

EUROPAWISSENSCHAFTLICHE REIHE, BAND 7

Ingrid Heidlmayr-Chegdaly

Technocratisation and Depoliticisation of Democracy Promotion and Development Aid

The European Union and the African
Development Bank in Morocco



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Preface

Much is made of the distinction that exists between the world of academia and that of the practitioner; probably in any field, but perhaps particularly so in external relations and the development of policy in this regard.

Certainly, some of the theories and approaches that are applied in the former, are rarely reproducible in the latter, because there are always aspects that are little known or too arcane or even unpredictable to be factored into an empirical study, but which in a real life situation can make a crucial difference to the outcome of any given situation.

What is certain, however, is that the practitioner needs to be able to turn to the academic as a source or sounding-board for ideas, which frequently require reflection and debate which is so rarely available when reacting to situations of crisis or when engaging in long-term and far-reaching support to partners near or far.

This in-depth study carried out by Ingrid Heidlmayr is an excellent example of the latter, delving into the complex network of actors and instruments that have worked with Morocco, which is one of the closest neighbours and partners of the European Union. While adopting an empirical and scientific approach, this is essentially a political work and Ms Heidlmayr has not chosen an easy subject: democracy promotion or propagation is controversial, especially in the southern Mediterranean. The record of the EU in this area is the subject of much debate and the jury is out on how effective it has been over the years, especially since the start of the Arab uprisings in 2011. While it is not my place here to enter into the merits of this discussion, I will posit that the EU has certainly been well-intentioned, wishing to balance its own union of values, with its interests and those of its member states, which is not an easy task by any means.

Ms. Heidlmayr's offering is a significant contribution which can provide an important point of reference in analysing the impact that reform agendas can have both in the country concerned as well as in terms of broader regional stability.

Brussels, November 2019

Colin Scicluna

Preface

In recent decades, states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations of the "Western world" have established democracy promotion as an important foreign policy instrument of their governments, agencies and multilateral institutions. This was motivated not only by the collapse of the international system structured by the East-West conflict, but also by the failed structural adjustment programs of the Bretton Woods institutions and the subsequent global economic crisis. The changed context prompted national, bilateral and multilateral donor countries and organizations to reconsider their objectives and instruments of development assistance, economic cooperation, foreign trade and modernization policies. After the collapse of the "Eastern Bloc", the cooperation, coordination and integration process of the European Union (EU) was perceived as a comparatively successful model for democratic transition of formerly authoritarian states into a system of peaceful and democratic conflict resolution. After all, the EU emulated the transformation in the post-socialist countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe by modeling the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and the free, social market economy into the core conditions for membership of the EU.

Despite large differences in the individual objectives, instruments and review regimes, the funding and cooperation programs of almost all national and international donors of the western community, which have been developed since the 1990s, are geared to the overarching goals of good governance and democracy. In particular, the discussions on the further development of the EU's external action fields show that a strict separation between the economic and political dimensions is hardly possible. As part of its cooperation with third countries, the EU links its aid to political dialogue and cooperation formats that are based on the EU's own goal and value canon and are used in addition to more traditional trade facilitation and development instruments. International organizations such as the World Bank, (inter)regional development banks and the International Monetary Fund have also linked their development and economic cooperation policies to a certain extent to political dimensions and conditions.

In politics, administration and law, questions of external democracy promotion have been established as a research field at the interface between democratization, governance and transformation research, with a focus on strategies, instruments and institutions. In contrast, so far only a smaller group of political science and economics have devoted interest to the approaches of non-Western states and their multilateral institutions regarding democratization and good-governance programs. This monography fills this gap, as it deals with the comparison of the external democratization and governance programs of the EU and the African Development Bank Group (AfDB).

The purpose of this study is to analyze the approaches of the EU and the AfDB in designing and implementing their aid, support and promotion policies for the development of democracy and good governance in the Kingdom of Morocco. The research focus of Dr. Heidlmayr-Chegdaly focuses on the interaction modes, instruments and

mechanisms as well as on the underlying interests and orientations of the actors involved. The author chose Morocco because of its specific regional links with both donor organizations. Firstly, the Kingdom is the recipient of most bilateral EU aid under the ENP and, in this context, benefits from an advanced status. On the other hand, Morocco is the AfDB's largest regional recipient state. The main objective of the book is to analyze the use of modes of interaction and their underlying strategic orientations in order to identify commonalities and differences, thus overlapping and connecting the respective program policies.

Dr. Heidlmayr-Chegdaly succeeds, starting from the description of formal structures and norms, deeply in the practice of the promotion program policies of the EU and the AfDB as well as the related adjustment and reform policies of Morocco. The study is based on a rich, empirical basis. It shows to what extent the understanding of different donor organizations of democracy and governance promotion is based on different political, administrative and technocratic approaches. Since the democratic and governance understandings underlying the respective program policies differ, the goals of democracy and governance promotion in the recipient state are different, sometimes contradictory, and ultimately in competition with each other. Since none of the actors involved wants to end the cooperation, the competition between the various foreign aid policies that are becoming effective in Morocco leads to a technocratization and depoliticization of external political assistance. As a result, the implementation of external political assistance is reduced to a technical-operational level that minimizes the political and strategic demands of European democracy promotion policy and pushes it to the limits of its design rights.

The study demonstrates profound expertise in the subject matter studied by the author, highlighting the processing of a comparatively underexposed research subject. Remarkable are also the theoretical arrangement of the work and the independent further development of the selected, theoretical bases. The analytic results presented in the study encourage deeper discussion on the normative orientation of European democracy promotion policies. The study is recommended to all those who deal with issues of democratization, development and transformation policy in science, political education, and in European and African political state and parliamentary practice.

