Marion A. Kaplan, *Dominican Haven: The Jewish Refugee Settlement in Sosúa, 1940–1945* (New York: Museum of Jewish Heritage, 2008); Hans-Ulrich Dillmann and Susanne Heim, *Fluchtpunkt Karibik: Jüdische Emigranten in der Dominikanischen Republik* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2009), pp. 34–40.

120 On the negotiations between Schacht/Wohlthat and the IGCR, see Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue*, pp. 45–68; Weingarten, *Die Hilfeleistung*, pp. 121–144; Friedländer, *Nazi Germany*, vol. 1, pp. 288 and 315–316; Fritz Kieffer, *Judenverfolgung in Deutschland – eine innere Angelegenheit? Internationale Reaktionen auf die Flüchtlingsproblematik 1933–1939* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2002), pp. 320–427.

121 Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 3rd edn, vol. 1 (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2003 [1961]), pp. 113–120; Harald Wixforth, *Die Expansion der Dresdner Bank in Europa* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), pp. 136–138; Kim Christian Priemel, *Flick: Eine Konzerngeschichte vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), pp. 390–431.

be permitted to emigrate within a period of five years. Only the elderly were to remain, and they were to be allowed to live in Germany until their death. Under the plan, the German tax authorities were allowed to retain 75 per cent of the Jews' assets. The value of the remaining 25 per cent was to be paid into a trust fund but released only in return for additional exports from Germany. Further, the plan provided for creating a bond fund abroad for advance financing of the resettlement of German Jews. The money for this purpose was to be raised by relief organizations and wealthy Jews (Doc. 207).

In his speech of 6 December 1938, Göring had already outlined this plan in broad strokes. Among the representatives of the Jewish organizations who were supposed to take care of the financing, the fund was highly controversial, because it would stabilize the German economy at the expense of Jewish assets. A formal agreement between the Intergovernmental Committee and the German Reich never came about. There was solely a confidential memorandum, which Rublee was prepared to regard as a unilateral statement of intent by Germany but not as a joint document.<sup>122</sup> The outbreak of the Second World War rendered the plan void.

### *Registration, Ostracization, and Forced Labour*

At the end of July 1938, compulsory identity cards were introduced for all young men screened for military service and for the entire Jewish population; by the end of the year, Jews over the age of 15 thus had to apply for an identity card, which was furnished with a photograph, fingerprints, and the signature of the card holder (Doc. 72). In correspondence with the authorities, card holders were always required to state the ID number marked on the card and the place code (place of issue). If they visited the administrative offices in person, they were required to point out, unprompted, that they were Jews and present their ID card (Doc. 300). A duplicate of the card was retained by the passport-issuing authority and was placed in the files of the local residents' registry as a means of identification.

In August 1938, the Reich Ministry of the Interior issued a regulation stating that only certain 'Jewish' first names were permissible for Jews from that point on. Jewish men with names other than the officially sanctioned first names had to add the name 'Israel', beginning on 1 January 1939, and women had to add 'Sara' as a second forename (Docs. 84, 86, 90, 181). The mandatory first name had to be recorded at the civil registry office and in the telephone book and used in official correspondence at all times. The next step towards registration of the Jews was the census of May 1939, which had been postponed by one year because of the Anschluss of Austria. On a special supplementary card, each person who was counted in the census had to provide information about the 'racial origin' of his or her four grandparents (Doc. 36). In this way, the statisticians calculated the current figure of 233,973 'Jews by race' in the Old Reich, of whom around 20,000 did not belong to the Jewish religious community; in addition, they

<sup>122</sup> Kieffer, *Judenverfolgung*, pp. 425–426. On the debate about the Schacht–Rublee Plan and the bond fund, see Yehuda Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1929–1939* (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974), pp. 273–285.

recorded the ‘half-Jews’ and ‘one-quarter-Jews’ along with their family members, members of the household, residential addresses, and other personal information. For control purposes, the census takers were urged, for their part, to write down in the records what they knew about the ‘race’ of those who were interviewed. All this information was entered the very same year in the newly established nationwide People’s Card Index (*Volkskartei*), as well as on the local residents’ registration cards, which since 1938 included the column ‘Descent’ at the top.<sup>123</sup> The multiple collection of information about ‘race’ – via ID card, compulsory first names, census forms, and the People’s Card Index – made it difficult for those concerned to avoid registration. And in view of the threatened penalties, attempting to avoid it was risky as well.

The church registers also served as an important source of information to enable classification based on racial considerations. In the registers, it was noted who had been baptized when and where, who had married a Jewish spouse or changed his or her name. After 1933, when the Aryan certificate began to determine professional advancement and personal fates and, moreover, genealogical research came into fashion, the parish offices could barely cope with the abundance of enquiries. Repeatedly, they were also confronted with pleas to let indications of non-Aryan descent go by the board. A decree issued by the Reich Minister of Church Affairs, dated October 1938, therefore admonished the keepers of the church registers to enter complete data and further demanded that they note the Jewish descent of the applicant on any document being issued, even if it was only known to them by chance (Doc. 188).<sup>124</sup> Even in the absence of such prompting, particularly in Protestant regional churches, assiduous individuals got down to work and busied themselves of their own accord with the recording of non-Aryans. In Berlin, for example, under the leadership of the Protestant pastor and archivist Karl Themel, the Old Berlin church registry office, financed by the church, searched the community records, looking for Jews who had been baptized, and compiled a ‘register of baptisms of persons of alien descent’, based on all the church registers in Berlin.<sup>125</sup> The church registry offices that existed in various regional churches passed on their findings to various authorities, including the Reich Office for Kinship Research, which was subordinate to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, but they also furnished particulars to Party institutions, the Reich Institute for History of the New Germany, the SS, and the police.<sup>126</sup> Concurrently, all the entries in the Berlin church registers were gathered in a card file, so that Aryan Christians could prove their ‘racial purity’ with as few complications as possible.

123 Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth, *Die restlose Erfassung: Volkszählen, Identifizieren, Aussondern im Nationalsozialismus*, new edn (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2000 [1984]), pp. 54–64.

124 Stephan Linck, “... restlose Ausscheidung dieses Fremdkörpers”: Das schleswig-holsteinische Kirchenbuchwesen und die “Judenfrage”, in Manfred Gailus (ed.), *Kirchliche Amtshilfe: Die Kirche und die Judenverfolgung im ‘Dritten Reich’* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), pp. 27–47, here p. 33.

125 Manfred Gailus, ‘Einführung’, in Gailus (ed.), *Kirchliche Amtshilfe*, pp. 12–13; Aly and Roth, *Die Restlose Erfassung*, p. 85.

126 Manfred Gailus, “Hier werden täglich drei, vier Fälle einer nichtarischen Abstammung aufgedeckt”: Pfarrer Karl Themel und die Kirchenbuchstelle Alt-Berlin’, in Gailus (ed.), *Kirchliche Amtshilfe*, pp. 82–100, here pp. 89–90.

At times, the boom in genealogical research had an oddly amusing effect on outside observers. For example, in April 1938 a Swiss pastor refused to provide information about the lineage of an NSDAP member, informing the requester

that we partly shook with laughter, partly began to doubt the good judgement of the Nordic race, when we saw: not only do you not consider the pathological requirements of the Aryan certificate in the case of the great-grandmother (!!!) to be crazy, but in addition you give a cheer of 'Heil!' for the man who gives the order for such rubbish.<sup>127</sup>

Among the Protestant pastors, those who felt connected to the religious movement known as the 'German Christians' were especially meticulous about recording the non-Aryan faithful. But most members of the Confessing Church, too, complied with the relevant instructions of the church leadership. In February 1939, the regional churches of Thuringia, Mecklenburg, Anhalt, and Saxony excluded non-Aryans (Doc. 262).<sup>128</sup> Only the advisory office run by Pastor Heinrich Grüber attended to the interests of the non-Aryan Protestant Christians, who, though persecuted as 'Jews by race', did not belong to the Jewish religious community and therefore obtained no support from Jewish organizations.<sup>129</sup> However, Berlin's church leaders made no secret of their qualms regarding the Grüber Office (Doc. 267). In the milieu of the German Christian movement, the Institute for the Study and Elimination of Jewish Influence on German Church Life was established in Eisenach in the early summer of 1939. Its objective was to examine church hymnals and the Bible to ascertain whether they included text passages that were the 'expression of an alien race-soul' or contained 'Jewish ideas' (Doc. 307).

In general, the Catholic Church reacted with distinctly greater restraint to the demands of the National Socialist regime, continued to use hymns whose words were now no longer deemed appropriate (Doc. 253), and threatened teachers of religious education with withdrawal of their teaching licences if they removed the Old Testament, decried as the 'Jewish Bible', from the curriculum. Only in isolated cases did individual clergymen participate in the inspection of the church registers to ferret out baptized Jews.<sup>130</sup> The non-Aryan Catholics continued to be regarded as fellow believers, and were not excluded from the church, although they were supported only with reserve. At no point during the National Socialist regime did either Christian church contemplate staunchly and publicly standing up for the persecuted Jews. After the November pogroms, neither the Protestant nor the Catholic bishops protested against the persecution of the Jews.

The registration of Jews took on practical significance, for example in the case of labour deployment. To the extent that economic connections had still existed between

127 Cited in Gailus (ed.), 'Einführung', p. 17.

128 Martin Greschat, 'Die Haltung der deutschen evangelischen Kirchen zur Verfolgung der Juden im Dritten Reich', in Ursula Büttner (ed.), *Die Deutschen und die Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003), pp. 320–341.

129 Eberhard Röhm and Jörg Thierfelder, *Juden, Christen, Deutsche: 1933–1945*, vol. 2: *1935 bis 1938*, part 2 (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1992), pp. 259–277.

130 Bernd Nellesen, 'Die schweigende Kirche: Katholiken und Judenverfolgung', in Büttner (ed.), *Die Deutschen und die Judenverfolgung*, pp. 305–319, here p. 309.

Jews and non-Jews, these ties were cut as Aryanization progressed. Although the employment of Jews in the firms of non-Jewish owners was still permitted, whenever possible they were separated from the non-Jewish personnel.<sup>131</sup> Since the summer of 1938, the local and Reich authorities had repeatedly discussed excluding the Jews from public welfare benefits (Docs. 164, 285, 293) or, alternatively, granting them these benefits only in exchange for work carried out. In particular, the Reich Institute for Labour Placement and Unemployment Insurance made various attempts to organize the forced labour of Jews. The intention was to relieve the pressure on the public welfare system and reinforce the pressure to emigrate (Doc. 105). On 19 October 1938, the president of the Reich Institute, Friedrich Syrup, issued a secret decree concerning the labour deployment of Jews. In it, the employment offices were asked to establish an overview of the number and skills of the unemployed Jews and to arrange for their deployment for labour in segregated groups. At this time, Jewish work squads were already being detailed for public works in some cities, including Vienna.<sup>132</sup>

However, the rule that Jews were to be deployed separately from non-Jews proved to be an obstacle, because the prerequisites for separation did not exist in many companies. Consequently, Jewish labour squads were kept busy primarily in the public sector, in parks and gardens, in the construction of roads and canals, with the Reich Railways, or at rubbish dumps. This often meant, however, that the accommodation of the Jewish forced labourers in camps and a guard force for them had to be arranged. In various places, including Hamburg, separate consolidated labour camps were set up for Jewish forced labourers in order to separate them from other persons doing compulsory labour and to oblige them to work off their relief payments.<sup>133</sup> Quite soon, however, labour deployment was no longer limited to Jews who were registered as unemployed and from whom a *quid pro quo* was to be exacted in return for public aid money; on the contrary, even Jews who were employed were forced to perform labour (Doc. 119). After the Reich Minister of the Interior had ordered that Jews were, in any case, to be excluded from public welfare and referred to Jewish welfare institutions (Doc. 164), it became clear that labour deployment primarily served other purposes: it was both a form of harassment and a way to mobilize all labour reserves in preparation for war. Certificates of exemption could be requested not, for example, from the employment office, but only from the Gestapo. Jews were threatened with imprisonment if they contravened the obligation to perform forced labour. Jews who were forcibly conscripted for labour replaced Aryan workers, who were used for tasks of 'national policy significance', as it was expressed in a decree issued by Göring. By July 1939, there were already 20,000 Jewish forced labourers in Germany, almost all of them men. General forced labour for all Jews was not officially mandated until October 1941, three years after forced labour had been implemented in practice.<sup>134</sup>

131 Kulka and Jäckel (eds.), *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, p. 435.

132 Wolf Gruner, *Jewish Forced Labor under the Nazis: Economic Needs and Racial Aims, 1938–1944*, trans. Kathleen M. Dell'Orto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 [German edn, 1997]), pp. 109–112.

133 Wolf Gruner, *Öffentliche Wohlfahrt und Judenverfolgung: Wechselwirkung lokaler und zentraler Politik im NS-Staat (1933–1942)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), pp. 137 and 205.

134 Gruner, *Jewish Forced Labor*, pp. 8, 19–20, and 30.

## *Deportation of Polish Jews and the November Pogroms*

On 31 March 1938 the Polish government enacted the Law on the Revocation of Citizenship, which was formulated in general terms but was in fact directed against Jews. The government thereby created a method of denaturalizing Polish citizens who had been living abroad for more than five years. In October 1938 a regulation followed under which passports issued abroad entitled the holder to enter Poland only with an endorsement from the relevant Polish consulate. In this way, the Polish government sought to prevent Jews who were Polish citizens living in the German Reich from fleeing to Poland.<sup>135</sup> The German leadership now feared, as State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker expressed it to Polish Ambassador Józef Lipski, 'that as a result of the denaturalization, a clump of 40,000 to 50,000 stateless former Polish Jews might drop into our lap'.<sup>136</sup> To prevent this, the Reich government decided shortly before the Polish law took effect, on the evening of 27 October 1938, to deport 17,000 Polish Jews to Poland. In some cities, the police arrested only men; in others, entire families.

