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is being lost.”**

The City

between

Contested Public Spaces
in the 21st Century

Birkhäuser Basel

Freedom

**Deane Simpson
Vibeke Jensen
Anders Rubing
(eds.)**

and

Security

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Foreword: BAS

One can be afraid of flying because of turbulence or inclement weather. One can read the self-help book *It Is Not Dangerous to Fly* to learn that it is not dangerous to fly, mechanically and statistically. But still one has to explain to oneself the anxiety in the bottom of one's heart. What is statistically to fear the most is not a threat, but one's own fear.

Through this book it is pinpointed how our fear is manifested in physical, spatial interventions. We can see these spatial interpretations of threat in the form of bollards in the streets and fenced-in public places organized to handle violent crowds and lone wolves. The situations studied and presented in this book reveal an architecture of threat prevention that visually and spatially expresses our fear, just as much as it expresses the risk we are exposed to, but to what degree does it also cater to expressions of freedom or enable subjective initiatives in the public domain?

Grounding the freedom of both the subject and the group to position oneself and to find one's place in a broader public discourse is essential in catering for democracy. In this book this is challenged with the focus on security in places and buildings. Through careful readings of means and thoughts constituting this architecture of security, can we start to distinguish our fear from the threat, and through that start a new approach of spatial negotiation of power relations, agencies, and interests premised by expressions of freedom?

At Bergen School of Architecture (BAS) we believe in understanding public space as a generous field for various groups and interests to find and develop their subjective place within the common public space. Through our education we strive to negotiate place and facilitate for the users to take part in shaping their grounding of ambiguous positions in the public. Through courses like City Secure we get to challenge these ideals up against measures of strain. Through this book the theme of security and freedom can be challenged not as biased or conflicting interests, but seen to coexist to encompass a good framework for an inclusive public life for all.

This book would not be a reality if it had not been for the master course "City Secure," arranged at BAS in autumn 2013 in collaboration with the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) and COWI, Center for Risk-Reducing Design. The course was in terms of ambitions and relevance the most far-reaching collaborative course ever arranged at BAS. The teachers and professors engaged in this course provided competence on a leading international, academic, artistic, and military analytical level. The students were met in a way that lifted their professional aspirations and analytical mode, and they responded with inquiring curiosity, engagement, and commitment. The discussions were informed by a broad array of stakeholders who conveyed their sincere attitude, interest, experience, and expertise throughout the entire process. The inquiries done in this course will through this book contribute to the important discussion on the sociospatial mechanism of negotiating democratic aspects of place-making.

The school is very grateful to the teachers, architects, and students who urged to bring the questions and inquiries from the course further into a process leading to this ambitious publication. We are also very grateful to NSM, PST, COWI, KRIPOS and TØI for the initiatives, support, and engaged involvement throughout the master course and in supporting and contributing to the publication. This support and commitment was essential to pursue the ambition level of this book.

All through the course and the process of the publication all interested parties have been clear in the aspiration and attitude toward creating a forum for the many various and conflicting voices in this debate. This angle of approach has been vital for our interest in the project. While the publication withholds closed or rigid judgement, we are grateful for the clear angle of approach every contributor and stakeholder in this publication has taken and grateful for the huge work done by the editors to weave these different voices into a dialogue where differences and nuances are brought forward.

Many of the cases in this book represent high-risk areas with a high level of security measures. It is with unease that we imagine ourselves negotiating our everyday practice within these spaces of manifested threat. We refuse to accept that architecture can be reduced to objects: While urban planning is not dealing solely with sites but with complex situations, threat is still site-specific and not seen as generic; site-specific interventions are carried out in a visual language that can be understood as generic although situated.

But despite this, these places are part of people's everyday lives, they are part of a public life, and they constitute the space we in centuries have negotiated in relation to aspects of safety. These circumstances cannot ease the need for a discussion on how to handle security without compromising freedom. Therefore it is essential that architects, planners, strategists, and politicians engage in the questions of how to cater for both security and freedom when the city and its spatial boundaries and borders are to be negotiated. This promises a book proposing a different set of urgencies, where relations to justice and freedom are spatially situated.

Cecilie Andersson,
Rector, Bergen School of Architecture

Foreword: NSM/PST

Whatever conceptions exist of security, it is in essence a balancing act. Function, budgets, resilience, form – all of these are inputs in considering security. In a public discourse on security, the major balancing act in an open and democratic society is the area between freedom and security.

There are few academic courses internationally, and until recently none in Norway, on the topic of secure design. We believe it is important to create a coherent understanding of the topic on all levels.

Wishing to dispel myths and explore alternative paths in the field of secure design, the National Security Authority (NSM)¹ and the Police Security Service (PST)² engage academia in joining at exploring security as a discourse. Though NSM and PST had previously arranged training with various professions, including architects, a full master course came to fruition when PST engaged with the Bergen School of Architecture (BAS).³ The cooperation resulted in a series of lectures by both government authorities and private stakeholders, along with in-depth assisted study trips to Great Britain, Norway, and the Middle East. Preconditions such as culture and threat level play an intricate part in the design and outlook of security. Physical security measures are as a point of departure relatively easy to plan and implement, but the political and economic consequences may be huge. This is not least the case when democratic principles such as openness and accessibility are concerned.

NSM and PST have partly overlapping tasks in providing advisories to the public on protective security, as well as preventing espionage, terrorism, and sabotage in their respective fields of expertise. A rule of thumb is, if security is a consideration in the early stages of planning, it is a more cost-effective and less intrusive feature than the retrofitting of security measures. No security measure should infringe more than strictly necessary and at the same time it should be robust and functional. Public security may also be multifunctional beyond security, and even contribute to more open urban areas, pedestrian zones, and environmental benefits. The key to achieving this is proper planning and sufficient multidisciplinary knowledge.

Apart from a very successful master course, this publication is a result of an academic exploration. It is intended as a reference for architects, city planners, designers, artists, engineers, and academia as well as security advisors and specialists. A mutual understanding of concepts and common reference on the topic of design and security will increase the output for all professionals involved. We do not intend to serve any absolute truths, but encourage an informed debate of what kind of role a balanced security will play in our society.

It is a prerequisite for us that both the course and this publication should reflect a comprehensive view and bring forward all views of essential questions in security policy. PST and NSM are concerned about security discipline and would like the interaction between security, safety, and openness to become the center of attention. PST and NSM

are not responsible for the content of the publication, nor the groundwork and conclusions which the students or BAS reuse or mention.

This publication aims to serve as a basis for further discussions on the topic of secure design. By maintaining focus we will be able to continue to improve and explore better ways of preserving a balance in which freedom and security are not at odds with each other.

The NSM and PST would like to thank and acknowledge the assistance of both public and private contributors to the professional contents of this publication and the master course at BAS, such as Norwegian National Crime Investigation Service (KRIPOS),⁴ the Norwegian Government Security and Service Organization (DSS),⁵ and COWI.

For our international cooperation a special acknowledgment goes to the UK's National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), as well as to the Norwegian Embassy in Israel.

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Introduction: On urban Indefensibility: Friction Lines in the Production of the Open City

“In the new military doctrine of asymmetric war [...] the prosaic and everyday sites, circulation and spaces of the city are becoming the main ‘battlespace’ both at home and abroad.”

Stephen Graham, *Cities Under Siege*

“If every space is susceptible to attack and every person a potential attacker, then the only recourse is to watch everyone and fortify everyplace. If every communication is potentially a fragment of conspiracy, then all must be recorded. Walking the streets nowadays, with troops at the subway entrance, barricades around buildings, cameras staring from lampposts [...] it feels – more and more – like the battle for freedom is being lost.”

Michael Sorkin, *Indefensible Space*

In recent years, terror events in cities such as New York (2001), Madrid (2004), London (2005), Boston (2013), Paris (2015), and Brussels (2016) have contributed to – and have been used as justification for – a renewed militarization and securitization of cities in the west.¹ This has led to a condition in which contemporary urban settings are, according to Stephen Graham, increasingly “...saturated by intelligent surveillance systems, checkpoints, defensive urban design and planning strategies, and intensifying security.”² In the United States and Europe in particular, this process has not only had considerable impact on the physical composition of urban public space, but also upon the citizenry’s access to it, and the activities and uses legally or practically tolerated within those spaces.

The attacks of July 2011 in Oslo would intensify the debate on terror in the Nordic setting. In the immediate aftermath of these events the rhetorics of then Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg focused on preserving the ethos and functioning of an open democratic civil society, in the face of a perceived elevated risk of terrorism. This was communicated with the statement: “Our answer is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity, but never naivety.”³ For external commentators these words were welcomed as generous and mature – in contrast to common political statements following other terror events tending to emphasise retribution, and the will to impose a state of exception. Stoltenberg’s statement, it has also been argued, more closely reflects the cultural perspective of the Nordic countries – within which the notion of trust plays a central role. It remains to be seen whether these words only represent political rhetoric – or sincere ambitions destined to be undermined by risk-averse state security agencies or the later government. Might such inclinations suggest the potential for an alternative political and cultural starting point, thus enabling an alternative discourse and an alternative set of spatial responses to the perceived threat of terror?

In the context of this evolving situation, and with the necessity to develop security approaches to the rebuilding of the heavily bomb-damaged Government Quarter in Oslo, the

Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) and the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) approached the Bergen Architecture School (BAS). Their inquiry was directed toward whether the school would be interested in exploring alternative approaches to the challenge of safety and security in the city in the context of a master course on security by design. Their interest was in responses that might avoid limitations such as what they referred to as American “security theatre.” These representatives expressed an interest in exploring a possible relationship between security and accessibility (and the associated right to the city) that was not one of mutual exclusivity. They suggested the potential contribution of design toward more aesthetic and less visible approaches to physical security measures, and in exploring how to integrate security thinking in the planning phase of buildings and public spaces rather than relying on expensive retrofits.

The proposal appeared positioned between a sincere and humble gesture to engage architectural and urban research and design on the one hand, and a public relations effort on behalf of agencies that had not come out unscathed from investigations into the 2011 events, on the other. This involved the BAS teaching team maintaining academic independence to run a course and control its content, while PST and NSM contributed their knowledge, and those of various experts, as possible inputs among others. Our own reticence toward organizations of this nature was heightened by the increasingly sensational exposure at the time of the expansive and intrusive actions of state security apparatuses⁴ – just as we had reservations concerning the behaviorist bent of the “security by design” and “crime prevention through environmental design” discourses that the security experts were interested in.⁵

After further deliberation, those concerns were gradually outweighed by what the editors agreed represented a unique opportunity to gain unprecedented access to the mind-sets and workings of these agencies, to potentially influence those who were most likely to impose security thinking on the future design of the Government Quarter in Oslo, and on public space in Norway in general. The agencies’ interest in supporting a publication resulting from the course – which they intended to function as a textbook for security and spatial professionals – suggested further opportunities to contribute to a broader long-term debate beyond an internal discussion with like-minded architects. At the same time, we believed that the collaboration could offer a productive pedagogical experience, exposing the students to an entire gamut of thinking and dynamics behind this issue, allowing them to position themselves critically within it.

Such a starting point would open up a wide range of questions and issues for discussion.

To what extent is the notion of the secure or safe city produced at the cost of the city of freedom, democracy, and the right to the city? This introduces competing histories, and conceptions, as well as aspirations for the city, framing on the one hand, a city understood through the terms of security (evident in the city’s intimate coupling with conflict and

warfare), and, on the other hand, a city functioning as a site of freedom (and emancipation, as well as social and political dynamism).

The reemergence of the former – the securitized city – is presented by Graham as the culmination of a historical arc following the entwinement of warfare and the city, one that originates with cities and city states, in premodern and early modern times functioning as both “...primary agents, as well as the main targets of war.”⁶ This connection is evident in historical urban morphology reflecting defensive and offensive logics from various ages. The specific organizing dimensions, geometries, and construction formats of pre-nineteenth-century walled cities – such as Vauban’s fortified cities of the late 1600s – are indicative of this, as are their subsequent obsolescence and removal due to advancements in offensive military technology in the middle of the nineteenth century. The subsequent distancing of specific acts of war from the city culminates in the mid-twentieth century in “a long period when Western military thought was preoccupied with planning globe-straddling nuclear exchanges between superpowers or massed tank engagements across rural plains.”⁷ With the return of the historical arc to the contemporary period of asymmetrical conflict, or “the long war,” warfare and “military and security imaginaries” reenter the city.⁸

The opposing historical, conceptual, and aspirational vision, position the city as a site of freedom, emancipation, social and political dynamism, as well as democratic dissent. Evoked in Hegel’s formalization of the eleventh-century German proverb “city air makes one free” – the history of this city may be tied to the longer tradition of the spaces of the Greek agora or the Roman forum. In broader contemporary terms, this may be tied to notions of and aspirations toward the open city (Richard Sennett, Kees Christiaanse) / the “inclusive city” (Ash Amin) / the democratic city (Sennett) / and in more specific terms, the right to the city (Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey.) For David Harvey, “The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.”⁹ It is this right – enabling the city as a site of social and political dynamism, democratic dissent, and even civil disobedience – that many have argued is increasingly under threat from the renewed securitization process taking place in cities, the components of which include: increased physical security measures in our cities, the privatization of public space, the militarization of urban police forces, and increasingly constrained laws addressing public assembly, particularly those related to states of exception responsible for the criminalization of protest, among other aspects.¹⁰

It is relevant to also mention that these contrasting conceptions of the city do not always neatly function in exclusion of one another – but can from time to time be characterised by a more complex set of relations, and overlaps. Physical security measures, such as hostile vehicle mitigation barriers surrounding a public space like a parliamentary square, can also perform as a driver for the pedestrianization of urban areas. While vibrant, densely inhabited urban areas can be interpreted as sites of possible risk, the presence of many

“eyes on the street” may also be understood as supporting a form of passive surveillance and increased safety.

