

# Warriors after War

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Indian and Pakistani Retired Military  
Leaders Reflect on Relations between the  
Two Countries, Past, Present and Future

Richard Bonney, Tridivesh Singh Maini  
and Tahir Malik (eds)

The inspiration for this book arose from the opening of the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus route on 7 April 2005, the first direct link between the two parts of divided Kashmir since 1947. The original impetus for change in the region arose not from politicians but from ex-military figures in Pakistan and India who had made a direct approach to the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), an independent, not-for-profit organization in the United States headed by former US Ambassador John W. McDonald. Most of the twenty-six retired military figures from India and Pakistan interviewed in this book accept that with both countries possessing nuclear weapons since 1998, choosing war to resolve outstanding disputes is no longer a sensible or realistic option. They differ greatly, however, in their analysis of the opportunities and pathways towards a sustainable peace in South Asia, with the greatest divergence of views on the Kashmir dispute. The material contained in the interviews is enhanced with biographical and other notes, along with a comprehensive introduction and conclusion. The detailed Appendices provide an analysis of religious-based extremist violence in Kashmir and Pakistan.

‘India and Pakistan have fought three wars since the Partition of the Subcontinent in 1947, but because of a shared history and culture, there are similarities between the two armies. *Warriors after War* is a fascinating collection that illustrates this remarkable bond and underlines the need to humanize each other and work towards a more peaceful South Asia.’

– Ambassador Akbar Ahmed, Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies,  
American University, Washington, DC

‘This is a timely study, which illuminates key episodes in India and Pakistan’s enduring rivalry since 1947 [...]. The extensive interviews with twenty-six former Indian and Pakistani officers reveal the centrality and intractability of the Kashmir issue for regional peace. The interviews are enhanced with biographical notes along with a comprehensive introduction and conclusion.’

– Professor Ian Talbot, Head of History, University of Southampton

**RICHARD BONNEY’s** recent publications include *Jihad: from Qur’an to Bin Laden* (2004), *False Prophets: the Clash of Civilizations and the Global War on Terror* (Peter Lang, 2008) and *Confronting the Nazi War on Christianity. The Kulturkampf Newsletters, 1936–9* (Peter Lang, 2009).

**TAHIR MALIK** and **TRIDIVESH SINGH MAINI** previously collaborated in *Humanity Amidst Insanity: Hope During and After the Indo-Pak Partition* (2008).



# **Warriors after War**

# Studies in the History of Religious and Political Pluralism

## Volume 6

Edited by Richard Bonney



PETER LANG

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Lieutenant-General Sondh, Commandant Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun, exchanging mementoes with Major-General Wajahat Husain at the First Post-war Regular Course Golden Jubilee Reunion in December 1996.



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## General Editor's Introduction

This unique set of interviews with Indian and Pakistani ex-military figures focuses on the wars of 1947–8, 1965 and 1971, as well as the short Kargil ‘war’<sup>1</sup> of 1999 and prompts reflection as to whether conflict between India and Pakistan has been, and continues to be, inevitable or whether the cycle of violence can be halted. A key underlying question is whether the poison that was generated by the British-imposed Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 is still working its way through the system of international relations in South Asia.

## The Legacy of Partition

Partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 remains a deeply controversial episode in the process of decolonization and the development of the successor states to the British Raj.<sup>2</sup> The Punjab was where the task of partition was most complex to implement, where the greater part of the violence took place – because there were three and not just two competing

1 Many commentators regard Kargil as a ‘conflict’ or ‘near war’ because total battlefield deaths may not have exceeded the 1,000 figure which is the classical definition of war as an armed conflict.

2 Joya Chatterji, ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier: the Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 1947–1952,’ *Modern Asian Studies*, 33/1 (1999), 185–242. Lucy Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

religions – and where most of the migration of the population in both directions was centred. Moreover, there had been no earlier partition of the Punjab, whereas Bengal had experienced this once before, between 1905 and 1911.

In June 1947, Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed by the British government as the chairman of two boundary commissions, one for Punjab, the other for Bengal. He did not arrive in India until 8 July and was given just five weeks to determine upon a frontier between independent India and the new federal state of West and East Pakistan. Lucy Chester argues that ‘Radcliffe played a greater role in Punjab than in Bengal. In Bengal the final line followed the Congress Plan closely. In Punjab, however, Radcliffe’s line differed significantly from each of the major proposals ... The Punjab parties’ extensive demands had the ironic effect of diminishing their influence over the final boundary and of increasing the importance of the chairman’s role.’<sup>3</sup>

The British, the Congress Party and the Muslim League had, for different reasons, a common purpose, which was to rush through Partition as quickly as possible in 1947. None of the politicians seems to have appreciated that a full-scale movement of population would become difficult to stop. Nehru noted, ‘we saw the fires burning in the Punjab and heard every day of the killings.’ But the plan for partition ‘offered a way out and we took it’. Some small movement of people might be needed to make the boundary workable, but ‘this need not [have] involve[d] any major transfers of population,’ he argued.<sup>4</sup>

The odd ones out among the politicians were the Sikh parties, who realized too late how much they had to lose from partition. They alone claimed that a significant transfer of population would be needed to secure their interests, but failed to win the argument. The Panthic Assembly Party, the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Panthic Pratindhi Board petitioned on 12–14 June 1947 ‘for the transfer of Hindu

3 Chester, *Borders and Conflict*, 196–7.

4 Ibid., 51, 62.

and Sikh populations and property from the western part of the Punjab to the eastern part after partition has been effected on an equitable basis'.<sup>5</sup>

In a meeting with the governor of Punjab, Sir Evan Jenkins, Giani Kartar Singh stated on 10 July 1947 that 'there must be an exchange of population on a large scale. Were the British ready to enforce this? He doubted if they were ...' He added that 'Sikhs should be moved to the East and 400,000 Muslims to the West (later in the conversation he said that the number of Sikhs would be 500,000 or 600,000 and the numbers of Muslims about one million; property as well as population should be taken into account in the exchange and the Sikhs [we]re on the whole better off than the Muslims)'.<sup>6</sup> The subsequent comments of the leading nationalist politicians that they had never imagined that Partition could lead to such a massive movement of the population in the two directions are therefore substantially untrue. Mountbatten knew for certain, and it is inconceivable that Jinnah<sup>7</sup> and Nehru were unaware of the dangers.

International opinion, especially American, was of importance to Mountbatten who sought to place responsibility for the transfer of power upon the South Asian politicians, with the partition awarding process perceived as objective as possible even if this meant the triumph of (impartial) ignorance over (suspect) local expertise in the areas to be divided. The Congress and the Muslim League agreed on very little, but they were able to settle that the boundary commission chair should be a man without any prior experience in India. The terms of the commission were to demarcate the boundaries 'on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims' and in so doing to 'take into account other

5 *Leicester Mercury*, 12 June 1947. *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947. India and Pakistan ...*, ed. Kirpal Singh (Delhi: National Bookshop, 1991; revised edn 2006), 108.

6 *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947 ...*, ed. Kirpal Singh, 164–7.