Innsbruck / Brussels, September 2019

Prof. Dr. Andreas Maurer

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List of Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
AfDB	African Development Bank
ADF	African Development Fund
ALECA	Accord de Libre Echange Complet et Approfondi (DCFTA in English)
AME	Association Marocaine d’Evaluation/Moroccan Association for Evaluation
AP	Action Plan
AU	African Union
AWI	Al Adl Wal Ihsane/Movement for Justice and Spirituality
BP	Barcelona Process
CC	Cours de Comptes/Court of Audit
CDMT	Cadre de dépense à moyen terme/Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAR	Dynamique de l’Appel de Rabat
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEA	European Economic Area
EEAS	European External Action Service
EED	European Endowment for Democracy
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
Feb20	February 20 th Movement
FMAS	Forum des Alternatives Maroc
GAP	Governance Strategic Direction/Framework and Action Plan
GERM	Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée/Research and Study Group on the Mediterranean
HCP	Haut-Commissariat au Plan / National Statistics Authority
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDH	Initiative Nationale du Développement Humain/National Initiative for Human Development
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation

IR	International Relations
LOF	Loi organique des finances / Organic law on finance
MAD	Moroccan Dirham
MAE	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale/Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
MCRP	Ministère chargé des Relations avec le Parlement et la Société Civile/Ministry in charge of Relations with the Parliament and Civil Society
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MEF	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances/Ministry of Economy and Finance
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MMSP	Ministère de la Réforme de l'Administration et de la Fonction Publique / Ministry of Public Administration Reform
NIP	National Indicative Program
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRMC	Non-Regional Member countries
PARAP	Programme d'Appui à la Réforme de l'Administration Publique/Assistance Program to Public Administration Reform
PJD	Parti de la Justice et du Développement/Justice and Development Party
POLITY	Polity IV
RMC	Regional Member Country
RSA	Réussir le Statut Avancé/Succeeding the Advanced Status
SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SGG	Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement Maroc/General Secretariat of the Government of Morocco
TFP	Technical and Financial Partners
TM	Transparency Maroc
TYS	Ten Year Strategy
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
USFP	Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires/Socialist Union of Popular Forces
UMA	Union du Maghreb Arabe/Arab Maghreb Union
WB	World Bank

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1. Introduction

In the last decades, the promotion of democracy has become a major component of western governments' and multilateral organisations' foreign policies. The failed structural adjustment programmes of the Bretton Wood Institutions and the severe global economic crisis forced bilateral and multilateral donors to rethink their objectives and instruments for development aid. After the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the European Union (EU) integration process represented a temporary successful model of democratic transition in former authoritarian states and exerted a strong influence on the transformation in post-socialist countries, by attaching principles of democracy, rule of law and free market economy to adhesion conditions (Trappmann 2015: 541). Despite that, recent situations of democratic backlashes in EU member states in the case of Poland and Hungary, confirmed that EU Integration cannot ensure sustainable democratic consolidation. Since the 1990s, nearly all national and international donors have regularly included good governance and democracy in their development aid agendas. The EU's foreign policy experiences showed, that separation between economic and political dimensions is impossible. Within the cooperation with third countries, the EU coupled aid with political dialogue additional to trade related issues (Nervi Christensen 2011: 51). International financial institutions, such as the World Bank, regional development banks and the International Monetary Fund, have progressively introduced some type of political dimensions to their aid policies.

External democracy promotion has become a vast field of research in political science and transformation studies with a focus on strategies and instruments of western governments and multilateral organisations. In contrast, political scientists and economists have rarely paid attention to non-western multilateral institutions, such as the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). This study is located between transformation and democratisation studies, international relations, development studies and Europeanization literature. The analysis contributes to research on political and development aid. While much scientific research focuses on multilateral donor institutions, such as the World Bank or IMF, the AfDB lacks to date to be researched. Regarding the analysis of a western and non-western actor, the EU and AfDB, the study offers new empirical insights into actors' implementation and strategy of development and political aid to Morocco, with a strong focus on actors' identity, and contributes to more systematic research on non-western actors' role in external aid. The study highlights actors' orientation and modes of interaction in elaboration and implementation processes of external aid.

The aim of this PhD project is to analyse how the different approaches of the EU and the AfDB in conceptualizing and implementing democracy and governance assistance differ in their operational and strategic orientations. The focus lies on interaction modes, instruments and mechanisms, and actors' interests and orientation. The analysis comprises the EU and AfDB as separate as opposed to comparative case studies. To gain a complete picture of the research, both case studies contribute to the analysis of

democracy and governance assistance. Due to Morocco's specific regional relations with both donor institutions, the country was selected as an appropriate case study. The North African country is the first recipient of EU bilateral aid within the framework of the ENP and benefits from an advanced status. In addition, Morocco is the most important regional client of the AfDB. Regarding the two selected donor actors, governance and democracy promotion takes place within the framework of development aid (AfDB) and international cooperation (EU). The aim of this research is to analyse the use of interaction modes and actors' orientation of western and non-western donors.

1.1. Background

When it comes to Morocco, as one of the most stable countries in the North African and Middle Eastern Region (MENA) due to successfully fending off political upheavals occurring during the Arab spring in 2011, seems very perceptive to democratic governance promotion. The North African country is the largest recipient of European Union (EU) funds in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Interview EU 12.05.2017). In 2015, Morocco received € 165 million Euros of bilateral EU assistance under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (EC n. d.a). The engagement of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) in Morocco, which goes back to the 1970s, amounts up to nearly € 2.5 billion Euros divided in 31 ongoing operations by September 2017 (AfDB n. d.c). Overall Morocco receives democracy assistance from international organisations and NGOs, namely the United Nations, the OECD, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Economic Development (KFAED), the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union and, to a lesser extent, from individual EU governments, most notably Germany, France, and Spain and other western governments as the United States, Canada and Japan. Support to the public administration reform in Morocco is only provided by the EU, the World Bank (WB) and the AfDB (EC 2014c: 7).