Although most of those targeted were completely taken by surprise when arrested, the Munich police, for example, were able to catch only around two thirds of the people they wanted to deport (Doc. 112). Among the deported was Marcel Reich-Ranicki, who became a victim of this mass deportation at the age of 18. He had no idea why he was suddenly arrested in Berlin, early on the morning of 28 October 1938, or what he was supposed to do in Poland, a country that 'was utterly alien' to him.<sup>137</sup> For many of those arrested, the journey ended, for the time being, at the border. Polish and German border guards herded the people back and forth between the lines for days on end. Eventually, they were placed in hastily arranged camps. The largest camp, situated in Zbąszyń (Bentschen), existed until the summer of 1939, because the inmates could neither return to Germany nor enter Poland (Doc. 203).

The family of Herschel Grynszpan was deported from Hanover to the Polish border. After Grynszpan, who was then living in Paris, learned of the deportation through a letter from his sister, he shot Legation Councillor Ernst vom Rath in the German embassy in Paris on 7 November 1938 and critically wounded him. The very same day, the editors of all the German newspapers received instructions to report on the assassination attempt 'in the biggest way' and in the process to emphasize the responsibility of 'world

<sup>135</sup> Sybil Milton, 'The Expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany: October 1938 to July 1939', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, vol. 29 (1984), pp. 169–199; Trude Maurer, 'Abschiebung und Attentat: Die Ausweisung der polnischen Juden und der Vorwand für die "Kristallnacht"', in Walter H. Pehle (ed.), *Der Judenpogrom 1938: Von der 'Reichskristallnacht' zum Völkermord* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1988), pp. 52–73; Jerzy Tomaszewski, 'Letters from Zbąszyń', *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 19 (1988), pp. 289–315; Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Auftakt zur Vernichtung: Die Vertreibung polnischer Juden aus Deutschland im Jahre 1938*, trans. Victoria Pollmann (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2002 [Polish edn, 1998]); Yfaat Weiss, *Deutsche und polnische Juden vor dem Holocaust: Jüdische Identität zwischen Staatsbürgerschaft und Ethnizität 1933–1940* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 195–217.

<sup>136</sup> Notes made by the state secretary, 8 Nov. 1938; *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*, series D: 1937–1945, vol. 5: *Polen, Südosteuropa, Lateinamerika, Klein- und Mittelstaaten, Juni 1937 – März 1939* (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, 1953), p. 102.

<sup>137</sup> Reich-Ranicki, *Mein Leben*, pp. 157–160; see also Rudi and Trude Gräber, 'Fehlgeschlagene Abschiebung nach Polen', in Charlotte Ueckert-Hilbert (ed.), *Fremd in der eigenen Stadt: Erinnerungen jüdischer Emigranten aus Hamburg* (Hamburg: Junius, 1989), pp. 95–100.

Jewry' for the act.<sup>138</sup> On the night of 7 November, synagogues, Jewish schools, and the shops and homes of Jews were raided and demolished in Kassel, Bebra, and other towns in northern Hesse (Doc. 123), and on 8 November there were similar events in Magdeburg-Anhalt.<sup>139</sup> That day, the *Völkischer Beobachter* almost openly called for a pogrom:

It is clear that the German people will draw its own conclusions from this new crime. It is an impossible state of affairs that within our borders, hundreds of thousands of Jews still control entire shopping streets, crowd the places of public entertainment and, as 'foreign' landlords, pocket the money of German tenants, while other members of their race outside the country call for war against Germany and gun down German officials.<sup>140</sup>

On the evening of 9 November, as was customary on the anniversary of the failed Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, leading NSDAP men assembled in the Old Town Hall in Munich. After the news of the diplomat's death had been announced, Hitler spoke briefly with Goebbels and then left the gathering. Goebbels called on the Gauleiter and SA commanders who were present to make sure that Grynszpan's deed did not go unatoned. The next day, he described the short conversation with Hitler in his diary:

He decides: let the demonstrations continue. Pull back the police. Let the Jews feel the anger of the people for once. That is right. I immediately give corresponding instructions to the police and Party. Then I briefly address the Party leaders along the same lines. Vigorous applause. Everybody dashes to the telephones right away. Now the people will take action.<sup>141</sup>

Towards 10:30 p.m., the gathering in Munich's Old Town Hall broke up, and the National Socialist functionaries in attendance briefed their Gau leaders and Gau propaganda officials by telephone. Everywhere in the Reich, SA men and NSDAP activists were commemorating the anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch on this evening. Already somewhat drunk, they had certainly also been fired up by the news of the assassination, and in this highly charged atmosphere they were verbally informed of vom Rath's death and told that the Party was not officially calling for anti-Jewish actions but would not quell spontaneous displays of outrage.

138 Wolfgang Benz, 'Der Rückfall in die Barbarei: Bericht über den Pogrom', in Pehle (ed.), *Der Judenpogrom 1938*, pp. 13–51, here p. 15; Jonathan Kirch, *The Short, Strange Life of Herschel Grynszpan: A Boy Avenger, a Nazi Diplomat, and a Murder in Paris* (New York: Liveright, 2013).

139 Wolf-Arno Kropat, *Kristallnacht in Hessen: Der Judenpogrom vom November 1938. Eine Dokumentation* (Wiesbaden: Kommission für die Geschichte der Juden in Hessen, 1988), pp. 19–47; Benz, 'Der Rückfall', p. 17; Alan E. Steinweis, *Kristallnacht 1938* (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 22–27; *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, part 1: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, vol. 6: August 1938 – Juni 1939, ed. Elke Frohlich (Munich: Saur, 1998), p. 180 (entry for 10 Nov. 1938).

140 *Völkischer Beobachter*, 8 Nov. 1938, cited in Elisabeth Klamper, 'Die "Affäre Herschel Grynszpan"', in *Der Novemberpogrom 1938: Die 'Reichskristallnacht' in Wien* (Vienna: Museen der Stadt Wien, 1989), pp. 53–59, here p. 56.

141 Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, part 1, vol. 6, p. 180 (entry for 10 Nov. 1938); Uwe Dietrich Adam, 'Wie spontan war der Pogrom?', in Pehle (ed.), *Der Judenpogrom 1938*, pp. 74–93.

Shortly before midnight, the head of the Gestapo Central Office, Heinrich Müller, telegraphed all the State Police offices and regional headquarters, saying that, 'within a very short time', actions against Jews would begin all over the country, and that they were not to be interfered with, though looting was to be stopped. Müller said that 'the most severe measures' were to be taken against Jews found in possession of weapons. Further, preparations were to be made for the arrest of 20,000 to 30,000 Jews – well-to-do ones in particular – in every part of the Reich (Doc. 125). After the synagogues were already ablaze in quite a number of cities, Heydrich sent out an express telex at 1:20 a.m. to the local SD and Gestapo offices, stating Müller's instructions more precisely: care was to be taken that the lives and property of non-Jews were not endangered; in addition, the property of foreign Jews was to be excluded from the devastation. Heydrich reinforced the ban on looting, the instructions to secure archival materials of historical significance and the order to arrest wealthy Jews in particular – 'initially only healthy male Jews who are not so advanced in years' (Doc. 126).<sup>142</sup>

In many places, the SA and Hitler Youth had already been asked on 8 November to ready themselves for 'action' against the Jews. As a result, during the night of 9/10 November, substantial crowds of people quickly gathered, set fire to synagogues, surrounded the buildings where Jews lived, drove the inhabitants into the street, beat them, and smashed their homes to pieces. The fire brigade, as a rule, intervened only to keep the flames from spreading, but occasionally helped to start fires as well: 'Evidently, setting fire to the synagogues was often difficult and succeeded, as in Essen, only after expert assistance from the fire brigade.'<sup>143</sup>

In many places, citizens who were not part of organized groups also joined in with the raids, attacks, and arson, and sometimes they formed cordons of either cheering or horrified spectators (Doc. 131). However, in most cases, the perpetrators were members of the SA, NSDAP, or Hitler Youth. They had been requested to appear in civilian clothing. In numerous cities, especially in north-western Germany, the young offenders did not live in the place itself but rather were brought in by truck from a distance. This prevented both the identification of the assailants by the victims and the potential sympathy of the assailants, should there have been personal acquaintances among the maltreated. Such an approach indicates that there may have been, at least in some places, detailed preparations for the pogroms, especially since every 'pogrom crew', as is reported for the Duisburg area, was equipped with 'carefully prepared lists of addresses'. Jewish and non-Jewish eyewitnesses alike reported in many cases that the youthful offenders were heavily inebriated, and inferred:

So they either got them drunk beforehand in order to get them in the mood for a pogrom – it is known that the consumption of alcohol has a particularly rapid effect on male adolescents – or they stopped off somewhere during the one-hour drive to the scene of the action and gave out free beer.<sup>144</sup>

<sup>142</sup> Steinweis, *Kristallnacht*, pp. 50–53.

<sup>143</sup> Ulrich Herbert, 'Von der "Reichskristallnacht" zum "Holocaust": Der 9. November und das Ende des "Radauantisemitismus"', in Thomas Hoffmann, Hanno Loewy, and Harry Stein (eds.), *Pogromnacht und Holocaust: Frankfurt, Weimar, Buchenwald ... Die schwierige Erinnerung an die Stationen der Vernichtung* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1994), pp. 58–80, here p. 67.

<sup>144</sup> Barkow, Gross, and Lenarz (eds.), *Novemberpogrom 1938*, pp. 357–358.

According to official data, on that night ninety-one Jews were killed, thirty-six people seriously injured, and several Jewish women raped. The actual number of victims, though not known precisely, was certainly higher. In Bremen and the surrounding area, five people were shot dead, including the 78-year-old doctor Adolph Goldberg and his wife Martha, née Sussmann. The murderers were SA men between the ages of 23 and 53 (Doc. 134).<sup>145</sup> In addition, more than 1,000 synagogues were set alight, demolished, or even blown up,<sup>146</sup> and 7,000 to 7,500 shops owned by Jews and at least 177 homes were destroyed and looted. The damage to glass on the so-called Night of Broken Glass was assessed at 6 million Reichsmarks, and the overall loss amounted to 39 million Reichsmarks.<sup>147</sup>

The US consul in Leipzig reported to Washington:

Having demolished dwellings and hurled most of the movable effects on to the streets, the insatiably sadistic perpetrators threw many of the trembling residents into a small stream that flows through the Zoological Gardens, commanding horrified spectators to spit at them, smear them with mud and jeer at their plight ... The slightest manifestation of sympathy evoked a veritable fury on the part of the perpetrators.<sup>148</sup>

The next day, the acts of violence continued, now frequently with the participation of the local population; in some places, teachers led entire school classes to the wrecked homes and shops of the Jews and urged the children to call out antisemitic slogans or applaud the removal of Jews placed under arrest.<sup>149</sup> Almost everywhere, curious onlookers gathered to have a look at the damage or grab another item from the displays in broken shop windows. From Aachen and Essen, eyewitnesses reported that after the looting, the booty was sold in the middle of the street, and shoes and clothes were exchanged for the appropriate sizes.<sup>150</sup> The SD's reports on the mood of the people documented very diverse reactions to the pogroms, ranging from explicit approval of the

145 Wilhelm Lührs, 'Der Pogrom vom 9./10. November 1938', in *'Reichskristallnacht' in Bremen: Vorgeschichte, Hergang und gerichtliche Bewältigung des Pogroms vom 9./10. Nov. 1938* (Bremen: Steintor, 1988), pp. 39–59, here pp. 43–46.

146 Adolf Diamant counted 1,802 synagogues and Jewish places of worship in Germany; around 1,200 of them were destroyed in the National Socialist era, most during the pogroms and a smaller number in the war. For Austria, Diamant was able to identify 95 destroyed synagogues and places of worship in Vienna alone: Adolf Diamant, *Zerstörte Synagogen vom November 1938: Eine Bestandsaufnahme* (Frankfurt am Main: A. Diamant, 1978), pp. xiv–xv.

147 Heinz Lauber, *Judenpogrom: 'Reichskristallnacht' November 1938 in Großdeutschland: Daten, Fakten, Dokumente, Quellentexte und Bewertungen* (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1981), p. 123; Erhard Roy Wiehn, *Novemberpogrom: Die 'Reichskristallnacht' in den Erinnerungen jüdischer Zeitzeugen der Kehilla Kadoscha Konstanz 50 Jahre danach als Dokumentation des Gedenkens* (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 1988), p. 52; Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich in Power, 1933–1939* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 585 and 590; Martin Gilbert, *Kristallnacht: Prelude to Destruction* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2006).

148 Cited in Wolfgang Mönninghoff, *Enteignung der Juden: Wunder der Wirtschaft, Erbe der Deutschen* (Hamburg/Vienna: Europa, 2001), p. 197.

149 Dieter Obst, *'Reichskristallnacht': Ursachen und Folgen des antisemitischen Pogroms vom November 1938* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991), p. 352.

150 Barkow, Gross, and Lenarz (eds.), *Novemberpogrom 1938*, p. 363.

'reckoning' with 'Jewry' to abashed silence to ostentatious professions of sympathy for those who had been humiliated and mistreated. In the foreground was criticism of the destruction of valuable goods and of the tactics employed, viewed by many as barbaric and medieval.<sup>151</sup> However, such criticism did not necessarily diminish Aryan neighbours' interest in acquiring Jewish property at a low price.

