

Nam-In Lee

# Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity

Husserl, Levinas, and  
East-West Dialogue



Meiner

Nam-In Lee  
Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity

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## Introduction

### *1. Husserl's Phenomenology as the Starting Point for the Exploration of Intersubjectivity*

This book is the fruit of twenty years of research into intersubjectivity. It consists of eleven chapters. There is a unity among them, even though they were not originally conceived as book chapters. What they address are the following four themes that are closely related to one another: 1) the discovery of some new aspects of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity; 2) a defense of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity against the criticisms of scholars who hold illegitimate views of it; 3) the promotion of a dialogue between phenomenologists/philosophers on the topic of intersubjectivity; and 4) the exploration of some new horizons of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Let me briefly clarify each of these four themes.

First, Husserl stands at the center of my research on intersubjectivity. Unfortunately, Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity has often been misinterpreted. There are even scholars who consider Husserl's phenomenology to be a kind of egology or Cartesianism that cannot adequately address intersubjectivity as a topic for phenomenology. However, this interpretation takes only a small part of Husserl's phenomenology into account since, as I will show, Husserl developed various kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity that go far beyond the scope of egology or Cartesianism. I clarify Husserl's distinctions among the various kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity such as the empirical, ontological, transcendental, and metaphysical phenomenology of intersubjectivity, each of which has its own sub-disciplines. I clarify this point in chapter 2 on "Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concepts of Primordiality in Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation", chapter 3 on "Various Fields of the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Relationship between Husserl and Buber", chapter 4 on "Genetic Phenomenology and Problems of Intersubjectivity", and in chapter 5 on "Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Levinas".

Second, by clarifying the various fields of Husserl's phenomenology, we can see that most of the criticisms of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity are invalid. It is true that among the various fields of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity seems closest to the kind of Cartesianism that Husserl's critics have in mind. In particular, critics often point to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation as proof that Husserl's phenomenology is intrinsically Cartesian. However, such criticisms overlook two crucial points. In the first place, despite all appearances, the basic idea behind the static phenomenology



gy of intersubjectivity is not as Cartesian as critics suspect. And in the second place, critics do not take into account the other fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity that Husserl developed, fields that radically depart from Cartesianism.

Third, my primary aim in assessing the criticisms made of Husserl's phenomenology is not simply to vindicate Husserl against all other philosophers or to assert his superiority dogmatically, but rather to promote a phenomenological dialogue from which both sides can profit. We find that contrary to critics' opinions, these very critics have more in common with Husserl than they may suspect. Besides, even those who wish to disagree with Husserl must have a solid grasp of what exactly they are disagreeing with in the first place. Only through such constructive criticism can there be a fruitful dialogue that is free from artificial disagreements or misunderstandings. To this end, I attempt to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Husserl and other philosophers. In particular, Part II focuses on evaluating Levinas's criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity; there are also discussions of other philosophers such as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, Martin Buber, and Jürgen Habermas in Part I. In addition, in Part III I attempt to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Western philosophers such as Husserl, Max Scheler, and Francis Hutcheson and Eastern philosophers such as Confucius, Mencius, and Chong Yak-Yong.

Fourth, I attempt to explore some new horizons for the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. For example, in chapter 8 on "Phenomenology of Exteriority beyond Linguistic Idealism", I show that Levinas's philosophy contains remnants of linguistic idealism and I attempt to develop a genetic phenomenology of exteriority that is free from any linguistic idealism. Finally, in the three chapters of Part III, I attempt to develop the moral phenomenology of intersubjectivity by considering such themes as the phenomenology of ethical renewal, the phenomenology of moral feeling, and the phenomenology of moral instinct in such a way as to open up a new dialogue between Western and Eastern philosophy.

On the whole, then, this book discusses various kinds of the phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by many philosophers, including Husserl and other post-Husserlian phenomenologists such as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Alfred Schutz; some contemporary philosophers such as Martin Buber and Jürgen Habermas; a traditional Western philosopher, Francis Hutcheson; and some East Asian philosophers, including Confucius, Mencius, and Chong Yak-Yong. Due to the constraints of space, not all of their accounts of the phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity are discussed at length, nor are they necessarily addressed in a systematic way. Nevertheless, I hope the book provides a broad overview of various approaches to the phenomenology of intersubjectiv-

ity, thereby giving readers an opportunity not only to experience their diversity, but to grasp their points of unity.

## 2. *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Husserl*

There are scholars who claim that Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity is either insufficient or even an outright failure. Such criticisms are often based on works that Husserl published during his lifetime, such as *Cartesian Meditations* or *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.<sup>1</sup> However, if we take a closer look at the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed in these works, we can see that the usual criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity is illegitimate. Moreover, it is astonishing to see how Husserl attempts to carry out many different kinds of phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity in other works and manuscripts in a way that goes far beyond the scope of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed in the *Cartesian Meditations* or *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Husserl not only discusses many more topics of intersubjectivity, but in some cases does so in a much more detailed manner than any other phenomenologist or philosopher,<sup>2</sup> a fact that is often overlooked by scholars who claim that Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity is a failure or is simply insufficient. However, there are also some important studies that do reveal the sheer diversity of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity<sup>3</sup> and show how criticisms of Husserl are often based on only

<sup>1</sup> Hua XVII; Edmund Husserl: *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Translated from German by Dorion Cairns. The Hague 1969.

<sup>2</sup> In this respect, I entirely agree with Dan Zahavi, who writes as follows: "From the winter 1910/11 and until his death, he worked thoroughly with different aspects of the problem of intersubjectivity, and left behind an almost inestimable amount of analyses, that from a purely quantitative point of view by far exceeds the treatment given this topic by any of the later phenomenologists" (Dan Zahavi: "Husserl's intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy". In: *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 27(3), 1996, 228–245, here: 228).

<sup>3</sup> For example, Klaus Held: "Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie". In: Ulrich Claesges, Klaus Held (Eds.), *Perspektiven transzendental-phenomenologischer Forschung. Für Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag*. Den Haag 1972, 3–60; Ichiro Yamaguchi: *Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl*. Den Haag 1982; James Mensch: *Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism*. Albany, NY 1988; Georg Römpp: *Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität und ihre Bedeutung für eine Theorie intersubjektiver Objektivität und die Konzeption einer phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Dordrecht 1992; James G. Hart: *The Person and the Common Life: Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics*. Dordrecht 1992; Kathleen M. Haney: *Intersubjectivity Revisited: Phenomenology and the Other*. Athens, OH 1994; Julia V. Iribarne: *Husserls Theorie der Intersubjektivität*. München 1994; Anthony J. Steinbock: *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*. Evanston, IL 1995; Natalie Depraz: *Transcendence et incarnation: Le statut de l'intersubjectivité comme altérité à soi chez Husserl*. Paris 1995; Dan Zahavi: *Husserl und die transzendente Intersubjektivität. Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik*. Dordrecht 1996; Janet Donohoe: *Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: From Static to Genetic Phenomenology*. Amherst, NY 2004; Lanei M. Rode-

a few of his works. I myself have also published studies in a similar vein, but by adopting my own strategy of distinguishing between various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in order to display the diversity of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. My studies have been guided, first of all, by the more specific distinction between the static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity as two kinds of the constitutive phenomenology of intersubjectivity. It has also been guided by the more general distinction between 1) the empirical phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 2) the ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity as an eidetic or essential science serving as the foundation of the empirical phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 3) the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity, which is the foundation of both the empirical and the ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and 4) the metaphysical phenomenology of intersubjectivity. I have collected some of these studies in Part I.

