

Anwendungsorientierte Religionswissenschaft

Beiträge zu gesellschaftlichen und politischen Fragestellungen

9

Cornelis Hulsman (Ed.)

FROM RULING TO OPPOSITION

Islamist Movements and Non-Islamist Groups in Egypt 2011–2013

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herausgegeben von Ulrike Bechmann und Wolfram Reiss

Cornelis Hulsman (ed.)

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Islamist Movements and Non-Islamist Groups
in Egypt 2011-2013

With contributions of:

Jayson Casper

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Quinta Smit

Eline Kasanwidjojo

Tectum Verlag

This book is mainly based on interviews with Islamists in Egypt.
The interviews are accessible at Arab-West Report:
<http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/project/interviews-islamist-movements-2013>.

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Ulrike Bechmann | Wolfram Reiss (Hg.)

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© Tectum Verlag Marburg, 2017

ISBN: 978-3-8288-6739-0

(Dieser Titel ist zugleich als gedrucktes Werk unter der ISBN 978-3-8288-3837-6 im

Tectum Verlag erschienen.)

ISSN: 2194-8941

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Bibliografische Informationen der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Angaben sind im Internet über <http://dnb.ddb.de> abrufbar.

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Abbreviations

AWR	Arab West Report
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SCC	Supreme Constitutional Court

Notes on Transliteration

There are a plurality of transliteration systems used for transliterating Arabic texts into English. To ensure consistency, this book uses the IJMES transliteration chart which transliterates the letter ‘g’ (Egyptian colloquial) with ‘j’ (Modern Standard Arabic). The names of places reasonably familiar to the English-speaking reader have been written in their familiar form (for example Tahrir Square rather than *midān al-taḥrīr*). Neither the IJMES wordlist for exceptions nor not adding diacritics to names has been applied for the sake of consistency. The article is *al-*. After the prepositions *li*, *bi* and *fi* the initial ‘a’ of the article is replaced by – (for example *bi-l-Waṭan*). Furthermore, no assimilation to sun-letters was applied. No hamza was used for the article. As for Arabic letterblocks containing more than one word, the different words are connected through – (for example *wa-bi-l-Waṭan*). No cases were used for single nouns since these are rarely written in modern Arabic publications. The cases in plural, however, have been used. We used the English plural for transliterated Arabic concepts (for example *muftī – muftīs*). To see a list of alternative spellings of names, please refer to Appendix I and II.

All Arabic words are in italics with the exception of personal names. No italics have been used in titles and sub-titles. Names of religious groups, currents and scriptures have been capitalized.

Glossary (*Cornelis Hulsman*)

This includes Islamic terms which had different meanings in traditional Islam and that have been partly altered in the discourse of Islamists.

akh al-ʿamal Working Brother; the fifth rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.

al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ The militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, established in the late 1930s and active until around 1965 following massive arrests. The leadership of the Brotherhood made the political decision in the late 1960s to abandon local armed activism. This wing was known for its secrecy and violence. Many members were arrested in the 1960s and released by President al-Sādāt in the 1970s. Former *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* member Maḥdī ʿĀkif was Supreme General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood between 2004 and 2010 and nominated former *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* member Khayrat al-Shāṭir as his second deputy.²

Bahāʾī(s) Member(s) of the Bahāʾī faith, a monotheistic religion that emphasizes the spiritual unity of all human kind. Its founder was Muslim and most early followers came from Islam. Their claim of having a prophet after the prophet Muḥammad is not accepted by traditional Muslims.

daʿwa Call to Islam, spreading the word of Islam by education and preaching.

fatwā(s) Legal opinion(s) given by a recognized Muslim scholar. Traditional Muslims usually recognize different scholars as Islamist Muslims which may result in contradictory *fatwās*.

fulūl Literally: Remnants. Derogative term used by opponents of the Mubārak regime to describe those with a close association with the Mubārak regime.

¹ With the assistance of Prof. Abdallah Schleifer and Eildert Mulder.

² Pargeter 2013; Ashour 2014.