To what extent do the perceived political pressures immediately following a terror event – in which political figures feel an obligation to show strong leadership in implementing security measures – lead to the introduction of a state of exception that potentially endures as a permanent condition? What discrepancies are present between the rhetorics justifying these security measures, and their actual disposition? Critics of various securitization strategies have focused on such discrepancies between these poles. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian separation barrier is presented largely in terms of the rhetorics of terror prevention, while its disposition tends toward an extended state of exception allowing territorial annexation and settlement expansion, and the systematic punishment on an everyday basis of Palestinians. The securitization measures of the 2007 APEC Summit in Sydney were justified according to the rhetorics of the protection of heads of state from potential terror attacks while critique was directed toward the disposition of such extreme measures in intimidating, preventing, and criminalizing demonstrations. The law enforcement reaction to Occupy Wall Street was presented in terms of the rhetorics of maintaining public order and public health in contrast to the disposition of the actions taken to criminalize and shut down social/political movement that was in the process of challenging existing political, social and economic orders.

Is the intensity of political attention and resources attributed to the process of securitization proportional to the threat in terms loss of life, injuries (or property damage) that terror (and crime) produces? To what extent is the economic influence of the security industry supporting the drive to securitize the city? What would be an appropriate balance between securing against terror vs against other forms of crime or other threats? American critics of the disproportional character of securitization compare, for example, the casualties and preventative investments addressing terrorism, to those of other causes of death such as heart disease, cancer, or stroke. In the US, one is over a thousand times more likely to die from gun violence than from a terrorist attack. The probability of death from lightning strike, for example, is three times more likely than by terrorism.¹¹

To what extent is the public discourse on terror (and crime) and the everyday lived experience of urban space dominated by purely irrational emotions and thought processes? And to what extent should physical security measures address these psychological states? In the post-July 2011 period, for example, according to a security advisor in the Norwegian government, “...we never receive any calls [when blue or red vans park outside government offices]. But when a white van parks in front of a government building, the department and the police receive dozens of calls from panicked government employees.”¹²

Does the classified threat information controlled by intelligence agencies provide an opportunity to elevate or maintain a high threat level, and in so doing be able to promote the urgency and importance of their own work? For example, the low frequency of attacks and the presentation by authorities that an indeterminate number of threats have been neutralized may be presented as the result of the security measures taken to protect us, the details of which have to be maintained as secret.

If our cities are in a state of constant war – and if we see a widening range of vulnerable targets from politically symbolic objects (for example, New York, September 11, 2001) to expanded sites of everyday life (for example, Paris, November 13, 2015) – can the city really be secured against these ever-expanding threats? What determines the stopping points for the introduction of physical security measures? Is it a relevant project to attempt to eliminate risk to the degree that the security-industrial complex proposes? Do we not live with risk on an everyday basis, whether crossing the road, riding a bicycle, or living with the possibility of having a stroke or heart attack? In the case of dynamic and changing threats, is it feasible for physical measures – which are often slow and expensive to implement, and tend to become permanent – to respond appropriately? A proposed reaction to the 2016 Brussels Airport bombing, for example, which took place in the departure check-in area, involves moving the security screening location to the departure hall entry, just as it has been done at Israeli airports. But does that not lead to the displacement of that threat to the drop-off area and X-ray screening line immediately outside the new security point? Should the screening then take place at the boarding points of trains and buses taking passengers to airports? This highlights the difficulty, and sometimes absurdity, of eliminating risk, and the problem of undefined stopping points.

If trust is one of the key strengths of Nordic societies and built into the logic of its urban spaces, what impact does the securitization of the city have on the experience of the city as a space of trust? How vulnerable are these spaces to physical and nonphysical measures associated with securitization? Do these measures impact on the vitality of urban life and on political and social dynamism?

While the publication does not seek to provide comprehensive or definitive answers to all of the questions above, reflections on them resonate throughout the project in its various sections. To understand how these questions have been addressed in existing contexts, we proposed for the studio members to travel (and take those from PST and NSM with us) to some of what we saw as some of the most problematic and oppressive forms of security thinking applied to urban space outside the United States: the UK, Israel, and Palestine. While PST and NSM offered to arrange meetings for us with representatives from security organizations such as Britain's MI5, and the counterterrorism department of the London Metropolitan Police, we also arranged meetings with representatives of organizations focused on the threat that the security apparatus poses to civil liberties, free speech and the right to the city, such as the Occupy Movement and the Olympic Monitor in London, and academics, civil rights groups, and activists addressing security measures deployed in the UK and in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. This rich, varied, and at times, extraordinary and disconcerting range of experiences have informed the concept for this publication – one approaching a broad audience in contemporary debates at the intersection of architecture, urbanism, and security.

The publication is comprised of six sections, under the headings: *Introduction*, *Discursive Texts*, *Contested Sites*, *Expert Interviews*, *Discursive Proposals*, and *Glossary*. The *Introduction* section outlines the context and thematics associated with the project. It includes a *Project Journal* chronicling the experiences and inputs occurring during the duration of the

master course. Significant events and important friction lines are highlighted within the running journal text.

The *Discursive Texts* section presents key theoretical works curated from contrasting viewpoints. The section builds upon, on the one hand, an existing body of critical literature such as: Stephen Graham's *Cities Under Siege* (Verso, 2010); Graham's edited volumes *Architectures of Fear* (CCCB, 2008), *Cities, War, and Terrorism* (Blackwell, 2004); Eyal Weizman's *Hollow Land* (Verso, 2007); the Michael Sorkin edited *Indefensible Space* (Routledge, 2007); Tim Reiniets and Philipp Misselwitz's *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism* (Birkhäuser, 2006); and Gerd De Bruyn, Stephan Trüby, et al's *5 Codes: Architecture, Paranoia and Risk in Times of Terror* (Birkhäuser, 2006). This strain of publications locates security prerogatives as one of the dominant obsessions of our zeitgeist – which at the same time represents one of the most fundamental challenges/threats to the ideals of open, accessible, and democratic cities. On the other hand, the section presents an opposing body of security- and risk-focused literature such as: Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme Newman's *Outsmarting the Terrorists* (Praeger Security, 2008); Jon Coaffee's *Terrorism, Risk and the Global City* (Blackwell, 2009), the US Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research's *Creating Defensible Space* (1996); and guides published by the Home Office in UK (for example: *Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues*) which are frequently referenced in the security field. These publications are representative of the security by design literature featuring theories and strategies for securing, stratifying, and hardening our cities by tactics of situational terror prevention (partly derived from strategies of situational crime prevention) and resiliency to prevent/minimize the impact of terror attacks. Texts aligned to the two perspectives are juxtaposed on facing sides of each spread, separated by a white interpretive space. Key excerpts from each text protrude into that space, creating a dialogue between the opposing sides. The white space is additionally occupied by key words providing links to explanations in the *Glossary* section at the back of the book.

The *Contested Sites* section documents international instances of security architecture through drawings, maps, analytical diagrams, and timelines. These documents, developed in draft form by the students, unfold the composition, organization, and disposition – as well as the consequences of – the securitization of space in different settings. Collectively the documentation of these sites forms an inventory of spatial instruments and techniques associated with securitization.

The *Expert Interviews* section documents conversations with a range of relevant experts addressing specific aspects of the theme from different perspectives. Both the *Expert Interviews* and the *Discursive Texts* sections are interspersed with annotated *Photo Essays*, providing a candid visual travelogue of the expanded series of sites analyzed.

The *Discursive Design Proposals* section presents student-generated scenarios for the reconstruction of the Oslo Government Quarter affected by the 2011 bombing. These proposals explore a range of responses to the pressures for securitized urban space, from the prioritization of the design of security measures to a negotiated balance between security measures and architectural/urban quality and the right to the city to outright resistance to the securitization of urban space.

The diverse sections of the book – interposing theoretical texts, interviews, photo essays, projects, etc., from a range of perspectives – provide a platform to position the reader in the center of a debate that carries particular urgency for all of us, one which foregrounds the fragility of our urban settings as sites supporting trust, openness, and social and political dynamism in the face of securitization tendencies.

Deane Simpson
Vibeke Jensen
Anders Rubing

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The City Between Freedom and Security: Project Journal

Consisting of observations, notes, and reflections, the following entries are selected excerpts from a Project Journal, recording relevant experiences and interactions during the project period.

Bergen School of Architecture (BAS) representatives (in order of appearance):

Anders Rubing (AR)
 diploma student BAS 2012, teacher
 City-Secure master course 2013, coeditor
 Deane Simpson (DS)
 diploma tutor BAS 2012, Professor APP
 City-Secure master course 2013, coeditor
 Vibeke Jensen (VJ)
 diploma tutor BAS 2012, Professor DAV
 City-Secure master course 2013, coeditor
 Sixten Rahlff (SR)
 acting dean BAS 2011–13, partner 3RW
 Haakon Rasmussen (HR)
 teacher BAS, partner 3RW, teacher
 City-Secure master course 2013, advisor
 Cecilie Andersson (CA)
 vice dean BAS 2011–13, rector BAS 2013–, advisor

Security representatives (in order of appearance):

Thomas Haneborg (TH)
 PST (Norwegian Police Security Service)
 Jack Fischer Eriksen (JFE)
 PST
 Håvard Walla (HW)
 NSM (Norwegian National Security Authority)
 Audun Vestli (AV)
 COWI

14.03.12 BAS Bergen

BAS diploma project: Site shift to the Norwegian Government Quarter

Inspired by the role of public space during the Arab Spring – in particular Cairo's Tahrir Square – BAS diploma students AR and Erlend Bolstad spend several weeks in Cairo in preparation for a proposal on the square for their graduation project – due to be submitted in August. They get cold feet as a result of their ongoing research and the reaction of locals. As AR mentions in an e-mail from Cairo to their tutor DS: "About half of the Egyptians we have talked to think it is too early to make anything in Tahrir." During a Skype conversation between tutor VJ, AR, and Erlend Bolstad, VJ suggests that they change focus from Tahrir to the Oslo Government



1. Tahrir Square, Cairo



2. Government Quarter, Oslo. Site of attack, postrestoration



3. Government Quarter, Oslo. Site of attack interior, postrestoration



4. Government Quarter, Oslo. Site of attack, cleanup period

Quarter, in order to directly engage in a critical situation at home – in light of what they had experienced in Cairo and learned from other protest space case studies. Upon their return to Norway, they research further the context for the redevelopment of the Government Quarter in Oslo, meeting with a number of the key actors and stakeholders in the discussion of its future. In April they meet representatives of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) in Oslo to discuss the challenges of redeveloping the Government Quarter in light of the reaction to the events of July 2011 and the heightened discussion around security. AR and Bolstad's project attempts to transform the fragmented and ill-defined public spaces around the quarter into a larger single identifiable access supporting a "democratic space" of public demonstration and representation – with an attempt to explore how selected security logics could encourage other possibilities. The resulting project presented in August gets caught in an ambiguous space. The decision to suspend the Prime Minister's office in the form of a glass volume over the square above typical safe blast distances argued by its authors according to the intention to make power somehow "transparent," visually accessible, and "accountable" – is interpreted by some critics as an Orwellian demonstration of power.

04.05.12 BAS Bergen

PST/NSM make contact with the acting Dean of BAS, Sixten Rahlff, and teacher at BAS, Haakon Rasmussen.

PST are reportedly impressed by the previous approach from the BAS students and the perceived interest in exploring alternative approaches to security in public space at the Government Quarter by thinking "outside of the box." PST/NSM pose the question to BAS, "would there be an interest in collaborating on a master course on the theme of 'security by design'?"

09.04.13 BAS Bergen

Meeting: Cecilie Andersson, Vice Dean at BAS; Deane Simpson, professor at BAS

DS is asked if he would be interested in leading an exploration into the problem of urban security. VJ and HR are suggested as possible teaching collaborators. There is some hesitancy over agreeing to collaborate with organizations such as PST and NSM, and with the principle of security

playing a dominant role in architecture and urban design, and in our cities in general. A number of questions emerge. Is there not a fundamental danger in the premise of designing public space with the intention of making it secure? Does such a mode of conceptualizing the city not result in diminishing its access, openness, and its possibility to support the free expression of its citizens? Does this not result in shutting down the possibility for the city to perform as an open site of democratic expression? Is the twenty-first-century obsession with, and fear of, terrorism and the resulting “protective measures” we see expanding in our cities not out of proportion with all forms of probability for an event occurring? For example, despite the impression gained from the popular media, statistics would suggest that, in Europe or the United States, one is far more likely to die from accidental electrocution or choking on one’s own vomit than by terrorism.

25.04.13 BAS Bergen +

Meeting: Sixten Rahlff, Haakon Rasmussen, Cecilie Andersson, Vibeke Jensen, Deane Simpson

SR and HR describe a previous meeting with PST representatives regarding a possible collaboration on the studio/course. We discuss if this is something we want to do. There is a mounting sense of the undeniable relevance of the theme – and the threat that security thinking poses to the access to, and the right to the city, and the increasing challenges to protest and demonstration within it. DS and VJ are particularly suspicious of the role of security logics applied to the city based on their experiences in New York in the aftermath of 9/11. We discuss the potential of study tours to some of the most problematic sites of security thinking – for example, London, Israel, the West Bank, as a way of exposing the oppressive nature of these spatial logics, and dangers of “security by design” thinking. Could such visits, and the introduction of voices from the other side of the debate – those who clearly articulate the various threats our cities face as sites of open access, democratic expression, and free speech, be ways to “educate” key members of the Norwegian security apparatus and our students on the fragility of the city and its performance?

We leave the decision of the collaboration open, and agree to take the step to meet with PST/NSM. +

Lastly, DS and VJ suggest AR as a member of the teaching team based on his research and general interest in the theme – if the studio/course goes ahead.

