Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity

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Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity

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Acknowledgements

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Part II: **The Crisis of the Subject**

References, Citations, and Abbreviations

All German quotations of Nietzsche's writings are from the following editions:

BAW   Nietzsche, Friedrich (1933–1940) *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Hans Joachim Mette/Carl Koch/Karl Schlechta (eds.), Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Reprinted as: *Frühe Schriften 1854–1869*, Munich: DTV 1994.
KSA   Nietzsche, Friedrich (1980) *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, Giorgio Colli/Mazzino Montinari (eds.), Munich/Berlin/New York: DTV/De Gruyter.
KSB   Nietzsche, Friedrich (1986) *Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bänden*, Giorgio Colli/Mazzino Montinari (eds.), Munich/Berlin/New York: DTV/De Gruyter.
KGB   Nietzsche, Friedrich (1975–) *Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, established by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, continued by Norbert Miller and Annemarie Pieper, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
KGW   Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967–) *Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, established by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, continued by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Karl Pestalozzi (eds.), Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.

References to published or titled texts by Nietzsche follow the standard abbreviations, which are given below. The German abbreviations are used when a text is quoted in German; the English abbreviations, when a text is quoted in English translation.

Unless otherwise stated, the cited translations are the following:

Works by Nietzsche

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1966) *The Birth of Tragedy*, ed./transl. Kaufmann, W., New York: Random House.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967) *On the Genealogy of Morals*, ed./transl. Kaufmann, W., New York: Random House.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1983) *Untimely Meditations*, transl. Hollingdale, R.J., Cambridge/London/New York/New Rochelle/Melbourne/Sydney: Cambridge University Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1986) *Human, All Too Human*, ed./transl. Hollingdale, R.J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1989) *Description of Ancient Rhetoric*, in: *F. Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, ed. & transl. by Gilman, S.L./Blair, C./Parent, D.J., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 2 ff.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1989) *The History of Greek Eloquence*, in: *F. Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, ed. & transl. by Gilman, S.L./Blair, C./Parent, D.J., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 213 ff.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1996) *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, Indianapolis: Hackett.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1996c) *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Christopher Middleton, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [reprint]

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1997) *Daybreak*, ed. Clark, M./Leiter, B., transl. Hollingdale, R.J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1998) *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, ed./transl. Cowan, M., Washington: A Gateway Edition.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1999) *On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense*, in: Nietzsche, F., *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Guess, R./Speirs, R., transl. Speirs, R., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 139–153.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2001) *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, B., transl. Nauckhoff, J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2002) *Beyond Good and Evil*, ed. Horstmann, R-P./Norman, J., transl. Norman, J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2005) *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley, A./Norman, J., transl. Norman, J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2005) *The Case of Wagner*, in Nietzsche, F., *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley, A./Norman, J., transl. Norman, J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 231–262.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2005) *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, in Nietzsche, F., *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley, A./Norman, J., transl. Norman, J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 263–282.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2006) *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, ed. Del Caro, A./Pippin, R., transl. Del Caro, A., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Occasionally, some of the authors have chosen to quote from the following translations:

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1954) *Twilight of the Idols*, ed./transl. Kaufmann, W., in: *The Portable Nietzsche*, New York: Viking Penguin.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1974) *The Gay Science*, ed./transl. Kaufmann, W., New York: Random House.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1966) *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, ed./transl. Kaufmann, W., New York: Random House.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1966) *Beyond Good and Evil*, ed./transl. Kaufmann, W., New York: Random House.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1987) *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1992) *Ecce Homo*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1996) *Beyond Good and Evil*, ed./transl. Smith, D., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1998) *Twilight of the Idols*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2003) *Thus spoke Zarathustra*, trans. T. Wayne, New-York: Algora Publishing.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2011) *Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2012) *Ecce Homo. How To Become What You Are*, trans. D. Large, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2013) *Human, All Too Human: Volume Two*, trans. Gary Handwerk, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Translations from the *Nachlass* are from the following editions:

WEN   Nietzsche, Friedrich (2009) *Writings from the Early Notebooks*, ed. Geuss, R./
       Nehamas, A., transl. Löb, L., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
WLN   Nietzsche, Friedrich (2003) *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, R., transl.
       Sturge, K., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
WP   Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967) *The Will to Power*, ed. Kaufmann, W., transl. Kaufmann,
       W./Hollingdale, R.J., New York: Random House.

Notes from the *Nachlass* not available in WEN, WLN, or WP have been translated
by either the editors or the authors.

References to the *Nachlass* are given as follows: NL year, note, KSA volume,
pages; e.g., NL 1885, 31[31], KSA 11: 367–369. References to a translation are
added after the references to the KSA, e.g. NL 1885, KSA 11, 31[131] = WLN, 10.
Sections or chapters that are not numbered but given a title in Nietzsche's text
are quoted accordingly: e.g. EH, Why I am so Clever 9. A few authors abbreviate
these titles: e.g. EH Clever 9. A few of the authors have added the KSA page
references to the abbreviated references to English translations: e.g. BGE 43,
KSA 5: 60.

Abbreviations of Nietzsche's works in German

AC   *Der Antichrist. Fluch auf das Christenthum*
DD   *Dionysos-Dithyramben*
EH   *Ecce homo. Wie man wird, was man ist*
           EH klug   Warum ich so klug bin
FW   *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*
GD   *Götzen-Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt*
           GD Irrthümer   Die vier grossen Irrthümer
GM   *Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift*
GT   *Die Geburt der Tragödie*
GT Versuch *Die Geburt der Tragödie, Versuch einer Selbstkritik*
JGB   *Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft*
M   *Morgenröthe. Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile*
MA   *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Ein Buch für freie Geister*
NL   Nachgelassene Fragmente/Notate/Aufzeichnungen Nietzsches
NW   *Nietzsche contra Wagner. Aktenstücke eines Psychologen*
PHG   *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*
UB   *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*
VM   (MA II) *Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche*
WA   *Der Fall Wagner. Ein Musikanten-Problem*
WL   *Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne*
WB   *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*

WS	*Der Wanderer und sein Schatten*
Z	Also Sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen
	Z I Verächtern Von den Verächtern des Leibes
	Z II Tugendhaften Von den Tugendhaften

Abbreviations of Nietzsche's works in English

A	*The Antichrist*
AOM	(HH II) *Assorted Opinions and Maxims*
BGE	*Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*
BT	*The Birth of Tragedy*
BT Attempt	*The Birth of Tragedy, Attempt At a Self-Criticism*
CW	*The Case of Wagner*
D	*Daybreak*
DD	*Dithyrambs of Dionysus*
DS	(UM I) *David Strauss*
EH	*Ecce Homo. How One Becomes What One Is*
	EH BGE Beyond Good and Evil
	EH Clever Why I am so Clever
	EH CW The Case of Wagner
	EH GM Genealogy of Morals
	EH Wise Why I am so Wise
GM	*On the Genealogy of Morals. A Polemic*
GS	*The Gay Science*
HH	*Human, All Too Human*
HL	(UM II) *On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*
NCW	*Nietzsche contra Wagner. Out of the Files of a Psychologist*
NL	Nietzsche's Posthumous Notebooks
PTAG	*Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*
RWB	(UM IV) *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*
SE	(UM III) *Schopenhauer as Educator*
TI	*Twilight of the Idols. How To Philosophize with a Hammer*
	TI Ancients What I Owe the Ancients
	TI Errors The Four Great Errors
	TI Morality Morality as Anti-Nature
	TI Reason "Reason" in Philosophy
	TI Socrates The Problem of Socrates
	TI Skirmishes Skirmishes of an Untimely Man
TL	*On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense*
UM	*Untimely Meditations*
WS	(HH II) *The Wanderer and His Shadow*
Z	*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*
	Z IV Cry The Cry of Distress
	Z III Wanderer The Wanderer
NB	Nietzsche's Library/Nietzsche-Bibliothek

Abbreviations of works by other authors

AA	Kant, Immanuel (1900–) *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. the Royal Prussian, subsequently German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, 29 vols., Berlin: Reimer, subsequently De Gruyter.
AR	Liebmann, Otto (1880) *Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit: Eine Erörterung der Grundprobleme der Philosophie [On the Analysis of Reality]*, 2nd edition, Strassburg: Trübner.
AT	Descartes, René (1996) *Œuvres*, ed. Adam, Ch./Tannery, P., 11 vols., Paris: J. Vrin.
BLBK	Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) "The Blue Book", in: *Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations", Generally Known as The Blue and Brown Books*, Oxford, UK: Blackwell. [2nd edition 1969]
CD	Freud, Sigmund (1961) *Civilization and its Discontents* [1934], in: *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, transl. under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, vol. 21, London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, pp. 57–145.
CL	Emerson, Ralph Waldo, (1904a) *The Conduct of Life*, in: *The Complete Works*, Concord Edition, vol. 6, Boston Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.
CPR	Kant, Immanuel (1998) *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed./transl. Guyer, P./Wood, A.W., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CV	Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) *Culture and Value*, Oxford: Blackwell.
De Anima	Aristotle (1986), *Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes.* VIII *On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath*, ed. W. S. Hett, Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press/Loeb Classical Library
E	Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1883), Essays: First and Second Series, Boston Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.
Ethics	Spinoza, Baruch de (1985) *Ethics.* In *Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
FL	Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1862) *Die Führung des Lebens*, transl. Mühlberg, E.S. von, Leipzig: Steinacker.
FR	Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974) *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, transl. Payne, E.F.J., La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Freud, SE	Freud, Sigmund (1953–74) *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols., transl. under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis.
KpV	Kant, Immanuel (1913) *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, in: Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. the Royal Prussian, subsequently German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, vol. 5, Berlin: Reimer, subsequently De Gruyter, 1–163.
KrV	Kant, Immanuel (1911) *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in: Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. the Royal Prussian, subsequently German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, vols. 3 and 4, Berlin: Reimer, subsequently De Gruyter, 1–552 and 1–252.

KU   Kant, Immanuel (1913) *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, in: Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. the Royal Prussian, subsequently German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, vol. 5, Berlin: Reimer, subsequently De Gruyter, 165–485.

LSA   Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1904b) Letters and Social Aims, in: *The Complete Works*, Concord Edition, vol. 8, Boston Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.

Mon   Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1714) *Les principes de la philosophie ou la monadologie* [*Monadology*], in: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 1, ed. Holz, H.H., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 438–483. [French text and German translation]

NBs   Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) *Notebooks 1914–1916*, ed. Anscombe, G.E.M./ Wright, G.H. von, transl. Anscombe, G.E.M, Oxford, UK: Blackwell. [2nd edition 1979]

NE   Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1876) *Neue Essays (Letters and Social Aims)*, transl. Schmidt, J., Stuttgart: Auerbach.

Nic.   Aristotle (1986), *Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes*. XIX *Nichomachean Ethics*, ed.
Ethics H. Rackham, Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press/Loeb Classical Library

NS   Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm ([1695], 1996) *Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de l'union qu'il y a entre l' âme et le corps [New System]*, in: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 1, ed. Holz, H.H., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 200–226. [French text and German translation]

OAFP   Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm ([1694], 1996) *De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae* [*On the Advancement of First Philosophy*], in: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 1, ed. Holz, H.H., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 194–200. [Latin text and German translation]

OARC   Drossbach, Maximilian (1884) *Über die scheinbaren und die wirklichen Ursachen des Geschehens in der Welt [On the Apparent and the Real Causes of Becoming in the World]*, Halle: Pfeffer.

PEFW   Schopenhauer, Arthur (1999) *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, ed. Zöller, G., transl. Payne, E.F.J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PI   Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958) *Philosophical Investigations*, transl. Anscombe, G.E.M., 2nd edition, Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

PR   Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) *Philosophical Remarks*, ed. Rhees, R., transl. Hargreaves, R./White, R., Oxford, UK: Blackwell. [2nd edition 1975]

RAW   Teichmüller G. (1882) *Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt: Neue Grundlegung der Metaphysik [The Real and the Apparent World]*, Breslau: Koebner.

RPP   Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I*, ed. Anscombe, G.E.M./Wright, G.H. von, transl. Anscombe, G.E.M., Oxford, UK: Blackwell. [1st pub. 1980]

SKS   Kierkegaard, Søren (2013) *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, 28 text volumes and 28 commentary volumes, ed. Cappelørn, N.J./Garff, J./Knuden, J./Kondrup, J./McKinnon, A., Copenhagen: Gad.

SuZ   Heidegger, Martin (1976) [1927] *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Niemeyer. [Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann 1977]

TF	Liebmann, Otto (1882) *Gedanken und Tatsachen: Philosophische Abhandlungen, Aphorismen und Studien [Thoughts and Facts]*, Stuttgart: Trübner.
TLP	Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2001) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, transl. Pears, D.F./ McGuinness, B.F. with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, London/New York: Routledge.
TP	Spinoza, Baruch de (2000) *Political Treatise*, trans. Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett.
TTP	Spinoza, Baruch de (2004) *Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise*, trans. Martin D. Yaffe, Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing.
V	Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1858) *Versuche* (*Essays*: first and second series), transl. Fabricius, G., Hannover: Carl Meyer.
WWR I	Schopenhauer, Arthur (1958) *The World as Will and Representation, vol. I*, transl. Payne, E.F.J., New York: Dover.
WWR II	Schopenhauer, Arthur (1958) *The World as Will and Representation, vol. II*, transl. Payne, E.F.J., New York: Dover.
WWV I	Schopenhauer, Arthur (1949) *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung Erster Band*, in Arthur Schopenhauer (1946–1950), *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 2, ed. Hübscher, A., 7 vols., Wiesbaden: Brockhaus.
WWV II	Schopenhauer, Arthur (1949) *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung Zweiter Band*, in Arthur Schopenhauer (1946–1950), *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 3, ed. Hübscher, A., 7 vols., Wiesbaden: Brockhaus.

João Constâncio, Maria João Mayer Branco and Bartholomew Ryan
Introduction to *Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity*

This book resulted from a research project which assumed that subjectivity remains a valid philosophical problem today, and that Nietzsche's thought is deeply concerned with this problem. In modern philosophy, from Descartes through to Schopenhauer and beyond, the "problem of subjectivity", as we called it in the title of our book, is first of all a theoretical question about the nature of human consciousness, and particularly about human *self*-consciousness. Already for Descartes the question, "what is consciousness?", becomes the question whether the 'I' or 'Self' that we articulate in our self-consciousness is 'a subject', an underlying, permanent reality that is the thinker of our thoughts, the knower of our knowledge, and the agent or doer of our deeds. Belief in such a subject can be equated with Descartes' belief in the existence of a *res cogitans*. Although he does not use the term 'subject', his 'thinking substance' is indeed supposed to be the 'subject' that underlies all manifestations of the *cogito*, the 'I think'. The reason why Descartes is so easily led from consciousness to self-consciousness is certainly because asking about consciousness involves a self-reflexive movement whereby one becomes (explicitly) conscious of one's consciousness. Paradoxically, our consciousness is unconscious most of the time, for we are not conscious of it *as such*, and so in our everyday dealings with the world we tend not to look at things as things that are given to our consciousness, while we also tend not to look at our consciousness as any sort of kernel or core of our being. But in acquiring consciousness of our consciousness we are led naturally to think of ourselves as 'thinking beings' and 'subjects', precisely as Descartes did.

However, it is well known that Nietzsche radically rejected the Cartesian subject and the dualism it entails. It is also well known that he rejected Schopenhauer's replacement of the Cartesian subject with an unconscious 'will' or individual 'character', and of course Nietzsche also rejected Kant's conception of a purely 'logical' – but still permanent – subject, a 'transcendental I of apperception' positioned at the centre of our subjectivity. If the problem of subjectivity is simply the question whether there is in some sense a 'subject', it seems that nothing much needs to be written about "Nietzsche and the problem of subjectivity". He rejected the notion of a subject, he considered the subject a 'fiction', and the only question seems to be whether we should understand this as implying that Nietzsche is a physicalist who reduces the first-personal, subjective

perspective to 'physiological' processes in the brain, or the first postmodernist, the first thinker to denounce the subject as an ideological fiction and tool of domination, which is now 'dead'.

We think, however, that this is a hasty conclusion, and that this volume shows that there is much more to Nietzsche's approach to the problem of subjectivity, as well as to the problem of subjectivity itself, than the preceding paragraph suggests. First, becoming conscious of consciousness in a subjective way, that is, 'first-personally', or 'phenomenologically', and then asking what consciousness 'is', that is, asking what is the nature of consciousness as manifested not only objectively, but also subjectively, raises a panoply of theoretical questions that cannot be reduced to the question about the *existence* of an underlying and unifying 'subject'. Nietzsche deals with these questions, and indeed he seems to have been fascinated by them.

There is, for example, the question of dualism. As many scholars have noted, criticising dualism and developing a non-dualistic conception of consciousness is a major concern for Nietzsche. Especially in his posthumous notebooks, he seems to have worked out a quite sophisticated 'adualistic' conception of consciousness, in fact a post-Spinozistic 'double aspect' conception of the body-soul relationship. This conception involves a very interesting distinction between 'self' (*Selbst*) and 'I' (*Ich*), which seems to dislocate our identity from the 'surface' of consciousness to the 'depths' of the 'body'.

But, to take another example, there is also the question of epiphenomenalism – i.e. the question whether consciousness is causally efficacious or not. This is also a crucial issue, which leads to the problem of free-will, and which has been extensively discussed in the literature on Nietzsche in recent years. Several of the articles included in this collection are new contributions to the scholarship on this issue (see, for example, chapters 6 and 7). Embodiment is another related issue, which Nietzsche also tackles (see, in particular, chapter 21), and which was also a major theme of Schopenhauer's philosophy, Nietzsche's 'master' (see chapter 5). Note that in the first volume of Schopenhauer's *World as Will* and Representation embodiment is a question that clearly belongs to the problem of subjectivity, for he conceives of embodiment as our *first-personal* experience of being a body.

