



Resignification of Borders: Eurasianism and the Russian World

Nina Friess / Konstantin Kaminskij (eds.)

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Inside Out Identities: Eurasianism and the Russian World

In 2008 the members of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) voted to change the name of the Association to ASEES, the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. “Suddenly, ‘Eurasia’ is everywhere,” wrote Stephen Kotkin just one year earlier, critically describing the reshaping of the field of Slavic Studies in Western academia.¹ At the dawn of the millennium, the term “Eurasia” transformed the way we think about the Slavic world, Russia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the post-socialist space in general. Nevertheless, the concepts of both Eurasia and Eurasianism lack a clear definition or even a common denominator. In Russia, as Kotkin recaps, Eurasia generally means anti-Western; in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, Eurasia generally means Western-friendly; and in Turkey Eurasia can mean either anti-Western or Western-friendly.² In Western academia, on the other hand, the term Eurasia has profitably replaced “post-Soviet” as a way to describe former Soviet republics without referring openly to the Soviet legacy. It is used to describe Russia *and* the other new independent states, as well as the new independent states *without* Russia.³

The concept of Eurasia has benefited the field of Slavic Studies, making it more diverse and inclusive, as stated by ASEES president Bruce Grant in 2012.⁴ One has to bear in mind, however, that the concept stems from “Eurasianism”, a controversial intellectual interwar movement, which was reintegrated into the Russian national identity discourse after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. This was subsequently reflected in the West as a substitute ide-

1 Stephen Kotkin, “Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance across the Post-Mongol space,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 8 (2007): 487–531.

2 Ibid., 497.

3 Marlene Laruelle, “The paradoxical legacy of Eurasianism,” in *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, ed. Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 187–194.

4 Bruce Grant, “We are All Eurasian,” *Newsnet* 52:1 (2012): 1–6.

ology for “Sovietism”⁵ or as a manifestation of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions.⁶ Today, a more nuanced approach to Eurasianism is on the way, one which recognizes it as an early experiment in postcolonial thinking⁷ and an alternative to Eurocentric world history, as Jack Goody demonstrates in his influential study, *The Eurasian Miracle*.⁸

Eurasianism has proved to be an unexpectedly diverse and highly self-reflexive concept. By transforming the way we describe the Eurasian landmass, it also resignifies our field of studies and its disciplinary boundaries. In this process, Eurasianism itself is subject to a constant resignification.

The present volume of essays builds on this notion while pursuing an innovative approach to Eurasianism. The authors advance the well-established positions that view Eurasianism as a historical intellectual movement or as an ideology of Russian neo-Imperialism, and proceed to unpack a vision of Eurasianism as a process of renegotiating cultural values and identity narratives—in and beyond Russia. This procedural approach provides deeper insight into the operability of the identity narratives and shifting semantics of Eurasianism in its relation to the Russian World.

The Russian World is another open concept with blurred semantic boundaries. Born in the 1980s as a universalist concept in historical philosophy, the “Russian World” soon developed a subversive meaning which transgressed the idea of the Russian state.⁹ Vladimir Putin first mentioned the term in 2001, in 2006 he promoted it as a soft power strategy. It was quickly institutionalized in the Russian World Foundation, which was founded in 2007 on the blueprint of similar cultural promotion agencies, such as the British Council and the German Goethe Institute.

5 Marlene Laruelle, “The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: An imperial version of Russian nationalism,” *Nationalities Papers* 32 (2004): 115–136.

6 Sergey Glebov, “Whither Eurasia: History of Ideas in Imperial Situation,” *Ab Imperio* 2 (2008): 345–376.

7 Nikolay Smirnov, “Left-Wing Eurasianism,” e-flux 97 (2019), accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/97/252238/left-wing-eurasianism-and-postcolonial-theory/>.

8 Jack Goody, *The Eurasian Miracle* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).

9 Mikhail Nemtsev, “Rethinking the ‘Russian World,’” *Riddle* (2019), accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.ridl.io/en/rethinking-the-russian-world/>. For a brief history of the concept, see Marlene Laruelle, *The “Russian World”: Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination* (Washington, D.C.: Center on Global Interests, 2015), accessed June 28, 2019, http://globalinterests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FINAL-CGI-Russian-World_Marlene-Laruelle.pdf.

