

Vol. 53

**Religions
and Discourse**

Patricia Madigan

**Women and Fundamentalism
in Islam and Catholicism**

Negotiating Modernity in a Globalized World

Peter Lang

Religions and Discourse

This book takes a historical–theological approach to understanding the complex relationships among gender, religion, economics and politics in a global context, with particular reference to Islam and Catholicism as two worldwide, culturally diverse and patriarchal religious traditions. It looks at ways in which Catholic and Muslim women, both within and between their respective traditions, are critiquing fundamentalist theological and cultural positions and reclaiming their rightful place within the life of their religious traditions. In so doing, it argues that they offer to their respective religious communities, and beyond, a holistic way of negotiating the impact of modernity in a globalized world. The final chapter of the book gives voice to some Australian Muslim and Catholic women who, at a local level, reflect many of the overall concerns of women who find themselves at the cutting edge of their respective religious tradition's negotiation of modernity.

Patricia Madigan is Chair of the Broken Bay Catholic Diocesan Commission for Interfaith Relations and Chair of the Living Faiths Commission of the New South Wales Ecumenical Council (Sydney). She completed her studies in ecumenical and interfaith dialogue at Tantur Ecumenical Institute in Jerusalem, the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin, and Harvard Divinity School, where she specialized in Christian–Muslim relations. She was awarded her PhD in the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Sydney.



Women and Fundamentalism in Islam and Catholicism

Religions and Discourse

Edited by James M. M. Francis

Volume 53



PETER LANG

Oxford • Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Wien

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Women frequently lead religious lives that are quite separate from the normative sphere of religious activity described by the major established religions... Once women are allowed to speak about their own space, rather than have male religious professionals speak for them from the male-dominated space, an entirely other world of experience may be identified.¹

Of all... groups, potentially the most revolutionary is the women's movement. If this phase of struggle were to open up to radical democratic change, women's liberation would necessarily be its spearhead. Even in the short term, the women's movement is the detonator which will explode neopatriarchal society from within. If allowed to grow and come into its own, it will become the permanent shield against patriarchal regression, the cornerstone of future modernity.²

The forces of globalized modernity are impacting upon and shifting the power structures of many aspects of civilizations as we have known them. Most of these power structures have been patriarchal at their roots for thousands of years. As their bases of power are threatened, patriarchal elites look for allies to assist them maintain their position of privilege. Religions in general, including Christianity and Islam, are possible allies.

- 1 Majella Franzmann, *Women and Religion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
- 2 Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 154.

However, in the contemporary struggle between patriarchy and the forces of modernity, religions are themselves experiencing the turmoil that accompanies any major social transformation. They find their own structures and systems challenged in this seismic global shift which includes a movement, led mainly by women scholars and activists, to liberate the religions themselves from their patriarchal power structures.

Many studies of 'fundamentalism' have rightly diagnosed it as a reactive movement against the forces of modernity, but few have adequately recognized its essentially patriarchal character. In this study religious fundamentalism is understood as a patriarchal politics of identity in which a male religious elite attempts to maintain its power over women and other males in both the religious and social spheres. The study explores the impact of fundamentalism on women's lives and their responses to it, with a focus on the origins and dynamics of fundamentalism in Catholicism and Islam as a political, social and cultural movement with economic underpinnings.

This study is important since, at the turn of the millennium, Catholics (17.4 per cent) and Muslims (19.8 per cent) together make up over 37 per cent of the world's people.³ Catholics numbered approximately 1.004 billion, concentrated in Latin America (454.1 million), and in Europe (285.7 million), with significant numbers also in Africa (117.2 million), Asia (108.4 million) and North America (70.6 million). Muslims numbered 1.155 billion and were most highly concentrated in Asia (807 million) and Africa (310.5 million) with significant numbers also in Europe (31.2 million) and fewer in North America (4.4 million) and Latin America (1.6 million).⁴ In Australia Catholics numbered 5,001,600 (26.6 per cent) and Muslims 281,600

3 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2002 figures <<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9394911/Worldwide-Adherents-of-All-Religions-by-Six-Continental-Areas-Mid-2002>> accessed 12 August 2007.

4 See 'Appendix' in Jane H. Bayes and Nayerreh Tohidi, eds, *Globalization, Gender and Religion: The Politics of Women's Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 259.

(1.5 per cent) of the population.⁵ When one considers that at least half of these are women, this study of Muslim and Catholic fundamentalisms, in their respective historical, socio-economic, political, and gendered realities would seem to have particular relevance in the modern world.

Under the impact of political developments since 1979 (the year of the Iranian revolution), there has been an explosion of academic study of fundamentalism, yet fundamentalism has been little studied from a gender perspective, from a politico-economic perspective or from an interfaith perspective. By combining all of these perspectives this study aims to provide a fuller consideration of the complex phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, especially as it impacts on the lives of women.

I propose to examine the origins and the dynamics of fundamentalism and fundamentalist-like movements within each of the religious traditions of Catholicism and Islam and their impact on women's lives. I then aim to investigate the ways in which Muslim and Catholic women are attempting to challenge the fundamentalist perspectives which diminish them and to reclaim their rightful place within the life of their respective traditions. The study includes a survey of sixteen women (eight Muslim and eight Catholic) who have been engaged in interfaith dialogue around these issues in Sydney.

Quotations from the Qur'an are from *The Koran Interpreted* translated by Arthur J. Arberry except where, as indicated, another translation seemed more accurate. Biblical quotations are from the *New Revised Standard Version* of the Bible. Where I have quoted from primary sources in other languages, such as the Christian scriptures (Greek), the Qur'an (Arabic) and the works of Thomas Aquinas (Latin), these were read in their original languages with the assistance of modern English translations.