The question whether consciousness is adaptive or why has it been selected and preserved in the course of human evolution is also another crucial issue for Nietzsche. Perhaps his most important reflection on consciousness is, or at least includes, an 'extravagant conjecture' about the evolutionary nature of consciousness (see GS 354). Issues of rationality are of paramount importance for Nietzsche as well. His well-known focus on 'power' is to a great extent a reflection on the limits of human reason, particularly of reason as conceived of by

modern philosophy precisely in the context of its development as a philosophy of subjectivity and the subject. For Nietzsche, the ultimate question seems to be whether rationality has any power over us, or the use of reason at the level of consciousness is just the 'surface' of unconscious power-relations among 'drives', 'affects', and 'instincts' that really decide what we do and are.

This last issue is an important part of Nietzsche's concern with the *value* of consciousness, which means (at least prima facie) his concern with the "overestimation of consciousness" (GS 11) in modern philosophy and modern culture. But his concern is in fact much wider than this. Nietzsche sees Descartes' dualism and the overestimation of consciousness in modern philosophy as a modern reformulation of Plato's old "error", the "invention of pure spirit and the Good in itself" (BGE Preface), as well as of Christianity's faith in the immortal 'soul' (BGE 54). As noted below (see chapter 11), Nietzsche believes that the question of the relationship between consciousness and the drives, instincts, and affects is a very old question. It lies at the heart of the modern approach to consciousness, but it was already a crucial question for Socrates and Plato, who formulated it in terms of an opposition between "instinct and reason" (BGE 191). In a few key-passages, Nietzsche rephrases this as an opposition between instinct and language, or between our purely instinctual life and our social life as language-users (BGE 268, GS 354), as well as an opposition between our 'affects' and our conscious thoughts, this being (he argues) a key opposition for the understanding of morality (e.g. BGE 187, BGE 198, GS 333). In Nietzsche's writings, the question of consciousness is closely linked with the question of agency (see, for example, chapters 14, 23, 24, and 26).

Moreover, in one of Nietzsche's most central texts on the problem of subjectivity – namely, aphorism 12 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, where he clarifies his position as a critique and rejection of what he terms the "atomism of the soul" – Nietzsche can be said to also reject any form of eliminism, and he is quite explicit:

> Between you and me, there is absolutely no need to give up "the soul" itself, and relinquish one of the oldest and most venerable hypotheses – as often happens with naturalists: given their clumsiness, they barely need to touch "the soul" to lose it. But the path lies open for new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis – and concepts like the "mortal soul" and the "soul as subject-multiplicity" and the "soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects" want henceforth to have civil rights in the realm of science. (BGE 12)

This passage becomes particularly important if one considers, firstly, the fact that where Nietzsche says 'soul' he could have said 'subject', as he takes the term 'subject' to be no more than a scholarly and modern term for the older,

pre-modern concepts of 'soul' and 'spirit' (NL 1885, 36[36], KSA 11: 565–566); and secondly, the fact that here he most clearly offers a non-eliminist *alternative* to the modern model of an underlying and unifying 'subject' of our thoughts and actions. He proposes that all 'atomistic' models of subjectivity, whether Cartesian, Kantian, broadly Christian or Platonic or of any other sort, be replaced with the conception of a 'subject-multiplicity' (*Subjekts-Vielheit*). What this means is, of course, open to interpretation, but it is certain that Nietzsche equates this subjective multiplicity, or this 'subject' which is in fact a 'multiplicity', not only with a mortal subject, a 'mortal soul', but also with the "soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects" (BGE 12). Several of the chapters below explore this idea of multiplicity (see, for example, chapters 8, 12, 18), or revise traditional notions of self-referentiality, reflexivity, and intentionality in the light of it (see, for example, chapters 11 and 13).

The issue of multiplicity in Nietzsche involves also his famous 'perspectivism'. In modern philosophy, the discovery of the first-personal, subjective realm of consciousness, of self-referential consciousness, or of consciousness of consciousness, leads to the idealist thesis that "the world is my representation" (WWR I §1), as Schopenhauer famously put it. The world becomes 'phenomenon', a 'phenomenal world'. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche seems to radicalise rather than discard modern phenomenalism, as he claims that Schopenhauer's 'world = representation' should be amended and replaced with 'world = error' (HH I 19). Also in *The Gay Science*'s aphorism on consciousness, Nietzsche asserts that what we call 'world' is merely a 'surface- and sign-world', a 'false' world of 'generalities', a world, as it were, constructed by our consciousness' linguistic conceptualisations. And yet he locates these linguistic conceptualisations and constructions of our 'surface- and sign-world' in the always already *social* milieu of 'communication'. That is most likely the reason why he writes that his conception of consciousness leads not only to a 'true phenomenalism', but also to a true 'perspectivism' (GS 354). Nietzsche's world = error is not the merely subjective world of solipsism – i.e., it is not the world as *my* representation –, but rather a social world where a multiplicity of perspectives communicate with each other, impact on each other, modify each other. We may call this a world of 'intersubjectivity', but we have to bear in mind that part of Nietzsche's point is that the perspectival world of social communications – or the world constituted by a non-solipsistic consciousness, which is in fact a social *Verbindungsnetz*, "a net connecting one person with another" (GS 354) – should not be seen as an aggregate of fixed, permanent, unifying 'subjects'. The multiple perspectives that emerge and interact within a realm of social communications do not belong to 'subjects', as they are not rooted in any substance or underlying reality (see chapter 19 for a radical exploration of the

idea that there are no substances if the world is constructed by a multiplicity of perspectives). However, the relationship between Nietzsche's social conception of consciousness and the issues of intersubjectivity, social identity, reciprocal recognition etc. remain a largely open question (see chapters 9, 11, and 25). The same goes for Nietzsche's relationship with idealism in general. Is his 'true phenomenalism and perspectivism' still a form of idealism, despite his usual self-presentation as an anti-idealist (e.g. BGE 15, BGE 39, BGE 210, GS 372, TI Ancients 2)? In a note from 1882, for example, Nietzsche speaks of his own kind of "idealism" ("*Meine Art von 'Idealismus'*", NL 1882, 21[3], KSA 9: 685), and defines it as an "idealism" (which he puts in quotation marks) which results from the belief that every sensation "contains an evaluation [*Werthschätzung*]" and every evaluation "fantasises and invents [*phantasirt und erfindet*]" (NL 1882, 21[3], KSA 9: 685).

But Nietzsche's conception of a 'true phenomenalism and perspectivism' has another major implication for the way in which he can be said to deal with the problem of subjectivity. The problem of subjectivity is after all the question about what is it and what does it imply to exist as a being that is first-personally conscious of itself. But this question is naive if it is not, in part, a question about what one can *know* about oneself from the first-person experience of oneself. The question about *self-knowledge* is a crucial part of the problem of subjectivity, as several chapters in this book show (see, for example, chapters 4, 7, 10, 11, 22, 26). As we shall discuss in just a moment (when we discuss the individual chapters in more detail), Nietzsche has a fundamentally sceptic view of self-knowledge, and in his terminology this means that he believes that one's 'inner world' is a 'phenomenal world', just as the external world. Or, in other words, his 'true phenomenalism and perspectivism' applies both to first-personal, subjective knowledge and to third-personal, objective knowledge. Paul Katsafanas (chapter 4) and Paolo Stellino (chapter 22) argue that Nietzsche seeks in 'genealogy' a new, non-introspective way of obtaining self-knowledge; Robert B. Pippin (chapter 26) argues that although Nietzsche is indeed sceptical about self-observation *qua* introspection and rejects it, he develops an 'expressivist' account of the self of self-knowledge, one which entails that what is expressed *in* our actions is a source of (retrospective) self-knowledge.

We thus have a quite impressive list of questions and problems involved in what we call the problem of subjectivity, namely: the nature of consciousness; the existence or non-existence of the subject as a substance; dualism; the self (perhaps as something distinct from the I); epiphenomenalism; embodiment; evolution; rationality (vs. power); the relationship between consciousness and the drives, affects, and instincts; agency; multiplicity (vs. 'the atomism of the soul'); self-referentiality, reflexivity; intentionality; perspectivism and phenom-

enalism; communication, language and conceptualisation; intersubjectivity; idealism; self-knowledge. That Nietzsche was fascinated by these questions and problems is especially clear from his notebooks. However, in the books that he actually published, including those he left prepared for publication before his mental collapse, he presents his theoretical positions on the problem of subjectivity in an extremely fragmented and condensed fashion – sometimes even *en passant* – and, most importantly, he often seems to take great care to embed them in a *practical* context, indeed in a context which may be called 'existential', or perhaps 'practical-existential'. The question about what is it and what does it imply to exist as a being that is first-personally conscious of itself is also an existential, or practical-existential, question, and several of the chapters of this volume highlight precisely this dimension of the problem of subjectivity (see chapters 8 to 13). Here the problem becomes, at least for Nietzsche, a much more local problem, that is, a matter of describing and diagnosing a particular existential situation, namely the existential situation of modern human beings faced with the 'death of God' and 'nihilism', or what is it and what does it imply to exist as a being that is first-personally conscious of itself in this practical-existential situation. Perhaps the whole of twentieth-century philosophy can be characterised as involving a crisis of the modern conception of the subject that is intrinsically connected with a broader practical-existential situation, such that even the problems that seem more purely theoretical in philosophy (such as epiphenomenalism or embodiment) are in fact embedded in a context which is ultimately normative.

This crisis of the modern subject and the whole philosophical question of modernity and postmodernity – and particularly the question whether Nietzsche is still a modern or already a postmodern philosopher – are the theme of Part II of the book. Part I focuses on 'tradition and context', that is, on Nietzsche's sources, as well as on the philosophical comparison between his views on the problem of subjectivity and the views of some of the most important philosophers that preceded him in the modern era. We believe that the ten chapters that compose Part I come as close as possible to giving a comprehensive view of the relevant 'tradition and context'. Part III focuses on philosophical debates and questions of Nietzsche scholarship that are being discussed today, and that belong to the constellation of problems which we have subsumed under the title "Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity".

We feel particularly proud for having brought together in this volume some of the best scholars from two traditions of Nietzsche scholarship that only rarely communicate with each other: broadly speaking, the 'Anglophone' and 'Continental' traditions. Let us now briefly consider each chapter of the book individually.

Part I: Tradition and Context

The first chapter is **Isabelle Wienand**'s "Writing from a First-Person Perspective: Nietzsche's Use of the Cartesian Model". As the title suggests, this chapter interrogates the importance of Descartes for the development of Nietzsche's conception of subjectivity by focusing on an affinity between Nietzsche and Descartes which is rarely mentioned or at least rarely valued as particularly relevant, which is the fact that they both write from a first-person (or first-personal) perspective, that is, from a *subjective* perspective. When scholars and philosophers consider the relation between Nietzsche and Descartes, they usually focus on Nietzsche's rejection of Descartes substantialisation of the 'I', but not on the fact that in writing he, too, like Descartes, adopts the perspective of an 'I' (or, as Wienand puts it, of an *ich* although not of an *Ich* with a capital letter). Wienand also tries to show that Nietzsche's well-known rejection of Descartes' *res cogitans* may be just the surface of a more fundamental affinity between the two, such that Cartesian subjectivity may in fact be a helpful resource to understanding Nietzsche's conception of the Self – or at least of the 'I' (the *ich*) that writes his philosophy. In the first part of the chapter, Wienand highlights, in particular, that there is an important continuity between Descartes conception of the union of soul and body in *The Passions of the Soul* (1649) and Nietzsche's naturalistic account of agency, a continuity which Nietzsche makes explicit when in *The Antichrist* he praises the temerity of Descartes' theory of animals (A 14). In modern philosophy, this was the first theory to entail a naturalistic conception of animals as 'machines', or of animality as a mechanism and hence as a matter of internal organisation. Friedrich Albert Lange, in his *History of Materialism* (one of the books that influenced Nietzsche's philosophical development most decisively), underlines the fact that Descartes' conception of animals as machines played a crucial role in the history of materialism, and particularly in the development of the naturalistic conception of human psychology in terms of 'animal psychology' and 'physiology' (e.g. in De la Mattrie's conception of the *homo natura* as *l'homme machine*). In the second part of the chapter, Wienand explores her interpretation of the affinity between Nietzsche and Descartes by arguing that *Ecce Homo* has Descartes' *Discourse on Method* as its '(anti-)model'. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche radicalises Descartes' adoption of the first-personal perspective by never allowing his discourse to leave the subjective realm of the first-personal, and he radicalises Descartes naturalism not only by emphasising the context-bound nature of his 'I' (*ich*) but also by adding the fabric of the instincts to Descartes' narrative of the subject as a free spirit.

In chapter 2, "Power, Affect, Knowledge: Nietzsche on Spinoza", **David Wollenberg** begins by examining Nietzsche's historical contact with Spinoza's

philosophy, highlighting what topics interested him the most. On this basis, he then explores more precisely both where Nietzsche saw Spinoza as a 'precursor' and where he felt it necessary to part ways. Nietzsche's collected remarks evidence a sustained reflection on Spinoza's philosophy, although one that evolved over time, and that has a crucial turning-point when Nietzsche reads Kuno Fisher's *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie: Baruch Spinoza* in 1881. As is well established, it was this reading that prompted the famous postcard to Overbeck where Nietzsche calls Spinoza his 'precursor'. Wollenberg then focuses, specifically, on how Spinoza's philosophy draws a linkage from the striving for power to the affirmation of being (basically because the affect corresponding to an increase in power is joy, and the affect corresponding to a decrease in power is sadness), and on how studying Nietzsche's reaction to this linkage in Spinoza helps us understand the linkage for Nietzsche himself. As Wollenberg underlines, there are fundamentally two themes in Spinoza that are of the greatest concern to Nietzsche: (a) the identification of virtue and power, and in particular the power of the affects; and (b) the identification of the most powerful affects with understanding and affirmation, particularly Spinoza's 'intellectual love of God'. Thus, the chapter connects questions of psychology and power to broader existential issues, but uses this "wider lens" (as Wollenberg calls it) in order to make clearer how Nietzsche is particularly drawn to Spinoza's model of human subjectivity as being constituted by "an agonistic conflict of affects, where one affect can only be supplanted by a stronger one". This concept of an internal struggle of the affects and the idea, as Fischer puts it, that the "affects are the power expressions of human nature" are crucial for Nietzsche's development of the hypothesis of the 'will to power' as a psychological hypothesis, and hence also for his whole conception and critique of human subjectivity. It is important to note that, according to Wollenberg, when Nietzsche assumes (or at least appears to assume) that Spinoza "posited an independent subject who could freely and intentionally perform the task of displacing the passionate with the reasonable affects", Nietzsche is in fact just mis-reading or mis-remembering Fischer's account of Spinoza's conception of subjectivity. Therefore, the affinity between Nietzsche and Spinoza regarding their conception of subjectivity goes even deeper than Nietzsche acknowledges (which does not prevent their differences on such issues as rationality and affirmation – or love of the world – from remaining as significant as Nietzsche tries to make them).

Nikolaos Loukidelis' and **Christopher Brinkmann**'s chapter, "Leibnizian Ideas in Nietzsche's Philosophy: On Force, Monads, Perspectivism, and the Subject", considers the relationship between Nietzsche and Leibniz by mapping the influence of three nineteenth-century philosophers on Nietzsche that defended Leibnizian ideas and made Nietzsche acquainted with the fundamen-

tal aspects of Leibniz's thought. These are Otto Liebmann, Maximilian Dross-bach, and Gustav Teichmüller. Otto Liebmann seems to have been crucial for the development of Nietzsche's conception of *force*, and hence indirectly for his reconception of the will not only in terms of an inner force of the human organism, but also as a multiplicity of 'wills to power'. Liebmann sides with Leibniz in his defence of 'dynamism' and his opposition to 'corpuscular theory'–a dynamism which assumes the existence of 'centres of force with no extension', thereby rejecting the reduction of causality to external relations of 'collision and pressure'. Whereas Nietzsche's knowledge and use of these ideas–and particularly of the notion of 'action at a distance', *actio in distans*, *Wirkung in die Ferne*–is usually associated with his reading of and about Boscovich, Loukidelis and Brinkmann show the importance of Liebmann (and indirectly of Leibniz) in this respect. Liebmann is also Nietzsche's source in another crucial aspect of Nietzsche's relation to Leibniz with regard to the problem of subjectivity. It was through Liebmann that Nietzsche became acquainted with what he calls Leibniz's "incomparable insight" that "consciousness is merely an *accidens* of representation and *not* its necessary and essential attribute" (GS 357). Maximilian Drossbach, on the other hand, developed Leibniz's conception of 'monads' in a way that influenced Nietzsche's conception of drives (*Triebe*) as 'wills to power'. In his notebooks, Nietzsche acknowledged that "we can speak of atoms and monads in a relative sense" (NL 1887, 11[73], KSA 13: 36). The crucial point, however, is that drives as forces and quasi-monads have sensations (*Empfindungen*) and representations (*Vorstellungen*), but since "consciousness is merely an *accidens* of representation and *not* its necessary and essential attribute" (GS 357), that does not imply that drives have consciousness. On the contrary, consciousness, according to Nietzsche, emerges from *unconscious* drives: conscious mental states are "*only a certain behaviour of the drives towards one another*" (GS 333), "thinking is only a relation between these drives" (BGE 36). And this is indeed a crucial point (which Loukidelis and Brinkmann do not explore). Leibniz's monadological model and the way he distinguishes representation (or sensation and perception) from consciousness (or apperception) allow Nietzsche to conceive of the unconscious *as mental*, thereby avoiding the kind of 'property dualism' which interprets the difference between unconsciousness and consciousness as identical with the difference between the physiological and the psychological. And, as Loukidelis and Brinkmann show, Gustav Teichmüller's influence on Nietzsche results mainly from the way in which the former developed a related aspect of Leibniz's thought: perspective and perspectivism. Monads are perspectives (each is a 'living mirror of the universe', or a 'point-of-view' over the whole), hence conceiving of reality in terms of a multiplicity of monads entails conceiving of it in perspectival terms, or as a multiplicity of per-

spectives. Again, for Nietzsche (especially for the Nietzsche of the notebooks), this entails conceiving of the *drives* as quasi-monadological forces that develop their own perspectives on the universe and thus contribute decisively for constituting the world of our experience, what Nietzsche calls "the world *that is relevant to us*" (BGE 34), or the "phenomenal world". Thus, as Loukidelis and Brinkmann conclude, Nietzsche's so-called 'continuum model' – that is, his 'adualistic' conception of consciousness as continuous with unconscious processes that can either be described as organic, physiological, or as mental, psychological[1] – has been greatly influenced by the Leibnizian ideas of Otto Liebmann on force, Maximilian Drossbach on monads, and Gustav Teichmüller on perspectivism.