<i>Ḥadīth</i>	Sayings and actions attributed to Prophet Muḥammad, that play a canonical role as a basic commentary on the <i>Qur'ān</i> . This includes narration, descriptions of his deeds and manners, dress and physical attributes and approval or disapproval of the Prophet.
<i>ḥakimiyya</i>	Belief that all things in life are under God's sovereignty and hence this implies that everything, including law and institutions, has to be Islamic. In recent years this term has, in Islamists discourse, obtained the meaning that Muslim scholars can authoritatively determine – as instruments of God – how to apply this.
<i>ḥarām</i>	Forbidden under Islam.
<i>ḥisba</i>	The Islamic concept of accountability based on the <i>Qur'ānic</i> verse "Enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong," giving the government the duty to coercively command right and forbid wrong in order to keep everything in order according to the <i>Shari'a</i> . Islamists have made this the right of, giving any Muslim to bring another before the court for violating religious principles.
<i>jāhiliyya</i>	The pre-Islamic period (known as the time of ignorance). This term has been redefined by some Islamists as being applicable to Muslims whose actions and words are not approved by these Islamists.
<i>jihād</i>	Literally: "Striving in the way of God" or "struggle". The spiritual struggle against the ego is called 'greater <i>jihād</i> .' The term is also used for armed struggle against whoever is perceived as the enemies of Islam, which for radical Islamists can include other Muslims who are opposed to Islamists. This designation is not limited to one particular current in Islam.
<i>jihādī</i>	Jihadist, person engaged in <i>jihād</i> , contemporary term to describe Islamist fighters (only a few decades ago the term <i>mujāhid</i> was used by Islamists as well as non-Islamists fighting the Russians in Afghanistan).
<i>jihādī Salafī(s)</i>	Salafi who believes that <i>jihād</i> is an essential component of his beliefs.

<i>ijtihād</i>	Analogical reasoning in Islam to find a solution to a legal problem.
<i>Kifāya</i>	Literally: Enough. Name of a protest movement founded in 2004, primarily against the expected transfer of power from president Mubārak to his son Jamāl.
<i>madhhab</i>	A traditional school of Islamic law.
<i>Maktab al-Irshād</i>	Guidance Council of the Muslim Brotherhood or <i>al-Jamā'a al-Islāmiyya</i> .
<i>mu'ayyid</i>	Supporter; the second rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.
<i>muftī</i>	An Islamic scholar with the authorization to give <i>fatwās</i> , who has, in traditional Islam, received an official appointment by the state. Islamist groups have appointed their own <i>muftīs</i> since they do not recognize the <i>muftīs</i> that have been appointed by a non-Islamist state.
<i>muḥibb</i>	Literally: lover; follower, the first rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.
<i>muntasib</i>	Affiliate; the third rank of membership of the Muslim Brotherhood.
<i>muntazim</i>	Organizer; the fourth rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.
<i>murshid</i>	Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. This term is an example of <i>Ṣūfī</i> terminology that has been adopted by Ḥasan al-Bannā for the Muslim Brotherhood.
<i>Nahḍa</i>	Literally: "Renaissance." Name chosen by the Muslim Brotherhood for their political, economic and scientific-program in 2012. This name was earlier used for the secular cultural revival in the Arab world at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th Century in which the core actors were Arab Christians. Christians focused on the Arabic heritage, Islamists aimed at connecting the Arabic and Islamic heritage.
<i>Qur'ān</i>	Muslims believe the <i>Qur'ān</i> is the compilation of God's revelations.