Most literature on fundamentalism focuses on it as a religious, social and psychological phenomenon, neglecting the global political and economic issues which underpin it. To ask why this is so is an important

5 Australian Bureau of Statistics figures 2001 census <<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/bb8db737e2af84b8ca2571780015701c/bfdda1ca506d6cfaca2570de0014496e!OpenDocument>> accessed 12 August 2007.

question. Up to the 1980s, studies of fundamentalism concentrated mainly on evangelical Protestantism, e.g. James Barr's 1977 book, *Fundamentalism*. But, in recent times, the study of fundamentalism has become a preoccupation of the Western or Western-influenced scholars heavily influenced by 'clash of civilizations' theories which construe Islamic violence as a counter-culture at odds with contemporary Western civilization. Scholars who have worked from this perspective include Bernard Lewis (1990), Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996), Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (1995), Francis Fukuyama (1999) and Gilles Kepel (2002).

There are many meritorious works on radical Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, e.g. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (1998) by Bassam Tibi and Gilles Kepel's *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (2002). However these have little, if anything at all, to say about women's experience of fundamentalism. Some collections of essays which take up the issue of fundamentalism as it affects Muslim women include *Shattering the Stereotypes: Muslim Women Speak Out* (2005), edited by Fawzia Afzal-Khan, and *On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era* (2005), edited by Fereshteh Nouraei-simone, which address issues of gender equality, politics and modernity, but without an interfaith perspective.

While Islamic fundamentalism has been central to many investigations, by contrast, Catholic fundamentalism has hardly been recognized at all. When it is referred to at all, it is more often referred to as 'traditionalism' (although it will be argued in the following chapters that it is far from traditional). For example, Gabriel A. Almond's *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World* (2003) mentions *Comunione e Liberazione* and the Lefebvrists, two fundamentalist groups on the periphery of Catholicism, but shows a greater preoccupation with Islamic fundamentalism. Paul Collins, former ABC broadcaster and commentator on religious affairs, is one of very few authors who names Catholic fundamentalism as such in his 1997 work *Papal Power*. There are few other notable examples apart from a book chapter titled 'Catholic fundamentalism' by Gabriel Daly, a Catholic theologian at Trinity College Dublin, in *Quench not the Spirit* (2005), edited by Angela Hanley and David Smith. These Catholic works however greatly emphasize the religio-cultural dimension of fundamentalism.

An example of a study of fundamentalism from a gender perspective is *Fundamentalism and Gender: 1875 to the Present* (1993) by Margaret Lamberts Bendroth. However, it is restricted to a mainly historical-cultural exploration of fundamentalism in Protestant Christianity. Many feminist Catholic and progressive Muslim scholars address the problem of the diminishment of women by religious fundamentalism, e.g. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Amina Wadud and Riffat Hassan, but tend to take a religio-theological approach and limit their study mainly to their own religious tradition.

Beverley Milton-Edwards's book *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945* is an excellent study of the political history, and to some extent, the economic forces impinging on the Islamic world which have given rise to fundamentalist responses, but it is not concerned with gender issues. Nor does it introduce comparisons with other fundamentalisms. An example of an important development study which addresses the topic of the effects of globalization on the economic well-being of women, *Women and Globalization* edited by Delia D. Aguilar and Anne E. Lacsamana (2004),⁶ notes the impact of fundamentalist ideology only in passing.

A collection of studies edited by Jane H. Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, *Globalization, Gender and Religion: The Politics of Women's Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts* (2001), represents well the development issues facing Muslim and Catholic women in their respective cultural contexts, although it does not address the internal theological questions of either tradition. It incorporates an insightful challenge to the 'clash of civilizations' theory in that the editors suggest that a more pertinent division to be addressed than a purported 'clash' between Islam and the West is the one that exists between those forces committed to democracy, freedom of choice and equal human/women's rights and those who support authoritarianism, discrimination and gender hierarchy under a religious or a secular

6 Delia D. Aguilar and Anne E. Lacsamana, eds, *Women and Globalization* (New York: Humanity Books, 2004).

guise.⁷ This kind of perspective is taken in this study which views women's participation in the negotiation of modernity as a vital part of economic and social development. To facilitate this, religious teachings and practices which diminish women will also need reform.

Critique of *The Fundamentalism Project* – External and Internal Issues

No appraisal of research related to religious fundamentalism would be complete without an assessment of *The Fundamentalism Project*⁸ – a wide-ranging five-volume collection of studies which attempt to understand the phenomenon of the rise of fundamentalist and fundamentalist-like movements in the modern world.⁹ The investigation was conducted under the auspices of the American Academy of Social Sciences, and the five volumes were edited and introduced by American academics Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby over a period of six years between 1988 and 1993. The volumes, containing 108 chapters in all, were published between 1991 and 1995. The project involved ninety-one scholars who were associated with seventy-seven different educational and research institutions in twenty-one

7 Jane H. Bayes and Nayerreh Tohidi, 'Introduction' in Bayes and Tohidi, eds, *Globalization, Gender and Religion*, 14.

8 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project: a study conducted by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 5 volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991–1995).

9 Others who have critiqued the culturally-focused approach taken by *The Fundamentalism Project* include Raoul Adam, who notes the lack of a cognitive perspective and asserts that cultural theories of religion by themselves are impoverished by a lack of understanding of how the mind works (see Raoul Adam, 'Fundamentalism: A Synthesis of Cultural and Cognitive Perspectives', in *Crossroads*, volume 1, issue 2, 2007) <<http://www.uq.edu.au/crossroads/Archives/Vol%201/Issue%202%202007/Vol1Iss207%20-%203.Adam%20%28p.4-14%29.pdf>> accessed 13 August 2007.

countries. The study resulted in eighty-seven chapters or articles (excluding editorial summaries) which covered fundamentalist movements in more than twenty-five countries, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma (Myanmar), Egypt, France, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, countries of South America, countries of the former Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Thailand, Turkey and USA. The movements covered were mostly within the religious traditions of Western Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism.