The discrepancy between the concepts of Eurasianism and the Russian World constitute a major controversy embedded in integrationist policies in the post-Soviet space. The distinction between the two is substantial: with the Eurasian Economic Union, Eurasianism eventually developed a set of *geopolitical* ideas more focused on governing territories rather than articulating identity discourses. The Russian World, in contrast, especially in the wake of the annexation of Crimea, virtually transformed into a *biopolitical* doctrine premised on protecting an imagined trans-territorial community of Russian speakers who allegedly share a common macro-identity.

Thus, the relation between Eurasianism and the Russian World may seem contradictory if regarded from the viewpoint of political ideology, but it seems a more complementary one if regarded as a renegotiation process of cultural semantics.

Eurasianism and the Russian World

An important starting point of this renegotiation process is the fundamental origin myth of the Russian state. This was fiercely debated in the mid-18th century alongside the question of where the Russians came from. In 1749, Gerhard Friedrich Müller, a German historian in the Russian Academy of Sciences, provided the so-called Normanist theory, which pushes the notion that Russian people originated from a northwestern, Scandinavian acculturation process. Another member of the Academy, however, the chemist and celebrated court poet Mikhail Lomonosov, combatted this view of Russian history and outlined the so-called Sarmatian, or Eurasian theory, which derived the origin of Rus' from a southeastern integration process. Although both Müller and Lomonosov debated about ancient history, the vector of Russia's future development was at stake. What is Russia? On the periphery of Europe, is it an import market for European culture and knowledge? Or does it represent a new cultural center, producing and exporting knowledge to the East and South?¹⁰

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10 Konstantin Kaminskij, "Der Normannenstreit als Gründungsschlacht der russischen Geschichtsschreibung: Zur Poetik wissenschaftlicher Anfangserzählungen," in *Europäische Geschichtskulturen um 1700 zwischen Gelehrsamkeit, Politik und Konfession*, ed. Thomas Wallnig et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 553–582.

This conflictual constellation of Russian messianism, oscillating between tradition and innovation, domination and cooperation, persuasion and coercion, Europe and Asia, was already embedded in the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome, which was instrumental for the expansionist project of the first Romanovs. It became clear to Muscovite officials and cultural elites as early as the 16th century that in order to stabilize new borderlands of the growing Empire, flexible systems of identity semantics and legitimation strategies would be required. Moreover, providing new borders shifts the question of national identity from periphery to center, triggering a process that permanently resignifies cultural identity markers and translates them back to the borderlands. The emergence of the schism of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 17th century and the Normanist controversy a hundred years later are nothing but an evolution of such cultural renegotiations under the pressure of economic modernization.¹¹

Another hundred years later, the European modernization project was once again contested in the Russian empire by nationalist sentiments and promoted by Slavophiles during the reign of Nikolai I. The controversy between Westerners and Slavophiles is an excellent example of a false dichotomy, since both were Western-centric. Aleksandr Gertsen, one of the most well-known Westerners of his time, often stressed the common philosophical ground of Westerners and Slavophiles: Georg Friedrich Hegel and his dialectical vision of world history for the progress of all nations. Gertsen was a keen believer in enlightenment ideals, reason, social justice and Western values, but after his emigration to Europe became disappointed with the outcome of the European revolution movement of 1848. His intellectual renegotiation of the conventional West-East dichotomy in Russian history envisions a reevaluation of Russia's fundamental identity narrative—the Mongol Yoke. “Both, Westerners and Slavophiles traditionally perceived the Mongol yoke as Russia's principal historical trauma. Herzen, in his disillusionment with Europe, vigorously reassesses this cliché. After all, if Russia had not been conquered by the Asians, but had instead been thoroughly

11 Konstantin Kaminskij, “Alter Glaube und neue Technologien. Konfessionalisierung und Wirtschaftsmodernisierung im Russischen Reich,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 84:1 (2018): 209–242.

