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The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe

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*For there is no durable treaty which is not founded on
reciprocal advantage, and indeed a treaty which does not
satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is apt
to contain the seeds of its own dissolution.*

François de Callieres, On the Manner of Negotiating With Princes (1716),
translated by A. F. Whyte (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), pp. 109-10

*Political action must be based on a coordination
of morality and power.*

Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939. An Introduction
to the Study of International Relations (London: MacMillan, 1939), p. 97

*The only remedy for a strong structural effect
is a structural change.*

Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-
Wesley, 1979), p. 111

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Acknowledgements

Hamburg, 2019

Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACFE	Agreement on Adaptation of CFE
A/CFE	meaning the CFE Treaty and the Agreement on Adaptation of CFE
AIAM	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
CAC	Conventional Arms Control in Europe
CBM	Confidence-Building Measures
CDE	Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFE-1A	Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of CFE
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
C/OSCE	Meaning CSCE and OSCE
COW	Correlates of War Index
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CST	Treaty on Collective Security
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach
ES	English School
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EST	European Security Treaty (Medvedev initiative of 2009)
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GOP	Grand Old Party (Republican Party)
G8	Group of Eight (see also G6, G7, and G20)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFSH	Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
JCC	Joint Consultative Commission
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New START	New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NSNW	Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
NTM	National-Technical Means
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSCC	Open Skies Consultative Commission
PC	Political Committee (of NATO)
PD	Prisoners' Dilemma
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
PMSC	Political-Military Steering Committee
POL-MIL	Political-Military
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
R&D	Research and Development
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC	Security Community
SG	Secretary General
SMM	OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
TFT	Tit-For-Tat
TLE	Treaty-Limited Equipment
TUR	Turkey
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States of America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
VD	Vienna Document
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

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Prologue

A chilly eastward wind crept through the streets of Manhattan. It had drizzled since the early hours. New York's hectic aura was only about to unfold on this Wednesday morning. A still young-looking man climbed the stairs of the United Nations Headquarters. Even though he was not as young anymore as he appeared to be on television – he would soon turn 58 – his moves were still energetic. Surrounded by a bunch of people, security guards and various broadcast teams, his thoughts remained focused on the first sentences he was about to deliver to the General Assembly. Until the very morning hours he had been pondering the weight his words would carry. He was certain that the coming weeks would change the course of history. Though, an awkward feeling which kept him awake at night made him shiver when imagining the future. He was not sure what the future would hold for him and his people. Only two events of comparable magnitude had come to mind when he was writing his speech.

A few minutes later, routine had gained the upper hand. The golden quadrangle behind his back, some hundred eagerly looking eyes before the podium, he started to formulate the first words that would set the scene; the words which would make the audience aware that a historic moment was about to unfold. 'Two great revolutions, the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian revolution of 1917, have exerted a powerful influence on the actual nature of the historical process and radically changed the course of world events.' He paused. From now on, nothing would be the same anymore…

That day – December 7, 1988 – the man by the name of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would reduce its military presence in Eastern Europe by half a million soldiers. Considerable numbers of tanks and other conventional arms would be withdrawn in the years to come. The world held its breath. What had been unthinkable for decades was about to happen in a blink: the Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe.

Probably more than any other event in the following years, that cold December morning marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. It was the irreversible sign that the politics of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* had become reality. It was the moment Moscow relinquished its trump card in the military standoff with NATO. It was the signal for the other Warsaw Pact members that the Kremlin would not constrain their foreign and security policy choices the way it did in the past.

The subsequent years would see the fall of the Berlin Wall, a reunited Germany, and the break-up of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's initiative would pave the way for a comprehensive treaty on the conventional military equipment of both blocs, resulting in the largest dis-

armament initiative of all times. Based on the mutual reduction of arms, a new system of cooperative security in Europe emerged. Diplomats from the East and the West, for years trapped in ideological trench warfare, now rushed to the various negotiation tables to elaborate a dense network of inter-locking agreements, designed to cement the new understanding and to avert a relapse into old confrontational times. The 1990 Charter of Paris of the CSCE stated with overt enthusiasm, 'ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and ex-pectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries.' Centuries of bloodshed in Europe seemed to end within a few years only. The future promised security through partnership and coopera-tion.

Almost 20 years later, in 2007, the same Mikhail Gorbachev – now an old and disenchanted pariah to his own people – applauded the Kremlin's leaders for their decision to give up on the CFE Treaty. 'It would be absolute-ly illogical for Russia to be the only state to abide by the treaty and for others not to even ratify it', he noted. The preceding years had seen the rise of American unipolarity, the sellout of Russian greatness followed by an eco-nomic recovery under the autocratic Vladimir Putin, and the slow erosion of the system of cooperative security in Europe.

Only a few months after the end of CFE, Russian troops crossed the border to the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. The five-day battle was the first international war between two recognized states on geographical Europe after the surrender of Nazi Germany. During the early hours of the Russian campaign, a hawkish U.S. Secretary of Defense seriously weighed the option of limited air strikes against the advancing Russian tanks. What seemed to be a long-gone specter of the past was in a sudden a conceivable scenario: a potential military standoff between Russia and an enlarged NATO.

While those five days seemed to be an unexpected "historical hick-up", a sudden relapse, owed to the complicated settings in the South Caucasus and not intended to significantly change Europe's security, the Russian incursion into Georgian territory turned out to be the writing on the wall that the West and Russia were again drifting apart. In March 2014, in a breathtaking coup of Machiavellian impudence, Vladimir Putin ordered the annexation of Cri-mea to halt Western influence in what the Kremlin sees as part of its *Near Abroad*. Shocked by the events, Western policy-makers slowly realized that there was no positive engagement strategy left in their dealings with Russia anymore. Belligerent language followed belligerent action and sanctions followed the unlawful presence of Russian soldiers on what was Ukrainian soil for the past 22 years. A quarter of a century after Gorbachev's bold speech, West-Russian relations had hit rock bottom.