Without a doubt this was a massive effort, in the period from the late 1980s to early 1990s in which the study took place, to understand the phenomenon of the rise of religious fundamentalism which was beginning to attract greater public attention, and to become much more a matter of societal concern in America and elsewhere. However, the study also suffers from the limitations of the perspective of the times in which it was conducted. The editors Marty and Appleby themselves acknowledge this in their introduction to volume IV (1994) when they say:

Given that the following essays were completed in 1992 and early 1993, it is worth noting that the rapid dynamism of the movements under consideration, as they interact with the sociopolitical environment, guarantees they will have changed again, perhaps several times (before the project is published).¹⁰

The 1980s could be said to be the decade of the twentieth century in which Christian feminism in particular reached its most energetic and creative intellectual expression, riding on the shoulders of first and second wave secular feminism, with Muslim writers becoming more prominent in the 1990s. The 1980s also experienced a new economic impetus characterized by deregulation of national economies, increasing globalization and economic experimentation, and the increasing use of the market as a political instrument. The new technologies and globalized forces were also not without their impact in the power structures of the world's religions. Catholics began to notice a growing power struggle taking place over the

10 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, IV, 'Introduction', 6.

implementation of the documents of the Second Vatican Council which had ended in 1965, after setting an agenda opening up the Catholic Church to respectful engagement with the modern world. From the late 1970s a new rigidity became noticeable in many of the papal documents and rulings, and a further centralization of clerical power began to take effect as the papacy of John Paul II progressed. In 1989 the Soviet Union collapsed and many of its former republics experienced religious revival as a part of their reclamation of political and religious identity and freedom. The study of *The Fundamentalism Project* therefore was carried out in a period in which some of the forces it was engaged to study were in initial stages and the full extent of their future development could only be conjectured.

Apart from the above external factors which make *The Fundamentalism Project* somewhat a product of its times there were other internal factors which without doubt influenced the project in its parameters, method and in its content. The overall editorial team of four (Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, Martin E. Marty and Emanuel Sivan) and those who shaped the final concluding chapters were all male academics and from prestigious American institutions, with the exception of Sivan who was from the Hebrew University. The two principal editors (R. Scott Appleby and Martin E. Marty) were Americans from Catholic and Protestant Christian backgrounds, respectively.

Although authors were either based at or associated with seventy-seven academic and research institutions in all, thirty-seven (38 per cent) of the ninety-seven chapters of the body of the study (excluding introductory and concluding chapters by the editors) were written by academics who were either based at, or had an association with, only six institutions – four prestigious American Universities and two Israeli universities: Harvard University (six chapters and six associated), Hebrew University Jerusalem (six chapters), University of California (six chapters and one associated), Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan (four chapters), Princeton (three chapters and three associated) and University of Chicago (three chapters and two associated). Only four contributing authors were based at, or associated with, Catholic universities – Notre Dame, CUA, Santa Clara and Institut Catholique de Paris. Although a handful of contributions came from institutions situated in places of strong Muslim culture, such as Monofiya

University, Egypt and the University of Abuja, Nigeria, these were too few to give the project the cross-cultural breadth claimed by the editors in volume V. It is striking that of ninety-one authors (including the four male editors) only thirteen (14 per cent) were female.

Another revealing statistic is that of the ninety-seven chapters of the body of the study, thirty-three had a primary emphasis on Islam (34 per cent) compared to twenty-two with a primary emphasis on Christianity (approximately 22 per cent) while Catholic fundamentalism was the subject of only two chapters and was mentioned in a substantial way in four others (in all 6 per cent of articles). This was despite the fact that, like Islam, Christianity is a world-wide religion with many manifestations in many cultures.

The editors show they had some awareness of the pitfalls. In their Introduction to volume IV they acknowledge:

The authors, many of whom hail from the nations or religious traditions about which they are writing, are nonetheless resolutely 'of the Western academy.' The editors asked [contributing scholars] to put in brackets their own presuppositions, an approach that does not mean they successfully leave them behind, but that they become aware of them, take them into consideration, and do some compensating for them.¹¹

However, as seems evident from the above analysis, they were far from successful in being aware of what their biases might be. The lack of cultural and religious diversity of the editorial team and also among the contributing scholars has inevitably given the project an inherent cultural and even political predisposition.

Despite the project's shortcomings, these volumes have made a valuable contribution towards understanding the internal dynamics of modern fundamentalist movements and the complex landscapes in which they take root and flourish.

The project directors, in their Introduction,¹² engage in an initial discussion about the nature of fundamentalisms. They see them as 'recently

11 Ibid., 8.

12 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, I, 'Introduction', vii–xiii.

developed forms of traditionalisms' growing out of some challenge or threat to a core identity, both social and personal. They suggest that 'modern' is a code word for what religious fundamentalists see as threatening and that this word encompasses at least three dimensions that are uncongenial to them: (1) a preference for secular rationality, (2) the adoption of religious tolerance with its accompanying tendencies towards relativism and (3) individualism.

The editors describe fundamentalists as people who believe that if they lose on the central issues they lose everything – therefore they *fight back* with great innovative power. They *fight for* a 'traditional' worldview which they fear is disappearing, they *fight with* a particularly chosen repository of resources which are used as weapons, reaching back to real or presumed pasts, to actual or imagined ideal or original conditions to select what they regard as fundamental. They *fight for* a worldview that touches on the most intimate zones of life such as family, including gender and sex roles, and education of children. As a last resort they may also fight for territory, using the instruments of war. They *fight against* others who are seen as outsiders – who may be the modernizer or infidel and, even more likely, moderates within their own religious group who would negotiate with modernity. They may spend even more time opposing moderates and apostates within their own group than on the polar opposites of their movement. Fundamentalists also *fight under* God – convinced they have divine right on their side.