22.05.13 PST Offices, Nydalen, Oslo Meeting between PST: Thomas Haneborg, Jack Fischer Eriksen, Lars Erik Svendsen; NSM: Håvard Walla; and BAS: Haakon Rasmussen, Vibeke Jensen, Anders Rubing, Deane Simpson



5. PST Headquarters, Nydalen, Oslo

We meet at PST headquarters – a relatively anonymous multistory block in an area of Oslo dominated by corporate office complexes built during the past decade. While largely nondescript, the building is bounded by a considerable amount of temporary concrete barriers. After entering the building, we are allowed to enter the first layer of security after surrendering passports and mobile phones. The meeting room is located outside of the main core of the building – which we will be invited into later in the year. Everyone introduces themselves. As we anticipated, the two groups represent entirely different cultures. The PST and NSM representatives’ backgrounds are in military intelligence. This is a rather exotic conversation for us. They express their interest in supporting a master course in security by design. The security experts present a general argument for the importance of integrating security by design thinking early in the design process – argued both in terms of cost, performance, and aesthetics.

The cultural dimension of urban security emerges as an interesting aspect of the conversation. There is an apparent appreciation on their part for the “British model” over the “American model” of security design. The American one is described in terms of the notion of “security theater” – with particular reference to the various physical measures applied to “protecting” installations such as American embassies and other federal buildings. We gradually realize, as the weeks pass, that what they are referring to in the British context is not some kind of intrinsic trust and generosity toward the concept of the citizenry as collective subjects in public space; but the intersection of a very high level of surveillance, control and top-down security on the one hand, and the apparent relative invisibility of a range of associated measures on the other. In the specific context of Norway, those we meet with suggest the need for a different, less invasive approach to security in public space and public buildings.

During the meeting, we gain a growing awareness of the highly instrumental set of measures played out in space. We are exposed to another vocabulary, range of knowledge, and standards. Buildings (and most other things) are referred to as “assets.” There is an energetic discussion on the part of the security experts on the theme of passive security vs. active security, and on the implications of various formats of risk analysis. Norwegian Risk Assessment standards are introduced: NS5814, for example, takes into account probability – according to them, not relevant in considering terrorism or sabotage, but useful for espionage. NS5832 addresses risk in terms of the cost of an event possibly happening, and so forth. The Norwegian National Security Act is discussed in this context – interestingly, it is described as “cynical toward human life.”

In their language, outcomes in architecture or urban design may be categorized under the heading of “physical security measures.” Oscar Newman’s theories of defensible space are discussed as a founding document in discussions of “security by design.” Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s *The Black Swan* is introduced as an important reference from the security side, with respect to events that have a large impact and are both hard to predict and rare.

We propose the idea of possible field trips to London, Israel, and the West Bank – insisting that we think it would be important to look at those locations. The security experts are receptive to the idea and offer the possibility of arranging meetings with local experts and members of their networks in each of the suggested locations.

Possible Norwegian sites of study for the course are discussed – other than the most obvious one, the Government Quarter in Oslo. Perceived “vulnerable” sites are discussed such as Oslo S, the Central Railway Station; the royal castle; the Oslo City Hall, large shopping malls, etc.; as well as vulnerable events such as the National Day Celebrations. There is a discussion concerning how the course could run, and how some kind of collaboration or dialogue would work. Tentative concerns emerge from our security experts about the composition of our student body. The question: “Do we have any Iranian, Russian, or Chinese students?” is apparently triggered by previous cases of state spying from “students” of these nationalities from Norwegian higher education institutions.

After the meeting, DS, VJ, HR and AR gather in a nearby café. We are intrigued by the apparent openness – reinforced by statements suggesting they “do not have all the answers,” and also by their general astuteness. It is evident that there is an agenda on their part in exploring the potential of design in somehow “improving the security of the city.” As there is the discussion on

their part of possible media coverage of the course, and their involvement in it, we also sense an additional agenda attached to the proposed project – a strategy to improve their organizations' public images in the fallout of the criticisms in the report on the 2011 attacks.

While we debate whether it makes sense to collaborate with such institutions with such agendas, we are undeniably curious about the possibility of entering into a dialogue with those holding different interests from us. And to somehow have the possibility to influence them – particularly in an interest to avoid the outcomes seen elsewhere in the world, where security-centric logics have dominated. Whether this will actually be possible or not becomes an open question. We finally agree to go ahead with the collaboration.

06.13 Bergen, Copenhagen, New York Studio/Course Preparations

We move forward with planning the studio. We fix the schedule of the study tours and lectures. AR contacts various groups including representatives of the Occupy London movement, ACRI, the Olympic Monitor, and together we contact academics such as Yuval Yaski, Stephen Graham, and Eyal Weizman. As we think further through the possibilities of the project, we are increasingly certain of its relevance and potential – and its political implications.

At the same time, we have a strange sense, along with the list of students who have just signed up for the studio, that we are in the process of being put through a range of extensive background checks.

25.06.13 BAS Bergen E-mail Correspondence from BAS Administration

We receive an email from BAS Administration regarding our plans to visit the West Bank, which AR has been organizing: "SR [the acting Dean] is slightly worried about your travel plans for the coming semester, could you please comment on the destination and the safety for the students. As a higher-education institution, we can under no circumstances send students to potentially dangerous areas. So we just want to make sure that this is closely considered. We cancelled a master course to Burkina Faso for this reason because it was too uncertain." We respond with various extracts from travel advisories and emphasize that the Gaza Strip will not be a destination.

06.08.13 BAS Bergen Meeting: Audun Vestli, COWI; Deane Simpson, BAS; Anders Rubing, BAS

After being approached by Audun Vestli (AV), a security consultant with the en-

gineering firm COWI, we agree to meet. AV is in dialogue with PST and NSM and expresses his interest in being involved in the studio. He has a similar background to the PST and NSM contacts – as a military intelligence officer, with previous postings in locations such as the Balkans and Afghanistan. He is currently responsible for building up COWI's position as a consultant within the security industry. He is involved for example in risk assessment consultancy related to proposals combining the city bus station with the existing Oslo Central Railway Station. As a strong proponent of "security by design," AV describes his background and expertise in risk assessment and situational measures. He is highly enthusiastic about these subjects, and talks for more than an hour practically without stopping. He argues for the relevance of not only considering terror, but also crime in general in relation to "security by design" thinking – in these terms, terror is framed as a subset of crime. In addition to linking a chain of relations in his work – between asset, threat, risk assessment, vulnerability, likelihood, consequences, etc. – he describes three levels of security to be considered. Primary security would involve physical elements such as locks, bolts, bollards, etc. Secondary security involves culture, environment, how people grow up; while tertiary security would include: legislation, the court system, etc. He describes how he believes architecture can play an important part in the secondary level of security in affecting a sense of care, ownership, protection, and as a result, contribute to reducing crime. AV seems knowledgeable and engaged, but we begin to get a sense of the intensity of private-sector interests and agendas in the security industry.

17.08.13 BAS Bergen Semester Start

The semester proper begins with an introductory lecture addressed to the students. We introduce the hypothesis of two competing histories and conceptions of the city. One is the city defined as a space of security, control, safety, and protection; the other, the city as a site of freedom, democracy, civil liberties, and emancipation. We begin by posing a series of questions around the theme.

– To what extent would it be possible to argue that freedom is based upon a limited level of security?

– How do the pressures of security thinking – defined by terms such as "risk and threat scenarios" – affect urbanism and architecture and impact upon its design and use?

– Is "security by design" viable? If so, at what costs? If not, why is it presented so frequently as a solution to the "problem" of public space? Should it still be an aspiration?

– Is there any possibility that the contemporary pressure to secure the city could be hijacked for the purpose of producing positive and novel qualities, atmospheres, social potentials – and new liberations?

– Could there be any way that the quest for heightened security could support rather than limit tolerance, coexistence, exchange, conflict, negotiation, protest, diversity, transparency, engagement, empowerment, and participation?

We issue the students with the task of studying the spatial regimes of security in various critical locations and in the context of various key events, and issue texts for the reading seminar.

19–29.08.13 BAS Bergen Theory Seminar



6. BAS Studio, Bergen

Introduced by VJ and AR, the theory seminar involves a range of texts from authors including: Nan Elin, Eyal Weizman, Stephen Graham, Oscar Newman, Setha Low, and David Harvey. After studying and debating the texts, the students are asked to produce maps, timelines, and diagrams that analyze and draw relationships between theories and events.

26.8.13 BAS Bergen Start-Up Workshop Lecture: Håvard Walla, Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM), "Security Management in the Public Sector – Building a Resilient Society"

After reading literature on the theme, the students are now introduced to the everyday work of a security professional in a Norwegian context. Walla begins the day with a presentation on security management and introduces security thinking from his perspective in Norway. In the Norwegian language *security* and *safety* are the same word (*sikkerhet*), and consequently Walla suggests that important differentiations in the terminology is lacking. He goes on to address a paradigm shift after the terror attack in 2011. "[In Norway] We know the forces of nature, we know the acts of God, and we have prepared for them for probably 2000 years or so [...] but there was a paradigm shift on July twenty-sec-

ond.” He introduces NSM, which was established in 2003 between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice to address three areas of concern: (1) espionage; (2) sabotage; and (3) terrorism.

NSM’s mission is to protect critical national infrastructure by providing protective security to information and (national) assets against events that are large-impact, hard to predict, and rare (LHR). Characteristics and implications of LHR events include:

1. It is impractical to try to accurately estimate the likelihood of LHR events (Taleb’s *Black Swan*, 2007). While nature repeats itself (e.g., floods), history does not always repeat itself.
2. LHR requires diverse risk-assessment approaches (Hole and Netland, 2010).¹
3. Protective measures, tailored or situational, are based on variable such as risk appetite and residual risk.
4. Cost is likely to vary among stakeholders according to the risk pyramid of: asset (what do you want to protect?), threat (what bad things could happen?), and vulnerability (what weaknesses exist?). In this context, NSM focuses on:

1. Protective security – what can be done before an incident in order to prevent it from occurring in the first place?
2. Contingency – prepared actions that would play out in conjunction with an incident.
3. Crisis management – addressing the situation during and after an event.

As part of this work, asset evaluation is important, whether addressing an information asset or a physical asset. (In the Norwegian law, assets are limited to physical objects and information – the law does not define humans as assets.)

Walla introduces six possible strategy responses to risk: (1) avoid; (2) ignore; (3) reduce; (4) accept; (5) transfer; and (6) exploit.

The workflow of his projects are framed in terms of risk-management cycles – diagrams include:

- planning and organization
- asset evaluation
- security goals
- threat assessment
- vulnerability assessment
- risk assessment
- determining strategy
- reevaluation of goals
- risk analysis and deciding implementation of measures
- implementation of security measures.

26.8.13 BAS Bergen

Start-Up Workshop Lecture:
Anne-Catherine Gustafson,
Police Superintendent, KRIPOS

Representing KRIPOS, the department of the national police force focused on combatting organized crime, Gustafson pres-

ents a number of videos of organized crime employing various techniques, including: ram-raids with automobiles; roof skylight break-ins, or literally cutting through prefabricated metal sandwich facade panels.

Giving many of us in the audience an uncomfortable feeling, Gustafson presented through various statistics the notion that almost all organized crime perpetrators in Norway originate from foreign crime gangs – with particular national and ethnic groups of Eastern European origin being represented disproportionately. It was indicated that organized criminals conducting crime in Norway tended to be less violent in Norway than in their home countries. This was explained in part due to the fact that Norwegian Police were not typically carrying firearms.

26.8.13 BAS Bergen

Start-Up Workshop Lecture: Jack Fischer Eriksen, Police Superintendent, PST



7. Jack Fischer Eriksen, PST

Eriksen’s agenda appears to be in making the terror threat tangible to the audience, claiming that there have been more than twenty thwarted terror attacks in Europe since 9/11 – involving approximately 100 cells. He identifies the sources of major threats to Norway in right-wing extremists, lone terrorists, left-wing groups, and Islamic extremist groups – referring to a YouTube video in which Allah is praised and asked to destroy the enemy and inflict pain. Eriksen also discusses counterintelligence and espionage, including how a local telecom provider experiences more than 10,000 hacking attempts every day.

Several videos of terror blasts from various locations and periods are presented – with a focus on the lethal role flying glass plays in producing casualties. One slow-motion video shows how a curtain wall collapses in a bomb attack during the IRA Docklands bombing in 1996.

26.8.13 BAS Bergen

Start-Up Workshop Lecture: Thomas Haneborg, MSc, Security Advisor, PST

Haneborg addresses the theme of terror and crime prevention. In the context of the framing of terrorism as a criminal act, he

begins his lecture with the question: why do people become criminals? He describes different forms of crime prevention: Social crime prevention involves avoiding the crime occurring through efforts to reform criminals, prevent the emergence of ghettos, and integrate ethnic minorities into the wider society. Situational Crime Prevention differs in that it focuses on preventing the potential criminal from committing a crime in the moment at a specific time and place. He attempts to unfold concepts like risk management, asset evaluation, target hardening, displacement, and threat assessment. In these terms he emphasizes a key formula: Probability × Consequence = Risk. Haneborg also discusses the most commonly used weapons, including hunting rifles, AK-47, AG-3, Glock 17, and HK416. He presents their availability, cost, and effects, including their performance against bulletproof glass or metal.

Lastly, he presents various Internet recruitment strategies for terror groups, along with their promotion through online magazines such as Al-Qaeda’s *Inspire*, which include guides and manuals describing how to make a bomb or commit other terror activities. With reference to *Inspire* magazine, Haneborg insists, “Never, ever open the site. Do not even do a Google search for it.” We understand by implication that we will be flagged, surveilled, and potentially detained if we follow this link. Airport travel is likely to become far more laborious.

27.8.13 BAS Bergen

Start-Up Workshop Lecture:
Anders Rubing, BAS

AR presents his research on protest spaces in Cairo and other locations, and walks through his proposal for a civic space for political expression in the Governmental Quarter in Oslo. Our security collaborators appear surprisingly enthusiastic about the presentation, and comment on their support for thinking “outside the box.”

