IMAGINED, EMBODIED AND ACTUAL TURKS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

edited by

Bent Holm · Mikael Bøgh Rasmussen

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Michael Hüttler · Suna Suner · Hans Ernst Weidinger

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ABBREVIATIONS

AD	*Anno Domini* (in the year of the Lord)
a.k.a.	also known as
b.	born
BC	Before Christ
c.	circa
cat.	catalogue
cf.	confer (compare, see)
ch.	chapter
d.	died
ed.	edited by, editor
eds.	editors, editions
e.g.	exempli gratia (for example)
et al.	et alii/aliae (and others)
f.	and following (page etc.)
ff.	and following (pages etc.)
fig.	figure
figs.	figures
fol.	folio
fols.	folios
i.e.	id est (in other words)
ibidem	in the same place
idem/eadem	the same
n.d.	no date
no.	number
nos.	numbers
p.	page
pp.	pages
r.	reign(ed)
res.	residence
s.l.	sine loco (without location)
s.n.	sine nomine (without name/author/editor)
s.p.	sine pagina
trans.	translated by, translator
v.	verse
vol.	volume
vols.	volumes

REMARKS

Translations, if not indicated otherwise, are by the authors of the contribution. Quotations are generally in the original language.

Double quotation marks are used for quotations in the continuous text; single quotation marks indicate translated words or sentences, as well as otherwise highlighted words or phrases.

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KALEIDOSCOPIC REFLECTIONS

Bent Holm and Mikael Bøgh Rasmussen (Copenhagen)

FOCUSES, PRINCIPLES, STRATEGIES

This book operates in various kinds of borderlands between the Ottoman Empire and the European nations, primarily in the Early Modern era.[1] The confrontation between European countries and the expanding Ottoman Empire, its culture and peoples, meant a challenge to western self-understanding in multiple respects, and played a major role in numerous historical connections. In much modern historiography, however, its role tends to be minor, even though the Ottoman Turks and the European imagining of the 'Turk' have constituted significant agents and points of reference in a variety of interrelations: military, political, cultural, and commercial.

The notion of imagery appears in most connections to constitute a pivotal point. We understand 'image' in a broad sense that comprehends a picture that is triggered in the receiver's imagination, created by oral, textual, or visual depictions. The image was not necessarily representative of – and it was constantly challenged by encounters with – the actual Ottomans. Furthermore, it was imbued with filters of European self-imagining, as observers also saw or reflected themselves in it. It was coloured by political and ideological considerations. In short, the image flickers. To talk about *the* image of the Turk is in itself a stereotype.

So, there was not just *one* image of the Turk. And the same image might function as various different images with different meanings depending on the context and levels of its use. A European viewpoint did not necessarily imply a position of power, as it did later on, in colonial and imperialistic eras. Distorted portrayals of the adversary or emphases of one's own strength might even be seen as acts of compensation for inferior positions.

1 This book originally took its point of departure in a series of sessions (The Image of the Turks in Early Modern Europe) at the inaugural conference of the Nordic Network of Renaissance Studies (NNRS) at Copenhagen University, followed by a workshop, in October 2012, with contributors from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, and Turkey. The sessions were introduced by Professor İlber Ortaylı of Istanbul, and were generously supported by the C. L. David Foundation and Collection. Based on the approaches, interpretations, and discussions we held during these sessions, we developed the strategies and optics which underlie the editoral principles of this publication. We are very greatful that lucky circumstances allowed us to elaborate these in the context of this publication with the Hollitzer Wissenschaftsverlag. The New Carlsberg Foundation has generously supported the acquisition of a number of the book's illustrations.

The idea behind this publication is therefore to confront textual, visual and embodied imageries with historical positions and conditions; to investigate the intersection and interplay of experience, imagination, and embodiment; and for this purpose to let a variety of areas of research approaches and national and linguistic backgrounds interact. The contributors are scholars from a number of western countries and from Turkey, representing political and military history, art history, literary history, and the history of theatre and performance – research fields with different traditions, strategies, and methodologies when approaching the formation of an image of another culture and the self-definition such imaginings trigger.

ACTUALITY, IMAGERY, PERFORMATIVITY

The book aims to investigate the Early Modern era's European-Ottoman interrelations from three angles. One concerns the actual circumstances: how did the Europeans meet the Turks in pragmatic and diplomatic connections? This is about relations and encounters. Another angle focuses on imagery: how were the Turks imagined and depicted in literature and art? This imagining is imbued with significance referring to both interior and exterior circumstances; it is both marked by and impacts on (the understanding of) the relations and encounters taking place on the actual front. And a third angle addresses performativity: what role did the Turk play in ceremonies, plays, and operas? The embodiment of the figure refers to actual relations and encounters, and to various Turkish images as well.

The book takes as its point of departure the occidental encounter with the 'actual' Turk connected characteristically with diplomatic missions and embassies related to wars, conflicts, and trade.

The *first* part, *The Actual Turk*, is introduced by surveys of different aspects of the history of the Ottoman Empire and its relation to Central and Western Europe. The Ottoman Empire's development is seen particularly from the perspective of the dynamics of its complex confessional and national diversity from the foundation in the fourteenth century to its collapse after the First World War (Pelt). The contemporary image of the Ottoman Empire is exposed as a result of the rather one-eyed and superficial optics by which it has been framed, especially in modern Anglo-Saxon historiography (Fleet). These complex and problematizing approaches and principles are in play in several more strictly defined cases of encounters. It is demonstrated that Venetian diplomatic, military, and cultural connections from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries also involved fascination and inspiration (Pedani), and that even Hungarian-Turkish relations in the sixteenth century, their conflictual aspects notwithstanding, implied humanist, confessional, and classical

connotations (Ács). Today's Eastern Central European images of the Turk are seen to some extent to echo the imagery developed in the political and cultural context of the fifteenth century, in particular the construction of Western identities as a bulwark of Christendom against the Ottoman Empire (Born). Imagery in a general sense is the pivot of the following part.

The *second* part, *The Imagined Turk*, shifts between literary and visual images with various national or artistic focuses. It begins with a survey of the impact of a number of European authors' cultural prerequisites for their texts about the Ottoman lands and populations in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries (Çirakman). This is followed by an exposition on the two-way pictorial stimulus between the Ottoman Empire and Europe (Renda). In terms of textual imagery, both condemnation and pragmatic information appear in sixteenth-century Italian texts and paratexts, along with epic poetry – texts that often served as major source material for other European authors (Schwarz Lausten). Literary depictions of the Ottoman Empire sometimes included a mirror effect: a transferability between exterior and interior enemy images (Duprat). This very mechanism is traceable in, for example, French fictional and expository portrayals in the sixteenth century (Keller). The interplay of text and image are strictly related to the use of Scripture against the backdrop of the confessional wars of the period (Smith), and in Melchior Lorcks's depictions of Turkish motives, inserted in a variety of contexts (Rasmussen).

The *third* part, *The Embodied Turk*, presents examples of ceremonial, ritualistic, and theatrical representations of the Turk in complex contexts: from triumphs and pageants in the Habsburg Netherlands in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries (Van Waelderen), to royal stagings in Denmark and the British Islands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Holm), and reciprocal Ottoman-Austrian relations as reflected in diplomatic and theatrical stagings of the eighteenth century (Suner). Even in these cases the Turk plays a complex role in stagings that address both domestic, confessional and political themes and circumstances.

With this final focus on diplomacy, the investigation returns to one of its points of departure: the encounter in the sixteenth century with the actual Turk during ambassadorial missions. The first part of this era is marked by Western embassies travelling to the Grand Turk in search of agreements that might include the payment of protection money. In the latter part, the overall power balance had tipped to such a degree that Ottoman ambassadors coming to Europe were looked upon as exotic, almost theatrical figures.

To summarize briefly, the main angles refer to: *actuality*, focusing on the actual Turk in connection with political and cultural encounters; *imagery*, dealing with the imagined Turk as depicted in art and literature; and *performativity*, concerning the embodied Turk as presented in ritualistic and theatrical stagings. However, in

practice the distinctions among these three dimensions are by no means clear; they overlap and interfere. This interchangeability or fluctuation among the various levels applies even to single images. A specific motif is not inherently one-dimensional; it does not necessarily mean one thing only; its interpretation is a function of its contexts, several of which might be active simultaneously.

TIME, PLACE, MOTIFS

Chronologically, the time arch of this book stretches thus *grosso modo* from the founding of the Ottoman Empire to its increasing decline in the late eighteenth century. However, the investigations pay particular attention to the sixteenth century, a period of decisive religious tensions and controversies, and primarily the complex clash between the Roman Catholic Church and the various reformations. This took place alongside some of the most momentous wars with the Ottoman Empire. In this connection, the image of the Turk came to play a central role in the theologized interpretations of contemporary events on the spiritual and military battlefields, in textual and artistic depictions as well as performative representations. The emphasis on the sixteenth century is framed with presentations of premises and consequences in the previous and the following periods, including reciprocal repulsion and attraction, disdain, and fascination.

Geographically, particular focus is on central Europe and the Balkans, given that some of the most significant confrontations in this specific connection took place between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire. Especially the fights about the Hungarian territories were crucial, but also the various refractions in the Mediterranean areas, in Northern and Western Europe are – though to a more limited extent – part of the multifaceted picture. In general, the confrontation with the expanding Ottoman Empire and its peoples resulted in a surge of images of Turks all over Early Modern Europe, putting these images to a wide range of often conflicting and sometimes surprising uses in every aspect of cultural expression. Certain events turn out to be specifically interesting as turning points, where the contradictory complexity of the imaginings seem to come much more to the fore than at other times. Examples of such key events include, for example, the sieges of Vienna, the Battle of Lepanto, or – more dispersed in time and place – the Long Turkish War.

Thematically, the book focuses primarily on Western multi-layered interrelations with the Ottoman Turks, and particularly on the historiographic, artistic, and theological processes in the construction of the image of the Turk. This image points in various directions, both backwards and forwards. The one pointing backwards refers to antiquity, to a conception of the Ottoman Empire as a

continuation of the Roman Empire. The other one, pointing to the more or less immediate future, refers to the role of the Turk as an instrument in diabolical and/or divine hands in the approaching apocalyptical world drama. Another recurrent motif concerns the variety of cultural confrontations and inspirations that may even comprehend openness across confessional borders; this is especially true for the Ottoman Empire, but also applies in varying degrees to European countries, especially France, which in many ways represents an exception from the general European norm of antagonistic attitudes.

CONTEXTS, CONTRADICTIONS, COMBINATIONS

As suggested, the disposition of this book is in a way artificial, in the sense that one specific chapter might possibly figure in another thematic context. Diplomacy implies, for instance, both actual and imaginative aspects; but first of all the intention is that the thematic focuses within the three main parts should enter into dialogue and interact with each other: any depiction of the Turk is necessarily ruled, marked, and coloured by the actual and ideological implications that constitute the receiver's universe on its various levels, be they religious, national, or pragmatic. We have for this reason recommended a limited number of references in between the chapters.

Threads may – and should – be drawn in numerous patterns of combinations both inside and between the parts. For example, when read in a dynamic dialogue with imaginings on various levels and in differing contexts, Melchior Lorck's image of Süleyman has no particular character by itself, but gains it according to the contexts provided by the accompanying texts.

Dependent upon actual and strategic circumstances, Western attitudes and understandings were not coherent. Contradictory complexities within and between the images are superimposed upon each other on several contextual levels, which bring forth very different meanings. Therefore, this book focuses mostly on the dynamic development of meaning that emerges from competing contexts, rather than on a specific interpretation of the image in itself. The images in their dynamic contexts may appear to be embodiments of history and memory, sometimes based on individual experiences, but expressed in a collective area they then become part of, as a public cultural memory active in the actual use of the image. Metaphorically, we hope this book will function as a kaleidoscope. It deals with a certain number of components: motifs that appear in dynamically shifting combinations inserted into the triangular frame we have constructed in order to demonstrate the diversity of the topic. It presents patterns and reflections from one optical point of view. Hopefully, this complex approach will problematize the all too common

notion of a simplistic conception of the Ottoman Turks in Early Modern Europe and thereby add to the mapping of the landscapes of customs, conceptions, and meanings to which the pictorial, literary, and performative imaginings of the Turks have contributed.