In volume I the idea is introduced that, although fundamentalisms can at first appear to be residues, vestiges or throwbacks to the past, the reality is more complex since they do not reject all aspects of modernity but exist in a kind of symbiotic relationship with the modern – for example, using technology, mass media communications and other instruments of modernity that are useful for their purpose. The relation between conservatism, traditionalism and fundamentalism is also taken up in volume I by the authors of chapters on Christian fundamentalism, Nancy Ammerman ('North American Protestant Fundamentalism')¹³ and William Dinges and

13 Nancy T. Ammerman, 'North American Protestant Fundamentalism' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, I, 1, 1–65.

James Hitchcock ('Roman Catholic Traditionalism and Activist Conservatism in the United States').¹⁴ Ammerman makes the pertinent comment that fundamentalism should not be confused with forms of traditionalism, orthodoxy or revivalism, with which it may appear superficially to have common features. Rather, she holds that fundamentalism differs from all these in being a response characterized by *conscious and organized opposition* to the perceived threat of disruption of the tradition or orthodoxy coming from a changing world.¹⁵

The contributors to volume I (*Fundamentalisms Observed*, 1991) were asked to investigate the sweep and scope of fundamentalist movements and to address a set of common questions, including the following. When and under what circumstances did the group or movement form? What are the specific economic, political, religious and social goals of the movement? Are there strategies in place for achieving these goals? Was there a charismatic founder? How does the movement understand history and human freedom under God? What is its vision of a just order? The published volume contained fourteen different studies of movements within Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, but at this early stage did not attempt to make any direct comparison between them.

A closer look at these guidelines suggests that the project had inbuilt weaknesses, even biases, from the beginning. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby note in their Foreword to James Piscatori's published work, *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, that project directors were careful to provide participating scholars with a working description of the traits and elements of 'religious fundamentalism' as a cross-cultural phenomenon. They outline one of these several 'working definitions.'¹⁶ What is striking

14 William D. Dinges and James Hitchcock, 'Roman Catholic Traditionalism and Activist Conservatism in the United States' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, I, 2, 66–141.

15 Ammerman, 'North American Protestant Fundamentalism' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, I, 1, 14.

16 See Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 'Foreword' in James Piscatori, *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis* (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), xii–xiii. A comparison of this 'working definition' with definitions of fundamentalism found throughout *The Fundamentalism Project* – see especially

is that these working definitions show few signs of further development during the progress of the project. This seems to indicate that the project began with its own clearly defined understanding of fundamentalism, and was not able or prepared to venture into unforeseen areas of investigation or to accommodate new insights – for example, those offered in chapters by Helen Hardacre, Andrea Rugh and Shahla Haeri, which call attention to the deeply patriarchal character of fundamentalism.

Therefore, despite its sweeping vision and broad scope, and the undeniable usefulness of much of its research, *The Fundamentalism Project* on closer analysis incorporates some investigational limitations. These include merely cursory attention given to some important and significant areas of investigation, including:

- (a) the failure to give proper attention to women's issues and perspectives,
- (b) the lack of a critical in-depth analysis of ways in which globalized economic and political forces were contributing to the rise of fundamentalisms,
- (c) a lack of awareness and failure to investigate phenomena associated with the growth of fundamentalist impulses at the centre of Catholic Christianity, and
- (d) a lack of comparative study of fundamentalist responses with non-fundamentalist alternatives amidst the shifting balances of power, for example in developing states of Central Asia.

Treatment of Catholic fundamentalism

A noticeable aspect of *The Fundamentalism Project's* treatment of Catholic fundamentalism is the paucity of articles which address it. Articles on Christianity in volume IV – by Nancy Ammerman ('The Dynamics of Christian

II, 'Introduction', 3; III, 'Introduction', 3; and Gabriel A. Almond, Emmanuel Sivan, and R. Scott Appleby, 'Politics, Ethnicity and Fundamentalism' (V, 18, 503ff) – shows little development.

Fundamentalism'¹⁷ and 'Accounting for Christian Fundamentalisms')¹⁸ and Robert Wuthnow and Matthew P. Lawson ('Sources of Christian Fundamentalism in the United States')¹⁹ – are disappointing in that each is engaged with a very limited spectrum of Christianity, both geographically and theologically. It is also very much in contrast to *The Fundamentalism Project's* treatment of Islam found in such studies as James Piscatori's comprehensive survey of Islamic movements and their catalysts in places as diverse as Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria and Gaza in 'Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms',²⁰ and other studies throughout the *Project* such as John O. Voll's essay, 'Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World, Egypt and the Sudan',²¹ as well as Manning Nash's examination of revivalism in 'Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia'.²²

Presumably, when Almond, Sivan and Appleby describe US (Catholic) traditionalism as a fundamentalist ideology in search of an organizational structure, resources, personnel – 'in short an ideology in search of a movement',²³ it is because they were looking for a fundamentalist movement somewhere on the fringe of the Catholic world, and did not have the heuristic framework to see a fundamentalist mindset taking greater control in the central organizational structure of Catholicism – at the Vatican itself. This may be one explanation of why the issue of Catholic fundamentalism

17 Nancy T. Ammerman, 'The Dynamics of Christian Fundamentalism' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, IV, 1, 13–17.

18 'Accounting for Christian Fundamentalisms' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, IV, 7, 149–72.

19 Robert Wuthnow and Matthew P. Lawson, 'Sources of Christian Fundamentalism in the United States' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, IV, 2, 18–56.

