Yasuko Shibata

Discrimination for the Sake of the Nation

The Discourse of the League of Polish Families against "Others" 2001–2007

Edited by Joanna Kurczewska and Yasuko Shibata

PETER LANG
EDITION

Discrimination for the Sake of the Nation

Polish Studies in Culture, Nations and Politics

Edited by Joanna Kurczewska and Yasuko Shibata

Vol. 4

PL ACADEMIC RESEARCH

Yasuko Shibata

Discrimination for the Sake of the Nation

The Discourse of the League of Polish Families
against "Others" 2001–2007

This book is part of an editor's series of PL Academic Research
and was peer reviewed prior to publication.

www.peterlang.com

Contents

Introduction

In March 1999, during a lesson at the Music Academy in Warsaw, an engaged reaction of the professor to my prepared piece of Frédéric Chopin surprised me, a high school student visiting the country for the first time. The acute tone of the Polish pianist in the remark that "you have not understood" a crucial point of his music contrasted with her kind critique that I had an innate sense for performing a Mozart sonata and Ravel's *Jeux d'eau*. Though having tried dearly to absorb the tradition cherished in the composer's birthplace, after the lesson, I held an unusual doubt if "I had understood" the crucial point, i.e. the "Polishness" presumably reserved only for Poles. A six-day trip thus ended with such a sense of incompleteness. In choosing to remain an amateur, the problem of the "proper" meaning of Chopin was left unsolved in my mind for some years. I can say that during a ritual wandering in a library in Tokyo at the end of my college time, it was the remaining sense of confusion about the Romantic music that had led me to pick up an English title on Polish nationalism, and later, made me decide to begin my own study on this phenomenon – in Poland itself.

The gap between such an episode and my academic focus on the League of Polish Families, a radical rightist party of contemporary Poland, is not huge. The problem of Polishness that captured an outsider's mind continues to circulate in the everyday life of Poles. The modern history of Poland, being under the rule of foreign polities, resulted in the intensive production of thoughts on the issue of national existence and the passing on of the discursive tradition from generation to generation. Today, the habitual reference to "national" themes ranging from sovereignty, national interests to the mission of Poles, as well as the recurring debates on these motives in the public sphere, shows the past's uncommon impact on the political "present," i.e. the relevance of the problem of national existence for the Polish people. The taken-for-granted importance of the continuity of nationhood lets Poles justify their rejection of improper interpretations and understanding of the Polish nation and national culture. Though in a great range of differentiation, the exclusion of those who do not reproduce the beauty, goodness and all the peculiar meanings embedded in the culture could take place with a decently reluctant phrase: "for the sake of the Polish nation."

I would like to declare that this book is my inquiry into the intricate mechanism working among national ideologies, Polish society and its culture from the perspective of a "stranger" within. The knowledge regarding Polishness, as well as the varied meanings of the "Polish nation," discussed, experienced and nurtured in history and everyday life, is profound and confusing for those who see the country from afar, as it is too common and evident to question for those liv-

ing in or attached to the country. The in-depth analysis of the discourse of discrimination attempted below, focused on a specific nationalist actor embedded in the ideological tradition of Poland, that being the League of Polish Families, offers outsiders a threshold for a better understanding of the interplay between politics and national culture in this country. At the same time, the stranger's analysis would suggest to Polish readers that the issue of otherness confronted by the "eccentric" nationalists is also ready to affect the worldviews and attitudes of all those who inherit the diverse resources of the Polish national culture.

General Questions

The discourse of today's politicians on Polishness, mirrored by its otherness, is a species of contemporary nationalism requiring critical analysis. Each of the currents of the past Polish nationalist thoughts[1], evolving from Romanticism, Positivism to Neo-Romanticism and the "National Democracy," is a subject waiting for life-long occupation; the nationalist ideas and ideologies, born out of the country's unique being between the West and the East, are little-known materials readily inspiring outside scholars. Yet further striking is the continuous impact of these national traditions on today's politics. While continuing the process of societal changes following the historic dissolution of the Communist regime in 1989, Poland faced the process of "rejoining" Europe, i.e. the accession to the European Union. The process of state-boundary deformation drew an energetic political discourse[2] about the being and non-being of the nation. The specific array of knowledge and imagination, both nurtured and accumulated in the history of Poland, comprises the basis of a distinctive "national" discourse; the connection between the country's past and the present, in the face of its future, was rehearsed by different actors of society, especially by politicians of rightist orientation. One of such heated phenomena was the **discourse on the nation's "others."**[3] In most of the politicians' discourse, the "others" do not appear as persons who enhance the vibrancy of multifaceted culture; they are

