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Europeanised defiance – Czech Euroscepticism since 2004

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1. Czech Euroscepticism as an object of social-scientific research

In 2016, the European Union as a political system is one that faces many challenges. Long-term problems in some of the countries of the Eurozone, and indeed issues in the very setup of the Eurozone and of the common currency itself, give weight to criticism of the EU's capacity to resolve economic problems and provide solid economic governance (see Rupnik 2012). Waves of immigration into the EU, meanwhile, have created a situation that entices the critics of integration to push the following themes to the forefront: protection of the EU's internal and external borders, the issue of EU identity and the EU's compatibility with migrants originating in other cultures. The crises reinforce populist rhetoric in 'old' and 'new' EU member countries alike, and also strengthen Eurosceptic political movements. European integration as a topic has shifted its focus: no longer a matter of 'permissive consensus', it now tends to elicit 'constraining dissensus' among both the general public and their political leaders (Hooghe and Marks 2008). However, the increased interest of domestic politicians and voters alike on the issue of European integration has not led to a desire to politicise 'European' issues and thereby remove a main component of the EU's democratic deficit (Hix and Follesdal 2006), i.e. the weak connexions between EU institutions, policies and citizens. Rather, the opposite tends to hold true: politicisation leads to growing criticism or even rejection of integration. These trends are particularly conspicuous in the countries of the so-called 'Eastern enlargement', which in 2004-2013 admitted, alongside Cyprus and Malta, 11 post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. All of this underlines the need to submit growing Euroscepticism in the EU in general and in individual member countries in particular to scholarly reflection.

This book is concerned with public Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic political actors in the Czech Republic. The issue is complex and distinctive, yet in many respects it is comparable to the situation in other countries; in analysing the Czech case, the book hopes to add a few new tools to the conceptual toolbox for the study of Euroscepticism by introducing the notion of the Europeanisation of Euroscepticism. The study of a single case, the Czech Republic, focusing on attitudinal changes since EU membership and, in particular, also analysing the present situation, is a deliberate choice. The authors' point of departure is that the Czech Republic is an important example of a country accepted into the EU as part of the Eastern Enlargement, and one in which Eurosceptic politics have long been important

(Handl 2005; Hanley 2004a; Haughton 2009; Hloušek and Pšejka 2011; Guerra 2013). Also, as a still relatively recent EU member state, the country is a suitable object for analysis undertaken from the perspective of Europeanisation. A detailed analysis of the case of the Czech Republic therefore allows us to ascertain whether new hypotheses can be proposed about the functioning of contemporary Euroscepticism in its various manifestations, and to do so primarily in the context of the Europeanisation process.

The Czech Republic represents a specific challenge for the study of Euroscepticism. Not only has the country's party-based and public Euroscepticism been long and persistent; it has also had a particular dynamism since the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. Czech Euroscepticism has reflected developments in European integration and has drawn its strength from integration's points of crisis. If the interest in Euroscepticism ebbed after accession, since then there have been: (1) in 2008-2009 a domestic political crisis (the fall of government and the installation of a temporary caretaker cabinet) connected with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and a deep split within Czech political leaders into the supporters and the opponents of the Treaty; (2) the tragi-comic progression of the Czech presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2009; (3) the radicalisation of economic Euroscepticism since 2010 in connection with the crisis in the Eurozone and the rescue programmes and mechanisms; and finally (4) the crisis connected with migrations into Europe since 2013, which has stimulated cultural and social Eurosceptic arguments. All of these phenomena have had as their consequence a strengthening of public Euroscepticism and, in a sense, also of party Euroscepticism.

There is also another interesting aspect, which in fact instigated this study. As we shall show, before 2004 Czech Euroscepticism was, in terms of its ideas and arguments, a distinctive world, largely confined to the contexts of Czech politics and contemporary Czech history. Despite the occasional reference to foreign examples (typically, in the case of the ODS, Margaret Thatcher), the mental horizon of Czech Euroscepticism did not really extend beyond the country's borders. It responded to domestic stimuli and fears, showing no serious interest in cooperation with parties and figures of a similar ideological composition in other EU member or candidate countries. This political choice was understandable, because until the end of the 1990s the perspective of real membership in the EU was somewhat vague; it was also related to the fact that party Euroscepticism was the dominant form of Euroscepticism, and that political parties in Central and Eastern Europe had long strongly resisted any form of Europeanisation whatsoever (Haughton 2011, Hloušek and Pšejka 2011).

