


Emmanuel Godin and
Natalya Vince (eds)

France and the Mediterranean

International Relations,
Culture and Politics

Peter Lang



Modern French Identities

This multidisciplinary edited volume examines wide-ranging exchanges between France and its Mediterranean neighbours and their impact. It questions the changing notion of a Mediterranean space and its representation, centrality and relevance in terms of France's international relations under Sarkozy's presidency, from the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean and its complex articulations with the European Union's own agenda in the region, to the tortuous relations with Libya, made even more complicated by the 2011 'Arab Spring'. Beyond the realm of state relations and formal policy networks, the volume examines the crucial role played by diasporas, the interplay between postcolonial and transnational representations in the fields of cultural diplomacy, cinema and architecture, and considers how these can produce merged or hybrid identities. Later in the collection, the politics of ethnicity in post-war France, the interplay between negative perceptions of Islam and the changing memory of the Algerian War, and the evolution of Franco-Algerian relations since 1962 are used to question the weight of the colonial past when analysing the relations between France and North Africa.

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France and the Mediterranean

Modern **F**rench **I**dentities

Edited by Peter Collier

Volume 86



PETER LANG

Oxford • Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Wien

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For George and Patricia Vince

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Acknowledgements

We first submitted this book to Peter Lang on 13 January 2011. The next day, President Ben Ali was forced to flee Tunisia with part of his family and found refuge in Saudi Arabia. Throughout the Arab world, protests (as in Algeria and Morocco), 'revolutions' (as in Tunisia and Egypt), civil war (Libya) and ferocious repression (Syria) have extensively altered the political contexts of countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. On its northern shores the impact of what is now referred to as the Arab Spring have been no less consequential: France, as other European countries, has had to find ways to ensure that her past support for Arab dictators and their regime did not damage her influence and interests in the Mediterranean.

The Arab spring has thus compelled us to revise the volume we first submitted in January 2011 and if it is too early to draw unambiguous conclusions about how Franco-Mediterranean relations have been altered since January 2011, we hope that it will provide some insights into the complex relations that France and the French entertain with the Mediterranean at many different levels.

The Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France (ASMCF), the French Embassy, London, and the Centre for European and International Studies Research (CEISR) at the University of Portsmouth offered their generous financial and logistic support to organise the 2009 ASMCF conference on 'France and the Mediterranean'. This conference provided the intellectual impetus for the completion of this volume. As such, we would like to thank Professor Máire Cross (ASMCF president), Professor Philippe Lane (attaché for higher education at the French embassy in London), and Professor Tony Chafer (director of CEISR) for their encouragement and support.

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Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
ACSE	Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances
AIF	Agence intergouvernementale de la Francophonie
ALECSO	Arab League Education, Cultural and Scientific Organisation
ALF	Anna Lindh Foundation
ASAF	Association soutien à l'armée française
BMVR	Bibliothèque Municipale à Vocation Régionale
BNF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France
CCFL	Chambre de Commerce Franco-Lybiennne
CDCAFN	Cercle pour la défense des combattants d'Afrique française du Nord
CDM	Comité de Défense des Marseillais
CEA	Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique
CFDT	Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail
CIEEMG	Commission Interministérielle pour l'Étude des Exportations de Matériel de Guerre
CIMADE	Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des Evacués
CIRTEF	Conseil International des Radios et Télévisions francophones
CNC	Centre national de la cinématographie
CRI	Collectif des Rapatriés Internautes
CSCM	Conference for Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean
DGA	Délégation Générale de l'Armement

DGCID	Direction générale de la coopération internationale du développement
DOM-TOM	Départements d’Outre-Mer – Territoires d’Outre-Mer
EADS	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EGCM	Etats généraux culturels méditerranéens (Mediterranean Cultural Forum)
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENI	Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (<i>but not used as an acronym any more</i>)
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Operational Rapid Force
EUFOR/RCA	European Union Force in Central African Republic
FFPAVS	Fonds Francophone de Production Audiovisuelle du Sud
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
FN	Front National
FNACA	Fédération Nationale des Anciens Combattants d’Algérie
FTA	Free Trade Area
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armé
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRCICA	Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture
IREMAM	Institut de Recherches et d’Études du Monde Arabe et Musulman
ISESCO	Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
MCF	Mediterranean Cultural Forum (<i>Etats généraux culturels méditerranéens</i>)
MEDA	Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia
MENA	Mediterranean and North African [partners/ region]

MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MEPP	Middle Eastern Peace Process
MIR	Mouvement des indigènes de la République
MODEM	Mouvement Démocrate
MTA	Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation Armée Secrète
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIF	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
ONEC	Organisation des enfants de shuhada (martyrs)
ONM	Organisation nationale des mujahidin (combatants)
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
ORTF	Office de radiodiffusion-télévision française
PACA	Provence, Alpes, Côte d'Azur
PS	Parti Socialiste
SODEPAU	Solidaritat per al Desenvolupament i la Pau
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UDR	Union pour la Défense de la République
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UM	Union of the Mediterranean
UMP	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
UN	United Nations
UNC	Union Nationale de Combattants
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Introduction: France and the Mediterranean in 2011

On 27 February 2011 President Nicolas Sarkozy reshuffled the French cabinet. Justifying his ministerial choices in a seven-minute televised address, Sarkozy made the link between domestic politics and the ‘immense upheaval’ on the ‘other side of the Mediterranean’ explicit from the outset:

Arab peoples are taking their destiny in hand, overthrowing regimes which, having been agents of emancipation during the era of decolonization, had become instruments of servitude. Since the end of colonization, all Western states and successive French governments have maintained economic, diplomatic and political relations with these regimes, despite their authoritarian character, because in the eyes of all they seemed to be ramparts against religious extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism.¹

This *mea culpa* dispensed with, paralleling Sarkozy’s policy errors with those of his presidential predecessors and conveniently submerging French strategic myopia in shared Western responsibility, Sarkozy hailed a new era in France’s relations with North Africa:

This change is historic. We must not be afraid. It carries extraordinary hope because it has been accomplished in the name of our most precious values, human rights and democracy. For the first time in history, these can triumph on both sides of the Mediterranean.

1 ‘Allocution radiotélévisée du Président sur la situation internationale’, 27 February 2011, <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/discours/2011/allocution-radiotelevisee-du-president-sur-la-10756.html?search=allocution&xtmc=allocution&xcr=7> (accessed 1 October 2011).

If the mistakes of the past were collective, Sarkozy argued that France's historical and geographical ties with the region and unique civilizational message positions the *Hexagone* – and by inference Sarkozy – as a major player in a more radiant Mediterranean future. This special role is nevertheless to be realized not through bilateral relations but through multilateral instruments. In his reshuffle address, Sarkozy referred to a 'recasting' of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the much maligned French – and now European Union – initiative, which began life with the recently deposed Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak as joint president and the now beleaguered Syrian president Bashar al-Assad as special guest at both the July 2008 launch meeting and Paris's Bastille Day celebrations. Sarkozy also suggested in his speech recourse to the European Council for a collective response to stem the inevitable migratory flows resulting from the Arab Spring.

Despite Sarkozy's claims of historic change and a new era, there is little that lends itself better to analyses of continuity than French politicians – of all parties – claiming a new start. Nowhere is this perhaps more true than in the overlapping spheres of Franco-African, Franco-Mediterranean and Franco-Arab relations. Sarkozy's 2011 reshuffle speech encapsulates entrenched themes in French policymakers' – admittedly often hazy – conceptualizations of 'the Mediterranean': it is both a proximate space in which ambitious foreign policy can flourish and the worryingly close location of an invading 'other' which needs to be contained and controlled. Both these fantasies are of domestic importance, with the potential to garner electoral support for 'statesman-like' politicians and generate interminable media and political debate on immigration and national identity. The ministerial changes of 27 February and subsequent events – notably the Franco-British-led military involvement in Libya and Franco-Italian challenges to the Schengen agreement – have fuelled this French Mediterranean imaginary.