<i>Quṭbī(s)</i>	Member(s) of the Muslim Brotherhood following the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), called conservatives by Muslim Brothers and revolutionaries by scholars in traditional Islam.
<i>salaf</i>	Devout ancestors from the days of the Prophet Muḥammad.
<i>Salafī(s)</i>	Adherent(s) of ultra-conservative reform movement within <i>Sunnī</i> Islam. It aims to apply the traditions of the “devout ancestors” (<i>salaf</i>) in modern times.
<i>Sharī‘a</i>	Body of legislation derived from <i>Qur’ān</i> and <i>Sunna</i> .
<i>shaykh(s)</i>	Islamic teacher or scholar. Plural in Arabic: <i>shuyūkh</i> . In this text we used English grammar to make it plural since it has become a word that has more or less been adopted into the English language.
<i>Shī‘ī(s)</i>	Adherent(s) of <i>Shī‘ī</i> Islam.
<i>shūrā</i>	Consultation.
<i>Shūrā Council</i>	Egypt’s upper bicameral chamber of Parliament (pre-2014).
<i>Sunna</i>	Collection of recorded words/actions of Prophet Muḥammad.
<i>Ṣūfī</i>	Person adhering to a mystical dimension of Islam that preferences spiritual rather than legal sensibility.
<i>Tablighī(s)</i>	Adherents of missionary Muslim group advocating a return to the values of Islam in the days of the Prophet Muḥammad.
<i>takfīr</i>	The act of branding a fellow Muslim of apostasy. In traditional Islam only the state, representing the <i>umma</i> , is allowed to do so. Yet, Islamists believe they, as the vanguard of the <i>umma</i> , can do so as well. Traditional Islam rejects this.
<i>takfīrī</i>	Deregatory designation of a Muslim who accuses another Muslim of apostasy. This designation is not limited to one particular current in Islam.
<i>tarbiyya</i>	Education.

<i>Tilmisānī(s)</i>	Member(s) of the Muslim Brotherhood following the ideas of ‘Umar al-Tilmisānī (1904-1986).
<i>umma</i>	The worldwide Muslim community.
<i>usra</i>	Literally: “family.” A term taken from Şūfism to denote a basic cell of the Muslim Brotherhood.
<i>Wasatīyya</i>	Literally: “middle” or “center”, term used by politically engaged Muslims to describe that they are moderate. This is mostly used as a self-description of Islamists who are more open to contacts with people outside their own circle. The term was in particular adopted by <i>al-Wasaṭ</i> Party.

Foreword (*Ambassador Mona Omar*)

When I was asked to write a foreword to this valuable book, I thought it would take a long time for me to just read it, but as soon as I started, I could not put the book down until I finished reading it. Firstly, I was so impressed by the number of interviews, and the quality of the information presented: this book is an invaluable reference for researchers and political analysts on one of the most misunderstood subjects. That is to say, the role of Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in contemporary Egyptian politics.

The text is incredibly comprehensive, including historical background, and a plurality of points of view, ranging from the most radical right-wing to the most liberal. I would like to especially note the academic value of the research conducted by non-Egyptians. The work reveals an objective image about the events that took place in Egypt during the very critical period of 2011-2013. This book is a cornerstone for any researcher or political analyst seeking to understand what went on in the Middle East and Egypt during this pivotal period of history.

It is certainly in line with the objectives of the Center for Arab-West Understanding (CAWU), an NGO that was established by Dutch sociologist Cornelis Hulsman with the aim of creating understanding between Arab countries and the world at large. CAWU hopes to dispel the numerous negative efforts to create divisions between these cultural spheres by using sincere reporting based on nuanced realities, on the ground interviews, and comprehensive explanations. CAWU calls for dialogue, not confrontation, as a mechanism for reaching an understanding between the Arab world and the West. In my view, dialogue is not an option with those who would use violence and acts of terrorism against any human being.

With regard to peaceful Islamists, they have to accept democracy in practice which entails accepting the choice of the majority of the people. In Egypt's case, the elected president who came to power following a people's revolution rejecting the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, what they call *hishba*, which is a Machiavellian style of operating, has to disappear from their philosophy, and violence has to be completely erased from their vocabulary.

In conclusion, this book is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand what happened in Egypt in 2013 through diverse, comprehensive, and first-hand information.