In chapter 1, I clarify the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology to lay the foundations for discussing Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. The distinction between them is an important yet controversial issue in Husserl's phenomenology and plays a central role in this book. Husserl seems to have been aware of this distinction before 1910; however, it was only after 1920 that he attempted to clarify the distinction systematically. There are many manuscripts that deal with this distinction, and given such an abundance of sources, one might have the impression that the distinction is already clear enough. Unfortunately, this distinction is not as obvious as it seems, even to Husserl himself, who wrestled with the question in the early 1920s. Since he was not clear about the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, he repeatedly attempted to clarify it, but if we take a close look at the various writings where he discusses the distinction, we realize that the way he discusses it is not at all consistent. Moreover, there are many different views of Husserl's distinction between static and genetic phenomenology.

If we take a look at the manuscripts and works dealing with the distinction, we find that Husserl makes this distinction in two different ways. On the one hand, in some manuscripts from the beginning of the 1920s, Husserl argues that static phenomenology serves as a pre-stage of genetic phenomenology, and

meyer: *Intersubjective Temporality: It's About Time*. Dordrecht 2006; Søren Overgaard: *Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl*. New York 2007; Michael D. Barber: *The Intentional Spectrum and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenology and the Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians*. Athens, OH 2011; Christel Fricke, Dagfinn Føllesdal (Eds.): *Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl*. Berlin 2013; Peter R. Costello: *Layers in Husserl's Phenomenology: On Meaning and Intersubjectivity*. Toronto 2012; Eric Chelstrom: *Social Phenomenology: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective Intentionality*. Lanham, MD 2013; Frode Kjosavik, Christian Beyer, Christel Fricke (Eds.): *Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications*. New York 2019.

he calls it a “phenomenology of leading clues”<sup>4</sup> that “makes it possible”<sup>5</sup> to carry out genetic analysis. According to him, static phenomenology analyzes “finished” (*fertig*)<sup>6</sup> constitution or apperception, whereas the genesis or the history of the finished constitution is the topic of genetic phenomenology. If we make the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology in this way, the former can be absorbed into the latter and lose its identity as an independent constitutive phenomenology as will be clarified in a detailed manner in chapter 1. On the other hand, in some other manuscripts after 1929 Husserl attempts to clarify the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology differently. According to this new distinction, the aim of static phenomenology is to clarify the transtemporal or atemporal “validity-foundation” (*Geltungsfundierung*)<sup>7</sup> of constitution, whereas the aim of genetic phenomenology is to clarify the temporal genetic foundation (*Genesisfundierung*) of constitution. The transtemporal validity-foundation and the temporal genetic foundation are basically different, and thus static and genetic phenomenology turn out to be two different kinds of constitutive phenomenology—Husserl even speaks of the “double face of phenomenology”<sup>8</sup> in this regard. I claim that the second distinction is legitimate, and I attempt to show why. In my view, the distinction between static phenomenology as a phenomenology of transtemporal validity-foundation and genetic phenomenology as a phenomenology of temporal genetic foundation will not only help us to better understand Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but also to clarify the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity and those of subsequent phenomenologists/philosophers.

In chapter 2 on “Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concepts of Primordially in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation”, on the basis of the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology discussed in chapter 1 I clarify the ambiguity of the concept of primordially in Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Husserl, the primordial sphere is the foundation or the motivational ground for the experience of the other, and as such it is introduced in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation as a fundamental concept without which it is not possible to develop the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Although the concept of primordially obviously plays a central role in the development of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, it has undergone many interpretations and critical assessments and there are many different views of it. Among the interpreters who are very critical of it, some hold the extreme view that it

<sup>4</sup> Hua XIV, 41; Edmund Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Translated from German by Anthony J. Steinbock. Dordrecht 2001, 644.

<sup>5</sup> Hua XXXV, 408.

<sup>6</sup> Hua XI, 345; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 634.

<sup>7</sup> Hua XV, 613 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Hua XV, 617.

is impossible to conceive such a primordial sphere, since it cannot be observed phenomenologically. On the contrary, some interpreters hold the view that it is indeed a legitimate concept that is indispensable for developing a transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Unfortunately, these interpreters do not agree as to the context in which the concept of primordiality is introduced in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation.

Many of Husserl's interpreters implicitly assume that there is only a single concept of primordiality in Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, namely the concept presented in §44 and subsequent sections. Contrary to what they believe, in chapter 2 I show that there are two concepts of primordiality in Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, namely the static-phenomenological concept and the genetic-phenomenological concept of primordiality, and I clarify this point through three steps.

First, clarifying the concept of primordiality discussed in §44 and subsequent sections in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, I show that it is possible to carry out the primordial reduction as a kind of thematic epochē and to reach the primordial sphere. Since Husserl writes that the primordial reduction is carried out "inside the universal transcendental sphere",<sup>9</sup> in order to understand the possibility of carrying it out, we need to grasp the structure of the "universal transcendental sphere". This is the sphere that is opened through the transcendental reduction as "the universal transcendental reduction",<sup>10</sup> which is possible through the transcendental epochē of the general thesis of the natural attitude. The universal transcendental sphere consists of the sphere of my own transcendental subjectivity and the sphere of the other transcendental subjectivities. Given that from the methodological perspective, the universal transcendental sphere is divided into the sphere of my own transcendental subjectivity that I can experience through "transcendental reflection",<sup>11</sup> and that of the other transcendental subjectivities that I can get access through transcendental empathy, which Husserl calls "phenomenological empathy",<sup>12</sup> it is possible to abstract from either one of these two spheres depending on one's research interest. The primordial reduction discussed in §44 and subsequent sections in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation is nothing other than the procedure of abstracting from the sphere of the other transcendental subjectivities and focusing on the sphere of my own transcendental subjectivity.

<sup>9</sup> Hua I, 124; Edmund Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Translated from German by Dorion Cairns. The Hague 1960, 93.

<sup>10</sup> Hua XV, 536.

<sup>11</sup> Hua I, 72; Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations*, 33.

<sup>12</sup> Hua XIII, 172; Edmund Husserl: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–1911*. Translated from German by Ingo Farin, James G. Hart. Dordrecht 2006, 67.

After showing how it is possible to carry out the primordial reduction as a kind of thematic epochē and to reach the primordial sphere, I show that this concept of primordiality is the static phenomenological one and clarify its structure. I show that the static primordial sphere has the following traits: 1) From the perspective of myself as the one empathizing, the static primordial sphere consists of my intentionalities and the world and worldly objects experienced by them; 2) The static primordial sphere is a realm for which I as an autonomous and responsible person can take responsibility; 3) For this reason, in order to reach the static primordial sphere, I need what Husserl calls “a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy”<sup>13</sup> and, in this sense and only in this sense, the static primordial sphere can be called a realm that is free of others; 4) From the perspective of the static primordial sphere I have an absolute priority over others since I can always experience my own transcendental subjectivity with a higher degree of validity than others; 5) The static primordial sphere does not contain non-objectifying acts that are not founded on objectifying acts, but only objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts that are founded on objectifying acts since only these acts are bearers of validity which falls under the province of static phenomenology.

