Arnold H. Kammel | Benjamin Zyla [eds.]

Peacebuilding at Home

NATO and its 'new' Member States after Crimea

Nomos

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Preface

The two editors have collaborated on research projects for several years. This edited volume is the latest fruit of this true transatlantic partnership as well as friendship among the editors and several authors. Unlike many other volumes on transatlantic affairs, this volume goes beyond the theoretical discussions that are so characteristic of the academy. Indeed, it bridges the well-known theory-practice divide that until this day we continue to witness too often in the literature. Make no mistake, the divide is difficult to overcome. On the one hand, academics like to hide in their ivory towers and behind their theoretical models, ontological assumptions and hypothesis. Thereby they often forget that a 'real' world exists out there and that there 'real' people who have to solve problems and issues on a daily basis. On the other hand, policy officials, regardless of which political colour or stripe, are not much different. Above all, they show strong inclinations to brush academic thinking away characterizing it as being too abstract and somewhat 'up in the clouds'—that is entirely detached from reality. What both sides, however, often forget is that theoretical models *and* policy practice almost always inform each other. At the minimum, they both depend on each other, whether it is directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously. How so? The policy official, for example, who is thinking about how to solve a real policy problem indeed works with ontological and epistemological assumptions that shape her/his worldviews. This undoubtedly has implications for the policy development and practice thereof. In turn, academics are influenced in developing their models by witnessing policy reality that surrounds and informs them.

In this anthology, we make no claims suggesting that we have managed to fully overcome this divide. This will require many more collaborative policy-theory bridging books. However, we do hope to have made at least a small, yet hopefully strong commitment in the field of international security affairs to overcome this divide without making any sacrifices to either academic or policy rigour.

Our interest in the topic of this book evolved some time in 2014 shortly after Russia annexed the Crimea on 18 March 2014. Of course, we quickly noticed that the media (print, online, and TV) extensively reported on Russia's military intervention in Crimea, which took place in the aftermath of

the 2014 Ukrainian revolution that essentially split the country into two camps: the pro- and the anti-Western supporters. That media interest, of course, remained strong, in part because the conflict itself intensified militarily to a point where the G8 member states voted to suspend Russia's membership in that group. They also introduced heavy economic sanctions.

While this was all unfolding, policy wonks on both sides of the Atlantic tried to understand what motivated President Putin to authorize such intervention and, more broadly, what drove Russia's foreign policy, why the invasion was a clear violation of international law (especially Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter), how the West could and perhaps should respond to the Russian aggression, and what the so-called West could do to help the Ukraine in managing its ethnic tensions and finding peace, especially in the Donbas region. In short, both policy advise and theoretically informed academic debates were readily available and very visible.

However, what was somewhat missing from these discussions, we found, was the perspective of what some call the central, eastern, and southern European states, most of which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. How did they perceive Russia's aggressive foreign policy, and how (if any) has this behaviour changed their views on transatlantic relations and the NATO alliance in particular? We felt that this perspective was not only missing from the analysis; it was also not well reflected in the policy responses that the 'old' NATO members offered. This is a lacuna that we want to address in this book. More specifically, we want to give policy makers from central, eastern, and southern Europe a voice in this discussion, and to let them reflect on what the crisis in Crimea meant for their states.

Co-editing a book such as this one does not come together easily; nor does it happen quickly. The manuscript has travelled with us to virtually all five continents, in various kinds, forms, stages, and shapes. Within the past two years, we also managed to take some time off from our busy policy, teaching, and research schedules to meet several times in person and to discuss the various stages of the project.

However, we could not have done all this work ourselves, and would like to thank a number of individuals and institutions for their support. First of all, we would like to thank our authors for their patience in the various stages of the writing and editing process. It has been a pleasure working with them, and we are looking forward to doing more projects like these with them in the future. Above all, we very much appreciate

their contributions to this volume, and hope that they will influence transatlantic security policy in one way or another.