Ambassador Mona Omar

Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs (2008-2013),
Chair of International Committee at the National
Council for Women, Board Member of Egyptian
Council for Foreign Affairs, Honorary Member of
the Center for Arab-West Understanding

Comments of Scholars on the Book

“For any serious student of the modern Middle East, From Ruling to Opposition is a very necessary corrective to the conventional coverage of Egypt in the critical and turbulent years of 2011 to 2013. Much of that coverage was lazy, buying into the simple narrative offered to journalists by fluent Muslim Brotherhood spokesmen. The extensive interviews with Egyptians of all political persuasions and the thoughtful reporting in this book dispels such false oversimplifications.”

Abdallah Schleifer
Professor of Political Science and Mass
Communication, Future University, Egypt

“The merit of this well-researched book lies in the fact that it addresses a critical dimension that is absent from most of the academic and media analyses of what happened in Egypt during the events that led to 30th of June revolution. This objective, outstanding and thoroughly researched historical study provides an in-depth analysis of a great number of interviews with many key involved actors. I can consider this work as an excellent refutation of a monolith inpropaganda studies that weaponized information for activating and achieving agiven political agenda. I do highly recommend this book for those who are interested in the areas of historical analysis, political science, media studies and crisis management.”

Dr. Hassan Mohamed Wageih Hassan
PhD Georgetown University, Expert International
Negotiation and Crisis Management, Professor of
Linguistics and Political Science, al-Azhar University,
Chairman of Political Science Department at Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Future University, Egypt

“I highly recommend this excellent documentary work for those who want to learn about the rise and fall of the Muslim Brothers’ rule in Egypt.”

Prof. Dr. Hoda Awad
Professor of Political Science at the Misr International University, Secretary of the Center for Arab-West Understanding, Egypt

"The authors have an eye for the socio-economic reverberations of the time: the tensions between pragmatism and puritanism, and the various stages of relationship between the state and Islamist movements from containment to open conflict. The editor has a vast experience of Egyptian affairs from his work in the country from 1976 to the present."

Amr Sherif
Bureau Chief of the Middle East News Agency
(MENA) Bureau in Ankara, Turkey, 2013-2016

"This book is the product of a dedicated group of researchers. Objectively presenting a multiplicity of viewpoints and perspectives, the book provides an enlightening analysis of the critical period in contemporary Egyptian history from 2011-2013. This is required reading for all scholars of Egyptian history, Islamic Movements, and political Islamism. I recommend this book as a textbook for all future students wishing to understand the post-2011 period of Egyptian history."

Ebtehal Younes
Head of the Department of French language and literature, Faculty of Letters, Cairo University, Professor of French and Comparative Civilization, Founder and president of the Dr. Nasr Hamed Abouzayd Institute for Islamic Studies, Egypt

"This is an important academic work that describes the rise and fall of Islamists in Egypt in 2013. When the Islamists came to power, they could have used their position to work on consensus-building, but instead they tried to push their own views upon the political opposition. This move alienated many non-Islamists who initially supported them. The rejection of the call for early presidential elections led to Mursi's downfall. This book is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the dynamics of this period. It describes a period in our recent history that we hope and pray will never be repeated."

Rev. Dr. Safwat al-Bayadi
Honorary President of the Protestant Community Council, 2015-today, Member of the Constituent Assemblies of 2012 and 2013, Founding member of the Center for Arab-West Understanding.

“This book is a unique contribution to our understanding of Egyptian Islamism after 2011. This research represents the first sustained effort to synthesise the perspectives of a broad range of Islamist actors on important political issues. This book is essential to anyone interested in the development of Islamist movements after the Arab uprisings.”

Dr. Jerome Devon
Research fellow at the University of Manchester
(UK) specialised in political violence and insurgencies.