What went wrong? What happened to the enthusiasm that had inspired leaders in the East and the West? And why was the neatly established system

of cooperative arms control agreements in Europe incapable of impeding the return to confrontation? Traces to the answers are spread across three continents and three generations of political leaders. Some of them date even back to a past long before the cold and rainy Manhattan winter day.

1   Introduction

For more than a decade now, Europe's once unique security institutions are in decay. (Cf. for example Dunay 2008; Steinmeier 2008; Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative 2012; Mützenich and Karádi 2013) To different degrees, this development affects almost all institutions under the rubric of cooperative security. In particular, the realm of cooperative arms control is negatively affected.

Significant legally and politically binding arms control agreements under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are either stagnating, deadlocked, or in retreat. The most prominent example is the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). OSCE participating States remain unable or unwilling to successfully overcome the deadlock in arms control institutions. Mirroring this development, cooperative security institutions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation have largely ceased to function. With the war in Ukraine ongoing, prospects for reversing this trend are rather low for the moment.

The rise and fall of cooperative arms control in Europe raises the question, why its institutions are eroding. Unfortunately, scholarly research on the issue is incomplete. On the one hand, scholars have failed to pay long-term attention to the volatile evolution of cooperative security institutions. On the other hand, they missed to comprehensively link institutional decay to the general foreign and security policies of the main actors involved. As a result, previous research has either concentrated on issue-specific institutions, while leaving out the conundrum why the broader schemes behind institutionalized cooperation changed over time, or it has focused on the broader politics while ignoring the issue-specificity of relevant institutions.

The rise and fall of cooperative arms control in Europe is therefore a promising research subject to analyze the volatility of institutionalized cooperation between the West and Russia, both from a theoretical and a policy-oriented angle. By concentrating on the establishment, maintenance, and decay of institutionalized cooperation in this specific sphere of Euro-Atlantic security, common interests, divergent interpretations, and critical structural changes come to the fore. Understanding the volatile process of institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe will not provide a blueprint for taking on current and future challenges. However, it could help to avoid repeating those policies that led to its current state of decay.

1.1   Focus of the Book

This book analyzes the policies of cooperative arms control in Europe and their institutionalization from 1973 to 2014, the year of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. It tries to explain not only the rise but also the fall of cooperative arms control by examining what forms of institutions compose cooperative arms control in Europe, and why those institutions are in decay.

Its focus is on institutions established between 1973 and 2014 with the aim of reducing the potential for military conflict between a number of actors: (1) between the United States and NATO on the one hand and the Soviet Union/The Russian Federation and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)/the Collective Security Treaty (CST) on the other; (2) between NATO and the post-Soviet states; and (3) amongst OSCE participating States. Special emphasis is placed on the respective politics under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its successor the OSCE as well as under the NATO-Russia framework. Intra-alliance arrangements of NATO, the coordinating politics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), or bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control arrangements from the realm of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are not part of the analysis.

Within this sphere of multilateral politics, special emphasis is put on two actors: the United States and the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation. This focus is due to the quasi-hegemonic roles both held during the Cold War (cf. Leffler and Westad 2010), the United States' quasi-hegemonic position in post-Cold War NATO (Rauchhaus 2000: 175), and Russia's national identity as the prime successor to the Soviet Union. (Cf. also Aggarwal 2000: 71)

Indeed, the politics of cooperative arms control in Europe are neither exclusively shaped by these two actors nor are their foreign and security policies identical with or limited to cooperative arms control in Europe. While further research is needed to fully understand the multilateral dimension of the evolution of cooperative arms control in Europe, concentrating on those two states that helped to substantially shape it is beneficial from a structural point of view. As McKenzie and Loedel (1998b: 8) have put it, 'the United States and Russia remain the key states in determining the outcome of the debate over European security: the United States as the only power with a global reach; Russia because of its ability to threaten its neighbors and to thwart attempts at institutional change.'

1.2   Why Focus on Cooperative Arms Control in Europe?

Five fundamental reasons speak for focusing on the rise and fall of cooperative arms control in Europe. The first reason is a *lack of comprehensiveness in current research*. Analysts and researchers have not provided a complete

picture of the volatility of institutionalization, including establishment, maintenance, and decay of institutions. At the same time, exclusive foci on specific institutions, such as the CFE Treaty (cf. Zellner, Schmidt, and Neuneck 2009), the OSCE (cf. Ghébali and Warner 2006), or NATO (cf. Pouliot 2010), prevail. Analysis of institutional overlap is underrepresented. No multi-level holistic approach on cooperative arms control in Europe exists so far.

The second reason is a *lack of theoretical research*. Current and past research has often avoided grounding issue-specific analysis in sound theoretical analysis. While early scholars of arms control have applied clear-cut theories in support of their analysis (cf. Schelling and Halperin 1961), current arms control research often tends either to overemphasize purely policy-driven approaches (cf. exemplary Andreasen and Williams 2011) or uses approaches that lack a well-researched and reasonable combination of theory and research issue (cf. exemplary Durkalec, Kearns, and Kulesa 2013: 9-10; for a good exception from the rule see Mutschler 2013). In turn, theoretical research of IR scholars has largely evaded the topic of arms control since the end of the Cold War. No sound scholarly research on the rise and fall of cooperative arms control in Europe exists so far.

The third reason is a *lax use of terminology*. Researchers, political analysts, and decision-makers often employ terminology from the theoretical concept of *regime* (for an analysis of the concept see Chapter 4) when referring to cooperative arms control in Europe without any proof that it really suits their requirement, both from a conceptual point of view and with respect to the topicality of the theoretical concept as such. No genuine research has either verified or falsified the regime claim in relation to the issue. The reasons behind this shortcoming are a general shrinking interest in theoretical research on arms control (cf. opening remarks by Alexei Arbatov, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference 2014) and a specific lack of originality in conjunction with the issue.