westernized, it would now be perishing on the ‘sinking ship’ of Europe, he exclaimed in 1859.”¹²

This very idea—to embrace Russia’s Asian heritage—gave birth to the Eurasianist way of thinking. It eventually led to intellectually renouncing the notion of “historical progress” and, as Lev Gumilev asserts in his works, the associated characterization of societies as “advanced” and “backward”. Gumilev’s subversive re-actualization of Eurasianism in the late Soviet time in turn triggered a renegotiation process of national identities in the Central Asian Soviet Republics and their relationship to the Russian Europeanized culture.¹³

Eurasianism as an essential critique of Eurocentrism

As we can see, the ideological nucleus of Eurasianism stemmed from the disillusionment of Russian intellectuals with promises of enlightenment and progress and articulated resentment towards Europeanization, as one of the founding fathers of Eurasianism, Nikolai Trubetskoi, bitterly laments: “Таким образом, даже при достижении максимальной степени европеизации этот народ, и без того уже задержавшийся в своем развитии [...], окажется все-таки не в равных условиях с романогерманцами и будет продолжать ‘отставать’. [...] Народы, не противодействующие своей ‘отсталости’, очень быстро становятся жертвою какого-нибудь соседнего или отдаленного романогерманского народа, который лишает этого отсталого члена ‘семьи цивилизованных народов’ сначала экономической, а потом и политической независимости и принимается беззастенчиво эксплуатировать его, вытягивая из него все соки и превратив его в ‘этнографический материал’.”¹⁴

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12 Olga Maiorova, “A Revolutionary and the Empire: Alexander Herzen and Russian Discourse on Asia,” in *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, ed. Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 13–26.

13 Mark Bassin, *The Gumilev Mystique. Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

14 Nikolai Trubetskoi, *Evropa i chelovechestvo* (Sofia, 1920), 67. “In this way, even if a certain nation reaches an advanced stage of Europeanization, it will remain ‘backward’ in relation to Romano-Germanic culture. On the other hand, if a nation is not trying to overcome its ‘backwardness’, it will soon become a victim to the neighboring or even distant Romano-Germanic nation which will deny to this backward member of the ‘family of civilized nations’ first its economical and then its political independence and then starts to exploit it shamelessly and eventually turns it into ‘ethnographic material’” (Our translation; K.K.; N.F.)

In this view, early Eurasianism, as existed in Russian émigré circles in Paris and Sofia in the 1920s, strikes us as the direct forerunner of the current critique of Eurocentrism along the economic and technological divide between the global South and the global North. While the “Theory from the South” develops a systematic critique of Western “developmentalism” and the colonality of knowledge, authors often repeat Eurasianist arguments even if they are not referring to Eurasianism in general or to Trubetskoi in particular. Consider, for example, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s attempt to provincialize Europe: “Historicism—and even the modern European idea of history—one might say, came to non-European peoples in the nineteenth century as somebody’s way of saying ‘not yet’ to somebody else. [...] That was what historicist consciousness was: a recommendation to the colonized to wait.”¹⁵ Evidently, Eurasianism is nothing less than an early experiment in provincializing Europe, which Chakrabarty defines as “the task of exploring how this [European] thought—which is now everybody’s heritage and which affects us all—may be renewed from and for the margins.”¹⁶ Following Chakrabarty’s invitation, social sciences in post-socialist Eastern Europe and Russia elaborated on their critique of Eurocentric colonality of knowledge while simultaneously trying to establish a link between postcolonial thinking from the South and the historical experience of Eurasianism.¹⁷ New approaches to world history, on the other hand, almost automatically question Eurocentric historicism as soon as they discover Eurasian history—this is most obvious in the cases of Lev Gumilev’s *Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere* (1989); Jack Goody’s *The Eurasian Miracle* (2009); and most recently Peter Frankopan’s highly acclaimed *The Silk Roads. A New History of the World* (2016).

By proposing a substitute for the Russian Empire vanishing under the pressure of revolutionary modernization based on Western socialist ideas, Eurasianism developed a critical theory of Eurocentrism, which soon aligned itself with the anticolonial stance of the Russian revolutionary movement.

15 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8.