7 At a press conference on 14 Nov. 1946, Jinnah stated that 'the exchange of populations would have to be considered seriously as far as possible, especially after this Bihar tragedy' (*Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi (4 vols., Lahore: Bazm-e-Iqbal, 1996), iv. 2458). Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah. India – Partition – Independence* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2009), 514.

factors'.<sup>8</sup> What were these other factors in the Punjab? Were they the location of the Sikh holy shrines? Arthur Henderson, Under-Secretary of State for India, said so in Parliament at Westminster, but Mountbatten had to backtrack, emphasizing the independence of the boundary commission and its freedom to interpret 'other factors' on its own.<sup>9</sup> Later on, Radcliffe was concerned, Sir Christopher Beaumont recalled, 'because he had to put this Sikh holy place into Pakistan – at Sheikhpura ... Guru Nanak's birthplace'. But there was no choice. Apart from the Golden Temple at Amritsar, which did play a part in determining that Amritsar should go to India, shrines did not figure in the boundary delineation.<sup>10</sup> Beaumont recalled that after contiguous majority areas, 'water was the key. And railways would come second, and electricity would run third.'<sup>11</sup>

Radcliffe is often cited as the key person responsible for the unfair treatment that, it is alleged, Pakistan received at the time of Partition. Jinnah's radio broadcast of 31 August castigated the 'unjust, incomprehensible, and even perverse award' of the Boundary Commission. There remain allegations of the 'theft' by India of Ferozepur and Gurdaspur. Following the witness of Sir Christopher Beaumont, Mountbatten's personal secretary, the allegations involving Gurdaspur may be rejected.<sup>12</sup> In contrast, Beaumont was convinced that Mountbatten persuaded Radcliffe of the adverse irrigation effects for Bikaner state if Ferozepur went to Pakistan and that Radcliffe yielded to 'what he thought was overwhelming political expediency'.<sup>13</sup>

An elderly Hindu woman said to Nehru in September 1947: 'Partitions take place in all families. Property changes hands, but it is all arranged peacefully. Why this butchery, loot and abductions? Could you not do it

8 Chester, *Borders and Conflict*, 39.

9 Ibid., 56, 115.

10 Ibid., 78.

11 Ibid., 80.

12 Ibid., 123.

13 Ibid., 120, 122–3.

the sensible way families divide [their property]?’<sup>14</sup> Lucy Chester concludes that Radcliffe's boundary for the Punjab was superior to the alternatives proposed at the time but was ‘the flawed product of a deeply flawed process, whose repercussions continue to plague South Asia today’.<sup>15</sup> Of the various difficulties that arose, the most serious was the inability of the British authorities to control the outbreak of communal violence prior to the transfer of power and during the paralysis of government that occurred afterwards. In one sense this was inevitable: one of the reasons why the British faced up to an early departure from India was the recognition that if their power was contested, they would no longer be able to rely on the Indian Army or to supply sufficient British troops.

The problem was that Mountbatten himself was initially hopelessly optimistic, ‘securing the [Indian] Cabinet's approval to the use of maximum force at the earliest possible moment (including air bombing if necessary) if there should be any outbreaks of violence’. He told Sir Evan Jenkins, the governor of the Punjab, that ‘the very first attempt at communal war should be utterly and ruthlessly crushed ...’. The policy of bombing and machine-gunning culprits from the air, and thus ‘prov[ing] conclusively that communal war was not going to pay’ was never likely to be realistic. As Sir Evan Jenkins retorted, firepower was less important than troop numbers: ‘the lesson of the 1947 disturbances in the Punjab is that once the interlocked communities begin to fight all over the countryside, the only remedy is to employ a very large number of troops.’ Jenkins wanted a force of 20,000 men on a war footing. Instead, the Punjab Boundary Force had only about 7,500 men on active duty, while the former Indian Army had been divided between India and Pakistan and the police force had disintegrated along communal lines. Lucy Chester argues that the political leaders should have made ‘more serious arrangements for a worse-case outcome’, while the British should have ‘allowed adequate time’.<sup>16</sup> Her own

14 Shashi B. Sahai, *South Asia: From Freedom to Terrorism* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 1998), 73.

15 Chester, *Borders and Conflict*, 200.

16 Ibid., 195–6.

suggestions for improving the implementation of Partition would have required 'a great deal of time, cooperation and political will – precisely the ingredients that were lacking in 1947'.

Violence seemed so imminent that the British judged it impossible to allow more time. Why then was there a pretence that there would be ruthless military intervention to prevent communal violence when there was no prospect of acting in this way? By July 1947, even before the establishment of the successor states of India and Pakistan, Mountbatten's bluff had been called. Mountbatten finally recognized this himself in a statement recorded by Alan Campbell-Johnson, his press secretary.

The Sikhs, he said, had launched an attack just as Gian[i] and Kartar Singh and Tara Singh before the 3rd June had told him they would. Mountbatten had expostulated with them at the time, stressing that the British would have gone. It would be Indian fighting Indian.<sup>17</sup> But they were adamant, and had in fact observed that they were waiting for us to go. The situation was now out of their control. In an area less than two hundred by one hundred and fifty miles containing some 17,000 inhabited localities and only about the size of Wales, some ten million people were on the move ....<sup>18</sup>

Shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of Partition, Campbell-Johnson gave an interview (27 May 1997) in which he asserted, 'Delays would have caused greater mayhem, not less.' The interim government had virtually collapsed after reaching the political settlement on 3 June 1947. 'How could you govern a country on the verge of Independence under martial law?' 'Once Partition was accepted, including the partition of the Punjab state, the Sikhs were in total revolt. We were dealing with a situation where we feared a collapse of law and order across the subcontinent. More delays

17 This was made much worse by Mountbatten's instructions which stated confidentially that the British Army units 'had no operational functions whatsoever, could not be used for internal security purposes and would not be used on the frontier or in the states. There was only one exception: they could be used in an emergency to save British lives' (Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition. The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 128–9).

18 Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London: Robert Hale, 1952), 174–5.



only meant more trouble. We ensured that the violence overall affected only 3 per cent of the country.' When the viceroy was told that partitioning Punjab would lead to trouble, 'Mountbatten replied that he had to think of the whole country when making a decision.' 'One reason why there have been such bitter wars is that deep down no one liked Partition, but they all accepted it.'<sup>19</sup>

Estimates of the number of deaths during the process of partition range from 180,000 to 2 million, 'with most scholars settling on a number between 500,000 and 1 million.'<sup>20</sup> Campbell-Johnson, who was a member of the Emergency Committee set up to monitor the situation in India, states categorically: 'claims have been made that about 500,000 people died during Partition. It was nothing of that sort ... most of the violence took place in a period of two and a half months, during which time about 200,000 people were killed.'<sup>21</sup> In reaction to the 'simmering violence of 1946 and early 1947,' writes Lucy Chester,

19 <<http://www.rediff.com/freedom/13allan1.htm>>

20 Chester, *Borders and Conflict*, 130. Contrast Philip Zeigler, *Mountbatten. The Official Biography* (London: Collins, 1985), 437: 'probably the most systematic attempt to work out a correct figure was that of Penderel Moon, who suggested the most likely total was 200,000. Even if this is nearest to the truth, it is catastrophic enough' (Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: an Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962), 283). Other estimates are given by Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight. The Last Years of the British Empire in India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 176. Gyanendra Pandey, after discussing Moon's methodology ('it will be clear ... that Moon was citing this figure only for Punjab and neighbouring princely states'), states of the estimated figure of 'about 500,000' deaths: 'nothing in the surviving records, in the calculations made at the time, or in the contentious debates that have gone on since then, gives us anything like a persuasive basis for such an inference. It is, rather, a question of what one can live with. Yet it is not entirely clear why it is easier to live with 500,000 dead than with a larger or a smaller figure ... The historical discourse continues to bear the stamp of rumour ...' (Pandey, *Remembering Partition. Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 90–1).