20 James Piscatori, 'Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, IV, 14, 361–73.

21 John O. Voll, 'Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, I, 6, 345–402.

22 Manning Nash, 'Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, I, 12, 691–739.

23 Gabriel A. Almond, Emmanuel Sivan and R. Scott Appleby, 'Fundamentalism: Genus and Species' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, V, 16, 422.

and its manifestations are generally so inadequately treated in *The Fundamentalism Project*. It is also sometimes argued that fundamentalism has difficulty taking root in a community as large and culturally diverse as the Catholic Church.²⁴

Only two articles in the entire project deal with Catholic fundamentalism in an in-depth way – William Dinges’s treatment of ‘Roman Catholic Traditionalism’²⁵ in volume I and ‘Comunione e Liberazione: A Fundamentalist Idea of Power’²⁶ by Dario Zadra in volume IV. In contrast to Ammerman’s examination of North American Protestant fundamentalism, Dinges seems reluctant to name fundamentalism as such in the Catholic context. He refers throughout his article to ‘conservative Catholics’, ‘the traditionalist movement’, ‘traditionalist ideology’, a ‘fundamentalist ethos’ and ‘the fundamentalist dynamic within Catholic traditionalism’ almost interchangeably. In other places, rather than speak of Catholic fundamentalism, he makes reference to traditionalism which ‘manifests a fundamentalist tendency’ and which ‘follows the fundamentalist pattern.’ Although he makes a valid point that, while being similar in content and cause, Catholic traditionalism and Protestant fundamentalism differ in their respective forms and structures he seems overly reluctant to utilize the term ‘fundamentalism’ in relation to Catholicism.²⁷

24 For example, Nikki Keddie says ‘To date, Roman Catholics, even in believing areas, have resisted fundamentalism, aside from “integralist” traditional movements that are not politically significant.... Roman Catholicism is the only major religion with a single doctrinal leader,... a dynamic which may inhibit the flexibility needed for local fundamentalisms’ in ‘The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do “Fundamentalisms” Appear?’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, volume 40, number 4 (1998), 703–4.

25 Dinges and Hitchcock, ‘Roman Catholic Traditionalism and Activist Conservatism in the United States’, 66–141.

26 Dario Zadra, ‘Comunione e Liberazione: A Fundamentalist Idea of Power’ in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, IV, 6, 124–48.

27 It is also noteworthy that when Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity is mentioned at all it is usually within the context of a chapter dealing largely with Muslim fundamentalism. Coptic Christianity in Egypt receives attention in this way in e.g. Andrea B. Rugh, ‘Reshaping Personal Relations in Egypt’ in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, II, 7, 165 ff.

In his essay Dinges helpfully outlines what he believes are the essential characteristics of what he labels ‘Catholic traditionalism.’ While it cannot be reduced to a single historical or social cause, the recent rise of the movement is clearly related to the crisis of reform and authority, and a reaction to a ‘blurring’ of Catholic identity, which took place in the aftermath of the Catholic Church’s Second Vatican Council held in the 1960s. He notes that, like Protestant fundamentalism, Catholic traditionalism is an anti-modernist worldview ‘rooted in adherence to religious and epistemological categories that have lost much of their plausibility and privileged status in the wake of institutional and intellectual change and adaptation.’²⁸ Its distinguishing feature is not merely nostalgia for bygone ritualism. Rather it is a radicalized and self-conscious anti-modernist ideology... a repudiation of historical consciousness as it is expressed in the ‘anthropological turn’ towards the subject, and the other relativizing tendencies that characterize contemporary consciousness. Like other fundamentalisms, Catholic traditionalism is not distinguished so much by the specific content of its orthodoxy, or by its epistemological presuppositions (e.g. pre-Kantian empirical rationalism) but by the priority it gives to ‘correct belief’ itself. It has a strongly rationalistic orientation where doctrine is not seen as a historical product of Christian experience but is what *determines* Christian experience.²⁹

In the course of his chapter Dinges outlines some defining characteristics of Catholic traditionalism which, while manifesting themselves in some ways that are particular to Catholicism, in essence are common to all fundamentalisms. For Dinges the five main features of traditionalist ideology are:

- (1) a radicalized and self-conscious anti-modernist ideology [which within Catholicism arises from reaction to the ‘false principles’ of the Reformation (Protestantism) and the French Revolution (liberalism and modernism)].

28 Dinges and Hitchcock, ‘Roman Catholic Traditionalism and Activist Conservatism in the United States’, I, 2, 98.

29 Ibid., 81–2.

- (2) a highly cognitive orientation in which ‘correct belief’ (orthodoxy) is seen to be prior to orthopraxis, along with tendencies towards extreme religious objectivism and a heightened sense of supernaturalism. Therefore, doctrine for the Catholic (and scripture for the Protestant) is not seen as a historical product of Christian experience but as what *determines* Christian experience.
- (3) an elitist and exclusivist orientation. Traditionalists, like other fundamentalists in their own contexts, do not see themselves as one option in a pluralist Catholic ecclesiology but are determined to monopolize religious reality.
- (4) a predilection for conspiracy and subversion theories, seeing themselves as engaged in spiritual warfare against ‘heresy’ or the ‘infidel’, and
- (5) a movement primarily concerned with the struggle for power, and often permeated with a right-wing sociopolitical agenda. In the case of Catholicism this power struggle is also characterized by class conflict and status politics within the Church itself.

Dinges outlines the many ways that the causes of Catholic traditionalism are comparable to those of Protestant fundamentalism: the extension of earlier theological orientations, the reaction against new epistemological and hermeneutical frames of reference, widespread social and cultural crisis linked to the loss of religious identity and discipline, the erosion of traditional forms of authority and the crisis of faith brought about by the relativizing of sacred realities by strategic elites within the respective traditions.³⁰

He also highlights what he sees as the three main differences between Protestant fundamentalism and Catholic traditionalism:

- (1) that, while the fundamentalist movement developed in a gradual and diffuse manner in evangelical Christianity, the rise of Catholic traditionalism, with its roots in the earlier Catholic Integralist response to the pressures of modernity at the beginning of the twentieth century, was given special impetus by a specific event: the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965).

30 Ibid., 99–100.

- (2) Catholic traditionalism has been more preoccupied with the problem of legitimacy than has been the case with Protestant fundamentalism, and
- (3) the traditionalist emphasis has been upon ritual practice rather than biblical texts.