In the reshuffle, the foreign, defence and interior ministries changed hands – clearly demonstrating what Sarkozy believes to be the strategically important areas for both France in the world and Sarkozy in the 2012 elections. Notably, out went foreign minister Michèle Alliot-Marie, embroiled in scandal over her use of a private jet belonging to an ally of the deposed

Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali whilst on holiday, and under fire for her offer to the Tunisian and Algerian regimes of French 'savoir faire' in maintaining law and order.² In came Alain Juppé, judged a 'safe pair of hands' and notably a panacea for increasingly vocal criticisms, not least amongst diplomats and Quai d'Orsay civil servants, of the Elysée's ad-hoc and haphazard foreign policy making under Sarkozy.³ The controversial Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Codevelopment, created by Sarkozy in 2007, was disbanded and immigration reattached to the Ministry for the Interior, under the president's close adviser Claude Guéant, on the right of the right-wing Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP). Despite the death of the ministry, Sarkozy's flirtation with extreme-right discourse has thus continued, with Guéant declaring that 'uncontrolled immigration' has led to 'the French' sometimes not feeling 'at home' and referring to the French intervention in Libya as a 'crusade'.⁴

On the eve of the extraordinary European Council meeting on the Libyan situation on 11 March 2011, and with the help of public intellectual and media celebrity Bernard-Henri Lévy, Sarkozy scrambled to make France the first state to officially recognize the National Transitional Council of the anti-Gaddafi opposition. The move – symptomatic of the highly media-tized, voluntarist style of Sarkozy's 'hyper-presidency' – was apparently without the approval or knowledge of Juppé, at the time in Brussels.⁵ Both France and Britain initially attracted domestic plaudits for their military

2 E. Martin, 'Faut-il s'étonner du silence français?', *Un monde libre* (14 January 2011).

3 Marly group, 'La voix de la France a disparu dans le monde', *Le Monde* (22 February 2011). In 2010, two former foreign ministers, including Juppé, wrote an opinion piece for *Le Monde* in which they criticized the impact of budget cuts on the functioning of French diplomacy. A. Juppé and H. Védrine 'Cessez d'affaiblir le Quai d'Orsay!', *Le Monde* (7 July 2010).

4 'Immigration: Guéant suscite la polémique', *Europe 1*, 17 March 2011, <http://www.europe1.fr/Politique/Immigration-Gueant-suscite-la-polemique-458409/> (accessed 1 October 2011); 'Le Talk: Carl Meus reçoit Claude Guéant', 21 March 2011 <http://www.lefigaro.fr/le-talk/2011/03/21/01021-20110321ARTFIG00452-claude-gueant-invite-du-talk.php> (accessed 1 October 2011).

5 A. Cabana, 'Quand Juppé menace Sarkozy', *Le Point* (17 March 2011).

intervention in Libya on 19 March 2011 against the forces of Muammar Gaddafi, the long-time international pariah whom both countries had so recently rehabilitated. Ostensibly installing a no-fly zone and protecting civilians under UN resolution 1973, the novelty of this 'humanitarian' mission with no clear exit strategy quickly began to wear off.⁶ Germany was sceptical from the outset. Russia was highly critical of French admissions in late June of arming anti-Gaddafi forces, describing it as a 'serious violation' of UN resolution 1970.⁷ Sarkozy also – unsuccessfully – sought to resist NATO taking over the military command of the no-fly zone, despite the president's instrumental role in orchestrating France's reintegration into NATO's military command in 2009.⁸ On the international scene, Sarkozy is clearly seeking to regain the initiative as a credible and decisive player, legitimizing and rendering financially viable unilateral policy through multilateral instruments whilst simultaneously foregrounding France's precursory contribution in defining international action. This task is rendered all the more difficult by a plethora of other actors also seeking to give the appearance of redefining their foreign policy, including the United States, as demonstrated by Barack Obama in his 19 May speech on the Middle East and the EU, which on 29 June created the post of EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Region. Spanish diplomat Bernardino

- 6 The France Inter radio station press review on 18 March 2011 refers to plaudits in the *Daily Mail* (UK), *La Stampa* (Italy), the *Times of Malta* and *Le Figaro* (France) amongst others, <http://www.franceinter.fr/chro/larevuedepresse/102614> (accessed 1 October 2011). A survey of 1,006 French people aged over eighteen between 24 and 26 May 2011 showed that 55 per cent were in favour of military intervention in Libya, down from 66 per cent at the start of the intervention three months previously. Ifop for *Dimanche Ouest France*, 'L'approbation de l'intervention militaire en Libye', 26 May 2011, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1513-1-study_file.pdf (accessed 1 October 2011).
- 7 'Livraisons d'armes aux rebelles libyens: accords et désaccords', *L'Express* (1 July 2011).
- 8 K. Willsher, 'Sarkozy Opposes NATO Taking Control of Libya Operation', *The Guardian* (22 March 2011).