The fourth reason is a *lack of research on regime decay*. As earlier said, cooperative arms control is now in decay. Directly deriving from the lack of comprehensiveness in current research on the issue is the fact that researchers are struggling to explain institutional decay, both from a more narrow issue-specific and from a broader theoretical perspective. Issue-specific research either remains with descriptions of the current problems (cf. exemplary Zellner 2012) or approaches the wider spectra of U.S.-Russian relations without going into the cumbersome procedure of searching for the reasons behind its poor state (cf. exemplary Walt 2014). Theoretical research based on the regime episteme has a somewhat different problem. Decay is simply not an equally represented part of regime scholars' research agenda. The result is an incomplete picture. So far, studies about the reasons for regime decay are underrepresented.

The fifth reason is the *topicality of the issue*. Policy-makers, researchers, and analysts alike agree that the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe is a severe problem for the continent's security (cf. exemplary Sikorski, Westerwelle, and Sovndal 2013). The Ukraine conflict has only helped to make the pre-existing problems even more pressing (cf. Ischinger, Pifer, and Zagorski 2014). However, future-oriented policy analysis based on sound theoretical research on the issue and designed to address the unraveling of institutions is absent. Issue-specific and theoretical lack of research will not alter this shortcoming. A comprehensive and theory-based approach might help to shed light on long-term policies that led to the current state. It might also help to formulate alternative policy concepts.

1.3   Shortcomings of Previous Research

When analyzing previous research on the issue, three important shortcomings come to the fore. (1) Previous research lacks a commonly agreed terminology when referring to the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe. Without a commonly agreed terminology, actors might not know whether they talk about the same issues. (2) With regards to institutions, scholars often employ the regime terminology without any proof that the very institutions are in fact regimes. Furthermore, their applications of definitions are often imprecise and contradictory. Without proof, definitions become irrelevant. (3) Theoretical works on the issue are either highly outdated or they pay considerably less attention to the fact of institutional decay. Without up to date research and a holistic approach to institutionalization, research remains incomplete.

1.3.1   Fuzzy Terminology

It is impossible to find a commonly agreed term in either scholarly research or everyday politics describing the very research subject at hand. Instead, diversity prevails. Often, architectural or artisan paraphrases are employed to describe institutionalization. Already in 1994, Walker (p. 13) issued a warning that 'the talk of security "architecture" is misleading; "patchwork" is a better metaphor for the plethora of shifting and overlapping experiments under way'. Particularly the term 'security architecture' features prominent in the literature (cf. Czempiel 1998: xi). The absence of clear terminology has opened up the doors for diverse interpretations. Whereas some speak of 'Euro-Atlantic security structures' (Zellner 2009: 18) or a 'full fabric of European security' (Gottemoeller 2008: 7), others refer to a 'multilayered security architecture that incorporates [...] NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, and the CFE regime' (Auton 1998: 153).

With a view to the OSCE, Rupp and McKenzie (1998: 120) see 'a web of interlocking institutions in post-cold-war Europe'. During his first term in office, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier (2009: 11) termed the result of 'the cooperative approach to arms control […] a network of mutually supporting and complementary arms control agreements.' In addition, former German Ambassador Hartmann (2009: 54) describes a 'CFE system […] complemented by a […] network of confidence- and security-building measures'. Krause (2003: 1) dubs the post-Cold War European order simply a 'liberal peace'.

Fuzzy terminology is a problem for research because it opens the door to misunderstandings. How can participants in a scholarly debate know that they talk about the same issue without a common terminology?

1.3.2   *Theoretical References without Evidence*

When talking about the rise and fall of cooperative arms control in Europe, IR scholars have regularly referred to regime theory or at least its terminology without providing actual empirical evidence. Chung (2005: 187) classifies the OSCE as a 'security regime' based on the general assessment that 'regimes can have formal structures as well'. Zellner (2012: 15) refers to a 'European arms control regime' and the CFE Treaty as 'the regime's core' (Zellner 2009: 12) without elaborating a regime-analytical line of argument. Contradicting these assumption, in another article, he labels CFE itself a 'regime' (cf. Zellner 2010: 67). Auton (1998) views confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and CFE as 'multilateral security regimes' without analyzing what their possible regime quality generates in terms of institutional interdependence. None of these authors nor any other author who uses the regime label with reference to cooperative arms control in Europe, has ever made the effort to embark on a sound regime-analytical line of analysis. Their observations are mere assumptions.

Theoretical references not backed up by evidence are a problem for academic credibility and for the potential cognitive effects such research generates. As Thomas Hobbes noted in *Leviathan*, the abuse of speech happens 'when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves.' They are also a problem for the possible consequences of issue-specific research. If the forms of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe deserve the regime label – as most IR scholars claim – than the decay of certain institutions, such as the CFE Treaty, might have different effects on other potential regimes or regime networks than perhaps anticipated by scholars so far.

1.3.3 Incomplete Theoretical Research

Terminological fuzziness and theoretical references not backed up by evidence have their roots in the lack of theoretical research on cooperative arms control in Europe. First, there are only a handful of studies on the research subject which rely on a sound theoretical basis at all. Second, of those few studies almost all employ regime theory. Other theoretical approaches are rare. Third, researchers have not analyzed the institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe over a longer period. Instead, the very few theoretical accounts are either incomplete or highly outdated.

Nye (1987: 392-3) sees the CSCE as a 'U.S.-Soviet security regime' and argues 'that at least a weak regime exists in Europe and that its broad principles and norms are the division of Germany, the legitimate role of the United States and the Soviet Union in European security, and mutually recognized spheres of concern. The implications and implementation of these principles are spelled out in various ways, including the Berlin agreements and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.'