Paul Katsafanas' chapter, "Nietzsche and Kant on Self-Knowledge", is much less about Kant's possible influence on Nietzsche's conception and criticism of self-knowledge than about fundamental affinities between the two thinkers. Identifying these affinities – but also differences between Kant and Nietzsche – gives a great contribution to the clarification of the context in which Nietzsche writes about self-knowledge, as well as to the clarification of his substantive views. Katsafanas' main point is the rejection of the prejudice according to which Kant and Nietzsche have diametrically opposed views of self-knowledge because Kant argues for the complete transparency of our minds and Nietzsche for complete opacity. Katsafanas claims that the differences between Kant and Nietzsche on self-knowledge are subtler and more interesting than traditionally assumed. Kant recognises two distinct forms of self-knowledge: introspection, which gives us knowledge of our sensations, and apperception, which is knowledge of our own activities. Kant acknowledges that both modes of self-knowledge can be error-ridden and are particularly prone to being distorted by selfish motives; thus, neither is guaranteed to provide us with comprehensive self-knowledge. Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that these two modes of self-knowledge (a) are not distinct and (b) are far more limited than Kant acknowledges. In addition, Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that we can acquire self-knowledge by looking away from ourselves. With his typical clarity, Katsafanas provides a brief sketch of the ways in which this is so, and highlights, in particular, how Nietzsche argues that genealogy enables a form of self-knowledge: it helps us to identify some of the subtle factors shaping our actions as well as the influence of our current conceptual repertoires on our perceptions and understandings of our actions.

In their chapter, "Nietzsche and Schopenhauer on the 'Self' and the 'Subject'", **Luís de Sousa** and **Marta Faustino** argue that Schopenhauer's

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[1] See Abel (2001), Abel (2012: 501ff.); see also Constâncio (2011).

influence on Nietzsche's critique of the traditional conception of the subject, as well as on his new account of subjectivity, remains largely unexplored.² Schopenhauer was one of the first philosophers in the Western tradition to systematically criticise the Cartesian conception of the subject in terms that pointed towards a naturalistic redefinition of our identity as human beings. He rejected the Cartesian, dualistic assumption that personal identity consists in our rational self-consciousness, and replaced it with the hypothesis that our innermost being is in fact 'the body', 'the organism' with its conative nature – the organic body as 'will'. Thus Sousa and Faustino argue that when Nietzsche equates the 'Self' (*Selbst*) with the body (Z I, On the Despisers of the Body), he is in fact refashioning Schopenhauer's conception of our innermost being as the 'will' of our organic body. Likewise, they argue that when Nietzsche presents the 'I' or 'ego' – that is, the 'subject' – as a mere construction, a projection, a fiction, or an illusion of self-consciousness, he again remains on solid Schopenhauerian ground. The same goes for Nietzsche's conception of reason and the intellect (or conceptual consciousness) as 'tools' of unconscious drives and affects, as well as for his deflationary conception of consciousness as a mere 'surface' of such unconscious processes. Thus, Sousa and Faustino conclude that in this regard Nietzsche's principal departure from Schopenhauer consists in his replacement of the latter's conception of the 'will' as a substance and a unity with the conception of a *multiplicity or plurality* of unconscious and fluid, insubstantial drives and affects. One of the novelties of Sousa and Faustino's article lies in their discussion of Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's expressivism. Schopenhauer gives an 'expressivist' account of action insofar as he conceives of action as expressive of 'will', in fact as expressive of what he calls 'character', which is anything but a neutral substratum, a 'subject' in both the Cartesian and the Kantian tradition. Nietzsche's expressivism is a radicalisation of Schopenhauer's insofar as it replaces the notion of an 'unchangeable character' being expressed in our actions with the notion that what is expressed in action is basically the strength or weakness of a changeable organisation of drives and affects. But Nietzsche's expressivism may even be more radically different from Schopenhauer's than this formulation suggests. For Nietzsche's version implies (as Robert B. Pippin argues) that what is 'expressed' in our actions does not exist at all within us *before* or *independently* of being expressed in our actions.³

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2 According to Sousa and Faustino, Janaway (1991) and Constâncio (2011) are the main exceptions.

3 See Pippin (2010), as well as Pippin's chapter in this volume.

The next chapter, **Pietro Gori**'s "Psychology without a Soul, Philosophy without an I: Nietzsche and 19th Century Psychophysics (Fechner, Lange, Mach)", focuses on how Nietzsche's way of posing the problem of subjectivity is rooted in a nineteenth-century context in which many other German authors and scholars were attempting to establish, or at least dreamed of establishing, a scientific psychology compatible with naturalism. Thus the chapter considers, in particular, how Nietzsche's thought relates to Fechner's, Lange's, and Mach's, but also takes into account and depicts a broader context. This is the context not only of Fechner's attempt to found 'psychophysics' with the publication of the two volumes of his *Elemente der Psychophysik* (1860), but also of Emil du Bois-Reymond's conferences on *The Boundaries of the Knowledge* of Nature (1872) and *The World's Seven Puzzles* (1880), as well as of a 'return to Kant' that created a first wave of naturalistic, science-oriented neo-Kantianism. Gori highlights Fechner's role in this context because the idea of a 'psychophysics' was groundbreaking for naturalism in its time, and although Nietzsche may have been acquainted with it only via Lange and others, he seems to have wanted to evoke it in his redefinition of philosophy as "physio-psychology" in *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE 23). Fechner's project made monism for the first time scientifically, or at least scholarly, acceptable in the field of psychology (hence the 'physics' in 'psychophysics'), and particularly a monism based on Spinoza's ontological 'parallelism', that is, in his *double aspect* conception of the relation between the physical and the psychical. This conception – that is, the thesis that the physical and the psychical are two aspects, or two equally admissible *descriptions*, of one and the same reality – also plays a decisive role in Lange's neo-Kantianism, as well as in Mach's scientific psychology. Both Lange and Mach attempt what Franz Brentano termed a 'psychology without a soul' – that is, without a *substantive* soul, without an entity called 'soul', a *res cogitans*. They both see the so-called 'soul' as nothing more than a first-personal description of a physical reality. According to Gori, a "psychology without a soul" is what Nietzsche's naturalisation of thought processes and his critique of the Cartesian subject are all about. Moreover, although Mach seems not to have read Nietzsche and there is no evidence that Nietzsche's reading of Mach changed his views in any way (for Nietzsche did not read Mach before 1886), it is interesting to note how their common inspiration, Lange, led them both from a 'psychology without a soul' to an even more radical 'philosophy without an I'. When in BGE 16 Nietzsche asks the "metaphysical question" whether it is possible to speak of the I as the cause of our thoughts, the implied answer, Gori argues, is that the I can*not* be a cause of our thoughts. The so-called 'I' is in fact a mere 'regulative fiction' or (in Mach's terminology) a mere 'ideal unity' wholly devoid of efficacy or causal power.

Thus Pietro Gori's chapter introduces in full force the heatedly debated question of *epiphenomenalism*. His position supports (mostly with historical arguments) that of Mattia Riccardi's.[4] They both claim that, according to Nietzsche, our first-order consciousness can be efficacious, but our high-order consciousness cannot. Self-consciousness either *qua* consciousness of our conscious states, or *qua* consciousness of being the 'I' that could ideally give unity to a multiplicity of first-order conscious states, is epiphenomenal. For Gori, in particular, it is Nietzsche's assertion that the so-called 'I' is merely a 'regulative fiction'–or merely a grammatical construction and hence one of the "prejudices of reason" (TI Reason 5)–that entails that he is an epiphenomenalist regarding self-consciousness. For Nietzsche, Gori claims, our first-personal conception of the so-called 'I' should be reduced to an epiphenomenon of "physiological processes located beneath it".

However, Gori's chapter also introduces another crucial theme that complicates matters with regard to the issue of epiphenomenalism. This other theme is Lange's fundamentally *sceptical* version of the 'double aspect' approach to the problem of subjectivity, a theme which is in fact the centrepiece of the chapter that comes after Gori's, Anthony Jensen's article on "Helmholtz, Lange, and Unconscious Symbols of the Self". Lange's skepsis is first of all about introspective self-knowledge, or in his own terms, "self-observation" (*Selbstbeobachtung*). Its main idea is that the results of self-observation are by nature linguistic constructs, such that self-observation is in principle inferior to external, third-personal observation and the whole field of psychology is hence problematic. Here is one of Lange's main formulations of his view:

> In psychology we can undertake no dissections, can weigh and measure nothing, can exhibit no preparations. Names like thinking, feeling, willing are mere names. Who will point out exactly what corresponds to them? Shall we make definitions? A treacherous element! They are of no use, at least for any exact comparisons. And with what are we to connect our observations? With what measure shall we measure? In this groping in the dark it is only childish prejudice or the clairvoyant impulse of the metaphysician that is sure of finding anything. (Lange 1881: 136/Lange 2006 [1875]: 354)

The creation of a name, especially a classificatory name, tends always to make believe that there is some sort of entity, or a "true unity" (*eine wahre Einheit*), that corresponds to it, even when nothing like that unity can be actually observed:

> [...] psychological analysis often shows clearly how little what is denoted by a single word forms a true unity. What is, for instance, the "courage" of the sailor in the storm, and then

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4 See Riccardi (forthcoming).

on the other hand in regard to supposed ghostly apparitions? What is "memory", what is "ratiocination", having regard for the various forms and spheres of their effects? Almost all these psychological notions give us a word by means of which a portion of the phenomenon of human life is very imperfectly classified. With this classification is combined the metaphysical delusion of a common substantial basis of these phenomena, and this delusion must be destroyed. (Lange 1881: 137–138/Lange 2006 [1875]: 355–356)

In proposing that scientific psychology be henceforth developed as a 'psychology without a soul', Lange is certainly implying (as Gori emphasises) that 'soul' is just another word to which nothing actually observed corresponds (or is just a collective name for the *not really* observable realm of first-personal experience), and therefore psychology should become a fundamentally physiological research of *physical* realities.[5] As Lange remarks, the kernel of scientific method is the establishment of observations that remove the influence of what is personal, or "neutralise the subjectivity of the researcher" (Lange 2006 [1875]: 387, see Lange 1881: 177). Even without further considerations, this fact immediately entails the scientific superiority of external observation over self-observation (which is intrinsically subjective, first-personal). But the sceptical point is precisely that it is so delusional to think that one can observe and investigate 'the soul' as a non-physical substance as it is to think that one can really observe the brain in such a way as to establish with certainty "the localisation of the mental faculties" (Lange 1881: 138/Lange 2006 [1875]: 356). The point of departure of psychology is the subjective, the first-personal, which means that its point of departure is necessarily a muddled bunch of linguistic constructs (or, in Nietzsche's unforgettable formulation in D 119, "a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text"). What physiology, or 'psychophysics', or 'scientific psychology' tries to do is to find physical and hence truly observable realities that may correspond to such linguistic constructs. But, for this reason, it will always have to remain a 'groping in the dark'. Or, to put it in terms of Lange's 'double aspect' approach, the physical and the psychical are indeed two aspects, or two equally admissible descriptions, of one and the same reality, but the former is necessarily based on the latter, and hence the former will never overcome the failures and distortions of the latter.

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5 Lange is indeed clear about the fact that one cannot truly observe 'the soul', and hence the latter is only a word: "in the few phenomena which so far have been made accessible to more precise observation, there is not the smallest occasion to assume a soul in any very definite sense at all" (Lange 1881: 167–8/Lange 2006 [1875]: 381). He is equally clear about 'the will': "when we speak of 'will', we only add a comprehensive word for a group of vital phenomena" (Lange 1881: 148/Lange 2006 [1875]: 365). The influence of these passages in, for example, BGE 12 and BGE 19 can hardly be overestimated.

A scientific description of events in the brain (even if it is as successful as such descriptions can be nowadays) is at best only less arbitrary than a description of mental events in folk-psychology, or in philosophy.

Anthony Jensen's article emphasises this sceptical side of Lange's thought – and of course its influence on Nietzsche. Jensen's argument is that Nietzsche takes sides with Lange in the latter's disagreement with Herman Ludwig von Helmholtz, and this constitutes a perhaps small, but nonetheless crucial nuance of his views on the problem of subjectivity, particularly of his conception of consciousness and his view of the relationship between the conscious and unconscious aspects of subjectivity. Through Lange's influential critique of Helmholtz, Jensen argues, Nietzsche came to realise that the usual naturalistic designations of sub-conscious activity – drives, instincts, urges, desires, power-quanta, etc. – are not actually referential. They are just a series of anti-realist symbolic representations that can be useful and informative but never demonstrative. All epistemological descriptions of the causes of mental processes – whether physiological or first-personal – necessarily distort the genuine character of whatever reality stands outside of our conceptualisation of it. Helmholtz's view was that we can only know 'signs' of external objects, but no such problem arises with regard to what is supposedly given through the internal sense within us. As Jensen puts it, Helmholtz "was an anti-realist about external objects, but a common-sense empirical realist about our knowledge of the function of the senses; Lange, on the other hand, was a thorough-going anti-realist both about external objects and about the internal subjective world through which those external objects are cognized". The inner world of willing, feeling, and thinking is as opaque as the external world of spatial objects, or as Nietzsche puts it several times in the notebooks, the inner world is no less a 'phenomenal' world, a world of interpretation and linguistic construction, than the external world, and therefore our philosophical 'phenomenalism' should be extended to the inner world.[6]

Thus, the first major implication of Jensen's paper is that although the naturalistic drive of the first generation of neo-Kantianism was indeed crucial for Nietzsche's development – as emphasised not only by Gori's treatment of German 'psychophysics', but also (in other respects) by Wollenberg's treatment of Kuno Fischer and Loukidelis' and Brinkmann's treatment of Otto Liebmann, Maximilian Drossbach, and Gustav Teichmüller –, the sceptical drive of Lange's version of neo-Kantianism was no less influential in Nietzsche's development.

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6 See NL 1885, 2[131], KSA 12: 129–132, NL 1885, 2[204], KSA 12: 167, NL 1887, 11[113], KSA 13: 53–54, NL 1888, 14[152], KSA 13: 333–335, NL 1888, 15[90], KSA 13: 458–460.

And this realisation may also contribute to the clarification of his relation to the philosophers treated in Wienand's, Katsafanas' and Sousa's and Faustino's chapters. Nietzsche is more of a naturalist than Descartes, Kant, and Schopenhauer, but he is also more of a sceptic. He develops several naturalistic aspects of their thought (as well as of Spinoza's and Leibniz's), but this seems to have led him to a scepticism that they would certainly reject, particularly regarding the problem of subjectivity.

However, Jensen's main claim is another one, namely that Nietzsche's adoption of Langean scepticism entails the rejection of the two interpretations of the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness that have dominated Nietzsche scholarship in recent years. These are the 'kind-epiphenomenalism' of Brian Leiter et al. and the 'last-link' interpretation of Günter Abel. The latter is also epitomised, according to Jensen, in Constâncio (2011). According to 'kind-epiphenomenalism', consciousness is not causally efficacious because (put simply) it is a mere epiphenomenon of unconscious events, either physiological or psychological; in Mattia Riccardi's version, as we saw above, only self-consciousness is considered epiphenomenal, first-order conscious mental states are not. By contrast, the 'last link' interpretation considers conscious mental states to be causally efficacious in bi-directional chains of causations. Such states are conceptualisations of unconscious processes and hence 'last links' in causal chains that run from the unconscious to the conceptualised, but in adding conceptualisations and therefore a whole new representational framework to these chains they become 'first links' in new causal chains that run from the conscious to the unconscious. Their power is limited (as Constâncio 2011 emphasises in many ways), but they are not powerless. The problem, according to Jensen, is that given Nietzsche's Langean scepticism regarding self-knowledge, it should be clear that he does not understand his own descriptions of subjectivity as referential designations whose truth or falsity rests on their adequation to a world-itself. Instead, his various descriptions are to be taken as symbols or signs ('words', 'names') whose expression indicates the momentary arrangement of a subject's dynamic disposition. Consequently, an historical awareness of a person's subjective expressions over time becomes the necessary condition of a symbolic understanding that is meaningful, even if not demonstrative. The consequence of this, according to Jensen, is that "both the epiphenomenal and last-link interpretations are mistakenly worried about the relations of things and processes which are actually not things or processes at all, but only a relation of symbols whose order and ascribed relations is itself only the result of an historical process of overwriting and reinterpreting by means of symbols". Or, as he also puts it: "even those naturalistic subjective facticities that are said to underlay our conscious activity must be considered signs, symbols, and anti-realist

designations for something we know not what". Thus, given Nietzsche's anti-realist (and indeed sceptical) view of the internal subjective world, he cannot have held either an epiphenomenal or a last-link interpretation of the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness.