27.8.13 BAS Bergen

Start-Up Workshop Lecture: Dag Bjarne Astor, Head of Section, Departementenes Service Senter (DSS)



8. Dag Bjarne Astor, DSS

As the person responsible for technical security within HSE (Health, Safety and Environment) at the Departementenes Service Senter (DSS), Astor addresses how government employees working within the buildings he oversees want security but do not want to be burdened by it. In these terms, he explains the difficulty with the users of the buildings rendering them insecure. "If you open a window – all security measures are gone." "Smokers will seek the shortest way out to an outdoor smoking space. They will often break open emergency exit doors, and despite warnings, continue to do so every day." Continuing discussing the problem of employees' free will overriding the workings of the building's security systems, he believes that people do not prioritize the security of their workplace on an everyday basis. His recommendation for an architectural response to the problem of security in governmental workplaces is to start with a closed concrete box, make openings for windows and doors, and add several physical layers of security measures to delay penetration into the core of the space.

As the result of the 2011 Oslo bomb being delivered in a white van, Astor refers to government workers' deep and irrational fears of white vans in the post-July 2011 period. Whenever a white van is parked in front of any governmental building, several phone calls are made to his office at DSS.

Lastly Astor summarizes his learnings as a result of the relocation of government workers to temporary locations around Oslo after the July 2011 attack. Most notable from his perspective is the necessity to design for security early on in the process of designing a building due to the extraordinary expense of introducing necessary security measures after a building has already been constructed.

27.8.13 BAS Bergen **Start-Up Workshop Lecture: Sunniva Frislid Meier, Ph.D, Transportøkonomisk Institutt**

Meier, a social scientist with the Norwegian Transportøkonomisk Institutt, enjoys a prominent role in the national security discussion. She is one of only a few security researchers working at an advanced level before and after the 2011 terror attack. It becomes clear to us that she is highly respected by PST and the other external security lecturers.

Meier outlines her work developing scenarios for terror attacks and analyzing how they can be prevented by spatial and social interventions. Employing theory stemming from the field of "situational crime prevention" she describes how the reduction of the amount of rubbish bins, or passive surveillance executed by cleaning personnel, can reduce the risk of terror attacks.



9. Sunniva Frislid Meier, Transportøkonomisk Institutt

She describes her latest academic work analyzing the July 2011 attack, identifying how the risk of its occurring could have been reduced by situational measures. This analysis involves making "crime scripts," in which the intent and the necessary steps to achieve the result are described. This is connected to a narrative describing the unfolding of the event, and finally the analysis discussed what form of measures could have been employed to disturb either the intent, or the steps required to achieve the intended result.

27.8.13 BAS Bergen **Start-Up Workshop Lecture: Audun Vestli, engineering firm COWI**



10. Audun Vestli, COWI

Vestli's presentation is made with a single slide as background image – a proposed bus terminal within the planned renovation of the main train station in Oslo. He describes the challenges of promoting the value of security to the private sector. This is outlined in terms of the common situation in which comfort and functionality are valued ahead of security, which is often given the lowest priority. Vestli explains the related problem of limited time allocated for important work such as risk-assessment reports, in spite of the high-value nature of some targets. He also touches upon a problem he perceives in the security industry of an inflexibility of thinking among security advisors – something he tries to overcome in the approach to his assignments. Vestli closes by advocating the necessity for architects to challenge the conventional low prioritization of security, the importance of analyzing uncertainties, and the importance of designing intelligent

security measures into projects early on in the design process.

11–14.9.13 London Study Tour **Participants: PST: Thomas Haneborg and Jack Fischer Ericksen; NSM: Håvard Walla; BAS: DS, VJ, HR, AR and 15 master students**

11.9.13 London **Tour of Battersea Park Nine Elms development: Bill Margetts, Design Out Crime Officer, London Metropolitan Police, "Design Out Crime/Secured by Design"**

Margetts is a police officer and Design Out Crime Officer (DOCO) in the London borough of Wandsworth – which happens to be the location with the highest number of CCTV cameras per inhabitant in the UK, the country with one of the highest number of CCTV cameras per inhabitant in the world. We meet Margetts in the entry space to the Battersea Park Station in Nine Elms. He leads us along construction barriers toward the Battersea Power Station to present the proposed plans for the development in the visitor center. As he has played an important role as DOCO on the project, he presents the plan proudly. We are struck, and somewhat concerned, with the resemblance of tone of the policeman to that of an urban planner and designer as Margetts explains the new developments around the Battersea Power Station. He talks about the plans for new "burglary-proof" luxury housing within the development, which will generously contain "affordable housing" for "doctors or lawyers not able to afford inner-city real estate." The new American Embassy, a centerpiece of the larger development, is described as a contributor to securing the area from "unwanted elements." We are curious what he exactly means by this, but the discussion has moved on quickly before we have a chance to ask. Thomas Haneborg from PST asks, "Why put a potential terror target in a residential neighborhood?" Margetts responds, "The Americans will be able to take care of themselves." Håvard Walla from NSM asks, "Why not put a mosque next to the site of the US embassy?" We are often surprised by such moments in these kinds of discussions.

The last phase of the tour is intended to be a social housing project in the nearby area built in the 1970s. As we arrive at the area, Margetts looks concerned. After some phone calls, he announces that he cannot vouch for the safety of our group in the area, as the local police officers who were scheduled to protect us have not arrived. While waiting for the local police, the party is required to eat their lunch in front of a nearby supermarket. Margetts finally announces that we have to leave the project

unseen, as the local police protection has still not arrived.

As we depart, Margetts gives us his official DOCO business card. It includes the slogan “Total Policing: Every Opportunity, Every Tactic.”



11. Bill Margetts, London Metropolitan Police. Nine Elms model presentation, London

from their homes in the Clays Lane Housing Estate as part of the construction project for the infrastructure and venues of the London Olympics. He openly mentions that this experience has obviously colored his view of the Olympics.



14. Study group visiting London Summer Olympic Games site (PST representatives in back row with sunglasses)

classic English men's club, where our group is brought in through the back entrance. The room is decorated with the animal riches of the former British Empire, including taxidermied heads of rhinoceros, bison, and moose. For security reasons, we are informed that we are not allowed to know the last name of the speaker. He will simply be known to us as Paul.

Paul describes the various security challenges and responses of CPNI to the types of sites it is responsible for. He provides four examples: 1. Parliament Buildings; 2. Canary Wharf; 3. Financial area Data Center (processing £350B of transactions per day) – in this case, the discretion of the building design is an important part of the design strategy; and 4. Difficult long-perimeter sites such as airports.



12. Study group visiting Tower Hamlets, London

As we stand on-site, Cheyne points to and describes a series of “surreal and exaggerated security measures” that were present during the period of the Games. He mentions the associated budget of £1.6 billion, which he describes as both “extreme and opaque,” dedicated to Games security. The elements he points to include 5,000-volt electrified perimeter fences, the positioning of missile launchers on top of the nearby buildings, the use of armed drones (which were not officially confirmed), and the imposition of an extended “Olympic Security Zone,” within which demonstration was legally not allowed. Cheyne describes how these extreme measures were linked to a heightened anxiety around social behavior – which included “Dispersal Zones” established by the authorities and organizers to prevent youth from congregating. He refers to an event involving a group of 182 bike riders for example who were kettled and arrested for riding bikes within the zone. Cheyne notes a general systemic problem of the draconian imposition of power and severely heavy-handed policing. It is in this context that he describes “The Olympics’ function[ing] as a test bed for new authoritarian measures, such as the use of drones or altered bail laws.”

We sense a somewhat awkward and icy atmosphere from the security advisors in response to the statements and concerns Cheyne raises. They stand silently at the back of the group, with sunglasses on and arms folded.

12.9.13 British Colonial Club, London Lecture: Paul X, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)/MI5

Between the secret identity of the speaker, the nature of the video material, the way it is delivered, and the background setting, this is a surreal experience. Our venue is coordinated by Håvard Walla from NSM – a



15. 16. Interior, British Colonial Club, London. Site of CPNI presentation. (Speaker's identity concealed)

He further describes the UK's general approach to counterterrorism: 1. Assess the threat (a function of a. the capability of the terrorist and b. malicious intent); 2. Identify vulnerabilities/criticalities; 3. Calculate risk; and 4. Propose commensurate (proportionate) measures.

Paul places emphasis on the main threat focused on in his work – vehicle-borne threats – of which he describes five styles:

1. Parked (most common) – identification helped by eyes and ears of the general public
2. Encroachment – exploiting gaps in site defenses (without impact); or tailgating through an active barrier system; or preempted by tampering with an electrical control cabinet



13. Julian Cheyne, Games Monitor

3. Penetrative impact (ramming)
4. Entry by deception – human blagging (talk your way in); use of a “Trojan vehicle,” for example, delivery/cleaning/pizza/emergency services/postal services vehicles
5. Entry by duress – duress against a guard to provide access; duress against a legitimate driver to act as a “mule”

The discussion then moves on to the role of static vs. active protective measures in relation to these types of threats. For example, Paul describes how expensive passive-security measures can be rendered ineffective by breaches allowed by active measures controlled by “a minimum-wage, low-motivation G4S worker at a point ten hours into a twelve-hour shift.” This particular image of the security worker will become a recurring one throughout the project period. These different threats and types of events are illustrated with a sequence of video surveillance clips – resembling a kind of violent highlight compilation of a range of American action films – but in low resolution, without sound. They are described with a rather distant English public-school voiceover.

Paul describes further vehicle-borne threats including “the use of a vehicle as a killing tool” referring to its promotion in Al-Qaeda’s online *Inspire* publication documenting a technique to attach knife blades to the front of a car to kill or maim. Paul, just as Thomas Haneborg had emphasized, warns us: “Don’t try and download it!” We wonder how many of the students have done so with such tempting warnings.

In a part of the presentation addressing the effect of bomb blasts, Paul describes the condition of a solid becoming gas in an extremely short period of time. This produces both an air shock, a ground shock, and a fire wall. Similarly, after the punch effect of the air shock, there is negative pressure or a sucking effect. In terms of casualties, 95 percent come from flying fragments; and 95 percent of those are from glass. A major countermeasure to this is the application of laminated glazing – a response that is unfortunately considerably more expensive than the installation of nonlaminated glass. It introduces other challenges, notably the challenge of keeping the glass in the frame, as well as the need to keep the frame fixed to the wall in the case of the impact of a blast. It is in this context that the necessity of maximizing standoff distance, or the distancing of the blast from the asset, is emphasized as highly important. According to Paul, “every meter of standoff counts.”

Paul goes on to describe the main groups of hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) strategies:

1. Total traffic exclusion from an entire area (often politically impossible)
2. Traffic inclusion but with screening of all vehicles entering the area

3. Traffic inclusion: free flow within the area but local protection of all critical/vulnerable assets within that area with traffic calming and traffic barriers

4. Temporary/supplementary or preinstalled barriers

Preferred measures are described as follows:

- Traffic calming with horizontal deflections: chicanes
- Vehicle restraint, using gravity: bunds and berms
- Bollards, of which seven types exist: circular hollow section steel tube multiple hollow section steel tube concrete-filled tube (requires deep foundations) rolled steel (solid bar) cast manganese steel (one-third of the thickness for same effect) polycarbonate spring steel

Paul’s enthusiasm for bollards continues unabated.

Bollards normally require deep foundations, approximately 750mm deep, which often produces conflicts with existing underground utilities, necessitating their being moved. This translates into considerable time and expense. Alternate types of shallow/no-foundation plated bollard systems have been developed which are surface-mounted and linked together. The high costs of security have been offset in some urban settings with selling advertising, for example, to Marks and Spencer.

Paul ventures deeper into the bollard world describing the testing of new bollard technologies and BSI (British Standards) for crash testing: PAS 68 Impact Testing, PAS 69 Installation Guidance, and the CPNI tested list. Design guides include: Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guide (2010), Landscape Architecture Guide, and Home Office Guide to Protecting Crowded Spaces. Several videos are presented documenting tests of various vehicle mitigation strategies – this mostly involves slow-motion videos of trucks driving at speed into bollards, trenches, and berms.

Paul introduces the basic design parameters of bollard placement. The maximum air gap should be 1.2 m, which he argues does not slow or impede the flow of pedestrians. Some tips: “Be careful of transitions. Concrete blocks placed directly on a road or pavement surface do not work, as they require a ‘key-in.’”

Additional functional objects capable of functioning as vehicle barriers include:

- leaf and pond edging
- seats at the water’s edge
- decorative planters
- shallow-mount and narrow planters
- energy-absorbing planters

Paul concludes by introducing the architects who CPNI have collaborated with

on the vehicle protection along Whitehall, where different ministries and other important assets are located.

12.9.13 London

Lecture: London Security Architect Peter Heath, Public Realm Design Director – Atkins

Heath, an older gentlemanly architect, wearing a bow tie and round glasses, seems to have a close collaboration with Paul and CPNI. He informs us of his background as an architect, town planner, and designer integrating security requirements into urban environments such as Whitehall in central London. Heath describes his general ambition in urban design settings is to remove or reduce the presence of urban “clutter” – such as CCTV equipment and a multitude of street furniture. He describes working with historical photographs of the sites he works on, in part to highlight the extent of existing clutter.

He describes the necessity of understanding a range of parameters and issues in his work, from knowledge of off-the-shelf product design ranges, to aesthetic, functional, economic and security parameters. Heath describes the adaptation of bus shelter design, for example, in relation to these parameters. The examples he goes into more detail with involve the design adaptation of a line of bollards into low walls, with the introduction of variety based on ground level changes. The detailed interior steel structure of a circular seating bench in front of one of the most prominent buildings in Whitehall is presented as the *pièce de résistance* of Paul and Peter’s presentation. It embeds the latest bollard research and technology within a neoclassically styled exterior – which he describes in terms of contextual appropriateness. The performance of security and the associated technical and material innovations are intentionally rendered invisible.

