THE POLITICS OF THE INDONESIAN RAINFOREST

A Rise of Forest Conflicts in East Kalimantan during

Indonesia´s Early Stage of Democratisation

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Cuvillier Verlag Göttingen

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Glossary

ABRI	:	*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Indonesian Armed Forces; the Army, the Marines, the Air Force, and the Police Force).
Adat	:	Customs, customary law, traditional rules of the game in the public life.
AMAN	:	*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (Alliance of Adat Community of the Archipelago).
APHI	:	*Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Forest Concession Holders, Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires).
APN	:	PT Anangga Pundinusa or PT Anangga Pundi Nusa, a joint HTI-Trans company between Inhutani I and BPTG.
AI	:	Astra International, a holding company owned by William Soerjadjaja, a parent company of PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Group.
Babinsa	:	*Bintara Pembina Desa* (Village Guidance Non-Commissioned Military Officer).
BAL	:	Basic Agrarian Law (1960).
Bakorstanas	:	*Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional* (Coordinating Board for Assisting in the Consolidation of National Stability)
Banjir Kap	:	East Kalimantan terminology for a form of logging that is less reliant on heavy equipment and infrastructure, where the logged timber from certain forest blocks (*kapersil/kopersil*) are transported by means of river transportation, either as a single trunk or a log raft, during the floods (*banjir*) of the rainy season. *Banjir Kap* was "formalised" in government policy in order to provide opportunities to local people for the extraction of timber. *Banjir Kap* I occurred from the late 1960s until the early 1970s and *Banjir Kap* II occurred from the late 1990s until the early 2000s.
Barito	:	Barito (Pacific Timber Group), a group company of APN and TYSP.
BFL	:	Basic Forestry Law (1967, 1999).
BPK	:	*Badan Perwakilan Kampung* (Village Representative Body).

BPTG		Barito Pacific Timber Group, a group company of APN and TYSP.
Camat	:	Sub-District Head.
Danramil	:	*Komandan Rayon Militer* (Sub-District Military Commander).
Dansek	:	*Komandan Sektor* (Sub-District Police Chief).
Dephut	:	*Departemen Kehutanan* (Department of Forestry, Ministry of Forestry).
Desa	:	Village
Dipan	:	Slaves, slave social group, the lowest class or social stratum in the Dayaknese society in the past.
Ditsospol	:	*Direktorat Sosial Politik* (Directorate of Socio-Political Affairs)
DPR	:	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (People's Representative Assembly, National Parliament).
DPRD I	:	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat I* (Provincial Parliament).
DPRD II	:	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat II* (District Parliament).
DR	:	*Dana Reboisasi* (Reforestation Fund).
Dishut	:	*Dinas Kehutanan* (Forestry Service under local government, both at provincial and district levels).
Dwifungsi	:	Dual function, a military doctrine placing itself as both a socio-political force and a defence force. This doctrine was excessively used during the New Order era to justify military intervention in non-military affairs, particularly in politics.
Golkar	:	*Golongan Karya* (Functional Group, government's party during the New Order era).
Golkarisation	:	A mechanism to Golkar-ise the government bureaucracy (state apparatus), villages (community members), etc.
Hipui	:	The highest social stratum (aristocratic group) in the Dayaknese society, adat/customary leader in the past.
HPH	:	*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan* (Forest Concession, Logging Concession, Forest Exploitation Rights).
HPH-Bina Desa	:	*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan-Bina Desa* (village community development program carried out by logging companies).
HPHH	:	*Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan* (Forest Product Harvesting Rights; a 100 ha concession rights granted to local community).
HPHTI	:	*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan Tanaman Industri* (Industrial Timber Estate/Plantation Concession).

HTI	:	*Hutan Tanaman Industri* (Industrial Timber Estate/Plantation).
HTI-Trans	:	*Hutan Tanaman Industri-Transmigrasi* (Industrial Timber Estate-Transmigration, an incorporation of HTI and transmigration programs where transmigrants are projected to be the HTI workers).
Hutan adat	:	Adat forest, customary forest.
Inhutani	:	Name of a state-owned forest company.
IPK	:	*Ijin Pemanfaatan Kayu* (Wood Utilisation Permit; forest exploitation rights prior to the establishment of an industrial timber estates/plantations).
Kabupaten	:	District, District government.
Kaditsospol	:	*Kepala Direktorat Sosial Politik* (Head of [Provincial/District Office of] the Directorate General of Socio-Political Affairs)
Kaltim	:	*Kalimantan Timur* (East Kalimantan).
Kampung	:	Village. In West Kutai District, the term *"Kampung"* is currently used in the district law to supersede the term *"Desa."*
Kanwil Kehutanan	:	Provincial Forestry Service under the Department of Forestry, Provincial Office of the Department of Forestry. Since the promulgation of the 1999 Basic Forestry Law and the 1999 Local Government Law, *Kanwil Kehutanan* has been abolished.
Kapolsek	:	*Kepala Kepolisian Sektor* (Sub-District Police Chief).
Kecamatan	:	Sub-District, Sub-District government.
Kepala Adat	:	Adat Leader, Customary Leader (village level).
Kepala Adat Besar	:	Great Adat Leader (sub-district level).
Kepala Desa	:	Village Head.
Kesbang Linmas	:	*Badan Kesejahteraan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat* (Nation's Welfare and Community Protection Body; a successor of Ditsospol).
Kodam	:	*Komando Daerah Militer* (Regional Military Command).
Kopkamtib	:	*Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* (Operation of Command for the Restoration of Security and Order).
Koramil	:	*Komando Rayon Militer* (Sub-District Military Command).
Korem	:	*Komando Resort Militer* (Resort Military Command).
Korpri	:	*Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia* (Indonesian Civil Servants Association).
KK	:	*Kepala Keluarga* (Household, Household Head).

KKN	:	*Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme* (Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism).
Kuasa Adat	:	Adat Authority, Village Team, village's representatives in dealing with the forest company.
Kubar	:	*Kutai Barat* (West Kutai District).
Ladang	:	A shifting cultivation rice filed, agricultural area in a dry-farming cultivation system.
Lamin Adat	:	Adat Hall
Latent conflict	:	Conflict that has not surfaced yet.
LBU	:	Long Bagun Ulu (name of a village in West Kutai District, a village case of this study).
LKMD	:	*Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa* (Village Community Resilience Council), a village organisation whose tasks are to plan and to implement village development programs.
LMD	:	*Lembaga Musyawarah Desa* (Village Consultative Council).
Mandau	:	Dayaknese sword.
Manifest conflict	:	Open conflict, frontal conflict, conflict that has been manifest.
Massa mengambang	:	Floating mass, mass depoliticisation policy by preventing political parties to have branches below the district level.
Masyarakat adat	:	Adat community, customary community.
Matalibaq	:	Name of a village in West Kutai District, a village case of this study.
Monoloyalitas	:	Mono-loyalty (civil servant's mono-loyalty to the government, including to the government's party [Golkar], during the New Order era).
MPR	:	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (People's Consultative Assembly).
Musdat	:	*Musyawarah Adat* (Adat Congress).
Muspida	:	*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah* (Council of Provincial Leaderships [*Muspida* I] or District Leaderships [*Muspida* II]).
Muspika	:	*Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan* (Council of Sub-District Leaderships, Sub-District Authorities. Muspika is composed of Sub-District Head [*Camat*], Sub-District Military Commander [*Danramil*], and Sub-District Police Chief [*Kapolsek*]).
New Order	:	Soeharto's government or regime, 11 March 1966 - 21 May 1998.
NTFPs	:	Non-Timber Forest Products, Non-Wood Forest Products.