16 Ibid., 16.

17 Madina Tlostanova, “Can the post-Soviet Think? On Coloniality of Knowledge, External Imperial and Double Colonial Difference,” *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* 1 (2015): 38–58; Martin Müller, “In Search of the Global East: Thinking between North and South in Search of the Global East,” *Geopolitics* (2018), accessed June 28, 2019, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2018.1477757.

Although the Eurasianist movement was underlined by a clear anti-Bolshevist impulse, it was Soviet Russia under Stalinist rule that succeeded to unite Eurasia in a political and economic framework consisting of multinational imperialist integration with global spheres of influence; they achieved this by combining the patterns of modernism and traditionalism. Alexandre Kojève, another Russian émigré in Paris, and a critical Eurasianist and renowned scholar of Hegel, observed this in 1945 when he wrote in his *Outline of a Doctrine of French Policy*: “Before being embodied in Humanity, the Hegelian Weltgeist, which has abandoned the Nations, inhabits Empires. Stalin’s political genius consists precisely in having understood this. [...] By demolishing ‘Trotskyism’ in Russia, Stalin rejoined the political reality of the day by creating the USSR as a Slavo-Soviet Empire. [...] Now, if one wants to preserve Latin and Catholic values, which are also eminently French values, and ensure their global influence—besides the Slavo-Soviet Empire of the Orthodox tradition and the Protestant-inspired Anglo-Saxon, and perhaps the Germano-Anglo-Saxon Empire, a Latin Empire must be created.”¹⁸ Kojève applied a popular brand of re-Hegelianized Marxism, which was extremely influential among French leftist philosophers, and at the same time proposed for Western Europe to follow a course of imperialist integration based on conservative Latin-catholic values.¹⁹ Remarkably, by outlining this reversed version of Eurasianism, Kojève became a consultant of the French government in the sphere of European politics. As such, he played a leading behind-the-scenes role in establishing both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the European Economic Community, being by this notion one of the founding fathers of the European Union.

Thus, Eurasianism unexpectedly inspired the process of European integration.

18 Alexandre Kojève, “Outline of a Doctrine of French Policy,” *Policy Review* 126 (2004): 8 f.

19 During the heated debates about European identity in the wake of the financial crisis, Giorgio Agamben embarked on Kojève’s idea of a Latin Empire in order to counterbalance the German influence in the EU. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, “The ‘Latin Empire’ should strike back,” *Libération*, March 26, 2013, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/3593961-latin-empire-should-strike-back>.

Eurasianism and the Post-Soviet Space

Parallel to the process of European integration, the disintegration of Soviet Eurasian Empire took place in the 20th century. After the ‘end of history’ (another idea inspired by Kojève’s lecture on Hegel),²⁰ the ‘clash of civilization’ started almost immediately. Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* (1996) grew out of a fierce polemic against Francis Fukuyama’s ideas and proved highly influential for the shape of revanchist neo-Eurasianism in Russia where it was promoted by Aleksandr Dugin who played a key role in importing West European far-right ideologies into Russia, and in establishing contacts with their main representatives.²¹

Around the same time in 1994, Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, came up with a different and more pragmatic vision of Eurasian Integration, based on re-integration of markets and supply chains, trade and customs regulations and security cooperation.

Both, Dugin and Nazarbaev, were inspired by the same source—the intellectual heritage of Lev Gumilev and his reconstruction of Eurasian history on the platform of Arnold Toynbee’s concept, which in turn was also instrumental for Samuel Huntington’s geopolitical notion with its central catchphrase “The West versus the rest.”²² For the ‘rest’ in Eurasia it was a clear signal to start a new reintegration process of the post-Soviet space.

Although Dugin’s Russian ethnic neo-Eurasianism and Gumilev’s indigenous neo-Eurasianism that inspired Nazarbaev seem to form a fundamental contradiction, over the course of ten years of constant cultural renegotiation they found common ground; Dugin himself rejected the ethno-nationalist components of his neo-Eurasianist notion and embarked on Nazarbaev’s vision of a pragmatic trade Eurasianism.²³ It took another ten years until the Eurasian integration process was institutionalized in 2014 in the form of the

20 Henk De Berg, *Das Ende der Geschichte und der bürgerliche Rechtsstaat. Henkel – Kojève – Fukuyama* (Tübingen: A. Francke, 2007).