The argument that will be examined in this work is, on the face of it, somewhat provocative: since 2004 there has been Europeanisation of Czech Euroscepticism, occurring on multiple levels. First, Czech party Euroscepticism began to socialise much more in the environment of EU institutions and policies, and substantially broadened its international links. Most importantly, formal affinities were transformed into real political alliances, and these have influenced Czech Euroscepticism's character and ideologies. Second, since 2004, the theme of European integration has become much more important in the rhetoric of Czech Eurosceptic politicians and activists; this despite their continuing unwillingness to perceive and present Czech politics as part of the multi-level system of governance in the EU. Third, Czech Euroscepticism has shed some of its specifically Czech themes, thus coming closer to the mainstream of Euroscepticism. Over the ten years of Czech EU membership, Czech Euroscepticism has lost a number of its specifics, yet has remained a very attractive option for some voters (consider the success of the Free Citizens Party in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament) and also for a number of politicians, including those who are part of the mainstream. The once-exceptional Czech case thus increasingly fits into the developmental pattern of Euroscepticism in EU member countries generally.

An analysis of the Europeanisation of Euroscepticism based on the Czech case provides not only a valuable empirical study that makes a significant contribution towards deepening our understanding of the nature of Euroscepticism. There is another reason why a new re-thinking of the relation between Euroscepticism and Europeanisation is important. Traditionally, these two phenomena have been understood as mutually exclusive: where Euroscepticism is strong, a serious barrier exists to Europeanisation; and conversely, Europeanisation suppresses Euroscepticism.¹ In a sense, the gauntlet already thrown down prior to the so-called Eastern Enlargement by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2002), who foresaw the potential for Euroscepticism's Europeanisation, has not yet been adequately taken up. The potential Europeanisation of Euroscepticism is not of interest only to academics. For a long time, it was thought that opinions critical of the EU could be studied only in their respective national contexts; if they are now coming together, this also implies a transformation of the EU's political system and its ability to generate universal opposition. At the same time, it would be true that this opposition, by virtue of its universality, is becoming more efficient and more dangerous for the European mainstream. In other

¹ This mutual exclusivity can be observed in the conceptual foundations of research into British Euroscepticism, a branch of study that is very well developed in other respects (Tournier-Sol and Gifford 2015).

words, Euroscepticism's potential to Europeanise itself clearly has implications for practical politics in the EU and its member states.

The choice of the Czech Republic is not simply due to the fact that this book is the result of work undertaken by a research team based at Masaryk University in Brno. The Czech Republic is an important case for the following reasons: (a) its public Euroscepticism is among the highest of new EU member countries; (b) it has strongly above-average, perhaps even the highest, presence of Eurosceptic parties, which (c) represent various types of party Euroscepticism, both in terms of 'host ideology', i.e. conservative, liberal, nationalist, or (radical) left, and in terms of intensity (soft, hard) as well as parliamentary presence; and (d) there is a strong feeling of non-party Euroscepticism among the general public, intellectuals, many non-governmental organisations, and even the head of state. Thus, the Czech Eurosceptic spectrum is comprehensive, internally varied, ideologically heterogeneous and often internally competitive. It also responds to current trends in the Czech political debate and in EU developments as well as to the changing present challenges of European integration, such as the crisis in the Eurozone and the issue of migration into EU countries. It needs to be emphasised that, within the context of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe which acceded to the EU in 2004-2013, the Czech Republic is an exception from the general trend; this trend has been marked by the dominance of the pro-integration discourse and the virtual absence of relevant Eurosceptic political players. Leaving aside Croatia, which only acceded to the EU in 2013 in a different historical and political context (Ashbrook 2010; Maldini and Pauković 2015), and Poland (Markowski and Tucker 2010; Szczerbiak 2012), in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, EU accession and membership have been so much intertwined with the democratising and modernising discourse – membership in the EU has been understood as confirming the positive political, economic and social change achieved during the process of democratic transition (Vachudova 2005) – that openly Eurosceptic voices have been rare.