NTT	:	*Nusa Tenggara Timur* (East Nusa Tenggara), one of the provinces in Indonesia.
Outer Islands	:	Mostly islands outside Java, Madura, and Bali.
Panyin	:	Common people, lower class or social stratum in the Dayaknese community.
PDI-P (PDIP)	:	*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle).
Pegawaq	:	Middle social stratum in the Dayaknese community, adat apparatus assisting the adat leader.
Pemkab	:	*Pemerintah Kabupaten* (District Government).
Pendekatan keamanan	:	Security approach, a mechanism where the security issues/matters are placed in a top priority.
Petinggi	:	Village Head. The term "*Petinggi*" is currently revived in West Kutai District to supersede the term "*Kepala Desa*."
PMDH	:	*Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa Hutan* (Forest Community Development Program).
PMA	:	*Penanaman Modal Asing* (foreign investment, law on foreign investment).
PMDN	:	*Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri* (domestic investment, law on domestic investment).
Pola kemitraan	:	Partnership scheme, cooperation project. In LBU, it is designed as a logging cooperation project.
Polsek	:	*Kepolisian Sektor* (Sub-District Police).
Post-New Order	:	Post-New Order regime or era, post-21 May 1998.
Rapat adat	:	Adat meeting
RKT	:	*Rencana Karya Tahunan* (Annual Working Program).
PPP	:	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party).
RT	:	*Rukun Tetangga* (Neighbourhood Association; sub-unit of a village).
Reformasi	:	Reform, reformation. *Reformasi* era refers to the era after Soeharto's fall (post-21 May 1998).
SKSHH	:	*Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan* (formal document stating the legality of the timber sources).
SLJ	:	PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya, PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Group
SLJ Tbk	:	PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya *Terbuka* (go public), PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Group
SLJG	:	PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Group
SLJ II	:	PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya II, a subsidiary company of SLJG, a neighbouring HPH company of SLJ V.
SLJ V	:	PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya V, a HPH company of SLJG.

Sumpit	:	Poisonous blowpipe.
Tanah adat	:	Adat land, customary land.
Tanah ulayat	:	Customary land, communal land in Minangkabau (Sumatra) recognised by the government.
Tanah negara	:	State land
TNI	:	*Tentara National Indonesia* (Indonesian National Military; the Army, the Marines, and the Air Force).
TPTI	:	*Tebang Pilih Tanam Indonesia* (Indonesian Selective Cutting and Planting System).
TYSP	:	PT. Tunggal Yudi Sawmill Plywood, a subsidiary company (HPH company) of BPTG.
UUPA	:	*Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria* (Basic Agrarian Law, BAL).

Chapter 1
Introduction

This work centers on the investigation of the rise of the forest conflict phenomenon in East Kalimantan during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation (1998-2001), with the case studies of Matalibaq and Long Bagun Ulu, where the conflicts involved forest companies and indigenous Dayaknese. This introductory chapter presents the background of the study, research questions, theoretical tools used in analysing such phenomenon, the methodology applied in the field research as well as the structure of this study.

Indonesia is the third largest forested and megabiodiversity country in the world with a total forest area of some 92 to 109 million hectares (Barber 1997), third only to Brazil and Democratic Republic of Congo (FWI/GFW 2002, Latin 1999). Although Indonesian territory constitutes only 1.3% of the world's territory, its megabiodiversity contributes to 10% of world's flowering plants, 12% of world's mammals, 17% of world's reptiles and amphibians, and 17% of world's birds (Barber, 1997). The Indonesian rainforest preserves endangered species as well as local culture and has been the home to indigenous peoples for hundreds of years. It supplies food and other sources of livelihood for between 40 and 70 million people that are directly dependent on forests (FAO, www.fao.org; cf. Lynch and Talbott 1995 [in Munggoro and Aliadi 1999], Poffenberger 1997), tens of millions of cubic meters of logs per year, and multi-purpose non-timber forest products (NTFPs). With regard to these functions and potentials, the Indonesian rainforest attracts various stakeholders with various, often conflicting interests.

One of the most important forest stakeholders is the incumbent government. For years after independence (1945), however, the incumbent government did not pay much attention to the abundant forest resources. This negligence was mainly due to the fact that the Indonesian government was focussing on solving the prevalent political problems at that time. During 1945-1949, the newly born government struggled to attain full independence as it had to defend the Republic against neo-colonial power through post-independence revolution struggles as well as to undertake active diplomacy abroad (Jenkins 1983). Successive parliamentary cabinets established during Indonesia's liberal democracy (1950-1959) similarly struggled in laying a new foundation for the Indonesian democracy as well as in suppressing regional rebellions (Amal 1992). During Guided Democracy (1959-1965), President Soekarno posed "politics as a commander"[1] and focused his activities on mobilising people's energies and in balancing the power struggle between the Indonesian Communist Party and the military (Crouch 1988). All of these problems and political activities contributed to the negligence of the

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[1] The supremacy of politics above other aspects. It was stated in Indonesian as *Politik Sebagai Panglima*.

abundant forest resources in the country, particularly in the Outer Islands (outside Java, Madura, and Bali).

Massive forest exploitation in Indonesia commenced only after the New Order (Soeharto's) government assumed power in 1966 (until 1998). According to the new paradigm employed in managing the country, "Development, yes -- Politics, no" (Gaffar 1992:41), the New Order government treated forest resources as an important economic source for foreign exchange to finance development programs. The most important step undertaken by the government was the promulgation of the 1967 Basic Forestry Law and the enactment of laws on foreign and domestic investments. The forestry law declared almost all forest areas as state forest; the state therefore claimed its ultimate rights to control the forest resources across the archipelago (Lindayati 2000). This included the state's rights to "sell" forestland to businessmen through the provision of forest concession rights licenses. The foreign and domestic investment laws provided greater chances to international and domestic business communities to exploit the Indonesian natural resources, including forest resources. In the course of forestry development, however, domestic businessmen later dominated the timber business, mainly because this industry did not require advanced technologies such as the mining and oil industries at that time (Barber 1997).

By means of these measures, the Indonesian rainforest has become a substantial source of foreign exchanges and a new source of state revenues. Until the last decade (prior to the collapse of the New Order regime), the contribution of the timber industry constituted about 20% of the overall foreign exchanges (Kartodihardjo, 1999). Compared to other sources of revenues generated from natural resources such as oil, however, the government gained little profit in the exploitation of forest resources. Whereas the government collected about 85% of the total rents in the oil sector, the forestry sector made up only about 8-30% (Barber, 1997). Although a significant proportion of the timber rent was not collected by the government, government officials claimed that the timber industries accelerated the growth of local economies, provided trickle down effects, and developed backward regions. Nonetheless, a study carried out in East Kalimantan found that the impact of the logging industry to the regional and local economy had been low (Walhi, in Barber 1997).