12.9.13 London

Tour of Whitehall, British Government Ministry Area, Vehicle Protection Barriers: Paul X, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)/MI5; Peter Heath, Public Realm Design Director – Atkins



17. Study group touring Whitehall, London

We tour sites of recently completed security measures in the Whitehall area containing ministries such as the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Ministry, the Treasury, etc. We are pointed toward the standard bollard employed in the area, of which our hosts are quite proud. We observe low Georgian-style continuous walls at the pedestrian scale (lower than 1 m in height) including the seating bench in front of the foreign ministry.

During our walk, we observe a demonstration taking place on the opposite side of the street and are asked by one of the UK security representatives if they are our “friends.” We answer, “Yes.”

13.9.13 London

Tour of Ring of Steel: Henriette Williams, photographer and videographer

Henriette Williams is a photographer and videographer whose work addresses the theme of security and surveillance within the UK. Starting from the Barbican Centre, Williams leads us on a walking tour along key sections of the “Ring of Steel,” which follows the approximate line of the original Roman wall of London. Developed in response to the 1993 IRA Bishopsgate bombing, the strategy and term itself originates from Northern Ireland, and protective measures installed during the period of “The Troubles” in Belfast. Williams presents this as an example of Foucault’s boomerang, where techniques applied to colonial contexts turn back on the original “home” context (see Stephen Graham’s “New Military Urbanism,” in *Cities Under Siege*). In London, the “Ring of Steel” is not literally a continuous steel wall, but an assemblage of measures, including road-narrowing devices, small sentry boxes, CCTV, etc., that are positioned at entry and exit points into the City of London area – collectively forming a fully surveilled and controlled perimeter.



18. Study group touring Ring of Steel, London with Henriette Williams

In its current configuration, according to Williams, the CCTV system hardware overlaps with the traffic congestion-pricing hardware and is hardly visible if one does not know it is there. She suggests that this aspect of the system of surveillance is in

fact more scary and disturbing because it is less visible.

Distinct from the diversity of eyes and ears on the street of the natural surveillance of Jane Jacobs, Williams describes the problematic of a singular interest and agenda of security controlled from a central control room.

Our guide highlights the coincidence of the phenomena of securitization and privatization within the City of London. In this sense, the Ring not only functions as a surveillance system, but also as the physical closure of roads by bollards, walls, fences, and other measures. These spaces tend toward a form of monocultural “public space” where the suitability/appropriateness of the users in a particular space is often determined by private security guards.

On our walk around the area, we are struck by the coexistence – in the same space – of manicured flowers in flower boxes; wall signs marking private property and the right of the owner to remove those partaking in inappropriate activity; and fences topped with barbed wire or other forms of sharp-edged material.

When asked for successful examples of safe or secure public space, Henriette refers to the Southbank Centre, as a site of many mixed activities, well-planned public spaces, and a site of natural surveillance.

She informs us further about her research into the security industry, in which she attends events such as arms fairs and security industry fairs – enabled by her press card. She speaks of the recurring issue of an immense number of CCTVs in operation, and the extraordinary challenge of the person power necessary to actually monitor them. She describes how their use is not preventative in real time but performs as a partial deterrent, and is predominantly employed as a source of evidence in the period after an event. This has been a recurring theme in the discussions with security experts including the Norwegian security consultants we have been in dialogue with. In an attempt to address this challenge of information overflow, automated systems are being developed to support real-time detection through algorithmic technologies – effectively monitoring programs designed to detect abnormal behaviors through algorithmic scanning/tracking technologies. We imagine flashing sirens and SWAT teams descending upon those with disabilities and associated gait differences; those accompanied by small children walking slowly and erratically; an artist photographing a specific series of objects; or an apparent loiterer looking for a recently lost glove.

13.9.13 Southbank Centre, London

Lecture and discussion on Occupy London: Maria Ludovica Rogers, architect and activist, Occupy London



19. Tense discussions prior to Occupy meeting, London

We experience an awkward moment with our security collaborators. They say that they are not able to join our meeting with Occupy London. They also discourage us from meeting with them. They mention that according to their British associates, members of the organization are on no-fly lists, and for this reason it would be diplomatically insensitive toward their British hosts, as representatives of the Norwegian government, to be involved in the meeting. We are surprised by the hostility that this suggests for the Occupy Movement from the perspective of the intelligence community. We inform the security experts that we will not change our plans. Minus the security experts, we meet with Maria Ludovica Rogers, a London-based, Italian-born architect from the Occupy London movement. She played a central role in the Saint Paul’s occupation, being involved in designing and laying out the camp during the protests that ran there from October 2011 to February 2012.



20. Study group meeting with Ludovica Rogers, Occupy London

We meet in the public meeting spaces of the Southbank Centre, as a group of around twenty, seated in a circle at Rogers’s suggestion. After we are settled, she begins by asking us, “What makes us feel secure?” and “What makes us feel insecure?” She introduces a set of British legal definitions, which represent the legal frameworks that Occupy’s activities are forced to work within. This is based on *The Protest Handbook* – a document written by lawyers for protesters. Rogers frames the definitions for three typologies of protest from the book:

– a “public procession” – a body of people moving along a route in public space;
 – a “public assembly” – an assembly of two or more persons in public space which is wholly or partly open to the air;
 – an “occupation” – use of physical presence in space for more than one hour.
 This is not necessarily based on same people but the same space.

While we previously imagined that the Occupy movement operates in relation to the rules and regulations of the occupation of public space, we were surprised by the extent to which the legal context defines the framework for their actions. In the case of their occupation, there were key roles played by lawyers within the organization in laying out the framework for their activities.

Rogers presents the legal definition of *public space* in the UK, which somewhat surprises us. Here, we understand that a highway is the only legally defined public space – with all other spaces considered as private. There are however, many private spaces to which the public has right of access. She describes the different ways the state and the police control public-access space and protests within it. Any protest (except for an assembly) requires 6 days’ advanced notice to the police, including the start location, route, and organizers. The naming of “organizers” in the case of Occupy is complicated by its stance of being a leaderless group, but this naming also has implications for those persons who are named – who, Rogers suggested, are often exposed to forms of harassment by police. During the Olympic Games, police enforced a ban on mass protests throughout the whole of North London for “security reasons.” This ban saw one event in which 180 persons were “kettled” (kettling is a crowd control tactic in which police surround and contain protesters in a limited area), arrested, and restrained on a bus for six to eight hours without access to food or a toilet. Additionally, during the Olympic Games period, new bail conditions were introduced that suspend the right to be in a designated area of the city. Just as Cheyne had suggested, Rogers argues that events such as the Olympics provide a convenient excuse for the authorities to introduce more oppressive forms of control that limit – ones that tend to stay in place after the event. She summarizes the situation as a highly constraining and challenging landscape to protest within – in which, for example, it is not possible to protest in Parliament Square. This is reinforced by a suite of legislation that includes, the Public Order Act, the Anti-social Behaviour Act, and the Terror Act.

Rogers goes on to outline other police tactics, including having police “stuff cameras in your face” during protests. Another tactic employed involves police

liaison officers who follow along on the march “appearing chatty and friendly; they are actually gathering information used in the police’s interests.” Also described are other forms of police surveillance and data collection applied to the group. According to Rogers: “We are evolving into a period in which the state is wanting complete control over everything to avoid the bad bits. The issue is who uses power and how?”

Rogers outlines some possible counter-measures available to protesters, including: protesters’ recording police behavior and directly broadcasting live to Internet; and what is referred to as the “Squatters Shield”: a Section 6 (of the Criminal Law Act 1977) legal notice on the front door of a nonresidential building/space which means that the police are not able to forcibly enter.

We ask Rogers to expand on her experiences with Occupy and the Saint Paul’s encampment. She describes the organization as a nonviolent leaderless movement that emerged in London with the call to occupy Paternoster Square in front of the London Stock Exchange – a planned protest that was blocked by police after a court injunction revoked the space’s license for public use. The protest moved to the space in front of the nearby Saint Paul’s Cathedral. She briefly describes the encampment and its organization, including in particular the working groups responsible for specific tasks, such as press, basic needs, tents, etc. She refers to the experience as an amazing one in terms of the specific form of “organic” architecture that emerged from it.

13.9.13 Canary Wharf, London Occupy London Tours: Canary Wharf



21. 22. Occupy London Tour, Canary Wharf, London

Just as we had been actively discouraged by the security experts from meeting with the Occupy London representative at the Southbank Centre, we were similarly discouraged from taking the Occupy London’s Canary Wharf tour. “Do not go” we were told, as if we were about to commit some deeply subversive act or heinous crime. Perhaps this was done out of genuine concern for what database our photographs would end up in, or list our names would be placed on. We had understood that the event would involve a guided narrated tour of the area with commentary from members of the movement.

We prebook our tour and arrive at the designated meeting place near the exit from the Underground. We are met by a man and a woman in their twenties in Victorian-period attire. During the tour, we are followed continuously by one uniformed “policeman” of the Canary Wharf private security force (dressed in uniforms closely resembling those of the London Metropolitan Police), and a plain-clothed security representative, along with our group of around twenty Occupy tour members. We are also tailed by an additional uniformed “policeman” following behind. The choreographed tour performance has been running weekly for some months as part of a rehearsed sequence of stops, and this is clear from the largely one-way banter directed toward the familiar “police detail” by the presenters. The tour moves between the spaces in front of the various building lobbies, where our guides tell us well-crafted narratives of financial misadventure of the various institutions – particularly leading up to the crisis and in its aftermath. Below is an excerpt from the script, at the final stop of the tour, HSBC:

Welcome to HSBC, the world’s second largest bank (and it’s most local of course!). The lions are called Stephen [roaring one] and Stitt [quiet one] – after two HSBC managers in Shanghai in the 1920s; and inside the building, you can see a “history wall.” Now, we’ve taken a look, and realized there were a few bits missing from the story. So we thought we’d fill you in.

In fact, HSBC was created in the aftermath of the mid-nineteenth-century Opium Wars to finance the opium trade that the British and allies had declared war on China in order to maintain. “HSBC” actually stands for Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, reminding us of its birth from the rubble of an imperial drug war. But if you thought HSBC’s drug-money days were over – think again. In July 2012 a US Senate investigation uncovered “astounding complacency” in HSBC’s US bank, which was found to have been facilitating the extraction of drug

money. It even helped move 7 billion in physical dollars out of the US and into Mexico.

HSBC agreed to a fine of just under \$2 billion in December 2012 for this and other offenses. But US authorities decided not to criminally prosecute the bank, and risk it losing its banking license. Eric Holder, the US Attorney General, said in June 2013 in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee: "I am concerned that the size of . . . these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them, when we are hit with indications that . . . it will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy." Translation? Banks are still not only too big to fail – but too big to jail.

Despite the established sequence of stops in front of the lobbies of the various company towers – which include HSBC, Moody's, Citigroup, Barclays, KPMG, etc., we are surprised by the intensity, urgency, and hostility that the small, quiet, and well-behaved group receives from the various security details in each of the tower lobbies. The Occupy group stands for between 5 and 10 minutes outside each lobby along the tour. In almost every case, the security guards move quickly to block the doors and windows on the interior of the lobbies in a repeated hostile experience. It is clear that they have been instructed to consider us as a serious security threat.

After the tour, as when we break off into smaller groups of two or three persons, we are tailed by our silent friends from the Canary Wharf "police force." The final phase of our experience involves being barred by other security guards from passing through the underground shopping mall area adjacent to the Underground train station due to our association with the Occupy tour. When we enquire as to why we were not being admitted to the space, the guards were silent – as they let other nontour participants through unimpeded.

14.9.13 Royal Air Force Club, London **Lecture and discussion: Spike Townsend,** **NaCTSO, London Metropolitan Police**



23. (From right) Spike Townsend of NaCTSO, JFE, and AV



24. Interior, Royal Air Force Club, London. Site of NaCTSO presentation

Our venue, the Royal Air Force Club in Mayfair, has a similar atmosphere to that of the site of our meeting with Paul from MI5. In this case, the animal heads and spears are replaced by paintings of Spitfires, Hurricanes, and Lancasters. Håvard Walla has arranged for us to meet with Spike Townsend, who is a National Counter Terrorism Security Officer (part of CPNI). He has parallel roles as family liaison officer and architecture liaison for the London Metropolitan Police. Townsend describes three main objectives in NaCTSO's work: to support the protection of critical infrastructure; to support the protection of radioactive materials and chemical weapons; and to be the national lead in the protection of crowded spaces. Their approach to these objectives is described according to the four Ps of the "Contest" strategy:

- Prevent radicalization
- Protect borders, infrastructure, crowded places (particularly locations where there is the potential for a high number of casualties) – also the protection of people, cultural heritage, economy, etc.
- Prepare responses
- Pursue terrorism

NaCTSO's work is carried out by 220 personnel trained in counterterrorism. In working in crime/terror prevention and providing security advice to industry, they utilize approaches such as RAT (Risk Assessment Theory); the onion ring principle; and general crime-prevention concepts.

Townsend outlines how design recommendations they offer are assessed on a risk-based approach starting with the question: What is the risk of terror? A key concept in this, according to Townsend is *proportionality* – "there is no point in designing a fortress if there is not a high likelihood, or a high impact. By contrast, if Canary Wharf, for example was attacked, it would be catastrophic." On vulnerable or critical sites such as this, the main focus of their work is on: firstly, stopping vehicles from entering the area (to protect against car bombs); and secondly, to address the danger of glass (to lower the impact of a backpack bomb). Just as we have been previously informed by the Norwegian experts, 85 to 90 percent of casualties are

from injuries associated with flying glass shards (as seen in attacks in Pakistan and Iraq). The reaction to the second challenge involves using laminated and shatterproof glass products. Townsend mentions that requirements to address the danger of glass can offer other benefits. For example, laminated glazing contributes to carbon emission reduction by lowering heat gain; while on the ground floor storefronts with laminated glazing make smash-and-grab or ram-raid attacks more difficult.