Dinges cites the necessity of distinguishing in Roman Catholicism between a fundamentalist 'orientation', which 'may be a latent ethos in any religious tradition' and a 'separatist fundamentalist movement', which he sees as having the 'more serious sociopolitical implications.' However, by his reluctance to name what is clearly Catholic fundamentalism as such and by drawing attention to what he sees as defining differences between Catholic traditionalism and Protestant fundamentalism, Dinges seems to want to suggest that fundamentalism is not really an issue in Catholicism. In this, I would argue, he fails to comprehend the full extent of the existence of fundamentalism and especially its impact internally on the Roman Catholic Church. He gives little inkling of the power struggles going on at the centre of the Church's administrative bureaucracy as fundamentalist leaders over the last few decades have put their energies into trying to maintain its traditional patriarchal and hierarchical culture, even more so during the long papacy of John Paul II.

The only other essay in *The Fundamentalism Project* which deals in any depth with fundamentalism in a Roman Catholic context is that by Zadra, which examines the *Communione e Liberazione (CL)* movement in volume IV. This organisation, whose founder is Luigi Giussani, a Catholic theologian and priest, began in Milan, Italy in 1956. It emerged from the Italian context, having as its central focus the reclamation of Catholic hegemony and the return of the Church to its traditional role of political power in the face of an increasingly secularized Italian culture and state. The movement draws on such images as the 'Church expelled' from Italian society, reflecting the events that brought the papal states to an end, and has remained mainly Italian-based. It condemns modernity as a cultural and political form of life that is devoid of any sovereign religious principle. It rejects the separation of church and modern state and boldly puts forward a Catholic claim dating from the teaching of Robert Bellarmine in the seventeenth century that the Church, as hierarchically constituted,

embodies authoritative truth that is binding on society at large. Although the article provides an in-depth study of the Catholic fundamentalist group *Communione e Liberazione*, it lacks analysis of its increasing influence as part of a growing fundamentalist orientation within the wider Catholic Church of the 1970s and 1980s.

The study of Roman Catholic fundamentalism in *The Fundamentalism Project* appears to be inadequate and quite superficial. Given the fact that, like Islam, Christianity is a world-wide religion with many cultural manifestations, the project's study of Catholic fundamentalism lacks both breadth and depth in comparison with its treatment of Islamic fundamentalisms. The researchers were not able to clearly diagnose the fundamentalist currents at work at the very heart of Catholic Christianity because of their focus on fundamentalisms as movements 'over and against' the culturally dominant or mainstream manifestations of a religious tradition, and possibly also because they, probably largely unconsciously, worked with Protestant fundamentalism as the normative form of Christian fundamentalism. There are many more *Project* articles dealing with Protestant fundamentalism. Weaknesses in the analysis of economic issues in volume III meant that the significance of global politico-economic forces and the Vatican's collusion with them in support of its efforts to maintain its own internal and external power interests went unnoticed. Further, lack of attention to fundamentalism as a 'patriarchal protest movement', described by Hardacre as 'the highest priority of the fundamentalist social agenda' in both Islam and Christianity,³¹ was another clue which should have alerted researchers to fundamentalist impulses within Catholicism. However, it was overlooked due to the lack of a thoroughgoing feminist perspective.

Women's experience

The Fundamentalism Project's second volume (*Fundamentalisms and Society*, 1993) and third volume (*Fundamentalisms and the State*, 1993) go on to delve more deeply into the impact of fundamentalist movements from

31 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, II, 'Introduction', 7.

early twentieth century until 1990 in six 'zones' or spheres of human existence. These are (a) science and technology, (b) family and interpersonal relationships, (c) education and media, (d) political life, (e) the economy and (f) militancy.

However, although women are mentioned intermittently throughout the study and three chapters in volume II explicitly take up women's issues, women's experience is far from being judged as integral to an understanding of the fundamentalist phenomenon in *The Fundamentalism Project*. As a consequence, the crucial subject of the profoundly patriarchal character of fundamentalism remained unaddressed. Areas of the study which needed much more analysis were the central role that the identity and behaviour of women play in the discourse and dynamics of fundamentalism and the effects of fundamentalism on women's lives. Wherever fundamentalist movements take root, whether in Afghanistan under the Taliban or, more subtly, the restrictions put on women in official Vatican teaching, women everywhere seem to become the first casualties of fundamentalist regimes.

It is in volume II that the issue of patriarchy as a pervasive and defining characteristic of fundamentalism is first taken up. The editors admit that it is in the realm of domestic relations that fundamentalists find the boundaries they wish to impose are most enforceable and that fundamentalist attempts to restore the 'traditional' family usually meet with greater success than those to reorder the public sphere. Studies by Helen Hardacre ('The Impact of Fundamentalisms on Women, the Family and Interpersonal Relations'),³² Andrea Rugh ('Reshaping Personal Relations in Egypt')³³ and Shahla Haeri ('Obedience versus Autonomy: Women and Fundamentalism in Iran and Pakistan')³⁴ provide valuable insight into the impact of fundamentalism on women's lives.

32 Helen Hardacre, 'The Impact of Fundamentalisms on Women, the Family and Interpersonal Relations' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, II, 6, 129–50.

33 Rugh, 'Reshaping Personal Relations in Egypt', 151–80.

34 Shahla Haeri, 'Obedience versus Autonomy: Women and Fundamentalism in Iran and Pakistan' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, II, 8, 181–213.