1 Introduction (*Cornelis Hulsman*)

2013 was a crucial year in Egypt's history. It was a year in which the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies on one hand and their opponents on the other became increasingly tense culminating in repeated massive demonstrations. As a result of these demonstrations Egypt's then Minister of Defence, General 'Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī, issued a number of clear warnings, not just at the ruling Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party but at all political factions, declaring that political unrest could instigate the "collapse of the state."³ On June 23, General al-Sīsī cautioned "There is a state of division in society, and the continuation of it is a danger to the Egyptian state, there must be consensus among us all."⁴

Expectations were that president Muḥammad Mursī would make efforts to heal divisions in society or call for new presidential elections but instead he remained defiant. In June 2013, he replaced many regional governors with Muslim Brotherhood members, loyalists or allies. One such appointment included establishing a leader of the *Jamā'a al-Islāmiyya*, as the governor of Luxor, the very city where members of the *Jamā'a al-Islāmiyya* killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians in November 1997. These and other decisions showed that President Mursī was seeking support from more hardline Islamists instead of seeking consensus with his political opponents.⁵ Muslim Brotherhood leaders knew that the president and his government had lost popularity but rejected calls for new presidential elections giving examples of presidents in the West who had experienced low popularity but nevertheless continued to serve the entire period.⁶

The largest demonstrations began nationwide on June 30 which prompted General al-Sīsī to warn President Mursī on July 1 "that we still have 48 hours to find a way out of the crisis."⁷ Mursī remained defiant. On July 3rd, the Egyptian army led by General 'Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī removed him from power.

In order to understand the crisis in 2013 we need to go back to January 25, 2011. Youth belonging to leftist movements drew increasingly large num-

³ Saleh 2013.

⁴ Kingsley 2013 (a).

⁵ Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (a).

⁶ Diana Serôdio and Cornelis Hulsman meeting Dr. Usāma Farīd on May 15, 2013, in the Marriot Hotel, Zamalek, Cairo. Interview with Dr. 'Amr Darrāj, July 22, 2013.

⁷ Al-Sīsī 2013.

bers of demonstrators who, three days later, were joined in full force by the Muslim Brotherhood. The demonstrations quickly spread to more cities⁸ which in turn led to the overthrow of autocratic president Ḥusnī Mubārak on February 11. This was the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood's eventual ascent to power. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) then took over the rule of Egypt. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) then took over the rule of Egypt. The SCAF started negotiating with the Muslim Brothers and other political actors at the time. This resulted in the SCAF appointment of Judge Tāriq al-Bishrī, a top Egyptian legal expert widely believed to be sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, as head of the Egyptian Constitutional Review Committee to begin reviewing the constitution. On March 19, 2011, Egyptians voted on the text of al-Bishrī's committee, limiting presidential terms to a maximum of two four-year terms, and stipulating a roadmap where parliamentary elections would come first, followed by presidential elections and the formation of a Constituent Assembly to write a new permanent constitution for Egypt. The Brotherhood and other Islamist groups campaigned in favour of accepting this roadmap while their opponents believed amending the Constitution should come before holding elections. The debates between Islamists and non-Islamists were heavily focused on the role of religion in the Egyptian Constitution as was earlier discussed in "The Sharia as the Main Source of Legislation?"⁹ The Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translation (CIDT) asked statistician Dr. Fāṭima Al-Zanāṭi to carry out a study on whether Egyptians wanted to cancel or keep Article II of the Egyptian Constitution. This article specifies that the *Shari'a* is the main source of legislation. Egyptians overwhelmingly wanted this article to remain. This point is an excellent indicator of Egypt's religiosity, which was used and manipulated by Islamists during the elections.¹⁰

The parliamentary elections in December 2011-January 2012 resulted in 68.95% of the votes going to a bloc of Islamist parties with non-Islamist parties receiving the remaining 31.05%. Most voters for Islamist parties were not Islamists but religious swing voters who, lured by promises of Islamists, believed they would be the political group best able to bring Egypt stability and economic progress. The Islamists used their victory to form a Constitutional Assembly that would produce a new constitution with heavy Islamist leanings. Non-Islamists resisted these efforts and other ef-

⁸ Not the countryside.

⁹ Hulsman (ed.) 2012 (a) This book discusses the history of the debates about the role of the *Shari'a* in Egypt in which Islamists and non-Islamists have had widely different opinions in the decades prior to the January 25 Revolution.