This does not imply that in all states of the Eastern Enlargement, Europeanisation occurred over and above the framework of political conditionality stipulating that they harmonise their legal and political systems with the EU's primary and secondary law (Grabbe 2006; Pridham 2005); nevertheless, the basic idea of EU accession was not fundamentally questioned. However, currently the proportion of Eurosceptic parties and other political actors is increasing in other post-communist countries besides the Czech Republic, especially in the states of Central Europe (Rupnik 2012). We might point to the acute dissonance between Robert Fico's party *Smer* (Direction) and the mainstream of the Party of European Socialists (Holmes and Lightfoot 2011: 42-43), or to the policies pursued by Viktor Orbán

(Fowler 2004) and the Law and Justice party currently in government in Poland. An analysis of the Czech situation can therefore provide valuable guidance for interpreting the growing importance of Euroscepticism in other countries of the EU's Eastern Enlargement. The Czech Republic can in this sense serve as a spotlight that illuminates the understanding of more general trends of Central and Eastern European Euroscepticism in its specific geopolitical and historical contexts. The analysis of the Czech case will also provide a new conceptual framework for studying Euroscepticism in the context of its own Europeanisation. This in turn will help to dispel the misunderstanding of Central and Eastern European Euroscepticism that comes from a persistent stereotype of the characteristics of post-communism, formed *a priori* and essentially unchanging. Sadly, this phenomenon is present not only in political arguments, but also in scholarly debate.

1.1 Study of Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic: state of the art and remaining challenges

Our study draws upon a number of existing analyses, not just of Euroscepticism, but also of the evolution of parties and party systems in Central and Eastern post-communist Europe generally. General works about political partisanship in Central Europe include studies by Ladislav Cabada, Petr Jurek and Vít Hloušek (2014), which have analysed, from a comparative perspective, the historical trajectories, cleavages and governmental and electoral performance of parties in the countries of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU. Other works on the development of political parties that have substantially covered the Czech Republic include those by Paul Lewis (2000), Tomáš Kostecký (2002), Petr Kopecký (2007 and 2006), Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček (2010) and Andrzej Antoszewski (2010). Also of relevance are monographs on, and comparisons of, party families – right-wing and centre-right parties (Hanley and Szczerbiak 2006), social democratic parties (Kopeček 2005), communist parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002; Curry and Urban 2003) as well as the extreme right (Ramet 1999, Pirro 2015). Although these works deal only indirectly with the issue of Czech parties' relationship with European integration, they are inspiring in that they show the gradually waning influence of the specific post-communist context on parties and the formation and functioning of the party system, thus paving the way for an explanation of the present state and developments by, among other things, the Europeanisation argument.

English-language studies of Czech Euroscepticism specifically or of Czech political actors' relationship to European integration are rare, though there are papers by Markéta Rulíková (2010), Mats Braun (2008), Tim

Haughton (2009), Vlastimil Havlík (2011), Seán Hanley (2004a and 2008), Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok (2014), Lubomír Kopeček and Jakub Šedo (2003) and Petr Kopecký (2004). More common are publications in Czech that map Czech Euroscepticism (Havlík 2010, Havlík and Kaniok 2006, Guasti and Mansfeldová 2012, Kaniok 2014) and the Europeanisation of Czech political actors (Fiala et al. 2009, Hloušek et al. 2015, Mansfeldová and Kroupa 2008). The Czech case is also sometimes discussed in publications dealing with the phenomenon of Euroscepticism generally. These works will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. Czech non-party Euroscepticism has not yet been given systematic scholarly attention.

What most of these works by both domestic and international scholars have in common is that they are largely focused either on the period before the Czech Republic's accession to the EU or immediately thereafter. Characteristically, during these times a strong role was played by the Civic Democratic Party and its chairman at the time Václav Klaus. More than a decade has elapsed since accession, and Czech Euroscepticism has moved on. Public support for the ODS has dwindled and Václav Klaus has not held any political office since his second term as president came to an end in 2013. Furthermore, most of the papers mentioned concentrate exclusively on the contents of Euroscepticism. Using selected taxonomies or typologies, they aim to characterise this Euroscepticism, or alternatively, study the compatibility of a party's attitude towards European integration with its primary ideology. To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between the Euroscepticism espoused by political actors and their activities at the European level has not yet been studied. Also lacking is a systematic analysis of changes in Euroscepticism among the Czech public since the country's accession to the EU.