Secondly, we would like to thank our research assistant Laura Grant for her excellent work with commenting on the manuscript, editing the respective chapters, and chasing footnotes. This is by no means an easy or trivial task as any writer would know.

Thirdly, this project would not have been possible without the support of our respective institutions, namely the Austrian Institute for Europe and Security Policy(AIES) in Vienna, Austria, and the School of International Development & Global Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada. The AIES in particular was instrumental in organizing a workshop that brought many of the authors together, and allowed us to discuss various aspects and policies of this project. We would also like to thank the Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Konstanz, Germany who provided a fantastic home and where the last stages of the project were completed.

Last but not least, we want to thank our respective families for their continuous support and encouragements with this project. It has been far too often that we spent time away from home, writing various sections of the book, getting stranded in some airports while returning or going to research meetings, chasing footnotes online or in libraries, or editing the manuscript in the evenings. This book would not have been possible without your help and appreciation for this project. Thank you!

Vienna (Austria) and Gatinau (Canada), April 2017
Arnold Kammel and Benjamin Zyla

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Introduction

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This book is written for policy makers and members of the general public who are interested in NATO and want to learn what alliance membership means for the so-called 'new' member states that joined NATO in 1999, 2004, and 2009.[1] Specifically, this anthology analyzes policy debates on what NATO means for their country, and discusses the added value that they see in being a NATO member. In order to better situate the debates in each of those countries, we have asked our contributors to offer a few introductory remarks reminding readers of the (geo-)political circumstances that led their respective countries to join the alliance. The authors then move on to discussing whether these circumstances and contexts have at all changed in today's security environment, perhaps even the value of NATO membership that these new member states hold. In short, our primary chief objective in this anthology is to understand and assess how important the NATO of 2016 is for the 'new' member states (or not), and why this is so. We thereby also outline some of the main weaknesses that the alliance needs to address in order to remain relevant in eastern and southern Europe in the years to come.

To be sure, we assess these questions for all the 'new' member states that joined the alliance in the post-Cold War era. In addition, we offer clear and concise policy implications for our findings. This has direct relevance for NATO desk officers in the respective governments, in embassies, for journalists, as well as policy analysts working on NATO and transatlantic security affairs more broadly. In that sense, this anthology bridges the obvious and growing gap between scientific, evidence based assessments and explanations (which we will refer to in the second half of

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1 Respectively, these are (in alphabetical order) Albania (2009), Bulgaria (2004), Croatia (2009), Czech Republic (1999), Estonia (2004), Hungary (1999), Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), Poland (1999), Romania (2004), Slovakia (2004), and Slovenia (2004). Unfortunately we are not able to include the chapters on Albania and Slovakia since the authors who have agreed to write a chapter did not deliver.

the introduction), and formulates sharp policy implications for policy practitioners to address the current security challenges in central, eastern, and southern Europe. In other words, while we hope that the book may indeed be of interest to some colleagues in the academy, it was not written for them as the primary audience that we had in mind, given the obvious lacks in the manuscript of an extensive footnote apparatus, and complex theoretical frameworks laden with abstract ontological and epistemological assumptions and propositions, and detailed methodological justifications for adopting certain research strategies. Colleagues who are interested in these types of discussions will undoubtedly be disappointed by this volume. To the contrary, this anthology is written for policy makers using plane, direct, simple, and accessible language where possible and without much academic jargon.

Moreover, the anthology prides itself with each chapter having been written by local policy experts from the respective 'new' member states rather than external so-called country experts who often are out of touch with the domestic and internal debates as well as policy issues occupying in the respective governments and societies. Each chapter thus provides a policy perspective from 'below'—that is from a perspective of the member states themselves as opposed to a bird's eye perspective from 30,000 feet or even from abroad.