Through the establishment of specific institutions and instruments, democracy promotion has become institutionalized and a complex intervention field in development aid. Since the 1990s, the EU has set up several instruments and strategies for democracy promotion in its external policy and legally enshrined democracy, rule of law and human rights assistance in the treaty of Maastricht in 1992 (van Hüllen 2009: 5). Meanwhile, the EU has turned into a major actor in democracy promotion in third countries, anchored through multilateral and bilateral instruments and cooperation agreements. The AfDB introduced good governance as a new agenda in the Bank's activities in 1999 by focusing on the following five aspects: accountability, transparency, combating corruption, participatory governance and legal and judicial reforms (AfDB 1999: ii).

Meanwhile, several studies on western democracy promotion in North Africa and the Middle East (Youngs 2002, 2004; Schmid 2006), Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005c) as well as on the legitimacy and assessment of democracy promotion (Youngs 2001; Burnell 2007) have been undertaken. Research topics comprising the EU as an active promoter of ideas in external relations and democracy

promotion within the EU have just started to become independently conceptualised research topics (Knodt & Jünemann 2007c: 12; Börzel & Risse 2009b: 10). So far, there are no other studies that systematically analyse European democracy promotion beyond its neighbourhood (Knodt & Urdze 2010: 2). Even though the commitment of the World Bank (WB) to governance reforms is well analysed from an economic and neoliberal perception (Harrison 2004), there is no empirical study on the AfDB's intervention in the field of governance.

Case-study Morocco: Political and institutional background

Morocco's political system is defined as a "constitutional, democratic, social and parliamentary monarchy". It became legally enshrined in article 1 of the new constitution in 2011 (Kingdom of Morocco 2011). The commonly used expression *exception marocaine* (Moroccan exception) appropriately describes Morocco's own experiences. Morocco's third way between the violent suppression of protest movements and radical change from below, seem at first to be something new and exceptional. Morocco's exceptionalism and its status as a role model for North Africa in the aftermath of the Arab spring is a result of the elite's official discourse and not an outcome of induced and implemented reforms (Maggi 2015: 75–76). The political evolution and stability in Morocco constitute not only an exception in the Maghreb, but also in the entire MENA-region. In the aftermath of the Arab spring, power holders could preserve stability because the regime maintained existing power distribution and political structures. International actors, concretely the EU and USA, already praised Morocco's political opening, party pluralism and stability before 2011, considering the North African kingdom as a *star reformer* in the Middle East (Youngs 2009: 910). Morocco's attempts to get internationally recognized as an Arab pioneer reformer results out of competition with less democratic and modern countries in the region, which have largely criticised Morocco regarding its internal stability (Kausch 2009b: 169). In consideration of the approved democratic progress by international actors, international democracy rankings organisations, such as Freedom House, as well as country progress reports of the European Commission, point out existing deficiencies concerning effective rule of law and democratisation (EC 2014b, 2015a). Despite progress in the sector of judiciary reform, the slow adoption of necessary laws hinders an effective implementation of the 2011 constitution (EC 2014b: 4, 2015a: 4). The European Commission further expressed a critical view on the limited freedom of assembly and press as well as the situation and conditions in prisons (EC 2015a: 5).

Mouaquit sees today's Moroccan regime as "an authoritarian structure shot through with forms borrowed from democratic, constitutional modernity" (Mouaquit 2009: 45). Classifications of the Moroccan political system range between authoritarian and democratic rule. The Economist classified Morocco in 2016 as a *hybrid regime* on the way to a flawed democracy (Economist 2016). According to the Bertelsmann Foundation, Morocco is a "monarchy with a constitution and a constitutionally anchored multiparty

system, a modern administrative system, and, since 1997, a renewed bicameral Parliament" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003: 3). Even though "[d]emocratic institutions formally exist [in Morocco] and elections are held regularly, [...] the political system remains undemocratic" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). And yet others define the kingdom as a *semi-authoritarian façade-democracy* being far from the model of Arab democratisation (Kausch 2010: 116). Drawing on political transition studies, Morlino classifies Morocco as an *inefficient democracy* or *democracy without state* due to poorly functioning institutions and weak state functioning (Morlino 2009: 293). Numerous strategies and programmes to foster participative democracy on all institutional levels have not led to a democratic breakthrough. The authoritarian system, the monarchy's executive power and the absence of a "pro-democracy" reform coalition hinder real political transformation. During the last decades, most major historical opposition parties were substantially weakened by the monarchy as they became part of the government and lost popular support in the next elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014).

Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has a multiparty system counting today 35 political parties (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication n. d.). The political evolution since independence is characterized by a power struggle between the monarchy and political parties (Haddadi 2002: 158; Storm 2007: 13), mainly between the Istiqlal Party (Party of Independence), which was one of the most important movements during the struggle for independence from the French protectorate, and the king. Even though the monarchy encouraged the establishment of party pluralism which is relatedly confirmed in different constitutions (El Moudden et al. 2004: 4), in the newly independent state the multi-party-system and competition among political parties as well as internal disputes, enabled the king to strengthen his position and power (Haddadi 2002: 159). The monarchy used pluralism as a tool to divide and fragment political parties and to strengthen the monarchs' arbitrary role in the political scene. With this strategy of segmentation a *politics of consensus* emerged and the position of the monarchy was no longer subject of debates among political parties of different ideologies (Maghraoui 2011: 683).