Referring to Hardacre's observation that for many fundamentalists the family and women's role in it serves as a potent symbol of an idealized moral order, the editors Marty and Appleby acknowledge that fundamentalist efforts to order gender relations along 'traditional' lines, with a resulting severe restriction of female sexual expression and autonomy outside the home, constitutes 'a patriarchal protest movement against the empowerment and "liberation" of women in nontraditional societies.'³⁵ They recognize that existing social inequalities provide an inherent advantage for fundamentalists in their efforts to order gender relationships along 'traditional' – that is, patriarchal, lines. At the same time, the editors acknowledge the complex role of women in traditional societies. The extent to which women are willing participants in a return to traditional norms of personal and social behaviour they believe is a subject that needs to be explored further. Questions include: Under what circumstances do women support male-dominated fundamentalist movements? Do women assume leadership roles within fundamentalist movements, many of which seem designed to preserve and fortify patriarchal structures? What benefits do women receive in their support of such movements? There is evidence to suggest that some women may view fundamentalist-like movements as vehicles for socioeconomic advancement or as a support in their efforts to domesticate their husbands.

The editors are aware of Majid Tehranian's assertion ('Fundamentalist Impact on Education and the Media: An Overview'),³⁶ of the 'anti-feminist animus of fundamentalism' and recognize that the pronounced patriarchalism of religious fundamentalisms is 'distinctive in terms of the level of self-awareness and intensity by which it is practiced.' They recognize that in fundamentalist communities 'an insistent and at times fierce patriarchalism even seems to serve as a pillar of the fundamentalist world-view.' They also take note of Tehranian's observation in volume II that 'a reassertion of patriarchal values in reaction to modern feminist values is

35 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, II, 'Introduction', 7–9.

36 Majid Tehranian, 'Fundamentalist Impact on Education and the Media' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, II, 12, 313–40.

reflected in the fundamentalist discourse against abortion, coeducation, unveiling and more generally in women's full and equal participation in social, economic and political life.' Since, in fundamentalist perceptions, combinations of these insidious trends have led to a pervasive deterioration of the moral order and traditional (read 'patriarchal') social practices and values, they understand that it is the restoration of such an order for which fundamentalists are aiming.³⁷

However, in claiming that, because patriarchalism is a characteristic of social and familial relations among non-fundamentalists as well as fundamentalists, it is not necessarily a distinctive or identifying mark of the latter, they have not understood the intrinsically patriarchal character of fundamentalism – as not simply a nostalgic desire to return to the past but as a pragmatic movement for self-empowerment of men. Fundamentalists, by selectively retrieving doctrines, beliefs and practices from a sacred past and setting these retrieved fundamentals alongside unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations, are engaged in an attempt to shape a religious identity that will then become the basis for a re-created 'neo-patriarchal' social and political order in which their own pre-eminence will be assured.³⁸ In this cause 'boundaries are set, the enemy identified, converts sought, and institutions created and sustained in the pursuit of a comprehensive reconstruction of society' with their own power interests central to the process.³⁹ Instead of tackling these issues head-on, in subsequent volumes, with the exception of one chapter authored by Valerie Hoffman in volume V ('Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Profiles')⁴⁰ which investigates the gender dynamics at work in attracting members to fundamentalist movements, the essentially patriarchal and neo-patriarchal character of fundamentalism, and its effect on women's lives, disappears from view in *The Fundamentalism Project*.

37 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, II, 'Introduction', 10, 12.

38 See also Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy*.

39 Ibid., 3.

40 Valerie J. Hoffman, 'Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Profiles' in Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, V, 8, 199–230.

In the last four chapters of the fifth and final volume (*Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, 1995), described as the ‘capstone statement of *The Fundamentalism Project*’, in a section which is meant to be read in tandem with the opening chapter by Sivan on ‘The Enclave Culture’, the editorial team attempts to draw the material from the previous volumes together to produce a coherent framework of understanding which will provide a cross-cultural explication of the main characteristics of fundamentalism.⁴¹ Chapter 17 describes four patterns of behaviour towards the world outside the religious enclave (world-conqueror, world-transformer, world-creator and world-renouncer). Chapter 18 tests the theory in action, running case studies through the grid. Chapter 19 focuses on the political and ethnic aspects of fundamentalism and the political strategies adopted by different movements in different cultural and political settings.

By this stage, to the detriment of the project, it is evident that the valuable insights of the earlier studies, especially in volume II, which pointed to the neo-patriarchal dynamic at work at the very heart of the phenomenon of the rise of religious fundamentalism, have disappeared from the final analyses of *The Fundamentalism Project*. Nor are the links between the neo-patriarchal character of fundamentalism and global economic issues adequately recognized and discussed.

Another intriguing aspect is the absence of the voices of fundamentalists themselves, with which the editors seemed little concerned. The editors’ justification was that the people with the skills necessary to contribute to the project were not such fundamentalists and instead the non-fundamentalist authors of chapters were charged with the responsibility of taking the interests of fundamentalists into consideration.⁴² It is to the detriment of the study that the model found in volume I chapter 2, in which the scholarly approach of William D. Dinges to the topic of Catholic traditionalism is complemented by the ‘inside’ voice of James Hitchcock, was not more widely adopted, and that women’s experience was not more central to the project.

41 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, V, ‘Introduction’, 3–4.

42 Ibid., I, ‘Introduction’, x.

Globalization and economic issues

Another key area, superficially covered in *The Fundamentalism Project*, despite having a whole section devoted to economic issues in volume III, is that of the impact of economic globalization as a causal factor in the rise of fundamentalisms. This could have been more adequately addressed, especially from the perspective of the way in which global economic forces, often US and Western-driven, can and do provide a fertile breeding ground for fundamentalist responses.

In volume III a first attempt is made to address the *global* processes which underpin the modern phenomenon of the rise of fundamentalisms. The editors explain that because 'society' and 'state' overlap and interact in significant ways, fundamentalists inevitably become involved in modern political life and in so doing they find they are participants in a common discourse about modernization, development, political structures and economic planning. Although they may successfully or unsuccessfully try to redirect or reinvent aspects of this discourse, they are inevitably contained within it. Therefore the 'tide of influence' can be seen to run in two directions. When they play politics to influence the state fundamentalists will almost certainly find themselves in situations that require compromise, even to such a degree that the word 'fundamentalist' may no longer apply to them.