Copenhagen, April 2021

PART I

THE ACTUAL TURK

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND EUROPE: THE MAKING AND UN-MAKING OF A MUSLIM-ORTHODOX PARTNERSHIP

Mogens Pelt (Copenhagen)

This chapter explains and analyses the relations between the Ottoman Empire and what we today call Europe from the rise of the house of Osman to its fall. During the period of early Ottoman expansion, Europe was often understood in terms of the Roman Empire, already long divided into an eastern and western part. The Ottomans' first expansion took place in East Roman lands where they conquered the last strongholds of the Byzantine Empire and territories predominantly populated by Orthodox Christians. After Mehmed II's (1432–1481, r. 1444–1446 and 1451–1481) conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the sultans turned their attention to the West and sought to bring the two halves of the Roman Empire under one ruler, the Ottoman sultan. While we have no master plans to this effect from the hands of the sultans, their use of symbols indicates that they saw themselves as players in a contest for the imperial throne of a re-unified Roman Empire. The roots of this understanding stemmed from their early conquests. In this process, the co-option of former Byzantine power holders and the integration of key institutions played such an important role that it makes sense to talk about a Muslim-Orthodox partnership on the level of governance. This partnership culminated after the conquest of Constantinople in Mehmed's granting the Orthodox Patriarch religious autonomy and his Orthodox flock limited self-governance. In this way, the Patriarchate also became a tool of domestic administration and of imperial statecraft, and was something that made the Sultan the undisputed leader of the Orthodox world – and thus heir to Byzantine claims on the Roman Empire. While no single Sultan ever succeeded in these ambitions, the Ottomans would play a key role in the transformation of the Christian commonwealth in the West into the state system of Early Modern Europe, exploiting the divisions created by the Reformation, by the wars between the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and the King of France, and by utilizing their Orthodox subjects as a resource to achieve their ends. But the Muslim-Orthodox partnership was also a fragile arrangement. It was based on inequality and privilege, making Orthodox subjects legally inferior to the Muslims and their security dependent on the will of the Sultan. In tandem with the rising power of the new European states and the contraction of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim-Orthodox partnership came under increasing pressure and began to crumble from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, culminating in the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First World War.

On the eve of Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire would probably have appeared unrecognizable to an observer who had witnessed its foundation and early expansion, at least at first glance. When its founder, Osman I (1258–1326, r. *c.* 1299–1326) acceded to the throne in around 1300, his realm was a beylik in the north-western corner of Anatolia, and only one among many. These principalities had emerged in the wake of the dissolution of the Sultanate of the Seljuk Turks, who had conquered most of Asia Minor form the Byzantines in the eleventh century.[1] Its statecraft was based on nomadic practices, while its coherence sprang from a solidarity built on kinship and personal loyalty. It lived from raids on Byzantine territories, but it was in no way preordained that a century and a half later it would be Osman's state that was the master of most of south-eastern Europe and Anatolia, and on the verge of capturing the capital of the Byzantine Empire.

And yet, if one takes a closer look at the ways in which the state was organized and how it arranged its expansion, there are important elements that point to this future.

EXPANSION INTO BYZANTINE LANDS

During Osman's reign its rise culminated in the siege of the Byzantine town of Bursa, while it was under the leadership of his son, Orhan I (d. 1362, r. 1323/24–1362), that the Ottomans would finally manage to conquer the city. This marked an important threshold in the development of the young state, because taking a city was something that required much more than competency in nomadic warfare. Furthermore, the capture of major centres like Bursa (1326) and Iznik (1331) gave the Ottomans control of all the land and cities of Bithynia, the province east of Constantinople. Making the old regional power hub, Bursa, their new capital meant that they were soon facing the difficult task of running an administratively complex region that had been ruled by the experienced Byzantines. It was necessary to build lasting institutions as an addendum to – and a substitute for – the bodies that had regulated the nomadic state.[2] The Ottoman expansion into Byzantines territories was fuelled by the Sultan's ability to rally warriors from the neighbouring beyliks against their Christian enemies. One such example is Gazi Haci Evrenos Bey (d. 1417) from the beylik of Karasi, which Orhan had appropriated in 1345. Evrenos Bey would become a major figure in the Ottoman conquest

1 Douglas A. Howard: *A History of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 8–15; Cemal Kafadar: *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995, pp. 14–16.

2 Ibidem, p. 16.

of the Balkans during the second half of the fourteenth century until his death in 1417. Almost every conquest, in the words of Heath Lowry, from the Evros River in the East to the Adriatic in West and the Morea peninsula in the south – today's Peloponnese – was linked to his name; and the territories in Macedonia would remain linked to his descendants – the Evrenos – in the following centuries, making them the second family of the Osman Empire.[3]

According to a Greek legend, Evrenos Bey's father was the governor of Bursa and a convert. True or not, the tale highlights an important feature in the Ottoman arrangement of alliances, namely that they co-opted the elites of the conquered states. Furthermore, the fact that they expanded their domains in former Byzantine lands forced the Sultans to find ways in which to include the local Christian lords and subjects. Finally, the Ottomans proved open to cooperation with the power-holders of neighbouring states, forging alliances on the basis of shared goals and strategic marriages. As an instance of this, in 1346 Orhan married Theodora (*c.* 1330–*c.* 1396), a daughter of the Byzantine prince John VI Kantakuzenos (1292–1383, r. 1347–1354), a pretender to the throne in Constantinople. This made the Ottomans a party in internal Byzantines politics, and an important one too, because soon afterwards John became Emperor. It was during his reign that the Ottomans gained their first bridgehead on the European shores of the Dardanelles while they were fighting on the side of the Byzantines against the Serbs and the Bulgarians.[4] Expanding their power to Europa was a landmark achievement because it was the first time since the Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula that a Muslim power was expanding into Europe – and it enhanced the prestige of the house of Osman enormously.

John VI Kantacuzenos was forced to abandon his throne in 1354, but the Ottomans continued their campaigns in the Balkans. In 1362 they took Edirne, making it their new capital. In 1389 they reduced the Serbian Kingdom to vassalage after the battle of Kosovo, and in 1394 they eliminated the Bulgarian Kingdom.[5] These various scales of relations represent the steps by which the Ottomans expanded their dominance: alliance, unequal partnership, vassalage, and incorporation.

They attempted to employ some of the same methods for their expansion into central Anatolia, but with less success; so that in the end they decided to bring in Christian troops, a move that proved to be decisive for their final success.[6] Cooper-

3 Heath W. Lowry: *The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 1350–1550: The Conquest, Settlement and Infrastructural Development of Northern Greece*. Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University, 2008, p. 16.

4 Halil İnalcik: *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*. London: Phoenix, 2003 (first ed. 1973), pp. 9–16.

5 Daniel Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 45.

6 Ibidem.

ation and co-option across political and religious borders were both a method and a rule in the Ottoman expansion. The Ottomans also faced internal dissent when powerful warlords acted as if they were autonomous. But after a period of crisis from 1366 to 1377, the empire was reunited when Murad I (1326–1389, r. 1362–1389) gained control of the strategically important Gallipoli, which connects Asia Minor to the Balkans. A similar situation occurred during the first decade of the fifteenth century when Bayezid I (1360–1403, r. 1389–1402) was defeated by Tamerlane (Timur, 1336–1405, r. 1370–1405) at the battle of Ankara in 1402 and lost the support of a number of his vassals. New periods of civil war would follow when Bayezid's sons fought each other, and again between 1446 and 1451, until Mehmed II finally managed to concentrate power around his leadership.[7]

BUILDING THE IMPERIAL HARDWARE

The Ottoman expansion was a process of learning. Transforming itself from a small beylik based on governance rooted in nomadic practices into a complex entity meant that the emerging state needed permanent institutions to run its affairs, preserve its cohesion, and perpetuate the dominance of the house of Osman. As the size and complexity of the state increased, the challenge was to combine territorial expansion with loyalty from the new institutions and the conquered lands. One answer was to concentrate power around the royal household and protect the Sultan from pretenders. The Harem was charged with the reproduction of the dynasty. To fulfil this task, it relied exclusively on concubines. This reduced the risk of leaving the Sultan without a heir; furthermore, since the future Sultan's mother would be a concubine and a not a formal wife of the reigning Sultan, the system also prevented ambitious families from gaining power by having their daughters married with the Sultan.[8] To ensure that the new Sultan took over the entire Empire, undivided, and to prevent it from being split among the heirs, succession took the form of combat among the sons of the Sultan, meaning that the new Sultan would be the son or relative of the deceased one who managed to eliminate all other rivals for the throne. This procedure was known as unigeniture. At the time of Mehmed II fratricide became an officially sanctioned form of succession.[9]

The creation of the Janissary standing army (1377) can be seen as an institution of artificial kinship. It functioned as an extension of the royal household designed

7 Kafadar: *Between Two Worlds*, pp. 18–19.

8 Leslie P. Peirce: *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

9 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 38.

to prevent the military from developing into an independent force. Recruitment was based on the practice of *devşirme*, the boy-levy system: the Ottoman boy-tax collector – normally a higher Janissary officer – would visit a Christian village and select a number of boys he would then take with him to Istanbul or other centres to make them the property of Sultan and bring them up as Muslims to serve in the army or the administration. In this way, recruitment also created possibilities for great social advancement because the converts could one day become Janissary colonels or statesmen with a seat in the *divan* (imperial council).[10]

A NEW HEIR TO THE ROMAN EMPIRE

On the eve of the fall of Constantinople, the Ottomans controlled large tracts of land in present-day Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, and western Turkey. In this manner, Constantinople had become a Byzantine island in an Ottoman ocean. While the fertile lands of Thessaly and Macedonia functioned as the Empire's breadbasket, and were necessary for the sake of provisions, the Byzantine capital was an emblem of power and prestige. Mehmed was fully aware of this, and understood its importance in the same terms as did the Christians: as the second Rome. He immediately made it the capital of his Empire and decided to present himself as *Kayser-i Rûm*, the Emperor of Rome. This was a signal clearly understood by friends and foes alike. Internally, it gained him so much prestige that he was able to eliminate any opposition, making it possible to launch an imperial project that would drive Ottoman ambitions for centuries to come and shape future relations between the Ottomans and the Christian powers. This was so not least because it took place at the same time when the last Muslim power on the Iberian Peninsula had been rolled back and was confined to Granada, which would be taken by the Catholic Spanish King a short while later in 1492.[11]

By the time of his death in 1481, Mehmed had expanded Ottoman control so that it covered most of south-eastern Europe, Anatolia, the Black Sea Coast, and also the lands of the Crimean Tatar Khanate, which joined the Ottomans in 1478 on the basis of an alliance bringing along a vast number of Orthodox subjects. The Ottomans were thus left with an Empire in which non-Muslims outnumbered Muslims, something the Ottomans dealt with in various ways.[12] During the early phases of expansion, particularly in the Balkans, the settlement of Muslims from

10 Gábor Agoston and Bruce Masters (eds.): *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Facts On File, 2009, pp. 296–297.

11 Kafadar: *Between Two Worlds*, p. 20.

12 Howard: *A History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 106.

Asia Minor was one way to enhance the Muslim presence in predominantly Christian territories. Conversion was another way. Forced conversions took place, but often it was the Christians themselves who decided to become Muslims in order to sustain the social position they had held in pre-Ottoman times, or to facilitate social and professional advancement under the new political circumstances.[13] Sources from a later period also mention that conversions took place *en masse* at the initiative of a local priest or bishop.[14] However, the most common way was to include the Christian lords and their subjects in the imperial system.

RELIGIOUS PARTNERSHIP

The outcome would depend not only on the Ottomans, but also on the conquered communities. The reactions of the Byzantines to Mehmed were ambivalent. Before the conquest they had sought an alliance with the Latins and Rome. However, a reunion between the two churches signed at the Council of Ferrara-Florence on 6 June 1439 was repudiated soon afterwards.[15] Old antagonisms were still rife, and the elite were split. The opponents condemned the Florence Agreement as treason. They regarded the Latin Christians – the Pope, the Franks,[16] and the Italian mercantile republics, especially Venice – as a greater danger than the Ottomans, pointing to the sack of Constantinople in 1204 and the Schism of 1054 between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. From this perspective the Ottomans represented a lesser evil: "better the Turkish turban than the Papal tiara", as the Admiral of the Byzantine navy, Loukas Notaras (1402–1453), is alleged to have declared.[17] Overall, the Byzantines knew the Ottomans well from the busi-

13 Ibidem, pp. 22, 107.

14 Marc Baer: "The Conversion of Christians and Jewish Souls and Space during the 'Anti-Dervish Movement' of 1656–76", in: *Archaeology, Anthropology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia: The Life and Times of F. W. Hasluck, 1878–1920*, ed. David Shankland. Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004, pp. 183–200.

15 The Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaeologus sought an alliance with the Latins. In return for Papal assistance, the Byzantines were expected to accept Latin authority as a condition. To that effect an agreement of reunion was signed at the Council of Ferrara-Florence on 6 June 1439. But upon their return to Constantinople, many of the delegates repudiated the agreement, while the news about it was met with stubborn refusal by monks, nuns, lower clerics, and ordinary people. The city was divided between Unionists and anti-Unionists. After the fall of the city, some claimed that this was God's punishment for the treason at Florence. The fall also saw the transmission of manuscripts from East to West by Byzantine scholars who fled to the Latin lands.