Although Constâncio's 2011 paper on Nietzsche and Schopenhauer on consciousness does not mention Lange as Nietzsche's main influence in this respect, it does not fail to mention Nietzsche's scepticism regarding proper knowledge of the inner world. One of the main ideas of the paper (following Josef Simon and Werner Stegmaier)[7] is that given that thoughts are 'signs' (e.g. NL 1880 6[253], KSA 9: 263), then thoughts about our thoughts, including Nietzsche's thoughts about consciousness and the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness, are also 'signs', and even such apparently simple concepts as 'I', 'drive' or 'consciousness' are therefore linguistic constructs, not names designating entities that one might actually be able to observe inside oneself. This is, however, an *epistemological* point. It may be correct to say, as Jensen claims, that Nietzsche's "descriptions of subjectivity" should not be understood as "referential designations whose truth or falsity rests on their adequation to a world-itself". But it is a fact that Nietzsche attempts such "descriptions of subjectivity", and hence the question remains as to whether they describe the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness in terms of some sort of 'kind-epiphenomenalism' or in terms of a 'last link' with limited power within the organism. (Similarly, Paul Katsafanas' assertion that Nietzsche replaces introspective self-knowledge with genealogical self-knowledge is not at all refuted by the fact that Nietzsche endorses Lange's scepticism regarding self-knowledge. This endorsement entails only that genealogy is for Nietzsche a very tentative, modest form of 'knowledge' – a 'groping in the dark', a work of interpretation in which one orientates oneself by nothing more than 'signs' and 'symptoms' of hidden, subterranean processes).

Constâncio's chapter in this volume is not at all about the debate on epiphenomenalism or mental causation. But it includes (albeit almost as an aside) a critique of Mattia Riccardi's claim that self-consciousness is epiphenomenal for Nietzsche. Within the context of his interpretation of GS 354, Constâncio argues that Nietzsche's evolutionary perspective entails that self-consciousness is adaptive, and since no feature of a species can be adaptive without having causal powers, self-consciousness cannot be epiphenomenal, or inefficacious. According to Constâncio, Nietzsche's claim that consciousness is 'superfluous' means only that consciousness is not a necessary condition of individual organic func-

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7 Cf. Simon (1984) and Stegmaier (2000).

tions. But the addition of consciousness to these functions, and particularly of self-consciousness, has made a huge difference in the evolution of the human species: it has *caused*, and continues to *cause*, the development of society and social interaction as we know them. In a brief note, Constâncio also reiterates the argument that since Nietzsche regards consciousness as a 'tool' of drives, affects, and instincts, he cannot have conceived of it as causally inert. If some *x* is a tool, inefficaciousness cannot belong to *x* as a property.[8] Constâncio's 2011 paper on Nietzsche and Schopenhauer also included another argument. There are passages in which Nietzsche *seems* to be saying that conscious thoughts can never be 'causes' or that there is no mental causation at all. But, in fact, these passages mean something else, namely that conscious thoughts cannot be equated with *mechanistic* causes, conscious thoughts do not 'cause' actions the way a billiard ball causes the movement of another billiard ball. But conscious thoughts are 'power-claims'. They are not sufficient for action, but as power-claims occurring within complex and organised constellations of other power-claims (called 'human organisms'), conscious thoughts exert some degree of limited power over us, thereby *contributing* to our actions (but not 'causing' them in isolation from unconscious drives, affects, and instincts). No doubt, there is in Nietzsche a critique of the 'overestimation of consciousness', but it does not entail epiphenomenalism.[9] A fourth argument that we consider to be decisive in favour of 'last link' interpretations vs. epiphenomenalism is one of the arguments proposed by Paul Katsafanas in his 2005 paper on Nietzsche's theory of mind, namely that Nietzsche considers consciousness (including self-consciousness) to be *dangerous* to the healthy functioning of human organisms. As Katsafanas puts it, "if a thing is dangerous, then it surely *does something*".[10]

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8 Jensen agrees that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the tool metaphor, but he believes that, on the other hand, last-link readings are inconsistent with the mirror metaphor (GS 354 and Constâncio 2011). But the latter is not the case. The mirror metaphor describes consciousness precisely as a last link in a causal chain that runs from the unconscious to conceptualisation; the tool metaphor describes consciousness (the 'mirror') as a *first link* in a new causal chain that runs from conceptualisation to action. As mentioned above, what Jensen terms "last-link readings" involves this sort of bi-directional causal chain. (Nietzsche's conception of such causal chains is further complicated by the fact that he wants to avoid mechanistic models and emphasises that whatever may look like an isolated 'cause' in a causal chain is in fact only *one* 'power-claim' interacting and occurring simultaneously with a multiplicity of other 'power-claims', and hence having its power limited by these other 'power-claims', 'centres of force', 'power-quanta', etc.)
9 See also Ken Gemes' chapter in this volume. See NL 1883–84, 24[2], KSA 10: 643–644, NL 1888, 14[146], KSA 13: 330–331; GS 11, GS 354.
10 See Katsafanas (2005: 1). See, in particular, GS 11 and GS 354.

In fact, by expanding on this last argument we are led easily into a unifying theme among the next (and last) three chapters of Part I of this volume. In one of the passages where Nietzsche writes that consciousness is "a danger", he adds that "he who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows it is a sickness" (GS 354). The idea that consciousness is a sickness, and particularly that the intellectual elite of Nietzsche's age suffers from excessive consciousness, is a crucial idea of Dostoevsky's *Notes from the Underground*[11] – and, more generally, a crucial idea in many nineteenth-century authors and cultural critics that concern themselves with such themes as decadence, nihilism, or the death of God. This is a sure sign that Nietzsche's focus on subjectivity, and particularly on consciousness, should not be interpreted as essentially theoretical, but rather as *practical-existential*. Besides naturalism and scepticism, *existentialism* should be considered a third crucial tendency in Nietzsche, and Giuliano Campioni's, Maria Cristina Fornari's, and Benedetta Zavatta's chapters highlight precisely different aspects of Nietzsche's practical-existential approach to the problem of subjectivity.

Giuliano Campioni's chapter is one of the most illuminating and surprising of this collection as regards Nietzsche's sources on subjectivity. Titled "Nietzsche and 'the French Psychologists': Stendhal, Taine, Ribot, Bourget", the chapter focuses on Nietzsche relation to these four authors, and aims to clarify why Nietzsche has them in mind (although not only them) when in dealing with the problem of subjectivity he praises "the French Psychologists" (e.g. BGE 218, HH I Preface 8, EH, Why I am so Clever 3). More generally, his chapter aims to clarify in which sense and under the influence of which authors and ideas Nietzsche characterises all of his works from *Beyond Good and Evil* onwards as works of "a psychologist". (The fact that he always writes in the first-person, or from a subjective perspective, as Isabelle Wienand's chapter accentuates, is obviously a point to be taken in consideration here). Campioni suggests that Nietzsche only started to see himself as "a psychologist" after reading (during the Winter of 1883) Paul Bourget's *Essais de psychologie contemporaine*. Stendhal and Dostoevsky may be for him the greatest psychologists, the only ones he regards as comparable to himself, but Bourget seems to be his model as an author writing from the perspective of 'a psychologist'. This has several implications. Firstly, it confirms Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical conception of 'psychology' – but with a twist. Nietzsche sees Bourget's psychology as expressive of the 'Latin spirit', and therefore as an alternative to the metaphysical mystifications typical of the 'German spirit'. But what moves a 'Latin' psychology like Bourget's

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11 See Dillinger (2012).

is typically "a *pleasure* to deny and dismember, as well as some careful cruelty which knows how to use the knife with confidence and elegance, even when the heart bleeds" (BGE 210). A 'Latin' psychology like Bourget's is anti-metaphysical, but not necessarily scientific and constructive in its aims. Its main focus is *self-critique*, therefore its perspective remains first-personal, subjective, and its 'objectivity' is often expressed by an *I* (as in Bourget's and Nietzsche's writings) because it basically consists in a debunking of *self*-deceptions, including the metaphysical self-deceptions that posit the 'I' as a unity and a substance. Secondly, this anti-metaphysical, self-critical 'psychology' is not at all solipsistic. If Nietzsche's psychology is modelled on Bourget's, then it is a kind of cultural critique. There is no doubt that Nietzsche's 'psychology' deals with the same cultural themes as Bourget's: nihilism, *décadence*, modern art, in sum: the whole "European consciousness" (BGE 259), and not just the individual consciousness. Ultimately, that is why Nietzschean psychology is in fact a 'genealogy'. However, none of this aims to suggest that Nietzsche is not interested in naturalism and the kind of scientific (or proto-scientific) psychology that he found in the likes of Lange or Mach. In fact, he cultivated his interest in this kind of psychology by becoming an avid reader not only of German but also of French authors, particularly Taine and Ribot, but also others. The point is that his interest in scientific psychology, including French scientific psychology, is subordinated to his interest in practical-existential 'psychology'. This is particularly clear, as Campioni shows, in Nietzsche's approach to one of the themes that interests him the most in such 'French psychologists' as Stendhal, Taine, Ribot, and Bourget: the theme of psychological *multiplicity*, which is closely related to the theme of psychological *opacity*. Nietzsche's critique of the "atomism of the soul" (BGE 12), Campioni claims, is closely related to a psychological theory that can be traced back to Stendhal's correspondence, Taine's *De l'intelligence*, Bourget's essays as well as novels, and Ribot's scientific research on the delicate mechanisms behind the formation and disintegration of personality: the theory of the '*petits faits*' or '*petits faits vrais*', according to which the so-called 'I' is in fact *composed of a multiplicity* of 'small facts', and these facts are for the most part unconscious, contradictory, difficult to decipher, and ultimately opaque. Like Bourget's, Nietzsche's principal aim in taking up this theory is not so much to develop it further as a *theory*. Campioni's argument warrants the conclusion that Nietzsche is first and foremost interested in using the theory for the more important task of describing and diagnosing the European human being's existential situation in the age of the death of God, nihilism, and *décadence*.

Maria Cristina Fornari's chapter, "Social Ties and the Emergence of the Individual: Nietzsche and the English Perspective", explores the way in which Nietzsche's engagement with the problem of subjectivity was influenced by

another kind of source: the 'Englishmen'. For Nietzsche, this term has a much wider meaning than in common usage. The 'Englishmen' refers to all European Darwinists, evolutionists, and utilitarians, in fact to the perspective that all of them seem to have in common (the "English perspective", as Fornari terms it). Among the 'Englishmen' who have influenced Nietzsche the most there is his friend Paul Rée, a young Prussian. Nietzsche's main source of inspiration (both positive and critical) is perhaps Herbert Spencer. Although Fornari's approach is mostly focused on establishing Nietzsche's sources, she is able to show not only that there is one theme that dominates Nietzsche's engagement with the Darwinists, evolutionists, and utilitarians, but also that for Nietzsche that theme has a crucially practical-existential dimension, or is not a merely theoretical problem. As Fornari's title suggests, this theme is the individual and its 'social ties' – or individuality and the relationship between individual and community. Nietzsche's treatment of this theme from *Human, All Too Human* onwards (and especially after meeting Rée) shows that his diatribes against Darwinists and evolutionists in general are merely a surface of "intense confrontation and fruitful dialogue", as Fornari puts it. Nietzsche is undoubtedly an evolutionist and a Darwinist of some sort, for he clearly believes not only in evolution, but also in the kind of blind mechanism that 'natural selection' is all about. But his attitude towards utilitarianism is something else. What Fornari's article clearly shows is that Nietzsche's critique of the 'English perspective' is in fact a critique of the *moral or normative presuppositions* of this perspective, such that what he rejects in Darwinism and evolutionism is not so much their main theoretical hypotheses as rather the utilitarian valuations that embed those hypotheses within the 'English perspective'. Nietzsche's views on 'adaptation' are a good example of all of this. He rejects 'adaptation' for presupposing that the altruism of merely passive, reactive individuals is *good* because it is *useful* for the whole, the community. The 'English' conception of adaptation is fundamentally normative, and Nietzsche focuses precisely on its normative implications. In the light of these implications, the non-utilitarian nature of the values and achievements of higher individuals' becomes morally suspect, while the utilitarian values of the 'herd' pass for the only possible values – for morality itself. Or, in other words, the 'English perspective' transforms Darwinian evolutionism into an ideological weapon that thwarts the individual's possibilities of self-creation and spiritual self-enhancement. Against this, and from a practical-existential perspective, indeed from a normative one, Nietzsche develops (in slightly different ways across time) an alternative evolutionary notion of individuality and the relationship between individual and community which is highly relevant for the study of his views on the problem of subjectivity. Fornari underlines, in particular, how the theme of subjective multiplicity dovetails with this evolutionary

perspective. The 'individual' is in fact shown to be a "dividuum" (HH I 57) composed of a multiplicity of 'drives' that *evolve* and have *evolved* across time; the gregarious individual whose subjective multiplicity organises itself as a social self that conforms to the community and becomes a mere "function of the herd" (GS 116) is the rule; but this does not in any way exclude the possibility of 'higher types', 'free-spirits', 'overmen', 'sovereign individuals' that become exceptionally individual by taking upon themselves, synthesising, and combining in a unique way a great multiplicity of perspectives made possible by the multiplicity of their drives.

The last chapter of Part I is **Benedetta Zavatta**'s "'Know Yourself' and 'Become What You Are'. The Development of Character in Nietzsche and Emerson". The theme of 'character' is an important dimension of Nietzsche's treatment of the problem of subjectivity. Zavatta's chapter aims to show how Emerson's conception of character crucially influenced Nietzsche from his youth through to his latest writings. From very early on, Nietzsche was interested in the connection between character and fate, but also in the individual's capacity to change at least some aspects or elements of its character, and hence of what would otherwise be its predestined fate. Nietzsche's reading of Emerson played, in particular, a decisive role in the way he eventually came to reject Schopenhauer's thesis of the immutability or unchangeability of character. Emerson gave Nietzsche the notion of a character that is able to expand indefinitely over time. On the other hand, Nietzsche's conception of how character changes and expands opposes Emerson's in one important respect. Nietzsche rejects the notion that agents can change their character (i.e. their 'temperament', the ultimate association of 'drives' that constitute them, the distinctive bundle of *affective*, and primarily *unconscious*, features and dispositions that make them unique) by conscious deliberation, as if agents possessed a metaphysical faculty, the 'will', by means of which they could simply and directly effectuate, for example, the project of 'giving style' to their character. People change, Zavatta argues, by developing an 'aspirational' or 'ideal' Self, but such a Self can only have motivational force if it is an *affective* idealisation *of one's subconscious drives* (e.g. NL 1880, 7[95], KSA 9: 336–337, NL 1881, 11[18], KSA 9: 448). Conscious purposes play a secondary role in processes of self-creation – or, as GS 360 indicates, their force is merely 'catalytic'. In fact, their efficaciousness depends on their being much more than ends of isolated 'intentions'. As an emancipatory, liberating process of 'becoming what one is' – as idealised by Emerson's 'heroic' model of character development –, self-creation is to a large extent a matter of 'discipline' and continuous 'experimentation'. Like Emerson, and again influenced by him, Nietzsche sees the capacity for this kind of 'great liberation' as the privilege of a rare few. Only the rare few are capable of what

Emerson terms 'intellectual nomadism', the capacity some people have to turn every kind of circumstances, no matter how painful, to their advantage, as if every event could be a means to the expansion of character, or to affirmation and spiritual growth and power. Such 'nomadism' is, for Emerson and for Nietzsche, the precondition of the capacity to develop the kind of Self one may term 'Dionysian', or, as Zavatta also puts it, 'a nomadic and imperialist Ego, which aims to expand its power beyond the boundaries imposed by the limited time-span of its existence'.