To be sure, there are clear trade-offs with adopting such an approach. One clear benefit is that it indirectly creates a network of policy experts in the respective central, eastern, and southern European NATO member states—the sort of 'go to people' that others could seek advise from or reach out to if they need to better understand what certain governments think and why. This, we believe, is an important achievement of this anthology, given today's renewed geopolitical contestations in those regions that shook the alliances' very basic foundations and the European security architecture more generally by calling into question long established and cherished transatlantic values such as multilateralism, diplomacy, democracy, rule of law, human rights to name just a few. One downside of adopting such policy oriented approach is that the 'grand picture', so to speak, can appear to be convoluted with no clear narrative or trajectory appearing.

Context and aim of the Book

A lot of ink has been spilled on analyzing and discussing NATO enlargement in the 1990s, including what benefits those states could bring to the alliance, how much that enlargement process would cost the allies, what outputs and outcomes have been made through the enlargement process, as well as the economic, political, and societal benefits that came with enlarging NATO first towards the east and then subsequently to the south. What was often missing from that analysis, we argue, especially in more recent years, was a voice from central, eastern, and southern Europe itself —that is an assessment from them on how important and worthwhile NATO membership is for these states and their societies today in light of Russia's aggressive foreign policy towards them. Such an assessment includes a discussion on what contributions the 'new' states made to the various NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya, regardless of whether they were of military, civilian, or political nature. Moreover, and far more important than simply mapping out the quantitative nature of those contributions, is a frank discussion on why those states, most of them small states compared to the rest of the 'old' NATO membership base, contributed to NATO's post-Cold War operations, and why their national commitments were considered important in their respective domestic polities. In other words, the question of burden sharing is an important aspect in assessing and defining the role of central, eastern, and southern Europe in NATO today, also vis-à-vis the 'old' NATO allies.

What has fuelled that discussion, indeed, it elevated its importance on NATO's political agenda, is of course the crisis in Crimea in 2014 and Moscow's ensuing aggressive behaviour in Eastern Europe more generally. Shaken by the instability Russia has created in their immediate neighbourhood, the Baltic states as well as the so-called Visegrad countries in particular have expressed strong concerns to their fellow NATO allies that their territorial sovereignty, even survival, might be compromised by the Kremlin's rather aggressive foreign policies. Indeed, while the crisis in Crimea was unfolding, strong concerns were raised at NATO headquarters in Brussels lobbying the 'old' NATO allies to do more militarily in central, eastern, and southern Europe and to better deter Russia from a potential invasion in their countries. The demand was clear and loud: immediately increase NATO's military presence in the region with boots on the ground and thereby effectively set up a trip-wire for a potential Russian invasion. This was an idea that reminded many of the dark Cold War times and what

was commonly known as the 'Fulda gap'. In other words, the crisis in Crimea had some real geopolitical implications for the region, especially for those 'new' NATO member states that share a direct border with the Soviet Union, live in its immediate neighborhood (e.g. the Baltic states), or are host to a large minority of Russian speaking citizens. From our analysis in this anthology it is very apparent that these states were united in their view that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not be trusted, and that Russia's expansionist and aggressive foreign policy should not be taken lightly by the 'old' member states.

Initially, however, NATO brushed these fears aside, citing long-standing security guarantees under Article 5 that all members are dedicated to, as well as the alliance's continuous and steadfast commitment to their (physical) security, even though it was more passive than active at that time given that no military forces or equipment were permanently stationed in central, eastern, and southern Europe. However, very few analysts in the 'new' member states believed what NATO elites were saying at the headquarters in Brussels or on the speaking circuit in Washington, Paris, London or Berlin that the alliance would indeed be willing to risk a war with Russia over the defence of say Riga, Sofia or Zagreb.

In short, the Crimea crisis questioned the value of NATO membership for central, eastern, and southern European states, and it was only until very recently that NATO made some strategic and tactical decisions to deploy a Rapid Reaction Force permanently to the region to help monitor the state's respective air-spaces and territorial borders. Jamie Shea's chapter analyzes these developments in greater detail.

Against this backdrop, it is pertinent to ask and reflect on how membership in NATO has evolved for the 'new' member states that joined the alliance in the post-Cold War era given the new geopolitical circumstances and threats posed by Russia, as well as what meaning those states and their citizens attach to that membership today?