21 <<http://www.rediff.com/freedom/13allan1.htm>>

the British constructed a façade of control, of which the Radcliffe commission was a central part ... The fact that British leaders were content to focus on maintaining an appearance of order, rather than making real preparations to reduce conflict, contributed to the mass killing that erupted during partition. The location of the line itself played a less significant role in this violence than did the larger set of attitudes and priorities that drove Britain's approach to its withdrawal.<sup>22</sup>

Yasmin Khan agrees, arguing that 'if not entirely responsible for the contending nationalisms that emerged in South Asia (which it certainly contributed to), the British government's most grievous failure was the shoddy way in which the plan was implemented.' Partition, she concludes, 'was the site for, and the origin of, so many of the suspicions and national myths that are deeply rooted in the definition of one state against the other.'<sup>23</sup>

## Kashmir: Unfinished Business from the Era of Partition

There are three main perspectives on Kashmir: the Pakistan case prior to October 1947; the Indian case arising from the Instrument of Accession of October 1947; and the modified Indian Kashmir case arising from Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The concealed hopes or implicit assumptions of the parties depend on which historical perspective is taken as axiomatic. There are those – and this would include many in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir – who are trapped in the mindset of the Pakistan struggle before 1947. For these individuals, there can be no serious concession or compromise on basic principles because Kashmir 'must be' part of Pakistan – after all, the letter 'K' in the name Pakistan arose from the assumption that Kashmir would be an integral part of the country. In this sense, Choudhary Rahmat Ali is responsible for the Kashmir problem

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 148.

<sup>23</sup> Khan, *The Great Partition*, 208–9.

because he it was who in 1933 formulated the name for a Muslim state in the northwest of British India: Kashmir, he assumed, would form part of the new state because of its Muslim majority.<sup>24</sup> The A for Afghanistan has now been lost in one sense since April 2010, with the renaming of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 'Khyber Pakhtunkhwa'.<sup>25</sup> Pakistan has no intention of ever losing that portion of Kashmir it controls as 'Azad Kashmir'; to stand for election to the Parliament there a candidate must swear prior allegiance to the state of Pakistan.<sup>26</sup> The formula is *Kashmir banega Pakistan*

- 24 Later he contended: "Pakistan" is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands – "Indian" and "Asian". That is, Punjab, Afghanistan (North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran [this seems absurd: see Jinnah's comment on 17 May 1947], Sindh (including Kach and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks – the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland. It has no other origin and no other meaning; and it does not admit of any other interpretation. Those writers who have tried to interpret it in more than one way have done so either through the love of casuistry, or through ignorance of its inspiration, origin and composition' (Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: the Fatherland of the Pak Nation* (Cambridge, 1947)). When spelling out the derivation of the word Pakistan to Mountbatten on 17 May 1947, Jinnah stated that 'P for was Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e. Pathan or NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in the word in Urdu; S for Sind and TAN for the last syllable of Baluchistan' (Alistair Lamb, *Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990* (original edn. Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991; repr. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 3rd impression, 2006), 107).
- 25 Ismail Khan, 'From NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa', *Dawn* (1 April 2010). 'NWFP officially renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa', *ibid.* (15 April 2010).
- 26 'For POK, self-determination, as inscribed in the constitution, relates to the ultimate accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Part 2 of Section 7 of the POK Constitution states: "No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to, the ideology of the State's accession to Pakistan"' (Embassy of India, Washington DC, 'A comprehensive note on Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (so-called "Azad Kashmir")': [www.indianembassy.org/policy/kashmir/kashmir\\_mea/pok.html](http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/kashmir/kashmir_mea/pok.html). See also Shabir Choudhry, 'Poor Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir', *Countercurrents.org* (24 May 2010): [www.countercurrents.org/choudhry240510.htm](http://www.countercurrents.org/choudhry240510.htm).

(Kashmir will become Pakistan). India had been partitioned on the basis of the two-nations theory, Liaquat 'Ali Khan contended. Kashmir should become part of Pakistan on the basis of the same theory.<sup>27</sup>

The second mindset of which we have to take note is of those who are stuck in the attitude of 25–26 October 1947, when the Indian Defence

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'Before a politician becomes a candidate for the Assembly in this territory declared as Azad, meaning independent, he has to declare he will be loyal to Pakistan.'

- 27 At a press conference following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London, Liaquat argued: 'Kashmir was a Muslim country; geographically, economically, culturally it was a part of Pakistan, with all its rivers flowing through and to Pakistan. All the roads led from Kashmir into Pakistan; it was joined to India only by a narrow strip of road which had been constructed since the partition of the Indian sub-continent took place. Mr. Nehru sometimes said that he could not accept partition on the lines of Hindu and Muslim, but the whole partition of the continent took place on that basis' (M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat 'Ali Khan, 1941–51* (Research Society of Pakistan: Lahore, 1967), 527 (incomplete)). *The Times* (17 Jan. 1951), 7. Ibid., 5: 'The Indian view is that Kashmir is part of the Indian Union; that Indian troops have a right to be there, while Pakistani troops are intruders; that India has the duty of protecting Kashmir from invasion and safeguarding the "legitimate" government headed by Sheikh Abdulla; and that this government cannot be superseded, even temporarily and for the purpose of a plebiscite, by any other authority. Mr. Nehru does not admit that Sheikh Abdulla is opposed by a powerful section of Kashmiri opinion. As he sees it, any opposition is merely factional, stirred up by Pakistan for religious reasons. It is here that the real dispute lies. To Mr. Nehru, as to other advocates of what is called the "secular" state, in which all citizens should have equal rights, without regard to creed, it seems self-evident that the Kashmiris ought to settle their future according to economic, not religious, considerations. Mr. Nehru declared yesterday that if India once accepted the argument that nationality should follow religion, it would mean that forty million Muslims in India and about fifteen million Hindus in Pakistan would become, in effect, second-class citizens, half alien and without any sense of security. Other Indian leaders have said that if Kashmir were to go to Pakistan because it was largely Muslim the whole aspiration of the "secular" state in India would be shattered – and at the back of their minds is the fear that the Muslims in Kashmir would in fact declare themselves in favour of Pakistan. To Indians there is not simply territory at stake, but a principle to which they are pledged ... So long as the deadlock lasts there is the risk that widespread in Pakistan will encourage the extremists to demand either a "holy war" or a severance of the Commonwealth bonds.'