Part II: The Crisis of the Subject

João Constâncio's chapter, "Nietzsche on Decentered Subjectivity or, the Existential Crisis of the Modern Subject", is to some extent an introduction to Part II of this volume. The main point of his chapter is that Nietzsche's writings describe a deep crisis of modern subjectivity. Constâncio argues that Nietzsche's theoretical conception of a 'decentered subject', i.e., of a non-transparent, opaque "subject-multiplicity", as Nietzsche terms it in BGE 12 – radically modifies the modern conception of the subject, but neither does Nietzsche proclaim the death of the subject, nor is his approach to the problem of subjectivity chiefly theoretical. Nietzsche's Langean scepticism regarding self-knowledge makes him discard the aspiration to present a foundational, privileged 'theory' of subjectivity, absolutely freed of self-deception and capable of declaring all other theories to be self-deceived. Nietzsche's views are, instead, heuristic hypotheses ('regulative fictions' in his terminology) which allow him to reflect upon, describe, and diagnose the *existential* situation of his age. Nietzsche's approach to the problem of subjectivity is perhaps best labelled as 'practical-existential', and the way he treats the problem can even be said to anticipate some of the chief tenets of twentieth-century existentialism. Focusing first on *Beyond Good and Evil*, Constâncio tries to show that the reason why Nietzsche makes the point that the problem of subjectivity should be traced back to the Greeks and especially to Plato's dualistic 'errors' is because the crisis of the modern subject that he wants to describe belongs to the wider crisis of the transcendent, metaphysical *values* which Plato and his 'errors' created or, in other words, to the crisis Nietzsche calls 'the death of God'. Nietzsche's not chiefly theoretical, but rather practical-existential description of modern subjectivity in terms of its (a) plasticity, (b) dividedness, (c) lack of hierarchic organisation, (d) problematic self-referentiality, (e) undeterminedness, and (f) self-deceptiveness serves a normative project, as it aims to contribute to the "struggle against nihilism" (NL 1886, 5[50], KSA 12: 201–204, NL 1886, 7[31], KSA 12: 306) and, in parti-

cular, against the modern experience of fragmentation, disintegration, contra-dictoriness, 'weakness' and 'paralysis of will' caused by the death of God. In the last section of his article, Constâncio focuses on Book V of *The Gay Science*, and tries to illuminate not just the theoretical (and evolutionary) but also the practi-cal-existential dimension of aphorism 354 by exploring its contextual connec-tion with aphorism 356. Consciousness emerges from this analysis as a "con-necting-net" (GS 354) of a society of "actors" (GS 356). In late modernity, when one becomes truly conscious of one's consciousness, one discovers oneself as an actor among actors – and certainly not as Descartes' *res cogitans* and pure *cogito*. Or, in other words, one discovers that one's subjectivity and indeed inter-subjectivity is very far from constituting a Hegelian, emancipated, free world of reciprocal 'recognition'. Instead one discovers one's decentred subjectivity and decentred intersubjectivity in a world of atomised and yet massified *misrecogni-tion*. This shows, according to Constâncio, that Nietzsche's take on subjectivity and intersubjectivity anticipates not only Camus or Sartre, but also Lacan, and it involves a critical engagement not only with Descartes, Kant, or Schopenhauer, but also (even if unintentionally) with German Idealism. Constâncio's main point, however, is that not only is this critical engagement a practical-existential engagement, but it also aims to *prevent* that the death of God causes some sort of 'death of the subject' (or death of the 'spirit'). Nietzsche modifies but does not eliminate either the first-personal perspective of the 'I' of consciousness or the social perspective of intersubjectivity because his ultimate task is to provoke a first-personal, *subjectivised* experience of the existential crisis of the modern subject. That is why at least in this respect he can still be said to belong to mod-ernity and modern philosophy – and not yet to postmodernity.

The contribution by **Bartholomew Ryan** is called "The Plurality of the Subject in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: Confronting Nihilism with Masks, Faith and *Amor Fati*". While Kierkegaard belongs to a generation earlier than Nietzsche, he is not a source of Nietzsche's thought, and in fact his reception (like Nietzsche's) is mostly posthumous. That is the first reason why Ryan's ana-lysis of the relationship between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard fits into Part II of this book. But, secondly, in exploring this relationship one immediately enters the discussion of the 'crisis of the subject', as well as the discussion of funda-mentally practical-existential issues rather than simply theoretical. There has been much written on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche by world famous philosophers and commentators (with the forerunners being Georg Brandes, Georg Lukács, Karl Löwith and Karl Jaspers) for the obvious reason in that they epitomise the philosopher of suspicion *par excellence* in the wake of Hegelian philosophy, the birth of modern democracy and nationalism, and the beginning of mass media, the scientific age and a secular society. Ryan acknowledges the previous work

done by philosophers and scholars up until now, but seeks to show in this chapter that in fact the subjectivity that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are grappling with in the age of modernism and beyond is a subjectivity that is transformed into a plurality rather than being nothing at all or unified. This chapter becomes very interesting in that it can be read both as a penetrating dialogue between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard bringing them closer together; but also as a subtle critique of them and critique of our understanding of them – in that Kierkegaard's "purity of heart to will one thing" and objective to unify the self as subject, and Nietzsche's destruction of all values and truths about the existence of subjectivity, turns the elusive self as subject into a plurality and disunity. Thus, we may think of Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus' motto "truth is subjectivity" – truth being Climacus' "wound of negativity" – as applying to both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Probably the most important difference between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard (born thirty-one years before Nietzsche) is their relationship to Christianity and appraisal of Socrates and Christ as prototypes for living passionately and thinking dangerously. But this great difference helps shed light on our understanding of the crisis of subjectivity in why Nietzsche was so vehemently against Socrates and Christ, and why and how Kierkegaard was so determined to renew an extremely passionate *Imitatione Christi* and awaken a new Socrates for the present age. This idea of Christianity and these figures under scrutiny provide the basis for the transformation of subjectivity into a plurality for Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's future readers. In this chapter, we can think again of the many points of contact between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche via experiencing the plurality of the subject, such as, for example, in their celebration of existential passion in their striking depictions of a Dionysian and Christ-like existence; their anti-system stance and unrelenting critique of modern philosophy; the creation of masks and multiple voices; the attack against the bourgeoisie of emerging democratic society and the established church; their increasingly solitary existence; their call for honesty; their humour, irony and wit; and finally their stylistic positioning as dramatic-poetic thinkers at odds with academic philosophical writing.

In the next chapter, "Nietzsche vs. Heidegger on the Self: Which I Am I?", **John Richardson** argues that although Nietzsche and Heidegger are both famous critics of our usual (they claim) conception of ourselves as subjects, each also offers a positive account of what's really there, where we take a subject to be. As regards Heidegger, Richardson focuses only on *Being and Time*, and thus only on the 'existential' aspect of that book that involves a conception of the 'I'. As regards Nietzsche, Richardson develops a view perhaps epitomised by D 115 (though he does not quote this particular passage). Here Nietzsche claims that there is no 'I' or 'ego', but the *opinion* that we form of ourselves *as if*

there existed the "so-called ego" is nonetheless "a fellow worker in the construction of our character and our destiny" (D 115). Our self-understanding as an 'I' does not entail the existence of an entity that could be theoretically investigated and termed 'the I', but our practical-existential relation to ourselves involves that we conceive of ourselves as an 'I' or self.[12] Or, in Richardson's own terms, although Nietzsche clearly rejects a "core view of the self", that is, the conception of the self as a "core or center of me, by comparison with which some of the things 'I am' are secondary", he holds a *reflexive view of the self* according to which "my self lies in how I am 'towards myself', i.e. reflexively refer to myself". This view of the self, Richardson argues, is the one Nietzsche and Heidegger (in *Being and Time*) have in common, though in different forms.[13] What they both reject in their critiques of subjectivity is the particular version of the 'core view' that posits the 'subject', or the 'I of consciousness', as the core 'me', or 'true self'. But they both insist on our capacity to 'self-relate' as the capacity that makes us selves, and they both insist that this self-relating happens primarily (though certainly not exclusively) 'beneath' consciousness. Moreover, they both agree, according to Richardson, that "this non-linguistic and non-conscious referring is still a matter of *intentionality*: a meaning or intending of some content", and in fact they both agree, also, that "there is a way we 'mean' or 'view' ourselves that is prior to awareness and words". That is why, again for both, the self-reflexive view of the self is not just descriptive, but also 'formative', that is: it always involves a self-referring directed at a not-yet-formed-self, at an 'aspirational self' – a self that one needs to 'create' and 'become'. Thus, the main difference between Nietzsche and Heidegger is the difference between the former's naturalism and the latter's phenomenological transcendentalism. For Nietzsche the task of achieving selfhood involves something different from, and in fact something more than, attuning oneself with a pre-given or inbuilt trans-

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12 As Richardson points out, this view is also developed by Gardner (2009) as the view that Nietzsche's has a 'theoretical conception of the self' as 'fictive' but in his 'practical thought' he still relies on a (non-theoretical) conception of the self. The 'fiction' is part of our practical-existential experience of ourselves – that is, of our first-personal and hence 'subjective' view of ourselves.

13 Such a view, as Richardson remarks, can also be ascribed to Fichte, Nozik, or Vellemen, among many others. Ultimately, it is the view, as Richardson puts it, that "the self *is* [...] how it views itself". But the fact that this view originates in Fichte should be particularly emphasised, as this fact establishes a link between Nietzsche and German Idealism which is usually neglected. Gardner and Constâncio briefly allude to this link in their respective chapters. See also Pippin's chapter for an 'expressivist' account of Nietzsche's (unintended) affinity with German Idealism, particularly with Hegel.

cendental. Facing one's mortality and guilt – understood as, so to speak, supra-historical and supra-personal structures of one's existence qua *Dasein* – is not enough. The task of achieving selfhood is for Nietzsche much more "historically and personally local", as Richardson writes. It involves dealing with one's biological and social constitution. On the other hand, however, there is even so another important affinity between Nietzsche and Heidegger on the self: they both equate the task of achieving selfhood with a sort of authenticity that entails freeing oneself from a social identity which stifles individuality and is fostered by the sociability of consciousness. A Nietzschean 'free spirit' can only achieve an individual self by freeing himself/herself from the 'herd', very much like in *Being and Time* authentic care (for oneself and others) entails freeing oneself from the everyday inauthenticity of the '*they*' (*das Man*). In both cases (it is crucial to emphasise it again), authenticity is *not* tantamount to identifying oneself with a core or 'true' self, especially *not* if this is interpreted as the subject of consciousness.

Sebastian Gardner's chapter, "Nietzsche and Freud: The 'I' and its Drives", focuses on the differences of Nietzsche and Freud, which receive much less attention than their points of similarity. In the first part of his chapter, Gardner tries to show that, though the concept of drive is of central importance for both thinkers, Nietzsche and Freud conceive human psychology in very different terms. In the second part of his chapter, Gardner tries to show that their differences emerge also and most sharply in the context of value. Here, those differences reflect a fundamental philosophical disagreement concerning the extent to which naturalisation can satisfy our axiological needs. Although Gardner basically considers the points of similarity between Nietzsche and Freud a matter of common knowledge, it is important to highlight them here, as he also briefly does. First, Nietzsche is an obvious precursor of naturalistic depth psychology, and Nietzsche and Freud have, as Gardner puts it, a "shared naturalistic emancipatory ambition". For their thought is centred on the idea of diagnosis and therapy, and they both aim at a "naturalistic reconstrual of human personality" that might ameliorate our condition by disabusing us of "rationalistic prejudices". Secondly, if the concept of drive is crucial for both, this means that they both "impute *a division within the human subject*" (our italics), as Gardner writes. This is the main reason why Freud's thought belongs to the 'crisis of the subject' and should be compared with Nietzsche's in Part II of this volume. Nietzsche's and Freud's drive model divides the subject between the ends that he/she pursues as a conscious agent and the hidden, unconscious ends that he/she pursues as 'drive' – and, most importantly, makes the latter the ultimate cause of the former. The "agent *qua* executor of reasons for action" is just (according to Nietzsche's preferred metaphors) a "surface" and a "tool" of the "agent *qua* bearer or vehicle or medium of drive". So why do they differ so much

with regard to the concept of drive, as Gardner claims? Gardner's argument is complex, and this is not the place to discuss it in detail. His main claims are the following. Firstly, Nietzsche does not try to develop, as Freud does, a scientific theory and a clear, coherent model of human subjectivity and agency. Secondly, there is in Nietzsche a "rub" between his "theoretical dissolution of the self" and his practical (or one should perhaps say, 'practical-existential') concept of an aspirational self, what Gardner terms "his ethical ideal of substantial individuality". Finally, in contrast to Freud, Nietzsche is in fact an anti-realist in regard to drives: his drive model, his talk of drives "is all metaphors [*es ist Alles Bilderrede*]" (D 119) (and this is, of course, another way of expressing the Langean scepticism discussed in Gori's, Jensen's, and Constâncio's chapters). As regards the second part of Gardner's chapter and his claim that in the context of value Nietzsche and Freud differ even more than at the theoretical level, his main point is that Freud's project is basically a project of full naturalisation embedded in a utilitarianism (or hedonism) he sees no reason to question, while Nietzsche's philosophy is precisely about a need for meaning and a modern crisis of meaning which he believes cannot be in any way solved by the faith in science and naturalism (for the latter faith only perpetuates the predominance of the 'will to truth' and hence does not create new, affirmative values). Nietzsche believes, on the contrary, that a utilitarianism (or hedonism) such as Freud's has to be questioned within such a crisis of meaning. Though Gardner's treatment of these tensions is fundamentally aporetic, it seems to us to warrant the conclusion that Freud's approach to the problem of subjectivity is quintessentially modern, while Nietzsche's conception of the problem of subjectivity in practical-existential terms expresses a true sense of crisis and questions all sorts of modern hopes of individual and collective emancipation and self-determination. Gardner ends his chapter by claiming (although rather tentatively) that "there is in Nietzsche an echo of Kant's 'primacy of practical reason' and of Fichte's *Thathandlung*" and hence "a recognizably transcendentalist residue". And yet Nietzsche seems indeed to question quite radically the emancipatory hopes of the subject of such a *Thathandlung*.

Yannick Souladié's chapter, "Nietzsche, Deleuze: Desubjectification and Will to Power", examines essentially two aspects of the relationship between Nietzsche and Deleuze that evince how the former influenced the latter's view of the problem of subjectivity. In the first part of his chapter, Souladié focuses on Deleuze's interest in Nietzsche's self-presentations in his last works. Instead of isolating himself from the world as a subject, Nietzsche inserts his own figure in his books, but he does it in a way that does not fixate him as a subject/author of the book and, on the contrary, displays a true process of 'desubjectification'. Nietzsche's self-presentations are at the same time self-abolitions. Most likely, no

other thinker goes as far as Deleuze in ascribing to Nietzsche a radical rejection, elimination even, of the subject. As Souladié points out, for Deleuze conceiving of a "subject", particularly of a subject as author of a book, is as wrong as "fabricating a beneficent God to explain geological movements". For Deleuze, the art of writing is the art of desubjectification *par excellence*, and Nietzsche seems to him to be *par excellence* the (non-)author who is aware of this. In writing, Nietzsche shows that 'he' is in fact not a 'subject', but rather a 'complexity of forces', sheer 'multiplicity' in the midst of 'life' and as part of 'life'. According to Souladié's Deleuzian interpretation, this is what it means to philosophise alongside "the guiding thread of the body". In philosophising, that is in writing his works, Nietzsche can be said to engage in a process of desubjectification because he writes as a 'body' (not as a subject) that opens itself up to the multiplicity of the world by discovering within himself a multiplicity of voices. Nietzsche's activity of writing/philosophising is a merging with the world, which culminates in Nietzsche's complete dissolution, that is, in his madness. In the second part of his chapter, Souladié tries to show that Nietzsche also enacts this process of desubjectification, or of simultaneous self-affirmation and self-abolition, in his non-biographic works. Souladié's main example is Nietzsche's exposition of the "hypothesis" of the "will to power" in BGE 36. According to Souladié, this crucial aphorism does not really present the will to power as a *mere* hypothesis, but rather as "an affirmation" which criticises identity, substance and the subject-object dichotomy. The will to power aims to enable a new unifying relationship with the world which overcomes the distinction between the philosophical subject and its 'object world'. Such an affirmation, according to Souladié, "is neither dogmatic, nor simply hypothetical: it is problematic". It is not dogmatic because Nietzsche does not simply assert it as a logician demonstrates a claim or a scientist asserts a proposition about the objective world; but it is not just a hypothesis like any other because it is (supposed to be) Nietzsche's direct expression of his most intimate experience as a body (or as a multiplicity), such that its suprapersonal implications result precisely from the fact that the expression of one's most intimate, personal experience cannot fail to have a suprapersonal relevance. But then the will to power remains indeed 'problematic' – for its affirmation remains rooted in the *merely* personal. Thus, the question that one should perhaps ask Deleuze – and all Deleuzians – is whether all of this is really substantiallly different from the claim that Nietzsche does *not* eliminate the first-personal and subjective and only redescribes it as a "subject-multiplicity" (BGE 12) whose conscious states are surfaces, tools, and mirrors of unconscious drives and affects.