In some places, the police also arrested women on the night of the pogroms, but generally released them again after a few hours or the next day. The Jewish men who were arrested that night were first held in sports halls, police stations, and town halls and then transferred the next day, sometimes after a humiliating passage through city streets lined with people, to Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen concentration camps. In the following days and nights, the arrests continued. They affected a total of 25,000 to 30,000 Jewish men. The camps were not equipped for such a large number of prisoners, and conditions were correspondingly catastrophic (Docs. 227, 229). In Buchenwald, guards and Kapos (prisoner functionaries) mistreated Jewish prisoners and tried in this way to extort valuable articles that had been brought along to the camp.<sup>152</sup> In Sachsenhausen, the SS guards, the majority of whom the prisoners estimated to be barely over the age of 20, had a predilection for tormenting overweight Jews, rabbis, and Jewish members of the professional classes, and forced Jewish prisoners to introduce themselves as *Saujuden* (Jewish pigs).<sup>153</sup> In Dachau, at least 185 of the new arrivals died within a few weeks; in Buchenwald, the comparable figure was 233.<sup>154</sup> For the Sachsenhausen camp, a report at the end of 1938 estimated the number of dead after the pogroms at 80 to 90 from a total of 6,000 prisoners: 'Causes of death are: 1. exhaustion, 2. absence of customary medical treatment, medication and nutrition, 3. septic diseases, 4. consequences of freezing temperatures and pneumonia.' An additional mode of death is described for Sachsenhausen as follows: 'Anybody who didn't stand straight enough during drill had to "roll", meaning roll over and over in the sand until he lost consciousness. At such times these unfortunates often bumped against the electrified fence and were killed by the electric shock or by the sentry, who noted that the prisoner had crossed the line.'<sup>155</sup> No reliable figures are available concerning those who became deranged or took their own lives as a result of the detention conditions or the torture.

The mass arrests of Jewish men served two purposes: The first was to get prosperous Jews, pressured by various forms of ill treatment, to transfer their assets to non-Jews. Second, the SD and Gestapo sought to accelerate the expulsion of the Jews from Germany. Most of those arrested were released in the weeks following the pogroms, provided

151 See Peter Longerich, 'Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!' *Die Deutschen und die Judenverfolgung 1933–1945* (Munich: Siedler, 2006), pp. 129–135; Frank Bajohr and Dieter Pohl, *Der Holocaust als offenes Geheimnis: Die Deutschen, die NS-Führung und die Alliierten* (Munich: Beck, 2006), pp. 37–45; Kulka and Jäckel (eds.), *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, pp. 353–364.

152 David A. Hackett (ed.), *Der Buchenwald-Report: Bericht über das Konzentrationslager Buchenwald bei Weimar* (Munich: Beck, 1996), pp. 283–287; Volkhard Knigge, Rikola-Gunnar Lüttgenau, Harry Stein, *Konzentrationslager Buchenwald 1937–1945: Begleitband zur ständigen historischen Ausstellung* (Göttingen: Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, 1999), pp. 76–80; Pingel, *Häftlinge*, pp. 91–96.

153 Barkow, Gross, and Lenarz (eds.), *Novemberpogrom 1938*, pp. 571, 577, 582, and 587.

154 Schüler-Springorum, 'Masseneinweisungen', p. 162; Orth, *Das System*, p. 53.

155 Barkow, Gross, and Lenarz (eds.), *Novemberpogrom 1938*, pp. 487 and 573.

they were able to present an exit visa or pledged to leave the country within a few days or weeks.

In a number of countries, the news of the extreme acts of violence led to a swing in public opinion in favour of Jewish refugees. The British government, with its willingness to take in Jewish children, set an example, and after the pogroms President Roosevelt recalled the US ambassador from Berlin. In general, however, immigration regulations were further tightened after the pogroms. In addition, the increased scramble for departure meant that emigration remained extremely difficult for German and Austrian Jews.

More than any other event before the beginning of the systematic deportations, the November pogroms marked a watershed in the collective consciousness of the Jews. In the preceding years of the National Socialist regime, the Jews in Germany had certainly been subject to victimization of many kinds and frequently also to antisemitically motivated violence on the part of their fellow countrymen, but in most cases these discriminatory acts were localized and more or less predictable.<sup>156</sup> The harassment of the Viennese Jews, which continued from mid March well into April 1938, however, made it clear that pogroms could occur not only in Russia or Romania but also in the midst of sophisticated bourgeois Vienna. After the pogrom night in November, those Jews who had thus far been unwilling to emigrate now feared for their lives. Even Victor Klemperer was left speechless. In his diary, an entry is not made again until 22 November: 'First illness, then the car accident, then, following the Grünspan shooting business in Paris, there came persecution, and since then the struggle to emigrate.' More than a year later, on New Year's Eve 1939, Klemperer noted, looking back at the persecution of the Jews and the first Christmas of the Second World War: 'I believe the pogroms of November '38 made less impression on the nation than cutting the bar of chocolate [ration] for Christmas.'<sup>157</sup>

The pogroms signified a turning point in anti-Jewish policy. In the preceding years the interrelationship between anti-Jewish terror on the part of the Party and SA rank and file, on the one hand, and antisemitic laws and administrative rules, on the other hand, had led to the successive radicalization of Jewish policies and the marginalization of the Jewish minority – although this was not a linear process but rather took place in a carefully considered manner, also based on considerations of expediency. After 9 November, the German leadership cast aside its remaining concerns about diplomatic entanglements or economic disadvantages. The consequences of the pogroms may not have been welcomed by all Nazi functionaries, but they all made use of the surge in radicalization to pursue objectives of their own. Göring may have thundered against the losses inflicted on the national economy by the pogroms, but he rejoiced at the newly created room for manoeuvre. Together with the Reich Ministry of Finance and the Reich Ministry of Economics, he now put into practice the long-delayed 'de-Jewification' of the economy and the dispossession of the Jews. The rapid succession of anti-Jewish measures in the days after 9 November shows that the state and Party institutions had carried out preparatory work in order to strike out in a major way against the Jews at a suitable opportunity.

<sup>156</sup> Michael Wildt, *Hitler's Volksgemeinschaft and the Dynamics of Racial Exclusion: Violence against Jews in Provincial Germany, 1919–1939*, trans. Bernard Heise (New York: Berghahn, 2012 [German edn, 2007]), p. 232.

<sup>157</sup> Klemperer, *I Shall Bear Witness*, pp. 332 and 394 (entries for 22 Nov. 1938 and 31 Dec. 1939).

Within six weeks, all the laws and regulations essential for that purpose appeared in the *Reichsgesetzblatt* (Reich Law Gazette). For the diplomats of the Reich Foreign Office, the international loss of reputation brought about by the pogroms certainly came at an inconvenient moment; nevertheless, the ministry demanded merely that it be involved, should any expropriation affecting foreign Jews take place (Doc. 146). Goebbels, who as Gauleiter of Berlin had long been urging that the capital should be made 'free of Jews', was in any case able to deliver a positive assessment after the extreme acts of violence, which had largely been directed by him. The same was true for the SA: it had been granted the prerogative of striking out, in contrast to the SS, which was enjoined to hold back. The SA's base, which otherwise only rarely had an opportunity to exhibit its own militancy, except during marches, was allowed to demonstrate its old strength and to run riot with regard to the Jews. Only in isolated instances were violations of the ban on looting or crimes ranging to murder punished afterwards.

In some respects, the antisemitic harassment may have come at an inopportune time also for the protagonists of controlled expulsion, such as the SD. But it seized the moment to bring into the discussion its proposals for visibly identifying and ghettoizing the Jews (Doc. 149) and extending to the Reich the Vienna-tested model of a central office for expulsion financed by the Jews themselves (Doc. 243). The responsibility for the systematic expulsion of the Jews and the police control of those remaining behind lay henceforth with the Security Police and the SD. The SD could now prove that its silent methods ultimately accomplished more than the pressure from the streets.<sup>158</sup> The basis for this belief was provided by the pogroms; after all, huge numbers of Jewish men were subsequently directly under the control of the Gestapo and the SS. From November 1938 on, arrests, interrogations, referrals to concentration camps, and expulsions through an expedited procedure were among the traumatic experiences which scarcely any Jewish family was spared.

After the November pogroms, maintaining Jewish religious life became a struggle. Each community strived to find places of worship after the destruction of the synagogues and the confiscation of other communal institutions, to find replacements for the rabbis, teachers, and spiritual leaders who had been arrested and thereafter emigrated on a large scale, and to cope with diminishing numbers of community members. In the small towns and villages, the increased rate of emigration led to the dissolution of many communities. Other communities upheld their adherence to religious life, in spite of the persecution. This was especially noticeable in Lower Franconia. The situation grew steadily worse all over Germany, however, as prayer venues and other Jewish property continued to be confiscated by the German authorities.

### *The 'De-Jewification' of the Economy*

By 1938, around 50 to 70 per cent of Jewish businesses, depending on local circumstances, had already been sold or liquidated. In Heidelberg, for example, 51.5 per cent of the sixty-six retail and wholesale operations that had existed in 1933 were affected. Two

<sup>158</sup> Herbert, *Best*, p. 221.

thirds of these Aryanized firms had been liquidated and one third sold.<sup>159</sup> At the end of 1938, the pogroms provided the opportunity to rigorously implement the 'definitive elimination' of the Jews from the economy, a measure that had long been desired and for which preparations had been under way for months.

On 12 November a discussion, chaired by Göring, about future Jewish policy took place in the Reich Ministry of Aviation. More than one hundred ministers, state secretaries, and top officials, including Adolf Eichmann, participated. Göring declared that the Führer had tasked him with ensuring that the Jewish question be 'settled in one way or another' (Doc. 146). He announced the rapid Aryanization of the economy, with priority given to retail shops because they were most readily visible to the public. The Aryanization of larger enterprises was something Göring reserved for the Office of the Four-Year Plan, which he headed. As in Vienna, firms were to be shut down in those branches of the economy where there was 'an excess' of them. Buyers of Aryanized businesses were to be selected on the basis of objective criteria, Party members given preference only by way of exception, and proceeds from the sales transferred into the state coffers.

The very same day, the government published the 'Regulation on the Atonement Fine on Jews of German Nationality' in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, levying on Jewish Germans a fine of 1 billion Reichsmarks (Doc. 142). How this sum was to be raised was decided by the Reich Minister of Finance. He converted the 'atonement' (*Sühneleistung*), frequently also known as the 'Jewish penance' (*Judenbuße*), into a property tax of 20 per cent, to be paid in four instalments and 'without special prompting' on 15 December 1938 and 15 February, 15 May, and 15 August 1939.<sup>160</sup> On 18 November 1938 the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted with regard to another in-house speech given by Göring the day before: 'Reich's finances in extremely critical condition. Short-term relief firstly from the billion demanded of Jews and also state profits from Aryanization of Jewish businesses.' The representative of the Reich Ministry of Finance to the Reichsbank feared during these days 'that the Reich won't be able to pay its debts'. Because the money extorted from the Jews was not immediately available, on 23 November 1938 the representatives of the big German banks offered 'to provide the Reich financial administration with a line of credit secured by Jewish securities to be acquired in the future'.<sup>161</sup>

159 According to Barkai, the number of Jewish firms dropped by 60 to 70 per cent during this period: Avraham Barkai, "'Schicksalsjahr 1938": Kontinuität und Verschärfung der wirtschaftlichen Ausplünderung der deutschen Juden', in Pehle (ed.), *Der Judenpogrom 1938*, pp. 94–117, here p. 96; Arno Weckbecker, *Die Judenverfolgung in Heidelberg 1933–1945* (Heidelberg: Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1985), p. 122.

160 Implementing Regulation on the Atonement Fine on Jews, 21 Nov. 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, I, pp. 1638–1640. The reported assets of the German Jews actually amounted to 7.1 billion Reichsmarks. However, the Reich Ministry of Finance had subtracted the real estate and business assets, and determined that the liquid component totalled 4.8 billion Reichsmarks (savings accounts and securities). The Reich Minister of Finance decreed the 20 per cent property tax on this basis. Right after the war began, he raised it to 25 per cent: Second Implementing Regulation on the Atonement Fine on Jews, 19 Oct. 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, I, p. 2059; see also Martin Friedenberger, *Fiskalische Ausplünderung: Die Berliner Steuer- und Finanzverwaltung und die jüdische Bevölkerung 1933–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 2008), pp. 197–243; Christiane Kuller, *Bürokratie und Verbrechen: Antisemitische Finanzpolitik und Verwaltungspraxis im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013).

161 Cited in Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries*, pp. 47–50.

For the damage incurred during the night of the pogroms, the injured parties were to be held financially liable. If they were insured, the insurance companies paid for the damage, though these payments – in close cooperation with the insurance companies – were confiscated in their entirety and credited to the Reich.

Furthermore, from then on Jews were no longer allowed to operate independent skilled craft enterprises, retail outlets, market stalls, or mail-order businesses (Doc. 143). On 3 December a regulation was issued that prohibited Jews from selling, without a permit, businesses, securities, jewellery, gold, works of art, antiquities, and real estate; if the sale was authorized by the state, the Jewish sellers had to invest the proceeds in Reich bonds, so-called 'Reich promissory notes' (*Reichsschuldscheine*) (Doc. 193). The same day, Himmler's police regulation was issued, declaring the driving licences of Jews invalid. On 5 December there was another cut in the pensions of retired Jewish civil servants.<sup>162</sup>

The meeting of 12 November was followed by a series of discussions, in which the practical consequences of the new course of anti-Jewish policy were considered and organizational measures agreed upon. On 6 December, Göring assembled the Gauleiter in the Reich Ministry of Aviation. In his address, he once again warned the Party representatives emphatically against violent excess and personal enrichment.<sup>163</sup> In addition, he impressed on them that they must not interfere in the Aryanization of the economy and that the proceeds should benefit solely the Reich. He referred repeatedly to decisions made by Hitler during the previous weeks. According to these decisions, there was to be no requirement for Jews to wear identifying markers, at least for the time being, and the setting up of specific residential districts for the Jews was to proceed only gradually and was under no circumstances to be mentioned in the press.

On 9 December, Heydrich and his deputy, the chief of administration in the Gestapo Central Office, Werner Best, announced the planned measures to the heads of the regional State Police offices. On 16 December, the Regierungspräsidenten and Reichsstatthalter were informed of the latest decisions. At the conference in the Reich Ministry of Aviation on 12 November, Heydrich had proposed far-reaching measures, which, though not implemented immediately, would prove to be indicative of future Jewish policy. Heydrich's suggestion that restricted areas be set up for Jews was reflected in a police regulation of 28 November that limited the Jews' freedom of movement in public places. One month later, Göring decreed, in addition to the prohibition on using railway sleeping and dining cars, a 'Jew ban' (*Judenbann*) for certain public buildings. He also ordered the setting up of so-called 'Jew houses' (*Judenhäuser*), in which Jews were to be concentrated in the medium term (Doc. 215). In Berlin, Albert Speer, as General Building Inspector for the Reich capital, had been urging for months that Jewish tenants of large apartments should be forcibly resettled to gain more creative leeway for the plans to erect new buildings (Doc. 101).