Afterwards, by consulting some other passages in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation and other works by Husserl, I clarify the genetic phenomenological concept of primordiality and show that we can make a distinction between the four kinds of the genetic primordial spheres such as 1) the natural pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, 2) the natural ideal primordial sphere, 3) the transcendental pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, and 4) the transcendental ideal genetic primordial sphere which have four corresponding kinds of geneses of empathy such as 1) the natural pre-ideal genesis of empathy, 2) the natural ideal genesis of empathy, 3) the transcendental pre-ideal genesis of empathy, and 4) the transcendental ideal genesis of empathy. Moreover, I show that the genetic primordial sphere has a different structure than the static one and possesses the following traits: 1) The genetic primordial sphere is a realm in which I and others dwell together; 2) In the genetic primordial sphere, I do not have a priority over others, since I am dependent on them; 3) The genetic primordial sphere is a unity of development and has various levels; 4) The genetic primordial sphere contains not only objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts that are founded on objectifying acts, but also non-objectifying acts that are not founded on objectifying acts since these too are incessantly operating in the field of consciousness as the genetic foundation of empathy.

<sup>13</sup> Hua VI, 187–188; Edmund Husserl: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Translated from German by David Carr. Evanston, IL 1970, 184.



In chapter 3 on “Various Fields of the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Relationship between Husserl and Buber” I make a distinction between the various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and clarify the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity and Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue by assessing Michael Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue. According to Theunissen, Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot avoid solipsism, since it is confined to analyzing the transcendental subjectivity which he considers a solitary ego devoid of sociality. Thus, Theunissen implicitly assumes that Husserl developed only one kind of phenomenology of intersubjectivity that is solipsistic. Moreover, he claims that Husserl’s phenomenology cannot deal with the issue of the different kinds of Thou that he considers are unique to Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue.

In order to assess Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I clarify the distinction amongst the different fields of phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed by Husserl such as 1) the ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 2) the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and 3) the metaphysical phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Moreover, in relation to the distinction between the static-phenomenological concept and the genetic-phenomenological concept of primordiality discussed in chapter 2, I attempt to clarify in a detailed manner the distinction between the two kinds of the constitutive phenomenology of intersubjectivity, namely the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a phenomenology of the validity-foundation concerning intersubjectivity and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a phenomenology of the genetic foundation concerning intersubjectivity. The distinction between them is crucial to understanding Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity as well as the relationship between it and other types of phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by other subsequent philosophers.

After clarifying the distinction between the different kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl, I assess Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity. My main argument is twofold: First, Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology as solipsism overlooks the distinction between the static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. It is true that, as Husserl himself admits, the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a phenomenology of the validity-foundation has “the illusion of solipsism,”<sup>14</sup> but it has nothing to do with solipsism. Moreover, in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity it is impossible to even have the impression of solipsism, since the genetic primordial sphere is always already intersub-

<sup>14</sup> Hua I, 176; Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations*, 150, translation altered.

jectively structured and the genesis of empathy cannot be performed without intersubjective connections with others. Second, if we take a close look at the various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed by Husserl, we observe that the different kinds of the Thou that Theunissen considers to be unique to Buber's philosophy of dialogue are also discussed by Husserl and that, contrary to what Theunissen claims, Husserl's phenomenology is not diametrically opposed to Buber's philosophy of dialogue.

In chapter 4 on "Genetic Phenomenology and Problems of Intersubjectivity" I explore the different fields of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity that go beyond the scope of the issues discussed in chapters 2 and 3. If we take a look at Husserl's works on intersubjectivity, we realize that he discusses various issues pertaining to genetic phenomenology. However, Husserl's reflections on the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity are scattered throughout his works and manuscripts, and he did not integrate them all into a single, comprehensive exposition. I will accordingly address some of the important passages dealing with the issue of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity in order to sketch out the various fields of a genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed by Husserl. The genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity encompasses a wide array of problems, and it is impossible to cover all of them extensively within the limits of chapter 4. There are various ways to address them corresponding to the interests of researchers and I examine those issues that are most relevant to our purposes: 1) some further issues concerning the experience of the other that are not discussed in detail or not discussed at all in chapter 3, for example the issue of non-objectifying intentionality as the genetic foundation of the experience of the other, that of the social experience of the other or that of the historical experience of the other, 2) the genesis of the habitual system of the experience of the other, and 3) the constitution of society.

After I attempt to give a unified account of Husserl's genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I clarify the relationship between Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity and the various kinds of phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, and Jürgen Habermas. In my discussion of this relationship, I focus first of all on Husserl's genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but also take into account the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The correct understanding of the relationship between them is an aim that should be pursued for its own sake, but it has the additional merit of making it possible to better understand both Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity and the subsequent work on this theme by others.

Clarifying the relationship between Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity and the various kinds of the phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by philosophers after him, I refute some of the criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity that are related to the genetic



phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As mentioned above, after the publication of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity was criticized by many scholars. The critics of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity are, first of all, phenomenologists after Husserl such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Alfred Schutz, etc., but there are also some critics who are not classified as phenomenologists—for example Michael Theunissen, as discussed above, or Jürgen Habermas. Of course, with some other phenomenologists such as Max Scheler or Maurice Merleau-Ponty it is not entirely clear if they are criticizing Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but there are certainly some scholars who claim that this is the case. Based on the account of the various fields of Husserl's genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I show how these criticisms are ultimately invalid.

For many of the critics of Husserl's phenomenology, their criticism of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity functions as a springboard from which they can develop their own philosophical positions. This is the reason why many of them would consider their philosophical positions to be superior to Husserl's account, and indeed, to go far beyond the scope of Husserl's phenomenology. But if their criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity are problematic, we have to ask whether they have really developed philosophical positions that go beyond Husserl's phenomenology. In this respect, I show that Husserl has actually paved the way to the various philosophical positions they have developed and that there are similarities between Husserl's positions and their own positions. For this reason, we need to promote a dialogue between Husserl and his critics, a dialogue from which both Husserl and his critics can profit.