Indonesia's New Order government also struggled for its survival. Hence, the government utilised all potential natural resources available in the country. The forest resources were of particular importance. Soeharto's government used forest concession arrangements as a means of political patronage (to reward clients, to coopt potential opponents) and to fund civilian and military bureaucracies to maintain loyalty. In the early years of the course of forest exploitation in East Kalimantan, many forest concession licenses were handed to military-owned companies or foundations. In the following years, businessmen connected to Soeharto's inner circle played a significant role in the timber industry, including Soeharto's family and cronies. Their roles were important not only politically but also economically. In the late Soeharto era, "virtually all the top players in the

timber industry [were] connected personally and financially with members of the president's family" (Barber 2000). By means of such arrangements, Soeharto was able to advance his political ambitions and his economic agenda. During economic crisis, for instance, when a bank owned by a foundation connected to the Soeharto family lost $430 million, Soeharto asked the timber tycoons to rescue the bank by compensating the loss. The success of Soeharto in this case portrays the personalistic and patron-client form of the regime. If necessary, "the 'excess rents' accumulated by logging conglomerates were tapped to resolve a significant crisis for the financial stability and credibility of the regime" (Barber 2000).[2] This is not surprising as during his reign, Soeharto had built a sort of predatory state—a concept referring to the state's interest in collecting revenue, rent-seeking, generating income, tax, either from natural resources or from certain business groups[3]—to capture rents from various potential sectors, including the forestry sector.

The forest policies also served as a vehicle to spread the ideological, political, and security doctrines of the New Order. The Pancasila state ideology and the *integralistik* state doctrine as well as the military's dual function (*dwifungsi*) and territorial commands were some instances that were promoted or supported by New Order's forest policies. In addition, forestlands in the Outer Islands were treated as "reserved land" for the densely populated islands of Java, Madura, and Bali by promoting a transmigration program (Barber 2000).

In short, during the New Order regime, Indonesian rainforest had been "a key arena for the New Order's program of economic development, political control, and social and ideological transformation" (Barber 1997). The Indonesian rainforest had been used as a vehicle to advance the regime's political and economic agendas.

The most critical practice of the New Order government in exploiting the Indonesian rainforest was the arbitrary provision of forest concession areas to forest companies. About 50% of the Indonesian rainforest has been designated as production forest to be granted to logging companies through forest concession rights arrangements (HPH licenses), particularly to those connected to Soeharto's inner circle. Up to six million hectares of forest concession area could be obtained by one single company, as was the case of the Barito Pacific Timber Group (BPTG). Moreover, the Government Regulations No. 21/1970 and No. 28/1985 issued by the government prohibited indigenous people of accessing their customary lands. In order to implement these regulations and to protect the regime's allies (forest companies) exploiting the forest, the government used force and coercion (Lindayati, 2000) through the bureaucracy and security apparatus.

Having evoked a steep increase of deforestation by supporting logging companies (HPH companies) in forest degradation, the Indonesian government

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[2] For rent-seeking and patron-client nature of Soeharto's regime, see Robison 1986, Brown 1999, Brown 2001.
[3] See Moselle and Polak 1997, Lips 2000, Boaz 1999, Robinson 1999, Bergessen *et.al*. 2000, Fatton Jr. 1992.

introduced the industrial timber estate scheme (HPHTI/HTI licenses) in 1984 to rejuvenate degraded forests and to sustain timber supplies (Walhi 1996). Paradoxically, industrial timber estate companies (HTI companies) were granted rights not only to lumber the remaining timber stands in the stubbed forests but also to lumber the virgin forests and to clear the forestlands before the area was planted with fast-growing timber species. Again, HTI licenses were mostly given to Soeharto's cronies or those connected to Soeharto's families and inner circle.

These two schemes (HPH and HTI) spawned reactions from those living in and around the forests whose livelihoods relied heavily on forest resources. Tensions increased, and conflicts over access and control of forest resources between local communities and HPH/HTI companies were inevitable. As the New Order government was equipped with a repressive bureaucracy and security apparatus, however, the conflicts could be easily suppressed. In East Kalimantan, some local people defied the forest companies acquiring customary (*adat*) land. However, in most cases local people were afraid to challenge the forest companies. Instead of confrontation, local people preferred to look for other forestlands that had not been exploited yet.

As time progressed, the increasing expansion of forest companies to the forestlands imposed growing threats to local people and their sources of livelihood. Conflicts arose because the locals, particularly the Dayaknese of East Kalimantan, regarded the forests exploited by the companies as their properties (*adat* land).

The collapse of New Order regime in May 1998 changed the situation and entailed a change in the power constellation. A common syndrome of regime change from authoritarian to democratic state power is that the state becomes paralytic politically and bankrupt economically. Pereira *et.al.* maintained that with this syndrome, new democracies faced double challenges, that is, to resume economic growth and to consolidate democracy. The state's efforts concerning structural adjustment programs and the stabilisation of the economy are frequently hampered by the "vast expectations of economic improvement" drawn upon by the population and the vulnerability of the new government to popular pressures and demands of interest groups and lobbies. Furthermore, daily political life and the competitive electoral cycle scotch any attempt of producing long-term programs (Pereira *et.al.* 1993, see also Gill 2000). In the political sector, the state's capacities—particularly in penetrating society, regulating social relationship, and appropriating or using resources in determined ways (Migdal 1988)—eroded. The state is unable to arrange or establish a new and prompt institutional mechanism where all groups must advance their interests and demands through appropriate channels. In the transition period, democratic institutions are unable to "offer the politically relevant groups incentives to process their demands within the institutional framework" (Pereira *et.al* 1993:5). This is the case because reforms mostly bring about a decline in material condition and consumption, at least in a transitional period.

Post-New Order Indonesia exhibited exactly these problems: Economically, the new government faced a severe economic crisis for quite a long period of time,

making it unable to improve the material condition of the population. The people found themselves in financial straits due to a skyrocketing price of most basic commodities. The number of poor people increased by nearly 400% in 1998 (from around 20 millions to nearly 80 millions). Politically, the paralysis of state coercive power evoked the euphoria of *reformasi* (reformation)—euphoria of freedom— among Indonesian people. Any state's attempted intervention in the expression of this freedom movement was ignored since this was regarded as maintaining or introducing an authoritarian style in directing people's aspirations. In this new situation, there was no appropriate distributional conflict mechanism (cf. Pereira *et. al*, 1993); "the rules of the political game [were] uncertain" (Gill 2000:45). As a result, widespread riots and lootings took place soon after Soeharto's fall. This incident portrayed the acute political and economic problems faced by the state and the population.

In the ensuing months, the situation was aggravated even further by ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts and violence. These conflicts were not only driven by ethnic or religious hatred, but also triggered by trivial cases. "Horizontal conflict/violence" (between societies) and "vertical conflict/violence" (between state and society, including violence in separatist movements) were popular terminologies used by the Indonesian media and observers to depict the existing conflicts or violence during this period. The number of violent incidents across the country jumped from 75 reported cases during the period of 1990-1998 to 1,015 reported cases during 1998-2001 (Tadjoeddin 2002). The cost of this violence was tremendous: Thousands of people died, tens of thousands of people took "internal" refuge, thousands of private and public properties and facilities were damaged.

Ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts had a "neighborhood" effect to resource conflicts. Resource conflicts were also on the rise in the country (Bachriadi 2001, FWI/GFW 2001). In the East Kalimantan forestry sector, forest conflicts increased both in quantity and intensity. In terms of quantity, the number of forest conflicts in this province increased from 17 during 1992-1998 to 95 within the period of 1998-2001. In terms of intensity, the rise of forest conflicts was mirrored by a transformation of the forest conflict from "silent conflict" to "conflict with collective actions." Local people not only seized companies' heavy equipment, occupied base camps, blocked logging roads, stopped companies' operation, but also burnt companies' properties and facilities (*Suara Pembaharuan Daily*, 27.02.00). In the Kutai District, 12 local leaders imposed customary sanctions to forest companies and fined them USD 2-5 per cubic meter of total timber production, counted back to the initial companies' production (1970s-1990s).[4] In some villages, local people issued ultimatums to forest companies to leave their concession areas, which never occurred during the New Order era. The

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[4] They were *Kepala Adat* of Long Nyelong, Long Bentuk, Long Pejeng, Long Lees, Rantau Sentosa, Mekar Baru, BPPLH Wilayah Tanah Adat Dayak, Long Tesak, Tanjung Manis, and Gemar Baru. Because the companies rejected the fines imposed by local people, they warned that "if forest companies do not fulfill the demands and fines, they will bear any further consequences" (*Suara Pembaharuan Daily*, 27 February 2000).

most interesting issue in the East Kalimantan forest conflict was that local people mobilised their indigenous potentials to advance their concerns and interests. Many companies were compelled to pour out millions to billions of *Rupiahs* ($ 1 = Rp 9,000-10,000 at that time) to tame the "angry tigers." Some still fight to pay off the lump sum provision.

Thus, the rise of the forest conflict in East Kalimantan after the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime was an interesting phenomenon inasmuch it took place "parallelly" with the rise of ethnic, religious, and communal types of conflicts in contemporary Indonesia. This phenomenon stimulated curiosity to investigate in the causes of the conflicts pertaining to the Indonesian rainforest. Hence, this research study attempts to answer the main question arising from this phenomenon: Why were the forest conflicts on the rise after the collapse of the authoritarian regime? The sub-main questions of this research are as follows: a) Did the forest conflicts intensify during the period of democratic transition (early stage of democratisation) or during the period of democratic consolidation? b) Was this phenomenon affected by the change of political environment characterised by an institutional breakdown? c) What were the motives behind the forest conflicts? Did the motives change in the new political setting? d) Which indigenous resources were used by the elites in the movement against the forest companies? Were the indigenous resources decisive for the success of the indigenous people's movement? What were the strategies used by the elites in mobilising such resources during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation?

There are two main reasons for addressing these questions. First, the existing research on resource conflicts did not pay much attention on the link between regime change/democratisation and the rise of resource conflicts. The available research mainly focuses on the link between resource condition (scarcity or abundance) and conflict. Although some researchers have addressed the importance of the political aspect in resource conflicts and have discussed the link between democracy and resource conflicts, investigation on the rise of resource conflicts *when* democracy is promoted is relatively neglected. Second, the rise of forest conflicts in East Kalimantan after the collapse of Indonesia's authoritarian regime is a new phenomenon. A remarkable characteristic of this new phenomenon is that local elites mobilised indigenous resources (ethnic-based resources) to achieve their collective goals. This East Kalimantan phenomenon, that is the indigenous resource mobilisation in the forest conflict, to my knowledge has not been deeply explored yet by researchers.

The rise of forest conflicts in East Kalimantan, including the study cases, constitutes a complex phenomenon. In order to depict this phenomenon more clearly, the conflicts will be examined from different angles. This is not intended to segment the phenomenon at hand, but merely to provide a more satisfying explanation of such phenomenon. This led me to use some major tools or theories offered by related disciplines. The most important ones are the regime change/ democratisation theory, the political opportunities explanation in a changing political environment, the elite theory in ethnonationalist mobilisation, resource

mobilisation theory, greed and grievance theories in resource conflicts, and the collective action theory in social movement. Although not all of these theories are originally associated with forest conflicts, they offer basic tools of analysis in explaining the phenomenon.

The regime change/democratisation theory is applied to provide a framework for the analysis. It sheds light on the happenings in Indonesian politics in recent years as well as the change in the political framework that increased the risks of conflict, including forest conflicts. In theory, democratisation can only develop because of the intention of the existing authoritarian regime to liberalise/ democratise (Snyder 2000) or the collapse of the authoritarian regime (Huntington 1991). What happened in Indonesia was the latter. The collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in Indonesia had a great impact on Indonesian politics. Due to popular demands and a strong pressure from democratic forces, the ensuing regimes had no choice other than to democratise the political system. As occurred elsewhere, however, during democratic transition or during early stage of democratisation, political institutions were still weak. The institutional breakdown of the authoritarian regime still characterised the political system; viable political institutions to deal with dissidents were not present yet; the "only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 2001) was still absent. *Laissez-faire* politics were present for a relatively long period of time, before a new democratic government could consolidate the democracy. The change of the political environment characterised by the institutional breakdown at the national level which occurred between 1998-2001 in Indonesian politics affected the political environment across the entire archipelago, including in the village level. This in turn provided political opportunities for the repressed masses. Thus, this theory provides an explanation on the relevance of the change of the political framework in association with the rise of many types of conflicts, including forest conflicts.

The elite theory in ethnonationalist mobilisation during the early stage of democratisation offers an explanation on the decisive role of elites in the transitional period by exploiting, generating, or "selling" ethnic-based feelings, sentiments or resources to achieve certain goals (Snyder 2000, van Klinken 2002). Although this explanation focuses on the issue of violent conflict between ethnic groups, it is also relevant for the analysis of non-violent conflicts between local communities and forest companies. This is because forest conflicts in the study cases involved particular ethnic groups whereas the elites used ethnic-based sentiments and resources in the struggle against the forest companies. This theory becomes more convincing in the explanation of the rise of forest conflicts when it is combined with the resource mobilisation theory. The resource mobilisation theory deals with the resources to be deployed and the strategy of using such resources. In East Kalimantan, in the study cases in particular, the indigenous resources used by the elites in the struggle against the forest companies are the *masyarakat adat* (adat community), the *adat* institution, and the *tanah adat* (customary land) institution. These resources are ethnic-based resources of indigenous people of East Kalimantan (Dayaknese) and play a critical role in

dealing with the forest companies. To a large extent, the rise of an indigenous resource mobilisation can be seen as the rise of an ethnolocalist mobilisation.