Still, major reform processes like the separation of power and the independence of the judiciary system develop slowly. Like other North African leaders and like his father Hassan II, Mohammed VI pursues partial reform and top-down liberalisation (Dillman 2002: 70). Besides top-down initiatives, pressure of the civil society and social movements prove to be more and more capable to initiate reforms and legislative amendments. The Moroccan civil society is conscious of its influential power on the government and the ruling elite, as is proven by the revision of the constitution in 2011, the Daniel Gate affair¹ and the amendment of article 475 of the penal code, which guaranteed rapists impunity when marrying their victims. Taking the dichotomy of top-down

¹ In 2013, 48 Spanish prisoners in Morocco were released by a royal act of grace of king Mohammed VI. Daniel Galvan, who was found guilty of raping 11 children and was sentenced to 30 years of prison, was among these

and bottom-up reforms into consideration, social movements and civil society organisations (CSO) proved to be capable of exploiting their power of political pressure to achieve political reforms. In contrast to the *politics of consensus* within formal political parties and institutions following the *makhzaninan*² logic, Maghraoui refers to politics outside the technocratic state as *subaltern politics*. Subaltern politics take place outside the control of the authoritarian state and political parties (Maghraoui 2011: 683). By controlling public policies and disposing of a corrective function, meanwhile the civil society acts as a control and an evaluation mechanism of both political powers. Due to limited space for action, the civil society cannot completely fulfil its role as a counter-power.

1.2. Research interest and design

This study explores the impact of interaction modes and actors' (donors' and recipients') orientation on democracy and governance promotion strategies during elaboration and implementation processes and the influence on external aid of the mismatch between donors' strategies in democracy and governance promotion from actions and implementation of developmentally oriented and politically oriented foreign aid. The question builds on the assumption that different donors pursue different goals through different strategies or use different strategies to pursue the same goal. Further actors with different interests and orientation determine strategies during elaboration and implementation processes. By choosing AfDB and EU as cases, the expected outcomes will help on the enlargement of the research spectrum. The AfDB is a non-western donor of development aid and regional multilateral development bank, whereas the EU is a western donor and political union. As a multilateral development bank, the AfDB's interests, strategies and implementation mechanisms strongly differ from those of the EU. Generally, this study contributes to the scientific debate on political and developmentally oriented foreign aid, including the different processes of change and diffusion and mechanisms of intervention. The research focus lies on the interdependence between methods and goals in external aid. Political goals and methods do not necessarily interact together. Programs with clear political goals are often conducted by means of technocratic methods. On the other hand, highly political methods, such as strengthening multiparty-systems and democratic checks and balances, can serve programs with apolitical aims (Carothers & Gramont 2013: 12).

The influence of the match/mismatch between donors' strategies and actions on foreign aid constitutes the dependent variable. In the present study, I assume the following independent variables to have a main influence on the elaboration of donors' strategies and the implementation of democracy and governance promotion:

prisoners. Due to vast protests by civil society and citizens, the king renounced his act of grace. Daniel Galvan, who had already left the Moroccan territory, was arrested in Spain (Huffpost Maghreb 2013).

² Makhzenian refers to the *Makhzen* – the influential entourage of the king, who takes important economic and political decisions. The makhzenian logic comprises actions and decisions based on the country's economic and the political elite's interests and preferences. For further explanations see chapter 6.1.

- *modes of interaction*
- *actors' orientation*

Modes of interaction are a determinant variable regarding the bargaining position of donor institutions and recipient countries, the actors' constellation and power relations. This study draws on two types of interaction modes: (1) up-loading/down-loading processes during the elaboration of strategies; and (2) network, competitive and hierarchic interaction modes during elaboration and implementation processes of strategies. Modes of interaction are analysed according to actors' relations and coordination, including donors and recipients. Depending on network, competitive or hierarchic modes of interaction, the recipient country's bargaining position strongly influences the coordination and negotiation process of external aid and bilateral cooperation. Donors' strategies and implementation actions of foreign assistance do not only depend on their own intentions, but rather on their relationship and position towards recipient countries. The recipient country's own needs and interests, as well as external actors' use of conditionality and incentives, additionally shape donors' strategies on democracy and governance promotion. If recipient countries have of a strong political commitment for reform, a high degree of *ownership* of externally supported reform programs and alternatives for external funding and cooperation, then recipients' domestic conditions have a strong impact on the choice of donors' sectoral choices. Ownership subsumes that recipients *own*, and control externally supported reform programs and that goals, ambitions and needs are expressed by a legitimate government. Furthermore, the interests of different groups and alliance formations, such as citizens, civil society, political and economic elites, strongly influence recipient countries' and donors' adopted policy and reform strategies. Through stakeholder consultations, actors' interests and priorities can be up-loaded from recipient to donor institutions. Moreover, through policy and governance transfer and the use of incentives, donors download their interests and own policy models to recipients. Down-loading and up-loading processes constitute interaction modes which result from hierarchic, network or competitive relations between actors as well as the use of different instruments. Consequently, these two processes influence the elaboration and implementation of external aid strategies.