Janice Stein (2003: 17, footnote 5) claims that the provisions of the 1986 Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) led to a 'limited security regime designed to build confidence in central Europe.' Efinger, Rittberger, and Zürn (1988: 174) conclude in late 1988 that the regime conduciveness in the realm of limitation of conventional armaments is 'presumably non-existent'. In a study on CSBMs, Rittberger, Efinger, and Mendler (1988: 28) admit that 'East-West relations have rarely been considered as a field for 'regime analyses.' They infer that an East-West CSBM regime exists as 'a stabilizing element in the still highly militarized security situation in Europe.' (Ibid: 30) In two other studies, Efinger (1989: 343-84; 1990: 117-50) traces the evolving CSBM regime back to the formative days of the Helsinki Final Act.

Without much further elaboration, Müller (1993a: 133-4) rates the Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 OSCE Charter of Paris as regimes that consolidate the territorial order in Europe and concludes that the policies of regulating military capabilities in Europe through means of CSBMs and CFE have reached a certain level of regime quality. In another account, he (Müller 1993b: 361) identifies a security regime in the realm of European military order, including 'INF Treaty, Stockholm/Paris agreements on confidence-building, CFE Treaty, 2+4 Treaty, practices such as doctrine seminars and mutual visits of military personnel, the Crisis Control Centre, and the recent mutual promises of unilateral reductions of short-range nuclear weapons'. Kelleher (1994: 318) sees an emerging 'cooperative security regime […] in the Northern Hemisphere.' In the same account (ibid: 326) she refers to 'the intersecting regimes set in place under the CFE, the CSCE, and the Open Skies agreements in 1992.'

Ropers and Schlotter (1989) have contributed the most elaborate account of the 'negotiation system of the CSCE' so far. They conclude that the system has led to generate regimes of differing scope and quality, with the military realm of CSBMs being the most established (ibid: 333). Furthermore, they anchor the regime demand in the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to establish all-European hegemony and in the subsequent bloc confrontation which underlined the need for regulating political, military, economic, and human issues. Through employing issue linkages within and outside the CSCE system, the two blocs were able to establish the CSCE as reinforcing processual institution. The CSCE in its entirety, they conclude, can be classified as a 'declaratory regime'. Schlotter (1999) views the evolution of CSBMs as the only full-fledged regime in the CSCE process.

Neuneck (1995) has contributed a novel approach towards one aspect of cooperative arms control in Europe by applying a Game Theory approach to conventional stability and arms control measures. His approach has a sound mathematical basis. The downturn is that it concentrates mostly on conventional forces stability and leaves out the wider political evolution which has shaped the process of conventional force limitations as well as the multitude of CSBMs in the C/OSCE framework beyond the Vienna Document (ibid: 228-59; see Annex II for a list of the relevant CSBMs).

Incomplete theoretical research is a problem for the arms control research agenda. The decay of cooperative arms control cannot be comprehensively explained without an encompassing and up-to-date approach based on a sound theoretical frame. Instead, approaches towards the research subject would have to rely on assumptions.

Summing up the three previous paragraphs, up-to-date and comprehensive theoretical accounts are missing. In addition, a common terminology based on sound theoretical research is absent. It is therefore important, first, to arrive at a clear definition of the research subject at hand.

1.4   Definitions of Key Terms

So far, this study has employed the term *cooperative arms control in Europe* without further elaboration. It is indeed important to explain its origin for two reasons: (1) in order to avoid repeating the mistake of the diverse and confusing use of terminology of previous research; and (2) because the term is a neologism[1] by the author – an attempt to unite the various terminological concepts under one definition.

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1   The term is not a mere translation of an earlier definition of arms control ('kooperative Rüstungssteuerung') provided by German Cold War scholars based in Hamburg (cf. von Baudissin and Lutz 1979: 5-6). In contrast, there is no stringent causal reference to nuclear deterrence.

Defining a subject of research should start with scrutinizing a number of concepts and definitions. Cooperative arms control in Europe appears within the issue-area of Euro-Atlantic cooperative security. The 'issue-area'[2] itself should by no means be confused with the issue of cooperative arms control in Europe or the boundaries of a specific regime or a network of regimes (cf. Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013: 30).

1.4.1 Cooperative Security

The first term in need of definition is *cooperative security*. Cooperative security has been defined differently (cf. Mihalka 2005: 113-4). In this book, the concept of cooperative security is understood to include a number of central aspects: increasing *mutual* security and predictability by means of reciprocity, inclusiveness, dialogue, a defensive orientation, transparency, confidence-building, and arms limitations (cf. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner 1992; Nolan 1994a,b; Mihalka 2005; Dewitt and Acharya 1996: 9-10; Jervis 1999). The aim of cooperative security is to generate interstate relations 'in which disputes are expected to occur, but they are expected to do so within the limits of agreed-upon norms and established procedures.' (Nolan 1994b: 5) Zartman provides an explanation of the just distribution of gains in security policy negotiations aimed at increasing mutual security. It captures well a basic definition of cooperative security:

> *Both negotiation and security policy are too often presented as tools for maximizing single party gain, when they should be presented as ways of maximizing two (or multi) party gain, jointly if possible, separately if necessary. Negotiations that provide something for everyone, or that trade off differentially valued goods, and security measures that provide security for all, or that tie my security to your security, are likely to lead to more favorable, stable, productive, and just results.* (Zartman 1995: 892)

The politics of cooperative security in Europe have often been identified with the institution of the OSCE (cf. Krause 2003). Therefore, a large part of the analysis of this study will concentrate on policies achieved under the auspices of the OSCE and its predecessor, the CSCE. However, the focus here is not limited to this organization but instead tackles cooperative policies of NATO as well. This is particularly due to the fact that the different layers of security institutions and policies have come to increasingly overlap in the aftermath of the Cold War (cf. Flynn and Farrell 1999: 505). Bauwens et al (1994: 21) have thus argued that 'it is difficult to distinguish NATO's enlarged mandate

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2   Keohane (1984: 61) defines issue-areas as sets of issues that are 'dealt with in common negotiations and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureaucracies.' Ernst B. Haas (1980: 365) defines an issue-area as 'a recognized cluster of concerns involving interdependence not only among the parties but among the issues themselves.'

from the overall approach of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.'