162 Seventh Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law, 5 Dec. 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, I, p. 1751.

163 Heim and Aly, 'Staatliche Ordnung', p. 395.

### *Between the Pogroms and the Outbreak of War*

After six years of National Socialist rule, most Aryan Germans had accepted that Jews could not be part of the *Volkgemeinschaft*.<sup>164</sup> They regarded the 'emigration' of the Jews as a situation that did not need further scrutiny or questioning. On 30 January 1939, Hitler announced in his speech to the Reichstag that, in the event of a new world war for which 'international Jewish financiers' were responsible, 'the result will be the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe' (Doc. 248). With these words, Hitler was not yet formulating a concrete plan for genocide, even though it may seem that way in retrospect. He was ascribing in advance the guilt for an imminent war to 'the Jews'. With his threat, he increased the pressure at home for expulsion as well as the pressure on other countries to accept the persecuted. He signalled to both the potential countries of refuge and the Jewish organizations, which were following with scepticism the negotiations concerning the Schacht–Ruble Plan, that Jews were not safe in Germany in the long term.<sup>165</sup> Hitler's speech increased the panic of the German Jews and made it clear to them that in the event of war, they would be the first victims, particularly as the openly but vaguely articulated threats of annihilation addressed to the Jews had been multiplying since the November pogroms and phrases such as 'final solution to the Jewish question' were cropping up in the newspapers (Doc. 148).

On 10 December 1938, Heydrich announced the founding of a 'Reich Association for Jewish Emigration Aid', which was eventually established under the name 'Reich Central Agency for Jewish Emigration' in January 1939 (Doc. 243). The founding came about in the context of a comprehensive reorganization of Jewish establishments in Germany, which was partly imposed and partly co-created by Jewish representatives under duress. After the November pogroms, all the administrative offices and contact centres of the Jewish communities and organizations had been shut down by the Gestapo. In accordance with the precepts of SD Jewish policy and Eichmann's Viennese model, the organization of Jewry was now to be centralized in the Old Reich, too, and aligned more closely with the objective of forced emigration.

Independently and for other reasons, the Reich Representation of Jews, headed by Leo Baeck (1873–1956), had already been discussing an organizational revamp for several months.<sup>166</sup> As a result of the new legal situation, the Jewish representatives feared a decline in membership: after April 1938, the Jewish communities no longer had the status of corporations under public law, to which all members of the Jewish religious community belonged as a matter of course; instead, they now had to formally join the communities, which henceforth were dealt with under the law governing associations (Doc. 23). The Reich Representation believed that this development could be counteracted by founding a new umbrella organization. While centralization seemed suspect to the persecutors before the pogroms, the SD supported such a step soon afterwards. In February 1939 the Reich Representation was reorganized and became the Reich Association of Jews in Germany, established by law on 4 July 1939 with the Tenth Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law.

164 Bajohr and Pohl, *Der Holocaust als offenes Geheimnis*, p. 43.

165 Longerich, *Holocaust*, pp. 124–125.

166 Otto Dov Kulka (ed.), *Deutsches Judentum unter dem Nationalsozialismus*, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), pp. 410–430.

Certainly, the Reich Association differed on significant points from its democratically structured precursor institution. The communities had no voice in matters of the umbrella organization, whose representatives were appointed rather than elected and were answerable to the Gestapo, later to the Reich Security Main Office.<sup>167</sup> An additional major difference from the old organization, which had been built on the basis of religious affiliation, was that from now on, everyone who was regarded as a Jew under the Nuremberg Laws had to belong to the new Reich Association. So-called ‘full Jews’ (*Volljuden*) or ‘Jews by definition’ (*Geltungsjuden*) who had converted to Christianity were also required to belong.<sup>168</sup> The German Jews were thus forced to apply the criterion of race within their own ranks.<sup>169</sup>

Despite the extensive organizational changes, the same individuals who had previously worked for the Reich Representation continued to work for the Reich Association, in the same offices on Kantstraße in Berlin and with the same priorities, though with dwindling room for manoeuvre and under firmer control.<sup>170</sup> Leo Baeck retained the role of president for the Reich Association too; its routine business, however, was handled primarily by Otto Hirsch (1885–1941) and Paul Eppstein (1902–1944). They had to report regularly to the Gestapo and received instructions from it. After every summons to the Gestapo, Eppstein and Hirsch prepared a written record, and in their convoluted, often sterile formulations the power relationships are revealed in a bleak and distressing fashion (Docs. 204, 259, 297).

On the one hand, the employees of the Reich Association were subject to the orders, arbitrariness, and excesses of German police officials, and in case of doubt they bore personal responsibility for the compliance of German Jews as a whole with the demands of the Reich authorities. On the other hand, they obeyed their own ethic of responsibility, their sense of duty, and some were doubtless guided by personal ambition as well. They saw that they were frequently being exploited, yet attempted nonetheless to make the conditions of life as tolerable as possible for those persecuted.

After the November pogroms, the Reich Association had the task of reconstructing the Jewish school system. Jewish school pupils were now permanently prohibited from being taught in state schools. In some cases, Jewish schools had been destroyed during

167 On the history of the Reich Representation and the Reich Association, see Herbert Strauss, ‘Jewish Autonomy within the Limits of National Socialist Policy: The Communities and the Reichsvertretung’, in Arnold Paucker, *Die Juden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland 1933–1943* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1986), pp. 125–152; Otto Dov Kulka, ‘The Reichsvereinigung and the Fate of the German Jews, 1938/1939–1942’, *ibid.*, pp. 353–363; Kulka (ed.), *Deutsches Judentum*; Avraham Barkai, ‘Von Berlin nach Theresienstadt: Zur politischen Biographie von Leo Baeck 1933–1945’, in *Hoffnung und Untergang: Studien zur deutsch-jüdischen Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Hamburg: Christians, 1998), pp. 141–166; Beate Meyer, ‘Gratwanderung zwischen Verantwortung und Verstrickung: Die Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland und die jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin 1938–1945’, in Beate Meyer and Hermann Simon (eds.), *Juden in Berlin 1938–1945* (Berlin: Philo, 2000), pp. 291–338; Friedländer, *Nazi Germany*, vol. 1, pp. 60–61; Beate Meyer, *A Fatal Balancing Act: The Dilemma of the Reich Association of Jews in Germany, 1939–1945*, trans. William Templer (Oxford: Berghahn, 2013 [German edn, 2011]).

168 A *Volljude* was someone with three or four Jewish grandparents. *Geltungsjude* was used for people who had converted to Judaism for marriage purposes or for other reasons.

169 Rosenstrauch (ed.), *Aus Nachbarn wurden Juden*, p. 46.

170 Barkai, ‘Von Berlin nach Theresienstadt’, p. 152.

the pogroms; in others, the teachers had been arrested.<sup>171</sup> In addition, the employees of the Reich Association were concerned with accelerating emigration and, with this in mind, retraining the younger Jews in vocational courses. Increasing numbers of Jewish establishments were closed; prominent representatives of Jewry, who until then had regarded it as their duty to maintain Jewish life in Germany – even if only for a transitional period – now emigrated. Jewish schools were transferred abroad; Zionists, who until then had prepared young people for life in Palestine and accompanied them to the Promised Land, now decided not to return to Germany.

Hopelessness and depression spread among those who had no prospect of emigration. In November 1938 there was a marked increase in the number of Jews in the Reich who took their own lives. According to estimates, the figure was between 300 and 500 – the highest level reached since the dismissal of the Jewish civil servants and the boycott in the spring months of 1933, and one not reached again until the beginning of the deportations in autumn 1941. It was most notably those over the age of 50, and more women than men, who lost the courage to face life as a result of the terror during the pogroms and the humiliating antisemitic regulations. Some, still living in their devastated homes, committed suicide along with their spouse or siblings (Doc. 225). The 76-year-old former teacher Hedwig Jastrow took her own life at the end of November 1938. In her suicide note, she made it clear that her death was neither a sudden irrational act nor an accident. She could not bear the humiliation of having to adopt the mandatory name ‘Sara’ (Doc. 181).

Sometimes it was concrete threats, for example, from the Gestapo, or existential fears that made death seem the only way out, but often the cause was general, profound despair. Many of those who ended their own lives under extreme pressure had long been preparing for this step: the barbiturate Veronal, which most Jews used to commit suicide, was difficult to obtain and dispensed only in small quantities, and doctors who could prescribe it were subject to strict controls. The increased frequency of suicide is reported in many private records; it was evidently not uncommon for Jews to know of several cases of suicide or attempted suicide in their circle of acquaintances alone (Docs. 123, 153, 170, 185, 225, 291). In the years that followed, this last resort became an increasingly natural choice.<sup>172</sup>

When the German leadership escalated the conflict with Poland in the summer of 1939 and was ever more clearly headed for war, Hitler’s ‘proclamation’ of January that

171 Joseph Walk, *Jüdische Schule und Erziehung im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt am Main: A. Hain, 1991), pp. 205–215; Monika Richarz, ‘Zwischen Berlin und New York: Adolf Leschnitzer, der erste Professor für jüdische Geschichte in der Bundesrepublik’, in Jürgen Matthäus and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (eds.), *Deutsche, Juden, Völkermord: Der Holocaust als Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), pp. 73–86. On the consequences of the pogroms for Jewish school pupils, see Robert Goldmann, *Flucht in die Welt: Ein Lebensweg nach New York* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1996), pp. 70–72; Eva Wohl, *So einfach liegen die Dinge nicht: Erinnerungen von Deutschland nach Israel* (Bonn: Lempertz, 2004), pp. 69–72.

172 Konrad Kwiet, ‘The Ultimate Refuge: Suicide in the Jewish Community under the Nazis’, *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, vol. 29 (1984), pp. 135–168; Konrad Kwiet and Helmut Eschwege, *Selbstbehauptung und Widerstand: Deutsche Juden im Kampf um Existenz und Menschenwürde 1933–1945* (Hamburg: Christians, 1984), pp. 194–215; Christian Goeschel, ‘Suicides of German Jews in the Third Reich’, *German History*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2007), pp. 22–45; Anna Fischer, *Erzwungener Freitod: Spuren und Zeugnisse in den Freitod getriebener Juden der Jahre 1938–1945* (Berlin: Textpunkt Verlag Edition Berlin, 2007); Christian Goeschel, *Suicide in Nazi Germany* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 96–118.

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year became a concrete threat for German Jews. On 14 August, Victor Klemperer noted, 'The same tension for weeks, always growing and always unchanged. Vox populi: He attacks in September, partitions Poland with Russia, England–France are impotent.' Some of Klemperer's acquaintances opined, 'He does not dare attack, keeps the peace and stays in power for years. Jewish opinion: bloody pogrom on the first day of the war. Whichever of these three things may happen: our situation is desperate.'<sup>173</sup>

<sup>173</sup> Klemperer, *I Shall Bear Witness*, p. 370 (entry for 14 August 1939).



## List of Documents

- 1 On 1 January 1938 Amalie Malsch writes to her son in the USA about waiting to emigrate
- 2 On 5 January 1938 Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler orders the expulsion of Soviet Jews from Germany
- 3 On 14 January 1938 the Munich Gestapo notes that Jewish *Mischlinge* with illegitimate children are not forbidden to meet with one other
- 4 On 19 January 1938 the director of the Reich Archives calls on the Reich Minister of the Interior to forbid Jews to use the archives
- 5 On 27 January 1938 Luise Solmitz describes her daughter's social exclusion
- 6 *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 27 January 1938: article on the economic restrictions placed on Jews and the consequences for their emigration prospects
- 7 *Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt*, 30 January 1938: article in which the Relief Association of German Jews promotes the emigration of women
- 8 On 30 January 1938 Rabbi Löwenstamm asks his colleague Max Dienemann for advice on whether a child from a mixed marriage may be accepted into the Jewish faith
- 9 In January 1938 a fifth-year school pupil writes an essay on the subject of Jews
- 10 *Israelitisches Familienblatt*, 3 February 1938: article on the prospects for Jewish youth
- 11 *Berliner Tageblatt*, 3 February 1938: article about the Jews in Poland
- 12 On 13 February 1938 the Oberpräsident of East Prussia writes to the German Council of Municipalities to ask how to deal with Jewish female patients in the Regional Women's Hospital
- 13 *Neues Volk*, February 1938: article about international antisemitism
- 14 On 2 March 1938 Luise Solmitz writes about discriminatory regulations against Jews
- 15 *Völkischer Beobachter*, 14 March 1938: article on the *Gleichschaltung* of the Viennese press
- 16 On 15 March 1938 the NSDAP Kreisleiter in Leipzig reports to the Gauleitung of Saxony on the measures taken thus far against Jews
- 17 David Schapira reports on the mistreatment of Viennese Jews in early 1938 following the Anschluss
- 18 Karl Sass describes the mood in Vienna in the spring of 1938 and the Anschluss of Austria
- 19 On 18 March 1938 Jay Pierrepont Moffat, chief of the Division of European Affairs at the State Department, describes conditions for Austrian Jews
- 20 On 19 March 1938 Hermann Göring commissions Wilhelm Keppler with the Aryanization of the economy in Austria
- 21 On 19 March 1938 the Reichsstathalter in Hamburg states the terms for the Aryanization of the M. M. Warburg & Co. Bank