16 The Franks were the ancestors of the Western European warriors who had established states in the Byzantine areas in the wake in of the Fourth Crusade.

17 Judith Herrin: *Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire*. London: Penguin, 2008 (first ed. 2007), pp. 299–309.

ness of daily life, including both wars and alliances, while they had first hand experience of what Turkish warriors could achieve against the Latins: in 1263 some 1,500 mercenaries, brought over from Asia Minor to its bridgehead in Monemvassia, had assisted the restored Byzantine government in Constantinople to recover south-eastern Morea from the Latins.[18] Ultimately Mehmed decided to lean on this group to integrate the Orthodox into his empire. While he reserved the Imperial throne for himself, he allowed the Patriarchate – the highest office of the Orthodox Church and second pillar of the Byzantine Empire – not only to retain its powers but also to expand them. He deposed the old Patriarch and enthroned one who belonged to the anti-Latin faction. The investiture took place in the traditional Byzantine way, as a signal that nothing had changed. The new patriarch swore his allegiance to Mehmed, guaranteeing the loyalty of his flock. He recognized Mehmed as Kayser-i Rûm, and in this way he sanctioned Ottoman rule of Constantinople as an expression of continuity in the history of the Eastern Roman Empire. Some took this accommodation to extremes, like the renaissance humanist George of Trebizond (1395–1472 or 1484), a convert to Catholicism who lived in Italy. In a number of texts, he praised Mehmed as the one person who could bring together all religious groups and change the course of history. If Mehmed accepted Christianity, he could bring peace and prosperity to all nations.[19] Mehmed did not convert, but he initiated a practice that took the shape of a religious partnership, albeit on an unequal basis, with the Patriarch as his junior partner.

The Patriarch became a participant in the administration of the Ottoman Empire, while his power vis-à-vis the Orthodox communities was immensely enhanced compared to the last period of the Byzantine Empire. The domains under his jurisdiction would now comprise also the metropolitan sees belonging to the Patriarch of Constantinople in the lands the Ottomans had conquered before the fall of the city – a power no Patriarch had held since the hey-day of the Byzantine Empire. By providing the Patriarch's flock with religious autonomy and limited self-governance, Mehmed also created a tool of domestic administration and of imperial statecraft that made him the undisputed leader of the Orthodox world.

The arrangement would later become known as the millet system. It was defined in confessional terms without regard to language or ethnicity. It was legitimized by the Quranic doctrine of *ahl al-dhimmi* – or protected people – meaning that in intra-communal affairs the Orthodox were subject to their own laws and exempted from certain laws that regulated the life of Muslims. In return, the Orthodox community was required to pledge loyalty to the Sultan and pay a special

18 Peter Lock: *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500*. London, New York: Longman, 1995, p. 83.

19 Nancy Bisaha: *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks*. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2004, p. 153.

tax. While Mehmed granted Jews and Armenians the same kind of autonomy, he refused to give similar privileges to the Catholics, fearing that they could function as a platform for fifth-column activities in the service of the Christian commonwealth in the West.

THE SULTAN AND THE CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH IN THE WEST

Mehmed had a keen understanding of the ways in which Christendom regarded its own past, and he took pains to portray himself in an image that would give him an important role in its self-narratives. With a clear allusion to the ancient epics about the Trojan war, he claimed to be the avenger of Prince Hector and King Priamos, and to have taken Constantinople from the Greeks in the same manner as they had taken Troy from the Trojans. In this way too, he could lay a claim on Rome, because according to the legend it was the Trojan Aeneas who had founded Rome. He also liked to compare himself with Alexander the Great, the young King who had conquered the known world within a lifetime. He made no secret of it, and saw to it that this message was propagated to the whole world.[20] The Venetian artist Gentile Bellini (*c.* 1429–1507) painted a famous portrait of Mehmed II as a descendent of Alexander the Great (336–323 BC), with *Imperator Orbis* [*Terrarum*] – the emperor of the world – added at the bottom.[21] Mehmed was serious about his ambitions. In June 1480, twenty-seven years after the fall of Constantinople, he landed in the south of the Italian peninsula and laid siege to the city of Otranto in Apulia. His assault unleashed fear among the Christians and hope among the Ottomans that the final destination of his campaign would be Rome, and that his goal was to reunite the Roman Empire under his Ottoman dynasty.[22] Although Mehmed died before any of this could be realized, his successors would carry on his ambitions and unleash the same fears among the Latin Christians as Mehmed had.

The conflict reached a peak during the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Kayser-i Rûm and the Holy Roman Emperor clashed in a prolonged struggle for mastery over the lands of the same Empire. While the Ottoman pretender was Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566, r. 1520–1566) – one of the most formidable adversaries any Christian power would ever face – there had been two aspirants

20 Johannes Koder: "Romaioi and Teukroi, Hellenes and Barbaroi, Europe and Asia", paper given at *Athens Dialogues* (12 November 2010); http://athensdialogues.chs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/WebObjects/athensdialogues.woa/wa/dist?dis=21; see also Kafadar: *Between Two Worlds*, p. 11.

21 Mark Greengrass: *Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517–1648*. London: Penguin Books, 2015 (first ed. 2014), p. 298.

22 Bisaha: *Creating East and West*, pp. 157–161.

to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire: the Habsburg King Charles (1500–1558, r. 1519–1556) and King Francis I of France (1494–1547, r. 1515–1547), which left the French King an enemy of Charles after his Habsburg rival was elected in 1521 – the same year that Süleyman took Belgrade from the Habsburgs, the gateway to central Europe.[23]

This was not the first time the Ottomans were at war with the Christian powers. They had fought Byzantines, Bulgarians, and Serbs; they had defeated them and incorporated them into the Empire. They had rolled back the power of the Frankish barons who established themselves in the Aegean lands and islands in the vacuum left by the Byzantine collapse in 1204. They had waged numerous wars with the Venetians since 1396, gaining important strongholds in the Ionian and Aegean Seas in the fifteenth century; but although Venice lost much of its maritime empire, the Ottomans never achieved anything like a final victory. By virtue of its wealth, the strength of its fleet, and its possession of Cyprus, Crete, a number of islands in the Greek archipelago, and some bases in the Adriatic, Venice – together with the Knights of Saint John – remained one of the mightiest Christian naval powers the Ottomans would ever face. At the same time, Ottoman-Venetian relations were marked by trade and peaceful coexistence. As an instance of this, the aforementioned painter Gentile Bellini was sent to Constantinople as a kind of cultural ambassador for Venice at the request of Mehmed. Venetians long stationed in Constantinople would sometimes assume Ottoman life styles, like the nobleman and later doge Andrea Gritti (1455–1538), who had one son by his wife and four by his Ottoman concubine.[24]

THE OTTOMANS AND THE MAKING OF A NEW EUROPE

But the conflict of the sixteenth century was different from the previous ones with the Christians states. Its scope was more global, and it interacted with the demise of a unified Christian commonwealth in the West, where Christendom was being torn apart by conflicts between supporters of the Reformation and its opponents, the Pope and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. At the same time there raged a struggle for supremacy over the continent between the Habsburg Empire and the French Kingdom, all contributing to shape the process that would lead to the making of Modern Europe. At their widest extent these conditions would last until the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648. In this way, in tandem with the progress of Christendom's self-destruction, the Ottoman Empire became an ever more

23 İnalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 35.
24 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 139.

important party in the shaping of the Europe that would rise from the old order. This becomes clear if we follow the Ottoman response to the Reformation and the subsequent outbreak of Protestant-Catholic wars.

The contest began in earnest after the Ottoman conquest of the Middle East in 1517, including Egypt, and their seizure of Rhodes in 1522 from the Knights of Saint John. The Sultan now dominated lands on both shores of the Eastern Mediterranean and the sea lanes connecting these lands with Constantinople. A drawing of the Ottoman domains would resemble a map of the Roman Empire at the time of Justinian I (527–565) on the eve of his attempt to reconquer the western half of the Empire from the barbarians.

CENTRAL EUROPE AND REFORMATION

The next major Ottoman campaign aimed at a Central Europe immersed in wars and deeply split between the princes supporting the Protestant Reformation on the one hand and those loyal to the Holy Roman Emperor and Pope on the other. In 1526 Süleyman launched a major invasion of Hungary, defeating its army at the battle of Mohács. He then moved in the direction of Vienna – a stronghold of Habsburg power and prestige – and the gateway to the German lands. Not only did they constitute the bloodiest theatre of the wars of the Reformation; they were also the stage for apocalyptic cults, such as those that gave rise to the Peasants' Rebellion of 1524–1525, providing a fertile field for intervention and alliances against traditional and well-known authorities. Although Süleyman failed to take Vienna in 1529, Christendom remained irreparably divided and effectively unable to stop the Ottomans. With Christendom fractured, the Sultan attempted to forge strong relations with the new Protestant powers of Europe, in order to tip the scales first and foremost against the Habsburgs. He also sought to deepen the Protestant-Catholic divide within the Habsburg Empire. While the Ottomans came into possession of the entire Kingdom of Hungary for a brief period in the second half of the 1520s, it was not until the 1540s that they translated military preponderance into institution-building. The eastern and southern parts were integrated into the Ottoman Empire as the provinces of Buda and Temesvár, while Transylvania became a vassal and strategic ally against the Habsburgs. To a large extent the Ottoman division of Hungary followed a rationale based on their recognition of the strategic potential of the tear in the fabric of Christendom. They built their power in the new provinces on Protestant hostility against the Holy Roman Emperor in general, and against his ally, the Hungarian King of the Catholic rump kingdom in the north, in particular. By empowering Transylvania they gained a vassal state that would not only pay tribute, but which was also primed to fight

the Habsburgs through civil-war-style conflicts.[25] Not only did Süleyman support Hungarian Protestants to undermine Habsburg power in Central Europe; the Sultan also courted the Schmalkalden League of German Protestant princes, urging them to continue to cooperate with France against the Pope and the Emperor. He assured them of amnesty should the Ottoman armies enter their lands, and claimed that he considered Protestants close to Muslims since they too destroyed idols and rose against the Pope.[26] In fact, according to Halil İnalcik, support and protection for Lutherans and Calvinists against Catholicism was a cornerstone of Ottoman policy in Europe.[27] And according to Luther, there existed some who preferred the Turks as rulers to their existing ones.[28]

ITALY AND THE FRENCH KINGDOM

Süleyman's enemies in Europe believed that his final goal was to take Rome. In the wake of his abortive attempt to conquer Vienna in 1529, the ambassador of Charles V reported that Süleyman's dream was to take Rome.[29] Such anxieties also gripped the general populace and were nurtured by printed broadsheets transmitting the Ottoman incursions into Eastern Europe.[30] Süleyman's own propaganda probably contributed to increasing such fears. According to an inscription carved on the fortress of Bender, Moldavia, dated 1538:

> I am God's slave and sultan of this world. By the grace of God I am head of Muhammad's community. God's might and Muhammad's miracles are my companions. I am Süleyman, in whose name the *hutbe* is read in Mecca and Medina. In Baghdad I am the shah, in Byzantine realms the Caesar, and in Egypt the sultan; who sends his fleets to the seas of Europe, the Maghrib, and India. I am the sultan who took the crown and throne of Hungary and granted them to a humble slave. The *voyvoda* [Moldavian Prince] Petru raised his head in revolt, but my horse's hoofs ground him into the dust and I conquered the land of Moldavia.[31]

25 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 101–105.
26 İnalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 37.
27 Ibidem.
28 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 109–110.
29 Greengrass: *Christendom Destroyed*, p. 11.
30 Ibidem, p. 11, pp. 298–299.
31 Quoted here is the translation in İnalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 41.