Committee discussed the request received from the Maharaja of Kashmir to send troops to oppose the Pakistani tribal raiders who had entered his state. Mountbatten argued that assistance should not be provided before the state had temporarily acceded to India. Pakistan would then have no right to intervene. Nehru questioned Mountbatten's interpretation, arguing that it would be perfectly legitimate for India to respond to the appeal from the Maharaja's government. He accepted the principle that a final settlement on accession should only be made after consulting the people of Kashmir.<sup>28</sup> At the meeting of the Indian Defence Committee on 26 October, when questioned as to whether the defence of Kashmir was of vital importance to India, Nehru and Patel both contended that it was vital to India's very existence. Because of common borders with Afghanistan, the USSR and China, the security of Kashmir was vital to the security of India, Nehru told Attlee by telegram.<sup>29</sup>

We may now never know whether the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession before or after the Indian Army arrived by air at Srinagar airport, though (in justification of the Pakistan position) Alastair Lamb argues a very convincing case that it could only have been signed *after* the arrival of Indian troops.<sup>30</sup> However, the Indian government claimed in its White Paper of 3 March 1948 that Indian troops were sent to Kashmir by air on 27 October 'following the signing of the Instrument of Accession the previous night' and the Instrument of Accession over time has become the legal and constitutional foundation for the Indian position regarding Jammu and Kashmir – the essential point being that although the decision was supposed to be ratified by the populations of their states, the princely rulers were given the right to choose freely between Pakistan or India under

28 Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition. The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute, 1947–1948* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1997), 145–7. C. Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947–8* (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), 45.

29 Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy*, 48, 54.

30 Lamb, *Incomplete Partition*, 162–3: 'in other words, because the State of Jammu & Kashmir was already part of India by the morning of 27 October 1947, those Indian troops who then arrived at Srinagar airfield were merely defending what was already India's.'

the British transfer of power arrangements. Jinnah seems to have been taken by surprise by the last Dogra ruler's decision regarding accession, but it was predictable given his commitment to his Hindu faith and the propaganda in favour of accession to India undertaken by the RSS leader, M. S. Golwalkar, in a personal meeting with Hari Singh held at the behest of Patel on 17 October 1947.<sup>31</sup> So the position of October 1947 is held to by those in India who argue that the constitutional position of Kashmir was 'settled' once and for all by the Instrument of Accession – regardless of the commitments made by Nehru to hold a plebiscite, and the declaration of the United Nations Security Council on 21 April 1948 to this effect. It is, for example, the position of the RSS with regard to Kashmir, although they claim that this is 'not an appeal to religion but is, on the contrary, an appeal to nationalism and against the tendencies to superimpose religions over nationalism'.<sup>32</sup>

A third mindset is of those who are committed to the position enshrined in the so-called Indira-Sheikh Abdullah accord of 13 November 1974. This was an agreement signed by the representatives of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah, whereby after a period of eleven years Abdullah once more was to become Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir (that is to say, Indian-administered Kashmir). Clause 1 of the agreement noted that the state of Jammu and Kashmir 'is a constituent unit of the Union of India' but 'in relation with the Union' was to continue to be governed by Article 370 of the Constitution of India. Though the residuary powers of legislation were to remain with the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Parliament in India would 'continue to have power to make laws relating towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India, insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and the Constitution'. The implications of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution is that except

31 M. G. Chitra, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. National Upsurge* (New Delhi: APH, 2004), 263.

32 Ibid., 126.

for defence, foreign affairs, finance and communications (matters specified in the Instrument of Accession), the Indian Government requires the agreement of the legislature of Jammu and Kashmir for the application of all other laws. Indian Kashmiris live under a separate set of laws, including those related to citizenship and the ownership of property, and they have different rights compared to other Indians.

To the extent that Kashmiris in Jammu and Kashmir have participated in the Indian general elections, Indian constitutional theory asserts that the population has consented to India's overarching sovereignty and the application of a plebiscite as envisaged in the United Nations Security Council resolutions has been overtaken by events and is now irrelevant. On the other hand, the application of draconian security legislation in Indian-administered Kashmir, especially the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) adopted in 2002, which was used by the Union and various state governments to mount campaigns against Muslims and to target political opponents, has clearly undermined the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. The POTA was repealed shortly after the UPA government came to power in the 2004 general elections.<sup>33</sup> But most of its draconian provisions were either included in the UPA-authored law that replaced it or in the anti-terrorist law rushed through Parliament following the November

33 The National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India (May 2004) stated that 'The UPA government is pledged to respecting the letter and spirit of Article 370 of the Constitution that accords a special status to J&K. Dialogue with all groups and with different shades of opinion in J&K will be pursued on a sustained basis, in consultation with the democratically-elected state government. The healing touch policy pursued by the state government will be fully supported and an economic and humanitarian thrust provided to it. The state will be given every assistance to rebuild its infrastructure quickly. New efforts will be launched to bring investments in areas like power, tourism, handicrafts and sericulture.' But the clause on POTA, and subsequent new legislation replacing it, has damaged this commitment. The Minimum Programme stated: 'The UPA has been concerned with the manner in which POTA has been grossly misused in the past two years. There will be no compromise in the fight against terrorism. But given the abuse of POTA that has taken place, the UPA government will repeal it, while existing laws are enforced strictly.'

2008 terrorist atrocity in Mumbai. The huge security apparatus in Indian-administered Kashmir has scarcely been reduced, in spite of the lessening of violence in recent years.

‘The South Asian Palestine’ is a title given to Kashmir by the prominent Kashmiri commentator Basharat Peer.<sup>34</sup> His study entitled *Curfewed Night: A Frontline Memoir of Life, Love and War in Kashmir* has been praised by reviewers for rising above the formidable challenge of telling the stories of Kashmir’s suffering without numbing the reader’s senses. Just one recent verdict on that suffering is the spiralling drug problem resulting from post-traumatic stress disorder. ‘A study by the Sociology Department of Kashmir University reveals that 35 per cent of the youth between 15 and 25 years of age have taken to drugs. Sociologist Dr B. A. Dabla says: “We lost one generation to the gun and we are going to lose the next to drugs.”’<sup>35</sup>

The parallel with Palestine has been taken up by some of the politicians. ‘The resolution of the Palestine issue finds resonance in the just and peaceful struggle of Kashmiri people for self-determination’, the Pakistan Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, stated on a visit to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The ‘People of Palestine and ... Kashmir are fighting for their just right of self-determination,’ Gilani contended. Drawing further comparison between Kashmir and Palestine, Gilani stated that peace would not prevail in South Asia and the Middle East unless the problems of Kashmir and Palestine were solved.<sup>36</sup>

There is no doubt that in the complexity of the attempts to find solutions and the risk they pose to the world community as festering unre-

34 [www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/2010/06/100602\\_hay\\_basharat.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/2010/06/100602_hay_basharat.shtml); Basharat Peer, *Curfewed Night: A Frontline Memoir of Life, Love and War in Kashmir* (London: HarperPress, 2010).

35 Dilnaz Boga, ‘Kashmir Valley’s Spiralling Drug Abuse’, Countercurrents.org (10 June 2010): [www.countercurrents.org/boga100610.htm](http://www.countercurrents.org/boga100610.htm).