### 3. *Husserl and the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Levinas*

The phenomenology of intersubjectivity is an important topic not only for Husserl, but also—as we have already seen above—for phenomenologists who followed after him. As discussed above, it is important for the future development of phenomenology to properly clarify the relationship between Husserl and subsequent phenomenologists in regard to the issue of intersubjectivity. Among the various kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity, Levinas's phenomenology of intersubjectivity has interested me the most. Part II contains studies that I have published or presented with the aim of clarifying the relationship between the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and in Levinas. In developing his phenomenology of the face in his major work *Totality and Infinity*,<sup>15</sup> Levinas offers various kinds of criticisms of Husserl's phe-

<sup>15</sup> Emmanuel Levinas: *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated from French by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh 1969.

nomenology. The most important aims of Part II are to clarify that Levinas's criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology are not legitimate and to demonstrate the possibility of promoting a dialogue between Husserl and Levinas. There are in fact many important studies that not only attempt to clarify the relationship between Husserl and Levinas, but agree with my view. For example, with respect to the relationship between the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and in Levinas, Søren Overgaard claims that "As far as intersubjectivity is concerned, Husserl and Levinas are mainly phenomenological allies, not opponents."<sup>16</sup>

Chapter 5 on the "Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Levinas" seeks to clarify the relationship between the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and in Levinas by assessing Levinas's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As implied by the title of *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas's phenomenology of the other states that the various kinds of relations between the ego and the other can be observed from the planes of *totality* and of *infinity*. The plane of totality consists of relations between the ego and the other in a relative sense since the other is totalized by the ego, and as such cannot be called the other in an absolute sense. In contrast, the plane of infinity consists of relations between the ego and the other in an absolute sense since the other resists all attempts by the ego to totalize and reabsorb the other into itself. The planes of totality and infinity can themselves be further divided into various smaller planes that must be distinguished from one another. For example, the plane of totality can be divided into the plane of representation, the plane of *Zeug*, the plane of enjoyment, etc. Likewise, the plane of infinity can also be divided into various sub-planes such as the plane of the face, the plane of eros, the plane of fecundity, etc.

Levinas criticizes Husserl's phenomenology by claiming that as a phenomenology of representation, it is the most radical form of the philosophy of totality and is therefore blind to the plane of infinity. In contrast, Levinas believes his own phenomenology opens up the possibility of developing a phenomenology of intersubjectivity on the plane of infinity. Since Levinas believes that the rela-

<sup>16</sup> Søren Overgaard: "On Levinas' critique of Husserl". In: Dan Zahavi et al. (Eds.), *Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries*. Dordrecht 2003, 115–138, here: 116. Other studies that are in agreement with my view include the following: Depraz: *Transcendence et incarnation*; Jeffrey Powell: "Levinas representing Husserl on representation". In: *Philosophy Today* 39(2), 1995, 185–197; John E. Drabinski: "The hither-side of the living-present in Levinas and Husserl". In: *Philosophy Today* 40(1), 1996, 142–150; Yasuhiro Murakami: *Lévinas phénoménologue*. Grenoble 2002; Curtis Hutt: "Identity, alterity, and ethics in the work of Husserl and his religious students: Stein and Levinas". In: *Philosophy Today* 53(1), 2009, 12–33; Thomas Finegan: "Levinas's faithfulness to Husserl, phenomenology, and God". In: *Religious Studies* 48(3), 2012, 281–303; Stacy Bautista: "The development of Levinas's philosophy of sensibility". In: *Philosophy Today* 57(3), 2013, 251–265; Hagi Kenaan: "Husserl and Levinas: The ethical structure of a philosophical debt". In: *The European Legacy* 21(5–6), 2016, 481–492.

tions between the ego and the other on the plane of totality are fundamentally different from those on the plane of infinity, he argues that his own phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot be reconciled with Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

However, Levinas's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity relies on the implicit premise that Husserl developed only one kind of phenomenology of intersubjectivity, when in fact Husserl developed several kinds. Thus, I reevaluate Levinas's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity by referring to the various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity that I clarified in chapter 3 on "Various Fields of the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Relationship between Husserl and Buber". More specifically, I use the distinction between the ontological and the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity to show how Levinas's criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity fall short. First, by comparing Husserl's ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity and Levinas's phenomenology of the other I show that Husserl's ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity is not simply a phenomenology of representation as Levinas had supposed but includes the phenomenology of infinity in the Levinasian sense as one of its fields. Second, by comparing Husserl's transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity and Levinas's phenomenology of the other I show how Husserl's phenomenology does not totalize and absorb the other into the same ego, since the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity is completely neutral regarding the question of whether the intersubjective relation is a representational one. Chapter 5 is not simply about vindicating Husserl against Levinas or correcting Levinas's views, but rather is meant to show that the gap between the two thinkers is not as wide as Levinas had supposed. Thus chapter 5 opens up a new dialogue between the two philosophical positions on intersubjectivity, a dialogue from which both can profit. The other chapters in part II are, in one way or another, supplements to chapter 5, providing a more detailed understanding of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl as well as in Levinas.

Chapter 6, on "Phenomenology of Sensible Life in Husserl and Levinas", attempts to clarify the relationship between Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Levinas's phenomenology of the face by clarifying the relationship between the phenomenology of sensible life in Husserl and in Levinas. Some commentators on Levinas's phenomenology hold the view that the phenomenological movement from Husserl to Heidegger, then from Heidegger to Levinas, can be described as a process of unidirectional development. According to this widespread view, the limitations of Husserl's phenomenology were overcome by Heidegger's phenomenology which in turn was surpassed by Levinas's phenomenology of the face. This view originally does not stem from commentators, but from Levinas himself, as is evident in some of his major works such as *Totality*

*and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*.<sup>17</sup> In chapter 6 I attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenology is not merely a preliminary stage or constituent moment of Levinas's phenomenology of the face and that Husserl's phenomenology cannot be integrated into that of Levinas. I demonstrate this through an analysis of the intentionality of sensible life, a theme that plays an important role both in Husserl's genetic phenomenology and in Levinas's phenomenology of the face. First, I delineate some aspects of the phenomenology of sensible life that Levinas develops as a part of the phenomenology of the face as well as some aspects of the phenomenology of sensible life that Husserl develops as a part of genetic phenomenology, and I demonstrate that Husserl's phenomenology cannot be defined as a phenomenology of representation as Levinas had thought. Thereafter I compare Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Levinas's phenomenology of the face, showing that they represent two basically different kinds of phenomenology that cannot be integrated at all.

Chapter 7 on "Experience and Evidence" assesses Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concepts of evidence, a criticism that can be found in his major work, *Totality and Infinity*. (As is well known, experience and evidence are two enormous topics in phenomenology. In this chapter, I limit my discussion of these topics to the aspects most relevant for the task of assessing Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concept of evidence.) After I summarize Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concept of evidence, I outline Husserl's concept of experience and attempt to define Husserl's concept of evidence with respect to his concept of experience. Next, I assess Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concept of evidence and show that this criticism misses the mark since it is based on a complete misunderstanding of Husserl's concept of evidence. Finally, I show that it is only on the basis of the evidence of absolute experience that Levinas can clarify the structure of absolute experience as the experience of the other in an absolute sense and can develop a phenomenology of the face on this basis. Even though Levinas does not discuss the issue of the evidence of absolute experience in detail, it is nevertheless the case that from a methodological point of view, he must appeal to it in developing a phenomenology of the face.