---

1   I follow the thinking of Anthony D. Smith in that nationalism is an ideological movement aiming at establishing/maintaining the unity, authenticity and identity of a human population called a nation (Smith, 2003, pp. 24-25). The definition of nation is more complex, yet I primarily regard it as a political community based on people's everyday communication (cf. Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Kłoskowska, 2001). More discussion on the concept of nation and nationalism will be offered in the first chapter.

2   Discourse is loosely clarified as a "language use in society"; see the following chapter.

3   The word "other," popularized by psychoanalysis, minimally signifies those who are different and connotes one's fear or fascination.

instead the ones who terrorize the inviolable entity of Polishness, having been spoken of by the "true" constituents of the Polish nation.

Following the primary observation of such a political discourse, the target of my study fell onto **the League of Polish Families (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*; LPR)**, whose malicious remarks on "others" stood out among political parties during the process of the country's entry into the EU structures. LPR appeared in April 2001 out of a merger of the fragmented successors of **the National Democracy (*Narodowa Demokracja*; ND)**, the country's pre-war political party and social movement known for its contribution to national independence as well as for its anti-Semitism. In its debut in the 2001 general elections, the declared inheritor of the "Endecja" acquired 7.87 percent of the votes cast by contemporary Polish citizens; together with its youth-appendage, All-Polish Youth (*Młodzież Wszechpolska*; MW), the party embarked on the project of changing Polish politics and society, which was – in the eyes of the politicians – losing the moral and cultural basis of Roman Catholicism and the sacred belief in the "Polish nation." As a parliamentary nationalist party, LPR uttered discriminatory words about ethnic/national minorities, sexual minorities and women at the legislature, in the media as well as at different public spaces around the country. Though primarily established as a group opposing Poland's accession to the European Union, by reflecting citizens' attitudes, the party loosened its Eurosceptic stance. LPR thus successfully ran for Poland's first European elections in 2004 to gain the second best results (15.92%) among all its competitors. During the Fifth Term Sejm (2005-2007), the party further entered the coalition government with Law and Justice (PiS) and Self-Defense (Samoobrona). As a consequence, its leader, Roman Giertych[4], came to serve as the Vice Premier of the Republic of Poland and its Minister of National Education from May 2006 to August 2007.

It is my aim to critically interpret **the language of the League of Polish Families** produced in Polish society **in the period between 2001-2007**. The LPR's disappearance from the country's main political scene in 2007 has not meant the end of the phenomenon of dichotomizing "we" and "they" in Polish society. The on-going developments of Polish politics based on the emotional rivalry of PO and PiS, colored by the refreshed rise of right-wing associations and hate speech, attest to the need for analysis of the cases and contexts of the LPR's discourse to critically grasp the political mechanism of discrimination against the "others" in the name of the Polish nation. The book primarily in-

---

4   Roman Giertych is a son of MEP Maciej Giertych and a grandson of Jędrzej Giertych (1903-1992), who was a dedicated ally of Dmowski. Having reactivated MW in 1989, R. Giertych served as its chairman until 1993 (honorary chairman since 1994).

quires into *how* different social groups and individuals in Poland were discriminated against during this period by the incumbent politicians and officials of a particular ideological origin. In other words, I examine the *meaning* of the language produced by LPR politicians, who proudly traced their specific cultural-political roots to the country's history. It is because through the interpretation of the language, produced in the twenty-first century by the direct heir of the "Endecja," one is able to apprehend the distinctive dynamics of Polish national cultures. From the point of view of cultural sociology, the LPR's discourse of discrimination is one of the most interesting phenomena of the politics of Poland during the first years of the twenty-first century. By focusing on **the discriminatory discourse** of the League of Polish Families, it is possible to observe the confrontation of one of the crucial elements of Polish national traditions, i.e. the cultural legacy of the pre-war National Democracy, with the contemporary conditions of the country, i.e. its social and political changes intensified at the time of EU accession. Based on such a premise, while offering critical analysis of the LPR's language, I hope to show the attempt of a particular group of Poles to project their "beings" in contemporary Poland.