Volume IV (*Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, 1994) develops further the issue of how fundamentalisms are shaped by their environments. It explores the dynamic character of religious radicalism – the way in which fundamentalist movements around the world change their ideological and behaviour patterns as they move into or away from greater engagement with people or forces outside the movement. It looks at fundamentalist religious groupings across a spectrum, from separatist to accommodationist movements, and asks: How may we account for the various attitudes, ideologies and behaviours of fundamentalist movements toward the outside world? Why have some movements that fall within the fundamentalist 'family' organized themselves 'over against' a dominant political, social and/or religious culture, while others have adopted programs of withdrawal and isolation from society, and yet still others have willingly become assimilated to some degree into the larger political, social and cultural milieu?

However, the global economic forces which underpin much of the world's uneven economic development and lead to a sense of disempowerment and loss in many parts of the developing world where Islamic fundamentalisms find a ready response, are not treated in any depth. The collusion between fundamentalisms and patriarchal capitalism, its devaluing of women's economic contribution and work, and its generally devastating impact on women's quality of life, remains unaddressed although, today, these issues are increasingly seen to be integral to an understanding of the dynamics of fundamentalism.

This is true also of the lack of attention *The Fundamentalism Project* is able to give to relevant changes taking place in many parts of the developing world during and after the collapse of Soviet rule between 1989 to 1991, although there is some recognition of them.⁴³ This is mainly because these changes were taking place as the essays for volume IV, including that of Mark Saroyan, 'Authority and Community in Soviet Islam', were being written. Many small republics in Central Asia, which had been part of the Soviet Union, claimed their independence while in other places Marxist regimes were overthrown. While some countries like the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)⁴⁴ experienced the rise of Islamic fundamentalist rule, others, such as Kazakstan in Central Asia, provide an alternative model of how religious heritage can be reclaimed within a modernizing culture without resorting to fundamentalist solutions. Since the impact of modernizing influences in each instance was different, as was the contribution that women were able to make, a study of such contrasts, if they had been incorporated into the project, could have contributed insights into the dynamics present in the rise of fundamentalist movements.

Psycho-social emphasis

One of the greatest weaknesses of *The Fundamentalism Project's* study of fundamentalism is its emphasis on social and psychological aspects to the neglect of political and economic issues. After testing their 'original

43 Ibid., III, 'Introduction', 2.

44 Later unified with North Yemen.

characterization of fundamentalism as a reactive, selective, absolutist, comprehensive mode of anti-secular religious activism', editors Marty and Appleby conclude by identifying fundamentalism as 'a process of selective retrieval, embellishment and construction of "essentials" or "fundamentals" of a religious tradition for the purposes of halting the erosion of traditional society and fighting back against the encroachments of secular modernity.'⁴⁵ However, although the studies provide a comprehensive account of the historical origin of the various fundamentalist movements, they approach the topic almost entirely in historical and phenomenological terms. As a consequence, they are lacking in an examination of the political and economic global processes that could be critical in spawning the fundamentalisms in the first place. Valerie Hoffman in her study 'Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Profiles' touches briefly on the impact of these economic and political issues when she says: 'The Islamists are not angry because the aeroplane has replaced the camel but because they could not get on the aeroplane.'⁴⁶ Analysis of this comment from a gender perspective would also uncover other dynamisms at work in the rise and tenacity of fundamentalisms that have so far been unaccounted for.

Yet, as the editors themselves remark, their study of fundamentalisms despite its magnitude is 'hardly comprehensive' and their hope is that it will provide tools of conceptualization and analysis for developments in years to come.⁴⁷ From the project's beginnings in 1988 the editors recognized the difficulty of even coming to agreement on a single definition or understanding of the term 'fundamentalism' and welcomed a diversity of perspective and interpretation.⁴⁸ They decided to postpone a final verdict on the term until the bulk of research and writing had been completed. Throughout the five volumes many of the authors can be seen to struggle with this aspect of the study, using the term 'fundamentalism' tentatively

45 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, V, 'Introduction', 6.

46 Hoffman, quoting Muslim scholar Nazih Ayubi, in 'Muslim Fundamentalists', 208.

47 Marty and Appleby, eds, *The Fundamentalism Project*, I, 'Introduction', xii.

48 Ibid., ix.

in a way that is exploratory rather than absolute.⁴⁹ The project directors appear to have moved towards a more open interpretation of the term as the project progressed, being prepared to accept ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘fundamentalist-like’ movements, as well as fundamentalist ‘orientations’ as all falling within a broad understanding of the term ‘fundamentalisms.’ This practice, of a relatively open approach towards working definitions of the term ‘fundamentalism’ appears generally to have allowed for greater flexibility, both in seeing the connections and in making necessary distinctions, in regard to the different manifestations of fundamentalism.

Conclusion

Overall, I concur with the general findings of *The Fundamentalism Project* that religious fundamentalisms can be described most essentially as a ‘politics of identity’: a strategy or set of strategies by which beleaguered believers, in a time of threat or uncertainty, attempt to preserve their distinctive identity and values as a group. In doing so they

- react to secularization and their marginalization – by opposing (a) their tepid or corrupt mainstream religious establishments (b) the secularizing state and (c) the secularized civil society (e.g. media, education).
- attempt to fortify their identity by a selective retrieval of doctrines beliefs and practices from a sacred past, thereby reshaping (or ‘reinventing’) particular aspects of the tradition.
- are political as well as religious in intent, envisioning a recreated religiously-based political and social order.

49 Ibid., IV, ‘Introduction’, 5, 8–9. The editors believed that no other co-ordinating term was as intelligible or serviceable in creating a distinction between such terms as ‘traditionalism’, ‘orthodoxy’ or ‘orthopraxis.’