When it comes to the second independent variable, *actors' orientations* are determinant elements during the elaboration of strategies and implementation of reform programs. They comprise donors' and recipients' guiding norms, self-interests and identity (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995a: 54; Maggi 2015: 39), as well as the recipients' political commitment and ownership of reforms. Actors' identity, such as the European identity of the EU, the African identity of the AfDB and Morocco's Arab, African and Euro-Mediterranean identity, determines actors' interests and goals. In this study, the analysis of actors includes donors (multilateral development banks and political unions) and recipients (state and non-state actors). Donors promote democracy and good governance due to their own interests and benefits (security, trade and investment), collective interests (international peace, mutually benefiting cooperation) or societies' interests in

recipient countries (Wolff & Wurm 2011: 79). Politically conditioned aid entails either an egoistic behaviour, when donors' self-interests influence aid decisions, or altruistic behaviour, which implies that aid allocations are decided independently of the specific relations between donor and recipients and respond to the recipients needs and merits (Berthélemy 2006: 179–192). Drawing on rational cost-benefit analysis, democratic governments have strong interests in *investing* in democratisation to achieve important net benefits of security and economic nature. However, there are also several reasons for not engaging in democracy promotion. First, because democracy promotion implies the promotion of democratisation, which is a complex long-term process of political change. While costs are immediate, results and rewards can be gained only in the distant future (Wolff & Wurm 2011: 80; Wolff & Spanger 2014: 11). Democratic governments' aims, however, are short-term, tied to the legislative period and the wish to be re-elected. Second, outcomes of democratisation processes are uncertain; they do not guarantee a successful transition towards democracy. Third, these uncertain outcomes of political transition may lead to insecurity and instability (Wolff & Wurm 2011: 80). Due to these uncertain or indefinite outcomes of democratisation processes, objectives of democracy promotion are conflicting rather than complementary. Especially for young, defective democracies, advanced democratisation increases the risk of instability and war (Wolff & Spanger 2014: 5–6). Political stability as a main goal of foreign assistance might be conflicting with democracy promotion or other objectives. Autocratic regimes in the Middle East received high funding amounts without any democratisation ambitions, because their stability was considered as crucial to the region and Western donors' own economic and security interests (Bader & Faust 2014: 587). Fourth, democratisation is a broadly domestically driven process. External factors only marginally determine domestic outcomes. Yet donors must sell tangible results to their domestic audience and assume a certain accountability towards voters in their home countries. Fifth, the external influence on political change involves a certain asymmetry of power relations between donor and recipient countries (Wolff & Wurm 2011). By using hierarchic interaction modes, democracy promotion adopts hegemonic structures during negotiation and implementation processes. Guaranteeing full ownership is thus not possible.

Hypothesis

H1: The stronger state actors' bargaining position and up-loading leverage in recipient countries is during elaboration and implementation processes of donors' democracy and governance promotion strategies, the less likely external political aid entails donors' goals of democratisation and political change.

The elaboration and implementation of domestic reforms are dynamic and complex processes, which involve different actors and depend on the contextual environment. The internalization of external norms and rules is more likely if they correspond with existing domestic structures. Recipient countries' interests, ownership and commitment influence negotiation processes and the elaboration and implementation of foreign aid strategies. As "autocratic recipients can have an interest in the promotion of supposedly

democratic institutions without, however, being committed to democratization" (Bader & Faust 2014: 576), recipient countries can bypass democratic conditionality by shaping and influencing donor strategies during elaboration processes. Furthermore, donors' prioritization of stability and security builds on continuous and stable structures. Donors' and recipients' interests in regional stability favour the maintaining of existing structures rather than profound institutional change and democratisation. Given the fact that the outcomes of democratisation processes are uncertain, probably leading to instability and insecurity, donors and authoritarian regimes do not intend to convince regime change and democratic transition. Also due to their own economic and security interests, donors opt for less politically conditioned foreign aid. Democracy and governance promotion are then limited to the strengthening of existing governance structures on a mere technocratic level in non-democratic regimes without fostering real democratisation.

The recipient states' bargaining position depends, besides power relations, on the countries' need for financial resources and actors' orientation, such as political commitment and ownership. If state actors are financially independent and do not need to search for additional funding, their bargaining position is stronger. Depending further on donors' interest and priorities, recipient states may enforce their own agenda in donor strategies, especially if this agenda does not follow donors' main interests. Recipients with a strong bargaining position during implementation and elaboration processes of donor strategies, may refuse several political conditions and enable the strengthening of existing political structures. As well as, implementing organisations of democracy and governance promoting programs may opt for tame programs to ensure their own survival, which occasionally reinforce authoritarian rule (Bush 2015: 5, 23). Subsequently, donors may pursue economic self-interests rather than promote political change and democratisation in recipient states. Furthermore, as donors and recipients regard themselves more and more as partners, donors provide support to recipients to implement their own reform agenda, which not necessarily corresponds with democratisation. On the other hand, if recipients are in a weak bargaining position, donors may force recipients to accept certain conditions for funding.

Linkage and leverage constitute two major elements of negotiation and strategy elaboration processes, and depend on actors' orientation, comprising donors' and recipients' identity, interests, political commitment and bargaining position, as well as actors' constellation and interaction modes. Down-loading and up-loading processes refer to actors' interaction modes. In case of down-loading interaction modes, external norms or policy models are transferred to recipients, which adopt them through domestic top-down reforms, e. g. rule convergence. If recipients have a strong bargaining position and achieve to integrate their interests in donors' strategies, the interaction mode is up-loading, for example, the integration of civil society actors' interests in democracy promotion programs and state institutions' priorities in budget supports.

H2: If donors politicize non-state actors and strengthen their autonomy through bypassing governments, the likelihood for tensions between state and civil society increases contrary to the overall goal of peaceful democratisation, transition and stability.