Thus there is a lacuna in the study of Czech Euroscepticism. Not only do we lack an analysis of the current situation, particularly of the present character and motives of public Euroscepticism, we also lack an analysis of the effect EU membership has had on the character of Euroscepticism. This is not just about the campaigns and attitudes of Eurosceptic parties; we must also examine the under-researched field of the philosophy and ideology of Czech Euroscepticism. We will therefore focus not just on party and public Euroscepticism, but also on the evolving sources from which Czech Euroscepticism has drawn its ideas and inspiration. An examination of who personifies Euroscepticism in contemporary Czech politics, and for what reasons, will facilitate a robust analysis of the following issue: Does strong Czech Euroscepticism lead to truly Eurosceptic Czech behaviour in European institutions? That is another lacuna that needs to be filled by systematic research. A solid analysis of the nature of Czech Euroscepticism will allow us to verify or falsify the argument that Czech Euroscepticism has itself

Europeanised. On the basis of this empirical analysis, we will theoretically refine the concept of the ‘Europeanisation of Euroscepticism’.

1.2 Aims and structure of the book

As the overview above shows, the present book fills a number of lacunae in existing research. First, it focuses not just on party Euroscepticism, but also on other actors who co-create Czech Eurosceptic politics. Second, it concentrates on developments since the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU and in particular on the current situation, thus continuing the work done in existing studies, most of which have analysed Czech Euroscepticism up to around 2005 at best. Third, the book’s authors do not view party and NGO Euroscepticism as an isolated phenomenon, but carefully situate it in its historical context, observing the development of Czech popular attitudes and, last but not least, evaluating the impact of Eurosceptics on the official positions and conduct of the country in EU institutions.

Yet the book hopes to make its greatest contribution by attempting to intertwine the concepts of Euroscepticism and Europeanism and show those elements of Czech Eurosceptics’ socialisation that might at first glance seem paradoxical. Hence it provides an important contribution to discussions about the blending of Euroscepticism (especially of its ‘soft’ variants) into mainstream political debate and opinion, a trend observable at least since the outbreak of economic crisis in the Eurozone countries (Brack and Startin 2015, Leconte 2015).

It is important to explain the period the book will cover. It will explore Eurosceptic developments from around 2002/2003, i.e. a couple of years before Czech EU accession, to the present day, with the proviso that an introductory chapter will also outline the roots of Czech Euroscepticism in the 1990s, a phase that ended with the debate about the accession, in the context of the 2002 parliamentary elections and the 2003 accession referendum. The fundamental assumption tested in our research is that there has been a noticeable transformation of Eurosceptics, their strategies and *modus operandi* since the Czech Republic’s accession in May 2004.

The main research objective is therefore to ascertain whether Czech Euroscepticism has become Europeanised, and how this Europeanisation has manifested itself. Hence it is necessary to analyse how the arguments, strategies and political relevance of Czech Eurosceptic political actors changed over time, and what role was played in these transformations by the socialisation of these actors in the EU environment since 2004. Another research question is the following: Why are such high degrees of Euroscepticism and such a persistence of strong Eurosceptic political

movements characteristic of the Czech Republic? From this question, other partial research questions follow; these investigate the character and roots of Euroscepticism in the country, its evolution and its impact on the functioning of the Czech political system.