- 22 On 23 March 1938 Albert Herzfeld of Düsseldorf gives an account of the Anschluss of Austria and preparations for the plebiscite
- 23 The Law on the Legal Status of the Jewish Religious Communities, dated 28 March 1938, deprives the Jewish communities of their status as corporations under public law
- 24 On 6 April 1938 the Reich Minister of Finance plans additional discriminatory measures concerning the taxation of Jews
- 25 On 9 April 1938 the Vienna Main Office of the SS Security Service documents raids against Freemasons
- 26 *Neue Freie Presse*, Vienna, 13 April 1938: article about anti-Jewish legislation in Hungary
- 27 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, New York, 14 April 1938: reports on the situation of Jews in Austria and reactions in the USA
- 28 On 24 April 1938 Julius Steinfeld describes his efforts to help the Orthodox Jews of Burgenland to emigrate
- 29 A regulation of 26 April 1938 requires Jews to register their assets under penalty of fines and prison terms
- 30 On 27 and 28 April 1938 Luise Solmitz notes her reaction to the instructions for the registration of assets
- 31 *Aufbau*, New York, 1 May 1938: article on the pogroms in Vienna
- 32 *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, 3 May 1938: article about anti-Jewish measures in Germany and their significance for foreign Jews
- 33 *Correspondance Juive*, 6 May 1938: article on the persecution and expulsion of Austria's Jews following the Anschluss
- 34 On 8 May 1938 Adolf Eichmann tells his friend and superior Herbert Hagen how he monitors the Viennese Jews
- 35 *New York Times*, 15 May 1938: article on the poverty of the Jewish communities and the demographic consequences of anti-Jewish policy
- 36 Questionnaire on 'racial belonging' for the census planned for May 1938, later filled in by Mr and Mrs Klemperer
- 37 On 31 May 1938 the Berlin Chamber of Industry and Commerce informs the tool manufacturer Fleck & Co. that it is not permitted to train Jewish apprentices
- 38 In May 1938 Felice Schragenheim reflects on her job prospects as an immigrant
- 39 On 1 June 1938 Reinhard Heydrich instructs the regional Criminal Police headquarters to intern so-called asocials and previously convicted Jews in Buchenwald concentration camp
- 40 Memorandum from Munich's municipal building director dated 9 June 1938 regarding the order for the demolition of the synagogue on Herzog-Max-/Maxburgstraße
- 41 On 14 June 1938 Luise Solmitz writes about antisemitic taunts from children
- 42 On 14 June 1938 Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick outlines his plans to dispossess the Jews and drive them out of the economy

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- 43 *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15 June 1938: article on the application of German citizenship law for the purpose of excluding Jews
  - 44 On 17 June 1938 Paul Strauss asks Frankfurt's Municipal School Authority to exempt his son from attendance at a secondary school
  - 45 On 20 June 1938 the SS Security Service considers the role of the Reichsbank and the Schlie Travel Agency in the emigration of Austrian Jews
  - 46 On 21 June 1938 the head of the Israelite Religious Community reports on the school situation for Jewish schoolchildren in Vienna
  - 47 On 22 June 1938 the US ambassador to Berlin informs his secretary of state about anti-Jewish demonstrations and arrests of Jews
  - 48 *Völkischer Beobachter*, 23 June 1938: article about Joseph Goebbels's speech at Berlin's Olympic Stadium, in which he announced new anti-Jewish measures
  - 49 On 24 June 1938 the Reich Board for Economic Efficiency makes suggestions regarding the Aryanization of the Austrian shoe trade
  - 50 On 27 June 1938 the Viennese Ministry of the Interior and Culture protests against the Gestapo's appointment of Josef Löwenherz as head of the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna
  - 51 On 30 June 1938 the headmaster of the Chayes Grammar School in Vienna asks the University of Jerusalem to admit Jewish school pupils and students from Vienna
  - 52 A former prisoner describes the detention conditions in Buchenwald concentration camp in June 1938
  - 53 *Blätter des Jüdischen Frauenbundes*, June 1938: article about the role of women after emigration
  - 54 The wine exporter Frederick Weil from Frankfurt travels through Germany in the early summer of 1938
  - 55 *Amtsblatt der Stadt Wien*, 1 July 1938: announcement of the segregation of Jewish schoolchildren and the introduction of a *numerus clausus* at middle schools
  - 56 Report by the SS Security Service dated 1 July 1938 about preparations for the international refugee conference in Evian
  - 57 *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7 July 1938: article about the contribution of anthropologists and statisticians to the study of the 'Jewish question'
  - 58 On 8 July 1938 the NSDAP Gauleiter in Vienna suggests appropriating and auctioning off the property of Jews who have fled
  - 59 On 8 July 1938 Max Kreutzberger reports on the Evian Conference
  - 60 On 11 July 1938 the board of directors of the Talmud Torah School requests support from the Hamburg school authorities
  - 61 On 12 July 1938 the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructs all ambassadors not to issue visas to anyone who is unwelcome in their country of origin
  - 62 On 14 July 1938 Reich Commissioner Josef Bürckel presents Hermann Göring with his ideas regarding Aryanization in Austria

- 63 On 15 July 1938 a Viennese shoe manufacturer points out to the Asset Transfer Office that the shoe industry is not sufficiently involved in 'Aryanization decisions'
- 64 *Völkischer Beobachter*, 16 July 1938: article on the Evian Conference
- 65 *Wiener Tagblatt*, 17 July 1938: article on the termination of leases to Jewish tenants
- 66 On 19 July 1938 the Israelite Religious Community reports on the work of the various community institutions and conditions for the Viennese Jews
- 67 On 20 July 1938 the Economic Group for Private Banking provides information about measures for scrutinizing the safe-deposit boxes of Jewish customers
- 68 On 20 July 1938 Berlin's chief of police issues guidelines for the discrimination against Jews
- 69 On 22 July 1938 the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna asks the Gestapo to release arrested women from Mattersburg in Burgenland
- 70 On 25 July 1938 Abraham Tauber Rubin of Vienna seeks a sponsor to enable him to emigrate with his family
- 71 *Israelitisches Familienblatt*, 28 July 1938: article on the founding of a Reich Federation of Jews in Germany
- 72 *Hamburger Anzeiger*, 28 July 1938: article on the introduction of the identity card for German citizens
- 73 On 1 August 1938 a provincial office of the German Council of Municipalities asks the central office in Berlin whether public contracts may be awarded to 'half-Jews'
- 74 On 3 August 1938 the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna submits proposals to the municipal administration of the city regarding the accommodation of elderly and care-dependent Jews
- 75 On 3 August 1938 the head of the Swiss Police for Foreign Nationals, Heinrich Rothmund, speaks to the German envoy in Bern about refugees being deported across the unfortified land border
- 76 On 5 August 1938 Hertha Nathorff notes her reaction to the revocation of the licences of Jewish physicians
- 77 Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft memorandum regarding a conversation with Hermann Josef Abs on 9 August 1938 about the Aryanization of the leather manufacturer Adler & Oppenheimer
- 78 On 11 August 1938 the Reichsbank is requested to make its director Richard Buzzi available for cooperation with the Central Office for Jewish Emigration
- 79 On 12 August 1938 the head of the SD Main District Danube reports to the Security Main Office in Berlin concerning the illegal emigration of Jews from Vienna
- 80 On 12 August 1938 the Episcopal Ordinariate of Berlin appeals to all German bishops to form aid organizations for Catholics who are regarded as Jews
- 81 On 13 August 1938 Siegfried Gerstle of Munich applies to have his assets converted into foreign currency under the Altreu scheme
- 82 On 16 August 1938 Mrs Marx asks the Pope for help, given the difficult position of non-Aryan Catholics

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- 83 On 17 August 1938 David Heimann, 75, president by seniority of the Jewish Community of Berlin, requests a certificate of urgency for emigration to Palestine
- 84 A regulation, dated 17 August 1938, forces Jews to adopt the first names 'Sara' and 'Israel'
- 85 On 19 August 1938 Hildegard Wagener reports on the unforeseen course of a political training evening
- 86 On 24 August 1938 Luise Solmitz writes about the introduction of compulsory first names for Jews
- 87 On 24 August 1938 Mr and Mrs Malsch of Düsseldorf write to their son in New York about efforts to emigrate and an imminent occupational ban
- 88 On 25 August 1938 the situation of Jews in Germany is summed up in a report to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
- 89 On 29 August 1938 the NSDAP Gauleitung for the Lower Danube complains to the NSDAP Main Office for People's Welfare about the conversion of a synagogue into a Protestant church
- 90 *Aufbau*, New York, 1 September 1938: article on the introduction of mandatory first names for Jews
- 91 On 10 September 1938 customs investigators in Halle accuse Ernst Petschek of using a front man to conceal his shareholdings
- 92 On 14 September 1938 Adolf Eichmann informs the Security Main Office in Berlin about the expulsion of destitute Jews from Vienna
- 93 Julian Kretschmer from Emden describes the closure of his doctor's practice in the late summer of 1938
- 94 On 16 September 1938 the Relief Association of German Jews issues information regarding the conditions for emigration to Bolivia
- 95 On 22 September 1938 the SS Security Service proposes converting retraining camps for Jews into labour camps in the event of war
- 96 Meeting in the Reich Ministry of Justice on 22 September 1938 regarding the abolition of tenant protection laws for Jews, and the impoverishment and possible ghettoization of the Jews
- 97 On 23 September 1938 the NSDAP Kreisleiter in Jena intervenes in the Aryanization of local livestock farming
- 98 Under pressure from Reich Commissioner Josef Bürckel, on 24 September 1938 the League of Austrian Industrialists revokes the call to dismiss Jewish *Mischlinge* from private businesses
- 99 Note, dated 27 September 1938, from the Warburg secretary's office regarding a German businessman's offer to sell his company in Argentina
- 100 Robert B. Lawrence on the Aryanization of his Vienna apartment in September 1938
- 101 On 6 October 1938 Albert Speer asks the Reich Ministry of Economics to support the mass termination of the leases of Jewish tenants in Berlin

- 102 *Jewish Chronicle*, 7 October 1938: article on conditions for Jews after Germany's invasion of the Sudetenland
- 103 *Selbstwehr. Jüdisches Volksblatt*, 8 October 1938: article on conditions for Jews in the border areas of Czechoslovakia
- 104 On 9 October 1938 Ruth Maier describes the despair of Jewish families in Vienna
- 105 On 11 October 1938 the Reich Institute for Labour Placement in Austria reports to Reich Commissioner Josef Bürckel about the difficulties involved in deploying Jews for forced labour
- 106 On 14 October 1938 the World Jewish Congress analyses the situation of Jews in Europe
- 107 Discussion on 14 October 1938 in Hermann Göring's office about economic preparations for war and the Aryanization process
- 108 On 16 October 1938 Police Sergeant Witzel writes to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Marburg to report on the smashing in of the windows and doors of the homes of Jews in Zwesten
- 109 On 21 October 1938 Adolf Eichmann reports to the SD Main Office in Berlin that 350 Jews are emigrating daily from Austria
- 110 On 27 October 1938 the Reich Minister of Economics informs the foreign currency offices that Jews can no longer claim a tax exemption when exporting foreign currency
- 111 On 27 October 1938 Austria's state commissioner for private industry proposes the creation of labour camps for Jews
- 112 On 28 October 1938 the Munich police note that 568 Jews of Polish nationality were arrested
- 113 Rabbi Arthur Bluhm reports on the deportation of Polish Jews from Krefeld on 28 October 1938
- 114 On 28 October 1938 the Relief Association of German Jews warns of problems regarding emigration to Shanghai
- 115 On 28 October 1938 Cornelius von Berenberg-Gossler learns of the impending deportation of a Jewish female acquaintance to Poland
- 116 Report by the SS Security Service, dated 28 October 1938, about the Austrian Jewish organizations
- 117 Questionnaire from the Reich Representation of Jews in Germany concerning the planned admission of Eva Oppenheim to Australia, dated 31 October 1938
- 118 Gerta Pfeffer describes the deportation of Polish Jews from Chemnitz in October 1938
- 119 The legal advisor to the Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith, Kurt Sabatzky, reports on boycotts, arrests, and forced labour in Leipzig and the vicinity in the autumn of 1938
- 120 Max Moses Polke reports on the final months of his work as a lawyer in Breslau, which ended on 3 November 1938

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- 121 On 7 November 1938 Ruth Maier describes the anxiety of the Viennese Jews following the assassination attempt on Ernst vom Rath
  - 122 On 8 November 1938 the Nuremberg Gestapo has Adolf Hitler informed about the number of deported Jews of Polish nationality
  - 123 Gerda Kappes tells her mother-in-law about the pogroms in Bebra on 7 and 9 November 1938
  - 124 Joseph Goebbels's diary entries concerning the evening of 9 November 1938 and the instructions for the November pogroms
  - 125 Directives of the Gestapo Central Office for the pogrom, 9 November 1938, 23:55 p.m.
  - 126 At 1:20 a.m. on 10 November 1938, Reinhard Heydrich specifies the instructions from the Gestapo Central Office for the pogrom
  - 127 On 10 November 1938 the Swiss legation summarizes for the Reich Foreign Office the agreements reached on the marking of passports held by Jews
  - 128 Ludwig Goldstein reports on the destruction of the synagogue in Königsberg, Prussia, on 9 and 10 November 1938
  - 129 On 10 November 1938 the Vienna Gestapo reports on the confiscation of a library and the destruction of a synagogue
  - 130 Max Reiner from Berlin describes how he escaped arrest on 10 November 1938
  - 131 Rabbi Arthur Bluhm describes the pogrom in Krefeld and his arrest on 10 November 1938
  - 132 On 10 November 1938 the Security Police submit a request for the denaturalization of Siegfried Gumbel and his family
  - 133 The Gauleiter of Vienna, Odilo Globocnik, reports on the arrest of Jews and the confiscation of their property following the pogrom
  - 134 SA members from Lesum fatally shoot three Jews in their apartments during the night of 9/10 November 1938
  - 135 On 11 November 1938 the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna asks the Central Office for Jewish Emigration to work towards a moderation of the campaign of anti-Jewish terror
  - 136 On 11 November 1938 the Bavarian Minister of the Interior informs the Bavarian Minister President about the conclusion and consequences of the pogrom night
  - 137 On 11 November 1938 SA Brigadeführer Karl Lucke gives notification of the destruction of thirty-six synagogues in Hesse
  - 138 On 11 November 1938 Ruth Maier describes the pogrom and the mistreatment and arrest of Jews in Vienna
  - 139 On 11 November 1938 Reinhard Heydrich orders Adolf Eichmann to travel to Berlin to discuss future anti-Jewish policy
  - 140 On 11 November 1938 Hildegard Wagener expresses her indignation at the violence against Jews