36 <http://news.oneindia.in/2010/02/13/gilani-equates-kashmir-with-palestine.html>. The Indian report noted that this statement was ‘in line with [Pakistan’s] obsession with Kashmir’.



solved problems,<sup>37</sup> the two cases are of comparable importance. There the apparent parallelism between them may cease, however. For all the rhetoric of journalists and politicians, the contrasts between the Kashmir and the Palestine disputes are more apparent than the similarities. They arose from the historic differences in the British role in the two lands prior to 1947 and the fact that the British refused to partition Palestine before they left.<sup>38</sup> Sumantra Bose writes that

in the Israeli-Palestinian case, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on a territory that closely approximates the pre-June 1967 borders between Israel and the occupied territories, with its capital in east Jerusalem, is the *sine qua non* of a settlement. The idea of a single, bi-national state of Israel/Palestine<sup>39</sup> is deeply infeasible in light of history and of contemporary realities, and it violates the essence of the creed of self-determination of both peoples.<sup>40</sup>

In contrast, it is precisely the underlying unity of Kashmir and the common Kashmir identity – the legacy of *Kashmiriyat* – and the fact that,

37 'Frozen conflicts don't stay frozen, and windows of opportunity to make real progress towards solutions don't come often. Stalling on such opportunities can be perilous,' comments Sumantra Bose. Bose, 'Kashmir – missed chances for peace': [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/7576393.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7576393.stm).

38 Lucy Chester writes: 'the most striking difference of all lay in Britain's handling of partition negotiations, for there was only a last-minute discussion of partition in South Asia, in contrast with a decade of debate in Palestine. As a result, there was only one boundary commission in South Asia, while numerous commissions advanced various boundary proposals in Palestine. And yet despite these lengthy discussions of partition, the British refused to implement any partition whatsoever as they withdrew from Palestine, while in South Asia Britain imposed a hastily drawn line [a line which did not affect Kashmir itself] in the final days of its rule' (Lucy Chester, 'Boundary Commissions as tools to safeguard British interests at the end of empire', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 34 (2008), 494–515, at 495).

39 Leila Farsakh, 'Israel-Palestine: time for a bi-national state', *The Electronic Intifada* (20 March 2007): <http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6702.shtml>.

40 Sumantra Bose, 'Contested lands: paths to progress': [http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions\\_government/contested\\_lands\\_4614.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/contested_lands_4614.jsp). This article was a preview of his book: *Contested Lands. Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2007).

in flagrant violation of the British-established rules for the accession of princely states in 1947, the people were not consulted,<sup>41</sup> which has fuelled the self-determination argument. Even so, as Chitralkha Zutshi argues, 'ultimately the Kashmir question has been so problematic because it does not fit the one state-one nation-one religion trope that has defined South Asia in the post-colonial era.'<sup>42</sup> Zutshi stresses that Kashmiri nationalism has been 'as reluctant to accommodate regional and religious differences, and multiple visions of nationalism within Kashmir, as its Indian and Pakistani counterparts'. Zutshi considers that 'political solutions to the "Kashmir problem" will be abortive until nationalist narratives – Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri – that are primarily responsible for its intractability, are dismantled.' This will be neither easy nor fast, given the extraordinary range

41 Apart from UNSCR 47 of 21 April 1948, the letter of Mountbatten accepting the Instrument of Accession dated 27 Oct. 1947, the telegrams of Nehru dated 27 and 31 Oct. 1947 and Nehru's broadcast on All-India Radio on 2 Nov. 1947 were explicit on this point; see Fahmida Ashraf, *Jammu and Kashmir Dispute: Examining Various Proposals for Its Resolution* (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies Papers 20, 2002), 11–12, 46–9. There were three UN resolutions bearing on the plebiscite: the Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948, an enabling resolution that authorized formation of the UN commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) as well as spelling out in detail the conditions for plebiscite; UNCIP Resolution 995 of 13 Aug. 1948, which only very briefly and vaguely endorsed the idea of Kashmiri self-determination; and UNCIP Resolution 1196 of 5 Jan. 1949, which spelt out the conditions for the plebiscite in detail; see Robert G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 58; also Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War. Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003). 'That the plebiscite was agreed upon in a world body, such as the United Nations', writes Victoria Schofield, 'meant that those Kashmiris who were opposed to union with India came to expect international support for what they perceived to be their right of self-determination' (Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict. India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 87).

42 Chitralkha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging. Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir* (London: Hurst, 2004), 332.

of opinions that can be brought to bear on the subject of the conflict, for example, within Jammu province.<sup>43</sup>

Kashmir may, in reality, be a more difficult nut to crack than even Palestine. India rejects third-party mediation, and the United States is therefore unable to act as anything more than a covert honest broker. There is no infrastructure for peacemaking, since the largest role that India has been prepared to concede for Kashmiris is separate talks between the factions rejecting violence and the Indian government.<sup>44</sup> This means that any consensus reached can easily be overturned by an extremist group which has no seat at the table. Moreover, as Muqtedar Khan has noted, 'the political development of both India and Pakistan makes peace negotiations a two-level game. [This] means that not only will the two parties have to negotiate terms with each other, they also will have to negotiate their own positions with opposition factions.'<sup>45</sup>

There is also the obstacle posed by Kashmiri diversity. If Kashmiris were to be invited to a joint negotiating table, they would have to reach an internal consensus first. This is more easily said than done. The astonishing range of views is one of the points that emerges most clearly from the recent opinion poll held on either side of the Line of Control which was financed by Saif al Islam Qadhafi. In the view of Robert Bradnock, 'the poll shows that there is more room than many had anticipated in Kashmiri opinion itself for negotiation. The bigger question is whether the governments of India and Pakistan have the confidence, the power and the goodwill to meet the urgent aspirations of the Kashmiris for a peaceful and permanent settlement.'<sup>46</sup>

43 Yoginder Sikand, 'Muslim–Hindu Relations in Jammu Province', Countercurrents.org (16 May 2010): <http://www.countercurrents.org/sikand1.htm>.

44 'We want to take the dialogue process forward. We are ready to talk to representatives of all sections who are opposed to terrorism and violence.' 'Indian PM Manmohan Singh renews Kashmir talks offer', BBC News (8 June 2010): [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/10261715.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/10261715.stm).

45 <http://www.glocaleye.org/kashmir2.htm>.

46 <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oitemid=2551>. The fieldwork was carried out between 27 Sept. and 28 Oct. 2009.

There are voices which lay claim to complete autonomy for Kashmir – free from both Pakistan and India – but these are siren voices, since they fail to take into account the fact that both Pakistan and India lay a territorial claim to the whole of Kashmir according to its pre-accession borders of 1947, while in order to avoid war each state has been prepared to acquiesce in a *de facto* modification of its full claim by accepting the reality of the Line of Control. The Line of Control, however, is not an agreed international border. Nor, Pakistan has always argued, is the *status quo* represented by the Line of Control an acceptable solution to the Kashmir problem. As one commentator and lobbyist puts it, ‘no settlement ... will hold unless it is explicitly based on the principle of self-determination and erases the so-called line of control, which is in reality the line of conflict.’<sup>47</sup> Conversely, Dr Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, asserts that ‘there can be no redrawing of borders in Jammu and Kashmir’ – which seems to preclude any serious move towards a permanent settlement.

Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten’s press secretary whose interview given about a year before his death in 1998 has already been quoted on the question of Partition, had firm views on the failure of India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute. ‘I don’t believe that there has ever been a firm will by both sides to resolve the Kashmir dispute’, he asserted. ‘For Pakistan, Kashmir was part of a bigger game plan, at least before the creation of Bangladesh [in 1971], to link up the East and West wings of the new country. So for the Pakistanis, the idea was to keep the crisis going, there are bigger issues involved.’ For its part, India, too, had reasons not to wish to settle the issue. ‘The Indian view was that one day Pakistan will collapse and it was worth keeping the dispute going. And the temptation has been to keep the dispute going, and it has been kept

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Robert W. Bradnock, *Kashmir: Paths to Peace* (London: Chatham House, 24 May 2010). <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/881/> ‘Kashmir mulls comprehensive opinion poll’ (2 June 2010): [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/10207909.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/10207909.stm).

47 Ghulam Nabi Fai, ‘India, the United Nations and Kashmir’, Countercurrents.org (19 April 2010): <http://www.countercurrents.org/fai190410.htm>.

going for 50 years.<sup>48</sup> Thirteen years after Campbell-Johnson's death, the situation has scarcely changed.

## Competing Strategic Cultures: I. India

Although none of the interviewees uses this language, what is being discussed by the ex-military figures interviewed in this book are the rival and conflicting strategic cultures of the two states. There is no single accepted definition of 'strategic culture'. Jeannie L. Johnson, writing for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, defines it thus: 'strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.'<sup>49</sup> Peter R. Lavoy adds to the equation the role of strategic elites, whom he calls *myth makers*, who 'operate within the constraints of both the international environment and their nation's political culture, but they are not helpless prisoners of these two confining structures; they have some degree of freedom to reorient and expand the internal and external boundaries of their behaviour.'<sup>50</sup>

48 Campbell-Johnson added: 'I would have thought that after the creation of Bangladesh, Kashmir isn't really worth fighting for. I expect Kashmir to be partitioned, some day if not right now.' <http://www.rediff.com/freedom/13alan2.htm>. Campbell-Johnson also argued: 'Mountbatten clearly believed that the Act of Accession was to be signed by the [ruler] concerned. He should consider the religion of the majority of his people, but if he didn't, his decision was final.' <http://www.rediff.com/freedom/13alan3.htm>.

49 Jeannie L. Johnson, 'Strategic Culture: Defining the Theoretical Construct', Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (31 Oct. 2006), 5.

50 Peter R. Lavoy, 'Pakistan's Strategic Culture: a Theoretical Excursion', *Strategic Insights*, 4/10 (Oct. 2005).

Though recognizing that India is 'perhaps the strongest of all the states in the region,' T. V. Paul characterizes it as a 'strong-weak' or even 'soft' state.<sup>51</sup> David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee concur: 'the heart of the paradox,' they assert, 'lies in the fact that although internationally India is emerging as a strong state that is increasingly tilting the global balance of power in Asia's favour, it is domestically a relatively weak state, compared to other great powers, with multiple security challenges.'<sup>52</sup> The authors agree with earlier writers such as Bhiku Parekh who argued that whereas Nehru (prime minister 1947–64) gave India a 'distinct moral voice' in the world, in more recent times the focus has been on a new pragmatism, with emphasis on economic and military power in foreign policy. The danger is that 'without a strong moral thread to bind the identity of its citizens, the Indian state risks undermining its own cohesiveness and security.' There is, however, little sign, the authors contend, 'that those who formulate India's security policies are capable of bringing any level of cohesion into the numerous conceptions of Indian identity that interact (and often clash) within the Indian polity.'<sup>53</sup>

What is clear is that after the sudden – and from the Indian perspective, unwanted – collapse of the USSR in 1991, India has become a fearful state: fearful of making concessions to its aggrieved regions and minorities. The fear is that any concessions which confer greater autonomy could lead to an unravelling of the Indian Union. Instead, the response is the repression of discontent, a policy which could prove counter-productive in the medium term.<sup>54</sup> Even Jaswant Singh, the former foreign minister of the

51 T. V. Paul, 'State Capacity and South Asia's Perennial Insecurity Problems', in *South Asia's Weak States. Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*, ed. T. V. Paul (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 15.

52 David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, 'Polity, Security and Foreign Policy in Contemporary India', in *South Asia's Weak States*, ed. Paul, 147–69, at 148.

53 Ibid., 158.

54 Sajjad Shaukat, 'India on Soviet Union's Path of Disintegration' (2 Sept. 2009): <http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/index.php?showtopic=84391&pid=1173984&mode=threaded&start=>.

BJP-led government, mentions the possibility of a 'third partition' if the grievances of minorities are not addressed.<sup>55</sup>

Why is India apparently bereft of strategic vision? Malone and Mukherjee argue that although political fragmentation diminishes state capacity, 'the emergence of multiple small yet powerful players creates space for alternative foreign policy ideologies. As fragmentation proceeds ... foreign policy becomes devoid of any single guiding principle of ideology.' By default, policy is based on interests rather than ideology and becomes the lowest common denominator policy.<sup>56</sup> Indian foreign policy, the authors contend, 'has become largely reactive in nature. It is criticized at home and abroad for lacking vision and a unified strategy for India's role in the world.'<sup>57</sup>

It is against these comments that Prime Minister Vajpayee's rationale to the Indian Parliament a fortnight after India's nuclear tests on 27 May 1998 should be read. The touchstone that guided India in making the correct choice was national security, he affirmed. 'These tests are a continuation of the policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action.' India was now a nuclear weapons state.

This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek, nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, [the] right of one-sixth of humankind. Our strengthened capability adds to our strength of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons

55 Though he was expelled from the BJP for his comments. Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah. India – Partition – Independence* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2009), 479: 'which is why some voices of Muslim protest now go to the extent of speaking of a "Third Partition", the second being the birth of Bangladesh.' Ibid., 481, where he talks of the 'unfinished agenda of partition.'

56 Malone and Mukherjee, 'Polity, Security and Foreign Policy in Contemporary India', 161.

57 Ibid., 163. For the argument that the BJP failed to achieve a realist alternative to the Nehruvian tradition, see Sreeram S. Chaulia, 'BJP, India's Foreign Policy and the "Realist Alternative" to the Nehruvian Tradition', *International Politics*, 39 (2002), 215–34.

for aggression, or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race ....

The prime minister concluded by emphasizing the national consensus on the issue, 'the sensibilities and obligations of an ancient civilization, a sense of responsibility and restraint, but a restraint born of the assurance of action, not of doubts and apprehension.' His hope was in the new millennium India would 'take its rightful place in the international community'.<sup>58</sup>

Following the Indian Prime Minister's statement to the Lok Sabha, the Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, produced *Defending India* (1999), a justification of the policy of Indian 'realism' that had culminated in the nuclear tests in May 1998. 'An examination of the first fifty years of Indian independence', he wrote, 'reveals that the country's moralistic nuclear policy and restraint did not pay any measurable dividends. Consequently, this resulted in resentment within the country; a feeling grew that India was being discriminated against.' In the totality of state power 'nuclear weapons as a currency' was still operational 'in large parts of the globe'. India therefore had no choice but to update and revalidate the capacity that had been demonstrated 24 years earlier, in the 'peaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974. India was committed to a 'no-first-use' agreement with 'any country, bilaterally or in a collective forum' and had no intention of engaging in an arms race.<sup>59</sup> These points were summarized in India's draft nuclear doctrine discussed by the National Security Board and submitted to the Government of India in August–September 1999.<sup>60</sup>

Writing in 2001, Rajesh Basrur provides an over-generous assessment of India's strategic culture. He argues that

58 J. N. Dixit, *India–Pakistan in War and Peace* (New Delhi: Books Today, 2002), 342–4.

59 Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Hindu Nationalism. A Reader* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 302–12.