Background for current debates: process of NATO enlargement post-1989[2]

However, before we engage with the analysis for each of those 'new' member states, we need to contextualize the current debates of the impor-

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2 This section is in part based on (Zyla, 2015: chapter 6).

tance of central, eastern, and southern Europe for NATO—that is to quickly recall the contexts of why, when, and how the respective NATO enlargement processes took place. So be sure, we have no ambition to provide a full or comprehensive historical assessment of that time; this has been accomplished elsewhere (see, for example, Asmus et. al, 1996; Carpenter et. al., 2001; Eyal, 1997; Kamp, 1998; Bebler, 1999). Rather, the objective here is to tease out some of the perhaps most important historical trend lines that informed decisions on NATO enlargement, and that form the basis of the value of NATO membership today.

NATO enlargement would not have been possible without what some analysts have called the 'new' NATO that emerged at the Cold War's end. When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner took the opportunity to carve out new roles and responsibilities for the alliance.[3] His ideas injected new life into the veins of an undoubtedly ageing European security institution that was considered by some as having lost its reason d'être now that the Cold War was over (c.f. Mearsheimer, 1994-95). Wörner's critics, on the other hand, noted that with the fall of the Berlin Wall NATO had fulfilled its primary objective for which it was created, namely, as NATO's first Secretary General Lord Ismay once put it, "to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in."[4]

Wörner's primary concern were the unfolding insecurities in what was then called central and eastern Europe:

> I am experiencing the fortieth anniversary of NATO rather like the manager of a successful football team which has just won the league title. His initial instinct is to celebrate the season's glories. But instead his mind is inevitably on the team's promotion to the higher division. How will the team cope with the new, more demanding environment where not only the rewards, but also the challenges, are so much greater? Such is life. The more successful we are, the more new tasks we find ourselves taking on.[5]

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3 One may even go so far to argue that the organization is the victim of its own success. Many books have been written about the question of the existence of NATO after the end of the Cold War. See, for example, (Carpenter, 1995; Carpenter & Conry, 2001; Eyal, 1997; Gordon, 1997; Kay, 1998).

4 One might also add the French happy. Lord Ismay was the first Secretary General of NATO between 1949-1957.

5 "The future Tasks of the Alliance," Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to the Quadrangular Forum, Brussels, 1 April 1989.

NATO as a global crisis management organization was born. That new path was paved at its seminal Turnberry Meeting in June 1990. There, the allies also extended a 'hand of friendship' to what was then called the Soviet Union, and to make peace with its former adversaries.[6] In its deliberations, NATO implicitly presumed that economic development was a critical component to a lasting democratic development of central and eastern European states and their societies. Indeed, the alliance saw itself as an institution that could assist central and eastern European states with stabilizing the region politically, and to create a zone of peace that was prosperous and free from aggression and hostility. For example, in an internal assessment of the unfolding situation in central and eastern Europe, the Canadian government concluded that "[…] in CEE there has been an extraordinary realignment of political and economic interests. Countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are looking to the European Community, North America and Japan as the locomotives to pull them toward a new era of democratic polity and economic prosperity" (Ibid, 1). To be clear, NATO's promotion of democratic values in central and eastern Europe was seen as a means to an end and clearly with strong self-interests in mind—that is fostering economic and political engagements while hoping for an extended economic interdependence and thus benefits in the future (c.f. Keohane & Nye, 1977; Slaughter, 1997; 2004). As Wörner put it himself:

> In its quest for growth, the East will need to import our values as much as our technology. It must also find ways to integrate its economies into the international trading system through participation in our Western economic and financial institutions. We will therefore have more influence over the domestic evolution of these societies than we have enjoyed over the past.[7]

As part of managing and facilitating this outreach process to central and eastern Europe, the alliance created new regimes. The first of these new regimes was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Its primary function was to provide transparency among aspirant NATO member