While the allegiances that had kept Christendom together were crumbling, a Europe of competing states was taking shape, one loyal first of all to *raison d'état*. Rivalry between the Habsburg Emperor and the French King created an opening for Franco-Ottoman cooperation. For France Ottoman power was a guarantee against Habsburg domination, while for Süleyman France was the key to expanding his influence within Europe and capitalizing on the Reformation. The Habsburgs, their common enemy, controlled all of southern Italy and Milan, the Low Countries, and Franche-Comté. King Francis attempted to persuade Süleyman to take Italy. In 1536 the two states concluded an alliance that was oral and kept secret. In 1537 they projected an invasion of the Italian peninsula: France would invade from the north, while Süleyman was to attack from the south in a campaign in which thirteen French galleys would join the Ottoman squadron in an attack on Venetian Corfu.[32] After a short spell of peace between Francis and Charles, there followed a new period of close cooperation between the French and the Ottomans: in July 1543 Ottoman Chief Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa's (*c.* 1478–1546) fleet of 110 galleys – with the French ambassador on board – prepared to invade Nice in Franche-Comté. In September that same year, King Francis I granted Barbarossa the right to use Toulon for refitting his fleet during the winter and allowed the Ottomans to practice Islam openly, turning the Cathedral of Toulon into a mosque.[33] While the alliance did not bring mastery over Italy either to Francis or to Süleyman – and Rome remained in the hands of the Pope – it was an important factor in the rise of national monarchies, such as in France, and in the official recognition of Protestantism. According to İnalcik, it was Ottoman pressure between 1521 and 1555 that forced the Habsburgs to grant concessions to the Protestants at the Peace of Augsburg between Charles V and the Schmalkalden League establishing the principle of *Cujus regio, ejus religio* – a breakthrough agreement in the wars of religion because it gave the political ruler the right to determine the religion of his territory.[34]

THE MEDITERRANEAN FRONTIER

In the first half of the sixteenth century the Ottomans expanded relentlessly in the Mediterranean and on the northern coast of North Africa. The Mediterranean was an Ottoman frontier, and since the mid-fourteenth century an offensive one.[35] It

32 Ibidem, p. 36; Greengrass: *Christendom Destroyed*, p. 304.

33 Greengrass, ibidem.

34 İnalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 36–38.

35 Molly Greene: "The Ottomans in the Mediterranean", in: *Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 104–116, here p. 104.

would remain so until the end of the sixteenth century, when the Ottomans' push westwards came to a halt along a line east of Malta.

During their expansion they fought the Knights of St. John, a number of commercial city-states (most famously Venice and Genoa), and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire – and, following the death of Charles V and the division of Habsburg dynasty, also the King of Habsburg Spain, Philip II (1527–1598, r. 1555–1598). Sometimes their Christian adversaries fought alone; sometimes they were united in formal alliances sanctioned by the Pope under the banner of the Holy League.[36]

The Knights of St. John were mainly fighting a defensive battle. They were heirs to the Crusaders, with a history in the Holy Land, attempting to hang on to their last strongholds. While the Ottomans managed to evict them from Rhodes in 1522, they failed to take the Knights' new bastion of Malta after a long siege that ended in 1565. The Knights of St. John would remain a threat to Ottoman interests in the centuries to come by virtue of Malta's role as the home port for a terrifying force of Catholic pirates.[37]

The Venetians and the Genoese were also defending old strongholds and attempting to regain what they had lost. Genoa lost its importance as a Mediterranean power in its own right after the Ottoman conquest of Chios in 1566, the last Genoese stronghold in the Mediterranean, and after its contribution to the battle of Lepanto in 1571. It exited the sixteenth century as a junior partner of the Spanish Kingdom, shifting its focus from its merchants to its bankers, and as a result reducing the need for a large navy.

With its loss of Cyprus in the war of 1570–1573, the Venetians held no more strongholds in the Levant; but they would hold on to Crete and remain a serious adversary to the Ottomans in the course of the following centuries.

The confrontation with the Emperor – and the Spanish King – was a battle with a rival who was also attempting to expand his domains. The wars included Ottoman raids on the coasts of the Italian and Iberian peninsulas; clashes over strongholds along the shores of north Africa and Greece; and the Siege of Malta. The last major confrontation in this context was the naval battle of Lepanto, where the Ottomans were defeated by Charles' natural son and Philip's half-brother, Don Juan of Austria (1547–1578) leading an alliance of almost all the Sultan's enemies in the Mediterranean: Venice, Genoa, the Crusader orders (including the Knights of St. John), the Papal states, and the King of Habsburg Spain – all under the banner of the Holy League. In these wars, as was the case during their early expansion in the Aegean Archipelagos, the Ottomans relied on the maritime knowledge of

36 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 145–164.

37 Molly Greene: *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 1–14.

Christians and converts. They had employed them to man their ships, or as independent corsairs. For the Christians and converts it was work as usual, with the only difference that they were now in the service of the Ottomans and not of the Byzantines; but they welcomed the opportunity to cooperate with a power that could facilitate their raids on the Latins and make it possible for them to take back positions they had lost.

In a similar manner, in the sixteenth century the Ottomans co-opted local captains not only in the Aegean Archipelagos and the Levant but also along the Barbary Coast of North Africa, most famously Hisir, the son of Yakub Ağa, from the island of Mytilene. Hisir was the later Ottoman Chief Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa. His profile almost exactly matches that of the numerous anonymous Christian and convert sailors just mentioned. His mother was Greek, and his father was a convert from the Albanian lands who had fought in the Sultan's armies. Hisir began his career as a corsair in the Ottoman service operating in the Aegean Archipelagos;[38] but soon it took a turn that would have seemed new to those who came before him, but resembled the path taken by some of his most ambitious contemporaries. Sometime in the first half of the 1500s he left his base in Mytilene and established himself on the coast of North Africa. This choice must be seen as a response to the important changes in the geopolitical situation that had taken place on the western shores of the Mediterranean in the wake of the capture of Granada by the Spanish King. The fall of the last Muslim stronghold on the Iberian Peninsula created a new frontier attracting adventurers and booty-hunters looking for new opportunities.[39] So great was the fear of the Muslim corsairs and the risk of being taken as booty and sold into slavery that long stretches of the Spanish and Italian coasts were almost completely abandoned by their inhabitants.

From their strongholds along the coast of North Africa the corsairs entered into relationships with the rulers in Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers who would include them in the local networks of power.[40] By around 1518 Hayreddin had established a domain for himself. But he soon decided to pay homage to the Sultan to protect himself from the Christian fleets. In 1533 he was appointed Chief Admiral of the Ottoman fleet. He would be in charge of a massive program to build up the Ottoman fleet to strengthen the Sultan's hand at sea. He remained a dominant personality in the struggle against the Emperor for supremacy over the Mediterranean, and made himself a name on both sides of that sea as a result of his exploits in the battles for Algiers and Tunis and Preveza.[41]

38 Greene: "The Ottomans in the Mediterranean", pp. 104–108.
39 Ibidem, pp. 107–108.
40 Ibidem.
41 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 145–149.

FIGHTING TO KEEP UP, AND INSTABILITY

While the intensity of the Ottoman expansion slowed down after the conquest of Cyprus and their defeat at Lepanto, they had not lost momentum entirely. But they moved at a reduced speed, and not without setbacks, such as the so-called Long Turkish War of 1593–1606 (a.k.a. The Long Hungarian War) against the Habsburgs over the Ottoman vassal states, the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania.[42]

They were often facing war on more than one front. Soon after they had conquered the Arab lands, they claimed the Red Sea and Mesopotamia. They fought the Portuguese in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. Military forces were dispatched to Yemen, the Indian subcontinent, and the Indonesian archipelago.[43] In the east of Anatolia they waged war against the heterodox Kizilbash population, and they fought the Persians in a total of four wars between 1578 and 1639.[44] The final important expansion in the West was their seizure of Crete after a long war with Venice between 1645 and 1669. It was also the last war between the Ottomans and a Christian power to take place in the context of the warlike divide between Protestants and Catholics and coalitions for and against the Holy Roman Empire. At the same time, this war was a harbinger of the future: because of reduced naval power, the Ottomans turned to the new European powers – England, France, and the Netherlands – for the provisioning and transportation of troops.[45]

The end of the Thirty Years War brought more stable relations to Central Europe as the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 legally ended the concept of a single Christian hegemony in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire. The following decades would see the growth of strong and centralized states in most of Europe, while at the same time, the new leading powers of England, France, and the Netherlands were becoming increasingly absorbed in the Atlantic World – Europe's new source of wealth and power.

When in 1683 the Sultan was again repulsed at the gates of Vienna, it was also a harbinger of the fact that the balance of power was tipping against him, making it possible for the Central European states not only to defend their lands but also to roll back Ottoman dominance in their backyards and force the Sultan to admit defeat.

The 1699 Peace of Karlowitz which ended a long war (1684–1699) between the Ottomans and Austria, in coalition with Poland, Venice, and Russia, marked the

42 Howard: *A History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 137.
43 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 99.
44 İnalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 182–183, 195–196.
45 Goffman: *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 217–220.

first time the Ottoman Empire accepted mediation by neutral powers (England and the Netherlands).

By handing over most of Hungary – except Temesvár – Transylvania, Slovenia, and Croatia to Austria, and most of Dalmatia and the whole of Morea to Venice, the Ottoman Empire was now replaced by Austria as the dominant power in east-central Europe. This trend was only strengthened by the peace of Passarowitz of 1718: after a series of disastrous Ottoman defeats at the hands of the Austrian General Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663–1736), the Sultan agreed to hand over his last possessions in Hungary as well as parts of northern Serbia, including Belgrade. But the Ottomans regained Morea from Venice.[46]

These developments indicate that the Ottoman Empire was more successful in the flux of the early Reformation period, and less so once Christendom's religious divides had been transformed into a functional system of more clearly defined states. But there was more to the Ottoman setbacks than just the making of a new European order.

Ottoman internal stability had been on the wane for some time. With many soldiers away fighting in The Long Turkish War, brigandage surged on the plateau in central Anatolia, a condition considered so severe from the point of view of Istanbul that it would go down in the official history as a single event known as the Celali Rebellions. In fact, it was a series of rebellions. The first one, from around 1590 to circa 1610, was driven by bandits and warlords. The second one, from 1622 and 1659, was instigated by local power holders, including provincial governors – also called notables – who refused to bend to the power of Istanbul. The Celali Rebellions were the largest and longest lasting in the history of the Ottoman Empire. They led to the emergence of local governing families and a decline in Istanbul's power vis-à-vis these dynasties, the so-called hanedans – another group which is conventionally referred to as notables. This was a trend that would gain further momentum in the following century and half. As a consequence, state revenues decreased and communications between the capital and the provinces became more difficult.[47] In response, old institutions were re-designed to adapt to the new situation, leading to an increased monetization of the economy, which among other things would see a rise in the use of seasonal mercenaries, by-passing classical recruitment methods. All this meant that an empty Ottoman treasury could well co-exist with a flourishing economy in the various localities, which tipped the internal balance of power in favour of the provinces.[48]

46 Virginia H. Aksan: *Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*. London: Pearson, 2007, pp. 24–25, 102.

47 Howard: *A History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 137–142.

48 Şevket Pamuk: *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadî Tarihi 1500–1914*. Istanbul: İletişim, 2005, pp. 178–181.

At about the same time, the political stability at the Ottoman centre of power weakened severely. Sultan Osman II (1604–1622, r. 1618–1622) ruled for only four years before he was overthrown by a palace coup in 1622 and executed by the Janissaries. This violence stands in sharp contrast to the previous one hundred years, when all five Sultans of the era remained in power until their rule came to a natural end. To make things even worse from the point of view of the Sultans, this sort of instability would continue over the following nearly two centuries until 1807, as seven out of fourteen Sultans were deposed.[49]

No doubt this disorder was a consequence of the Celali Rebellions and the decentralization of the Empire; but it was also due to fundamental changes in the social composition of the Ottoman military. The case in point was the Sultan's elite fighting force, the Janissaries. Since the late seventeenth century, the boy-levy system, *devşirme*, had been abolished. This was so because the state needed more man-power than the old system could deliver, but also because membership in the Janissary corps had become so attractive that Muslim families wanted to have their boys enrolled. As a result, the social character of the corps changed to the extent that in some places their ranks were swelled by fortune-seekers and people who were motivated by anything but military glory. In this way, the Janissaries also assumed the role of a distinctly autonomous and powerful group with vested interests to defend. They became a player in Ottoman politics, and in alliance with the senior clergy in the capital, the Şeyhülislam, they became so powerful that they could dethrone the Sultan. The Janissaries would do the 'dirty' work while the Şeyhülislam would issue a religious opinion (*fatwa*) to legalize their actions in the eyes of the public. The alliance between the Janissaries and the clergy (*Ulema*) proved an efficient counterweight to the Sultan, to such an extent that politics at the centre would henceforth also revolve around the axis Janissary/Ulema versus Sultan. This state of affairs, in turn, began to affect the performance of the Ottomans on the battlefield, because any innovation in the army would need the consent of both the Janissaries and the Ulema.[50] The need to reform the army became an increasingly urgent issue after Russia arose as the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the eighteenth century.

49 Baki Tezkan: *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; see also Karen Barkey: *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 206.