Townsend discusses their ongoing work with "Secured by Design," in particular the way that developers have the possibility through the scheme to apply for a security award, based on a set of criteria. He argues that these awards become selling points for the safety and security of the property, while also representing a good way to showcase innovative approaches to security. Part of this discussion involves what he calls "aesthetic design." He mentions the example of Paul X's bollards. Here Spike accidentally utters the full name of the secret figure. He frames the challenge of "how to design to not make it look like a fortress?" He mentions camouflaging tactics in which bollard performance is attributed to other objects such as flagpoles, benches, signage, or cycle racks.

The advantages of different forms of surveillance in relation to "Secured by Design" are presented – in particular, the advantages of CCTV vs. natural surveillance. In this context, Townsend argues for his preference toward natural surveillance, characterized by: clear lines of sight (hedges can hold things); larger open spaces support less fear. He describes an additional advantage to open space – it allows the atmospheric pressure of a blast to return to normal more quickly. It is suggested that passive surveillance should not be the only form of surveillance – but is best in combination with CCTV and private guards.

In the discussion afterwards, some interesting issues came up. One question from a Norwegian security consultant addresses the asymmetry in resource levels applied to this form of security work between the UK (approx. 450 persons) and Norway (approx. 10 persons). The Norwegian insider take describes a situation in which private companies in Norway address the potential impact of terror/sabotage/espionage through large insurance policies.

17.09.13 BAS Bergen, **Lecture and Discussion: Åse Gilje** **Østensen, University of Bergen, Norwegian Naval Academy, "Private Military and Security Companies" (PMSC's)**

A political scientist and associate professor at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy,

Åse Gilje Østensen speaks about the rise of private military and security companies (PMSC) – her primary research focus – and the extent of the growing security industry. She describes a history of these companies stretching back to the outsourcing coordinated by the American military during the Vietnam War in the 1960s. She identifies the period after the end of the Cold War, and the massive surplus of military equipment and redundant military personnel, as an important trigger of growth in the industry – a moment that coincided with the expansion of many smaller and more widely dispersed conflicts. The period in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the new wars the US would enter into, both at home and abroad, saw further explosive growth in the industry.

PMSCs developed since the 1990s from single-service companies to “one-stop shop” solutions, as conventional state armies have become increasingly dependent on the industry. In this sense, she describes how violence, previously monopolized by the state, becomes a service like all other services on the free market, purchased by the state, and awarded to the best bidder. Østensen introduces Executive Outcomes as the mother of all PMSCs. Founded in 1989 by Eben Barlow, a former member of the South African Defence Forces, the company emerged as the government’s military units were being dismantled due to pressure from the ANC. Before it was dissolved in 1998, Executive Outcomes would go on to carry out combat roles in Angola and Sierra Leone, as well as contracts with corporations such as De Beers, Chevron, and Texaco.

Østensen describes four service niches provided by such companies:

- security and risk administration for business and commercial clients
- tasks formerly performed by state armed forces
- security and support provided to civilian actors (such as NGOs and aid organizations) in zones of conflict
- support of state-building activities such as institution building and democracy support (such as training a new police force in Afghanistan).

She speaks of the versatility, adaptability, and responsiveness of the industry particularly since the mid-2000s. This is evident in the capacity of companies to rebrand and rename to reestablish their legitimacy (for example, Blackwater becomes XE Services, and then becomes Academi); to provide flexible service menus to prospective clients; to deploy extremely quickly; to operate within assemblages and networks of security governance within the context of a risk society. Also discussed are concerns over the democratic challenges associated with the industry. For example:

- “the fox guarding the henhouse”
- reduction of transparency
- blurring the division between public and private
- their expertise grants them authority in decision-making related to security, but there is limited accountability and little legitimacy
- there is no comprehensive legal framework internationally (largely fragmented)
- there is a question as to whether self-regulation leads to PMSCs setting their own standards.

Lastly, Østensen emphasizes the theme that PMSCs do not represent a neutral service, in the sense that these companies are not likely to downplay the risk attached to various environments or conditions – but rather that PMSCs are more likely to exaggerate risk as it is in their interest to do so.

23.09.13 Quality Airport Hotel

Gardermoen, Oslo

COWI, Secured by Design Conference

COWI invites us to present our work at their Secured by Design Conference in Oslo. A high proportion of the Norwegian Security Advisors we meet are either working with colleagues in the UK or have been educated in the UK, or both. As a result, the Norwegian security standards and discourse are to a large degree influenced by the UK. This comes across in the makeup of the day in several topics addressed by a range of speakers. These include:

- Risk assessment, why and when? (Norwegian PST)
- Designing out crime (BREEAM UK)
- Secured by design, the concept (ACPO UK)
- Threats, security design (Norwegian PST)
- Protection against blast and shock (NDEA)
- Threats and people’s need of feeling safe (Henrik Syse)
- Summary (President of COWI Norway)

In one presentation, a representative of BRE (UK Building Research Establishment) – the same company that invented the BREEAM standard – describes the way architectural components are standardized and listed in the UK (by BRE). A speaker describes how security products are tested, with a tester receiving a set of tools – including, for example, a screwdriver, pipe, hammer or crowbar, and an electric drill. They have a time limit to break into, or force entry through a building component like a window or door.

Representatives of the formerly public, now private company that founded, implemented, and standardized Design Out Crime in the UK presents after the BRE.

They describe the influence on their work of the theories of Oscar Newman and other early Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) thinking, as well as the relevance of the “broken windows theory.” They describe the main concepts they work with:

- Access control
- Natural surveillance
- Territoriality

These presentations begin to repeat much of what we have already been exposed to in the previous months, but perhaps with less nuance. An interesting moment however occurs when these themes are related – in what feels to be a somewhat forced way – to environmental issues when the presenter cites research evaluating the “carbon cost of crime.”

The presenter from the Norwegian Defense Estates Agency speaks about protection against blast and shock. This seems to rehash the material the students the students have already been exposed to in London and Bergen. With some of the same videos we have been shown by Paul in London but with a less precise spoken accompaniment. One of the students in the audience puts up his hand and questions some of the details of the presentation, based on their knowledge from London. PST is apparently happy with this display from the students.

We make our presentation, addressing our reservations and concerns with the potential securitization of Nordic cities – to a somewhat muted response. It gradually becomes clear that for the great majority of attendees at this conference, security and securitization represent their economic livelihoods.

30.09.13 BAS Bergen

Lecture: Thomas Hilberth, Associate Professor, Aarhus School of Architecture, “Control Space”

Hilberth’s research addresses the intersection of fear/anxiety and architecture. In his presentation, he distinguishes between fear (when we know what we are afraid of) and anxiety (when we do not know what we are afraid of). He attempts to unfold the increasing role of fear and anxiety – as some of the most basic and powerful human emotions – in the production of contemporary spaces and territories. He relates these emotions – common between humans and animals – to the typical reactions of *freeze*, *flight*, or *fight*. Hilberth expands upon the centrality of these drivers in relation to Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, or what he refers to as *instinctoid needs*, in which security and safety are near the base of the pyramid, sitting immediately above the basic physiological needs such as food, water, warmth and rest. He presents the

centrality of the reaction of defending territory and the associated spatial techniques that outline a terminology for the twenty-first century, including: cocooning, wallification, sacrificial facades, CCTV, CPTED, fail-safe dimensions, panic rooms, etc. After he passes through a relatively familiar bibliography, including Foucault, Deleuze and Virilio, Jacobs, Gehl, Blakely and Snyder, Weizman, etc., we ask Hilberth his position on appropriate spatial reactions to fear and anxiety. He argues that there should not be a spatial reaction.

7–13 October 2013 Israel Study Tour

Participants: PST: Thomas Haneborg and Jack Fischer Ericksen; NSM: Håvard Walla; BAS: DS, VJ, HR, AR and 15 master students

7.10.13 Ben Gurion International Airport, Tel Aviv

Group Arrival

HR and AR arrive with the majority of the student group. Soon after disembarking the aircraft, a substantial distance from the passport checkpoint, AR and HR are stopped and questioned by two Israeli officers in civilian clothing waiting on the top of a one-way escalator. HR and AR are asked about their intentions for the visit, and are required to provide the officers with a day-by-day verbal description of their plans. This is somewhat surprising to them as prior to the trip both the Israeli and Norwegian embassies are informed of the visit and the context within which it is being carried out.

8.10.13 Norwegian Embassy, Tel Aviv

Lecture and discussion: Henrik Width, Norwegian Cultural Secretary/Attache, and Svein Seveje, Norwegian Ambassador



25. VJ and AR, Norwegian Embassy, Tel Aviv

The Norwegian Embassy in Tel Aviv is a small temporary office on the thirteenth floor of a nondescript office building. Like most other countries, Norway refuses to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv. The ambassador, Svein Seveje, welcomes us and informs us of the long relationship

between Norway and Israel. He outlines Israel's changing narrative from defensive to offensive military state, and explains Norway's more recent position as one of Israel's most vocal critics – particularly in terms of Israel's settlement policies in the Palestinian territories.

Norway provides 500 million NOK in humanitarian aid to Palestine, and has a representative office in Ramallah functioning effectively as an embassy. Ironically, in a somewhat tragic sense, it is now located on the Israeli side of the wall, reducing the possibility for Palestinians to access it. Seveje goes on to describe the increased hardening of Israeli politics, and that – in spite of the general public's being in favor of it – a two-state solution appears increasingly unlikely. We get a clear sense of the difficult situation for a foreign ambassador in a setting where so many fundamental differences exist with the host country.

9.10.13 Tel Aviv

Lecture and Tour, Yafo Municipality: Yael Enoch Maoz, International Relations, Yafo Municipality, and David Aharony, Director of Emergency and Security Department, Yafo Municipality



26. Study group meeting with Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, Tel Aviv

We are invited to the headquarters of the municipality of Yafo, the central municipality of Tel Aviv. Here we pass through metal detectors and our bags are searched before we are escorted to a large meeting room on an upper floor with views over large parts of Tel Aviv. We have made a request to representatives of the municipality to make a presentation addressing how they work with the theme of security. Maoz, the international relations officer first highlights the key characteristics that differentiate the city from the rest of Israel. We hear it from her, as we will hear it from many others – Tel Aviv is a liberal, friendly, secular, and cosmopolitan island within the country, where one of the greatest challenges is, in her opinion, the shortage of affordable housing. In these conversations, crime is presented by one of our hosts as a phenomenon that “comes from the outside” – or more specifically from the quarter of the population consisting of refugees and migrant workers.



27. Study group visiting underground park/bomb-shelter beneath Habima Square, Tel Aviv

Aharony, as director of the Emergency and Security Department introduces the municipality's various forms of threat response. A key concern in Yafo is hostile missile or chemical weapons attack – addressed in a law (introduced in 1991) requiring each apartment building in the municipality to have a shelter, with housing built at that time also being required to have an extra secure room. Today the municipality is focused on building centralized shelters. There are 353 bomb shelters, 93 underground parking garages converted to public shelters totaling 1.2 million m², and plans for 71 temporary evacuation centers with space for 25,000 beds. (Tel Aviv's total population is 400,000 residents.) Five-story buildings are at the same time reinforced and made earthquake-proof. During the meeting, we are taken on a tour to the largest of the new bomb shelters under the recently completed Habima Square. It is a huge underground space that doubles as an underground parking area, and – with large bomb-proof and chemical/fallout-proof doors, and lift-up entry stairs on the upper plaza surface – a bomb shelter.

They present wider plans for disaster management addressing earthquakes or tsunamis to possible epidemics such as influenza, smallpox, polio, anthrax, or avian flu. The municipality describes detailed plans as to how to deploy camps and temporary housing in parks and public space. The municipality requires this type of planning when developing new neighborhoods.

9.10.13 Tel Aviv

Tour: Etzel Museum

After having visited the museum on a previous day, HW proposes that our group visit the museum of the Etzel underground military group – an organization that was apparently one of three groups instrumental in establishing the state of Israel in the late 1940s. We arrive at the museum, near the waterfront, which consists of a black-tinted glass box that has landed somewhat awkwardly on top of a ruined stone fortress. An older man,



28. Study group in front of Etzel Museum, Tel Aviv



29. Interior, Etzel Museum, Tel Aviv

probably in his 80s or 90s, who himself apparently played a part in the Etzel battles, functions as our guide, offering details of the militarized struggle that “built the state of Israel.” Speaking in proud and somewhat nostalgic terms toward the violence, sorrows, and satisfaction of winning the war – the speaker is less focused on providing the background to the conflict than delivering entertaining and heroic war stories. As our guide relives various battles and military subterfuge, HW jokes: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

10.10.13 Jerusalem

Lecture and Discussion: Yuval Yaski, Chair, Department of Architecture, Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design



30. Scene upon study-group’s arrival in Jerusalem

We travel to Jerusalem and sense a radically different atmosphere from Tel Aviv.

Chair of the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design, Yuval Yaski welcomes us at a relatively deserted architecture school, while students are still on vacation. The

school is surrounded by walls, and we pass through a security checkpoint to get into the campus. We all sit down in one of the lecture halls. He describes the architecture school as a political setting focused on nurturing critical thinking. The department has both Israeli and Palestinian professors with projects being carried out, for example, in East Jerusalem and in Bedouin communities in the south of the country. He describes the school’s interests in educating planners and architects who are active in developing mapping techniques, visual testimonials, and design strategies capable of confronting existing Israeli master plans and master narratives. As with the rest of the tour, we are joined by our Norwegian security experts, who seem to be slightly uncomfortable with the content of Yaski’s talk.