Greed and grievance theories have become one school of thought in the discourse of resource conflict, particularly in analysing the driving forces of resource conflicts. They provided an explanation on grievance-motivated behaviour (justice-seeking) and greed-motivated behaviour (loot-seeking) in resource conflicts. Thus, these theories have to do with conflict motives of the actors. These theories are mostly used in analysing violent resource conflicts, and the greed theory receiving particularly much attention in recent years. Although this research deals with non-violent forest conflicts, these theories offer a tool of analysis in examining the phenomenon of the rise of the forest conflict. In order to be applicable to forest conflicts, however, a generic terminology is used to replace the "greed" terminology, that is, the economically motivated behaviour or the economic-gain seeking motive. Although certain elites used the conflict situation to obtain private economic gains, local people did not loot their belongings (timbers in customary land). They merely demanded material/cash compensation that they felt they deserved due to the "encroachment" of their adat land by forest companies. In violent resource conflicts, greed theory is mostly applied to analyse the motive of rebel leaders or conflict entrepreneurs. In forest conflicts, the economic motives of the elites are crucial. However, as the local people struggled for compensation, this economic motive is shared by all villagers (along with the grievance motive).

The collective action theory is worthwhile in analysing people's action against forest companies. In fact, the rise of the forest conflict was caused by extensive mass action against forest companies. This theory is of importance to shed light on how local people come into action, such as during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation. Risk consideration in staging collective action during the period of institutional breakdown (democratic transition) did take place from the mass side. At this point, the role of the elites is of importance again in handling the problem of collective action (free-riders) by offering selective incentives to the participants of collective action. In this regard, the collective action theory will help explain the issue of free-riding and how the elites dealt with potential free-riders so that well-prepared or well organised collective actions in the field sites could be staged during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation.

In order to analyse this phenomenon as well as the research questions, this study presents local (village) case studies. Although local case studies may not serve for a generalisation of the phenomenon, case studies offer the possibility to explore the phenomenon more deeply. Eckstein argued that case studies "may certainly score a clean knockout over a theory" (Eckstein, quoted in King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

As noted, this research examines *non-violent* forest conflicts. There are two reasons for this containment. First, almost all forest conflicts in East Kalimantan were non-violent. Second, violent forest conflicts (e.g. burning companies' base camps or heavy equipment, etc) mostly ended with criminal charges so that

people's struggles against forest companies were easily undermined, or they terminated without considerable outcomes. In order to gain an enhanced insight into non-violent forms of forest conflict, a comparative study was carried out. In this study, Matalibaq and Long Bagun Ulu were selected as crucial case studies for four reasons. First, the rise of forest conflicts in both villages was affected by the change in national politics, that is the change of regimes from authoritarian rule to democratic rule. Second, the Matalibaq conflict is a monumental forest conflict which considerably contributed to the rise of other forest conflicts in East Kalimantan. Long Bagun Ulu conflict was a demonstration effect of Matalibaq conflict. Third, the forest conflicts in both villages stand for two types of forest conflicts to be analysed in this research study. The forest conflict in Matalibaq was carried out between local people and the HTI company (industrial timber estate company) while the forest conflict in Long Bagun Ulu involved local people and the HPH company (logging company). Fourth, forest companies in both sites were owned by conglomerates connected to the previous authoritarian government. Thus an analysis of the forest conflicts in both villages can clearly expose the implication of regime change at national level on the rise of forest conflict at local (village) level.

The case studies of this research will be presented using qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is drawn from qualitative and quantitative data collected from key informants, respondents, conflicting parties (conflict documents and general documents), and related research reports. The methods of data collection used in this study were observation, interviews, questionnaires, and documentary research. The key informants interviewed for this research were selected by the researcher on the basis of their knowledge on the issue (purposive). Most commonly, semi structure interviews were used in the interview process. Informal interview/communication was also carried out to avoid debilitating formality so that key informants did not have to worry to speak up in sensitive issues. In order to select respondents, the population of the study was determined in the first place, particularly to assess the risks of action in the new political environment. A large number of households (household heads) were looked into to get a picture of the study population, and based on this, a number of samples was determined. Structure interviews (questionnaires) were used for the interviews with the respondents.

This research study has four objectives. First, to achieve a better understanding of the phenomenon of the rise of forest conflicts during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation. Second, to identify the key entry point for durable conflict resolution in the period of democratic consolidation. Third, to examine the rise of the ethnolocalist mobilisation phenomenon in East Kalimantan in recent years, particularly during the democratic transition period. Fourth, to contribute to the enrichment of the existing body of knowledge on democratisation and resource conflict.

The organisation of this work is presented in seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the research background, research problems, and research questions of the

study. This chapter also clarifies the logic behind this work, and presents a) the reasons on why such questions are important to address, b) the major tools which were used to adequately tackle the research questions, and c) the structure of the whole study report.

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework used in this study. It is aimed at providing a theoretical foundation for the explanation of the phenomenon of rising forest conflicts in the study cases. Furthermore, it theorises a) the linkage between regime change/democratisation and conflict, b) why regime change/ democratisation increases the risk of conflict, c) the institutional breakdown that generates political opportunities to act, d) the conflict motives and driving forces of forest conflicts, e) resource mobilisation, and f) the logic of collective action. In addition to these points, working definitions of the types of conflict and the period of democratisation are presented as parameters to assess in which period forest conflicts intensified in the field sites.

Chapter 3 examines the regime change and democratisation process in Indonesian politics. It also analyses the institutional breakdown occurred during the early stage of democratisation. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to provide a political framework for the analysis of the aforementioned phenomenon in the study cases. An overview of regime changes from the New Order (Soeharto's) authoritarian regime to democratic regimes (Habibie's, Wahid's, and Megawati's regime) as well as the characteristics of the respective regimes will be discussed. Concerning the analysis of institutional breakdown, Chapter 3 will focus on the collapse of repressive institutions that had been previously used by the New Order regime in impeding conflicts with dissidents of Indonesian society, namely the repressive security institution, the repressive bureaucratic institution, and the mass depoliticisation institution (floating mass institution). These three institutions had great effects on the general population during the New Order era. Chapter 3 will also attempt to show the rise of various conflicts in Indonesia—which can be simply subdivided into violent conflicts and non-violent conflicts—immediately after the collapse of the New Order regime. The purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate that the state's "collapse" or institutional breakdown greatly contributed to the rise of many types of conflicts.

Chapter 4 highlights the diverse forest policies, forest exploitation schemes as well as forest conflicts in Indonesia and East Kalimantan under the particular regimes. The discussion sets out with an analysis of the forest policies deployed by the incumbent government from historical perspectives (from the colonial period to the present time). In this respect, the discussion focuses on the origin and the development of discourses between state vs. community on resource control in Indonesia. Following this, the forest exploitation schemes enacted during the New Order and post-New Order regimes both at national level (Indonesia) and provincial level (East Kalimantan) will be presented. The discussion will emphasise on logging concession (HPH) arrangements and industrial timber estate (HTI) arrangements from the perspective of political economy as both HPH companies and HTI companies are active in the field sites. Having examined these

two issues (forest politics and forest exploitation), the discussion will move to the forest conflicts in Indonesia and East Kalimantan which were affected by regime change. The purpose of this chapter, particularly in view of the East Kalimantan case, is to provide a foundation for the discussion of the forest conflicts in the village cases.