50 Ibidem.

THE RUSSIAN FACTOR AND INTERNAL DEFECTION

The wars with Russia unfolded in tandem with internal dynamics in Ottoman society that were linked to the rising power of local power holders vis-à-vis the central government. The following rhythm was created: notables would typically increase their power in periods of war – which normally meant with Russia – while the central government were more successful in containing the notables in times of peace. In practical terms, by the second half of the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire had become a loose confederation of countless semi-autonomous power holders. As an instance of this, during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–1774, the emergence of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean in 1770 under the command of Alexei Orloff (1773–1807/08) unleashed a chain reaction of small and vast rebellions in various places in the Sultan's realm, fuelled by the desire to increase family, local, or provincial power at the expense of the centre. In Egypt the Mameluke notable, Ali Bey al-Kebir (1728–1773), struck a deal with the Russians to wrest autonomy from Istanbul, only to fail miserably as soon as his Muslim allies learned about his alliance with St. Petersburg and turned their back on him as a traitor.[51] Orloff's arrival sparked a number of similar insurrections among the Orthodox subjects, with repercussions in European public opinion.[52] Nevertheless, the main trend remained, namely that smaller local notables and quasi-independent dynasties in the provinces became crucial for governing the Empire – in the case of the latter, most famously Ali Pasha (1741–1822) in Epirus and Mehmed Ali Pasha (1769–1849) in Egypt, who would cause major trouble for the sultans in the nineteenth century.

The war was ended by the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. Russia gained the northern shores of the Black Sea, transforming it from an Ottoman lake into an open sea. This was a momentous achievement in Russia's policy towards the Ottoman Empire. In the wake of the fall of Constantinople it had become a commonplace perception in Orthodox circles that Moscow was the legitimate heir to the Roman Empire – the third Rome. This idea gained traction during the reign of the Grand Duke Ivan III (1440–1505), who married Sophia Palaiologina (Zoe Palaiologos, 1440s–1503), a niece of the last Emperor of Byzantium, Konstantin XI Palaiologos (1405–1453). Ivan IV (1530–1584) made this claim a part of his title when he was proclaimed Emperor (Tsar) of Russia in 1547. The title was justified by

51 Eugene Rogan: *The Arabs: A History*. London: Allan Lane, 2009, p. 50.

52 David Roessel: *In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 13–16; on the insurrections see Molly Green: *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Mediterranean*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 206–208.

claims that the Holy Russian Empire was the true leader of Orthodox Christianity. However, it was not until the reign of Tsarina Catharina the Great (1729–1796) that such ambitions were turned into palpable political goals. The Russian victories in the wars against the Ottoman Empire in 1768–1774 and in 1787–1792 nurtured Catharina's dreams of a Constantinople in Russian hands – her so-called "Greek Plan", which focused on Orthodox subjects aiming to make an independent kingdom out of the Ottoman vassal states, Moldavia and Wallachia, which her grandson Constantine (Russian Tsar Konstantin Pavlovich, 1779–1831, r. 1825) would rule from Constantinople. While her son never came to reside in Constantinople, the city would remain a Russian war aim nonetheless, and in the following century the Russians would continue their expansion into Ottoman lands.

Most importantly perhaps, the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca gave Russia vague protective rights over the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Empire, something St. Petersburg would use as leverage to influence internal Ottoman affairs in the years to come. In this way, a third element of instability emerged: Orthodox separatism.[53]

ORTHODOX SEPARATISM

Orthodox subjects began to identify the Russians with the *xanthon genos* ('the fair-haired people') from prophesies circulating at the time which predicted that one day a fair-haired race of liberators from the north would come to liberate the Orthodox subjects from their captivity and restore Byzantium. There was much about Ottoman rule that made it difficult for Orthodox subjects to commit fully to the Empire. While official Ottoman tolerance of the Orthodox faith meant that Orthodox subjects could practice their faith more freely than in the Catholic lands, they were legally inferior so long as they remained non-Muslims. The Ottomans considered the Orthodox subjects conquered peoples, and expected gratitude for their continuing presence within the Empire because they saw it as an expression of Muslim benevolence. In this way, to the Orthodox subjects, Ottoman rule constituted domination based on power relations in which persuasion was outweighed by coercion. Therefore, there was always the potential that the Orthodox subjects might alter their allegiances, particularly as the Empire came under pressure from the Christian powers.[54]

53 Şükrü Hanioğlu: *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 79.

54 Nicholas Doumanis: *Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and its Destruction in Last Ottoman Anatolia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 24.

From the period beginning around 1770 onwards, the Sultan was thus facing four main challenges: the Janissaries, the notables, orthodox separatism, and the European great powers. Defeats on the battlefield made the Sultan want to emulate the ways in which his European adversaries were organizing their armies. This, in turn, made the Janissaries a key to the modernization of the army. The conflict began in earnest in 1789, when the Ottomans suffered a humiliating defeat on the shores of the Danube, where 120,000 Janissaries were routed by 8,000 Russian troops, something which made reforms inevitable.[55] At first Sultan Selim III (1761–1808, r. 1789–1807) managed to enact a number of laws to modernize the military according to European standards, with so-called "new order troops." However, in 1807 the Janissaries rebelled, and supported by the clergy they dethroned the Sultan. This made the provincial power holders react, with the most powerful among them, Alemdar Mustafa (1755–1808), marching his well-trained army of 30,000 men to the capital. He had the Janissary leader executed along with a number of others responsible for the rebellion. While he did not manage to save Selim from the hands of the Janissary conspiracy, a new sultan acceded to the throne, Sultan Mahmud II (1785–1839). In return, Mahmud signed an agreement that recognized the power of the provinces in the so-called *Sened-i İttifak* (Deed of Agreements). However, this codified triumph of the provinces at the expense of the central power turned out to be short-lived, as Mahmud soon turned against the notables and launched a campaign to curb their power. It was a struggle that would drag out for decades at an uneven rhythm.[56]

By 1820 the central government had gained control over all of Anatolia and its eastern provinces in Europe. However, the campaigns had drained the manpower of the forces loyal to the Sultan and left him vulnerable in various pockets where imperial power was absent. One such place was Morea. It was left unguarded when the local governor marched his troops northwards to quell the power of Ali Pasha in Epirus. The situation became critical when a local rebellion among the Orthodox subjects in Morea turned into a national revolution with a coherent national ideology and a significant mobilizing potential internally and externally. It was the Greek Revolution. News that the Janissaries and forces raised by the notables proved impotent to prevent the revolutionaries from getting control of most of the peninsula made the Sultan understand the rebellion in apocalyptic terms: a conspiracy between his Orthodox subjects and Russia to destroy the Empire and annihilate the Muslim community. His response was radical. First, he attempted to

55 Hanioğlu: *A Brief History*, p. 44.

56 Hüseyin Şükrü Ilıcak: *A Radical Rethinking of Empire: Ottoman State and Society during the Greek War of Independence*. Phd diss., Harvard University, 2011, pp. 27–32; see also Ali Yaycıoğlu: *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016.

create a new Muslim man – a self-mobilizing subject dedicated to personal sacrifice for the sake of the community and the Sultan – not unlike the citizen soldier who appeared as a result of the French Revolution. But in vain.[57] He then called to his aid the most powerful notable of the Empire, the governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali. He soon managed to turn the tide, and probably would have quelled the revolution had not the European powers intervened.

In 1827 the European great powers, Britain, France, and Russia, sank the Egyptian fleet at the bay of Navarino and paved the way for the establishment of the Greek nation-state in 1830. It was first state to secede from the Ottoman Empire, which made the Greek case a modular example to be feared or followed. In the next nearly ninety years, a number of political movements in Ottoman Europe would follow the Greek example to achieve the independence of the nations they represented.

At the same time, the Sultan directed his attention to reforming the state institutions, which brought the Janissaries into focus. The corps had acted as a corporation primed to protect its vested interests but most disinclined to take up its duty as the Sultan's elite force and to go fight in Morea. In this way, the Janissaries revealed themselves as nothing more than a corporation of self-seeking armed men and a far cry from the ideal of the self-mobilizing citizen the Sultan had sought to create.[58] It undermined their standing with the public, including the clergy, and gave the Sultan the window of opportunity he needed to reform the armed forces. In 1826 he completely eradicated the Janissaries and emasculated whatever symbolic power was left in their wake. In official Ottoman historiography, "1826" is known as the *Vaka-i Hayriye* ('Auspicious Incident') because it signifies the final triumph of the Sultan in a long struggle against the power-nexus between the Janissaries and the senior clergy.[59]

Nevertheless, he lost the war.

AN UNEQUAL MEMBER OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

These reformation efforts were codified during the so-called Tanzimat-era, 1839–1876, in a number of laws to centralize the imperial administration, modernize the state institutions, and introduce the principle of equality before the law for all the subjects of the Empire. This reform also gave birth to a new power nexus at the centre of Empire, namely the Sultan and the bureaucracy.[60]

57 Ilıcak: *A Radical Rethinking*, pp. 100–129.
58 Ibidem, pp. 230–232.
59 Ibidem, pp. 283–289.
60 Hanioğlu: *A Brief History*, pp. 72–109.

But it also became a catalyst for internal institutional changes that would profoundly alter the Ottoman Empire, because there was a close correlation between the lessons the Sultan took from dealing with the Greek revolution and his vision for a reformed Empire. Since the attempt to stake the Empire's survival on the creation of a self-mobilizing Muslim proto-citizen had failed, and because it was clear that the Greeks had managed make the great powers intervene on their behalf, it became a priority to integrate the Christians into the Empire and win their loyalty in order to avoid a repetition of the Greek Revolution. The goal was to make Ottoman citizens out of Orthodox subjects and to appease the Great Powers. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire was once more becoming intimately integrated into European politics, since 1815 as a *de facto* member of the Concert of Europe and from 1853 as a member *de jure*. In contrast to the sixteenth century, when the Empire had the political and military capacity to influence the game of nations among the European powers actively by direct intervention, or by placing its formidable military power behind one of its allies, now its role was defined by its relative weakness vis-à-vis the European great powers. Any minor or major change of the status quo, either internally in the Ottoman Empire or in its relations with other states, had the potential to threaten the European balance of power.

Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 moved the theatre of the wars of the French Revolution to the Ottoman lands. Soon the British landed, and battles for the supremacy of the European continent were fought in Ottoman Egypt. But the incursion by the Europeans also made Egypt a different place politically. It spelled the end of the Sultan's control of that province and challenged his position in Greater Syria. The threat came from Mehmed Ali, a warlord with roots in the Albanian lands in the service of the Sultan who was sent to Egypt to fight the French. But he was so successful that he managed not only to expel the European powers but also to enhance his personal position and establish a semi-autonomous Egypt. His power culminated in the 1830s, when he took over control from the Ottomans not only of today's Syria and Lebanon but also of Cilicia on the southern shores of Anatolia. This issue assumed international dimensions when it became clear that Egypt's governor was apparently in a position to depose the Sultan, resulting in an international crisis in 1839–1841 that pitted a coalition led by England supporting the Sultan against Mehmed Ali. The coalition saved the Sultan and effectively confined Mehmed Ali's power to Egypt proper, with only lukewarm support from the French.[61] But Istanbul never regained its control over Egypt, while the crisis laid bare the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The European powers saw the Ottoman Empire as an appendix to Europe, and their approach to it was paternalistic; in their view the Ottoman governing elite had to be responsible and

61 Hanioğlu: *A Brief History*, pp. 60–61.

learn to rule in the interest of the local populations. In practical terms, this meant that the powers would react primarily in the interest of the Christians.[62] While intervention in the internal affairs of any of the great European powers was unthinkable, and never took place, intervention became a norm in relation to the Ottoman Empire, ostensibly to save the lives of Christians. One important reason for the great powers' intervention in the Greek revolution was to prevent the realization of an alleged plan – a non-existent so-called barbarization project – according to which the Egyptians were said to have plotted to keep whatever parts of Greece they could conquer, to remove the whole Greek population by carrying them off into slavery in Egypt, and to repopulate Greece with Egyptians.[63] Just as the demise of Christendom and the need to re-define the community of states that rose in its place accorded the "Turk" a central role in the definition of Early Modern Europe, so the reduction of the Ottoman Empire to an unequal member of the Concert of Europe also produced a number of redefinitions of the "Turk" to justify successive interventions in the Ottoman Empire's internal affairs. In tandem with social Darwinism gaining ground in the second half of the century, the Turk would henceforth be represented as "unreformable" and the Ottoman Empire as an exponent of Asiatic society: immutable, idle, and despotic.[64] In other words, it was deemed ripe for conquest in the common interest of the European nations. An increasingly tense competition among the powers was unleashed, reaching its climax in 1914 when the Austrian attack on Serbia to roll back Belgrade's hold over lands recently conquered from the Ottomans turned out to be the trigger to the First World War.