¹⁰ El-Zanaty and al-Ghazali 2012.

forts to push an Islamist agenda which resulted in a decline of support for Islamists.

In the first round of the presidential elections, the Islamist candidates received only 43.77% of the vote, indicating a rapid decline in popularity. The second round of the Presidential elections pitted Muḥammad Mursī and Aḥmad Shafiq against each other. Mursī represented the Muslim Brotherhood and depicted himself as a proponent of revolutionary forces against the old regime. Aḥmad Shafiq, a former air force general and Mubārak's last Prime Minister, presented himself as an independent candidate, but was widely viewed as a representative of the old Mubārak regime. It did not help Shafiq's claim of being an independent candidate that the Supreme Constitutional Court had dissolved the Egyptian Parliament and declared the Political Disenfranchisement Law as unconstitutional on June 14. The Political Disenfranchisement Law had been accepted by the Muslim-Brotherhood dominated parliament in order to bar former officials from Mubārak's government from government participation. This added to the already extremely tense atmosphere with a lot of rhetoric, continuous allegations and bad-mouthing in both directions. The Al-Ahram Weekly described this as "a war between two political blocs" with:

Shafik openly accusing Mursi, and the Muslim Brotherhood, of wanting to drag Egypt into outmoded norms and with Mursi openly accusing Shafik of working with the support of state security bodies and a corrupt business community to re-instate the Mubarak regime in what would amount to a total elimination of the revolution.¹¹

The consequence was that, in the first round of voting, around 7% of the voters who had voted for a non-Islamist candidate now voted for Mursī for no other reason than fear of a return to the old regime. The ballot boxes closed on June 17, 2012. On the same day the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces published an appendix to the interim Constitutional Declaration in the Official Gazette which gave itself "the final say over swathes of domestic and foreign policy."¹² The decree increased fear for military intervention in the electoral process with Shafiq seen, rightly or wrongly, as the candidate more closely associated with the SCAF. The Muslim Brotherhood immediately declared electoral victory which was given credibility by Ahram Online, stating that "initial indications appeared to suggest victory for

¹¹ Ezzat 2012 (a).

¹² El-Din 2012.

Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi.”¹³ But Ahram Online also stated that

the two presidential campaigns continued to exchange accusations of electoral fraud. Meanwhile, there were several reports of violations, including illegal campaigning in front of polling stations, vote-buying, influencing voters to choose certain candidates, and arranging votes for military and police personnel.¹⁴

Ahram Online stated on June 18 that counting is still in progress but “indications so far put Morsi in the lead - 51.74% to 48.25%.”¹⁵ Monday morning, June 18, Mursī declared victory in what was seen as his “acceptance speech.” The Al-Ahram Weekly reports that

chants of “God is great” and “down with military rule” rang out at the press conference, and hundreds of Mursi supporters marched to Tahrir Square to celebrate.¹⁶

The Shafiq campaign rapidly responded that their candidate had won the elections. “The Muslim Brotherhood, they claimed, was attempting to impose a *fait accompli*.”¹⁷ One day later they claimed Shafiq was leading Mursī by half a million votes. Lawyers of both parties filed complaints of vote rigging with the Presidential Election Committee which decided to investigate the claims and postpone the election results. This also made the war of words continue and enabled at the same time secret negotiations to take place between different parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the army. Opponents to the army used the terms revolution and revolutionaries liberally for any activity that opposed any form of army interference in politics. On the evening of June 19 Tahrir Square was packed with mainly Brotherhood and *Salafi* demonstrators chanting:

‘we shall continue the struggle’, ‘down with SCAF’ and ‘leave! We won’t leave, they leave!’, a revival of a slogan popular throughout the 18-day uprising that toppled Mubarak, only this time directed against the military council.¹⁸

On June 20 the Muslim Brotherhood issued a warning: “There will be a “dangerous faceoff” between the people and the army if Ahmed Shafiq is

¹³ Shukrallah 2012.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ El-Rashidi 2012 (a).

¹⁶ Abdel-Baky 2012.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ El-Nahhas 2012.