Leon was promptly selected to fill the post.⁹ The choice of a Spaniard for this role merits reflection. The freshly appointed secretary general of the UfM, Moroccan diplomat Youssef Amrani, officially welcomed the development; Algerian newspaper *Liberté* interpreted it as another obstacle to French attempts to shape policy in the region.¹⁰

As France rushed to bid adieu to selected North African *anciens régimes*, the border controls which Ben Ali and Gaddafi enforced for the EU collapsed. The Mediterranean Sea started to fill with ever-increasing numbers of migrants, with thousands arriving on the small Italian island of Lampedusa. A year away from 2012, the toxic tandem of immigration and crime, which dominated the 2002, and to a lesser extent 2007, presidential elections, was once again pushed to the fore. Seeking to capitalize on favourable poll showings and having already argued that France should pass bilateral agreements with Spain and Italy in order to ‘push back into international waters migrants who want to enter Europe,’ Front National leader and MEP Marine Le Pen visited Lampedusa on 14 March. Accompanied by Mario Borghezio, an Italian MP and member of the right-wing anti-immigrant Lega Nord, Le Pen attacked what she described as the European failure to deal with the problem.¹¹ As the Italian authorities on the mainland issued migrants with

9 Obama’s Middle East speech, 19 May 2011. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8083250.stm> (accessed 1 October 2011); ‘Catherine Ashton Proposes Bernardino Leon as New EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Region’ (29 June 2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123285.pdf (accessed 1 October 2011).

10 Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, ‘Secretary General Amb. Amrani: “The Secretariat stands ready to work in close co-operation ...”’ (8 July 2011), <http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/secretary-general-amb-amrani-the-secretariat-stands-ready-to-work-in-close-cooperation-with-both-the-eu-special-representative-and-the-task-force-to-promote-joint-regional-projects/> (accessed 1 October 2011); D. Bouatta, ‘Union pour la Méditerranée: UE saborde les efforts du président français,’ *Liberté* (11 July 2011).

11 ‘Marine Le Pen, président du Front National, “On peut repousser humainement des bateaux dans les eaux internationales”,’ *RTL* (1 March 2011), <http://www.rtl.fr/emission/l-invite-de-rtl/ecouter/marine-le-pen-presidente-du-front-national-on-peut-repousser-humainement-des-bateaux-dans-les-eaux-internationales-766451303>

temporary visas, many began to make their way to France, where they had family ties and/or linguistic knowledge. Franco-Italian tensions reached a critical point, and France began to make noises about the temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement. On 26 April 2011, Sarkozy and the Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi sent a joint letter to the presidents of the European Council and European Commission demanding a revision of Schengen. On 4 May the European Commission published a document suggesting the Schengen agreements could be temporarily suspended under 'very exceptional circumstances' although the mechanisms for enabling this continue to be debated.¹² The salience of populist discourse and policies on immigration on both sides of the Alps indicates that this is not solely a French phenomenon and that 'le Sarkozysme' may not be a French specificity.¹³ In a broader context, the EU and its founding principles of free exchange and free movement are currently being pushed to their limits by crises in the Mediterranean region, not just in North Africa and the Middle East, but also on the EU's own Mediterranean shores with the spectre of economic collapse in Greece and its potential impact on the Eurozone.

The first versions of the chapters in this volume were all written before the momentous events of 2011 and where appropriate they have been revised accordingly. It is impossible at this stage to judge the full impact of the Arab Spring, but developments so far have highlighted the pertinence of the key themes which this volume engages with: ruptures and continuities in French discourse and policy in 'the Mediterranean', the exceptionalism or otherwise of French action and relations in the region and the ability or desire of nation-states on either side of the Mediterranean to function outside of the global economic system and/or international organizations such as NATO, EU, UN and IMF. The Arab Spring has also highlighted

(accessed 1 October 2011); 'Opération communication pour Marine Le Pen à Lampedusa', *Le Monde* (14 March 2011).

12 Y. Pascouau, 'Internal Border Controls in the Schengen Area: Much Ado About Nothing?', *European Policy Centre* (28 June 2011), http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1309_internal_border_controls_in_the_schengen_area_-_much_ado_about_nothing.pdf (accessed 1 October 2011).