- 141 On 11 November 1938 Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick prohibits Jews from owning weapons
- 142 On 12 November 1938 Hermann Göring imposes a compulsory levy of 1 billion Reichsmarks on Jews of German nationality
- 143 On 12 November 1938 Hermann Göring forbids Jews from operating retail businesses and skilled craft enterprises
- 144 On 12 November 1938 Hermann Göring decrees that Jews must cover the cost of damage resulting from the pogrom
- 145 On 12 November 1938 the Bonn resident Marie Kahle and her son are accused of sympathizing with Jews
- 146 Meeting chaired by Hermann Göring on 12 November 1938 regarding anti-Jewish policy after the pogrom
- 147 On 12 November 1938 Cell 08 of the Dornbusch branch of the NSDAP gathers information about wealthy Jews
- 148 Luise Solmitz's diary entries from 10 to 14 November 1938 on the November pogrom and new anti-Jewish rulings
- 149 On 14 November 1938 the SS Security Service presents five badge designs for identifying Jews
- 150 Cornelius von Berenberg-Gossler describes the arrests in his social circle from 11 to 15 November 1938
- 151 On 15 November 1938 the Swiss ambassador in Paris reports on his meeting with State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker regarding the expulsion of Jews from Germany
- 152 On 15 November 1938 the Reich Minister of Education prohibits Jewish pupils from attending school with non-Jews
- 153 On 15 November 1938 the apostolic nuncio in Berlin reports to the Vatican regarding the November pogrom
- 154 On 15 November 1938 the Chief of the Security Police informs the Reich Foreign Office about the establishment of a Reich association for the care of Jewish emigrants and Jews reliant on welfare
- 155 *The Times*, 15 November 1938: article on the situation of the Jews in the Reich
- 156 On 15 November 1938 a French diplomat in Berlin analyses the background to the pogroms and the resulting international tensions
- 157 *Norddeutsche Hausbesitzer-Zeitung*, 15 November 1938: article on the requirement to terminate leases with Jewish tenants
- 158 *Marienbader Zeitung*, 16 November 1938: article on the expulsion of Jews from the spa town
- 159 A decree issued on 16 November 1938 bans Jews from wearing uniforms
- 160 *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, 16 November 1938: article on the closure of Jewish businesses and their exclusion from housing cooperatives
- 161 Record of confiscated money, valuables, and furniture of the Jews in Markt Piesting, dated 18 November 1938

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- 162 Express letter from the Reich Minister of Economics regarding the Regulation on the Exclusion of Jews from German Economic Life, 18 November 1938
- 163 On 19 November 1938 a father from Beuthen writes to his daughter living abroad about events during the November pogrom
- 164 On 19 November 1938 Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick orders that Jews in need may draw public welfare benefits only in exceptional cases
- 165 *Berliner Tageblatt*: announcement, dated 19 November 1938, on the establishment of separate sales outlets for Jews in Munich
- 166 On 21 November 1938 the Jewish Central Office in Stuttgart writes to the Gestapo to ask that Jewish facilities assisting with preparations for emigration are retained
- 167 On 21 November 1938 the Reich Minister of Economics lists the Jewish assets that are immediately available
- 168 On 22 November 1938 the Protestant Bishop Julius Kühlewein reports to the clergy of the regional church in Baden about the criticism voiced by the Ministry of Education regarding the treatment of the Bible story in religious instruction
- 169 On 23 November 1938 the Reich Minister of Economics and the Reich Minister of Justice regulate the forced sale and the closure of Jewish commercial and skilled craft enterprises
- 170 On 23 November 1938 Fritz Falk, Amsterdam, asks Sam van den Bergh to enable his family to emigrate to the Netherlands
- 171 On 23 November 1938 Ruth Spier describes to her friend Lilo what life is like at the Gehringshof Hachsharah Camp near Fulda
- 172 Conversation on 24 November 1938 between Adolf Hitler and the South African Minister Oswald Pirow about Germany's position of power in the world and the 'Jewish question'
- 173 *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 November 1938: article about the role of the Jews in German philosophy
- 174 On 24 November 1938 the Relief Association of German Jews begins to organize the emigration of children to the Netherlands
- 175 On 24 November 1938 representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the big banks discuss the complete dispossession of the Jews
- 176 *Das Schwarze Korps*, 24 November 1938: article about the annihilation of the Jews
- 177 On 25 November 1938 Ernst Englander reports from London on the situation of German Jews and asks that possible relief campaigns be considered in the USA
- 178 On 26 November 1938 a local branch of the NSDAP in Berlin denounces a pharmacist who employs a Jew
- 179 On 25 and 26 November 1938 Cornelius von Berenberg-Gossler learns about the conditions of confinement in Sachsenhausen concentration camp
- 180 *Schlesische Zeitung*, 27 November 1938: article about the discriminatory legislation for *Mischlinge*

- 181 Hedwig Jastrow, age 76, takes her own life on 29 November 1938 so as not to have to bear the compulsory forename
- 182 On 29 November 1938 the SS Security Service reports that the Gestapo Central Office has ordered all Jewish organizations to merge into a single body
- 183 On 29 November 1938 the auditor Max Joseph asks the regional tax director in Berlin for permission to take furnishings with him to Australia
- 184 On 30 November 1938 Leopold Breisacher describes the situation for Jews after the November pogroms to his son, an emigrant in Palestine
- 185 American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee memorandum, dated 30 November 1938, on the consequences of the pogrom in various cities, as well as in Jewish retraining centres and in concentration camps
- 186 On 1 December 1938 the Reich Ministry of Education initiates a discussion about ways to saddle the Reich Representation of Jews in Germany with the costs for separate Jewish schools
- 187 The antisemitic worldview is summarized in the Wehrmacht's guidelines for service training, dated 1 December 1938
- 188 On 2 December 1938 the Office for Kinship Research in Vienna complains about the clergy's lax approach to ascertaining Jewish descent
- 189 *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 2 December 1938: article on the annual meeting of the Reich Institute for History of the New Germany
- 190 On 2 December 1938 the Gestapo appoints Max Plaut as manager of the Jewish Religious Association in Hamburg
- 191 On 2 December 1938 the German consulate general reports on the flight of the Jews from the Memel Territory and its economic consequences
- 192 Erik and Magda Geiershoefer from Allersberg describe how NSDAP functionaries confiscated their property in late November/early December 1938
- 193 A regulation dated 3 December 1938 addresses the forced sale of Jewish companies and the procedure regarding Jewish bonds
- 194 On 3 December 1938 the SS Security Service in Vienna offers the Racial Policy Office photos of emigrants from the files of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration
- 195 On 5 December 1938 the Landrat in Glatz instructs the mayor to provide information regarding the Aryanization of the retail sector
- 196 On 6 December 1938 the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna reports on complications for emigration following the arrest of Jewish men
- 197 On 6 December 1938 Benno Cohn from the Palestine Office in Berlin reports to Georg Landauer on emigration to Palestine and the imminent forced merger of Jewish organizations
- 198 On 5 and 6 December 1938 Luise Solmitz describes her fears of ghettoization and the expropriation of her house
- 199 On 7 December 1938 Gerda Erdmann from Berlin writes to the Pope to suggest ways in which the Catholic Church could solve the Jewish question

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- 200 On 9 December 1938 Cornelius von Berenberg-Gossler records his thoughts about the inhumane treatment of the Jews and its impact abroad
- 201 *Deutsches Recht*, 10 December 1938: article on the right to rescind a contract concluded in ignorance of the 'racial origins' of the contractual partner
- 202 On 11 December 1938 Ruth Maier of Vienna describes bidding farewell to her sister, who is travelling to Britain on a Kindertransport
- 203 On 16 December 1938 Max Karp writes to a relative about the situation of the Polish Jews expelled from Germany and now in the Zbąszyń camp
- 204 Paul Eppstein, summoned by the Berlin Gestapo on 16 December 1938, writes notes on the discussion of the payment of the cost of pogrom damage and the expulsion of stateless persons
- 205 On 17 December 1938 the Warburg Bank asks the Economic Group for Private Banking to simplify the sale of securities belonging to Jews
- 206 Hermann Krips's tax clearance certificate from the Frankfurt tax authorities, 19 December 1938
- 207 *New York Times*, 20 December 1938: article on Schacht's proposals for the emigration of the Jews and the transfer of their assets
- 208 On 21 December 1938 the Reich Minister of Education asks the Reich Minister of the Interior whether the emigration of Jewish university lecturers is to be prohibited
- 209 On 21 December 1938 the Chemnitz Youth and Welfare Office instructs its agencies to stop granting benefits to Jews
- 210 On 22 December 1938 the SS Security Service orders that the scrolls and sacred objects looted from synagogues must not fall into Jewish hands again
- 211 On 22 December 1938 the Jewish Central Office in Stuttgart records attacks on Jews in Bad Mergentheim
- 212 On 24 December 1938 Paul Fürstenberg reminds the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft about its assurances in connection with the Aryanization of his firm
- 213 On 25 December 1938 youngsters from a Kindertransport report on their reception in Britain
- 214 On 27 December 1938 Adele Klinger of Vienna asks the Gestapo to release her husband from Buchenwald concentration camp
- 215 On 28 December 1938 Göring orders the establishment of 'Jew houses', forbids Jews to use sleeping carriages and dining cars, and regulates the status of mixed marriages
- 216 *Deutsches Volksblatt*, Vienna, 30 December 1938: article on the compulsory emigration of the Jews
- 217 On 30 December 1938 Cornelius von Berenberg-Gossler describes the funeral service for his business partner, who died in a psychiatric hospital
- 218 On 30 December 1938 Ehud Ueberall of the Youth Aliyah Information Centre reports on his efforts to place children from Vienna in the Netherlands or Britain
- 219 *NS-Frauen-Warte*, December 1938: article about reactions in Germany and abroad to the November pogroms

- 220 Karl Sass from Vienna describes his attempts to emigrate illegally in December 1938
- 221 *Der Internationale Klassenkampf*, December 1938: article on the reactions of the German working class and the international bourgeoisie to the November pogroms
- 222 Rudolf Walter reports on the changes to Austrian cultural life after the Anschluss and on instances of mistreatment in police custody in 1938
- 223 In late 1938 the SS Security Service proposes the creation of a Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration
- 224 Fred Rodeck describes the bureaucracy at the Vienna Central Office for Jewish Emigration in late 1938
- 225 Rudolf Bing describes the November pogrom in Nuremberg and his emigration in late 1938
- 226 In 1938 Irmgard Keun describes the emigration experiences of Jews from a child's perspective
- 227 Siegfried Neumann from Berlin reports on his imprisonment in Sachsenhausen concentration camp in late 1938
- 228 The children's book *Der Giftpilz* (1938) explains the term *Ostjude*
- 229 Paul Martin Neurath reflects on sickness and death in a concentration camp in 1938
- 230 *Aufbau*, New York, 1 January 1939: editorial on negotiations on the transfer of Jewish assets from Germany
- 231 On 3 January 1939 Herbert Nothmann from Breslau asks a distant relative for help in emigrating
- 232 On 4 January 1939 Sigmund Geller in Paris attempts to facilitate the emigration of his sons and his wife from Vienna
- 233 *Jewish Chronicle*, London, 6 January 1939: report on refugee camps in different European countries
- 234 On 9 January 1939 the Jewish Central Office in Stuttgart appeals to the Gestapo for the release of sick inmates from Dachau
- 235 At Hermann Göring's request, on 10 January 1939 the Reich Minister of the Interior stipulates that no one be denounced on account of having previous contact with Jews
- 236 On 11 January 1939 the Department of German Studies at the University of Greifswald reports all books in its library holdings declared to be Jewish
- 237 *Völkischer Beobachter*, 12 January 1939: article on a series of lectures at Berlin University, in which renowned academics justify anti-Jewish policy
- 238 Report for the World Jewish Congress, dated 14 January 1939, on conditions for Jews in the Free City of Danzig
- 239 On 16 January 1939 the Reich Minister of Economics instructs municipal pawn-brokers on how to proceed with the jewellery and valuables of Jewish emigrants
- 240 On 17 and 18 January 1939 Nahum Goldmann records his impressions of talks with representatives of the League of Nations regarding legislation on Jews in Danzig

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- 241 *Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt*, 20 January 1939: the Reich Representation of Jews in Germany announces the establishment of a transit camp for refugees in England
- 242 On 21 January 1939 Mrs D., who is looking for an apartment in Berlin, expresses her hopes that leases to Jewish tenants will be terminated
- 243 On 24 January 1939 Hermann Göring orders the founding of the Reich Central Agency for Jewish Emigration
- 244 On 25 January 1939 the Reich Foreign Office outlines to the German representations abroad the importance of the 'Jewish question' for foreign policy
- 245 On 26 January 1939 the mayor of Friedrichstadt writes to the Landrat in Schleswig to approve the sale of Jewish property below its market value
- 246 Oscar Schloss describes his departure from Germany on 26 January 1939
- 247 *Deutsche Steuer-Zeitung und Wirtschaftlicher Beobachter*: article dated 28 January 1939 on the Levy on Jewish Assets
- 248 On 30 January 1939 Adolf Hitler threatens to annihilate the European Jews
- 249 On 2 February 1939 the president of the Viennese branch office of the Reich Institute for Labour Placement and Unemployment Insurance considers using Jewish forced labourers
- 250 On 6 February 1939 Paula Schwab asks the Relief Agency for the Evacuation of Children to arrange accommodation abroad for her son
- 251 SS Security Service memorandum, dated 11 February 1939, regarding Quaker activity in support of Jews
- 252 On 14 February 1939 the Neue Frankfurter Versicherung instructs its agents to cancel the insurance policies of their Jewish clients
- 253 SS Security Service memorandum, dated 16 February 1939, on the demonstrative singing of hymns that console the people of Israel
- 254 After fleeing Germany, on 21 February 1939 Simon Meisner gives Jewish welfare organizations an account of the living conditions in Antwerp
- 255 On 21 February 1939 the SD conveys its approval to the staff of the Deputy of the Führer regarding the establishment of a lectureship for Talmudic studies and modern Hebrew at the University of Berlin
- 256 On 22 February 1939 the Gau personnel office in Vienna advocates the auctioning of stolen Jewish property in Vienna rather than Berlin
- 257 On 1 March 1939 the Chief of the Security Police provides information about plans to register Jews for forced labour in wartime
- 258 On 2 March 1939 the Synagogue Community in Gleiwitz asks the Reich Association of Jews in Germany about the requirements for surrendering precious metals
- 259 Paul Eppstein of the Reich Association of Jews in Germany records a summons to the Gestapo on 7 March 1939 on the subject of emigration, particularly to Shanghai
- 260 On 8 March 1939 Robert Thompson Pell, an official in the US State Department, reports to his superior on the difficulties associated with the emigration of Jews from Germany