Chapter 8, on "Phenomenology of Exteriority beyond Linguistic Idealism", aims to develop a genetic-phenomenological concept of exteriority by evaluating and refining Levinas's concept of exteriority. First, I clarify what linguistic idealism is and show how Levinas's concept of exteriority displays traces of it. Linguistic idealism is the philosophical position that considers language to be a necessary condition for the constitution of the world and of worldly objects. But such a position cannot address either the pre-linguistic or the trans-linguistic level of entities, and since Levinas's philosophy contains remnants of lin-

<sup>17</sup> Emmanuel Levinas: *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. Translated from French by Alphonso Lingis. The Hague 1981.

guistic idealism, it, too, suffers from these flaws. Then I discuss three possible relationships between the world and worldly objects in genetic-phenomenological constitution and thereby clarify the genetic-phenomenological concept of exteriority, namely something that can cause a radical change from one form of the world into another. Next, I analyze the genetic-phenomenological event—the radical change from one form of the world into another—and clarify the structure of this event by comparing it to the event in Heidegger's later philosophy and in Levinas's phenomenology of the face. Finally, I examine some views that are critical of linguistic idealism, such as Meister Eckhart's view that God is ineffable; the Buddhist view that ultimate reality is ineffable; and the Taoist view that "The Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao". This opens the possibility of carrying out a phenomenological dialogue between East and West by moving beyond linguistic idealism which is precisely what the genetic-phenomenological concept of exteriority allows us to do.

#### *4. Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Dialogue between East and West*

Phenomenology of intersubjectivity is an important topic not only in Western philosophy but in Eastern philosophy as well. For example, intersubjectivity plays a crucial role in the moral philosophy of Confucianism. The four cardinal virtues of Confucianism—benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom—are virtues that acquire their meaning through intersubjective relations between persons. We can accordingly employ the phenomenological reduction in order to analyze the four cardinal virtues of Confucianism under the lens of the moral phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In part III I compare Husserl, Scheler, and Hutcheson to Eastern philosophers such as Confucius, Mencius, and Chong Yak-Yong. Through this comparison, we can realize that there is a great deal of affinity between the Western and Eastern traditions, thereby opening up the possibility of a new dialogue between the two. In so doing, we can discover new horizons in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

Chapter 9, on "Ethics of Renewal in Husserl and Confucius", opens a dialogue between Husserl and Confucius on the topic of ethical renewal. In the 1920s, Husserl developed an ethics of renewal and wrote five articles on the topic. A closer examination of these articles from the 1920s reveals that the ethics of renewal was an important topic for his later phenomenology. It is exciting to note that 2400 years before Husserl developed his ethics of renewal, Confucius (孔子, 551–479 BC), the founder of Confucianism, had already discussed important issues regarding the ethics of renewal in his *Analects* and *The Great Learning*. In chapter 9, I tried to reconstruct and evaluate the ethics of renewal in both Husserl and Confucius before clarifying the intersubjective aspect of

ethical renewal. Finally, I sketch out the future tasks of an ethics of renewal. Chapter 9 is the first study to date that explores the relationship between Husserl and Confucius, demonstrating the possibility of interpreting Confucius as a phenomenologist in his own right. By setting up a new and fruitful dialogue between these two otherwise seemingly disparate thinkers, chapter 9 also promises to open up a new dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophy.

In chapter 10 on “Feeling as the Origin of Value in Scheler and Mencius”, I compare the views of Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Mencius (孟子, 372–289 BC) on the relationship between feeling and value. There have been many attempts to develop the theory of value in the history of philosophy, as well as in contemporary philosophy. Broadly speaking, there seem to be three major positions, namely axiological rationalism, axiological sentimentalism, and axiological conativism. These positions consider reason, feeling, and desire (*conatus*) respectively to be the origin of value. Max Scheler, one of the most important phenomenologists of the 20th century, and Mencius, one of the founding fathers of Confucianism, both take feeling to be the origin of value and can therefore be considered the proponents of axiological sentimentalism. In fact, despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that largely stem from some of the difficulties that arise within their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value can be developed. In chapter 10 I have tried to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. I first summarize their theories of value and feeling and show that both theories have certain limitations that could be overcome by combining elements of the two theories together. Furthermore, by analyzing the four moral feelings discussed by Mencius—“the heart of compassion”, “the heart of shame”, “the heart of courtesy and modesty”, and “the heart of right and wrong”—I underline the intersubjective aspect of moral feeling so that we can understand the structure of moral feeling more concretely.

Finally, in chapter 11, on “Moral Instinct in Hutcheson and Chong Yak-Yong”, I attempt to develop a phenomenology of moral instinct. There are several philosophers who have developed a theory of moral instinct, and in chapter 11 I will be concerned with two of them, Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) and Chong Yak-Yong (1762–1836), examining their possible contributions toward a phenomenology of moral instinct. Francis Hutcheson is a Scottish philosopher who is well known for his moral philosophy as a theory of moral sense, and he developed a theory of moral instinct as a part of this theory. Chong Yak-Yong, better known by his pen name *Dasan*, is the most important representative of *silhak*, a practical stream of Confucianism in the 18th and 19th centuries of the Choson Dynasty in Korea; he developed a theory of moral instinct within the general framework of his theory of human nature. It is highly interesting to

observe that the theories of moral instinct developed by Hutcheson and Chong Yak-Yong display various kinds of similarity, and by partly adopting and partly criticizing their theories, we can develop a phenomenology of moral instinct. First, however, I must clarify the concept of instinct since it plays an important role in chapter 11 but is widely misunderstood. Then I introduce the theory of moral instinct that each thinker developed since both philosophers have contributed immensely to the clarification of moral instinct. Yet this does not mean that they have provided perfect theories in no need of revision. In fact, each theory has some limitations that must be overcome in order to develop a phenomenology of moral instinct. I will address one of the topics they discuss—namely, the relationship between moral instinct and moral feeling—and show how we can develop a phenomenology of moral instinct by partly adopting and partly criticizing their views on this topic. Moreover, there are many important topics in the phenomenology of moral instinct that they have not clarified systematically. Among these topics, I focus on that of the intersubjective aspects of moral instinct and attempt to clarify some of these aspects as a way of developing a phenomenology of moral instinct.

PART I  
Problems of Intersubjectivity in Husserl





# Chapter 1

## Static Phenomenology and Genetic Phenomenology

### 1. *Various Views on the Distinction Between Static and Genetic Phenomenology*

The distinction between static and genetic phenomenology plays a central role in this book. It is an important yet controversial issue in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl seems to have been aware of this distinction before 1910, as shown by the fact that he speaks of "a fundamental part of a priori phenomenological genesis"<sup>1</sup> in a text about inner time-consciousness written before the fall of 1908. However, it was only after 1920 that he attempted to clarify the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology systematically. And there are many manuscripts that deal with this distinction, including the following.

1) The 1921 text that was published as a treatise in *Husserliana* XI under the title: "Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method".<sup>2</sup> The text develops a theory of genesis and is full of genetic-phenomenological analyses but does not discuss the issue of static phenomenology at length.

2) The text written in June 1921 and published as Appendix I of *Husserliana* XIV under the title: "The Phenomenology of Monadic Individuality and the Phenomenology of the General Possibilities and Compossibilities of Lived-Experiences: Static and Genetic Phenomenology".<sup>3</sup> This text is concerned with the problem of monadic individuality and contains many genetic-phenomenological analyses but only a few static-phenomenological analyses.