13 N. Hewlett, *The Sarkozy Phenomenon* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011).

the importance of using frameworks of analysis which go beyond state-level relations. Alliot-Marie's misreading of the Tunisian situation was symptomatic of a wider European and North American obsession, accentuated in the past decade, with securing commercial and security interests, paying little attention to the growing gulf between rulers and the ruled across North Africa and the Middle East. Authoritarian rulers had also demonstrated their ability to speak the same language of commercial exchange, immigration control and anti-Islamism. After a decade of popular, political and sometimes academic discourse in which North African youth had two dominant and often intersecting manifestations – the illegal migrant and/or Islamist radical – it is perhaps of little surprise that US and European governments were taken off guard by an apparently leaderless movement whose frames of reference were not couched in terms of their attitudes towards 'the West', either as Eldorado or infidel. This volume thus also places an emphasis on 'bottom up' approaches to understanding 'France in the Mediterranean', including the perspectives of non-elite south Mediterranean actors and cultural and social networks operating at local as well as European and transnational levels.

What is the Mediterranean?

One of the key conceptual themes which this volume seeks to engage with is the idea of the Mediterranean, its multiple meanings in political and cultural discourses as well as its usefulness as a framework for analysis. What does the Mediterranean mean? For whom? In which contexts? Taking a long historical perspective, Jean-Yves Moisseron and Manar Ezzat Bayoumi argue in their chapter that the Mediterranean is a concept produced by the north which has little resonance on southern shores, apart from as an instrumental tool to acquire EU funding. For the populations of the southern shore – as opposed to its elites – the somewhat lyrical invocations of a common Mediterranean culture remain largely abstract, if not

irrelevant. Moisseron and Ezzat Bayoumi suggest that the 'Arab World' or the 'Muslim World' may provide more appropriate frameworks of analysis and alternative geographical schematizations to 'the Mediterranean', which appeals first and foremost to a Westernized elite.

Jean-Robert Henry argues that whilst in the Arab world a French *politique arabe* is a meaningful and useful term, equated with pro-Arab positions, the concept of a 'Mediterranean' policy 'sells' better to France's European partners. One might also argue that *la politique arabe* is perceived as a compromise between 'disreputable regimes' whilst 'Mediterranean policy' could be conceived of as a form of increased rapprochement with Israel, presented as 'the only democracy in the Middle East'. In the following chapter, Ivano Bruno demonstrates that it is now impossible to think of France's position in the Mediterranean without taking into account the EU's Mediterranean policy framework. Without denying that bilateral relations remain crucial to articulate and support France's objectives in the region, Bruno analyses how France has used the EU as a complementary, if not more efficient track, to realize her Mediterranean ambition and to extend her influence well beyond a 'Maghrebi Mediterranean' when seeking, for instance, closer relations with Egypt, or engaging with regional actors such as the African Union. The objectives of such a policy may be understood as a desire to readjust the balance of power within the EU, with France contesting Spain's claims to leadership in the field, and seeking in the south the sort of influence that Germany has carved for herself in the east since 1989. Analysing the renewal of Franco-Libyan relations between 2003 and 2010 in the final chapter of Part I, David Styan emphasizes that the Mediterranean is a fairly poor conceptual tool. During this period, Gaddafi's pan-African geopolitical objectives partly converged with French defence and foreign policy objectives in Africa, such as in Chad and Sudan, and French relations with Libya, notably on issues of security and immigration, were also part of a wider European agenda. As such, European and African policy frameworks may be more useful and indeed, more important, than French and Mediterranean ones. The increasing involvement of actors external to North Africa, the Middle East and their immediate neighbours – including China, Russia and the United States – also needs to be taken into account. 'The Mediterranean' is thus a contested concept, but rather than dismissing

it as a category of analysis, this volume seeks to examine why and how it is contested and elucidate what insights this gives us into the intersections of different types of actors in a loosely defined 'region'.