The OSCE's approach to security is basically holistic (cf. Krause 2003). So is the concept of cooperative security. It encompasses "hard" security issues in the military realm, economic and environmental, as well as human security aspects. It does not stop with the legal concept of the sovereign nation state but views intrastate developments as well as transnational and transboundary threats as key factors affecting the security of others – that is states *and* the individual human being.

Even though the holistic approach of cooperative security together with the encompassing security approach of the OSCE is of particular importance for the argument of this book, only a certain spectrum – arms control – is under consideration. Hence, the concept of cooperative security rather serves as the normative background against which a particular set of arms control institutions and the policies directed to them are analyzed. The following table comprises the aims and means of the concept of cooperative security.

TABLE 1

AIMS AND MEANS OF THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Aims	*increasing mutual security and predictability*
Means	*reciprocity* *inclusiveness* *dialogue-based* *defensive orientation* *transparency* *confidence-building* *arms limitations*

1.4.2   Arms Control

The second term in need of definition is *arms control*. Bull (1961: 4-5) sees 'peace through the manipulation of force' as the grand scheme under which to place the concept theoretically. In its most practical sense and in relation to the early period of the bipolar arms race, arms control's foremost objective was the prevention of (nuclear) war (cf. Schelling and Halperin 1961: 3; Bull 1961: 3-4).

Historically speaking, arms control in the bipolar context existed before the emergence of the paradigm of cooperative security during the 1970s.

However, the two became almost equated (cf. Dunn 2009: 175). Nolan (1994b: 5) concludes: 'at the practical level cooperative security seeks to devise agreed-upon measures to prevent war and to do so primarily by preventing the means for successful aggression from being assembled'. This quote reads almost like a description of the concept of arms control. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner (1992: 6) refer to 'a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.' Again, they do not refer to arms control but to cooperative security. These examples show how closely intertwined the two concepts are. Arms control has thus become an integral part or means of the "toolbox" of cooperative security. In recent years, the paths of the two concepts have somewhat drifted apart with arms control being questioned particularly in the United States (cf. Larsen 2009: 11 et seq) and cooperative security seen mostly through the prism of Constructivist theory (cf. Müller and Wunderlich 2013). In this book, a rather broad definition of arms control is used. Arms control is understood to be

> *any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, or types of military forces, weapons, or facilities. Whatever their scope or terms, however, all plans for arms control have one common factor: they presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action among participants regarding their military programs.* (Larsen 2009: 1)

Military-to-military contacts, military exchange programs, and the democratic control of forces, usually subsumed under the headline of CSBMs[3], are all part of this definition. In this sense, arms control 'should be thought of as encompassing all aspects of the military dimension' in order 'to prevent conflicts within states as well as between them.' (Walker 1994: 6-7)

1.4.3   Europe

Europe is the third term in need of definition. The term as such resembles 'a concept as well as a continent, and the borders of both oscillate wildly.' (Jacobs 2012) In this book, Europe is neither used in purely geographical nor in cultural terms. It is a linguistic reference to a historical-political development.

As already stated, cooperative security in Europe has always been in close vicinity to the CSCE/OSCE. Zagorski (2010: 58) argues that the contemporary understanding of cooperative security should not be confused with the indivisibility of security from the early documents of the CSCE. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War approach towards cooperative security in Europe

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3   For a discussion about the validity of distinguishing between arms control and CSBMs see Holst 1991and Wright 2000: 4-5.

can only be understood against the specific historical European background (cf. Krause 2003: 4).

As will be explained later, the politics and institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe took off shortly before and in parallel to the early CSCE framework. Even though the end of the Cold War triggered a fundamental shift in the political goals pursued and in the composition of parties to a number of agreements and organizations, the historical provenance of the concept of cooperative arms control in Europe is European. This book argues, however, that the concept is not limited to the OSCE but stretches across a densely institutionalized area, including NATO, and involving 56 states from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Hence, this book is not about regionalism. Snyder (2012b: 312) defines regions as 'groupings of states that share either geographic proximity or have sufficient cultural/historic ties that bind them together.' In the vast OSCE area, stretching across three continents, this is not the case, neither from a cultural nor from a geographical point of view.

1.4.4   Cooperative Arms Control in Europe

The result of these observations is the novel term of *cooperative arms control in Europe*. It shall serve the purpose of combining cooperative security and arms control in a specific European historical-political setting. Cooperative arms control is not simply a merger of two already closely connected concepts (i.e. cooperative security and arms control). It is also not a reference to the earlier German definitions of arms control. Instead, it is an attempt to link institutionalization in a specific sphere of arms control to a strongly normative concept of European origin.

1.4.5   Institutions and Regimes

So far, this study has made continued references to *institutions* and *institutionalization*. As Thomas Risse (2002: 605) correctly noted, 'there are at least as many definitions of (international) institutions as there are theoretical perspectives'. The term *international institution* is often applied in IR to cover diverse social concepts such as treaties, organizations, regimes, or conventions. Duffield (2007) has addressed this terminological diversity by differentiating between ontological and functional forms of international institutions. Accordingly, ontological forms refer to intersubjective elements such as "norms". Functional forms refer to formal elements such as "rules". (Ibid: 8) Following his typology, regimes, in a general understanding, fall under ontological forms while agreements and formal IGOs fall under functional forms. (Ibid: 15) Throughout this book, these three types of international cooperative interaction – regimes, agreements, and IGOs (or IOs) – will be covered by the term institutions, while the process of their establish-

ment, maintenance, and, in a more general understanding, their evolution will be captured by the term institutionalization.

International institutions are in close vicinity to the theoretical concept of regime. Often, institutions are equated with regimes. Before this study will provide an analysis of the concept of regime, it will be important for the further research process to provide a first, though incomplete, definition of the concept.