3) The text written in 1922/1923 and published as Appendix XIV of *Husserliana* XXXV under the title: "Intersubjectivity and the Constitution of the World in Static and Genetic Analysis".<sup>4</sup> As the title indicates, it is primarily

<sup>1</sup> Hua X, 54; Edmund Husserl: *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*. Translated from German by John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht 1991, 56.

<sup>2</sup> Hua XI, 336–345; Edmund Husserl: "Static and genetic phenomenological method". Translated from German by Anthony J. Steinbock. In: *Continental Philosophy Review* 31(2), 1998, 135–142. This text was republished in Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 624–634.

<sup>3</sup> Hua XIV, 34–42; Edmund Husserl: "The phenomenology of monadic individuality and the phenomenology of the general possibilities and compossibilities of lived-experiences: Static and genetic phenomenology". Translated from German by Anthony J. Steinbock. In: *Continental Philosophy Review* 31(2), 1998, 143–152. This text was republished in Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 635–645.

<sup>4</sup> Hua XXXV, 407–410.

concerned with intersubjectivity. In contrast to the two manuscripts discussed above, this text attempts to clarify the task of static phenomenology as well as that of genetic phenomenology by placing equal emphasis on both.

4) The text written in 1923 and published as Text No. 14 of *Husserliana* XIV under the title: “The Intersubjective Validity of Phenomenological Truth”.<sup>5</sup> This text also deals with intersubjectivity. It addresses the issue of static phenomenology as well as that of genetic phenomenology but does not contain a detailed analysis of either of them.

5) The text that was written in 1929 and was published as Appendix II of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* under the title: “The Phenomenological Constitution of the Judgment: Originally Active Judging and Its Secondary Modifications”.<sup>6</sup> This text contains some important analyses concerning the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology and provides important textual evidence for my thesis regarding this distinction.

6) The text that was written in 1933 and was published as Text No. 35 of *Husserliana* XV under the title: “Static and Genetic Phenomenology: <The Home-World and Understanding Others. Understanding Animals>”.<sup>7</sup> This text concerns the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and provides important textual evidence for my thesis regarding the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. Moreover, it contains some important analyses concerning the distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of *intersubjectivity* which plays a central role in the present book.

7) The text written in 1916/1917 but later revised, published as Appendix XLV of *Husserliana* XIII under the title: “On Phenomenological Problems of Origin [...]”.<sup>8</sup> I introduce this manuscript last because it is not clear when it was revised. While revising the text, Husserl changes the subtitle of b) “The connection between the psychological origin (*Ursprung*) and the phenomenological origin” into “The connection between the genetic origin (*Ursprung*) and the phenomenological-static origin”.<sup>9</sup> The revised subtitle is of crucial importance for understanding the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology.

<sup>5</sup> Hua XIV, 305–308. Edmund Husserl: “The intersubjective validity of phenomenological truth”. Translated from German by Anthony J. Steinbock. In: Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 646–648.

<sup>6</sup> Hua XVII, 314–326; Husserl: *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, 312–329.

<sup>7</sup> Hua XV, 613–627.

<sup>8</sup> Hua XIII, 346–357.

<sup>9</sup> Hua XIII, 352–353.

This revised version also contains important textual evidence for the view that I hold concerning this distinction.

There are other texts dealing with the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, such as the *Cartesian Meditations*, the main text of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, *Phenomenological Psychology*, and the C-manuscripts on time-constitution collected in *Husserliana Materialien VIII*,<sup>10</sup> etc., but the analyses contained in these works are not as extensive as those in the seven manuscripts introduced above. *Husserliana XXXIX*, a volume devoted to the life-world, contains two manuscripts (Text No. 4 and Appendix XLI) that refer to the concepts of “static” and “genetic” in their titles:<sup>11</sup> in one of them, Text No. 4 from 1928, Husserl attempts to clarify general aspects of the static and genetic constitution of the pregiven world, but one cannot find detailed analyses of the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology either in this text or in Appendix XLI.

Since there is such an abundance of manuscripts and works discussing the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology one might have the impression that the distinction between them should be clear enough. Furthermore, in ordinary language, the distinction between the concepts of “static” and “genetic” already seems to be clear as well. It should be noted, however, that the distinction between them is not as obvious as it seems, even to Husserl himself, who wrestled with the question in the early 1920s. In the text written in June 1921, Husserl first writes: “These are fundamental questions concerning the distinction, but also the ordering of necessary phenomenological investigations. Where they are concerned, I will always speak of *static* and *genetic* phenomenology.” Then he immediately poses the question: “What was actually the leading perspective here?”<sup>12</sup> Since Husserl was not clear about the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, he repeatedly attempted to clarify it, but if we take a close look at the various writings where he discusses this distinction we realize that the distinction between them is not at all consistent.

Moreover, corresponding to the fact that Husserl’s distinction between static and genetic phenomenology is not consistent we find many different views on this distinction, as Saulius Geniusas correctly points out: “Husserl’s own clarification of static and genetic methods notwithstanding, the difference between

<sup>10</sup> Hua I, 110, 136, 162–163 (Husserl: *Cartesian Mediations*, 76 ff., 106, 135–136); Hua XVII, 257 (Husserl: *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, 250); Hua IX, 216, 286 ff.; Hua Mat VIII, 54, 174, 259, 420.

<sup>11</sup> See Text No. 4: “Die vorgegebene Welt. Allgemeine Aspekte ihres statischen und genetischen Aufbaus” (Hua XXXIX, 26–34) and Appendix XLI: “Exposition der allgemeinen Problematik der statischen und genetischen Auslegung der Weltapperzeption. Mit einer kritischen Note zu Heideggers ‘Seinsverständnis’” (Hua XXXIX, 487–494).

<sup>12</sup> Hua XIV, 40; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 643.

these phenomenological methods is notoriously vague and the plurality of interpretations that address them did not generate any kind of consensus.”<sup>13</sup> We can already observe the plurality of interpretations in studies on the topic published in the 1970s. For example, referring to what is “only a preliminary, that is static layer of investigation”<sup>14</sup> and claiming that “static phenomenology must become genetic if it wants to uncover the ultimate meaning of Being and being”,<sup>15</sup> Antonio Aguirre holds the view that static phenomenology is merely a prelude to genetic phenomenology. Mary Jeanne Larrabee holds the same view as Aguirre and writes that “genetic analysis begins from the point at which static analysis ends, i. e., its beginning point is the analyzed object and consciousness given at the conclusion of static analysis”.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, Elmar Holenstein considers static and genetic phenomenology to be “two abstractive or reductive modes” to gain access “to the same genetically arising phenomenon of the multifarious consciousness”.<sup>17</sup> The situation did not change after 2000. For example, claiming that “the kind of inquiry that has so far been primarily indicated in these pages, and with which it is natural for the ‘beginning philosopher’ to start, is termed ‘static phenomenology’”,<sup>18</sup> Arthur David Smith holds the view that static phenomenology is only a prelude to genetic phenomenology. Tanja Staehler, however, maintains “that Husserl did not consider the static phenomenology to be redundant after developing the genetic method [...]”.<sup>19</sup>