Ruptures and Continuities in French Foreign Policy

Sarkozy's 2007 presidential election campaign was based on the theme of 'rupture' in domestic and foreign policy. Henry, Styan and Bruno offer contrasting diagnostics, but agree that this rupture has failed to materialize; instead, they insist on the continuity between Sarkozy's objectives and those of previous presidents. In this respect, Styan maintains, long-term perspectives bring to the fore the essential tenets of France's objectives in the Mediterranean and beyond, that too strong a focus on initiatives well publicized by the media fail to capture. Sarkozy – and his special adviser Henri Guaino – hastily enunciated a Mediterranean policy without much thought or coherence, and France and other European states' reluctance to dissuade Israel from its January 2009 Gaza offensive threw the project into disarray almost immediately. The fact that France, its fellow European countries and the EU as an institution all seemed to have been caught on the back foot by the revolts in spring 2011 has done little to strengthen their credibility as proactive – rather than reactive – players in the region. In the end, Sarkozy's Mediterranean initiatives from the UfM to the present are interesting because they provide insights into the president's policymaking and discursive style. Certainly, Sarkozy's relationship with the region is less personalized than that of his predecessor Jacques Chirac, whose network of contacts with heads of state of often unsavoury regimes has been characterized as openly paternalistic rather than part of any foreign policy grand strategy.¹⁴ In his chapter Gérald Arboit emphasizes that we

14 See E. Aeschimann and C. Boltanski, *Chirac d'Arabie* (Paris: Grasset, 2006), and A. Youssef, *L'Orient de Jacques Chirac: la politique arabe de la France* (Paris: Editions

should carefully examine who discourses are aimed at and the domestic contexts in which they develop. He explains that France's tendency to develop enthusiastic discourses about her 'special mission in the service of humanity' is particularly acute when a sense of national insecurity and decline prevail. He argues that France's Mediterranean cultural policy is also a means to project at home a sense of universal grandeur, a discursive performance which bears little relation to what is actually happening on the ground, as foreign policy objectives and a lack of funding put severe limits to France's Mediterranean *rayonnement*.

Human Ties: Migration and Memory

A Braudelian approach of the Mediterranean questions the usual dichotomy between centre and periphery, north and south, national and local and prefers to stress the density of networks which mediate exchanges across the Mediterranean.¹⁵ In this volume, Jane-Robert Henry contrasts the relative mediocrity of exchanges between Mediterranean states with the richness of relations linking individuals and communities on each side of the sea. What gives substance and warmth to the Mediterranean are the manifold human relations which have been woven across the Mediterranean at a personal level (mixed marriages for instance) and through the creation of numerous Franco-Maghrebi associations, creating what Henry terms a transnational Franco-Maghrebi community. The aspirations and strategies of such a community are at odds with Fortress Europe which leads, Henry argues, to a form of 'mild apartheid'.

du Rocher, 2003). For more on the question of rupture and continuity between Chirac and Sarkozy see M. Vaïsse, *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958* (Paris: Fayard, 2009).

15 I. Malkin, 'Introduction', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 18/2 (2003), 1–8.

Migration across the Mediterranean, indeed, has become a major obsession on each side of the sea. On the southern shores, young people in particular are often desperate to cross the Mediterranean and are looking to Europe for the promise of a better life whereas on the northern shores, populist and extreme-right parties fan anti-immigrant feeling. One of the major changes which has taken place in terms of France's relationship with the Mediterranean in the postcolonial period is the shift in discourse on immigration, which has gone from being a technocratic issue in the 1960s and 1970s to one of the main themes structuring French and European political debate since the late 1980s. Focusing on Marseille's chequered history as a Mediterranean melting pot, Ed Naylor's chapter provides insights into the politics of postcolonial immigration in 1970s France. He illustrates how socialist mayor Gaston Defferre was a precursor in this politicization and the emergence of a racialized 'immigration question', likening immigration to 'a system which resembles both colonialism and the invasion of France'.

The extent to which France's colonial past on the southern shore of the Mediterranean explains the importance of anti-immigrant feeling today is discussed within the volume. Drawing on the work of Benjamin Stora, Bruno Levasseur explains the demonizing images of the 'ethnic other' as a consequence of French society failing to come to terms with its colonial past. On the other hand, Natalya Vince argues that discourses on immigration in France are the product of manifold contexts which cannot be reduced simply to the 'colonial fracture': other frames of reference – such as the 1979 Iranian revolution, the end of the Cold War, European integration, globalization and 11 September 2001 – are just as important for understanding the development of anti-immigrant discourses across Europe. Migrations across the Mediterranean have prompted the development of anti-immigrant discourses, but these are not necessarily grounded in a colonial past. Neither does such a colonial past provide the only framework to explain the nature of relations that (North African) colonies entertain with France and with their own memory. Vince shows that a generation of younger Algerians has 'a perception of the war [of independence, 1954–62] which is far removed from its anti-colonial context': on the contrary, they have a 'tendency to "rewrite" the Algerian War

as a primarily religious, rather than anti-colonial, struggle'. In doing so, the focus within the Mediterranean shifts from its northern shores to the Middle East. So-called 'memory wars' – notably those which have re-emerged in France in the past decade over the events of the Algerian War – can be seen as less revealing of the impact of the colonial period on the post-independence relationship between two nation states and instead tell us more about internal Franco-French and Algero-Algerian tensions and divisions which are only partly linked to colonial history.