21 Laruelle, “The paradoxical legacy of Eurasianism,” 189.

22 This process evolved against the backdrop of import of geopolitical thinking to Russia, which was a new intellectual experience, since the Soviet Union never articulated its national and international imperatives in the language of geopolitics. Mark Bassin and Mikhail Suslov, *Eurasia 2.0. Russian Geopolitics in the Age of New Media* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016).

23 See Aleksandr Dugin, *Evrasijskaya missiya Nursultana Nazarbaeva* (Moscow: ROF Evraziya, 2004).

Eurasian Economic Union, which is based on the regional framework in the post-Soviet space and emulates EU institutions.²⁴ During this period, identity politics in Russia changed, as did the borders in Europe. The 2004 enlargement of the European Union integrated post-socialist and some post-Soviet states into the confederation. Most of these states simultaneously joined NATO. In Russia this triggered certain fears about losing ground in the clash of civilizations. Eventually this line of confrontation led to the adoption of the concept of the Russian World, as a new Russian soft power strategy as well as a strategy for identity politics in 2007. In 2008 the Russo-Georgian war started with the outcome of South Ossetia declaring a formal independence and was de facto integrated into Russia's belt of frozen conflicts along the Southern borders of the former Soviet Union. In 2009 the EU invited further post-Soviet states to the 'waiting room' of European integration—the Eastern Partnership. This happened against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, which steadily evolved into the European debt crisis and triggered all kinds of Eurosceptic populist movements. The Arab spring started and ended in a series of proxy wars in the Middle East, widening the divide between Russia and the West. Ukraine pulled out from the Eurasian integration process and voted for EU association. In 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and added large parts of Eastern Ukraine to its belt of frozen conflicts that seem to mark the borders of the Russian World. In his annexation speech on March 18, 2014, Putin explicitly highlighted Russia's 'legitimate role' in Eurasia and its need to defend itself against a possible NATO expansion.²⁵

The more Eurasianism developed from a set of ethno-nationalist resentments to a set of international cooperation policies, the more the Russian World evolved from a soft power tool globally promoting Russian language and culture to an aggressive, anti-Western, revanchist rhetoric legitimizing hard power insurgence. "Geopolitically, events have shifted the nature of the relationship between Russia and the extraterritorial Russian World from one built on partnership to one between protector-state and aggrieved minority

24 Madalina Vicari, "The Eurasian Economic Union. Approaching the Economic Integration in the Post-Soviet Space by EU-Emulated Elements," *Revue Interventions économiques. Papers in Political Economy* 55 (2016), accessed June 28, 2019, doi: 10.4000/interventionseconomiques.2823.

25 Laruelle, "The paradoxical legacy of Eurasianism," 192.

sharing a common genetic code, a common ideology, and a common enemy in a civilizational clash with the Western world.”²⁶

As for today, the notion of the Russian World has inherited Eurasianism’s authentic rhetoric of confronting the cultural hegemony, the coloniality of knowledge and the neoliberal values of Europe and the West. Borders are then resignified through “Identity without Economy”. This is most visible in the phrase said by Russian Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev to Crimean pensioners in 2016, which quickly went viral: “There is no money, but you hold on.” Eurasianism, on the other hand, has been stripped of all its confrontationist rhetoric and has inherited the pragmatic policies and institutions of European economic integration, thus developing a process of resignifying borders through “Economy without Identity”. Identity politics are rarely addressed in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Therefore, we propose to regard Eurasianism not as a system of policies or ideas, but as a process of renegotiation. This procedural approach allows us to explain the inherent paradoxes of diverse Eurasianisms.