To treat topics that are more sensitive and pursue self-interests, donors adopt strategies to bypass governments and public institutions by directly supporting non-state actors. The outsourcing of external aid enables donors to intervene beyond the state sphere and empower civil society. By financially supporting CSOs and making them more autonomous and independent vis-à-vis the state power, external donors intend to politicize civil society and citizens. In contrast to donors' efforts, the Moroccan state elicited a process of depoliticisation of citizens and civil society through technocratisation. The depoliticisation of civil society actors by domestic authorities and the parallel process of politicisation and empowerment through external actors' outsourcing of democracy promotion increases the risks of tensions between citizens, civil society and the state.

Due to strict and exigent eligibility criteria for CSOs to obtain external funding, civil society actors must increase technical implementation capacities to be able to manage and obtain funding. External donors' requirements for funding forces domestic civil society actors to compete among each other and creates market-type structures. Apart from competition and professionalization of CSOs due to aid conditionality, external donors stress their engagement to consult civil society actors in strategy and project elaboration processes. Through these consultation processes, the civil society's preferences and interests also shape external aid strategies. However, consultation processes do not ensure equal bargaining positions of actors. Thus, non-state actors' participation in donors' strategic planning risks being limited to a formal dialogue tool. CSOs are also concerned about their own survival between obtaining external funding and pursuing their own goals of democratisation within authoritarian structures. This essential survival conflict may occasionally reinforce authoritarian rule (Bush 2015: 5). Non-state actors' formal participation in domestic decision-making processes and donors' strategy planning as well as their own survival interests limit their participation to a technocratic level.

H3: The more donors have conflicting objectives; the more likely external aid enables the consolidation of existing structures rather than inducing change.

Donors' and recipients' diverging understandings of democracy and governance impact external aid strategies and implementation. Donors follow either a technical approach or systemic understanding of democracy. In the first case, donors consider democracy and governance as frameworks for efficient and effective governing and policy-making. Accountability and transparency are considered as capacities that enable rational decision-making and efficient policy implementation. This understanding follows a developmental aid approach, which considers socioeconomic and political development as outcomes of modernisation. Political aid provides a systemic understanding of democracy. Democracy or democratic governance is thus not a governance model, but a system, which enables the legitimization of public decision-making through active and

passive participation. Whereas the technical understanding assumes that governance and democracy enable efficient and effective decision-making and implementation of rational and technocratic policies, the political understanding considers democracy and democratic governance as control mechanisms which ensures that decisions are justified and legitimate towards all involved actors and that decisions-makers are accountable towards citizens.

Donors do not only follow a technical understanding of democracy and governance promotion in their objectives and goals, but also adopt a technical approach in implementation strategies. Good governance ensures efficient management of resources and thus becomes a selection criterion and pre-condition for program funding. The evaluation of externally supported performance-based projects is oriented towards the measurement of quantitative outputs rather than qualitative outcomes.

1.2.1. *Theoretical framework*

During the last decades, the interest of academics and analysts in external influences on domestic development has grown. Due to *democratic recession* (Carothers 2010: 18) and the fact that still many people live in poverty and poorly developed regions exist, academics as well as evaluation specialists aim to measure the external impact of development aid on domestic progress. Donor organisations and countries' interest in measuring the impact of development aid and democracy promotion arises out of their accountability towards their home institutions and their need for justification of high funding amounts. In the beginning economists and political scientists focused on domestic dimensions of democratisation and development, arguing that democratisation is a domestically driven process (O'Donnell et al. 1986). The impact of external factors on domestic political development was marginally analysed in scientific research, as development cooperation mainly focused on market reforms and technical development. Due to the failure of economic-reform oriented structural adjustment programs, as well as the fact that economic transformations and technical improvement did not lead to the expected democratisation effects, western states and international institutions started to focus more on a *political* dimension of development aid by supporting political transitions in *new democracies*. Revolutionary or evolutionary changes in political systems were not limited to domestic structures and factors. International powers' foreign policies towards *weaker* states, embedded in a postcolonial and hegemonic world order, as well regional *spillover* effects, proved that external factors influenced domestic structures, causes and consequences of domestic politics (Gourevitch 1978). Gradually external factors were taken into consideration as reliable variables for domestic change and democratisation processes. Laurence Whitehead and Geoffrey Pridham were among the first scholars who considered international aspects as crucial factors for domestic democratisation processes (Kneuer 2014: 9–11).

Nowadays, the debates on impacts of international development and democracy aid on target countries is extensive, including academic research as well as development institutions' impact assessment. Academic literature on institutional reform and domestic

change strongly differs from donor organisations' evaluation and assessment reports. Donor institutions operate on the practical rather than theoretical level in implementing democracy promoting activities (Carothers 2006: 203). Therefore, when regarding to the influence of external factors and democracy promotion on domestic change, the diverging approaches between academic literature on democratisation and domestic change and donor organisations' own assessment tools and concepts must be taken into consideration. The units of analysis in academic literature and donor-specific knowledge differ along subjects and objects. Academic discourses analyse the institutional linkage between state and society, whereas donor-driven discourses focus on policy effectiveness and external intervention (Doornbos 2003: 6).

Democracy and good governance as objectives of external aid further differ according to the legitimization and effectiveness of governing. "While democracy tends to refer to the *legitimacy* of government, good governance refers to the *effectiveness* of government" (Santiso 2002: 14). Further Santiso argues that the question of legitimacy and effectiveness leads to a controversial relationship between political and developmental democracy promotion and further between democracy and good governance (Santiso 2002: 14). Democracy and good governance are neither interdependent nor mutually exclusive, they respectively affect each other. Governance – including good and democratic governance – and its strong references to economic and management studies subsuming modernization rather than democratisation, therefore follows a developmental approach.