60 Dixit, *India–Pakistan in War and Peace*, 345.



there is every reason to expect that Indian strategic culture will retain its propensity for negotiated solutions to adversarial nuclear– strategic relationships. At the same time, the longstanding preference for universal non-discriminatory disarmament remains integral to this strategic culture. Though often derided by critics as unrealistic or even self-serving, India's consistent advocacy of global solutions is consistent with its original open-door policy on nuclear weapons: unless everyone closes the nuclear door, it is not in India's interests to do so. The readiness to negotiate equitable arms control both bilaterally and multilaterally gives to Indian strategic culture a positive feature. In contrast to the constraining effects observed above, we find here an enabling effect: strategic culture facilitates arms control and hence the building of stable strategic relationships.<sup>61</sup>

The reality is otherwise. First, India has consistently rejected Pakistan's overtures to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone.<sup>62</sup> Secondly, a fierce arms race has been fuelled by India's military spending. Because its economy is several times the size of that of Pakistan, India can allocate a lower percentage of its national budget on defence (14.1 per cent in 2007, as against 17.5 per cent in Pakistan) yet spend far more on its military. Between 2000 and 2007, India doubled its defence expenditure from \$10.5 billion to \$23.2 billion per annum. Pakistan tried to keep pace, increasing spending from \$2.7 billion to \$4.5 billion. In the view of Owen Bennett-Jones, 'India is totally committed to the South Asian arms race and the gap is likely to become even wider ... The different absolute spending levels are reflected not only in the number of men in the two countries' armed forces but also in the amount of military hardware available to those men.'<sup>63</sup> Prime Minister Vajpayee announced to the Lok Sabha on 27 May 1998 that India did not intend to engage in an arms race. The facts speak otherwise, when \$133 million dollars was spent by India on the military in the first seven years of the twenty-first century.

61 Rajesh M. Basrur, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture', *Journal of Peace Research*, 38/2 (2001), 181–98, at 195.

62 This is documented in Rizwana Abbasi's companion volume in this series. The official view is given by Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence. Pakistan's Perspective* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).

63 Owen Bennett-Jones, *Pakistan. Eye of the Storm* (3rd edn: New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 272 and graphs at 271.

In the same speech, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that India's nuclear weapons were not intended for mounting threats against any country but were 'weapons of self-defence'. His Defence Minister, George Fernandes, described India's military posture as 'a non-aggressive, non-provocative [one] based on the philosophy of defensive defence'. Is this consistent with the 'Cold Start' doctrine formulated in 2004 and expounded publicly by Lieutenant-General Deepak Kapoor in 2009? Those Indian ex-military who were interviewed on this point tended to downplay this innovation, which – following US questioning of the doctrine – was officially repudiated by Kapoor's successor, General V. K. Singh, who stated in September 2010: 'There is nothing called "Cold Start". As part of our overall strategy, we have a number of contingencies and options, depending on what the aggressor does. In recent years, we've been improving our systems with respect to mobilization, but our basic military posture is defensive.'<sup>64</sup>

Though the denial by General V. K. Singh is plausible, it flies against the evidence that, since the failure of Operation Parakram (Operation Victory) in 2002, when the Indian Army failed to provide a timely threat to Pakistan in spite of its massive mobilization, the emphasis has been on achieving a multiple, rapid strike capability, before counter-mobilization and international political pressure could deny India the fruits of its offensive. The Indian Army developed its new limited war doctrine in order to respond to the specific challenges posed by Pakistan's proxy war strategy. For one commentator, writing in 2007–8, Cold Start 'remains more of a concept than a reality. Recent military exercises and associated organizational changes indicate that even though the Indian Army has made progress toward developing an operational Cold Start capability, much work remains.' The doctrine represents a significant advance in India's conventional capabilities, but 'it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could breach the nuclear threshold.' The disengagement of India's political leadership from security issues remains a

64 N. V. Subramanian, 'India Denies "Cold Start" Plan' (11 Sept. 2010): <http://thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2010/09/11/india-denies-cold-start-plan/>.

cause for concern, since it might turn to an apparent limited war strategy during a subsequent crisis without having evaluated the potentially disastrous consequences.<sup>65</sup>

## Competing Strategic Cultures: II. Pakistan

'Pakistan was a weak state from the beginning,' writes Lawrence Ziring, 'made weaker by its formation in two parts separated by a thousand miles of Indian domain. The collapse of the two-winged state hardly more than twenty-three years after independence was not unanticipated ...' State failure occurred in 1971,<sup>66</sup> as a result of a civil war, though Bangladesh might not have achieved its independence had it not been midwifed by massive Indian intervention: Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora was given the job of destroying the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan and half a million men to complete the task. The USSR provided the necessary

65 Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine', *International Security* 32/3 (2007–8), 158–90. The US Ambassador to India, Tim Roemer, according to a cable leaked by WikiLeaks, doubted whether India ever intended to implement the doctrine. He wrote: 'even if the plan is never actually implemented – and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it – news of Cold Start's existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.' 'India "unlikely" to deploy Cold Start against Pakistan', *Dawn* (3 Dec. 2010): <http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/03/india-%E2%80%98unlikely%E2%80%99-to-deploy-cold-start-against-pakistan.html>.

66 Lawrence Ziring, 'Weak State, Failed State, Garrison State. The Pakistan Saga', in *South Asia's Weak States. Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*, ed. T. V. Paul (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 170–94, at 172–3.

military supplies and crucial political backing at the United Nations. As J. N. Dixit argues, 'had there not been a Soviet veto, President Nixon's pro-Pakistan tilt would have found expression in a Security Council initiative that would have aborted the Bangladesh freedom struggle and resulted in a monumental strategic setback for India.'<sup>67</sup> Instead, India humiliated its rival and captured 74,000 prisoners of war<sup>68</sup> as hostage for a settlement on its terms – the Simla Agreement of 1972.

Indian policymakers' long-cherished aspiration of breaking up Pakistan coincided with Bangladesh's struggle for independence, which was driven chiefly by the language issue. As one Bangladeshi historian comments: 'a section of the Indian intelligentsia has always tried to disprove the religion-based two-nations theory on the basis of which India was partitioned in 1947. Bangladesh's war of liberation provided them with the tool to vindicate their proposition and they exploited it well.'<sup>69</sup> Indira Gandhi's statement before the Lok Sabha, immediately after the Bangladesh war, lends credence to this view: 'The war with Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh', she claimed, '... falsified the two-nation theory and vindicated our principles of secularism.' In reality, the principles of secularism would only have been 'vindicated' had Bangladesh chosen voluntarily to return to the Indian Union, which it had no intention of doing.<sup>70</sup> What 1971 demonstrated was that the Pakistan federation of 1947 was unworkable if mutually

67 Dixit, *India–Pakistan in War and Peace*, 214.

68 Not the larger figure of 93,000 PoWs cited in the various interviews below. The figures are those given in writing in the Lok Sabha and quoted by Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (4th edn, 2011). The author is indebted to Brian Cloughley for drawing this figure to his attention. Note: there were also 16,370 civilian prisoners.