The **research span** coincides with the party's endurance on the main stage of Polish politics, i.e. from **April 2001 (the establishment of the LPR)** to **October 2007 (its disappearance from the Sejm)**. Upon the analysis of the LPR's language, the period will be divided at the middle point of **June 2004, i.e. the time of Poland's first elections for the European Parliament**. Such a bisection of the research period serves to reflect on the changes of the LPR's language and the objects of discrimination as well as a certain continuity of the party's rhetoric utilized throughout the whole period.

I have formulated the following **research questions**:

1. What elements of the tradition of Polish national culture does the LPR use in its discourse discriminating against "others"?
2. How does the LPR modify past Polish national ideologies in order to make them apply to the present-day social and geopolitical conditions?
3. Are there/what are the ideological elements, which comprise the unchanging core of the discriminatory discourse of the LPR? How does the LPR change the objects and methods of discursive discrimination in the course of its political career? What drives the party to make such a decision?
4. What rhetorics and arguments for justifying discrimination do the LPR politicians use against different social groups in today's Poland? What are the differences and similarities among the strategies of discrimination applied to these social groups?

Layout of the Book

The book consists of **six chapters**. The methodology and main conceptual framework of the research will be presented in **the first chapter**. My study falls into the interdisciplinary enterprise of **critical discourse analysis (CDA)**, whose linguistic analytical tool is theoretically compatible with sociological studies on the social use of language. More specifically, as a primary method, I will adopt the "**discourse-historical approach**" established by Viennese scholar, Ruth Wodak. The social linguist, whose major interest is the political as well as everyday discrimination of ethnic groups, emphasizes the importance of all the necessary background information in the process of the textual analysis of a certain discourse. By adopting this approach, the discriminatory discourse of the LPR, which is a social phenomenon uniquely rooted in Polish history and culture, will be effectively examined as already seen in some fruitful analyses.[5] To fully consider the cultural contexts of the LPR discourse, I will further propose to implement the CDA method with **the "critique of fantasy,"** a method of literary studies having been practiced in Poland by historian of literature and idea, Maria Janion. The method and the CDA will be combined under the concept of **the lifeworld [*Lebenswelt*]**, elaborated upon by phenomenological sociologist Alfred Schütz, as well as that of the **"national cultural resources,"** suggested by historian Anthony D. Smith. By regarding the Schützean lifeworld as the storage of the nation's "sacred" resources including various kinds of "national" fantasies, I set forth conducting an in-depth examination of the nationalist discourse.

The second and third chapters introduce the contextual information that is necessary to understand the language of nationalist discourse in Poland. The main "cultural resources" of the discourse will be discussed in **the second chapter**, based on the framework of **the "three traditions" of Polish patriotism** suggested by historian of ideas, Andrzej Walicki. The topics include the concept of "collective sovereignty" exercised in the gentry democracy, Polish Romantic Messianism and its accompanying fantasy of "plotting" Jews and different images of women (the Polish Mother = Maryja, the heroic virgin and innocent victim), and the concept of "national interest" and the "spiritual nation" elaborated by National Democracy. **The third chapter** moves on to show the political and ideological contexts of the LPR discourse. The aspiration of the post-1989 marginalized groupings of the Neo-Endecja to enter the realm of state politics will be discussed as a decisive element that led to the establishment of

---

5   See Kurczewska et al, 2005 and Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska, 2007. These studies will be further referred to in the fourth chapter concerning the LPR's discourse based on "race" and ethnicity.

the party. The LPR's shift to a "soft" Euroscepticism will be further discussed as the populist adaptation of the heirs of Neo-Endecja to Poland's contemporary conditions.