A further classification of democracy and governance assistance can be made according to inherent objects of external support: First, the supply side of governance in the target countries (constitutions, government organisation, legal framework, etc.) and the demand side of pressure group networks, and second, the inputs into public decision-making processes (all forms of participation, including political parties) as well as outputs (public policies and management of public affairs) (Burnell 2000a: 57). Both objects of external democracy and governance promotion as well as domestic reforms may imply opposite directions of change. Democratisation or domestic change can initiate or can be initiated by top-down or bottom-up processes (Carothers 2006: 250). Furthermore, the interaction between external and domestic actors is either hierarchic, competitive or horizontal/network. The use of hierarchic mechanisms such as conditionality, induces down-loading processes by donors towards recipients and domestic top-down reforms. Domestic top-down reforms are initiated by political elites whereas reforms responding to the pressure of civil society organisations follow the bottom-up logic.

Based on the distinction of down-loading/up-loading interaction modes and top-down/bottom-up reform processes as well as the different levels of intervention, governance and democracy promotion operate in different directions, on different levels and target different actors. Governance transfer occurs through down-loading interac-

tion modes and induces domestic top-down reforms. Nevertheless, democracy promotion consists of horizontal or up-loading forms of interaction and encompasses bottom-up reform processes on the domestic level.

Given the fact that in general existing studies on democracy and democratic governance promotion are rather of a descriptive nature (Youngs 2001), recently more and more scholars have concentrated on the analysis of the effectiveness of democracy promotion. This may be due to the increasing corpus of development aid strategy and evaluation reports by donor organisations. Analysing the effectiveness of democracy and governance promotion is therefore strongly linked to the assessment and evaluation of development aid in practice (Burnell 2007; Youngs 2009). Subsequently, assessing democracy assistance proves to be difficult due to a lack of appropriate methodology and knowledge sharing between donor institutions. Measuring the *output* is significantly easier than measuring the *outcome* (Burnell 2007: 8). Effectiveness assessment of democracy assistance serves the purpose of legitimizing political aid by illustrating the benefit of democracy promotion and its contribution to democratisation. Development aid depends on positive evaluations to justify high amounts of funding. Negative impacts or failures of political development aid are rarely taken into consideration. Only few studies concentrate those cases where democracy assistance does *more harm than good* (Burnell 2007: 12). Based on Burnell's critical question "Does international democracy promotion work?" it is necessary to find out when democracy promotion fails, which is often the result of poor project design or too many or too high objectives (Bossuyt & et al. 2006: 12). Dolowitz/Marsh integrate possible negative impacts or failure of policy transfer in their research (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). Burnell points out that improvement of qualitative methods for democracy promotion is crucial in order to be able to provide clear evidence on the impact and outcome of democracy promotion (Burnell 2007; Burnell & Blair 2007). Apart from the lack of information, incompleteness and inaptitude of policies as reasons for failed transfers (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000: 17), the success of policy transfer depends on the degree of feasibility and desirability (Rose 1991: 26). Some evidence already shows that the EU partnership and cooperation agreements, as well as association processes led at best to a stagnating and in a few cases to a deterioration of the political situations in EU neighbourhood countries (Freyburg et al. 2014: 178).

Despite the increasing democracy assistance in quantitative terms, *re-authoritarisation* and *democratic recession* due to stagnating democratisation and political liberalisation on the global level occur. Autocratisation does not only challenge donors' evaluation tools, which focus solely on the success and effectiveness of democracy aid but entails a shift from the academic research on success to that of the limited impact or failure of external democracy promotion. Scholars argue that inadequate strategies or inconsistent implementation are the main reasons for failures of democracy assistance (Reiber 2014: 213). Existing evaluations show that positive effects emerged from governance promotion in the case of strong government ownership of a domestic reform program (Bos-

suyt & et al. 2006: 12). More critical studies show that democratic governance promotion does not necessarily lead to democratisation of political institutions. According to Freyburg, democratic governance promotion might lead at best to

“hybrid regimes through grafting “modern” liberal forms of governance in certain spheres onto essentially authoritarian structures. [...] In the negative scenario, external actors may even risk undermining the prospects for further democratic reforms, stabilizing non-democratic political systems and eventually creating the so-called enlightened dictatorships.” (Freyburg et al. 2011: 1047)

Literature shows that reasons for the adoption of reform and democratisation are complex, depending the target regime’s international embedding and domestic policies. As Morocco does not have any EU accession perspectives and is member of the AfDB, the outcome and effectivity of democracy and governance promotion is related to other factors, such as incentives and imposed conditions, economic and trade relations between Morocco and multilateral donors, and interests of member states of the EU and the AfDB.

Modes of interaction and actors' orientation

Apart from the differences between democracy and governance promotion in practice, scientific literature uses different approaches on the theoretical level. Literature on democracy promotion aims to explain changes in fundamental structures of the political system and public space on the polity level. Literature on policy transfer and governance promotion focuses rather on regulatory harmonization, policy effectiveness and change on the *institutional* level. Both research fields concentrate on actor-centred approaches. Within this context, compliance studies aim attention on the circumstances of change of actors' behaviour (states, governments), especially when and why these *actors* adopt agreed rules and norms. On the *structural* level, socialization studies concentrate on either international actors' possibilities of norm diffusion or the conditions of norm internalization in the target country's institutions (Reiber 2014: 218–219). Based on the identification of these three dimensions (*institutions*, *actors* and *structures*), three main theoretical approaches are taken into consideration for the analysis of the elaboration of donors' strategy and implementation of democracy and governance promotion: (a) an actor-centred or agency-based approach; (b) a structural approach; and (c) institutionalist or institution-based approach (Börzel & Risse; Knill 2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002). Mixed approaches combine the actor-centred with the institutionalist approach (Kneuer & Demmelhuber 2015: 777), or the focus on institutional change with the changes in structures (Olsen 2002: 926). As this study's unit of analysis is the elaboration and implementation of donor strategies, the theoretical framework builds on an actor-centred or agency-based approach.