Under these circumstances, it may seem natural to conclude that Husserl was not successful in making a clear distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. And in fact, there are scholars who do hold this view. For example, Elmar Holenstein claims that “Husserl was not successful in separating static

<sup>13</sup> Saulius Geniusas: *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl's Phenomenology*. Dordrecht 2012, 90. There are many studies on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, such as Antonio Aguirre: *Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion*. Den Haag 1970; Elmar Holenstein: *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*. Den Haag 1972; Mary Jeanne Larrabee: “Husserl's static and genetic phenomenology”. In: *Man and World* 9(2), 1976, 163–174; Donn Welton: “Structure and genesis in Husserl's phenomenology”. In: Frederick A. Elliston, Peter McCormick (Eds.), *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*. Notre Dame, IN 1977, 54–69; Donn Welton: *The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Threshold of Husserlian Phenomenology*. The Hague 1983; Nam-In Lee: *Edmund Husserl's Phänomenologie der Instinkte*. Dordrecht 1993, 17–30; Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, Eduard Marbach: *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*. Evanston, IL 1995, 195–204; Steinbock: *Home and Beyond*; Anthony J. Steinbock: “Husserl's static and genetic phenomenology: Translator's introduction to two essays”. In: *Continental Philosophy Review* 31(2), 1998, 127–134.

<sup>14</sup> Aguirre: *Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion*, xx.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., xxi.

<sup>16</sup> Larrabee: “Husserl's static and genetic phenomenology”, 164.

<sup>17</sup> Holenstein: *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*, 29.

<sup>18</sup> Arthur David Smith: *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations*. London 2003, 115.

<sup>19</sup> Tanja Staehler: “What is the question to which Husserl's *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* is the answer?”. In: *Husserl Studies* 24(2), 2008, 99–117, here: 104–105.

and genetic phenomenology from one another without overlapping.”<sup>20</sup> Such interpretations would be valid if we limited ourselves to the four manuscripts written at the beginning of the 1920s. In my view, however, Husserl does in fact make a clear distinction between static and genetic phenomenology in the manuscripts from 1929 and 1933 mentioned above. I have tried to clarify what I consider to be Husserl’s final position on this issue in a detailed manner in *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte*,<sup>21</sup> and here I will follow the same line of argument. Husserl’s final position on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology will hopefully help us not only to understand Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity better, but also to clarify the relationship between the phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity he developed and that of subsequent phenomenologists/philosophers. Before we begin, however, I wish to proceed by arguing against what I consider to be an illegitimate view, namely the view that static phenomenology is merely a pre-stage of genetic phenomenology.

## 2. *Assessment of the View of Static Phenomenology as a Pre-Stage of Genetic Phenomenology*

Static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology are two distinct kinds of constitutive phenomenology; thus, to arrive at a full appreciation of the difference between them we must first understand what constitution itself means. The constitution of an object carried out through intentionality displays the following property: “as a consciousness,” it “is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of its meant [*Meinung seines Gemeinten*],” but “at any moment, this something meant [*dieses Vermeinte*] is more—something meant with something more—than what is meant at that moment ‘explicitly’.”<sup>22</sup> Let us take an example from external perception: an intention directed toward a house in front of me. Although in each phase of the perception only one side of the house is actually given, what I experience is nevertheless not only the currently given side, but the house as a whole. This is possible because the perceptual intention reaches beyond the currently given side to the identical object. This reaching beyond the current side to the identical object, “house”—or more universally, any case of reaching beyond lower unities toward a still higher unity of objectivity—is called *constitution*.

Static and genetic phenomenology attempt to clarify the structure of constitution in two different ways. However, if we take a close look at the works in

<sup>20</sup> Holenstein: *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*, 28.

<sup>21</sup> Nam-In Lee: *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte*, 17–30.

<sup>22</sup> Hua I, 84; Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations*, 46.

which Husserl deals with the distinction between them, we can find two different views, namely 1) the view that static phenomenology is a pre-stage of genetic phenomenology and 2) the view that static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology are two different ideas of constitutive phenomenology. Husserl holds the first view in the four manuscripts written during the beginning of the 1920s, whereas he holds the second view in the other three manuscripts discussed above. I argue that the first view is mistaken.

In the four manuscripts from the beginning of the 1920s,<sup>23</sup> Husserl argues that static phenomenology serves as a pre-stage of genetic phenomenology since it is a “phenomenology of leading clues” (*Phänomenologie der Leitfäden*)<sup>24</sup> that makes it possible to carry out “genetic analysis” as “the clarification of exactly the genesis of the static structures in question”.<sup>25</sup> Static phenomenology analyzes the “finished” (*fertig*)<sup>26</sup> constitution or apperception, whereas “the constitution of constitution” or the genesis or the history of the finished constitution is the topic of genetic phenomenology, as the following two passages show:

But in a “static” regard, we have “finished” apperceptions [constitutions]. Here apperceptions emerge and are awakened as finished, and have a “history” reaching way back. A constitutive phenomenology can regard the nexuses of apperceptions in which the same object is *constituted* eidetically, in which it *shows itself in its constituted* ipseity in the way it is expected and can be expected. Another “constitutive” phenomenology, the phenomenology of genesis, follows the history, the necessary history of this objectivation and thereby the history of the object itself as the object of a possible knowledge.<sup>27</sup>

In this context, “static” here describes what has, as always, become, in the “history” of the I, a firmly established habituality and a type of perception that belongs to it, a type of apperception. Genetic analysis understands and elucidates genetic constitution, i.e., the constitution of this constitution, the genesis of the corresponding habituality and habitual type of apperception.<sup>28</sup>

After claiming that the goal of static phenomenology is to study the finished constitution while the goal of genetic phenomenology is to study the constitution of constitution, Husserl goes on to clarify the distinction between static analysis and genetic analysis even further. From the methodological point of view, the static analysis of the finished constitution is carried out through the method of “description” (*Beschreiben*), whereas the genetic analysis of the genesis

<sup>23</sup> It should be noted that Husserl also holds this view in the *Cartesian Meditations*, as the following passage shows: “The phenomenology developed at first is merely ‘static’; its descriptions are analogous to those of natural history [...]” (Ibid., 110; 76).

<sup>24</sup> Hua XIV, 41; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 644.

<sup>25</sup> Hua XXXV, 408.

<sup>26</sup> Hua XI, 345; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 634.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., italics added.

<sup>28</sup> Hua XXXV, 407.

of the finished constitution is carried out through the method of “explanation” (*Erklären*). Correspondingly, Husserl designates static phenomenology as a descriptive phenomenology and genetic phenomenology as an explanatory phenomenology.<sup>29</sup> Thus, the distinction between description and explanation plays a decisive role for the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology.