The book's structure follows the main research objectives. The next chapter presents the conceptual and methodological framework of the study; in particular, the concepts of Euroscepticism and Europeanisation will be discussed and operationalised for the purposes of the research. Moreover, the methods for studying political parties, the intellectual grounding of Euroscepticism and the methodology for working with Czech opinion polls is also included. The next chapter will define the actors involved in Czech Euroscepticism and justify their relevance for the present research. The fourth chapter will provide a basic overview of Czech Euroscepticism's historical development until the country's EU accession and sketch a conceptual map that will define the argument about the Europeanisation of Czech Euroscepticism, to be examined further. The fifth chapter will locate Czech Euroscepticism within the context of Czech popular attitudes towards European integration. The sixth chapter will cover Czech political parties generally, especially the three most important Eurosceptic parties: the Civic Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Free Citizens Party. The seventh chapter will examine the intellectual background of Czech Euroscepticism, i.e. relevant intellectuals and selected civil-society actors. The eighth chapter will show, using the example of voting in the Council of the EU and in the European Parliament, and from an analysis of proceedings against the Czech Republic at the Court of Justice of the EU, as well as on the Czech Presidency of the Council in 2009, to what extent a strong Czech Euroscepticism influences the country's conduct in EU institutions. The ninth concluding chapter will summarise the answers to the research questions, establish the conceptual premises for the Europeanisation of Euroscepticism, and offer a hypothesis for further research into contemporary Euroscepticism, in the EU in general and in the states of the Eastern Enlargement in particular.

1.3 Acknowledgements

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to Štěpán Káňa and Matt Rees for English translations and proof-readings. The responsibility for the final text and possible errors is, of course, solely our own.

2. Defining the object of research and the concepts and methods used

The aim of this book is to provide a detailed analysis of Eurosceptic political movements and actors in the Czech Republic during the period from the country's EU accession in 2004 up to 2015. This period was chosen not only because it focuses the research on the most recent developments, but also because there was a possible *direct* influence exerted by the political systems and actors of the EU and its other member countries on Czech politics and its actors. Czech Euroscepticism, which has been pronounced and stronger than in most other countries that came into the EU during the 'Eastern Enlargement' from 2004 to 2013 (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007, Pechova 2012), could therefore be directly and immediately confronted with the political culture, arguments, *modi operandi*, rhetoric strategies and political opportunity structures generated within the EU environment, including both 'old' EU member countries (the EU15) and other countries of the Eastern Enlargement.

The fundamental premise tested in this work is that Czech Euroscepticism has itself become Europeanised, that the original domestic roots of resistance to integration, or at least to its deepening, have been replaced during the process of political socialisation and learning by impulses imported from the EU and other Member States. Thanks to these processes of political socialisation and learning, there has been a substantial shift in Czech Euroscepticism, which has adopted the attitudes and arguments espoused by Eurosceptics in other EU member countries – and that this is observable in the many variants which have characterised Czech Euroscepticism historically as well as today. For example, the notion of European integration held by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia has gradually shifted due to the party's cooperation within the framework of the Party of the European Left and the corresponding parliamentary party group in the European Parliament (EP). Similarly, the Civic Democratic Party's participation in the group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) has been of relevance for the group's emergence and activities. The strength and especially the position of Czech Eurosceptic parties, with the ODS being one of the two major Czech parties from 1991 to 2013 (see Hloušek 2010), is exceptional among the new member countries, there being only one similarity: Poland after 2001 (with the Law and Justice party).

Since Czech EU accession, there has not been a significant reduction or re-layering within Czech Euroscepticism of its main movements connected


with various host ideologies;² rather there has been a transformation of the arguments, emphases and *modus operandi* of Czech Eurosceptics – hence our decision to focus on the years 2004-2015 and also to place contemporary Czech Euroscepticism in the historical context of the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium. At that time, the official Czech political representation continuously worked to achieve Czech EU membership (Marek and Baun 2011, Cabada and Waisová 2011); however, there was also at the time a vigorous domestic debate about the conditions of this membership, its relative merits and reasons for other potential political alternatives to it (Havlík 2010, Havlík and Kaniok 2006). As we shall see, the arguments that were fundamental to these debates were often based on recent Czech history (the expulsion of Germans from the Czech lands after 1945 can serve as *pars pro toto*) or to domestic circumstances (for example, the economically-motivated argument about whether it was or was not appropriate to expose the Czech economy to open competition from the markets of the European Communities and subsequently the EU, given that at the time it was still making a transition to market principles).