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6 London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5-6 July 1990.
7 "The future Tasks of the Alliance," Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to the Quadrangular Forum, Brussels, 1 April 1989.

states and to hold regular political consultations[8] on economic, political, and social issues.[9] In that sense, the NACC provided a consultative forum for discussions on civil-military relations as well as how to reform the armed forces and defence industries, which were some of the most pertinent questions at the time. It is in this sense that the NACC presented an institutionalization of a loose partnership between NATO and central and eastern European states, but without explicitly locking its members into legally binding agreements or extending NATO's collective defence clause (Article 5) to them. In that sense, the NACC was, as the U.S. State Department put it, the "first bridge NATO constructed over Europe's old divide."[10]

The so-called Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) was the next step towards NATO membership by aspirant member states. It was created as a program that offered practical and individually tailored advise to PfP members, which is something that the NACC was unable to do.[11] It simply

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8 See, for example, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat, October 2001, Article 3. The negotiations for the CFE treaty as well as the Russian troop withdrawals are often cited as examples of where the NACC process had had a practical and important impact.

9 Besides those rather positive elements, some analysts saw the NACC with rather critical eyes. For starters, the NACC lacked the opportunity for each partner country to develop an individual relationship with NATO. This led some critics such as Jonathan Eyal, for example, who argued that the NACC was only a gigantic talking shop similar to the OSCE and produced no real results or significant decisions. See, for example, (Eyal, 1997: 701). Moreover, the NACC operated on a scarcity of resources, and failed to solve security problems between its partners. Canada itself noted that "achieving C/EE's [Central Europe's] goals had been revealed as more difficult than originally thought, which has produced uncertainty. Overall, while there has been progress in dealing with challenges, no risks have been fully eliminated and new variants have emerged." The NACC was also perceived by some of its partner states as not being successful in developing a community of security, and that it was still too much a bilateral relationship between NATO and CEE partners. Telex, Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO, "APAG (Atlantic Policy Advisory Group) MTG with Cooperation Partners: European Security in Transition", YBGR 1092, to EXTOTT IDS (International Security and Defence Relations Divisions, DFAIT), 5 May 1994, page 2-5. Access to Information Act, 10 April 2007, A-3, File No. 3947-01.

10 US Department of State, *Statement to North Atlantic Cooperation Council*: Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher (Brussels, 96/12/11).

11 Through a so-called Partnership Coordination Cell that was established at SHAPE in Moens. For a greater discussion about the role of the PCC see (Lange, 1995).

remained a forum for discussion rather than direct and individual policy advise. In contrast, PfP's primary goal was to help transform the societies and institutions of PfP member countries and to advise them on how to navigate the new socio-economic as well as political and security challenges they have been facing since the Cold War's end. PfP was correctly seen as a soft power tool that helped to manage a diverse club of states while encouraging its own members to "tame their élan, go back to their capitals and acquire some knowledge of government" (Eyal, 1997: 697). Membership in PfP meant the acceptance of existing borders in Europe, and the active commitment to the peaceful settlement of internal as well as external disputes.

With these new regimes in place, NATO moved gradually towards full membership of central and eastern European states. However, at the core of the debates surrounding the enlargement process was the question which countries should be invited first to join the alliance, and based on what grounds? Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—also known as the Visegrad countries—were among the first in 1990 to publicly and openly voice their desire to achieve "total integration into the European political, economic, security, and legislative order […] to harmonize their efforts to foster cooperation and close relations with European institutions […].[12]

NATO finally decided on 10 December, 1996 to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to apply for membership at the Madrid summit in 1997; they became members in 1999. However, the alliance clearly stated that its intentions are to maintain an open-door policy for other potential rounds of enlargement in the future See (Solana, 1997). The first round of enlargement was primarily driven by strategic concerns and informed by the guidelines laid out in the September 1995 NATO Enlargement Study. It noted that successful applicants must have implemented democratic systems of government in their respective polities, implemented economic reforms toward free market systems, shown respect for human rights, peaceful relations with neighboring states, set up a civilian mechanism to control the military, and an overall willingness and ability to contribute to the security of the Alliance. In practice, however, the first round of enlargement was influenced by factors that were not laid out in

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12 Statement issued by the Visegrad Summit in *Report on Eastern Europe*: 31-32. See also (Cottey. 1995).

the study: the relative strategic importance of the candidate countries, Russia's political sensitivities over certain states, domestic political constituencies of central and eastern European heritage in the 'old' NATO member states, as well as allied cost calculations.