By incorporating the contexts discussed above, **the fourth to sixth chapters** will conduct a detailed textual analysis of the LPR's discriminatory discourse.[6] In **the fourth chapter**, the party's targets of discrimination are those persons whose ethnicity differs from Polish nationals. Aggressive words about ethnic groups, i.e. **Jews, other ethnic/national minorities and immigrants**, will be analyzed through the application of the abovementioned method. The auxiliary use of the critique of fantasy will be fruitful especially in the analysis of the rhetoric against Jews, as well as that against **sexual "others," i.e. sexual minorities and women**, whose situation will be taken up in **the fifth and sixth chapters**. The second research period will also indicate the considerable mobilization of the national fantasy of the "Polish women," who were literally absent in the preceding period. These analyses will show that the place of the real ethnic "Jews," which had been replaced by the phantasmatic Jews in the later LPR discourse, was taken over by sexual minorities and feminists, whom the LPR politicians assaulted throughout the whole period.

In **the concluding section**, I will offer an observation on the Polish political scene after the "demise" of the League of Polish Families. Despite the physical disappearance of the Neo-National Democratic political party, some of the former party leaders, as well as the "ghost" of the mentality of the LPR, seem to be ever green in the Polish public sphere. The constant presence of Roman Giertych in the media, commenting on the ongoing political events in Polish society, and the climate supporting the rise of organizations holding the ideological principles of National Democracy, will be tentatively analyzed.

It is my ambition that the book cuts out a picture of an aspect of Polish society and culture, which incites critical questions and studies on the question of the "Polish nation." The complex meaning of the discriminatory language of a Polish nationalist party, which is going to be inquired upon in the following chapters, attests to the need for a flexible cooperation among different academic disciplines when studying the nationalist discourse of discrimination. By breaking the established boundaries of social sciences and humanities, a more complete disclosure of the mechanism of nationalist domination, which continues to function in the "irrational" sphere of culture and society, will be made possible. At the same time, it is my hope that the objective analysis of such a "Polish" phenomenon as the discourse of the League of Polish Families that I attempt

---

6   The outcome of the analysis is presented as a summary at the end of each of these empirical chapters.

below will spur the very Polish people to critically see the cultural mechanism of nationalist domination necessarily functioning in *their* everyday lives. The LPR's "otherness" comprises a crucial part of "Polishness" that continues to evolve today. The "spirit" of Poles, differently imagined and constantly nurtured in their history, culture and in social and political life, is as alluring an issue as it is an entrapping one. Upon the start of my inquiry, I would like to say that the issue of Polishness and the Polish nation, as well as the dynamic character of its development, patiently awaits lively questioning from any persons entrapped in the richness of Polish culture.

<div align="center">***</div>

I. The Discourse of Discrimination against the Nation's Strangers: Tools for Interpretation

The purpose of this starting chapter is to present basic concepts, methodology and analytical procedures for the discriminatory discourse on the "other."

The first section clarifies the concept of discourse and introduces the methodological framework appropriate for the discourse of discrimination. From among the studies of language that attest to the demand for interdisciplinary analysis, also known as the "discourse-historical approach," I will adopt one of the crucial methods, critical discourse analysis (CDA), which combines assets from history, social psychology and sociology. Due to its euphemistic character, the discriminatory discourse requires a sensitive insight. In this respect, its leading scholar, Ruth Wodak, suggests the potential of a cognitive approach that detects the tacitly shared knowledge behind the discourse, and encourages further cooperation with sociology.

In the second section, I will conceptualize the primary actor of the discriminatory discourse, i.e. the "other." Turning to the reference frame of existential phenomenology,[7] the "other" will be clarified as a cognitive and power-involved figure of the "stranger," and then juxtaposed to the ideological movement of nationalism. The nationalist, who is the other player of the discriminatory discourse, will be presented as a social-phenomenological actor, who uses the "stock of knowledge" (Schütz, 1975) for the derogative categorization of the stranger *for the nation*. The texts produced by nationalists present their relevant choice from the Schützean stock of knowledge.[8]

The third section shows the procedures for the analysis of such texts, which requires an insight into the "deeper and sacred recourses" (Smith, 2003) of different types of Polish national cultures. Considering the cultural contexts accompanying the discourse, I will propose to complement Wodak's approach, whenever necessary, with a method of literary studies, which analyzes the "ideological fantasies" (Žižek, 1989/1999; Janion, 1996/2006a) of the Polish nation appearing in Romanticist works. The procedure incorporating this method as well as general remarks on empirical materials will be presented at the end.