The main reasons for choosing to study the Czech Republic is the strength and long political relevance of Czech Euroscepticism and the considerable continuity of its often ideologically opposed and politically competing movements. Two Eurosceptic political parties – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Civic Democratic Party – have been involved in Czech politics since the early 1990s, and the more recent entrants – parties, non-governmental organisations and single-issue Eurosceptic online media – very often have strong personnel continuity with earlier developmental phases of contemporary Czech democratic politics. Eurosceptics include not just nationalist or chauvinist parties, but also communist, conservative and liberal (or even libertarian, such as the Free Citizens Party) ones, as well as many distinctive political personalities, chief among them the former Prime Minister and in 2003-2013 the head of state, Václav Klaus. In both its moderate and radical forms, Czech Euroscepticism enjoys considerable intellectual backing by figures such as Miloslav Bednář, Petr Fiala and Alexander Tomský on the right, and Miloslav Ransdorf (who died in January 2016) on the left. It also benefits from substantial public support, as shown

² Like nationalism (Freedman 1998) and populism (Aslanidis 2015, Stanley 2008), Euroscepticism is sometimes understood as an internally incoherent position, one that does not represent or produce a unified ideology, but, rather, can be combined with various ‘host’ ideologies. For the purposes of our study, the question of whether Euroscepticism is or is not an ideology is not important. However, we gravitate towards the pluralist view of Euroscepticism as a position compatible with various political ideologies, or operating as a single political issue, on the basis of which political actors establish their respective profiles.

not just by national and Eurobarometer opinion polls (discussed in Chapter Five), but also by the results achieved by Eurosceptic parties in the elections to the Czech parliament's Chamber of Deputies and to the European Parliament, since the mid-1990s to the present. A basic overview is provided in the following figure.

Figure 1: Proportion of the vote obtained by Eurosceptic parties in elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (CoD) and to the European Parliament (EP), 1996-2014³



Source: www.volby.cz


³ The 1996 parliamentary election was the first after the establishment of the independent Czech Republic. The Chamber of Deputies that served from 1992-1996 came into existence by a transformation of the Czech National Council – the Czech parliament elected in June 1992, when the country was still a member of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

The following Eurosceptic parties have been identified in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies (only those polling more than 0.5 per cent of the vote are listed): in 1996 and 1998, KSČM, ODS and SPR-RSČ; in 2002, ODS, KSČM and Miroslav Sládek's Republicans; in 2006, ODS, KSČM and Vladimír Železný's Independent Democrats; in 2010, ODS, KSČM, Sovereignty-Jana Bobošíková's Block, the Workers' Party of Social Justice and the Free Citizens Party; in 2013, ODS, KSČM, Dawn of Direct Democracy, the Free Citizens Party, the Workers' Party of Social Justice and the Hold Your Head High party.

The following Eurosceptic parties stood for election to the European Parliament: in 2004, ODS, KSČM and the Independent Democrats; in 2009, ODS, KSČM, Libertas.cz, Sovereignty and the Free Citizens Party; in 2014, ODS, KSČM, Dawn of Direct Democracy.

We see that in Czech parliamentary elections the aggregated support for Eurosceptic parties has been decreasing since 2006. Still, the voters of Eurosceptic parties represent at least a third of the electorate. We illustrate the changing Euroscepticism of the Czech population by its position on the idea of replacing the Czech crown with the euro, as show in the figure below.

Figure 2: Evolution of Czech popular opinion on the introduction of the euro



Source: Červenka 2015: 2.

As noted by Simona Guerra (2013: Chapters Two and Three of Guerra's book) among others, before EU accession and immediately thereafter the Czech Republic was exceptionally Eurosceptic compared with its peer nations. In most of the countries that acceded in 2004 and 2007, politicians and the general public alike were very optimistic, endorsing a vision of the EU as facilitating not just economic and social development, but also the consolidation of democracy and improvements to political culture (Ilonszki 2010). This optimism almost endured until the first serious repercussions of the eurozone crisis.

Scepticism then also set in in other states. In a sense, the Czech Republic can therefore be viewed as the laboratory for a strong Central and Eastern European Euroscepticism, and study of the Czech case can produce valuable findings and serve to reinvigorate the conceptual apparatus with innovations subsequently applicable to other countries of the Eastern Enlargement and ultimately also to remaining EU countries.

On the face of it, the coupling of Europeanisation with Euroscepticism may seem paradoxical. Contemporary Eurosceptic parties either reject integration generally or at least strongly question its present direction: the post-Lisbon European Union. One would expect, therefore, that they would