In his analysis of how French veterans of the Algerian War recount the conflict in the contemporary context, Andrea Brazzoduro explores the multiple and shifting frames of reference which shape their narratives. These include 'tendencies which seem common on a European if not worldwide scale' – such as informants' insistence on their youthfulness, and, it is implied, lack of responsibility, in the events they describe – and themes which can be located more precisely, 'linked to the recent French political mood' and social context – such as Sarkozy's insistence on a 'rupture' with colonial repentance.¹⁶ Further, by drawing our attention to the growing importance attached to Islam in the way French veterans of the Algerian War today redefine their past struggles, Brazzoduro suggests that colonialism is not the only available frame of reference which can be used to decrypt the making and remaking of relations across the Mediterranean. This volume presents some material and ideas which it is hoped will enable readers to question some core concepts at the heart of postcolonial theory, such as memory transfer, the colonial fracture and hybridity.

16 With regards to Sarkozy's (often inconsistent) attitudes towards history and memory and his proclaimed rejection of the politics of repentance, see his controversial speech at the Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, Senegal, on 26 July 2007, available on the website of LDH Toulon <http://www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article2173> (accessed 1 October 2011), and his Tangiers discourse on the Mediterranean delivered on 23 October 2007, in which he declared: 'We will not construct the Union for the Mediterranean upon repentance, no more than Europe has been built upon atonement and repentance', <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Discours-du-President-Sarkozy-sur.html> (accessed 1 October 2011).

Culture and Postcoloniality

Hybridity is central to the argument developed by Mary Bonham, who, through an analysis of Marseille's Bibliothèque Municipale à Vocation Régionale, seeks to explain what a Mediterranean culture may be and how it can 'speak to multiple or merged cultural identities without becoming a pastiche of styles and symbols'. In doing so, Bonham explores the integrative – if not universal – quality of a Mediterranean culture. Conversely, Arboit argues that the multiplication of places where different cultures meet around the Mediterranean does not necessarily elucidate the nature of a Mediterranean culture: focusing on the Ateliers culturels méditerranéens as a tool of France's Mediterranean cultural policy, Arboit demonstrates that as a meeting point for – rather than of – different cultures of the Mediterranean basin, they do not fundamentally engage with the question of whether a Mediterranean culture actually exists either as a transcendent or hybrid culture: they are nevertheless politically useful to undermine both a Huntington-esque 'clash of civilizations' and Eurocentric concepts of culture. Likewise, in France, Levasseur argues, French left-wing *artistes engagés* have also relentlessly questioned the centrality of French republican universal values: their promotion of cultural hybridity instead provides a hospitable and convivial strategy to open the Republic to the ethnic other and to transcend the politics of race and ethnicity. Not everyone would agree on the value to ascribe to the politics of hybridity. Its radicalism may in fact mask the last avatar of a liberal position, a position which is not too different from Camus's Mediterranean humanism.¹⁷ Margaret Majumdar points out that hybridity downplays the very experience of colonial domination:

17 N. Foxlee, 'Mediterranean Humanism or Colonialism with a Human Face? Contextualizing Albert Camus's "The New Mediterranean culture"', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 21/1 (2006), 77–97.

It is often the case that notions of hybridity have been assumed within an ideological stance, which would have us believe that there are no fundamental differences and opposition any more, that everything is on a par, of equal value and that the divisions between 'us' and 'them' are no longer credible, if they ever were. The history of the colonial period is rewritten to emphasize mutual influences and interactions and to downplay the binary dialectic of opposites as a figure of the colonial relations of domination and struggle.¹⁸