In the studio he teaches – which addresses the Bedouin territories – he describes the use of comparative mapping approaches that evaluate differences between official maps and actual conditions. Yaski emphasizes the heavily planned nature of the territory controlled by the Israelis – where the state uses planning for the purpose of realizing its geopolitical ambitions. In that context, infrastructure for example is not a neutral, apolitical intervention, but a measure laid out in many cases to control, oppress, or gain other geopolitical advantages. He speaks of these territorial logics imposed by the state in relation to a notion of the welfare state. He argues that the notion of a welfare state is largely reserved for Zionist settlers; while at the same time, services, education, and rights to housing are being limited or withdrawn from the roughly 350,000 Palestinians in Jerusalem.

We ask Yaski to talk further about his everyday experience of security in a city like Jerusalem. He explains the role of profiling. The police and security personnel make a first screening of a person by listening to their language and dialect. As a member of the Israeli elite he describes his privileged position in which he is not heavily inconvenienced by these checks. He suggests that while the socially conscious are against it, the Israeli elite and middle class generally see security in positive terms. While Tel Aviv is a liberal enclave in a security state, in Jerusalem security is more visible – young soldiers crowd the streets, both male and female, carrying guns, sometimes uniformed and sometimes off duty, sitting around café tables with their weapons on their chairs.

10.10.13 East Jerusalem

Walking Tour of Silwan: Ronit Sela, Public Outreach Director for the Department of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ACRI (Association of Civil Rights in Israel)



31. Study group on ACRI tour of East Jerusalem



32. Study group on ACRI tour of East Jerusalem. The Separation Barrier



33. Study group on ACRI tour of East Jerusalem. Settler home



34. Study group on ACRI tour of East Jerusalem. Settler home

The Norwegian Embassy arranges a tour for us with the NGO Association of Civil Rights in Israel. ACRI is “Israel’s oldest and largest human rights organization” with a mandate “to ensure Israel’s accountability and respect for human rights, by addressing violations committed by the Israeli authorities in Israel, the Occupied Territories, or elsewhere.” A Norwegian Embassy employee joins us on the trip, along with the Norwegian security experts. We meet in central Jerusalem, where the ACRI team

pick us up in a tour bus. We drive to the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Silwan, a valley close to the old city, where we experience a quite different pattern of housing from that of central Jerusalem. On one side of the valley we observe a number of houses adorned with Israeli flags, a high concentration of CCTV cameras, and in some cases, small guardhouses. The other side of the valley is a dense neighborhood consisting of similarly informally built houses that constitute the still intact largely Palestinian area.

Our guides explain the process by which Israeli authorities and Israeli settlers contest Palestinians' rights to homes in this part of East Jerusalem with various methods – one of which involves the withholding of citizenship from Palestinians living in East Jerusalem – which in turn limits those residents' rights. Other related methods include: forced evictions, challenged residency permits, withholding building permits and services, disinvestment in infrastructure and schools, etc. Sela describes how three hundred mostly ultraorthodox Israeli settlers have built their homes in this part of East Jerusalem, in walled-off compounds equipped with CCTV and guarded around the clock by security guards. We are struck by this much smaller scale of infiltrating Israeli settlements, their extremely close proximity to the Palestinian houses, and the obvious heightened tension that this introduces – in relation to the more separated condition of many of the other settlements further into the West Bank.

ACRI attempts to fight for the necessary services for the 55,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Sela explains how those Palestinian residents pay taxes to Israel but get very little in return. There are for example only nine schools in East Jerusalem, none of which have playgrounds. Since 1967 the population of the neighborhood has increased by a factor of more than four, but almost no building permits have been issued in that period. In response to the resulting overcrowding, residents have had to build anyway, making many homes exposed to Israeli demolition. We are informed also about the settlers' claims to Palestinian houses and lands in East Jerusalem by

making assertions to the antiquities authorities as to important Jewish archaeological sites.

The bus takes us further into East Jerusalem, where the students have their first close-up experience of the "separation wall" or "security wall." We stop at one of the checkpoints, where Sela describes the effects of the wall not only as a fixed spatial barrier, which separates Palestinians from family members or workplaces, but also as a concerted method to "exhaust, humiliate, and demoralize" the Palestinian people. The unreliable waiting time and treatment when trying to pass through the checkpoints, as well as the complexity involved in moving between walled-off Palestinian neighborhoods discourages the population from passing to the Israeli side of the wall. Sela explains how ACRI organizes ongoing efforts to inform the press about police mistreatment at the Separation Barrier checkpoints.

11.10.13 West Bank

Bus Tour: Abu Hasan (AH), organizer of West Bank tours, formerly PLO



36. Study group on West Bank tour in Ramallah

Our tour guide in the West Bank, Abu Hasan, is an enthusiastic and knowledgeable character. TH and JFE from PST join us – equipped, it appears, with provisions for more than a day, and police-style pants containing knee protection disguised as casual clothing. The first day-trip is focused on East Jerusalem, the separation wall and Ramallah. On our way, out of Jerusalem we are driven through Israeli settlements that are particularly suburban and surprisingly

banal in character. They appear well tended-to, with schools, playgrounds, stores, and so forth. AH speaks passionately about the decades of illegal Israeli-built settlements in the West Bank – built with disregard for international law and several UN resolutions forbidding them. He describes the economic incentives for settlers provided by the Israeli government, including a five-year tax-free period and reduced rent expenses, equivalent to one-quarter of the cost of a similar living space in Jerusalem. AH addresses the contrasting challenges in the Palestinian areas where, for example, there is a considerable deficit of school places for children.

From the vantage point of the settlements we can see the Palestinian neighborhoods encircled as islands. Wall sections such as these snake through Palestinian territory claiming 780 km² more land than that defined by the green line – the demarcation line set out after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. We are informed that the wall's position is intended to place wells and other resources on the Israeli side while separating Palestinians from one another. The International Court of Justice in The Hague has demanded that Israel take down the wall; instead, the wall is continuously expanded. AH describes the severity of the resulting deficiency of resources and services on the Palestinian side of the wall: half the homes have no water, there is no waste removal or police, and fire and emergency medical services in many cases do not exist.

The main checkpoint between Jerusalem and Ramallah – Qalandia – is the administrative center of the Occupied West Bank, through which 5,000–7,000 people cross daily. As we pass through the separation barrier toward the West Bank there appear to be no difficulties in passing through. To return to Jerusalem from the West Bank, however, will be quite a different situation.

As we drive on the roads of the West Bank, AH describes the division of the territory into zones according to the Oslo Accords. Area A, containing Palestinian cities and their surrounding areas, is under full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority, constituting approximately 18 percent of the West Bank's total area. Despite being forbidden from this zone, the Israeli Defense Forces regularly enter this area, mostly at night to conduct raids. Area B, containing Palestinian villages, is under Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli–Palestinian security control, and comprises around 22 percent of the West Bank's area. Area C, including Israeli settlements, is under full Israeli civil and security control. It comprises around 63 percent of the West Bank's area. AH explains to us when we are leaving one area and entering another. We are struck by the ubiquity of the Israeli lookout towers – which are a somewhat disturbing presence, and the wreckage sprawled around the landscape.



35. Study group on ACRI tour of East Jerusalem. The Separation Barrier



37. Yasser Arafat's Mausoleum, Palestinian Authority Headquarters, Ramallah



38. Study group at the Separation Barrier

As the day goes on, we ask our AH about his own past. He describes how he has, like many other Palestinian men, spent several years in prison on “terror” charges (eleven years in total in his case, spread over three separate occasions). The first time was for six months at age thirteen, when he was accused of throwing stones. After his brother was killed and he joined the PLO youth organization when he was sixteen years old, he spent five years in prison. One year out of prison, he would return for a six further years. AH was released as a result of the Oslo Agreement. He describes how he is now fortunate to be able to continue to run his tours of the West Bank due to support from the German and Greek embassies. AH says his ongoing political work involves travels to Europe to advocate for Palestine more than a dozen times a year.

We visit the headquarters of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, which includes observing Yasser Arafat’s tomb. Before going to the memorial, JFE tells us about his time in the Norwegian Police’s Close Protection Unit, when he was Arafat’s personal bodyguard in Oslo during the Oslo Accord talks in the early 1990s. He speaks of Arafat’s enormous charisma and of the respect he held for him. JFE asks to have his picture taken at the tomb. Afterward, the group explores Ramallah. Later, at AH’s suggestion, the bus stops and we each buy an ice cream, which we eat together on the main street of Ramallah.

12.10.13 West Bank

Bus Tour: Abu Hasan (AH), organizer of West Bank tours, formerly PLO

During the second day of our West Bank tour, we visit Nablus and the Balata refugee camp.

A city of about around 140,000 inhabitants, Nablus has been described by an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson in the late 2000s as the “capital of terror” in the West Bank, and the center of Palestinian rocket production. During the second intifada the area was blocked off by IDF roadblocks as the city became the site of some of the most aggressive IDF incursions. These roadblocks, according to AH, would reap huge damage on the local industries. Military actions by the Israelis

in the early 2000s would lead to the death of 522 and injury of more than 3,000 Palestinians, along with serious damage caused to historical monuments. We walk through the beautiful streets and space of the ancient city, including a bathhouse and soap factory. As we walk through the streets and squares, we come across several shrines to young martyrs as AH explains the various scenarios behind the youths’ deaths – including one case of illegal weapons used by the Israelis. We are invited to meet with local representatives of the youth club.



39. Study group at Yafa Cultural Center, Balata Refugee Camp, Nablus



40. Balata refugee camp, Nablus



41. Study group at Balata refugee camp, Nablus

The Balata refugee camp was established as a temporary refugee tent camp for 500 people in 1952. Currently, according to AH, approximately 28,000 people live within the same 1 km² with little in the way of jobs, education, or health care. At the time of their original displacement, these refugees had been farmers; there is now little to no hope of returning to their original land. We walk around the camp, which is characterized by an extraordinary dense urban fabric of what looks to be largely self-made concrete. In the narrow streets, we see sim-



42. Balata refugee camp, Nablus



43. Study group meeting in youth club, Nablus



44. Abu Hassan, West Bank Tours

ilar martyr photographs to those we saw in Nablus, with young boys holding machine guns. We visit the Yafa Cultural Center, established in 1995, which runs three schools along with courses including traditional arts and crafts, oral history, and rights awareness. The center runs a computer lab, library, and clinic with one doctor. We are impressed by the dedication and efforts of the volunteers.

On our return trip to Jerusalem our bus is stopped by guards with machine guns and reflective sunglasses. Our driver is double-checked.

13.10.13 Tel Aviv **Group Departure**

Before checking in to fly out of the Tel Aviv Airport, DS is singled out in the prechecks by the airport security team. This not only involves several bag searches but a series of particularly aggressive and repeated questioning sessions. We discuss afterwards if this was related to an awareness on the part of Israeli intelligence of the time we spent in the West Bank.

14.10.13 Oslo Study Tour

14.10.13 Oslo **Introduction to Oslo Program,** **Benedicte Bjørnland, PST Chief,** **The Norwegian Police Security Service** **(PST) Headquarters**

After arriving in Oslo the previous evening, we meet in the morning at the PST headquarters together with the students. We leave our bags, IDs, and mobile phones in security boxes in the outer “public” area, and are guided into the lobby of the main auditorium of the inner part of the complex. The lobby showcases historical spy equipment. The oddest of all is a display of a camera hidden inside of a baby pram from the 1960s or 1970s, with an accompanying photograph presenting its original use. Once inside the auditorium, Benedicte Bjørnland, the chief of the PST, gives a brief speech describing the collaboration as a “new and good step toward the future” in which architects play a key role “in finding the balance between security and openness.” She asks what role architects can play in “reducing vulnerability” and in providing tools in “fighting terrorism in the long term.” Bjørnland finishes her speech abruptly and quickly disappears.

14.10.13 Oslo **Lars Erik Svendsen, PST Close Protection** **Unit, The Norwegian Police Security** **Service (PST) Headquarters**

The next speaker is Lars Erik Svendsen, whose work involves the very direct protection of people – in particular,

Norwegian officials who travel abroad, VIPs, or guests. For a short while the discussion is less about bombs, shattered glass, and hostile vehicle mitigation, but rather about multiple points of escape, overview, sight lines, decoy motorcades, and safe rooms. According to Svendsen, 90 percent of his job is about meticulous planning. He describes the necessary training in his job to support reading behavior in crowds, detecting nervousness, and lurking. A series of events are shown and discussed, from the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in 2013, to the Marriott Hotel attack in Islamabad, to the Serena Hotel attack in Kabul in 2008 – with a reflection on the conditions and mistakes that allowed these attacks to take place. To additionally read spatial conditions through this lens requires, according to one of the students, another act of mental gymnastics.

14.10.13 Oslo **Tour of Oslo Opera House with Head of** **Security**



45. Study group at Oslo Opera House

The group travels together to the Oslo Opera House. According to our security experts and the head of security of the Opera complex, security had not been a priority in the planning and design of this popular and celebrated public building, other than securing it against fire. This is discussed, for example, in relation to the building’s exposure to vehicles on the northern facade to Operagata, and in the potential openness of the roofscape. In smaller groups we discuss whether the integration of more intense security scrutiny during the earlier stages of the design of the project would have compromised the design. Many of us agreed that limited measures might not, such as more stringent HVM measures on the north facade, but we agree that there are dangers that if the building’s securitization had been taken further, the strength of the project may never have emerged. Lars Erik Svendsen also discusses the building in more detail through his lens of protecting important persons. We go into the bowels of the building to the surveillance room, where a security worker watches CCTV monitors. The “secret” Justin Bieber con-

cert of 2012, which was described earlier by the head of the opera house’s security, is mentioned again by the security worker as one of the greatest tests of the building’s security. He describes the panic associated with having between 15,000 and 20,000 Beliebers on the roof of the building, and the ensuing challenges related to that number of persons being squeezed into that area for several hours with a minimal supply of food, lavatories, and water.