Studies dealing with democracy and governance promotion focus either on (i) instruments and mechanisms or (ii) the impact of external interventions on domestic change. The implementation processes and strategies and the outcome of democracy assistance constitute the main dependent variables. Impact-oriented research focuses on the influence on domestic arrangements, institutions and policy making (Knill 2001; Knill &

Lehmkuhl 2002) by including additional factors such as domestic opportunity structures and behaviour of domestic actors. The mere analysis of instruments and mechanism is of rather descriptive nature and already largely discussed in democratisation literature.

Based on the existing literature, the following for this study relevant, dimensions have been identified. They constitute core elements of the analysis of interaction modes and actors' orientation in external aid:

1. donor's **motives** and **interests** for promoting democracy abroad (Wolff & Wurm 2011; Wolff et al. 2014) and **actors' (donors' and recipients') orientation** and **interests** (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995a; Maggi 2015)
2. **levels** (macro, meso and micro) (Checkel 2007; Freyburg 2011, 2012) and **policy sectors** (Freyburg et al; Geddes et al. 2013)
3. **processes** (Olsen 2002; Featherstone 2009)
4. **instruments** and **mechanisms** (Cortell & Davis 2000; Knill 2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Manners 2002; Checkel 2007; Knodt & Jünemann 2007c; Schimmelfennig 2007; Börzel et al. 2008; Reiber 2014)
5. **power relations** (Bicchi 2006; Budde & Großklaus 2010; Geddes et al. 2013) and **actors' constellation/coalitions** (Gourevitch 1978)
6. **domestic conditions** (Knill 2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Knodt & Jünemann 2007b; Schimmelfennig 2007; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; van Hüllen 2009; Youngs 2009; Freyburg et al. 2011; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011) and **determinants** (Wolff et al. 2014)
7. **consequences** and **outcomes** (Börzel & Risse; Radaelli 2009; Geddes et al. 2013).

These categories are not mutually exclusive and can be combined, as for instance in the analysis of levels in combination with outcomes (Radaelli 2009).

Based on the above-discussed elements of democracy and governance promotion, the external governance approach is a useful framework to analyse distinct mechanisms, interaction modes and actors' constellation and orientation in rule and norm transfer as well as external influence on domestic change. In literature, *external governance* (Gänzle 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009) and *exported governance* (Youngs 2014) concepts are used in order to analyse the EU's efforts to export its own rules and regulations into third countries. Externalized or external governance, in contrast to domestic actions of governments, is not limited to territories. The focus lies on the construction of political spaces by activities and international cooperation (Gänzle 2008: 4). Gänzle argues that via "the externalization of EU governance" modes of internal EU governance, decision- and policy-making are employed with third countries, attempting to externalize the EU's own system of governance beyond its borders (Gänzle 2008: 4–5). The main

objective of the ENP external governance is to achieve a high degree of institutionalization of a common system of rules in its neighbourhood (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 795). The external governance approach therefore provides an institutional and structural view of democracy promotion and external relations (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 794, 2011: 896) and makes the analysis of interaction modes and actors' relation possible.

1.2.2. Methodology

Main research strands in the field of external democracy and democratic governance promotion contribute to fundamental research (Radaelli 2004; Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009; Radaelli 2009) in democratisation and transformation studies. More and more studies are now located in applied science in the field of scientific policy consultancy (Youngs 2001). As the development of assessment and evaluation tools by international donor institutions and state agencies has become a vast field of analysis during the last years, mainly based on the use of quantitative and qualitative indicators, the question of how to assess both democratic progress and policy and reform success gained importance in academic research. Analysts initially conceived conceptual and analytical frameworks for development cooperation rather than for scientific purposes. In contrast to the use of quantitative indicators, qualitative measuring of democracy and aid effectiveness proves to be rather difficult. Literature on *output* assessment of democracy promotion, such as for example instruments and mechanisms, is very comprehensive, but due to the difficulty of measuring the *outcome*, such as the impact of external aid on domestic change, this issue has not received equal attention. Numeric data and sources of verification neither provide information on the *impact* nor do they take other influencing factors into account. Assessment of democracy and governance promotion by donor institutions as well as in political science should therefore – like the democratisation process itself – be as participatory as possible (Burnell 2007: 7–8).

Studies on external policy transfer and democracy promotion imply qualitative and quantitative analyses. Literature on democratisation and policy change comprises qualitative analyses of qualitative data (Budde & Großklaus 2010), such as document analyses (Freyburg et al 2007; Budde & Großklaus 2010) and discourse analyses (Cortell & Davis 2000); as well as quantitative analyses of quantitative data (Knack 2004; Freyburg 2011). The present research relies on a qualitative analysis of qualitative data.

As far as literature on democracy and democratic governance promotion is concerned, data collection occurs either through (semi-structured) interviews with state and non-state actors (policy-makers, state officials and members of the civil society) (Knill 2001; Youngs 2001; Freyburg 2012; Geddes et al. 2013; Maggi 2015; Fernandez-Molina 2016) or surveys using close-end questionnaires (Freyburg 2011, 2012). Collected documents serve either as main sources of analyses or are complementary data to interviews and surveys (Budde & Großklaus 2010; Freyburg et al. 2014). For this research, semi-struc-