   Keith Ansell-Pearson's chapter, "Questions of the Subject in Nietzsche and Foucault: A Reading of *Dawn*", interrogates the relationship between Nietzsche and Foucault by exploring the latter's conception of 'care of the self' and

'ethical resistance', as well as the former's text of 1881, *Dawn*, and its affinities with the themes of Foucault's so-called 'ethical turn'. The usual post-modern interpretation of Nietzsche – including Foucault's – claims that Nietzsche deconstructs and dissolves the subject. But, Ansell-Pearson argues, this raises at least two problems: "(a) how do we explain Nietzsche's appeal, running throughout his writings, to our becoming those that we are (unique, singular, incomparable, *self-creating, self-legislating*)? (b) how do we account for the interest in the self and the subject shown by Foucault in what we now call his late writings?" In dealing with these two questions, Ansell-Pearson begins by analysing the way in which Foucault appropriated Nietzsche for the ends of anti-humanism in the early and middle periods of his thought, i.e., up to the point of his late writing and so-called ethical turn. As an anti-humanist thinker, Foucault's interest in the concept of the subject is in dissolving and destroying it by showing how it is engendered (as a 'subject of knowledge') by repressive, or controlling social practices. As Ansell-Pearson writes, "The key claim is that there is no *given* subject of knowledge": there is no 'human nature', no 'human being', no fixed human identity, and in this sense 'man' *qua* subject of knowledge should by now be declared as dead as God. At this point, Nietzsche is particularly important for Foucault as the teacher of a 'passion for knowledge' (*Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis*) that shows us how to abandon the positing of solid identities and engage in a radical experimentation with ourselves – an experimentation allegedly freed from the prejudice of a fixed subject. However, as Ansell-Pearson emphasises, Foucault's ethical turn shifts the focus of his attention "from the production of the subject through regimes of power-knowledge to how the subject produces itself through a form of ethical life and involving technologies of the self". In this new context, the reconception of the subject or self not as a substance but rather as an activity, and in fact as a self-reflexive activity, becomes relevant and acceptable. Foucault's "care of the self" entails the conception of a self-reflexive self capable of "critically examining the processes of its own constitution and bringing about changes in them". In the last part of his chapter, Ansell-Pearson explores the possibility that Foucault may not have seen how *Dawn* (or *Daybreak*, as the most common translation goes) epitomises Nietzsche's own concern not only with the care of the self and the technologies of the self, but also, as Ansell-Pearson puts it, with "ethical resistance to normalization and the biopolitical tendencies of modernity". Thus Ansell-Pearson highlights Nietzsche's appeal to 'creativity' (instead of 'authenticity') as involving the project of creating and becoming a self (or as involving a 'formative' view of a reflexive self, to borrow Richardson' terminology used above). But in his (very Foucaultian) reading of *Dawn*, Ansell-Pearson is especially interested in showing that, for Nietzsche, becoming a self in this sense is fundamentally

not so much about preserving a subjective independence from an abstract 'herd' as is about *resisting*, as a unique individual, the disciplining effects and the communitarian tyranny typical of modern "commercial society" (D 174). This is the context in which Nietzsche develops his own ethic of self-cultivation – an ethic which, according to Ansell-Pearson, is obviously concerned with cultivating one's character as a multiplicity of 'drives' (e.g. D 560), but which is no less concerned with a sort of Stoic resistance and care of the self modelled on Epictetus and starkly opposed to the Christian, particularly Pascalian hatred of the ego.

Jaanus Sooväli's chapter, "Gapping the Subject: Nietzsche and Derrida", discusses both thinkers' interpretation of the concept of the subject by focussing not only on how Nietzsche influenced Derrida in this respect, but also on how Derrida's deconstruction of the subject may be said to be a development of Nietzsche's. Sooväli begins by raising the question as to why Derrida quotes Nietzsche more than any other philosopher – almost always in decisive moments – and yet he has only written a few short independent texts on Nietzsche. In certain respects, Nietzsche goes well beyond Freud, Heidegger, or Husserl in the direction of Derrida's thought. Sooväli's answer to his own question is that Nietzsche, with his multiple voices and philosophical perspectives, is himself a paradigm of self-deconstruction. Nietzsche does not need to be deconstructed – he deconstructs himself. However, Sooväli's further point is that neither Derrida's nor Nietzsche's deconstruction of the subject aims to remove or eliminate the concept of the subject (although this is a common objection raised against both). Their aim is to radically change its interpretation. In order to show that this is so, Sooväli focuses on BGE 16. Here, he claims, it is clear that Derrida is right in pointing out that already for Nietzsche "the subject is always inscribed in language". They both try to show that no mental state and no concept is ever directly *present*. There are always other mental states and concepts that 'construct' them, and therefore the conditions of their possibility always presuppose a detour, a mediation, a relation to these other mental states and concepts. The subject is always already "caught in differential relationships that exclude simple self-presence and are governed by language", and that is why "the subject is a 'function' of (or is 'produced' by) language". According to Sooväli, this is the main point in which Nietzsche has directly and explicitly influenced Derrida's conceptions of *différance*. It is certainly interesting to note that if this is so, then Nietzsche's influence on Derrida is rooted in the way his Langean scepticism regarding self-knowledge shows subjectivity and language to be intertwined. Moreover, if all of this is so, Nietzsche's affinity with Derrida is found in the same aspect of his philosophy as his affinity with Wittgenstein, as Maria João Mayer Branco emphasises in the next chapter. In fact, that same aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy is also the one that immediately connects his

approach to the problem of subjectivity with that of two other author who might otherwise have little in common: Niklas Luhmann and Daniel Dennett. The last three chapters of Part II focus on the crisis of the modern subject as evinced in the philosophical relationship between Nietzsche and these three authors: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Niklas Luhmann and Daniel Dennett.

Maria João Mayer Branco's chapter, "Questioning Introspection: Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on 'The Peculiar Grammar of the Word "I"'", is one of the most extensive discussions of language and intersubjectivity in the collection, and it aims to show that there is a crucial affinity between Nietzsche's and Wittgenstein's rejection of introspection. By exploring their 'anti-Cartesianism' and the way they both question the *cogito*'s epistemological immediacy, transparency, and interiority, Branco tries to clarify the reasons why both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein claim that first-personal, subjective self-knowledge is an indirect, mediated access of the 'I' to itself in which language plays a decisive role. They both criticise the kind of ontological conception of the subject that transforms the self into a metaphysical, concealed and inexpressible substance completely transparent to itself and detached from the public, intersubjective world in which it lives. Thus, they both argue, though in different ways, that one of the chief failings of Cartesianism is the fact that it does not acknowledge that the individual subject only becomes an individual subject by using a language and, hence, it is always already connected with and actually belongs to an intersubjective space of linguistic conceptualisation. Moreover, they both converge in rejecting traditional referentialist views of language, particularly of the kind that entails that words for inner states and an inner 'I' designate, describe, or simply refer to an observable reality. Consequently, both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein convert the Cartesian ontology of the ego and its epistemological claims into a linguistic or grammatical question. After establishing that the Cartesian conception of the self is a point of departure that is common to Nietzsche's and Wittgenstein's analyses of subjectivity and self-knowledge, Branco elucidates Nietzsche's and Wittgenstein's criticisms of Cartesianism. In the section on Nietzsche, she focuses mainly on *Daybreak*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Gay Science*, and in section on Wittgenstein she focuses on the famous 'private language argument' (PI, Part I, §§ 243–315), as well as on crucial passages from the *Blue Book*. Branco points out that the (first-personal) experience of pain or suffering is not only a crucial example and focus of analysis for Wittgenstein, but also for Nietzsche. He, too, realises that "the knowledge acquired through suffering" (D 114) seems to be the best instance of first-personal self-knowledge. Suffering "separates", as Nietzsche claims (BGE 270), it distinguishes and it awakens a "silent arrogance" in the sufferer, as well as the "certainty" that he knows what nobody else can know (BGE 270, D 114). Nevertheless, however valuable and "noble" (BGE 270)

this state may be, it demands "relief" (D 114). Even the sufferer, Branco argues, cannot know himself introspectively, and in fact his pain releases in him the "*need to communicate*" (GS 354). For (the later) Wittgenstein, too, even pain is not at all an argument in favour of introspective knowledge. The meaning of such words as 'pain' and 'I' is learned and lies in their use within intersubjective forms of life, such that they always already presuppose a language that could not have been created by a single individual and, therefore, could never have been a 'private' language. Thus, both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein believe that becoming conscious of oneself through pain should in fact make us realise the opaque nature of our so-called self-consciousness. Self-reflexive suffering (and particularly the kind of 'great suffering' which is so important for Nietzsche) is not so much an experience where the truth about who we are reveals itself as rather an experience where we lose track of what such 'truth' might signify. On the other hand, the fact that, as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein agree, self-reflexive suffering can promote the 'need to communicate' suggests that alternative forms of non-introspective self-knowledge are thinkable. According to Branco, for both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein the 'I' is not really incommunicable, and further research on Wittgenstein's expressivist account of sensation may come to contribute decisively for clarifying Nietzsche's position on self-knowledge. For Nietzsche's critique of Descartes' *cogito* is indeed not eliminist, and it involves a conception of an *inner* 'pathos of distance' (BGE 257), which should be interpreted in the light of Nietzsche's conception of consciousness as a "net connecting one person with another" (GS 354).

Werner Stegmaier's chapter, "Subjects as Temporal Clues to Orientation: Nietzsche and Luhmann on Subjectivity", is an extremely original exploration of the affinity between Nietzsche and Luhmann regarding the problem of subjectivity, particularly of the way in which both thinkers converge not only in identifying the most fundamental paradoxes involved in the modern philosophical concept of the subject, but also in trying to make these paradoxes productive for the progress of their thought. According to Stegmaier, Nietzsche and Luhmann are particularly interested in the 'subject' as a concept that in the Enlightenment fulfilled the function of liberating "the individual from his bond to God and his traditional social relationships, thus radically handing him back to himself – as autonomous thinker". In order to fulfil this function, the concept of the subject had to become paradoxical, as it had to posit every human being as simultaneously unequal *and* equal to every other human being. This paradox was made even deeper by the scientific, that is, *objectifying*, approach to subjectivity in modern philosophy. This approach converts the subject into its opposite, namely an 'object' of inquiry. By adopting this objectifying approach and positing a transcendental subject – a subject that is 'me' and yet is a universal subject constituted by theore-

tical and practical structures supposedly common to all – modern transcendental philosophy falls into paradox. According to Stegmaier, in the twentieth century Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is especially paradigmatic of this paradoxical nature of transcendental philosophy. Nietzsche and Luhmann, by contrast, expose the paradoxical nature of transcendental philosophy, indeed of every philosophy of the subject in general. They both argue that if a concept leads to paradox its claim to refer to something real outside of itself (its referentiality) has to be questioned. In particular, they both show that there is no reason to assume that the word 'subject' designates some sort of really observable and describable entity. No real answer to the question of what is 'subjectivity' can be expected, for nothing 'corresponds' to the word 'subject'. As Stegmaier puts it – in one of the strongest, most forcible postmodern denials of the subject in this volume – "the concept of the subject is a means for description, not an object of description". Nietzsche and Luhmann converge in this, according to Stegmaier: "instead of asking what a 'subject' is, they looked for the *function* or functions the concept has fulfilled in European philosophy – functions which in the meantime may already have changed and become superfluous". But Stegmaier also believes that Nietzsche's and Luhmann's efforts to dissolve the concept of the subject by showing its paradoxical nature do not end in a cul-de-sac. As mentioned, Stegmaier supposes paradoxes to be productive. Thus, he argues that the paradoxes of subjectivity make Nietzsche replace the concept of the subject with the concept of 'perspective', or rather 'perspectives'. Nietzsche does this by showing (a) that 'subject', 'I', 'consciousness', 'agent' (or 'doer'), etc. are mere linguistic constructions, and (b) they were constructed in order to fulfil a social function, namely to "create unity and order over time in the chaos of ideas of individuals and among individuals" (and hence to make society possible). Realising this makes Nietzsche free the subject from any transcendental a prioris and *construe* a new conception of the subject, namely the subject as a unique *perspective* radically separated from all other 'subjects' (or perspectives) and unable to reach them in their 'subjectivity'. Similarly, Luhmann replaces the concepts of subject and perspective with the concept of *observation* (the concept of an impersonal and yet self-referential observation that autopoetically *constructs* social reality as a linguistic realm of social communications). Stegmaier's ultimate aim seems to be the interpretation of both Nietzsche's 'perspectives' and Luhmann's 'observation' in terms of his own philosophy of 'orientation'.

Sofia Miguens' chapter, "Three Senses of Selfless Consciousness: Nietzsche and Dennett on Mind, Language and Body", considers philosophical affinities between Nietzsche and Dennett – and, more generally, between Nietzsche and contemporary philosophy of mind – by assessing some of Nietzsche's views on mind, language, body, consciousness and the self in the context of contemporary

debates. The chapter can also be read as a discussion of Daniel Dennett's idea of a 'dismantling of the Cartesian Theatre' and the general idea of a 'selfless consciousness'. The chapter is divided in three parts, each of which discusses a different meaning of 'selfless consciousness'. In Part 1 (*Vielheit* and *Intermittenzen*), Miguens considers what role natural language may play in consciousness. Miguens focuses on GS 354, an aphorism that Dennett quotes more than once in his work on consciousness, and she tries to assess Nietzsche's proposal (according to which consciousness developed under the pressure of the need for communication) by appealing to Dennett's conception of the status of the self and the role of high-order mental states in his functionalist models of consciousness (*Brainstorms*, 1978 and *Consciousness Explained*, 1991). The main point that Miguens makes is that Nietzsche and Dennett converge in intertwining consciousness and language – and, therefore, consciousness and publicity (for language, in contrast with a brain, or a body, is public and shared). In addition, Miguens shows that Nietzsche and Dennett also converge in understanding consciousness as intermittent, as well as in identifying different levels of awareness, including sub-personal awareness. Only at the 'surface level' of language and conceptualisation are there conscious mental states – and particularly, a 'self' and *proper* consciousness *qua* self-consciousness. The intertwinement of consciousness and language is indeed what leads to the conclusion (both for Nietzsche and for Dennett) that there definitely is no 'Cartesian natural unity or centre stage'. In Part 2 (*Unterseelen*), Miguens dovetails Nietzsche's idea of 'sub-souls' with Dennett's engagement with Antonio Damasio's objections to classic, dis-embodied (and, as it were, 'dis-embrained') functionalism. Retracting from this kind of functionalism, Dennett credits Nietzsche as an inspiration for the idea that evolution embodies information in all parts of the body. In Part 3 (Is that all? *Warheit* and *Wissenschaft*), Miguens draws some conclusions regarding the fruitfulness of comparing Nietzsche and Dennett. It seems to us important to ponder over what she has to say in this section, for it raises key general questions about what is at stake in this present volume.

Miguens' main point is that we should sharply separate treatments of consciousness, mind, body, self, language, etc. that belong to philosophy of mind and cognition from treatments that belong to metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy or, more generally, treatments that involve *content* and hence questions of value and of truth. As soon as, for example, Nietzsche explores the hypothesis that (proper) consciousness *qua* conceptual and linguistic consciousness 'falsifies', he stands immediately outside of the field in which a comparison with Dennett's functionalism makes sense. Or, to take another example, when Nietzsche reflects on the *value* for the 'affirmation of life' either of something like the Cartesian theatre or of something like a selfless consciousness, he is no longer in any possible dialogue with psychology, or cognitive science, or Dennett's philosophy of mind.

This raises two main questions. First, there is the question of the so-called 'analytic Nietzsche'. Does the trend that transforms Nietzsche into an analytic philosopher make sense? Nietzsche may easily be considered an 'analytic' philosopher in a very broad sense: he is not 'irrational', and he makes claims and at least sometimes presents arguments to underpin them. But (Miguens suggests) he does not belong to the analytic tradition in the same way as, say, Frege or even Husserl (who weren't born much later than Nietzsche) do. And one of the reasons for this is precisely that in the analytic tradition thoughts tend not to be considered to be 'mental states', that is, analytic philosophers tend to assume, as Miguens puts it, that "the appropriate units for pursuing an investigation on thought-world relations are propositions or judgements, *and not selves*". The second question Miguens' final thoughts raise is whether it is "really the same author continental and analytical philosophers are interested in when they are interested in Nietzsche, *in particular where a critique of the subject is concerned*". Most likely, a Deleuzian, say, is mostly interested in Nietzsche's axiological stance towards the problem of subjectivity, whereas an analytical philosopher will most likely be interested either in embodiment or in Nietzsche's evolutionary conjectures about consciousness, or in his psychological theory of motivation. Is Nietzsche really able to make them communicate?

As regards the 'analytic Nietzsche', we believe that though it is certainly wrong to assimilate Nietzsche too much to the analytic tradition – particularly if that entails losing focus on the practical-existential dimension of his writings –, recent scholarship that manages to relate current analytic debates with Nietzsche thought has proven much more interesting than might be expected. Moreover, even if Nietzsche can be said not to belong to the tradition that assumes that 'propositions are facts', his anti-realism about concepts (or about both moral and epistemic norms, as Brian Leiter puts it in his chapter) is certainly relevant for the analytic tradition today. Finally, we believe that this volume is itself a contribution, even if a modest one, to the promotion of fruitful philosophical dialogues not only between anglophone and continental Nietzsche scholars, but also between 'analytics' and 'continentals'. That Nietzsche's writings are able to mediate the latter kind of dialogue is indeed surprising – but it seems to be a fact.