- 261 Franziska Schubert describes her efforts to obtain the release of her husband from prison, the attempts at intimidation made by the Vienna Gestapo, and her emigration on 8 March 1939
- 262 On 10 March 1939 Aurel von Jüchen and Karl Kleinschmidt protest against Protestant pastors being instructed not baptize Jews
- 263 Jolanthe Wolff's passport, dated 10 March 1939, with instructions on how German refugees should behave in Britain
- 264 On 10 March 1939 Adolf Eichmann points out that legal discrimination against the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna would result in the loss of foreign exchange
- 265 On 14 March 1939 Luise Solmitz writes about repeated demands for emigration
- 266 On 17 March 1939 Joseph Hyman from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee reports on the employment ban for Jews, returning emigrants and children being detained in concentration camps, and Jewish refugees in Europe
- 267 On 18 March 1939 the Church Chancery in Berlin advises the High Consistory in Vienna to show restraint regarding the Grüber Office, which supports Protestant non-Aryans
- 268 On 24 March 1939 Siegfried Simon of Berlin asks Ruth Kimmel to help his father-in-law obtain an immigration certificate for Palestine
- 269 On 25 March 1939 Simon Meisner describes his experiences in a refugee camp and with the Police for Foreign Nationals in Belgium
- 270 On 29 March 1939 Hanna Kaack of Hamburg endeavours to entrust her son to the care of the Quakers
- 271 On 3 April 1939 representatives of the police and the judiciary in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland hold a meeting in Brussels to discuss the illegal immigration of refugees from Germany
- 272 On 14 April 1939 Chaim Selzer of Vienna attempts to obtain a place for his daughter on a Kindertransport to England
- 273 *Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt*: on 17 April 1939 the Reich Ministry of Economics issues instructions regarding the items that emigrants are permitted to take with them when they depart
- 274 On 18 April 1939 Cornelius von Berenberg-Gossler recounts a visit to the Berlin Gestapo to advocate the emigration of Fritz Warburg
- 275 On 20 April 1939 Ottilie Spitzer and Hermann Göbbels write to Adolf Hitler to request a marriage permit
- 276 On 25 April 1939 the Reich Office for Emigration Affairs reports on the course of emigration in the second half of 1938
- 277 A Reich law, dated 30 April 1939, restricts the rights of Jewish landlords and tenants
- 278 On 1 May 1939 Moritz Mailich asks Jos. A. Schwalb to support his emigration to the USA

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- 279 On 2 May 1939 the director of the Talmud Torah School in Hamburg outlines his ideas for a Jewish school for immigrant children in the USA
- 280 On 3 May 1939 the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Vienna reports on the trade in entry visas for Monaco
- 281 On 5 May 1939 Mr and Mrs Malsch of Düsseldorf tell their son Willy in the USA of their growing despair and their hopes of emigrating
- 282 *6-Uhr-Abendblatt*, Vienna, 8 May 1939: report on an antisemitic exhibition at the Natural History Museum in Vienna
- 283 On 14 May 1939 Julius Bernheim of Buchau asks his son Manfred to bring him and his wife to a place where they are safe from antisemitic attacks
- 284 On 15 May 1939 the Audit Office in Frankfurt encourages the mayor to commission the Municipal Welfare Office with the task of systematically rehousing Jews
- 285 On 25 May 1939 the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Minister of Labour regulate the payment of welfare benefits to Jews who live with non-Jews
- 286 On 31 May 1939 Oberregierungsrat Kurt Krüger, Vienna, asks the SS Security Service for its opinion regarding the status of the leaving certificates of Jewish schools
- 287 The SPD in exile reports on the situation of the Jews in the Memel Territory at the end of May 1939, after the German assumption of power that March
- 288 On 2 June 1939 the Brussels-based Aid Committee for Jewish Refugee Children asks the Israelite Religious Community of Vienna for support with the organization of the Kindertransport
- 289 On 2 June 1939 Georg Landauer lists the distribution of 25,000 refugee certificates for immigration into Palestine
- 290 In June 1939 the purser of the *St. Louis* reports on the journey of the refugee ship after being refused permission to land in Havana
- 291 Writing to Stephan Lackner on 4 June 1939, Walter Benjamin expresses his thoughts on the situation in exile and on the suicides of Jews in Vienna
- 292 In June 1939 Eduard and Emma Weil report on the hopes and fears of the passengers aboard the refugee ship *St. Louis*
- 293 On 7 June 1939 the City of Frankfurt passes on the welfare costs for Jews to the Jewish Community
- 294 On 14 June 1939 Bernhard Heun, lawyer in the Personnel Office of the city of Frankfurt, interprets the provisions regarding tenancy agreements with Jews
- 295 On 15 June 1939 Max Plaut, Hamburg, writes to Arthur Spier about being told to report unemployed Jews to the Employment Office and the Gestapo
- 296 *The Times*, 15 June 1939: announcement that Charlie Chaplin wants the proceeds from his new film to go to Jews
- 297 On 16 June 1939 Paul Eppstein of the Reich Association of Jews in Germany notes what he stated regarding the fate of Jewish refugees when he was summoned to the Gestapo
- 298 On 19 June 1939 Felice Schragenheim writes a poem about forced emigration

- 299 On 22 June 1939 Hermann Ritter informs the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft that the leather manufacturer Adler & Oppenheimer can be bought at a low price
- 300 On 23 June 1939 Jacques Cahn fears that charges will be brought against him after his visit to the Berlin-Schöneberg police station
- 301 On 24 June 1939 Adolf Eichmann reports to Reich Commissioner Josef Bürckel in Vienna on the progress of emigration
- 302 On 27 June 1939 Adolf Eichmann denounces a director of the Dräger company to the Security Service in Vienna for having expressed sympathy for Jews
- 303 In June 1939 the Reich Representation of Jews in Germany is informed that pressure to emigrate is impeding emigration to the USA
- 304 On 3 July 1939 Martin Fuchs asks the mayor of Breslau and the Minister of the Interior for permission to emigrate with continued payment of his pension
- 305 On 5 July 1939 an unknown author reports to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee on expulsions and illegal emigration from the Reich
- 306 On 6 July 1939 the Central Office for Jewish Emigration announces the expulsion of the Jews from Baden near Vienna
- 307 The Institute for the Study and Elimination of Jewish Influence on German Church Life reviews Protestant hymnals in July 1939
- 308 *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7 July 1939: article about the German philologist Friedrich Gundolf and the Jews as an object of research for German historians
- 309 On 8 July 1939 the Reichsführer SS issues instructions regarding the deportation of Polish Jews across the unfortified land border
- 310 On 11 July 1939 Leo Lippmann describes his efforts to prevent buildings of the Hamburg Jewish Community from being seized by the state
- 311 On 14 July 1939 the Security Service in Linz reports the imprisonment of SA personnel after desecration of a cemetery in the former Czech town of Rosenberg
- 312 On 16 July 1939 Willy Cohn notes that the Breslau Gestapo want to oblige him to research the history of the Jews
- 313 On 19 July 1939 the Gestapo instructs the State Police offices to prevent cohabitation by couples whose marriage applications have been rejected
- 314 Memorandum of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, dated 24 July 1939, on illegal immigration into Palestine
- 315 On 25 July 1939 Siegfried Wolff of Eisenach describes his efforts to emigrate
- 316 In July 1939 the SPD in exile lists the refugee ships that are denied permission to land
- 317 On 4 August 1939 Luise Solmitz comments on the exclusion of Jews from the air-raid shelters
- 318 On 7/8 August 1939 Mr and Mrs Malsch of Düsseldorf write to their son in the USA about forced labour and loneliness
- 319 *Neues Volk*, 8 August 1939: Fritz Arlt reviews the book *The Jewish Question in Romania*

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- 320** On 10 August 1939 Cornelius von Berenberg-Gossler learns of the suicide of a Jewish acquaintance who had emigrated
- 321** On 16 August 1939 Willy Cohn of Breslau reports on his experiences as a historian in the Regional Office for Race and Kinship Research
- 322** On 17 August 1939 the chief public prosecutor in Hamburg promises to release Norbert Arendt from custody if he emigrates within one week
- 323** Writing on 19 August 1939, Cilli Lipski gives her parents and brother little hope of obtaining a certificate for Palestine
- 324** On 24 August 1939 Arthur Löwy asks the Youth Aliyah Advice Centre in Vienna to facilitate the emigration of his son
- 325** On 26 August 1939 Klaus Jakob Langer describes the tense political situation and his fear that a war might prevent his emigration
- 326** On 27 August 1939 the head of the Frankfurt Tax Office proposes that Jews be compensated for their surrendered valuables only after special assessment
- 327** On 28 August 1939 Margarete Korant of Berlin writes to her daughter in the USA about her fear of war and isolation
- 328** Paul Eppstein records his summons to the Gestapo on 28 August 1939 and the instructions for Jews to carry out forced labour in wartime
- 329** At the end of August 1939 Walter Tausk sees his emigration plans threatened by the impending war



# DOCUMENTS



## DOC. 1

**On 1 January 1938 Amalie Malsch writes to her son in the USA  
about waiting to emigrate<sup>1</sup>**

Handwritten letter from Amalie Malsch,<sup>2</sup> Düsseldorf, to Wilhelm Malsch,<sup>3</sup> Long Island (New York), dated 1 January 1938

My dear child! We wrote you a detailed letter the day after Christmas, you've probably received it by now. No doubt the telegram [saying] Papa is home,<sup>4</sup> too, gave you tremendous pleasure. You were surely in high spirits after that. I hope you passed on the news to Uncle Eugen<sup>5</sup> as well. Now we're waiting in anguish for [word from] Stuttgart,<sup>6</sup> it simply has to come. We heard here that the ships are fully booked months in advance, and we plan to inquire in the next few days whether there's really something to it, let's hope not. Then we'll let you know. Alfred wrote to us today, he has gone to London with his wife for good and plans to have his mother etc. follow later. He wrote that you had also written to him to say we would probably be able to leave soon and join you, please God, may it come true. He is a dear, warm-hearted boy; we are very fond of him. Has Franklin answered you? Artur has also written to him. I'd really like to know the actual amount of the second financial guarantee [for emigration]. You even wrote about a third one besides. We naturally have to do our utmost *now* to join you *soon*. We are living in one room in the Steinhardts' apartment, it is completely adequate, of course, pending emigration. The St[einhardts] are very nice to us, as you can imagine, we spend most of our time with them in the apartment, our old friendship has stood the test. You know them too, of course, and were here in their apartment before, when you said your good-byes. We have the room straight on when one comes up the flight of stairs. Dear child, how happy I am that Paula is with me again. She looks very good, thank God, has a good appetite, and likes to sleep a lot. Uncle Ernst<sup>7</sup> also wrote to us today, he's quite satisfied with his new position. How is Uncle doing there, anyway? I'm so very worried about how you're getting along. Why don't you write about this in a bit more detail? Are you living *together* with Marta? Where do you have your meals? Have you run into any acquaintances there yet? If only [we] were just with you, *that is our whole concern now* and all we think about. Ernst can be glad if his wife ever joins him, I'm still not really

1 USHMM, RG-10.086/5 of 13. This document has been translated from German.

2 Amalie Malsch, née Samuel (1889–1942); married to Paul Malsch (see fn. 4). The couple lived in Düsseldorf and were deported to Łódź on 27 Oct. 1941 on the first transport from Düsseldorf. They were murdered in Chelmo in 1942.

3 Wilhelm Malsch, later William Ronald Malsh (1913–1994), only son of Amalie and Paul Malsch, emigrated to Britain around the turn of the year 1935/1936, and from there went to the USA in Jan. 1937.

4 Paul Malsch (1885–1942), sales representative. He was arrested on 10 Nov. 1938, deported to Dachau concentration camp after several days in Düsseldorf prison, and then released on 23 Dec. 1938.

5 Eugen Malsch, brother of Paul Malsch, lived in New York and made efforts from there to help Paul and Amalie Malsch to emigrate.

6 The author means the US consulate in Stuttgart, where Paul and Amalie Malsch had applied for a visa.

7 Ernst Malsch (b. 1887), sales representative, brother of Paul Malsch. He lived in Rathenow, and emigrated to the Netherlands in late 1938 and then to Shanghai via Britain in August 1939.

convinced that it will happen. We're expecting post from you in the next few days; we're eager to read your lovely letter. Some day everything has to turn out well after all and go smoothly, I pray for this every day, and some day God must answer my prayer. Dear child, how are you managing with your underclothes and clothing? Just keep warm, that's the main thing, stay healthy. You've probably bought underclothes in the meantime, haven't you? We've heard nothing more from Irma in ages or from Ilse in M[ünchen] Gladbach.<sup>8</sup> Are Irma and her husband coming there soon? M[ünchen] Gladbach would probably like to come there too, right?<sup>9</sup> Martin wanted maybe to act as guarantor for them, you know, they showed us his letter at the time, in which he said so. So, dear child, do stay healthy, and let's hope we are reunited before much longer. For today, 1,000 hugs and kisses from your mother, who always loves you very much

## DOC. 2

**On 5 January 1938 Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler orders the expulsion  
of Soviet Jews from Germany<sup>1</sup>**

Letter (secret) from the RFSS/Chief of the German Police in the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior (S-V 6 1/38-469-30g.), signed on behalf of the former by Dr Best,<sup>2</sup> as telex to all State Police head offices and State Police offices, dated 5 January 1938 (copy to the Gestapo Central Office (Gestapa) II A 3)<sup>3</sup>

Re: Soviet Russians in Germany.