69 The verdict of Afsan Chowdhury, a Bangladeshi researcher: Nurul Kabir, 'Researching the 1971 war', *Dawn* (15 Dec. 2002): <http://www.dawn.com/weekly/books/archive/021215/book55.htm>.

70 Though, as Dixit argues, Bhutto worked at reviving Bangladesh's Islamic consciousness and invited Mujibur Rahman to the OIC conference at Lahore in Feb. 1974. Dixit, *India–Pakistan in War and Peace*, 231: 'it was conveyed [that] Bangladesh would get recognition from Pakistan and admission to the OIC if war crimes trials were not held.'

hostile political parties captured the majority of seats in the assemblies of the constituent parts of the confederation. The breakdown only became irrevocable when the largely West Pakistan military lost discipline and engaged in mass murder. The trials of those responsible, authorized in Bangladesh on 25 March 2010, are yet to take place.

Many of the ex-military on the Indian side denounce Bhutto's alleged 'duplicity' at the Simla negotiations in 1972. Indira Gandhi and her advisers pressed for a formal agreement recognizing the Line of Control in Kashmir as a *de jure* border and that the release of Pakistani PoWs and the evacuation of occupied Pakistani territory should be conditional on this. Bhutto and the Pakistani negotiators refused to agree. A private meeting between Indira Gandhi and Bhutto was organized at which he requested that his undertakings on the Line of Control should not be included in the form of a written agreement. Bhutto argued that if this were done, it would endanger his survival and the establishment of democratic rule in Pakistan. Instead, he proposed that after he had integrated Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the other related territories of the old princely state of Jammu and Kashmir on the Pakistani side within the federal territories of Pakistan, the Line of Control would gradually be converted into a *de jure* border.<sup>71</sup>

India believed that the Simla Agreement was the answer to regularizing relations between Pakistan and India without third-party mediation.<sup>72</sup> For Pakistan, however, the role of India in the war of 1971 and the Simla Agreement served only to confirm its suspicions that India had, all

71 Ibid., 229–30, based on the statement of P. N. Dhar, secretary and later principal secretary to the Indian Prime Minister. Dixit argues that 'to some extent Bhutto did follow up on his offers.' In the private meeting with Indira Gandhi, Bhutto had said 'trust me' in answer to her question 'is this the understanding on which we proceed?' The Indians argue that Bhutto reneged on the understanding and therefore that Pakistan cannot be trusted. The Pakistanis argue that Bhutto was negotiating under duress and had to salvage what he could for Pakistan, in spite of the enormity of the military defeat.

72 Ibid., 225: 'the experiences of the 1948 and 1965 wars with Pakistan were well learnt by India. It did not wish again to be part of a third party mediation process in which Pakistan would assume an artificial air of injured innocence and claim compensatory post-conflict compromises.'

along, sought to break up the Pakistan union and would do so again if the opportunity arose. It is important to note that Bhutto was encouraged in this position – if not in his resulting strategy – by Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. ‘My basic perception of India,’ Kissinger told Bhutto in 1976,

is that she sooner or later will have another go at Pakistan, regardless of the Soviet viewpoint, although the Soviets would certainly come to the assistance of India. As long as this Prime Minister [Indira Gandhi] is in office, the danger persists. I myself heard her say that the Northwest Frontier Province really belongs to India, and there is no way to get to them except through the Punjab.<sup>73</sup>

J. N. Dixit contends that ‘within two-and-a-half years of his assuming power in Pakistan, by the end of 1974, the moderation and rationalism in Bhutto’s approach to India had disappeared’ and he reverted to his ‘adversarial mindset.’<sup>74</sup> In fact, there was scarcely any change in Bhutto’s approach: he summoned Pakistan’s 263 top scientists to a secret meeting at Multan on 20 January 1972 and instructed them that the country required a nuclear weapon within three years. He undertook to provide the necessary resources and facilities for the task. The change in policy was a consequence of the break-up of the Pakistan union in December 1971, not a reaction to India’s allegedly ‘peaceful’ nuclear test at Pokhran on 18 May 1974.<sup>75</sup> The Indian test merely gave Bhutto the opportunity to provide a public justification for his decision two years earlier: ‘even if we have to eat grass, we will make nuclear bombs,’ he told a press conference after the announcement of the Indian test. Pakistan would never fall prey to India’s nuclear blackmail, he declared. The US ambassador to New Delhi, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, called the Indian PNE (peaceful nuclear explosion) ‘a huge mistake,’ pre-

73 Memorandum of Conversation. The Secretary’s Meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto, 26 February 1976, p. 27. Downloadable from URL: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/index.htm>.

74 Dixit, *India–Pakistan in War and Peace*, 235.

75 Dixit’s chronology is at fault here: *ibid.*, 234.

cisely because India's overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons would eventually be eroded by Pakistan's nuclear capability.<sup>76</sup>

Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, a former bureaucrat, dismissed Pakistan's first civilian government in 1953. Since then, the governor-generals, presidents and army chiefs have dismissed as many as ten civilian governments that together have ruled the country for 29 years. The remaining 34 years have seen direct military rule. Lawrence Ziring contends for this reason that Pakistan should be considered a 'garrison state': 'union between the garrison state and the more radical Islamist organizations', he writes, 'illustrates the extent of state failure.'<sup>77</sup> As originally argued in 1941 by Harold D. Lasswell, the garrison state is one in which 'the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society.'<sup>78</sup> From the period of the US–Saudi Arabian-backed jihad against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, there have been close links between the Pakistani military, the leading intelligence agency (the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate or ISI) and militant Islamist groups. Ajai Sahni argues that the gravest error of Indian responses to Pakistan in the past has been the failure 'to evolve an internal consistency and coherence that can weaken and eventually destroy the source of terror – the quasi-feudal military – mujahiddeen complex in Pakistan.'<sup>79</sup> This, he argues,

76 As was correctly pointed out subsequently in India (though only in a news conference as late as 1999), there can be no such thing as a PNE. Moynihan stated: 'now in a decade's time, some Pakistani general will call you up and say I have four nuclear weapons and I want Kashmir. If not, we will drop them on you and we will all meet in heaven. And then what will you do?' (George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb. The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, repr. 2001), 186).

77 Ziring, 'Weak State, Failed State, Garrison State. The Pakistan Saga', in *South Asia's Weak States*, ed. Paul, 193.

78 Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Garrison State', *American Journal of Sociology*, 46/4 (1941), 455–68.

79 Ajai Sahni, 'Countering Terrorism. The "Core Issue" is Pakistan', *Defence and Technology*, 2/9 (Jan. 2003), 35–8. Online at: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/DefTech0103.htm>.