In contrast, the second round of enlargement in 2004 was clearly driven by stability concerns in south-eastern Europe—that is political considerations of the remaining candidate's democratic developments and willingness to become part of the Western (security) architecture.

The third round of enlargement in 2009 took place at the 60th anniversary of the Alliance, and marked the completion of the enlargement in the Western Balkans for those states that had a clearly indicated path towards EU membership. The membership overlap between NATO and the EU made it clear that Europe was finally both secure and united.

Question of burden sharing: why do those states contribute to NATO the way they did?[13]

Soon after the first post-Cold War enlargement process took place, analysts started to discuss what those 'new' member states could bring to the NATO table as opposed to what NATO could bring to their table. However, these contributions do not feature prominently in academic or policy debates, neither past nor present. Yet, it is accepted wisdom in the literature that since joining NATO the 'new' member states have contributed significantly to the alliance. The following tables show how and to what extend.

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13 This section is partly based (Massie & Zyla, n.d.).

Table 1: SFOR/EUFPR Troop Contributions by country, 1997-2013

	SFOR 1997/1998	SFOR 2002/2003	EUFOR 2004/2005	EUFOR 2005/2006	EUFOR 2007	EUFOR 2008	EUFOR 2009	EUFOR 2010	EUFOR 2011	EUFOR 2012	EUFOR 2013
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	134	115	116	119	120	117	10
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	
Czech republic	363	0	0	0	65	5	2	2	2	2	2
Estonia	44	2	1	1	33	3	2	2	2	1	1
Hungary	2	155	150	150	118	158	158	160	166	171	162
Latvia	40	97	1	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	140	95	97	97	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Poland	396	287	287	287	236	203	204	188	184	47	47
Romania	204	122	106	106	85	49	58	56	64	59	59
Slovakia	0	0	29	29	42	40	40	32	40	46	34
Slovenia	0	78	158	158	84	58	34	26	29	15	14

Praise for their performance even came from the U.S. Congress, which is normally a sharp critic of allies' relative share of the collective NATO burden. While the 'new' members already contributed militarily to NATO operations in the Balkans back in the day when they were not even members of the alliance yet (i.e. contributions to Stabilization Force, Implementation Force, and Kosovo Force; see table 1 above), they clearly impressed the alliance with strong commitments to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (see Table 2) when most of them were full members. Of note here are Poland as well as Romania and Hungary (the Czech Republic later on in ISAF) who appear to be among the highest and most consistent force contributors to NATO operations.

Table 2: ISAF Troop contributions by country, 2002-13

	2002/2003	2004/2005	2005/2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Bulgaria	0	34	34	150	401	460	460	516	597	572
Croatia	0	22	22	120	199	280	290	300	317	260
Czech republic	0	19	56	103	435	415	480	468	694	422
Estonia	0	7	1	1	129	120	150	136	162	1
Hungary	0	130	130	175	225	240	360	507	415	555
Latvia	0	2	10	35	97	70	175	155	174	40
Lithuania	0	6	6	130	195	200	250	220	236	221
Poland	0	22	22	10	937	130	1910	2417	2580	1800
Romania	48	32	32	558	536	725	990	1648	1947	1762
Slovakia	0	17	17	57	59	70	245	300	326	343
Slovenia	0	18	18	54	42	70	130	72	87	77

While one might normally expect such a strong commitment from major- rather than small or middle powers, an informed observer of NATO might ask why any of these 'new' member states would contribute militarily to essentially US-led peace operations, given their limited and partially outdated military capabilities, as well as the fact that the United States as NATO's superpower can reasonably be expected to shoulder the military burden itself? The more theoretical literature on alliance politics would have expected that the 'new' member states would free-ride—that is minimally,

if at all, contribute militarily to NATO's peace operations (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014).[14] Thus, the important question we ask as part of our investigation here, is why did the 'new' member states *not* free-ride on the back of the 'old' members?