Yet if we take a look at the four manuscripts from the beginning of the 1920s, we realize that there is an asymmetry in the way Husserl discusses the issue of static and genetic phenomenology. He addresses the issue of genetic phenomenology in a more systematic and detailed manner than the issue of static phenomenology which he touches on only sporadically. In fact, there are some pages where he discusses the issues of genetic phenomenology, so it is not difficult for readers to understand what each issue means concretely. A typical example is a passage from a manuscript from 1921 published as a treatise in *Husserliana* XI entitled: “Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method”,<sup>30</sup> where Husserl discusses seven topics of genetic phenomenology, from passive genesis as the most primitive topic to the genetic constitution of the objective world as the highest topic, as the list below shows:

- 1) “Genesis of passivity, that is, a general lawful regularity of genetic becoming in passivity that is always there and, without a doubt, has origins that lie further back, just as apperception itself does”;<sup>31</sup>
- 2) “The participation of the ego and relationships between activity and passivity”;<sup>32</sup>
- 3) “Interrelations, formations of pure activity; genesis as an active accomplishment of ideal objects and as an accomplishment of real generation. Secondary sensibility: general laws of the consciousness of habituality. Everything habitual belongs to passivity. Even the activity that has become habitual”;<sup>33</sup>
- 4) “Once we have gained all the kinds of genesis and their laws, we will then ask to what extent one can assert something about the individuality of a monad, about the unity of its ‘development’, about the regulative system that essentially unites all the particular geneses in the form of one monad, and about which types of individual monads are *a priori* possible and construable”;<sup>34</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Hua XI, 340; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 629.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 342–344; 631–633.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 342; 631.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.



5) “In what sense can the genesis of a monad be implicated in the genesis of another and in what sense can a unity of genesis, according to laws [of genesis], combine a multiplicity of monads [?]”;<sup>35</sup>

6) “the genetic explanation of a monad within which a unitary nature and a world in general is constituted genetically, and how a unitary nature and a world in general remain constituted from this point onward throughout its entire life”;<sup>36</sup> and

7) “My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others: One and the same thing-world is constituted for us, one and the same time [is constituted] as objective time such that through this, my Now and the Now of every other—and thus his life-present (with all immanences) and my life-present—are objectively ‘simultaneous.’”<sup>37</sup>

We can summarize the topics found in the manuscripts from the beginning of the 1920s as follows: 1) passive genesis, 2) active genesis, 3) the relationship between them, 4) the development of the monad, 5) the implication of the genesis of a monad in the genesis of another monad, 6) the genetic constitution of a unitary nature and a world in general in a monad, 7) the genetic constitution of the objective world, etc.

It should be noted, however, that Husserl does not devote as many passages to static phenomenology which is only mentioned sporadically throughout the passages. Here is a list of the topics of static phenomenology that I gathered from the four manuscripts from the beginning of the 1920s:

1) “the correlations between constituting consciousness and the constituted objectlike formation”;<sup>38</sup>

2) “the ‘constitution’ of the perceptual object”, “the structure of the perceptual manifold, which reveals it as something perceivable (or as the subject of possible perceptions)”<sup>39</sup> or “types of constituting objects” along with “constituting consciousness, and finally, the constitution of this type, world”;<sup>40</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 342–343; 631.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 343; 632.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 343; 632.

<sup>38</sup> Hua XIV, 38; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 640.

<sup>39</sup> Hua XXXV, 407.

<sup>40</sup> Hua XI, 344–345; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 633–634.

3) “the nexuses of apperceptions in which the same object is *constituted* eidetically, in which it *shows itself in its constituted* ipseity in the way it is expected and can be expected”;<sup>41</sup>

4) “the constitutive possibilities in relation to an object as a leading clue”, “the typicality of the nexuses in consciousness of any kind of developmental level”, and “the structures of pure consciousness as structures of possibly appearing phenomena in the unity of an immanent phenomenal nexus”;<sup>42</sup>

5) “possible, essential shapes [...] in pure consciousness and their teleological ordering in the realm of possible reason under the headings, ‘object’ and ‘sense’”;<sup>43</sup>

6) “the constitution of truly existing objectivities as ideas of the real and ideal worlds”;<sup>44</sup> and

7) “subjects of pure reason and their shapes of rational activities in which they live toward and attain true being and truths, as well as true values and goods”.<sup>45</sup>

So far, I have summarized Husserl’s distinction between static and genetic phenomenology as found in the four manuscripts from the beginning of 1920, all of which lead to the view that static phenomenology is merely a pre-stage of genetic phenomenology. In my view, however, such a standpoint is untenable because it leads to some severe difficulties. Let me clarify this point through four arguments.

First, the distinction between static phenomenology as descriptive phenomenology and genetic phenomenology as explanatory phenomenology is problematic since description is the general method that any kind of phenomenology must employ if it is to be considered as phenomenology in the genuine sense of the word. Genetic phenomenology cannot be an exception. In fact, Husserl himself admits that genetic phenomenology requires the method of description as well, writing as follows: “One can even say that I can also describe individuated geneses and the laws of genesis without systematically tackling the problem of the universal genesis of a monad and the nature of its individuality.”<sup>46</sup> If this is the case, it is clear that the use of description cannot distinguish static phenomenology from genetic phenomenology.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 345; 634.

<sup>42</sup> Hua XIV, 41; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 644–645.

<sup>43</sup> Hua XI, 340; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 629.

<sup>44</sup> Hua XXXV, 409.

<sup>45</sup> Hua XI, 341; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 630.

<sup>46</sup> Hua XIV, 37–38; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 639.

Second, though Husserl attempts to clarify the idea of genetic phenomenology in a systematic manner in the four manuscripts from the early 1920s there are some serious difficulties. From the perspective of genetic phenomenology, the distinction between the “finished” constitution as the topic of static phenomenology and “the constitution of this constitution” as the topic of genetic phenomenology is highly problematic for the following two reasons:

1) Needless to say, the constitution of a given finished constitution is an important topic of genetic phenomenology, but it cannot be considered the exclusive topic of genetic phenomenology. In this respect, it should be noted that most of the seven issues of genetic phenomenology discussed above cannot be called the constitution of a given finished constitution as the process of the genesis of the habitual system. For example, passive or active genesis cannot be equated with the process of the genesis of habitual system itself, although it can contribute to this process. The same applies to most of the other topics, such as the relationships between activity and passivity, the implication of the genesis of a monad in the genesis of another monad, the genetic constitution of a unitary nature and a world in general in a monad, and the genetic constitution of the objective world. Even though they may be related to the constitution of a given finished constitution, they themselves cannot be equated with the constitution of a given finished constitution as the process of the genesis of the habitual system itself.

2) In Husserl’s view, the finished constitution as a habitual system is a static phenomenon that may have nothing to do with genesis, but, in my view, it can still be considered a genetic phenomenon since it can operate in the stream of inner time-consciousness. Husserl also considers it an open question as to whether the finished constitution truly does not have anything to do with genesis, writing as follows: “If we compare static and genetic nexuses, then we will have to ask whether one can achieve a systematic phenomenology of static nexuses (like that of noesis and noema), that is, whether the genetic dimension can be completely suspended here.”<sup>47</sup> I believe that here Husserl is admitting that the “genetic dimension” cannot be completely suspended in “a systematic phenomenology of static nexuses”, since the constitution of an object that is carried out at present is normally a process of the operation of the finished constitution as a habitual system that was built in the past—a process that has to follow the “laws of genesis in the sense of one demonstrating laws for the sequences of particular events in the stream of lived experience”.<sup>48</sup> Thus, not only the constitution of a given finished constitution in the past but also the finished consti-

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 344; 633.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 337; 624.