Part III: Current Debates – From Embodiment and Consciousness to Agency

The aim of **Mattia Riccardi**'s chapter, "Nietzsche on the Embodiment of Mind and Self", is (as the title suggests) to work out in some detail Nietzsche's view

on the embodiment of mind and self. In order to do so, Riccardi makes use of an important distinction in contemporary philosophy of mind, namely Barry Dainton's distinction between 'effective embodiment' and 'phenomenal embodiment'. The mind is said to be 'effectively embodied' when it is said to depend *de facto* on the kind of body it happens to have. As many passages in Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings show, Nietzsche clearly believes the mind to be effectively embodied, and as at least a few key-passages (such as Z I, On the Despisers of the Body) show, he also believes the 'self' (*Selbst*) to be effectively embodied. But a mind is said to be 'phenomenally embodied' only if it can be said to be present to itself as embodied, that is, (as Riccardi puts it) to experience its own mental life "as in some sense shaped by the kind of body it happens to have. Here, the relevant dimension is purely phenomenological" – here, what is at stake is purely the first-personal, subjective experience that a mind has of itself, and particularly the reflexivity that is thought to justify our talk of a 'self'. Riccardi's thesis is that Nietzsche believes that although we are effectively embodied, we lack phenomenal embodiment. But Riccardi qualifies this claim in an important respect. He acknowledges that Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in arguing that the body is the only 'immediate object' in our experience – that is to say, in defending that besides having third-personal knowledge of our body, we also have a first-personal, subjective experience precisely of our embodiment in *this* body, which distinguishes it from any other spatial object in our experience. According to Riccardi, the problem, however, is that Nietzsche believes that in spite of the fact that we have first-personal, subjective, phenomenal access to our our own body, it is also a fact that such access is fundamentally defective, such that our body as phenomenally given is in truth a "*terra incognita*" (NL 1882, 5[31], KSA 10: 225) or, as Riccardi writes, "we lack epistemic access to a certain range of facts concerning the way in which the body shapes mind and self". In particular, we lack, from a phenomenal point of view, epistemic access to the way in which our body is supposed to shape our "propositionally articulated conscious attitudes (like beliefs, desires, emotions, volitions, etc.)", and therefore we lack phenomenal embodiment *with respect to this class of psychological states* (albeit not with respect to all classes of psychological states). Thus the problem is again the defectiveness of introspection and its intrinsic entanglement with language. Our introspective access to our propositionally articulated conscious attitudes is mediated by language and indeed itself propositional, so that it causes us not only to remain "unknown to ourselves" (GM Preface 1) but also to think of ourselves as if we were disembodied minds and selves. As Riccardi puts it, "Nietzsche takes what is usually called the *Cartesian* picture of mind and self to accurately capture the conception we naïvely form of ourselves as thinkers and agents". This sort of

phenomenal (although not effective) disembodiment is particularly clear, as well as particularly stark, with respect to our self-understanding as an 'I' or 'self'. In self-referentially employing the word 'I' and using it to give unity to the whole of our mental life, we have no sense of how our bodies effectively shape the states in which we do that and thus we fall into the pseudo-disembodied experience of ourselves that typically originates our self-conception as 'souls' or 'subjects'. Therefore, according to Riccardi Nietzsche's conception of our *effective* embodiment is fundamentally objective or third-personal, and it belongs to Nietzsche's rejection of the Cartesian illusions that our lack of phenomenal embodiment typically promotes. Nietzsche's conception of 'drives' and his thesis that 'body' and 'soul' are just different ways of describing the same reality (basically the reality of the drives) are third-personal and aim to account for our effective embodiment. Like Sofia Miguens, Riccardi analyses Nietzsche's conception of a "subject-multiplicity" (BGE 12) and explores his views on effective embodiment by comparing them to Dennett's and other functionalist views.

Paolo Stellino's chapter, "Self-knowledge, Genealogy, Evolution", can be said to begin by exploring a crucial idea also discussed in Paul Katsafanas' chapter. Although Nietzsche's position regarding self-knowledge is admittedly sceptical (which means, to say it once more, that it is basically 'Langean'), he nevertheless believes that there is a non-negligible difference between direct and indirect self-knowledge – or between first-personal, subjective, introspective self-knowledge and third-personal, objective, scientific self-knowledge –, such that the latter can be attained, at least to some extent or to a certain degree, *if* it is understood and undertaken not only as physiology and psychology but also, and most crucially, as 'genealogy'. This move from introspective psychology to physio-psychology *qua* genealogy has, however, an introspective starting point, that is, a starting point in (first-personal) self-knowledge. It is self-knowledge that lets us know that there is no self-knowledge, as Stellino paradoxically puts it. In other words, it is by introspection that one discovers that introspective self-knowledge is impossible and we need an alternative method to probe the hidden depths of our psychological or subjective life. Nietzsche's scepticism regarding self-knowledge is what leads to the development of the genealogical method as we need a better or truer method of self-observation. (Not by accident, the *Genealogy* of Morality begins precisely with the assertion that "we are unknown to ourselves", GM Preface 1). Stellino explores this idea by investigating the evolutionary dimension of genealogy and comparing Nietzsche's use of it for self-knowledge with recent attempts to provide evolutionary and genealogical critiques of morality. Stellino focuses, in particular, on Ruse (1986) and Joyce (2006) and their respective attempts to defend evolutionary anti-realist account in metaethics.

Brian Leiter's chapter, "Moralities Are a *Sign-Language* of the Affects", is an excellent example of how Nietzsche's view of subjectivity (or his use of psychology as an explanatory idiom) can contribute to the most sophisticated debates of contemporary moral psychology and philosophy of the emotions. Leiter offers an interpretation and partial defence of Nietzsche's idea that moralities and moral judgements are 'sign-languages' or 'symptoms' of our affects, that is, they are *caused* by our emotions or feelings, and these are causes whose existence "can be correctly inferred from the symptom or sign", as Leiter puts it in his reconstruction of Nietzsche's view. According to this reconstruction, moral judgements result from the interaction of two kinds of affective responses: first, a 'basic affect' of inclination towards or aversion from certain acts, and then a further affective response (the 'meta-affect', or 'moral affect') to that basic affect, that is, either an inclination towards or an aversion away from a basic affect. Leiter argues that Nietzsche views basic affects (basic inclinations towards X and aversions away from Y) as *non-cognitive,* that is, as identifiable solely by their phenomenal character – by how they feel to the subject who experiences the affect; by contrast, meta-affects such as guilt and shame sometimes incorporate a *cognitive* component like belief. Leiter ascribes this view to Nietzsche by exploring Katsafanas' (2013) interpretation of drives as *dispositions to have affective responses under certain conditions*. The same drive has the potential to give rise to different moral feelings depending on the circumstances, but the causal root of a moral judgement (the "motivational oomph or push") is always the qualitatively distinctive *feel* of an affect and this affect is always a way in which a drive responds to given circumstances (or what it feels like for us to respond to these circumstances while being driven by a given drive X). That is why moralities and moral judgements are 'sign-languages' or 'symptoms' of our affects. In addition, Leiter tries to show that this view is compatible with his previous reading of Nietzsche, particularly with what he terms Nietzsche's "Doctrine of Types" (Leiter 2002: 8–10), by arguing that Nietzsche believes that the psychological component of a person's type consists of drives and a person is always constituted by a relatively stable set and association of drives. In accordance with Nietzsche's Lamarckianism, sets and associations of drives tend to be stable even when they are culturally acquired character traits. As Leiter points out, in the early twenty-first century, we know that characterological traits are not inherited (for they have no gene), but behavioural genetics has established that they are *heritable*, which means that they can be said to "mimick the Lamarckian result". If this is so and therefore, as Leiter argues, at least the kernel of Nietzsche's outdated Lamarckianism can be reformulated and made plausible by means of our contemporary distinction between inheritance and heritability, then moralities and moral judgements can indeed be said to be

'sign-languages' and 'symptoms' caused by 'type-facts' about persons, as it will become plausible to conceive of them as ultimately rooted not only in strictly biological type-facts, but also in stable sets and associations of drives. Or, in other words, by updating and indeed replacing Nietzsche's Lamarckianism with a plausible (and still 'Nietzschean') psychology of drives, we can see that moral judgements are caused by "affects and meta-affects, which are the joint product of nature and culture", as Leiter puts it. The chapter concludes with a discussion of philosophical and empirical psychological reasons for thinking that Nietzsche's account of moral judgement is correct. In this context, Leiter's discussion of Nietzsche's moral 'anti-realism' (an anti-realism which, in fact, concerns both moral and epistemic norms) seems to us to make particularly clear how Nietzsche's psychology and his view of the problem of subjectivity crucially underpin his reflections on such themes as morality and nihilism.

Ken Gemes' and **Imogen Le Patourel**'s chapter, "Nietzsche on Consciousness, Unity, and the Self", seems to us to be an important attempt to provide a state-of-the-art critical update on some of the key issues of this volume: what is Nietzsche's view of consciousness and its relation to the drives and their unconsciousness, and how does Nietzsche conceive of the self and its unity, that is, its wholeness, or completeness. In Part 1 of their chapter, Gemes and Le Patourel argue that Nietzsche makes a "pronounced distinction between the self and the I or ego". They claim that he is sceptical about the I or ego – that is, about the I or ego of consciousness –, but not about the self that is formed at the level of unconscious drives. As regards the I, Nietzsche sometimes seems to be sceptical about the very *existence* of the I or ego, but his considered view "involves only scepticism about its importance for self, action and agency". As for the self, Nietzsche sees it as "the core of one's agency", and yet he locates it primarily in the unconscious, namely as the result of the activity the drives and the way they interrelate. However, Gemes and Le Patourel discuss two alternative views of the self as a primarily unconscious interrelation of the drives. What they call 'the egalitarian version' entails that any given collection of drives constituting an individual organism is a self. The 'elitist version', by contrast, entails that only a few individual organisms are truly 'selves', that is, genuine selfhood presupposes a unified set of drives that only a few individuals are really able to achieve. According to Gemes and Le Patourel, Nietzsche favours the elitist version and equates the process of 'becoming what one is' and being a genuine individual with the process of achieving internal unity and order at the unconscious level of drives. Most importantly, Gemes and Le Patourel interpret this unity and order as imposed by a predominant drive. Genuine selfhood is possible only because certain drives can predominate over all other drives within the organism, in fact only because a given 'master drive' can do this by supplying a

creative vocation or task and marshalling one's capacities in the service of this creative vocation or task (and hence in the service of certain values). Nietzsche ascribes a secondary role to consciousness in this kind of process, and this is the essential meaning of his critique of the overestimation of consciousness, or his "largely deflationary account of the role of consciousness", as Gemes and Le Patourel put it. Part 2 of their chapter discusses this way of interpreting the unity of self. The 'predominance model' – according to which unity is achieved when a master drive organises or sublimates the other drives into hierarchical relations to itself – has an alternative, namely the model proposed by Paul Katsafanas, according to which unity should be seen as a harmony between the drives and conscious reflection. Gemes and Le Patourel argue that Nietzsche is a "champion of agonal struggle and the great sceptic of the power and function of conscious reflection", and therefore "should not be domesticated [...] as an apologist for a traditional valorisation of harmony between instincts and reason". They conclude that the predominance model best captures Nietzsche's position, as it entails that "it is always the drives rather than consciousness that are the root causal determinants of our actions and the formation of the self, and that where consciousness does have a role, it is essentially as a tool of the drives". Note, this view involves the rejection of epiphenomenalism, while it also involves the rejection of the traditional overestimation of consciousness, especially of the view that the I of consciousness is a knower and doer that can stay above the drives and control them by reflecting upon them.

Herman Siemens' chapter, "Nietzsche's Socio-Physiology of the Self", examines Nietzsche's thought on the social and historical sources of the self as a counter-argument against the liberal concept of the individual. In specific, the chapter takes issue with the notion of the asocial, antecedently individuated person to which the liberal notion of freedom, as the right to choose one's concept of the good, is attached. Nietzsche, Siemens argues, offers both a powerful critique of the asocial, antecedently individuated concept of personhood, and an alternative counter-conception of personhood and sovereignty. On the critical side are arguments to the effect that the individual or person is inseparable from its ends or values, which in turn are socially constituted, and that our capacities as individuals, especially for sovereign agency, are the product of a long social history and pre-history. On the positive side is the constructive counter-claim that the maintenance and cultivation of our capacities for productive, autonomous agency is dependent on relations of measured antagonism both between and within us as individuals, or rather: as '*dividua*'. Siemens reconstructs these arguments along four main lines of thought: on the social origins and character of (self-)consciousness (§ 1); on the (pre-)history and social constitution of our capacities as sovereign individuals (§ 2); on the social origins

of moral phenomena, understood as internalisations of communal norms (§ 3); on Nietzsche's physiological destruction of the substantial moral subject, coupled with the physiological reconstruction of the subject as '*dividuum*' (§ 4). The texts discussed come mainly from the *Nachlass* of 1880–1882 (KSA 9), where Nietzsche develops a socio-physiology of the self. These texts allow Siemens to interrogate the rationale for the typically Nietzschean 'category mistake' of discussing moral and political issues in physiological terms. Nietzsche's physiological discourse is understood as part of his programme to naturalise morality and serves to deflate moral concepts by exposing the metaphysical errors on which they are based. It also enables Nietzsche to reconstruct the historical emergence of the individual from the social 'organism' in a way that avoids substance ontology in favour of processes modelled on organic life. In this regard, he also develops a prescriptive alternative to the liberal concept of freedom that turns on radically individual self-legislation, grounded in processes of self-regulation that enable each individual as *unicum* to meet its conditions of existence. And against the Socratic ideal of inner harmony, Nietzschean sovereignty involves the maintenance of maximal but measured inner antagonism through relations of measured outer antagonism with equals.

In the last chapter of this collection, "The Expressivist Nietzsche", **Robert B. Pippin** engages in an important attempt to clarify in detail some of the polemic views that he put forward in his book, *Nietzsche, Psychology* & First Philosophy. There he had tried to interpret in a new way the important passage of *Beyond Good and Evil* where Nietzsche claims that his writings make "psychology" once again "the queen of the sciences", and so once more the "path to the fundamental problems" (BGE 23). Pippin's argument was, and remains, that the French *moralistes* (particularly Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, and above all Montaigne) are the main inspiration of Nietzsche's conception of 'psychology', and that this conception leads to a characterisation of Nietzsche's conception of agency as 'expressivist'. Pippin's attempt to align Nietzsche with that tradition aims, first of all, to make the point that Nietzsche "is unquestionably better understood as a French *moraliste* than the German metaphysician of Heidegger's influential lectures from the 1930s and 1940s". Secondly, Pippin's aim is to reject the view according to which Nietzsche's conception of psychology is fundamentally naturalistic.

Our volume, particularly in Part I, shows that the sources of Nietzsche's conception of 'psychology' are rather multifarious. Although it is certainly right that Nietzsche identifies with Montaigne or La Rochefoucauld in their way of doing 'psychology', (i) Descartes also remains important for him (as shown in Isabelle Wienand's chapter), (ii) the French 'psychologists' include for him the likes of Stendhal and Bourget (as shown by Giuliano Campioni's chapter), (iii) the scien-

tific, naturalistic psychology of his time is perhaps less important than that of Montaigne or Bourget, but is nonetheless quite important (as shown Pietro Gori's, Maria Cristina Fornari's and again Giuliano Campioni's chapters), (iv) neo-Kantianism (from Schopenhauer to Teichmüller and others) is another major influence; and (v) Friedrich A. Lange is perhaps his most important source and influence. Interestingly, this work on Nietzsche's sources, and especially the way several of the authors highlight Lange's role, either directly (as in Anthony Jensen's and João Constâncio's chapters) or indirectly (as in Maria João Mayer Branco's), confirms the kernel of Pippin's main claim, namely that Nietzsche's psychology is fundamentally focused on the critique of introspection and more generally, as he puts it, on "the problem of self-knowledge and the relation between that problem and knowledge of others' actions and words, and especially the unique kind of difficulty one faces in attempting to know such things as why one (or anyone) did what one did, what it actually was that one (or anyone) did; what one (or some other) truly values; why one values what one does; could one come to know what sort of a life one might truly affirm, and if so how?" Neither the natural sciences nor a metaphysics of the basic structure of the soul can provide such self- and other-knowledge, and this for several reasons, according to Pippin: "partly because it is neither empirical nor a priori knowledge, partly because the soul is not an object in the usual sense, but mostly because in his treatments such putative self- and other-knowledge is almost always an expression of some self-deception that must be overcome". This focus on self-deception is what ultimately unites Nietzsche and the French *moralistes*, and it is also the reason why they know, as Nietzsche knows, that in order to attain any glimpse of self- and other-knowledge what is needed is not so much a scientific 'method' and general 'theory' of the soul as rather the ability to find "ways to characterize how the human soul typically works (how such questions as those above are posed and pursued) in ways true to the unstable, variable, situation dependent, self-interested contexts in which they arise". And this is what leads to Nietzsche's 'expressivism'. The main idea is that self- and other-knowledge results from what is expressed *in* our own deeds and the deeds of others. Introspective knowledge of our own ex ante formulations of intention is not really knowledge. Without such formulations and the 'mindedness' they entail there would be no difference between human deeds and merely material events (e.g. bodily movements), but such formulations are only provisional and tell us nothing about what we really 'are', that is, about what really matters to us, what we are really committed to doing, and hence defines us. Only the action, only what is expressed in the deed after it has happened, reveals what we are or (perhaps more precisely) allows for an interpretation and retrospective reconstruction that can be tentatively equated with self- or other-knowledge.

Thus, Nietzsche is still committed to the distinction between action (or deed) and event, but he is able to make this distinction in a way that is different from voluntarism, spontaneity theories, and intention-causal theories. According to Pippin, this different way of making the distinction involves conceiving of the intentional intelligibility as "the domain of value, self-subsumption under norms", and conceiving of such intelligibility as depending on what is expressed *in* actions that are public involves, in turn, conceiving of human valuing as basically "collective, sustained over time, mediated in many institutional, religious and artistic practices, and inherited; *very rarely* open to revision". In other words, intentional intelligibility is intersubjective. But, if so, then we might add that the first-personal – the 'subjective' involved in that 'inter-subjectivity' – remains relevant, such that Nietzsche's 'psychology', as well as his 'perspectivism', can still be said to remain within the boundaries of the problem that modern philosophy has so forcibly *posed*: the problem of subjectivity.