A quick review of the NATO literature below might provide some first answers, which we subsequently 'test' in the last section at the end of this introduction. More specifically, that literature suggests that alliance value and status enhancement for these new member states best explains their decisions to share a relatively large share of the NATO burden in the Balkans (IFOR and SFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF), and Libya (Unified Protector). Below are some brief explanations of some of the most pertinent hypothesis found in the literature, followed by our interpretation of the evidence that our contributors provided in their discussions.

Threats[15]

A very prominent explanation in the literature offered especially by the realist scholarship on alliances suggests that member states share collective alliance burdens because they want to eliminate threats before they materialize. They are therefore inclined to share more costs to eliminate these threats. As Stephen Walt's (1987) balance of threat theory reminds us, if a state feels physically threatened, it has a direct and personal motivation to eliminate that threat. One would thus expect that the stronger and more serious the nature of the threat, the higher the probability of states affected by it to partake in military operations. In our cases here, this might only apply to Estonia, Poland and Romania who have been strong contributors to NATO-led operations. Whereas the first two states share a direct border with the Russia, Romania and Bulgaria are a neighbor on the other shore of the Black Sea; the majority of the so-called 'new members' do not share a direct border with Russia.

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14 Burden sharing can be defined as —"the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal" (Forster & Cimbala, 2010: 1).

15 This section draws heavily on Zyla, B. & Justin Massie "Alliance Value and Status Enhancement: Canada's Disproportionate Military Burden Sharing in Afghanistan", *Politics & Policy* vol. 46, no. 1 (2018), pp. 1-25.

Alliance Dependence

The literature also suggests that allies might be bandwagoning with the su-
perpower, which in the case of NATO is the United States, because they
fear abandonment or entrapment by America as the preponderant power.
Abandonment can occur when a state fails to share a collective burden of
the alliance or when the state in question decides to align itself with that
aggressor and against the alliance. As a result, states constantly fear being
abandoned by their allies (Kupchan, 1988). By contrast, should they hold
large autonomy vis-à-vis the other allies, the more likely it is to be en-
trapped in alliance politics (Snyder, 1997). Specifically, Snyder finds that
an ally that is highly dependent on America tends to actively and uncondi-
tionally support NATO operations in exchange for security guarantes. To
put it simple, one can hypothesize that the level of dependence towards
NATO's superpower (the US) determines states' likeliness to support NA-
TO's military operations. A more independent and autonomous ally is
likely to restrain its foreign policy engagements for fear of entrapment in
the alliance. Jens Ringsmose (2010: 330), for example, has shown that
some US allies follow a *quid pro quo* logic: they provide meaningful con-
tributions to US-led military operations despite having little stakes in the
conflict *per se*. In exchange, they receive US security guarantees and slip
under the nuclear protection shield. This logic helps to explain why, for
example, most of the 'new' NATO member states contributed dispropor-
tionally to the provision of public goods in Afghanistan in spite of their
very limited (military) capabilities. They did so in exchange for the club
goods of territorial defence and regional security vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union. In terms of policy, the consequence is that the so-called 'new' NA-
TO member states are expected to essentially bandwagon with the United
States.

Alliance value

Scholars have aptly distinguished followership from acquiescence in order
to determine the nature and degree of a state's dependence vis-à-vis the
United States. Followership refers to the voluntary desire to bandwagon
with NATO's superpower (the US) and entails the normative acceptance
of its leadership. Acquiescence, on the other hand, involves pragmatic def-
erence to the superpower—that is the necessity to comply with its requests