> *Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.* (Krasner 1982: 2)

1.5   The Theoretical Basis

Previous research has failed to comprehensively analyze what forms of institutions compose cooperative arms control in Europe and what their relationship is. As a consequence, decay has not been comprehensively explained. Possible reasons for decay which might have to do with the institutional form (e.g. linkages between regimes) remained unconsidered. Since cooperative arms control in Europe – the name already implies it – is based on international cooperation, IR approaches which analyze and explain international cooperation will provide the theoretical basis of this book. Different theories have tried to explain international institutionalized cooperation (cf. Schieder and Spindler 2010).

This study employs a multi-theory approach for explaining the rise and fall of cooperative arms control in Europe and the related foreign and security policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Such an approach seems more promising for analyzing long-term cooperation than a single-theory approach, for IR's three grand theories put different emphases on the various aspects of cooperation and competition – all of them containing valuable insights (cf. Schieder and Spindler 2010). Realism, for instance, has always been skeptical with regard the durability of cooperation due to the constant competition states seemingly face. Regime theory, an offspring of Liberalism, has described how states cooperate using international institutions – however, mostly by focusing on trade and the environment while neglecting the realm of classical security policy (cf. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997). Constructivism is particularly apt to explain cooperation taking into account the impact of cognitive repercussions such as emotions, knowledge or socially constructed images of oneself and "the other" (cf. Ross 2006).

This study relies particularly on Realism and regime theory. It combines these two theoretical approaches with the essentials of the concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics. Together, this multi-theory approach will provide the necessary broad analytical perspective on the rise and fall of cooperative arms control. This approach seems also particularly valuable given the long period covered by this study.

One alternative possibility to approach international cooperation would be the heuristic device of a Game Theoretical 2 x 2 matrix (cf. Mutschler 2013). However, examples of repeated and long-term cooperation involving different layers of cooperation and different situations would have to include a variety of multi super games with different payoff structures (cf. McGinnis 1986). Such real-world examples would be extremely difficult to model. In addition, explanations along the lines of a rational choice approach would most likely suffer from its overly static and rigid framing (cf. Hopmann and Druckman 1991: 273).

The following paragraphs will shortly highlight the five theoretical approaches chosen for this study.

1.5.1   Realism

Realism's skepticism towards international cooperation and its occupation with the impediments to successful cooperation provides the necessary critical basis, for the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe are in fact in decay. Russia's foreign and security policy has regularly been characterized as following Realist rationales (cf. Mearsheimer 2014). Realism would thus be a good basis for better understanding contemporary Russian foreign and security policy (cf. Jonsson 2012: 450). Further on, the Ukraine conflict has triggered a revival of the Neoliberal vs. Neorealist debate amongst some U.S. scholars (see Mearsheimer 2014; McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer 2014; Charap and Shapiro 2014a,b) about which U.S. and/or Russian foreign policy orientation (Liberal vs. Realist) is to blame for the conflict. Realism is therefore a very timely approach. In addition, Realism's occupation with conflict seems appropriate given the fact that the U.S.-Soviet/ Russian security relationship has undergone recurring periods of competition and conflict. Last but not least, the role of power remains central to understanding international cooperation (cf. Müller 2013).

1.5.2   Regime Theory

Regime theory makes for a reasonable approach due to the widespread recognition of cooperative arms control as either a single regime or as a network of interlinked regimes in both, the existing research literature and in official documents; even more so, because no research has ever proven the

regime assumption. In addition, Realism is biased when it comes to international institutions and limited in its approach to explaining the persistence of international institutions, particularly in times of change or crisis. Regime theory simply provides more answers to this phenomenon. Beyond that, regime theory was an effort by Neoliberal scholars to bring the Neorealists on board in their effort to explain and accept international institutions. Regime theory thus builds on a number of distinct Realist assumptions and can be viewed as the Neoliberal "extension" to Neorealism (cf. Crawford 1996). Last but not least, regime theory can be applied as a method for classifying international institutions.

However, before we can speak of regimes when referring to cooperative arms control in Europe, the term regime will be handled with great care. Instead, the term *cooperation clusters* (Young 1996) shall be applied until the very form of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe has been fully analyzed and clarified.

1.5.3 Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist Analyses

Since decay is a prominent part of this study, particularly such theoretical approaches that also take account of the wider cooperation spectra which drive institutionalized cooperation might provide an additional basis for understanding the reasons for and effects of decay. As will be discussed later on, regime theorists have not comprehensively explained institutional decay. The consequences of this shortcoming make it necessary to look into other theoretical approaches explaining the volatility and, hence, the decay of international institutionalized cooperative efforts. Amongst them is the concept of Security Community, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics.

1.6 Methodology

This study applies mostly an inductive approach as outlined in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (2008). It does not aim at theory building. Instead, it tries to either verify or falsify whether cooperative arms control in Europe can be characterized along the lines of the regime concept. This leads to instances of abductive analysis where inductive and deductive methods go hand in hand (cf. Daase et al 2008: 152).

The reason for this approach is rooted in the inadequate state of previous research. As already stated, a plethora of institutions under the broad rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe has already been labeled *regime* by various IR scholars. The diverse use of terminology and the lack of sound theoretical research has led to a cacophony of definitions. Of course, one

could simply describe the institutions and the phenomenon of decay empirically. However, that would mean that any theoretical insights going beyond the descriptive stage would be left out. As an example, certain institutions might share significant characteristics of the regime concept. If that would be the case, the decay of specific agreements such as CFE would have a stronger effect on other agreements which might be part of the same potential regime (see the effects of 'negative reverberation' described in Alter and Meunier 2009). Before any questions about institutional decay can be answered, it has to be either verified or falsified that the form of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe actually deserves the regime label.

The methodological approach chosen for this study proceeds in a number of sequential stages. First, a Realist model for understanding international cooperation is developed. Then, the empirics of 41 years of cooperative arms control in Europe are assessed and analyzed, using the Realist model. Next, the main findings and assumptions of regime scholars are introduced and applied in order to classify the empirics. That way it will be possible to test whether and which institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe deserve the regime label. Finally, the question shall be answered whether regime theory can produce meaningful results with regards decay or whether other theories of cooperation have more explanatory power.