14.10.13 Oslo **Brief from DSS (Department Service** **Center), Government Quarter: Matius** **Eckel, head of the Department of Security** **Management; and Marius Orningård** **Madsen, senior advisor, Department of** **Security Management**

Our traveling group meets with representatives of DSS (Department Service Center) – the governmental department responsible for the everyday life of the government and the security of government buildings. They describe the security situation as a split narrative, addressing what was done before the 2011 attack, and what has happened afterward. Prior to the attack, they refer to the struggle of obtaining approval for security measures – particularly with regards to the “slowness of the Norwegian planning system.” The challenge after the attack is described more according to the need to reassure workers that they are safe behind the increased security measures. It is in these terms that Madsen asks: “What is security – Is it a real or conceived condition?” They describe some of the discussions they have been having regarding the definition of the security brief for the future renovated Government Quarter. One of them refers to an interest in new technologies such as a smoke-screen product – already apparently used as a security measure in petrol stations – that is deployed at the time of a potential attack, eliminating visibility for a potential attacker. We have difficulty overcoming our skepticism toward this proposal.

14.10.13 Oslo **Inspection of bomb-damaged** **Government Quarter**

After the meeting, which included the presentation of AR’s diploma project to some curious DSS officials, the group is led by the DSS team into the closed-off site of the 2011 attack on the government quarter. On our way we discuss further the temporary security measures – involving an orgy of concrete Jersey barriers that have been distributed around the streets and public spaces of the area. We enter into the H-block and the R4-Block buildings which were the epicenter of the attack. They have been significantly cleaned of debris since the 2011 event, but they are nonetheless

sites of considerable damage. We can clearly see the extent of the blown-out windows and the impact of flying glass and debris on various architectural surfaces. While the crater immediately under the location of the vehicle bomb has been repaired, we are mildly surprised at the resilience of the original concrete surfaces in the lobby of the H-building, which was only meters from the bomb.

Observing security advisors from three different departments of government, we begin to recognize differences in their mind-sets. DSS, being responsible for the ongoing day-to-day security for

government employees in the Government Quarter, appear to be trying to make the best of a difficult temporary situation. They are tending not only to the security of the employees, but are also attentive to reducing fear among employees through simply taking action. We pass one of the buildings where DSS has increased the original standoff distance between the building facade and the vehicle-accessible street edge by 1.5 m through the deployment of temporary concrete Jersey barriers. It becomes obvious that the other security consultants disagree. The discussion moves from the problematic appearance of the

14.10.13 Oslo

Briefing on Security at Oslo Central Station: Tor Saghaug, ROM Eiendom



50. Study group at ROM Eiendom presentation, Oslo Central Station

ROM Eiendom is a company that owns the buildings within the Norwegian railroad network, including approximately 330 stations. Tor Saghaug, a project director at ROM, makes a presentation of the company, the Oslo S station, and the plans for its future renovation based on an architectural competition awarded in 2008. While the main security concerns on an everyday basis are petty crime such as pickpocketing and unsocial behavior, we are meeting with ROM primarily due to the fact that PST and NSM see Oslo S as a target vulnerable to a potential terror attack. It is evident to us that an attack in such a busy location, relying on the free and rapid movement of many persons would be extremely difficult to prevent.

The station was the site of a previous attack in 1982, in which a suitcase bomb was detonated in the luggage area, killing one and injuring eleven persons. The architecture of the station was adapted after that bombing with the movement of all the luggage storage to a location between two other buildings. The new area was covered with a lightweight roof that would support the dissipation of energy from an explosion upward – with the ambition of leaving the rest of the station undamaged.

We are presented the 2008 proposal for the new central station and it is challenged by some of the students, who identify what they see as its security shortcomings.

The presentation is followed by a walking tour around the station.

18.10.13 E-mail from Haakon Rasmussen

Four days after the Oslo S visit, HR contacts us by e-mail concerning our students' "testing the security" at the Oslo S main station.

Regarding police attention toward two of our students

From: Haakon Rasmussen

Sent: Friday 18 October 2013 10:00

To: Anders Rubing; Deane Alan Simpson; Vibeke Jensen



46. Study group at Høyblokken, Government Quarter, Oslo



47. Study group in secured Government Quarter, Oslo



48. Study group at Government Quarter, Oslo



49. Study group in Høyblokken foyer, Government Quarter, Oslo

barriers to how much, if any, security they provide. The question is posed whether the increased standoff distance is helpful when, in the event of a hostile vehicle bomb attack, concrete debris from the Jersey barriers could be more dangerous than the effect of a reduced standoff distance.

Hi!

The day after our visit to the Oslo Central station, two of our students went on their own past the gates into the goods-delivery area at Oslo S and were apprehended by security guards and taken to the police for registration of their IDs and deletion of the pictures they had taken. When they were apprehended, the students told the police and the guards that they were “testing the security.”

I have spoken to the police and to ROM-Eiendom about it, and luckily there will be no legal aftermath to this, but we should talk some sense into the students about it. They had all the opportunities to take contact with the people that we spoke to on Monday, and would then have been let into the area for their individual research. But when they try to pull off a more 007 approach and break into the area like they did, people get slightly annoyed.

Any ideas on how we should deal with this?

I include the security log for the event below.

“Observe two men walking down to the delivery entrance from the barrier at Track 19. Send security guards to check. Before guards get there, the men check car doors and photograph the map of the delivery entrance. They disappear up the stairs by the freight elevator. The guards gain control over them. They claim they were there yesterday with ROM Eiendom [real estate company developing and maintaining property of the Norwegian railway], and would now test the security. They are escorted to the police post for ID-check and expelled/discharged. Photograph of the map of the delivery entrance is deleted.”

11.11.13 BAS Bergen Studio Midterm Review



51. BAS mid-term review

In the weeks leading up to and following the study tours, the students are asked to develop a series of initial design proposals for the sites, based on five different scenarios. This range of scenarios is intended to prompt their experimentation into different registers of response to the site.

The scenario outlines are:

1. Fortress – what if security is the only parameter, without regards to other qualities or other design parameters?
2. Win-Win – Could the project both give enhanced security and enhanced urban qualities?
3. Passivity – What could forms of conscious passivity yield?
4. Ignore and Enhance – What is possible based upon ignoring security concerns and instead focusing on enhancing urban qualities?
5. Exploit logics of security as an excuse for other ends. Could there be the possibility that focused argumentation and design language of securitization can be deployed to enhance urban qualities?

Attending the review is the core team of security experts and the teaching team:

Håvard Walla, NSM
Jack Fischer Eriksen, Police
Superintendent, PST Thomas
Haneborg, MSc / Security Advisor, PST
Deane Simpson, Professor, BAS
Vibeke Jensen, Visiting Professor BAS
Haakon Rasmussen, 3RW
Anders Rubing, Teacher BAS

The students present a plethora of approaches to the sites. The security experts are clearly impressed with the students' grasp of their tools and the delivery of “outside the box” thinking – but they struggle in some cases to address the spatial aspects of the projects, and to address the projects on the students' terms. Some of the students are enjoying the political nature of the theme, and are exploring the potential to prod and provoke.

During the midterm, one of the surprises on our part is the introduction by the security experts of additional threats to design for, in particular that of espionage. If we are to take this threat seriously as a design parameter, it adds an entirely different rationale to the forming of the quarter. Espionage in this case is defined as largely industrial espionage in relation to recently developed eavesdropping technologies such as the laser microphone that employs a laser directed at a distant window to pick up sound vibrations. If such a threat is to be incorporated into the design brief, it means a building without windows or without visible windows, for example. We challenge this framing of the brief based also on the rapidly changing nature of these technologies. Would it not be highly likely that an entire building complex designed to eliminate visible windows from the street or surrounding buildings, would be made obsolete in a short time by a further technological measure, such as a laser microphone jammer?

05.11.13 BAS Bergen

Post Midterm written comments from PST/NSM

At the suggestion of the security experts, the students are asked to send their projects to JFE and TH from PST and HW from NSM for a more formal evaluation of the security performance of their schemes. The feedback is divided under nine headings which describe an interesting taxonomy for security analysis, providing an insight into their way of approaching the spatial through the lens of security:

- Threats
- Description of concept
- Detection
- Resilience
- Vulnerabilities
- Robustness
- Distance and perimeter
- Surveillance
- Line of sight
- Creativity.

Below is an example of a review for one of the proposals:

Threats:

- terrorism
- crime in general
- sabotage
- hostile reconnaissance

Detection:

The layers and cobweb limits the overview of the area and enhances the need of technical use of surveillance. The different floors could require added use of security guards.

Resilience:

Difficult to see the resilient ability in the layers of transport facilities. A structural collapse will affect nearly all transport systems. A threat against one or more of the different transport types will affect all of them. A plus is the exclusivity of transport and not added functions.

Vulnerabilities:

Concerns regarding emergency response and rescue, because accessibility is unclear. No quick entries for emergency services. [...] A more holistic explanation of this project would be beneficial.

Surveillance:

Good opportunities for natural surveillance on ground level; on the below-ground level, technical measures need to be added.

Line of sight:

Target acquisition (humans) is easy on ground level. Line of sight is heavily reduced on transport system below ground level.

Creativity:

A very unison use of well-known security principles.

A good approach for creating open spaces and separate different functions. The distance of the different functions (shopping center / train station / bus station) will reduce damage effects from serious threats.

Below is an evaluation of a "fortress scenario" proposal:

Threats:

- terrorism
- crime in general
- sabotage
- espionage

Description of concept:

Existing buildings structures are mainly kept in place, with an extensive use of visible security measures. A well-outlined and informal context. A clearly defined perimeter and intention of desired security level.

Detection:

A very heavy emphasis on technical solutions, with a hard outer shell and internal zoning. Unclear if there is visible connection between the watchtowers. A massive scale of monitoring detection systems is required.

Resilience:

Difficult to assess the innovation of resilience in this concept. A penetration of the different zones may cause logistical problems (for example, partial refurbish-ing after a fire, etc.).

Vulnerabilities:

The vehicle lock is meandering into the perimeter, where there is possibility to exclude it from the very same perimeter.

The concept is vulnerable to insider threat in the security management.

Concerns regarding emergency response and rescue. No quick entries for emergency services.

Choke point at entrance. Delivery services access the area.

VIP entrance a possible target point. Questions arise regarding the logistics and movement within the perimeter. Underground garage under R5 is unnecessary and unwanted in this level of security.

Distance and perimeter:

Very well thought-out. Hostile vehicle mitigation is apparently well-maintained, however vehicle access is not excluded. Public access is nonexistent and therefore not an issue.

Surveillance:

Extreme levels of technical measures needed to conduct surveillance. Natural surveillance is possible to some extent on both sides of perimeter. Not all blind spots seem eliminated.

Line of sight:

Target acquisition is limited; target of opportunity is nearly nonexistent. Hostile reconnaissance is difficult, as nearby buildings are expropriated and demolished.

Creativity:

A very unison [sic] use of well-known security principles. Absolutely no reuse of public space. A dystopian image of security. Few design and innovative security features. Traditional martial approach for securing, excluding the public.

Closing remarks:

A well-explained use of security measures, but with little practical use for democratic governance. High-profile security measures, with obvious security gaps such as deliveries. The concept displaces risk to other targets.

In the second evaluation in particular, there are further security challenges introduced, such as concerns for hostile penetration in one part of the building translating into expanded logistical problems elsewhere, or the requirement that all blind spots must be eliminated. These considerations add to the complexity and difficulty of satisfying security ambitions, a high quality of design, and the continued right and access to the city.

**18.12.13 BAS, Bergen
Final Semester Review****Present:**

Jack Fischer Eriksen, Police Superintendent, PST
Thomas Haneborg, MSc / Security Advisor, PST
Audun Vestli, COWI
Deane Simpson, Professor, BAS
Vibeke Jensen, Visiting Professor BAS
Anders Rubing, Teacher BAS

We begin the final day of the project with a short introductory presentation. DS attempts to frame the central challenges and dilemmas of the semester. He presents a 3-axis graph showing different spaces that can be occupied within the figure between varying levels of security, design quality, and access/right to the city. After his introduction the students, arranged in pairs grouped by theme, present their final projects. In the last weeks, the students have struggled to find a balance between their responses to the security feedback from the midterm review and the continued

feedback from the teachers. In that sense, the final review becomes a somewhat two-layered discussion: one discussion takes place between the security consultants and the student; and the other between students and teachers, despite concerted efforts to bridge what emerges as two competing cultures and agendas.

As the student projects have developed, so have the security concerns from the consultants, and at the same time the teachers and the consultants have further critiqued the same projects based on their design quality and their relation to the notion of the right to the city. One example is a project in which the loading dock is indoors. Although perfectly separated from the rest of the building in security terms, it becomes a concern as to how the building would react to a 20,000 kg bomb, as one theoretically could enter the loading dock with a truck. The discussion moves on to how to design and construct a building system capable of absorbing the hypothetical bomb in a place where only logistical personnel would work. Similar to the discussion about espionage at the midterm review, this concern is entirely new to us. Such feedback also occurs in relation to the Government Quarter projects, where sight lines and the risk of being attacked (with firearms) is being discussed as a reality. We challenge the rationale behind this thinking, in the context of a country largely free from politically motivated assassination, apart from the 2011 attack. This tendency of demanding increasingly secured environments – represented in the escalating feedback by the security consultants, mirrors what we see in realized securitization projects such as the American embassies. From being open to the public, they are hidden by more and more layers of bollards, fences, and surveillance until they have to move out of the city centers in order to comply with security and standoff distance demands, a situation where the regime of fear produces an involuntary abandonment of the city itself.

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Theme: Democracy and Security

Author: Giorgio Agamben

For a Theory of Destituent Power

Public Lecture in Athens, November 16, 2013