At the end of the war, Istanbul was occupied by the victorious European powers. Millions had perished as result of war, famine, epidemics, and mass killings, while the Empire was primed for dismemberment. Its Middle Eastern lands became mandate states under British and French supervision. Greece, Italy, France, and the Armenians were given territories in Anatolia. But the *coup de grace* to the Empire was dealt by the Turkish nationalist movement. On the one hand, they managed to undo the treaties that would have partitioned Anatolia, a major achievement also in a European context because it marked the first revision of the post-1918 world order established by the Entente powers at the peace conferences in Paris. On the other hand, they accepted the losses in the Middle East, abolished a number of the Empire's central institutions such as the Sultanate and the Caliphate, and created a homogenous population of Muslims by exchanging almost the entire Orthodox population with Greece in return for its Muslims. From there, they entered

62 Davide Rodogn: *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Intervention in the Ottoman Empire 1815–1914*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 26.

63 Ibidem, pp. 78–80.

64 Ibidem, p. 27.

a project of social engineering aiming at creating a new man who could meet the criteria of homogeneity required to become a citizen of the Turkish nation-state established in 1923.[65]

This was not only the final nail in the Ottomans' coffin, but it also destroyed any prospect of Muslim-Orthodox partnership in the future. It thus ended a practice that went back to the early expansion of the Ottoman Empire, so that '1923' – like the Conquest of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmed II in 1453 – also marks the end of the Byzantine Empire as an ecclesiastical and symbolic reality. The Ottoman Empire existed for more than six hundred years. During the first half of this period it was an expanding power. A substantial part of its early conquests brought into its possession old Byzantine lands and territories predominantly populated by Orthodox Christians. In this process the sultans co-opted Orthodox power holders and key institutions, and after the conquest of Constantinople Mehmed made the Orthodox Patriarchate a part of the Ottoman administration, while Orthodox prelates hailed the sultan as the successor to the Byzantine Emperor. When the sultans turned their gaze towards the lands of the Christian commonwealth in the West, they would frame themselves as successors to the imperial throne with the task of unifying the Roman Empire. The Ottomans took this step at a time when Christendom was in a process of self-destruction, and in this way the Ottoman Empire came to play an important role in the events that would lead to the formation of Early Modern Europe. These deep changes in the power structures of the West strengthened the new European states vis-à-vis the Ottomans. Combined with imperial overstretch and the fragmentation of the central power, this new Western strength would put the Ottomans on the defensive in confrontations with the rising power of the European states. This conflict led to the contraction of the Ottoman Empire and brought the Muslim-Orthodox partnership under increasing pressure, and it began to crumble from the end of the eighteenth century onwards. The threat to the very existence of the Ottoman Empire by the European powers (and Russia in particular), combined with the threat of nationalism, resulted in Orthodox separatism culminating in the creation of a number of nation-states in former Ottoman lands in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This process ended in the wake of the First World War with the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish nation-state.

65 Uğur Ümit: *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia 1913–1950*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 42–50, 100–106.

THE ABSENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN EUROPEAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Kate Fleet (Cambridge)

As the British historian Anthony Pagden has observed, Europe is "a highly unstable term", a region whose identity "has always been uncertain and imprecise" and the exact location of whose frontiers are never quite clear.[1] The eastern frontier, "forever on the move"[2] and surrounded by "controversy and confusion",[3] is particularly problematic, as is the designation of Europe as a 'continent'[4] – a term resulting, according to J. G. A. Pocock, from the Mediterranean need for a label for the lands west of the Bosphorus and a product of "the exceptionally self-centered and world-dominating outlook developed by a civilization that took place in those lands."[5]

Regardless, however, of the "indeterminancy of Europe in the East",[6] or the inappropriateness of the use of the term continent, the geographical region of Europe is usually defined as being bounded on the East by the Ural Mountains, in the South by the Mediterranean, and by the Atlantic to the West. Taking this as a base definition for the geographical region of Europe, one can say that the Ottomans first appeared in Europe in 1354 when Süleyman (d. 1357), the son of the second Ottoman ruler Orhan I (d. 1362), took Gallipoli (Gelibolu) after an earthquake. Under the reign of Orhan's successors, the Ottomans advanced rapidly across European soil into what is now Bulgaria and Serbia, raiding Bosnia and Albania and advancing South into the Peloponnese.

After the setback caused by Timur's (1336–1405, r. 1370–1405) crushing victory over the Ottomans in 1402, which resulted in a decade of collapse and internecine warfare, the Ottomans regrouped and European expansion recommenced. By 1453, when Constantinople fell to Mehmed II (1432–1481, r. 1444–1446 and 1451–1481) and the Byzantine empire ended, Ottoman European territories once more included much of southern and most of eastern Europe. By 1503 the

1 Anthony Pagden: "Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent", in: *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. idem. Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 33–55, here p. 33.

2 Ibidem, p. 47.

3 W. H. Parker: "Europe: How Far?", in: *The Geographical Journal* 126/3 (1960), pp. 278–297, here p. 278.

4 J. G. A. Pocock: "Some Europes in their History", in: Pagden: *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*, pp. 55–71, here p. 57.

5 Ibidem.

6 Ibidem, p. 67.

Ottomans had established mastery over the waters of the eastern Mediterranean, taking most of the Aegean islands and defeating the major sea power of the period, Venice, in not one but two wars. In 1529 the Ottomans reached the gates of Vienna, but failed to take the city. In the later sixteenth and into the seventeenth century, the Ottomans continued to expand their Mediterranean holdings with the conquest of Cyprus in 1571–1573 and that of Crete completed in 1669.

By the sixteenth century the Ottomans were not merely a territorial presence in Europe but also a diplomatic one, a power broker in European politics and an economic giant in the commerce of the Mediterranean basin. In the course of the first half of the sixteenth century the French made several alliances with the Ottomans, the first of which was signed in 1536, while Süleyman controlled Hungarian politics, making and breaking its kings, and Spain's foreign policy was shaped round its power rivalry with the Ottomans. As Thomas Kaiser has noted, "the Ottoman empire [...] played a direct, and major role in contemporary European power politics and thus remained a concern of the French state and the French public at large throughout the Early Modern period."[7] The Ottomans were thus indubitably a power within Europe, present and indeed dominant in the Early Modern European world. In short, Europe without the Ottomans was unthinkable.

However, when one looks for them in modern Anglo-Saxon scholarship on the history of Early Modern Europe, they are but a dim reflection of themselves, largely absent or, when present, accompanied by inaccuracies and errors or covered in clichés. They are absent, for example, from Marian Malowist's chapter on "Movements of expansion in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" in the volume *Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe* edited by Peter Burke, despite the author's acknowledgement that "it would be of the greatest interest to analyse Turkish expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries from the social point of view", something regarded as "inconceivable" given the current state of research.[8] They make only a brief appearance in the volume on *New Approaches to the History of Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* edited by Troels Dahlerup and Per Ingesman, where they pop up in Ian Blanchard's chapter on "The late medieval European 'integration crisis' 1340–1540",[9] which looks at economic change in

7 Thomas Kaiser: "The Evil Empire? The Debate on Turkish Despotism in Eighteenth-Century French Political Culture", in: *Early Modern Europe: Issues and Interpretations*, ed. James B Collins and Karen L. Taylor. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 69–81, here p. 70.

8 Marian Malowist: "Movements of Expansion in Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in: *Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe: Essays from Annales*, ed. Peter Burke. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, pp. 104–112, here pp. 108–109.

9 Ian Blanchard: "The Late Medieval European 'Integration Crisis' 1340–1540", in: *New Approaches to the History of Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Proceedings of Two International Conferences at The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in Copenhagen in 1997 and 1999*,

central and south-eastern Europe, and in Andrew Cunningham's chapter on "Disease: crisis or transformation?" which refers to "the Christian armies defending Europe against the Turks."[10]

The volume *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, part of the series *A General History of Europe*, contains few references to the Ottomans, who are persistently referred to as Turks or, on rare occasions, as Ottoman Turks. Just over seven pages (one of which is taken up by a map) are devoted specifically to the Ottoman Empire. Here the authors explain that "Muslims in general, and the Turks in particular, were notoriously conservative in their interpretations of this law [the Holy Law]"[11] and that "From Selim II descended the long and only rarely broken succession of cretinous or paranoic sultans of the following two centuries."[12]

While one might wonder at the ability of an empire ruled for two hundred years by cretinous sultans to survive, the decline thesis, a trope long since abandoned by Ottomanists, is, as Ehud Toledano has noted recently,[13] still alive and well among European historians, as is the perception of the empire as a war machine motivated solely by the desire to conquer infidel lands, "the only significant principle" of the Ottomans being "the essentially sterile one of conquest."[14] According to Guilmartin, whose chapter is the only one in Benedict and Gutmann's volume on Early Modern Europe which addresses the Ottomans, "the Ottoman state was, in principle and to a large degree in practice, devoted to war."[15] For Abulafia, too, the Ottomans were endowed with "a devotion to the holy cause of the *jihad*",[16] and it was "the traditional holy war against Christendom" to which the Ottomans returned under Süleyman, according to Steven Gunn.[17]

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ed. Troels Dahlerup and Per Ingesman. Copenhagen: Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 2009, pp. 301–334, here p. 319.

10 Andrew Cunningham: "Disease: Crisis or Transformation?", in: Dahlerup and Ingesman: *New Approaches to the History of Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, pp. 397–415, here p. 401.

11 H. G. Koenigsberger and George L. Mosse: *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*. London: Longman, 1968, p. 192.

12 Ibidem, p. 194.

13 Ehud R. Toledano: "The Arabic-Speaking World in the Ottoman Period: A Socio-Political Analysis", in: *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead. London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 453–466, here p. 457.

14 Geoffrey Treasure: *The Making of Modern Europe 1648–1780*. London, New York: Methuen, 1985, p. 605.

15 John F. Guilmartin: "Military Technology and the Struggle for Stability, 1500–1700", in: *Early Modern Europe: From Crisis to Stability*, ed. Philip Benedict and Myron P. Gutmann. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005, pp. 259–277, here p. 269.

16 David Abulafia: *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean*. London: Allen Lane, 2011, p. 384.

17 Steven Gunn: "War, Religion, and the State", in: *Early Modern Europe: An Oxford History*, ed. Euan Cameron. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 102–133, here p. 105.

Unperturbed by the apparent oddity of an empire which lasted for six centuries, and was in decline for three centuries, by following the single 'sterile' principle of conquest, many European historians are apparently also content to regard the empire as isolated from the outside world, in which it showed neither interest nor understanding. "Fortified by the conviction that they [the Ottomans] stood at the centre of the world", Treasure informs us, "they saw no need to learn more."[18] Europeans might have traded with and fought against the Ottomans, but "there was no real interchange of ideas and behaviour", for there was an "iron curtain [...] between Christian and Muslim" in seventeenth-century Europe.[19] "Few bridges" were created between the Ottoman East and the Christian West, between these "contrasting worlds of western Christendom and the Turks."[20] Faced with such an unattractive and introverted structure, it is perhaps no wonder that European historians seem so disinclined to engage with it.

Such a superficial approach and lack of enquiry would surely be unacceptable, indeed unthinkable, when dealing, for example, with the British Empire. Mistakes such as that made by Horden and Purcell, who quote "the Arabic phrase *hem ziyaret hem tifaret*", a phrase unfortunately neither Arabic nor accurate,[21] would be unacceptable if applied to the Roman Empire or confusing Greek with Latin. It is hard to imagine that the rather odd explanation of Ottoman administration – "typically the mystic number four, rather than administrative requirements, determined the division of authority"[22] – could be used for the Spanish Empire.

Ignored or stereotyped in much work on Early Modern Europe and the Mediterranean,[23] the Ottomans are also often the victims of inaccuracies. The Ottoman court in this period can hardly be described as "fascinated by Western culture",[24] the area to the east being of far greater significance to the Ottomans than anything that lay to the west of the empire.[25] According to one modern his-

18 Treasure: *The Making of Modern Europe 1648–1780*, p. 605.

19 R. A. Houston: "Colonies, Enterprises, and Wealth: The Economies of Europe and the Wider World in the Seventeenth Century", in: Cameron: *Early Modern Europe*, pp. 137–170, here p. 166.

20 Abulafia: *The Great Sea*, p. 388.

21 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell: *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000, p. 445. The phrase, which is Turkish, should read "hem ziyaret hem ticaret", meaning both pilgrimage and trade.

22 Treasure: *The Making of Modern Europe 1648–1780*, p. 606.

23 Kate Fleet: "The Invisible Ottomans: The Missing Part of Mediterranean History in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Period", in: *The Turks*, vol. 3: *Ottomans*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002, pp. 40–45.