*Dossier* Decree of the Gestapo Central Office II A 4 1792/36, 24 October 1936.<sup>4</sup>

I ask that the regional police authorities responsible for ordering expulsions from the Reich be instructed to expel from the territory of the Reich all Soviet Russian subjects in their district, provided they are Jews, based on § 2 no. 3 of the Law on Expulsions from the Reich of 23 March 1934 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 213) without further statement of grounds, with a deadline of ten days for departure. Suspensive effect is to be denied to any appeal that may be lodged. If departure from the country does not occur within the time stipulated, the expulsion is to be accomplished by deportation across the border

<sup>8</sup> Now Mönchengladbach in the German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

<sup>9</sup> Sentence as in the original.

<sup>1</sup> RGVA, 501k-3-583, fol. 102r-v. This document has been translated from German.

<sup>2</sup> Dr Werner Best (1903-1989), lawyer; probationary judge in Hesse-Darmstadt, 1929; joined the NSDAP in 1930 and the SS in 1931; state commissioner for police in Hesse, 1933; deputy head of the Gestapo, 1935; head of Office I of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), 1939-1940; head of the administration staff of the Military Commander in France, 1940-1942; Reich plenipotentiary in Denmark, 1942-1945; sentenced to death in Copenhagen in 1948; amnestied and released in 1951; thereafter, lawyer and legal advisor for the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in North Rhine-Westphalia; author of works including *Die deutsche Polizei* (1940).

<sup>3</sup> The original contains some handwritten underlining and the stamp of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The telex replicated here was transmitted in duplicate to the Gestapo Central Office (Gestapa) by the Reichsführer SS the same day.

<sup>4</sup> This decree could not be found.

of the Reich. If there are a number of Jewish Soviet Russian citizens residing in the district of a regional police authority, the ordering of the expulsions from the Reich is to be appropriately spread over the period up to 15 February 1938. Holders of Soviet Russian official or diplomatic passports are to be exempted from expulsion.

Gestapo Central Office II A 3 is to be promptly informed by telex every time an expulsion from the Reich is ordered and carried out, with indication of all particulars (surname, first name, occupation, date of birth, place of birth, home address, employer), as well as the date of the expulsion order and the date of departure from Germany.

*Addendum for the State Police head office in Berlin:*

The Soviet Russian Leo Arinstein (physician at the Soviet embassy in Berlin), born in Kiev on 3 November 1872 and residing in Berlin-Wilmersdorf, 34 Schaperstr., is not subject to the aforementioned measure for the time being.<sup>5</sup>

### DOC. 3

#### **On 14 January 1938 the Munich Gestapo notes that Jewish *Mischlinge* with illegitimate children are not forbidden to meet with one other<sup>1</sup>**

Memorandum written by the State Police head office (II B he), Detective Chief Inspector Heckl,<sup>2</sup> Munich, dated 14 January 1938

Re: enforcement of the Blood Protection Law; here, denial of the requested marriage licence application.

The government of Upper Bavaria, Inspector *Grötzinger*, made it known in a telephone call on 14 January 1938 that the government office is frequently visited by persons to whom permission to marry has been denied on the basis of the Blood Protection Law.<sup>3</sup> These persons state that the police, when informing them that permission to marry has been denied, tell them among other things that in future they are not allowed to meet with their prospective spouses again, otherwise they will be placed in concentration camps. Those who come round to the office are generally individuals who have an

<sup>5</sup> The decree, which affected around 500 Jews with Soviet citizenship, was issued by the Gestapo in reaction to the expulsion of German citizens from the Soviet Union. However, since the Soviet Jews did not receive permission to enter the Soviet Union, on 28 May 1938 Heydrich ordered that they be sent to concentration camps until they could prove that their emigration was imminent: RGVA, 501k-3-583, fol. 106r-v; Eliahu Ben Elissar, *La diplomatie du IIIe Reich et les Juifs (1933-1939)* (Paris: Juillard, 1969), pp. 231-232.

<sup>1</sup> StAM, Rep. Polizeidirektion Munich, Nr. 7017, Aufn. 6. This document has been translated from German.

<sup>2</sup> Lukas Heckl (1900-1967), policeman; joined the Bavarian Regional Police, 1922; police detective in Munich, 1932; joined the Gestapo, 1937; in Lublin and Drohobycz from 1940; classified as a 'follower' during denazification proceedings in 1948; worked thereafter for the Bavarian riot police.

<sup>3</sup> According to the First Regulation on the Implementation of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour, 14 Nov. 1935 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1935, I, pp. 1334-1336), *Mischlinge* of the first degree required a certificate of exemption in order to marry non-Jews or *Mischlinge* of the second degree; generally, these exemptions were denied.

illegitimate child, and it would mean great hardship for them should the child's father or mother no longer be permitted to visit the child. As the persons in question are exclusively Jewish Mischlinge, meeting is not prohibited; only cohabitation, living together without legal marriage, is prohibited.

Grötzinger asks that the officials who deal with the enforcement of the Blood Protection Law be instructed accordingly.

#### DOC. 4

#### **On 19 January 1938 the director of the Reich Archives calls on the Reich Minister of the Interior to forbid Jews to use the archives<sup>1</sup>**

Letter from the director of the Reich Archives (V10-192/38), (Dr Zi) Ernst Zipfel,<sup>2</sup> Potsdam, to the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior (received on 19 January 1938), dated 19 January 1938<sup>3</sup>

Re: use of archives by Jews and Jewish Mischlinge

Through Decree VI A 13 611/6062 of 20 December 1937<sup>4</sup> concerning the denial of access to records for Dr Hans Goldschmidt,<sup>5</sup> a decision was made in an individual case regarding the granting of a user permit to a non-Aryan. Applications that the non-Aryan Professor Hans Rothfels<sup>6</sup> has addressed to the Reich Archives and the Prussian Secret State Archives concerning the use of archival materials from the nineteenth century, in addition to observations that I have made regarding other cases of this kind, cause me to request henceforth a categorical and general settlement of this matter, which is a meaningful one for the National Socialist state and its intellectual life.

In the Third Reich the influence of Jewry on German cultural and intellectual life has been completely eliminated by legal measures. That is also the case in the field of historical scholarship. No Jew can lecture on German history at German universities and thereby influence the next generation from the standpoint of his alien national character. No Jew can edit a history journal or work as an archivist under contract to the state authority to act as steward of the German nation's body of historical sources. Yet, even today, Jews and Jewish Mischlinge can still work as editors and writers in the field of our history. Indeed, some even receive government contracts and resources for this purpose. Everyone will describe as impossible the notion that a non-Aryan should perform and interpret a Beethoven symphony, a musical drama by Richard Wagner, or a

1 BAArch, R 1506/307, fols. 169–170v. This document has been translated from German.

2 Ernst Zipfel (1891–1966), archival director; joined the NSDAP in 1932; from 1938 member of the advisory council of the Research Department for the Jewish Question at the Reich Institute for the History of the New Germany; from 1942 commissioner for archival protection; after 1945 lived in Bad Pyrmont.

3 In the original there are handwritten administrative notes.

4 As *ibid.*, fol. 166.

5 Dr (Julius) Hans Goldschmidt (1879–1940), historian; from 1920 to 1934 historian at the Reich Archives; emigrated to Britain in 1939; killed in London during a German bombing raid.

6 Dr Hans Rothfels (1891–1976), historian; professor in Königsberg, 1926–1934; dismissed in 1934; studied sources at the Secret State Archives in Berlin until 1938; emigrated to the USA in 1939; returned to Germany in 1951; taught at the universities of Tübingen and Chicago; from 1953 co-editor of the academic journal *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*.

classical drama for a German audience. But it is a fact that even today the most important events and circumstances of our national history, from which the strongest influences on our current actions and thoughts can spring, even today are first retrieved from the sources by Jews and Jewish Mischlinge and are presented to the German public from a Jewish perspective. Non-Aryans can still work on the documents on German political and cultural life that are stored in the state archives. By selecting and interpreting the historical source material, Jews have the opportunity to exert influence that is especially dangerous precisely because it is intangible and inconspicuous.

Here, it seems to me, yawns a highly alarming gap in the new order of our cultural life. If leading organs of the [National Socialist] Movement are pointing today to the still astonishing percentage of Jews who represent German businesses, namely abroad, and demanding that this deplorable state of affairs be corrected, I view it as my duty to call attention to the no less dangerous abuse that thwarts a significant portion of the efforts of the National Socialist state leadership to gain, from insight into the German past, strength for dealing with the momentous tasks of the present. To my mind, nothing less than an undermining of the racial policy legislation of the Third Reich must result should the Jews continue to be allowed to use the archives and thus exploit highly prized state and national records.

The special nature of archival work accounts for the failure so far to remedy this shortcoming. This work is done in silence and within a fairly narrow circle, mostly secluded from the everyday events of the present and little heeded by the public. The fruits of this work are usually reflected at first in purely scholarly works, which often affect the broader public only after some time and by means of more popular accounts, biographies, and historical novels, in book form and in the press. It is precisely in this that I see a particular danger. The Jewish historian who, say, first gathers the main features of Prussian administration in the eighteenth century from the acts of state during the reign of Frederick the Great, and then publishes the findings in a scholarly work, perhaps causes no direct harm at first. But since no one can re-examine his selection and treatment of the materials, his work becomes the basis for numerous further interpretations, and his understanding of the sources remains definitive. Aside from this, I regard it as an imperative of national dignity to have German history written only by Germans, and not to allow the Jew to raise an objection, insisting that his scholarly involvement in this field is simply indispensable. But in my opinion the political dangers must not be underestimated, either. One cannot expect that precisely the so-called 'decent Jews' will have sympathy with the German state and people. One must instead assume that they will succumb only too readily to the temptation to assert their influence in the field of history, which has remained open to them by chance and has such great value, and perhaps even to exact vengeance on the nationhood of the host.

From these points of view, it is intolerable that Jews are still allowed today to exploit documents on domestic and foreign history until now unknown to the German people, and that state funds are even spent for this purpose. Even granted that efforts are made to achieve objectivity in individual cases, the fact remains that no approach to the sources can be made without an inherent point of view. An objective presentation of history in the sense of complete detachment from the present-day political and cultural situation was always preposterous, but must be utterly impossible today.

In my view, a remedy can be found only by forbidding Jews and Jewish Mischlinge to use the historical source material contained in the state archives and thus also

implementing the Aryan Paragraph in the area of archival access. The objection that this would occasionally affect Jewish combat veterans cannot be considered valid, since the individuals in question continue to receive their stipends in this capacity and so are financially protected by the state's payment in return. Concerns of an academic and non-material nature and a right to the continuation of the scholarly study of archive sources, with the exertion of influence ensuing therefrom, cannot be justified by the possession of combat veteran status. If the Jew is barred from all other aspects of cultural life, it is all the more important that he be kept from participation in German historical research and the presentation of German history, as the racial and ideological foundation of our national existence.

Accordingly, I venture to put forward a motion, and in consultation with the Prussian Minister President to seek the issuance of an order, to the effect that Jews are to be barred from using the archives except for purposes of family history and research concerning their own national character (with specific limits on time and subject matter).<sup>7</sup>

#### DOC. 5

#### On 27 January 1938 Luise Solmitz describes her daughter's social exclusion<sup>1</sup>

Handwritten diary of Luise Solmitz,<sup>2</sup> Hamburg, entry for 27 January 1938<sup>3</sup>

*Kaiser's birthday, 79 years old. Mr Merutisch [...] <sup>4</sup> saw us before the meal and we had a pleasant time together until lunch. In the evening, Mrs [...] <sup>5</sup> came by, [asked] whether we are willing to lend a few chairs for Käthe Merutisch's [...] birthday (we are invited). Then French dictation with Gis. <sup>6</sup> and Inge, English with [...] Inge, then Pauli [...] worked until 2:30 a.m. on 'our' school-leaving exams; I embellished maths with chit-chat and anecdotes, he, the Pythagorean theorem. The best thing is that the unbeatable Hilde Hünchen [...], who gets nothing but A grades for all her work, 20, 30 times in a row, always, got a C in the last maths test before the school-leaving exam! Mr Rammeler [...] was dumbfounded! Major Portz [...] and his dainty princess in Berlin also plan to cross their fingers, and so do Enno and [...]! When I was composing my little essay about [...], the thought of all the splendour that I failed to grasp made my heart swell, I felt [...], <sup>7</sup> how clear, how encompass-*

7 In a circular letter (VIC2237 II.ANG./6062) dated 24 March 1938, the Reich Ministry of the Interior, p.p. Pfundtner, forbade Jews to use the archives 'except for purposes of family history and for research concerning Jewish national character [Volkstum]': LAB, B. Rep. 142/7, Nr. 1-2-6-1.

1 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 622-1/140, Familie Solmitz, 1, Bd. 31. This document has been translated from German.

2 Luise Solmitz, née Stephan (1889–1974), teacher in Hamburg; married to Friedrich Wilhelm Solmitz (see fn. 9), who was regarded as a Jew under the Nuremberg Laws even after his conversion to Christianity.

3 The italicized sections are from the handwritten version of the diary. See Editorial Preface.

4 Original text illegible.

5 Difficult to read in the original: Vögel or Nägel.

6 Gisela Solmitz, the daughter of Luise and Friedrich Solmitz (see fn. 12).

7 Difficult to read in the original: Nähe (closeness) or Mühe (difficulty).