Chapter 5 discusses the forest conflict in one of the study cases, namely the Matalibaq forest conflict. It firstly presents a general overview of the conflicting parties, the Matalibaq Dayaknese and the PT. Anangga Pundinusa (a HTI Company). Next, the discussion examines the formation of the forest conflict as well as when and how the conflict intensified. The main focus of this chapter will be on demonstrating how the political change at national level implicates changes at village/local level which later bring about opportunities for local people to act against the forest companies. The significance of the elites' motives in the conflict that were shared by the masses and the role of the elites in the field of indigenous resource mobilisation to persuade the masses to stage collective action will come under scrutiny as well.

Chapter 6 discusses the forest conflict in the other study case of Long Bagun Ulu. A general overview of the conflicting parties, Long Bagun Ulu Dayaknese and PT. Sumalindo Lestari Jaya V (a HPH company), will be presented in the introductory part. Subsequently, a discussion will follow on how the conflict emerged, and when and how the conflict intensified. Similar to the previous chapter (Chapter 5), Chapter 6 focuses on the question of how the change of political environment at national level implicated the change of Long Bagun Ulu's political environment that later "offered" opportunities to act for local people. The role of the elites' motives that were shared by the masses and their significance for the mobilisation of indigenous resources will also be scrutinised.

In the last chapter of this study, Chapter 7, both study cases (Matalibaq and Long Bagun Ulu forest conflicts) are compared and a conclusion of the findings is presented. Similarities and differences of the phenomenon of the rise forest conflicts in both study cases will be examined, with particular attention paid to the people's action against forest companies (intensifying forest conflicts), conflict motives, and indigenous resource mobilisation. This chapter also attempts to assess the risks and problems of conceivable future forest conflicts as well as to identify the key entry point in conflict resolution and to draw attention on the relationship between such a key entry point and democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework

A. State of the Art

Scholars investigating the resource conflict phenomenon have conducted a substantial amount of research on the relationship between natural resources and conflict. There are two broad themes or streams in the development of research on resource conflicts (de Soysa 2002). The first one focuses on the condition of natural resources, and emphasis is placed on the causality between resource scarcities and conflict (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1997; Barber 1997, Diehl and Gleditsch 2000). The second one highlights the driving forces of resource conflicts, greed vs. grievance, and emphasis is placed on greed-driven conflict (Collier 1998, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1999, 2001; Ross 2001, 2002).

As far as the first stream is concerned (resource scarcities), the findings suggest that resources degradation or scarcities cause resource conflict (e.g. Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994; Percival and Homer Dixon 2001; Diehl and Gleditsch 2001). This stream of thought identifies environmental physical change, population growth or pressures (including migration), and unequal resource distribution as the main relevant variables (Homer-Dixon 1994). In contrast, some experts found that conflicts contributed positively to natural resources degradation/scarcities in some cases (Swain 1996; Isaac and Hosh 1997). Although opposing arguments exist, there is a widespread understanding that resource scarcities have a reciprocal relationship with conflict. Conflict on one hand can contribute to resource degradation or scarcities; resource scarcities on the other hand can cause the conflict (Westing, Fox, and Renner 2001).

According to this perspective, known as the Toronto school (Dalby 2003), resource scarcities (renewable as well as non-renewable resources) are not only found in resource-poor countries but also in resource-rich or resource-abundant countries. While resource scarcities are commonly found in resource-poor countries, resource scarcities in resource-abundant countries (relative scarcities) can be crop up with one or more of the following phenomena: First, the shrinking resource use. It is argued that an excessive exploitation of natural resources threatens the interests of stakeholders, particularly those living in and around the forest. Tensions or conflicts are therefore inevitable due to growing degradation or scarcities. The second phenomenon is the one of demand-induced scarcity which describes a situation when the demand for resources exceeds the available supplies (e.g. timber demand vs. timber supply). Thus natural resources are managed unsustainably. Scarcities caused by immoderate demands are regarded responsible for the rise of resource conflicts. The distributive scarcity of natural resources constitutes the third detectable phenomenon. Here, the use of resources or the

access to them is unequally distributed. One party may have more privileges to exploit natural resources than the other. This inequality is also deemed responsible for the rise of forest conflicts (Homer-Dixon, in Barber 1997). Barber has examined these three issues within the forestry sector in the case of Indonesia. His findings suggest that growing scarcities of forest resources considerably contributed to forest conflicts in Indonesia (Barber 1997). Studies on resource scarcities (relative scarcities or not) in India, Pakistan, Mexico, Gaza, Rwanda, South Africa, Tand China, also identified links between the eruption of conflicts and an increasing scarcity of natural resources.[1]

Undoubtedly Homer-Dixon and his group's approach have dominated the discourse of environmental/resource conflicts for some years. In the development of this research stream, Levy challenged the Toronto school. Levy argued that an approach as represented by the Toronto school is "analytically uninteresting" (Levy 2000) because too much emphasis is placed on the independent variable of resource scarcities. He provided the example of Singapore. He argued that Singapore was a resource-poor country or was suffering from natural resource scarcities, but that incidents of conflicts, particularly violent conflicts, were almost nonexistent. Therefore, Levy proposed "shifting the focus to conflict *per se*, rather than [to] environmentally caused conflict" (Levy 2000). In other words, the conflict itself should be the core interest in the research on resource conflicts (Levy 2000). In Levy's views, no one will reject the relationship between resource scarcities and conflict as the investigation on environmentally caused conflicts has done since the 1970s with the same or similar conclusions. According to Levy, the most important thing is to understand what actually happens as the conflict emerges so that one can assess its consequences and provide remedies thereafter (Levy 2000).

The second stream focuses research on the agenda or motives of the conflicting parties, particularly in the case of greed-driven conflicts, which is in line with Levy's argument to a certain extent. The greed-driven conflict explanation emerged to challenge a dominant approach analysing the driving force of resource conflicts, namely the grievance-driven conflict approach. It was previously argued that the conflict was generated by grievance of one or more conflicting parties. In Collier's view, this argument could be misleading and therefore measures to deal with the conflicts by means of government or donor policies would be ineffective. Accordingly, Collier came up with the greed-driven conflict approach. As he carried out a macro level statistical analysis of numerous countries, he found that most conflicts were driven by the greed of the conflicting parties, either the greed of the rebel groups or the incumbent governments. He concluded that in many violent resource conflicts greed outperforms grievance. On

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[1] This worldwide research project, chaired/coordinated by Homer-Dixon, was conducted under the theme "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict". For country case studies, see Homer-Dixon and Percival 1997 (India); Gizewski and Homer-Dixon 1996 (Pakistan); Howard and Homer-Dixon 1995 (Mexico); Kelly and Homer-Dixon 1995 (Gaza); Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995 (Rwanda); Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995 (South Africa); and Economy 1997 (China).

the basis of this finding, he suggested to change the existing approaches in field of conflict resolution. Numerous studies were then conducted based on this argument (Berdal and Malone 2000).