Yet hybridity is also a useful starting point to revisit and interrogate how binary divisions may or may not function. In her discussion of cinemas of the Maghreb, Patricia Caillé highlights the importance of interrogating our categories of analysis. 'Cinemas of the Maghreb', she argues, does not refer to a common source of film financing, production and circulation, nor does it represent a particular type of authorial voice or aesthetic style. Instead, 'Cinemas of the Maghreb' is used to describe films which engage in a certain number of themes, notably the condition of Maghrebi women, which in turn tends to attract commercial success on French and European shores. One example she uses is the reception of Tunisian director Moufida Tlatli's historical epic *The Silences of the Palace* (1994) in France. Clearly sensitive to present-day concerns about Islam, the 'Maghrebi family' and in particular the Muslim-Maghrebi woman in France, French audiences foreground the Tunisian female protagonists' battle against patriarchal oppression whilst marginalizing the ongoing struggle against colonial rule which is a key theme in the film. This gendered reading of Maghrebi society does not, as Caillé emphasizes, necessarily represent how female film-makers in these countries see themselves – many are resistant to the category of Maghrebi female film-makers, fearing 'being trapped in a gender and/or regional ghetto'. Thus, films produced in Tunisia, Morocco or Algeria are more likely to be seen in France than in a neighbouring Maghrebi country. In terms of a collective filmic identity, Pan-African cinema has a far greater online presence and film festival circuit than 'Cinemas of the Maghreb'. Between

18 M. Majumdar, *Postcoloniality: The French Dimension* (London and New York: Berghahn, 2007), 255.

European and African audiences, political, aesthetic and commercial demands, the southern shore of the Mediterranean finds it difficult to define its own cultural space.

The volume takes an multidisciplinary approach to question the multiple and complex set of relations across the Mediterranean and seeks to de-romanticize the subject by highlighting the ways in which the Mediterranean and France appear to be partly de-centred in a world where other spaces have become equally if not more important: Europe, Africa and the Arab-Muslim world. Furthermore, beyond relations between states, the changing set of relations between civil societies on each side of the Mediterranean are better understood at the local level and here, the two chapters on Marseille reveal both their complexity and ambiguity. The political reactions in France to the 2011 Arab Spring have highlighted that the Mediterranean region remains of strategic importance, but they also raise questions about the relevance of our categories of analysis. What differences are there, if at all, between an Arab and Mediterranean policy? Do countries with a border on the Mediterranean Sea have a definable 'Mediterranean character' or should we instead conceptualize the region as a series of concentric circles around the Middle East with the Mediterranean as a wider, and more diluted, category? Where is French 'Mediterranean' policy made and by whom? How has the relationship between the Elysée and the Quai d'Orsay shifted? How do the Elysée and Quai d'Orsay interact with other policy actors and complex networks, ranging from civil society to supra-national institutions such as the EU and the African Union within complex multilateral and bilateral relations? Is there more continuity than rupture between the policies pursued by Sarkozy in the region and those of his presidential predecessors? The Arab Spring has also demonstrated strong French interest in countries with whom it shares no colonial history, emphasizing the importance of analysing Franco-Mediterranean relations beyond the French colonial presence in the Maghreb, and notably beyond Franco-Algerian relations.

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PART I

International Relations: France and the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean: A Contested Concept

Over the past five decades, the Mediterranean has become the central reference for European public policy. The reinforced Mediterranean policy, the Barcelona Process, the New Neighbourhood Policy, and more recently the Union for the Mediterranean, all use and function within this geographical framework which appears to be obvious and completely organic.

However, in contrast with the overall scope and depth of integration achieved by the EU over the past fifty years, Euro-Mediterranean regional ambitions seem to have been thwarted by recurring difficulties and the results remain rather modest, if not outright disappointing. The reasons for this slow Euro-Mediterranean regional integration are widely documented¹ and it is not the objective of this chapter to discuss them any further. Rather, this chapter will seek to demonstrate that a partial responsibility for this failure finds its precise origins in the way in which the Mediterranean has been conceptualized, represented and used as a legitimate geographical framework to structure European public policy. It is our contention that the way the Mediterranean is conceptualized, as an obvious, given and organic geographical framework to determine and organize the parameters of European initiatives and policies, is based on a myth. As such, it acts as a veil, masking and obstructing the region's fundamental issues and making it difficult to find realistic and operative solutions to these challenges. In particular, to rely on such a Mediterranean myth often leads decision-makers to ignore the true dynamics of the area, upon which the construction of a common space between Europe and the Arab World could be possible. As Jean-Robert Henry argues: 'This myth

1 J.Y. Moisseron, *Le partenariat euroméditerranéen: l'échec d'une ambition régionale* (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble 2005).