24 Abulafia: *The Great Sea*, p. 388.

25 Persian ambassadors were thus treated to lavish displays of hospitality while European ones were left waiting incessantly for an audience, or squabbling over precedence. See, for example, the audience of the French ambassador de Nointel in May 1677, described in Merlijn Olnon: "'A Most Agreeable and Pleasant Creature'? Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa in the Correspondence

tory of Europe, Syria was apparently not part of the Ottoman Empire,[26] the office of Grand Vizier was often occupied by "the highest Janissary"[27] (a claim displaying a total confusion over the military and administrative structure of the empire), Syria and Iraq were conquered from "a rival Turkic group, the Safavids",[28] and the position of Grand Vizier "became heritable".[29] In David Abulafia's recent large volume on the Mediterranean, the very famous sixteenth-century Ottoman corsair Hayreddin, who became grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet in 1533, receives a new biography[30] and is described as "liking to call himself *kapudan pasha*, 'captain general'",[31] which is rather like saying that Nelson was given to calling himself 'admiral'.

Despite Norman Davies's observation that "the Ottoman presence has to be one of the major features in any survey of European history"[32] or H. M. Scott's remark that the Ottoman Empire "remained a significant factor in eighteenth-century European history",[33] the Ottomans can hardly be said to hold their own in most Anglo-Saxon writing on Early Modern Europe. To quote from Wayne Vucinich in his article on Balkan society under Ottoman rule, "it is a pity that historians have not given this important [i.e., Ottoman] civilization, which has influenced the destinies of several African, Asian, and European peoples, the attention it deserves. What explains this neglect?"[34]

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of Justinun Colyer (1668–1682)", in: *The Ottoman Capitulations: Text and Context*, ed. Maurits H. van den Boogert and Kate Fleet. Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente C.A. Nallino, 2003 (= Oriente Moderno 22/3), pp. 649–669. Any marvelling was, for the Ottomans, done by the Europeans, such as the ten European experts in geometry and architecture who were so dumbstruck by the magnificence and perfection of the Süleymaniye that they not only took off their hats but, in a gesture of total bewilderment, put all ten fingers together in their mouths at the same time, so amazed were they by the sight before them; Evliya Çelebi b. Derviş Muhammed Zılli: *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu-Dizini. I. Kitap*, ed. Orhan Şaik Gökyay. Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995, pp. 65–66.

26 Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks: *Early Modern Europe, 1450–1789*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 414 ('Ships travelling from Syria or the Ottoman Empire').

27 Ibidem, p. 85.

28 Ibidem, pp. 104–105.

29 Ibidem, p. 312.

30 Abulafia: *The Great Sea*, pp. 415–418.

31 Ibidem, p. 418. This is interestingly reminiscent of a phrase in J. M. Roberts: *The Penguin History of the Twentieth Century*. London: Penguin Books, 1999, p. 310, where, talking about Mustafa Kemal, Roberts refers to "Kemal, as he tended to call himself (the name meant 'Perfection')".

32 Norman Davies: *Europe East and West*. London: Jonathan Cape, 2006, pp. 208–209.

33 H. M. Scott: "Europe Turns East: Political Developments in the Eighteenth Century", in: Cameron: *Early Modern Europe*, pp. 298–344, here p. 301.

34 Wayne S. Vucinich: "The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule", in: *Slavic Review* 21/4 (1962), pp. 597–616, here p. 598.

Perhaps the reason lies in part with Ottoman historians themselves. Ottoman studies are a comparatively new discipline in the Anglo-Saxon world, and until very recently not "a particularly robust field of endeavor", at least according to one Ottoman historian.[35] Although there has been a considerable increase in published works in English on the Ottomans over the past two decades or so, there is still not a great deal available, and many European historians appear to rely in any case on older sources. Ottoman history remains something of a 'niche' subject, often consigned to the netherworld of area studies or the outer reaches of small, specialist university departments. "Despite the efforts, not entirely unsuccessful, of Fernand Braudel and other non-Ottomanist historians to bring Ottoman history in from the cold", according to Colin Heywood,

> and despite work in several aspects of the field now achieving parity with that done on other, allegedly historiographically more 'advanced' areas, the 'curse of orientalism' (or *Orientalism*) still appears to have the field in its baleful grip, and there can be little doubt about the continuing unfashionability of Ottoman history among many in the wider world of historical scholarship.[36]

To this must be added the problem of sources. Whereas much western European archival material is readily available (many Italian documents, for example, having been published in the nineteenth century), Ottoman archival material is much less accessible. Even though more and more publications of facsimile and transcribed material are appearing, such as those produced by the state archives in Turkey, and documents are increasingly available on web sites such as those of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies in Crete or the Oriental Department of the National Library of St. Cyril and St. Methodius in Sofia, or digitised and downloadable from the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi within Turkey, it still remains the case that much Ottoman archival material is available only in archives, unappealing even to many Ottoman historians who show a depressing tendency to rely on each other or on a few published chronicles. Apart from accessibility, there is the added difficulty of the nature of Ottoman sources, which hampers an integrated historiographical approach. This is evident, for example, in economic data, where the ubiqutious notary deeds of the city-states of Genoa and Venice have no counterpart among

35 Virginia Aksan: "Theoretical Ottomans", in: *History and Theory* 47 (2008), pp. 109–122, here p. 109.

36 Paul Wittek: *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire: Studies in the History of Turkey, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. with an introduction and afterword by Colin Heywood. London, New York: Routledge, 2012, p. 27.

the extant documents from the Ottoman archives, or where the requirements of Ottoman central state budgets mean that they do not provide data comparable to that in budgets of European states to the west.[37]

NATIONALIST AGENDAS

One major impediment to Ottoman integration into European history is what one might call the 'poppy factor' in Balkan historiography.[38] Nationalist history is "all about false continuities and convenient silences, the fictions necessary to tell the story of the rendez-vous of a chosen people with the land marked out for them by destiny";[39] and for many Balkan historians, their destiny was blighted by the Ottoman state, "a ruthless exploiter"[40] who brought devastation, pillage, massacres and economic disaster,[41] and "barrenness and desolation".[42] With the arrival of the Ottomans "the Turkish incubus"[43] descended over the region, not to be lifted until it was liberated from the 'Turkish yoke'. Even for those outside the region, such as Rebecca West, the Ottomans were an alien and barbarous element in eastern Europe. West, who was a great supporter of the Serbs, noted that "there could be no two races more antipathetic than the Serbs, with their infinite capacity for enquiry and speculation, and the Turks, who had no word in their language to express the idea of being interested in anything"[44] and who lived under "the oppressive yet sluttish Ottoman law".[45]

37 Kate Fleet and Svetla Ianeva: *Economic Transformations in the Balkans: The Cases of Crete and Bulgaria*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2014, p. 19; Kate Fleet: "The Ottoman Economy, *c.* 1300–*c.* 1585", in: *History Compass* 12/5 (2014), pp. 455–464, here pp. 455–456.

38 Eric Hobsbawm has noted that history "is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction. The past is an essential element, perhaps *the* essential element, in these ideologies. If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented". Eric Hobsbawm: *On History*. London: Abacus, 1997, p. 6.

39 Mark Mazower: *Salonica City of Ghosts, Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430–1950*. London, New York: Harper Perennial, 2005, p. 474.

40 Aleks Buda: "About Some Questions of the History and Formation of the Albanian People and of Their Culture", in: *The Albanians and Their Territories*, ed. The Academy of Sciences of the PSR of Albania. Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 1985, pp. 5–32, here p. 26.

41 A. E. Vacalopoulos: "La retraite des populations greques vers des régions éloignées et montagneuses pendant la domination turque", in: *Balkan Studies* 4 (1963), pp. 265–276, here p. 266.

42 Constantinos Spyridakis: *A Brief History of Cyprus*. Nicosia: Zavallis Press, 1974, pp. 164–165.

43 L. S. Stavrianos: "Antecedents to the Balkan Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century", in: *The Journal of Modern History* 29/4 (1957), pp. 335–348, here p. 342.

44 Rebecca West: *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: The Record of a Journey through Yugoslavia in 1937*, vol. 1. London: Macmillan, 1967, p. 307.

45 Ibidem, p. 217.

In his history of Thessaloniki, Mark Mazower notes the absence of Muslims in the Greek and Jewish histories of the city between 1430 and 1912, the nearly 500-year period in which it was part of the Ottoman Empire:

> Centuries of European antipathy to the Ottomans had left their mark. Their presence on the wrong side of the Dardanelles had for so long been seen as an accident, misfortune or tragedy that in an act of belated historical wishful thinking they had been expunged from the record of European history. Turkish scholars and writers, professional Ottomanists had not done much to rectify things. It suited everyone, it seemed, to ignore the fact that there had once existed in this corner of Europe an Ottoman and an Islamic city atop the Greek and Jewish one.[46]

Mazower goes on to ask, "have scholars, then, simply been blinkered by nationalism and the narrowed sympathies of ethnic politics?"[47]

While nationalism or ethnic politics may contribute to the exclusion of the Ottomans from the European space, it is also perhaps related to the nineteenth and early twentieth-century mindset in which at least some scholars of Early Modern Europe appear ensconced.

For later nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century British historians, and politicians too, the Ottomans were clearly not part of Europe. The historian Edward Freeman wrote in 1877 that "The Turk came into Europe as a stranger and an oppressor, and after five hundred years he is a stranger and oppressor still",[48] adding that the Turk in Europe "can shew no memorials of cultivation; he can show only memorials of destruction. His history for the five hundred years during which he has been encamped on European soil is best summed up in the proverbial saying, "where the Sultan's horse-hoof treads, grass never grows again".[49] This was a sentiment with which William Gladstone, four times British Prime Minister, clearly agreed, for he wrote in his 1876 pamphlet, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* that the Turks "are not the mild Mahometans of India, nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria, nor the cultured Moors of Spain", but were instead "the one great anti-human specimen of humanity" whose advance was marked by "a broad line of blood" and whose arrival heralded the disappearance of civilisation.[50]

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46 Mazower: *Salonica*, p. 9.

47 Ibidem, p. 10.

48 Edward Freeman: *The Ottoman Power in Europe, Its Nature, Its Growth and Its Decline*. London: Macmillan & Co., 1877, p. 311.

49 Ibidem, p. 312.

50 William Gladstone: *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*. London: John Murray, 1876, p. 9.

This attitude continued into the twentieth century, a British admiralty handbook from 1917 explaining that:

> The Turk succeeded in orientalizing and proselytizing and reducing to practical servitude a considerable part of the Balkans because he found there no unity of race or religion, but he has never succeeded in assimilating the conquered people here or elsewhere. It is most unfortunate that owing to his inherent incapacity for art or science or business or political life the energies of the Turk are prone to find their outlets mainly in the works of destruction. Wherever he rules we find squalor and decay, and the suggestion of the distracting temporary settlement of a migratory race.[51]

While W. M. Sloane, in an article published in 1911, described Ottoman rule in the Balkans as "a grinding tyranny that lasted nearly four centuries",[52] Sir Edwin Pears, writing several years later, noted that "the Turkish population [...] was inferior in education and intelligence to the Christian."[53] The Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842–1918, r. 1876–1909), whose biography Pears wrote and who was described in the preface as "an evil nightmare brooding over Europe",[54] was bad in every way. "If it be said", Pears wrote, "that Abdul Hamid's suspicion was not entirely due to his environment but was largely attributable to an unhealthy trait of Orientalism, the answer is that many of his predecessors largely overcame it by a healthy out-of-door life", but Abdülhamid "took no interest in out-of-door sports; cared nothing for fishing, hunting, or other physical exercise."[55] Although "he had spasmodic periods of energy", these were mostly "of the unwholesome indoor kind."[56]

The extent of this hostility is nicely encapsulated in the explanation by Arthur Balfour (1848–1930), British Prime Minister from 1902–1905 and Foreign Secretary from 1916–1919, that one of the British war aims was "the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to western civilisation".[57] This perceived alien nature was mentioned earlier in an article in the *Westminister and Foreign Quarterly Review* where the Ottomans were described as "a race alien

51 *A Handbook of Turkey in Europe. Prepared on Behalf of the Admiralty*. [London]: Admiralty War Staff Intelligence Division, January 1917, p. 16.