A derivative of this approach can be found in the research attempting to link the driving forces of conflict to the condition of natural resources. Ross's research provided an explanation for the linkage between exploitation of natural resources and the greed of conflicting parties (Ross 2001, 2002, 2002a, 2003, 2003a), by arguing that the extraction of resource in resource-rich areas provides looting opportunities for rebel groups (Ross 2001). Renner also examined the characteristics of the exploitation of natural resources and the economic agenda of the conflicting parties. Renner suggested that rich natural resources have become conflict commodities in many violent conflicts. Revenues obtained from conflict commodities have been used either to enrich the rebel leaders, smugglers, and elites in the governments or to compensate the expenses of the conflicts (Renner 2002). De Soysa's work concluded that "rapacity encouraged by an abundance of natural resources tends to fuel civil conflict. Paucity of natural resources, on the other hand, does not seem to be such a strong factor in determining the likelihood of civil strife, despite the recent upsurge of interest in environmental degradation and scarcity as a source of conflict" (de Soysa 2000:127).

Such findings suggest that greed-driven conflicts linked to an abundance of natural resources. This constitutes a challenge to the Toronto school belief that it is resource scarcities which cause conflict. Yet, if one acknowledges the concept of relative scarcities (degradation or growing scarcities in resource-rich countries) the above findings do not necessarily contradict with the Toronto school's approach. Barber's finding on resource predation by elites in resource-rich country that contributed to conflict may serve as evidence (Barber 1997).

However, both research streams do not pay sufficient attention on the phenomenon of the rise of conflict under a certain (political) condition. For instance, both perspectives do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the rise of conflicts in transitional periods when the regimes change from authoritarian state power to a democratic one. However, it is important to incorporate this variable to better understand how conflicts develop in certain political conditions as well as to gain other underlying insights into the efforts to find the crucial entry point for a durable conflict resolution (e.g. through democratic consolidation). Although the body of knowledge on this issue is thin, a number of prerequisites have been addressed to understand this phenomenon. Barber highlighted the importance of the state's capacity in managing resource scarcities which could prevent the conflict (Barber 1997). Similarly, Peluso analysed the state's ideology in regard to the control of natural resources that contribute to resource conflicts (Peluso 1992). Diehl and Gleditsch have emphasised the importance of regime types in the field of resource conflicts. They even suggested including the political aspect in future research agendas on resource conflict as they regard regime types as a powerful element in such conflicts (Diehl and Gleditsch 2001). In addition, by referring to the phenomenon of Western liberal democracy, Midlarsky argued that democracy

is compatible with environmental protection, and therefore, it potentially prevents conflicts. This is ascribed to the fact that in a democratic regime, as Midlarsky maintains, the state recognises individual rights and property rights and involves the population in the decision-making process. Without pluralism, certain groups may be denied their rights in the decision-making process and as a result resource conflicts are inevitable (Midlarsky, 2001). However, democracy *per se* is not sufficient to prevent conflicts. In many new democracies, particularly in developing countries, resource conflicts are ubiquitous.

Researchers who agree that democratic institutions are supportive of environmental protection are concerned with the question of why attempts to avert conflicts fail in many democratic states, particularly in the developing world. In order to answer this question, research mainly focuses on ("static") democratic condition of particular countries and the existence of resource conflicts (Midlarsky 2001, Walker 1999). However, little attention is devoted to the question of how resource conflicts develop due to the introduction of democracy. This research study attempts to fill this gap by contributing a new dimension to the explanation of the link between the rise of resource conflicts and the development of a new democracy.

In addition, while resource scarcities spawning conflict have been widely investigated (for the Indonesian case, see Barber 1997), and greed and grievance-driven conflicts have been drawn upon for the explanation of violent conflicts (for Aceh and West Papua cases, see Ross 2003b), this research will apply the greed (economic-gain) and grievance-driven conflict theory to non-violent resource conflicts.

B. Regime Change, Democratisation, and Conflict
B.1. Regime Change and Democratisation: Working Definitions
B.1.1. Regime and Regime Change

In the Dictionaries, a regime is defined as "a form of government," "a government in power," "a prevailing social system or pattern,"[2] a "mode or system of rule," a "character of government,"[3] or "the organization that is the governing authority of a political unit."[4] Thus, besides referring to the rule, regime terminology is used to refer to the body or organisation. The term regime referring to body or organisation, and even actor, is also found in 16 definitions of political regimes provided by researchers that were collected by Munck (1996). Peter Calvert, for instance said that "[a] regime is the name usually given to a government or sequence of governments in which power remains essentially in the hands of the same *social group*." Michael Mann suggested that a regime is "an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power *actors,* coordinated

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[2] *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, Fourth Edition, 2000, published by Houghton Mifflin Company.
[3] Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc.
[4] Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913), http://dict.die.net/regime/

by the rulers of the state." T.J. Pempel maintains that "a regime's character will be determined by the *societal coalition on which a state rests,* the formal powers of that state, and by the institutionalization and bias of the public policies that result" (emphasis by Munck; quoted in Munck 1996). These definitions reflect a variety and even an overarching concept of "regime." This raises concerns among political scientists as Munck suggests:

> The basic reason why regime analysis constitutes a coherent agenda is that it has, for the most part, formulated a variety of concepts that have retained a common overarching concept: the concept of political regime. That is, whether analysts have focused on the study of democracy or authoritarianism, on problems of transition or consolidation, their work has been conceived with reference to a broader and more encompassing notion of political regime or some other concept, such as form of government, system of government, or system of governance, which has been used interchangeably with political regime. Nonetheless, very rarely do regime analysts stop to define what they mean by political regime and even more rarely do they actually consider how the definition of political regime they implicitly or explicitly adopt can serve as a tool to organize their inquiries (Munck 1996).

In the study of democracy or democratisation, the terminology of "regime" or "political regime" is usually used to refer to the rules (formal or informal), not referring to the body, organisation, or actor. Laurence Whitehead stated that "[t]he term 'political regime' denotes a defined set of institutions and 'rules of the game' that regulate access to, and the uses of, positions of public authority in a given society" whereas Stephanie Lawson insisted that "[t]he concept of regime is concerned with the form of rule... [R]egimes embody the norms and principles of the political organization of the state, which are set out in the rules and procedures within which governments operate." Scott Mainwaring suggested that "Regime...is a broader concept than government and refers to the rules (formal or not) that govern the interaction of the major actors in the political system. The notion of regime involves institutionalization, i.e., the idea that such rules are widely understood and accepted, and that actors pattern their behavior accordingly." Last but not least, Guillermo O'Donnell maintained that "[t]he regime is the set of effectively prevailing patterns (not necessarily legally formalized) that establish the modalities of recruitment and access to government roles and the criteria for representation and the permissible resources that form the basis for expectations of access to such roles" (quoted in Munck 1996).

This research uses a definition of regime commonly used in the study of democratisation as a form of rule imposed by those in power that govern the society. Thus, Soeharto's regime in this work means Soeharto's rule, Habibie's regime means Habibie's rule, authoritarian regime means authoritarian rule, and democratic regime means democratic rule. Similarly, Soeharto's authoritarian

regime means Soeharto's authoritarian rule, Wahid's democratic regime means Wahid's democratic rule, and so forth.