The Eurasianism of 1920 helped develop an intellectual substitute for the Russian Empire by establishing a link to the Soviet Empire. The Eurasianism of 2020 is instrumental to overcoming the term “post-Soviet” as a marker for Central Asian states, and at the same time it remains instrumental for the reintegration of post-Soviet markets. Eurasianism is framing and reframing the experience of the Soviet modernization project and the Eurasian integration process by renegotiating Russian identity in its complex relationship to Europe and Asia. Eurasianism of 1994 was looking inside, addressing ethnonationalist sentiments, and standing at the cradle of the Russian World looking outward. In 2014, Eurasianism was looking outward and fostering cooperation with growing markets in Asia-Pacific, and so the Russian World shifted to an ideology of isolationism. Eurasianism is not a fixed identity narrative. It is a fluent renegotiation process turning cultural semantics inside out.

The essays in this volume are trying to develop an innovative approach which takes into account the fluid procedurality and semantic diversity of Eurasianism in its relationship to the Russian World. In his article, **Erik Martin** reevaluates the historic notion of interwar Eurasianism. In outlining and

26 Michael Gorham, “When Soft Power Hardens: The Formation and Fracturing of Putin’s ‘Russian World,’” in *Global Russian Cultures*, ed. Kevin Platt (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2019), 185–206.

comparing the basic ideas of Nikolai Trubetskoi and Mikhail Rostovtsev, Martin demonstrates that the negotiation of cultural identity has always been located in a field of tension—a conclusion that still holds true for contemporary theoretical as well as political debates on Eurasianism. **Anna Razuvalova** shows in her carefully reconstructed account of Eduard Limonov's career in literature and politics how the aggressive expansionist ideology of the Russian World was prefigured in the National Bolshevik movement and the closely associated neo-Eurasianism of Aleksandr Dugin during the 1990s. **Clemens Günther** and **Svetlana Sirotinina** develop a notion of literary Eurasianism(s) and link the renegotiation of post-Soviet cultural identity in the 1990s to contemporary Russian literature, in this way overcoming the discourse-dominating imperialist understanding of Eurasianism. Expanding on this idea of different Eurasianisms and their postcolonial semantic varieties, **Michael Kemper** and **Gulnaz Sibgatullina** unpack the concept of Islamic Eurasianism(s) promoted by competing groups of Russian Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders in the Northern Caucasus and the Republic of Tatarstan. **Victoria Abakumovskikh** examines the understanding of Tatarstan as a major Islamic subject in the Russian Federation, and provides insight into the Republic's intertwined integration strategies on three levels: the Russian World, the worldwide Muslim religious community, and the global market. **Nina Friess** demonstrates that there are not only different versions of Eurasianism, but also of the Russian World. In her article on Russophone literature in Kazakhstan, she describes how young writers have developed their own idea of a Russian World that differs significantly from the Kremlin's version. Kazakhstan's nomadic heritage, on the other hand, provides a cultural framework for national identity and creates new perspectives for the Eurasian integration process, as **Konstantin Kaminskij** points out in his article by establishing a link to contemporary migration studies and environmental research.

Global Warming triggers disruptive regional environmental changes in Eurasia, threatening its water and food security and thus multiplying the risks of violent (ethnic) conflicts. There is a pressing need for integrative narratives and inclusive cultural semantics. With this in mind one should ask the question, "What might the future of Eurasianism look like now, as it managed to emancipate itself from the Russian World?" The most optimistic perspective on the market of ideas might be 'A Concept of Eurasia' by Chris Hann, who

builds on Jack Goody's work and proposes a Eurasian model of inclusion marked by a specific Eurasian dialectic, a model of inclusive embeddedness between community and individual, redistribution and market which might be capable to overcome the destructive logic of global laissez-faire, to connect Europe and Asia in a unity-in-civilizational-diversity approach and to create a base for global political cooperation.²⁷

Maybe there is a new Eurasianism on the way, one that barely remembers the origins of the term in the Russian interwar émigré circles but extends much further in time and space. A Eurasianism that could deliver a new narrative for Europe and transcend it to the scale of the whole Eurasian landmass—a diverse and united cultural space from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

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27 Chris Hann, "A Concept of Eurasia," *Current Anthropology* 57 (2016): 1–27; see also Chris Hann, "Long live Eurasian civ! Towards a new confluence of anthropology and world history," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 142 (2017): 225–244.

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