52 W. M. Sloane: "Turkey in Europe II", in: *Political Science Quarterly* 26/4 (1911), pp. 676–696, here p. 685.

53 Sir Edwin Pears: *Life of Abdul Hamid*. London: Constable and Company, 1917, p. 3.

54 Basil William, in preface to ibidem, pp. v–vi.

55 Ibidem, p. 333.

56 Ibidem, p. 334.

57 Harold Nicolson: *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919–1925*. New York: H. Fertig, 1974 (orig. 1934), p. 98.

alike in origin, character, and religion."[58] For the British diplomat Harold Nicolson (1886–1968), Turkey was "a purely animal organism",[59] and he referred to "the subservience of Oriental psychology".[60] "The Turks", he noted in his book on 1919, "have contributed nothing whatsoever to the progress of humanity: they are a race of Anatolian marauders."[61] Perhaps here, however, we should note that it was Nicolson who remarked about the Americans that "at best they are a most unfortunate mistake."[62]

Such comments on the "alien" nature of the Ottomans and their accidental or "temporary" presence on European soil are not restricted to historians and politicians of the early twentieth century; they can also be found in the writings of historians at the end of the century or the beginning of the next, for whom "Turkey was in Europe but scarcely of it"[63] and the Ottomans "totally alien to Europe."[64]

So, if the Ottomans, in the Anglo-Saxon mindset were, and are, not in Europe, then where were they? The answer to this question is that they were in the Middle East, deposited there by a cartographical sleight of hand.

The beginning of this shift can perhaps be illustrated by the rise of the term 'Balkans' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the demise of the term 'Turkey' in Europe,[65] which it replaced. While the Ottomans themselves referred to their western territories which lay in Europe as 'Rumeli', the Europeans, having earlier referred to this territory as Turkey in Europe, now began to use the term Balkans, which came to mean both Ottoman and non-Ottoman European territory, thus, as Ebru Boyar has argued, "alienating" these territories from the empire itself, "at least at the level of discourse",[66] and representing, in Ebru Boyar's phrase, the "cognitive trimming"[67] of the empire by the European powers. Ottoman geographical territory was thus not Ottoman. Despite Ottoman resistance to the application of this new term to its own territory, by the early twentieth cen-

58 "The Ottoman Turks in Europe", in: *Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review* 123/246 (April 1885), p. 303.

59 Nicolson: *Curzon*, pp. 69–70.

60 Ibidem, p. 99.

61 Harold Nicolson: *Peacemaking 1919*. London: Constable, 1933, p. 35.

62 Norman Rose: *Harold Nicolson*. London: Random House, 2005, p. 177.

63 Treasure: *The Making of Modern Europe 1648–1780*, p. 4.

64 Ernle Bradford: *Mediterranean: Portrait of a Sea*. London: Penguin Books, 2000 (orig. 1971), pp. 395–396.

65 In an article published in June 1908, W. M. Sloane, writing of what he described as "the easternmost of the three great peninsulas which project southward from continental Europe", noted that "our fathers called it Turkey in Europe". W. M. Sloane: "Turkey in Europe", in: *Political Science Quarterly* 23/2 (1908), pp. 297–319, here p. 297.

66 Ebru Boyar: *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered*. London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007, p. 34.

67 Ibidem, p. 37.

tury it had become part of the political vocabulary of the Ottoman elite.[68] Thus the Ottomans slipped into acceptance of a geographical construct that "cognitively trimmed" their territory.

This is a demonstration of what Foucault referred to as "the mechanisms of power",[69] when "no power [...] is exercised without a series of aims and objectives."[70] Here it is the map which is the instrument of power, for, as Jeremy Black has pointed out in his book on *Maps and Politics*, cartography is political and the projection of Western power has diminished or reduced to nothing other cartographic traditions.[71] While medieval Christian maps placed Jerusalem at the centre of the world, and the Mercator projection placed Europe centrally and gave primacy to the northern hemisphere,[72] the "polymorphous tentacles of power", to borrow (and slightly adapt) Foucault's phrase,[73] now drew up a map in which the Ottomans, or Turks in European phraseology, lay firmly in the Middle East.

While the Ottomans slipped, cartographically speaking, out of Europe, 'Turkey in Asia' became encapsulated in a new geographical designation which first appeared around the beginning of the twentieth century in response to the "imperatives of late-nineteenth-century strategy and diplomacy",[74] a "strategic reference developed in a Eurocentred world", as Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff point out in their book on the geography of the Middle East.[75] The term was used by Valentine Chirol (1852–1929), the foreign editor of *The Times* from 1899 to 1912, in a series of articles he wrote for the newspaper when in Tehran, which appeared between October 1902 and April 1903 under the heading "The Middle Eastern Question". After the First World War the Turks were joined in the new Middle East by a host of new states whose boundaries were drawn up by the map, pencil, and tracing paper of officials such as the above-mentioned Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, who used the phrase in a diary entry for 24 February 1919.[76] Nicolson was in fact unhappy with this arbitrary cartographical exercise in relation to Anatolia, which he likened to the cutting up

68 Ibidem, pp. 40–41.

69 Michel Foucault: *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1: *The Will to Knowledge*. London: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 5.

70 Ibidem, p. 95.

71 Jeremy Black: *Maps and Politics*. London: Reaktion, 1997, p. 27.

72 Ibidem, p. 30. The Mercator projection was developed by the Fleming Gerard (de) Kremer in 1569.

73 Foucault: *The History of Sexuality*, p. 11. The original phrase is "the polymorphous techniques of power".

74 Clayton R. Koppes: "Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origins of the Term 'Middle East'", in: *Middle Eastern Studies* 12/1 (1976), pp. 95–98, here p. 95.

75 Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm Wagstaff: *The Middle East: A Geographical Study*. London: Fulton, 1988, p. 1.

76 Nicolson: *Peacemaking 1919*, p. 269.

of a cake,[77] an analogy repeated by Balfour, who referred angrily to "those three all-powerful, all-ignorant men [i.e., British Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1865–1945), French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929), and U. S. President Woodrow Wilson (1866–1924)] sitting there and carving continents."[78] Such carving was clearly not conducted on the basis of a great deal of knowledge, for Lloyd George, during discussions with the Italians Orlando and Sonnino, mistook the colours on the map drawn for him by the British team as representing ethnic divisions, green for Greeks and brown for Turks, whereas in fact green denoted valleys and brown signified mountains.[79] Regardless of any such blips, the Middle East had, cartographically speaking, now arrived.

Cartographical power was not merely a matter of physical force and mental arrogance, but also consisted of the ability, like a conjuror with a rabbit, to impose a map mentally and psychologically, in other words to persuade those within these territories that this was their place and that this was geographical reality. Thus, in the Ottoman case, the point was to make the Ottomans perceive of themselves as Middle Eastern, a construct echoed almost a century later in 2007 by Deniz Baykal, the then leader of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (The Republican People's Party), the main Turkish opposition party, when he warned that "They [the West] want to make us into a Middle Eastern country."[80] As Bernard Lewis and Peter Holt noted many years ago, what was remarkable about the new geographical designation, the Middle East, a term which derived from "a world of which Western Europe was the centre and in which other regions had significance only as Western Europe saw them", was that this artificial Eurocentric term was one adopted in the region itself.[81]

Apart from donning a cloak of moral superiority, it was also essential, in this version of the emperor's new clothes, that this view be accepted by those to whom the role of Middle Easterner had been assigned. Once the Ottomans thus came to accept the imposition of geography from outside, their days were numbered. The impact of such psychological pressure is evident in the approach of the last Ottoman government under Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdeddin (1861–1926, r. 1918–1922), a British puppet in British-controlled Istanbul, summed up by a remark made by Damad Ferid Pasha (1853–1923), his brother-in-law and Grand Vizier, who stated that "his only hope was in God and Great Britain."[82] In July 1920 he wrote that in

77 Ibidem, p. 337.
78 Ibidem, p. 342.
79 Ibidem, p. 333.
80 This phrase was used in a speech Baykal gave on 6 February 2007.
81 Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.): *Historians of the Middle East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 1.
82 Eastern Report, no. CXI, 13 March 1919, p. 2. London, The National Archives, CAB/24/145.

order to extract itself from its "many and varied difficulties", Turkey needed the support of the power most interested in the region, namely Britain.[83] One of the triumphs of the early Turkish Republic, which moved its capital further east from Istanbul to Ankara, in the heart of the Anatolian plateau, was the rejection of an imposed geography.

The extraction of the Ottomans/Turks from Europe and their insertion into the newly defined region of the Middle East is taken up and reinforced in the contemporary history of Early Modern Europe through the use of the terms 'Turks' and 'Turkey'. Thus the Ottomans are Turks, and the empire is Turkish: there was "the Turkish Empire in the Balkans",[84] internal political crises occurred in the mid-seventeenth century "in a large number of states, including [...] Turkey",[85] and France made an "alliance with Turkey".[86] Indexes often reference the Ottomans under Turks or Turkey, as is the case for example in Treasure's book on the making of modern Europe, where the entry in the index is "Ottomans (*see* Turkey)".[87] Just what is meant by 'Turkey' in this context is unclear. Is it meant to represent the region that is today Turkey, or Anatolia, or the Balkans under Ottoman rule and Anatolia, or Anatolia and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire? Are Turks the same as Ottomans (thus by no means necessarily Turks), or are they the ruling elite (and so again not necessarily Turkish) or ethnic Turks, such as the peasants of Anatolia (which is what the term meant when used by the Ottomans themselves)? Whatever the reason for choosing to use the term 'Turk' rather than Ottoman or 'Turkey' rather than Ottoman Empire or state, the result mentally is to locate them outside of Europe, or at best, clinging to the fringes.

What lay behind the cartographic creation of the Middle East and the representation of the Ottomans as barbarous and backwards in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was related to political requirements and the game of power politics. Once the Ottoman Empire slid from being a major power to be reckoned with to, by the mid-nineteenth century, one to be colonized, economically if not physically, then it had to be perceived as lesser, inferior, and in need of guidance and assistance by superior Western powers. Exploitation requires the moral high ground, as has been so often and so graphically shown in recent years. The need for such psychological dominance was nicely expressed by Sir Valentine

83 Damad Ferid Paşa to Aubrey Herbert, 23 July 1920, Somerset Country Archives (UK), DD DRE 34.

84 Euan Cameron: "The Power of the World: Renaissance and Reformation", in: Cameron: *Early Modern Europe*, pp. 62–101, here p. 64.

85 Jeremy Black: "Warfare, Crisis, and Absolutism", in: Cameron: *Early Modern Europe*, pp. 206–230, here p. 209.

86 Abulafia: *The Great Sea*, p. 445.

87 Treasure: *The Making of Modern Europe 1648–1780*, p. 602.

Chirol, who published an article entitled "The End of the Ottoman Empire" in the *Edinburgh Review* in October 1920. Chirol foresaw that Britain would face disaster throughout the East "if the East loses at this critical juncture its faith in the moral superiority of the West which has been the basis and the justification of western ascendancy".[88] Harold Nicolson also argued that "the doctrine of force, particularly in its application to 'backward' races, is based, not merely upon overwhelming physical power, but on certain moral forces behind that power" in which those to whom that force was applied must believe.[89] It was this belief in moral supremacy which enabled Chirol, in a phrase redolent of the American president George W. Bush's 'axis of evil' epithet for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea,[90] to write that "The Ottoman Empire has disappeared because it had become an instrument for evil to the world. The British Empire has survived because it has on the whole been an instrument of good in the world."[91]

For the British from the late nineteenth century onwards, a popular image of Ottoman economic incompetence, political inability, and general barbarity was required to enable the British government to interfere both physically and economically in the Ottoman state, detaching Egypt and Cyprus for strategic reasons and dominating the economy. British portrayals of Turkish barbarity rose in tandem with what they regarded as a growing threat to their economic interests in the region. The nineteenth century saw a steep rise in the import of British goods into the Ottoman Empire, resulting in Britain having, by the middle of the century, "an extensive commercial interest in the progress and well-being of the Turkish Empire."[92] At the same time, the Empire embarked on a series of loans and rapidly became sucked into a dangerous spiral of short- and long-term borrowing. The strategic calculation that lay behind this policy was largely the perceived need to invest in infrastructure in order to develop the economy and thus put the Empire on a more sound financial footing. This was, however, a race against time and one which the Ottomans were ultimately to lose.

Although there had been "renewed optimism"[93] about the financial prospects of the Ottoman economy in the summer and early autumn of 1874, by early 1875 it was clear to many that the financial position of the Empire was not going

88 Valentine Chirol: "The End of the Ottoman Empire", in: *The Edinburgh Review* 282/474 (October 1920), pp. 209–232, here p. 232.

89 Nicolson: *Curzon*, pp. 69–70.

90 Used by George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002.

91 Chirol: "The End of the Ottoman Empire", p. 232.

92 *The Parliamentary Debates Official Report (Hansard)*, series 3, vol. 165, col. 1513, debate on 14 March 1862.

93 Christopher Clay: *Gold for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance 1856–1881*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000, p. 279.