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Part I: **Tradition and Context**

Isabelle Wienand

1 Writing from a First-Person Perspective: Nietzsche's Use of the Cartesian Model

Introduction[1]

This paper aims to clarify the notion of subject or Self in Nietzsche's philosophy. There are indeed many methods to apply in order to achieve this goal. One fruitful way to understand the status of *ich* in Nietzsche's writings is to work out the converging points and differences with prevailing conceptions of the Self in modern philosophy. My suggestion consists in showing that Nietzsche's sense of the Self bears recognisable features that we find in particular in Descartes' thoughts. Some interesting points can be drawn from this analogy. First, Descartes' thoughts about the immediate and clear knowledge of the *Cogito* serve as a basis against which Nietzsche develops his idea of the Self; and second, the Cartesian writing from the first-person perspective is an (anti-)model for Nietzsche's autobiographical texts. There are of course important differences between both thinkers and the purpose of my contribution is not to minimize them. However, Nietzsche's critique of the conscious subject qua *Cogito* does not preclude the relevance of considering Cartesian subjectivity as a significant model to better capture Nietzsche's conception of the Self. At the same time, Descartes constitutes a helpful model and source in understanding what Nietzsche wants to achieve in writing in the first-person. I argue that reading the *Discourse on the Method* (1637) helps us determine to which purpose Nietzsche is writing about himself, for example in the new Prefaces to the second edition of *Daybreak* (1886) and *The Gay Science* (1887). Ultimately, this paper is part of a larger concern to illustrate with arguments other than Heidegger's[2] and Lampert's[3] that it makes sense to study and to teach Nietzsche within the tradition of modern philosophy, in order to understand and evaluate accordingly what Nietzsche says about the Self.

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2 Heidegger 1961, vol. 2: 141–192, in particular the section entitled "Der innere Zusammenhang der Grundstellung von Descartes und Nietzsche", 189–192.
3 Lampert 1993: 143–271.

The paper has two parts. Part 1 considers Nietzsche's critique of the *Cogito* and of other Cartesian concepts. I show that Cartesian subjectivity is a helpful resource to understand Nietzsche's conception of the Self. Part 2 focuses on the first-person perspective in the *Discourse on the Method*. I stress its importance as a (anti-)model for Nietzsche's self-presentation. I conclude by suggesting that the philosophical autobiography which Nietzsche seems to offer to his readers in his late text *Ecce homo* (1888) narrates the *ich* both as a fate, determined by historical, familial, physiological factors, and as something entirely new and independent. In this sense, Nietzsche completes the Cartesian narrative of the subject as a free spirit by adding a fundamental component to the Self: the fabric of the instincts.

1 Thinking about the Self

We should approach Nietzsche's conception of the Self with more caution, that is, we should refrain from believing that his contribution to the understanding of the Self is unprecedented in the history of modern philosophy. However, my claim is neither that Nietzsche's philosophy is – without Nietzsche knowing it – a variation of Descartes' metaphysics of subjectivity.[4] Nor that Nietzsche's philosophy helps us understand early modern philosophy.[5]

Nietzsche is well known for making use of the first-person perspective in his philosophical writings in a way that seems in many regards novel and unique. By doing so, he achieves a radical turn in the way philosophy has been conceived, written and read, but also in so far as he brings thought and existence into a radically new combination. Nietzsche makes us conscious of the ordinary features of our life, our habits, our experiences and our dreams, which not only play a decisive role upon the conditions of the emergence of certain types of

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4 See for instance the influential reading of Heidegger in Heidegger 1961, vol. 2: 189: "Nietzsche's comment to the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum' is in all respects the proof that he misjudges [*verkennt*] the inner essential historical [*wesengeschichtlichen*] connection of his own metaphysical position with Descartes'." (My translation)

5 Lampert 1993: 2: "Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche mutually illuminate one another. Bacon and Descartes, often enough considered in some sense the fathers of modern philosophy, seem to me to share in all essentials the view of philosophy set out in Nietzsche's three pronouncements. Confirmation of Nietzsche's three principles is beautifully accessible in their writings; they are 'Nietzschean' philosophers, legislators who mastered an esoteric style and whose thoughts are among the greatest modern events. Nietzsche's pronouncements provide entry to their writings, and their writings reciprocate: reflection on them and their revolutionary consequences prepares the reader to enter Nietzsche's writings with a clear sense of what is possible for a philosopher."

thoughts, feelings and habits. They also constitute the very matrix of the elaboration of the philosophers' ideas, which seem to be disconnected from everyday life. Nietzsche suspects that the most abstract and disinterested thoughts are not generated by the universal power of understanding alone and are not of a selfless origin, as it is usually imagined. Thinking is not a process that engages only the intellectual part of the thinker. It is always embedded in the fabric of the Self. Henceforth, Nietzsche suggests that philosophy is not only an intellectual contribution to the advancement of truth, but also entails at its very basis a not fully conscious attempt to make sense of one's own existence. As he writes at the beginning of *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), the domain of philosophy offers a particular opportunity for the philosopher to enterprise a kind of unintentional self-narration:

> It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir [...] (BGE 6)[6]

The first chapter of *Beyond Good and Evil*, from which the above passage is quoted, focuses upon the prejudices of the philosophers. Nietzsche identifies in the very principles of the discipline of philosophy a series of preconceived ideas, of blind beliefs, and of atavistic convictions: "On the Prejudices of Philosophers" serves the function of discrediting the truth claim of these foundational principles and of displaying the flaws in their assumptions. This first chapter also serves the more positive purpose of defining anew what philosophy should be about (psychology),[7] how philosophers of the future should be "attempters" (*Versucher*[8]), and of laying down new foundational principles (the idea of will to power[9]).

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6 KSA 5: 19: "Allmählich hat sich mir herausgestellt, was jede grosse Philosophie bisher war: nämlich das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers und eine Art ungewollter und unvermerkter mémoires [...]."

7 See BGE 23/JGB 23, KSA 5: 38: "All psychology has hitherto remained anchored to moral prejudices and timidities [*moralischen Vorurtheilen und Befürchtungen*]: it has not ventured into the depths. To conceive it as morphology and the development-theory of the will to power [*Entwicklungslehre des Willens zur Macht*], as I conceive it – has never yet so much entered the mind of anyone else [...]."

8 See BGE 42/JGB 42, KSA 5: 59: "A new species of philosopher is appearing: I venture to baptise these philosophers with a name not without danger [*nicht ungefährlichen Namen*] in it. As I divine them [...] these philosophers of the future might rightly, but perhaps wrongly, be described as attempters [Versucher]." See also the ninth chapter of BGE, "What is noble?" (*Was ist vornehm?*).

9 BGE 36/JGB 36, KSA 5: 54–55: "The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its 'intelligible character' – it would be 'will to power' and nothing else."

In *Beyond Good and Evil* Descartes is presented as holding the naive belief, according to which one has an immediate and indubitable access to oneself. Nietzsche dismisses the Cartesian thesis as unwarranted on the grounds that Descartes does not demonstrate that the existence and the nature of the mind can be known with indubitable certainty (see *Meditations*, in particular the Second Meditation, AT VII: 23 – 34). Descartes does not convincingly show that the *Cogito* is the fundamental experience of the existence of the ego, i.e. the ultimate proof against sceptic arguments. In §16 of *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche refers implicitly to the Cartesian *Cogito*-experience without naming it when he writes:

> There are still harmless self-observers who believe "immediate certainties" exist, for example "I think" [...]. (BGE 16)[10]

One could quote *ad libitum* other passages from *Beyond Good and Evil* – e.g. BGE 54, BGE 191 as well as from the *Nachlass* notes from August – September 1885,[11] in which Nietzsche rejects the Cartesian experience of the evidence of the *res cogitans*. As Robert Rethy aptly writes:

> In fact, in a closely connected series of notes written in August-September 1885, and thus contemporaneous with *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Nietzsche speaks more explicitly of "going beyond" mere Cartesian doubt, emphasizing the moral-practical restrictions to that doubt. Descartes, he writes, "ist mir nicht radikal genug" [...] In being "vorsichtiger" [than Descartes], Nietzsche is still philosophizing in the spirit of Descartes, but doing the latters' work "better" than he himself did or could do. [...] Descartes's "superficiality" or "Leichtfertigkeit" consists, then, not in doubting, but in not doubting enough, in being literally "leicht fertig mit dem Zweifel." It is Descartes' own greatest achievement, his method that is the tool that triumphs over science itself, by posing the question of the value of the highest values. In this sense [...] Nietzsche is Descartes' heir, the latter's "new organon" of method destroying the very edifice for the construction of which it was devised – the edifice of modern science. (Rethy 1976: 294 – 295)

Nietzsche recognises that thoughts come to consciousness. Yet it is, as he claims, a logical error to attribute them to the thinking substance, the intellectual subject qua the origin of thoughts. He contests that the emergence of thoughts can be simply explained in terms of causality: the conscious 'I' cannot

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10 KSA 5: 29: "Es giebt immer noch harmlose Selbst-Beobachter, welche glauben, dass es 'unmittelbare Gewissheiten' gebe, zum Beispiel 'ich denke' [...]."
11 NL 40[10], KSA 11: 632: " – Descartes is not radical enough for me. In face of his demand [*Verlangen*] to have something for certain and 'I do not want to be deceived', it was necessary to ask 'why not?' In short, moral prejudices (or reasons of utility) in favour of certainty [*Gewißheit*] against appearance [*Schein*] ..." (My translation) See also NL 1885, 40[20], 40[22], 40[23], 40[24], KSA 11: 637 – 641.

be related as the cause of thoughts with certainty and immediate evidence. Therefore, the proof of the existence of the *res cogitans* is "the fact of a very strong belief", as he writes in a *Nachlass* note dated from autumn 1887:

> "There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks" [*Es wird gedacht: folglich giebt es Denkendes*]: this is the upshot of all Descartes' argumentation. But that means positing our belief in the concept of substance already as "true a priori": – that, when there is think-ing, there ought to be something "that thinks", is simply an expression of our grammatical habit which adds a doer to every deed. In short, here already a logical-metaphysical postu-late is being made – and not just a statement ... On the path followed by Descartes one does not reach something absolutely certain, but only the fact of a very strong belief

> If one reduces the proposition to "There is thinking, therefore there are thoughts", one has a mere tautology: and precisely that what is in question, namely the "reality of the thought" is not alluded to – that is, the "apparent reality" [*Scheinbarkeit*] of thought cannot be rejected in this way. But what Descartes wanted was that the thought have not only an apparent reality, but a reality in itself. (NL 1887, 10[158], KSA 12: 549)[12]

Nikolaos Loukidelis brings to our attention that what Nietzsche knew from the canonical works of Descartes (*Discours de la méthode*, *Meditationes*, *Principia Philosophiae*) was most probably from secondary sources.[13] One should also bear in mind that Nietzsche had read neither the Sixth Meditation, nor *The Pas-sions of the Soul* (1649), nor the correspondence with Elisabeth of Bohemia and the French diplomat Pierre Chanut – these being precisely the texts in which Des-cartes elaborates a non-dualistic account of self-consciousness (see Descartes 2015).

 As we know, the claim that both substances form a union and interact with one another (see the Sixth Meditation and the letters from and to Elisabeth from

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12 NL 1887, 10[158], KSA 12: 549: "'Es wird gedacht: folglich giebt es Denkendes': darauf läuft die argumentatio des Cartesius hinaus. Aber das heißt, unsern Glauben an den Substanzbegriff schon als 'wahr a priori' ansetzen: daß, wenn gedacht wird, es etwas geben muß, 'das denkt', ist aber einfach eine Formulirung unserer grammatischen Gewöhnung, welche zu einem Thun einen Thäter setzt. Kurz, es wird hier bereits ein logisch-metaphysisches Postulat gemacht – und nicht nur constatirt ... Auf dem Wege des Cartesius kommt man nicht zu etwas absolut Gewissem, sondern nur zu einem Faktum eines sehr starken Glaubens Reduzirt man den Satz auf 'es wird gedacht, folglich giebt es Gedanken' so hat man eine bloße Tautologie: und gerade das, was in Frage steht die 'Realität des Gedankens' ist nicht berührt, – nämlich in dieser Form ist die 'Schein-barkeit' des Gedankens nicht abzuweisen. Was aber Cartesius wollte, ist, daß der Gedanke nicht nur eine scheinbare Realität hat, sondern an sich."
13 Loukidelis brings further evidence that Nietzsche read the *Meditations* via Ueberweg's *Grun-driss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 3. Teil (*Die Neuzeit*), also from A. Spir, *Denken und Wirklich-keit. Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie*, 1877, from E. Dühring, *Natürliche Dialek-tik*, 1865. See Loukidelis 2005: 300 – 309, here in particular 303 – 306.

May and June 1643[14]), and that the soul's desire of knowledge is explained in terms of a passion (*admiration*), and finally that the soul can only have an indirect control over the body's power. Descartes also recognises in the Treatise on the passions that we do have a limited knowledge of bodily movements.[15] Bearing this in mind, it is possible to conjecture that the Cartesian account of the Self as a union of soul and body, which can only be perceived in a confused way through the senses, is not as foreign to Nietzsche's account of the Self as one could expect. Admittedly, my point is speculative, as there is to my knowledge no document indicating that Nietzsche did read the *Passions de l'âme*. Moreover Nietzsche might have disagreed with the *Passions*, had he read it.

A less hypothetical point about the relevance of going back to Descartes in order to understand Nietzsche's conception of the Self better is the fact that, despite the greater disagreement from 1885 onward of Nietzsche with Descartes' epistemology, Nietzsche praises in *The Antichrist* the temerity of Descartes' theory of animals. In Nietzsche's eyes the French scientist has paved the way for a better understanding of the body as a self-regulated machine.[16]

> We have learned better. We have become more modest in every respect. We no longer trace the origin of man in the "spirit", in the "divinity", we have placed him back among the animals. [...] As regards the animals, Descartes was the first who, with a boldness worthy of reverence, ventured to think of the animal as a machine: our whole science of physiology is devoted to proving this proposition. Nor, logically, do we exclude man, as even Descartes did [...]. (A 14)[17]

The details of Descartes' use of the model of the automaton for his physiology cannot be explained in this article.[18] It is however important to keep in mind that the debate in early modern philosophy about the status of animals was ongoing,

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14 See AT III: 660–668, 683–685, 690–695. For an English translation of the full correspondence between Descartes and Elisabeth, see Shapiro 2007. For the letters from 1643 on the union between soul and body, see in particular pp. 59–71.

15 See for instance Brown 2006, Canziani 1999: 67–91 and Wienand/Ribordy 2013: 142–159.

16 See in particular G. Campioni, "Nietzsche, Descartes und der französische Geist" in: Campioni 2009: 40–45.

17 KSA 6: 180: "Wir haben umgelernt. Wir sind in allen Stücken bescheidner geworden. Wir leiten den Menschen nicht mehr vom 'Geist', von der 'Gottheit' ab, wir haben ihn unter die Thiere zurückgestellt. [...] Was die Thiere betrifft, so hat zuerst Descartes, mit verehrungswürdiger Kühnheit, den Gedanken gewagt, das Thier als machina zu verstehn: unsre ganze Physiologie bemüht sich um den Beweis dieses Satzes. Auch stellen wir logischer Weise den Menschen nicht bei Seite, wie noch Descartes that [...]."

18 See F. de Buzon's illuminating essay "L'homme et le langage chez Montaigne et Descartes" (De Buzon 1992: 451–466).

since Montaigne had argued that the difference between animals and humans was not of essence, but of degree (see Montaigne 1962: 415–466). In the fifth Part of the *Discourse*,[19] Descartes reacts against Montaigne by claiming that animals cannot speak mainly because they are deprived of a mind.[20] Nietzsche shows a distinct interest for his own thinking on physiology, in particular on the issue whether the naturalist account is adequate to explaining how human beings act.[21]

Finally, one can add that both Descartes and Nietzsche think about their own Self in a similar way. We recognise in both the awareness with which they perceive their double task of *dismissing* the very principles of almost the entire tradition of philosophy and *setting* up new ones. Thus, Nietzsche and Descartes present themselves as *ego contra omnes*: both are in a permanent conflict with the scholastic tradition in the case of Descartes, and with modern philosophy in the case of Nietzsche.[22] *Ego* supra omnes, they present themselves also as the first thinkers who have overcome their teachers and their own prejudices.

Summing up, Descartes' metaphysics and epistemology constitute an important source for Nietzsche in working out a more "careful", less "superficial" account of the Self. Similarly, Cartesian physiology permits him to develop his naturalistic account of agency. As for Descartes' psychology, it is not attested that Nietzsche was familiar with it. Had he been, it is possible that he would have agreed with the Cartesian claim of the union of soul and body as well as with his analysis of the phenomenon of the passions.

2 Writing from the first-person perspective

Descartes is an important (anti-)model for the tradition of writing philosophy in the first-person. However, the *Discourse* does not inaugurate this literary form in

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19 See this famous passage from the *Discourse* (AT VI: 57): "For it is quite remarkable that there are no men so dull-witted [*hébétés*] or stupid – and this includes even madmen [*insensés*] – that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance from them in order to make their thoughts understood [*fassent entendre leurs pensées*]; whereas there is no other animal, however perfect and well-endowed [*heureusement né*] it may be, that can do the like." See also the commentary of Gilson, in: Gilson 1925: 423–429. (Translations of Descartes according to Descarte (2008), unless otherwise indicated).

20 See for example Des Chene 2001.

21 On this question, see the clarifying chapter of Robert Pippin, "'L'agir est tout'. Nietzsche et le sujet", in Pippin 2006: 141–175.

22 See A. Camus, "Nietzsche et le nihilisme" in: Camus 1951: 92: "Instead of the methodical doubt, Nietzsche has practiced the methodical negation, the careful [*appliquée*] destruction of all that still hides [*masque*] nihilism from itself [...] He has written, in his own way the *Discourse on the method* of his time [...]." (My translation)