1.6.1   *A Realist Model of International Cooperation*

First, a Realist model for understanding international cooperation will be developed in order to explain what international cooperation is and why it is so problematic from a Realist point of view. The model will consists of five variables determining a number of processual sequences of international cooperation. It has been developed by the author specifically for this study in order to assess repeated instances of U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe during the last 41 years. The model shall help to shed light on the origins and consequences of cooperation and institutionalization. Its application shall allow for assessing reasons for, strategies of, and states' evaluation of gains from cooperation. By highlighting these factors, a preliminary comparison with the essentials of regime theory shall become possible.

1.6.2   *First Abductive Test*

After comparing the empirical evidence with the main claims of regime scholars, Steven Krasner's (1982: 2) typology of regimes ('principles', 'norms', 'rules', and 'decision-making procedures') will be used as a model to qualitatively classify 36 agreements with direct relevance to cooperative arms control in Europe. Identifying possible shared principles and norms, this is to test whether the form of institutions deserves the regime label. Thus, a

final assessment about a potential regime quality of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe will become possible. In addition, regime scholars' findings about indicators of decay will be compared with the empirical evidence in order to assess whether the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe display any such signs of decay. This test will be abductive, for it will combine the inductive process of extrapolating from potentially shared principles and norms to a general regime quality with the deductive process of extrapolating from general findings of regime scholars about decay to the specific state of certain institutions.

1.6.3   Second Abductive Test

Principles and norms are a significant part of regime theory. Their condition as regards topicality and relevance will then be analyzed in a second abductive test. As part of that second test, 51 statements by U.S. and Soviet/Russian delegations to the C/OSCE between 1990 and 2014 will be analyzed using quantitative and qualitative content analysis (cf. Krippendorff 1980) before being compared to twelve key principles and norms that shape cooperative arms control in Europe. That way, it should be possible to determine what principles and norms are still reflected in the statements, which ones are not reflected anymore, and what other general policy topics are on the two states' agendas. Thereby, potential additional reasons for the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe shall be highlighted. That second test is abductive as well since it combines the inductive process of extrapolating from the use of key principles and norms to a general assessment of their political relevance with the deductive process of extrapolating from general policy topics of the two states to the specific state of key principles and norms.

1.6.4   Comparison with Other Theories

Regime theory has a number of shortcomings, both from a conceptual as well as historical point of view. Additional approaches deriving from the theoretical concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics might help to broaden the regime concept in order to better explain the general volatility of international cooperation. Analyzing the empirics using those other theoretical approaches, a more holistic perspective, less exclusively bound to Realism and regime theory, shall be gained. That way, a hopefully complete picture of the reasons behind the rise and fall of cooperation on arms control in Europe will emerge.

2 International Cooperation from a Realist Viewpoint

This chapter is about international cooperation from a Realist point of view. Its main research question is: How do states, according to Realism, arrive at international cooperation and which factors complicate their efforts?

The aim of this chapter is to understand the problems associated with international cooperation. Different theoretical approaches try to explain and understand cooperation and the institutionalization of cooperation among states in an environment which lacks any central authority such as a world government. Among them is the Realist approach – the most cooperation-skeptical of all major IR theories. Realism has provided powerful arguments speaking against the probability of repeated, stable, and long-term cooperation, particularly in the realm of security. At the same time, Realism assumes a number of prerequisites which should be in place in order to achieve international cooperation. This chapter develops a novel model for understanding international cooperation from a Realist viewpoint. It shall help to understand and assess the policies of cooperative arms control in Europe.

2.1 Introductory Remarks

Before turning to Realism, one should first define cooperation. The Oxford Dictionary (Oxford University Press eds. 2014) defines *cooperation* as 'the action or process of working together to the same end'. Studying the behavior of animals, Clements and Stephens (1995: 527) define cooperation as 'joint action for mutual benefit'. Both definitions tell only little about the process other than that it is based on a reason and that it involves more than one entity engaged in a certain activity with at least another entity. The reason behind it, the nature of the entities, their activity, the surrounding environment, and their relationship towards the reason, towards their activity, towards each other, and towards the environment, remain a matter of speculation or, better, of definition and explanation.

Explaining *international cooperation* is not possible without first reflecting upon the nature of the entities and the environment in which international cooperation takes place. Since the Westphalian Peace, a particular system of sovereign *nation states* has developed, first in Europe and since the end of Colonialism also globally (cf. Reinhard 2009). Major elements of this system are states' sovereignty, the mutual recognition of sovereign equality, the non-interference in internal affairs of the nation state, diplomatic conduct amongst states, and war (cf. Bull 1977).

Ideally, the modern nation state has an internal monopoly of power which works to establish and uphold order. The domestic monopoly of power can have different forms. The most common forms during the last centuries

were democracy, autocracy, monarchy, and oligarchy (cf. Hobsbawn 1992). No central authority (e.g. a world government) exists in the environment in which states operate. If they want to cooperate with each other, they have to find ways to deal with the consequences of the absence of a central authority. All major schools of IR thought recognize this fact to varying degrees. However, they treat the consequences for cooperation differently (cf. Baldwin 1993: 5). While Liberal and Constructivist theories view the absence of a central authority as a lesser impediment to international cooperation, Realism sees it as a major hindrance. So why apply Realism at this point?

First, this book is about institutional decay. Realism's skepticism towards successful cooperation seems therefore only appropriate to assess the interests and the cooperation strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. In short, the 'who-gets-what' from cooperation (Strange 1982: 496) gets better addressed by Realism. Also, Realism underscores the impediments to successful cooperation. Concentrating on these impediments might help to explain institutional decay. Further on, Realism is not very prone to any form of normative enthusiasm about cooperation as such, often found in Neoliberal or early Constructivist accounts.