Regime change therefore refers to the change from one form of rule to another form of rule. Regime change may occur due to the change from one authoritarian regime (rule) to another authoritarian regime (rule). However, it may also occur due to a change from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. Similarly, a regime change also counts in a change from a democratic regime to another democratic regime. In this work, what I mean by "regime change" is the change from authoritarian regime (Soeharto's regime) to democratic regime (Habibie's, Wahid's, Megawati's regime). Thus the term "forest conflicts during regime change" refers to forest conflicts in the field sites that occurred when Soeharto's regime collapsed and was replaced by the ensuing democratic Habibie and Wahid regimes.

B.1.2. Early Stage of Democratisation, Democratic Transition, and Democratisation and Regime Change

Since the publication of Huntington's *The Third Wave of Democratisation* (1991), there has been a growing number of studies examining the democratisation phenomenon across the globe. However, there is no single and ultimate definition provided by researchers or even a provision of precise criteria for democratisation (Huntington 1991; Qadir, Clapham, and Gills 1993; Shin 1992, Koppel 1993, Snyder 2002)[5] and of the "borderline" between liberalisation and democratisation (Linz and Stepan 1996; Qadir, Clapham, and Gills 1993; Shin 1992; Koppel 1993), democratic transition and democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996, Diamond 1999, Haynes 2001, O'Donnell 1997, Bertrand 2002),[6] democratising states and mature democracies (Snyder 2000),[7] and so forth.

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[5] Qadir, Clapham, and Gills state that "political liberalization implies a process of political change controlled from top down as a means of preserving most of status quo. It is a game elites to play to manage the granting of very carefully selected concessions. It is a cosmetic exercise and does not install the fundamentals of democratization. However, political liberalization may sometimes lead to a deeper process of democratization, if the impetus for change escape from elite control to encompass broader social forces and its purpose is transformed from preservation of interests to genuine reform" (Qadir, Clapham, and Gills 1993). In this definition, one will find difficulties in drawing the "borderline" between liberalisation and democratisation.

[6] Linz and Stepan maintains that "[a] democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislature and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*" (Linz and Stepan 1996:3). For a "negotiable" version, see quotations in Bertrand's analysis.

[7] Jack Snyder argues that "[t]he term democratization distinguishes between mature democracies and democratizing states… The category of democratizing states is a very broad one. It includes states like the Czech Republic in the early 1990s, which made a transition from autocracy to virtually complete democracy. However, it also includes the former Yugoslavia just before its

Among definitions given by researchers, democratisation has been used both in a broad sense of the term (Huntington 1991, Snyder 2000, Bertrand 2002) and in a specific sense of the term (Linz and Stepan 1996, 1997, 2001; Qadir, Clapham, and Gills 1993; Shin 1992, Koppel 1993). The former refers democratisation to a whole process beginning from the collapse of the authoritarian regime to the establishment of a consolidated democracy (from liberalisation to democratisation, from democratic transition to democratic consolidation, from democratising state to mature democracy). In this definition, phrases such as "initial phase of democratisation," "initial stage of democratisation," "early stage of democratisation" (Snyder 2000), or "transitional phase of democratisation" (Mansfield and Snyder, quoted in Huntington 1997) are introduced, although the longevity of the initial/early stage or transitional phase of democratisation is not taken into consideration. The latter refers democratisation to "a wider and more specifically political concept" compared to liberalisation (Linz and Stepan 1995). The definition of liberalisation and democratisation are introduced to understand the processes of democratic transition and democratic consolidation. However, as mentioned above, the "demarcation" between democratic transition and democratic consolidation as well as between liberalisation and democratisation is still vague or debatable. Moreover, the *precise* relationship between liberalisation-democratisation and democratic transition-democratic consolidation remains unclear. Is liberalisation typically found during democratic transition? Is it impossible that democratisation can be found during democratic transition? (cf. Bertrand 2002).

This study uses the term "democratisation" in its broad sense, embracing both the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime as well as the current Megawati's regime. Thus, it includes terms as "liberalisation" and "democratisation" as well as the terms "democratic transition" and "democratic consolidation." In assessing the phenomenon of the rise of forest conflict, emphasis is placed on the period of democratic transition (May 1998-July 2001) and democratic consolidation (July 2001-present), hence focusing on the period in which the forest conflict was on the rise, whether during democratic transition or democratic consolidation. The terms "initial stage/phase of democratisation" and "transitional period of democratisation" are used to refer to the democratic transition period, while the period of democratic consolidation is labeled as "consolidated stage/phase of democratisation."

In order to attain a comprehensive picture of Indonesia's democratisation, Bertrand used the term "democratisation to include both the periods of transition

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breakup in 1991, when elections were contested for the first time in which circumstances of somewhat freer speech, yet electoral fairness and the rule of law were hardly well established…At what moment does a successfully democratizing state become a mature democracy?… Some scholars use the "two turnover rule" to define democratic consolidation: that is, a democracy is consolidated when power has changed hands twice as a result of free and fair election. Others say that democracy is consolidated when it is 'the only game in town,'… Finally, others measure the degree to which the country has achieved the institutional and legal characteristics of a mature democracy…" (Snyder 2000:25-27).

and consolidation" (Bertrand 2002). Concerning the "demarcation" between democratic transition and democratic consolidation in the Indonesian case, he introduced the following working definition of democratic transition:

> The period of democratisation began in May 1998. After three days of rioting in Jakarta and other major cities of Indonesia, President Suharto resigned and his Vice-President, B.J. Habibie, was sworn in as President…Legislative elections were held in June 1997 and presidential elections in October of the same year…After October 1999, one can argue that Indonesia continued a democratic transition or entered a period of democratic consolidation. If one takes the minimal definition of transition, it ended with the election of new parliament and Abdurrachman Wahid as president, especially since opposition political parties made gains.[8] By other accounts, such as Linz and Stepan's definition, the transition was not over. The military continued to play an important role in the polity and even maintained appointed seats in the country's highest governing body, the People's Consultative Assembly (Bertrand 2002).

And in respect to democratic consolidation, Bertrand suggests:

> In July 2001, after months of political wrangling between the national legislature and President Wahid, the latter was impeached because of an alleged corruption scandal by a process that followed dubious legal procedures. Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had been Wahid's Vice President, was sworn in as President. Despite the questionable process of Megawati's accession to power, it can be argued that Indonesia entered a period of democratic consolidation at that time. The military remained important but did not challenge Megawati's presidency despite a period of high uncertainty. Although Megawati appeared to become closer to the armed forces after a few months in power, her presidency allowed for much deepening of the democratic process, including significant constitutional amendments and reforms that continued to limit the military's ability to intervene with civilian process (Bertrand 2002).

Thus, even if taking Bertrand's assessment into account, the period of democratic transition can still be "discussed." However, a working definition is required for analytical purposes, which is used in this research study to assess in which period the forest conflict was on the rise. Based on the above explanation, this research uses a working definition as summarised in the following table.

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[8] Although Megawati's party won the 1999 election, Wahid was elected/appointed President by People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Free-election was held on 7 June 1999 and the President was appointed in October 1999; thus, there was a four-month long gap. This is one reason (besides Bertrand's explanation) why the "demarcation" between liberalisation and democratisation is vague in the Indonesian case.