Second, Russia's foreign and security policy has regularly been characterized as following Realist rationales (cf. Jonsson 2012: 450). Thorun (2009) describes Putin's first term as President as 'pragmatic geo-economic realism' and his second term as 'cultural geopolitical realism'. Jonsson (2012: 450) views Russia's foreign and security policy as 'pragmatic, geopolitically focused, [and] realist rather than value-based'. In conjunction with the Ukraine crisis, John Mearsheimer (2014) has argued that Putin acts like a Realist and that Western politicians do not understand his political provenance anymore. German Chancellor Angela Merkel's reported comment to U.S. President Obama that Putin was living 'in another world' (quoted from Packer 2014) has been used to underscore this assumption (cf. Charap and Shapiro 2014b). Realism could thus provide a valuable basis for better understanding and explaining contemporary Russian foreign and security policy.

Third, the ongoing conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine has triggered a revival of the Neoliberal vs. Neorealist debate amongst some U.S. scholars (see Mearsheimer 2014; McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer 2014; Charap and Shapiro 2014a, b; Lipman 2014) about which U.S. and/or Russian foreign policy orientation (Liberal vs. Realist) is to blame for the conflict. A Realist approach appears quite timely from that angle.

Fourth, the U.S.-Soviet/Russian security relationship has undergone recurring periods of competition and conflict. Realism's occupation with explaining the roots of conflict provides a valuable basis to analyze the reasons behind these two states' competitive relationship.

Fifth, the role of power remains central to understanding instances of international cooperation (cf. Müller 2013). The dominant actors in world affairs – states – are still highly unequal in terms of military, economic, techno-

logical, or cultural capabilities and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Even though international institutions have constraining effects on states' behavior (see Drezner 2008), particularly powerful states do not shy away from giving preference to the unilateral employment of power once critical interests are at stake. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia are particularly powerful states. At the same time, particularly with regards to interests, the constraining effects of international institutions are indeed visible in the form of learning effects, adjustment of interests to the interests of others, and the implication of norms on states' behavior (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). To say that international institutions do not matter at all in the process of international cooperation would be a misrepresentation of reality; however, they matter less than usually assumed by Neoliberals (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95).

2.2 Realism and the Problem of International Cooperation

The long history of Realism starts with Thucydides' depiction of the *Peloponnesian War* (431-411 B.C.), was expanded at the end of the Middle Age by Niccolo Machiavelli's *Il Principe* (1513) and Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan* (1651), and re-emerged as one of the principle schools of IR theorizing with the end of World War II (cf. exemplary Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1954). Particularly two scholars of IR have shaped modern Realism: Hans Joachim Morgenthau with his seminal work *Politics Among Nations* and Kenneth Neal Waltz with his opus magnum *Theory of International Politics*. The former gets equated with what is called *Classical Realism*, the latter with *Neorealism* or *Structural Realism* (cf. Pashakhanlou 2009). Both authors share significant views; at the same time, their works show important differences.

As all Realists, Morgenthau and Waltz attempt to see the world as what it is and not what it ought to be (cf. Carr 1939: 5). Their approaches are an empirical rather than a normative paradigm (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 4). They also agree that states are operating in an environment of *anarchy* (cf. Waltz 1959: 224 et seq; Hoffmann 1965: 54 et seq) which lacks any central authority. The state of anarchy has strong features of the Hobbesian state of nature of homo homini lupus (cf. Waltz 1979: 102). It should, however, not become confused with anarchy in the sense of complete political disorder and lawlessness. Rather, anarchy in international affairs means 'a lack of common government in world politics' (Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 226).[4] Morgen-

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4   Art and Jervis (1992: 1) explain that 'international politics takes place in an arena that has no central governing body. No agency exists above individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punishes deviations. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.'

thau and Waltz concur that *states* are the principle actors in the environment of anarchy and that particularly powerful states have the most impact (Mearsheimer 2001: 17-8). Further on, it is the distribution of *power* which determines states' position in the environment of anarchy (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 31-7; Waltz 1979: 97-9). In addition, it is states' national *interest* and the constraining effects of anarchy which determine their behavior to act as *rational* egoists (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 5-12; Waltz 1979: 117). Realism assumes that it is rational for states to seek their individual advantage in an absolute and a relative understanding in order to avoid dependence on other states, or worst, their disappearance. Therewith, both agree that it is rational for states to seek *gains* (cf. ibid). However, they differ with regards to their definition of power and states' reasons for pursuing power.

For Morgenthau (1954: 5), 'international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power'. Power is 'anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.' (Ibid: 11) Aside from military power, Morgenthau also adds a moral stratum counting a nation's character, its morale, and the quality of governance as factors of power. (Ibid: 186) Waltz (1979: 131) infers that power derives from several factors which he summarizes under the term *capabilities*. Capabilities are the 'size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence'. He adds that 'although power is a key concept in realist theory its proper definition remains a matter of controversy.' (Waltz 1986a: 333)

They also slightly differ with their reasoning why states seek power. According to Morgenthau (1954: 31), 'international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.' Morgenthau sees states' struggle for power primarily rooted in the nature of man (ibid: 4) and the inability of the anarchic system to constrain his, and thus states, desires. Morgenthau rests his theory on three images: the first image of the nature of man, the second image of the nature of nation states which he views as an extension to man's desires, and the third image of anarchy. Waltz puts greater emphasis on the third image and largely ignores the first. He sees primarily the structural causes of anarchy at work. Waltz (1979: 95) views states as 'the units whose interactions form the structure of international-political systems' and 'although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities across units is not. The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept.' (Ibid: 98) The absence of a higher authority leads to a constant state of insecurity. In contrast to Morgenthau who sees a permanent struggle for power as states' prime interest, Waltz (1979: 126) views states as being less concerned with maximizing their power. 'States can seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal. International politics is too serious a business for that.' (Ibid: 127) Instead, 'states seek to ensure their survival.' (Ibid: 91; cf. also Mearsheimer 1994/95: 9) Since *sur-*