---

7   I will refer to one of the two major variants of phenomenology on social/cultural analysis: a hermeneutical variant represented by Gadamer and Ricoeur; and an existential variant led by Schütz and P. Berger (Giddens, 1977; Wuthnow, 1984, pp. 30-31).

8   Spoken language is also included in "texts"; the difference between discourse and text will be later discussed.

I-1.   The Discourse of Discrimination

Discrimination – a series of acts and situations that deny the equal status of a particular individual or a social group – is a multifarious phenomenon having been analyzed in various fields of social and cultural sciences. The social phenomenon of discrimination appears in such forms as racism, sexism, homophobia, or in some combination of these. Studies conducted from differing perspectives such as critical theory (e.g. Reich, 1933/1980; Horkheimer & Flowerman, 1949; Adorno *et al*., 1950/1973), postcolonial studies (e.g. Said, 1978, 1993; Fanon, 1986), postmodern studies (e.g. Bhabha, 1990; Bauman, 1989) and social psychology (e.g. Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1985) show that the phenomenon of discrimination defies any kind of generalization. Its analysis requires such a stance that probes questions into the concrete cultural, social, psychological and political conditions of people's negative attitudes toward the "other." The research should be conducted with problem-oriented flexibility; cooperation among social/psychological, cultural and historical studies is mandate. Besides the use of physical violence, discrimination most noticeably occurs as a particular use of language in society. Teun A. van Dijk has once observed prejudice in language and presented representative discursive methods of discrimination. The social linguist thus named seven Ds: dominance, distance, differentiation, diffusion, diversion, depersonalization/destruction, and daily discrimination (van Dijk, 1984, p. 40). Based on such strategies, language functions to discriminate the "other" in society, disguising itself as "discourse."

Discourse, roughly meaning a use of language in society, is more precisely defined as a language-based power relation that formulates society.[9] Earlier theories on discourse would offer us a basis for analyzing the intertwined relationship among language, power and society. The most well-known is the articulation of Michel Foucault, i.e. the discourse as a social phenomenon, which turns up as language use and ideas and is derived from social power. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault says that a discourse is a social practice of ideas and language comprising a social order; it functions to constitute and reproduce power relations in society (Foucault, 1994). The philosopher further offers comments on the dominant ideas and languages, which impose what is "normal" on people; namely, the discursive generation of diseases and of sexuality is the authority's knowledge control in modern society (Foucault, 1976/1990, pp. 23-25). Pierre Bourdieu, in his *Language and Symbolic Power*, similarly depicts

---

9   The concept of "power" is compactly defined by Giddens, 1985: "the capacity to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them"; and Weber, 1968: "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance."

the invisible power of language being used in society. According to the sociologist of culture, language is a social historical phenomenon. Every linguistic interaction embraces the traces of the social structure of power and inequality; language in turn reproduces such a power structure (Bourdieu, 1981/1994, pp. 50-52). Power is tacitly authorized by the everyday use of language; routine linguistic expression is thus transmuted into power to re/produce symbolic violence (ibid., pp. 168-170). In line with the French scholars, Jürgen Habermas has theorized the authorities' colonization of people's discursive communication. By engaging in communicative action with their fellow citizens, people thematize the lifeworld, being a "horizon of knowledge" that offers a background to life. Yet in modernity, the function of the lifeworld that supports people's communicative action is intervened and marred by the political and economic power crystallized as a "system" (Habermas, 1981/1987a). The power thus entraps discourse and embeds it in the quasi-institutional practices and relationships in society.[10]

Depending on the fields and orientations of concerns, analysts of discourse take a variety of approaches. Among numerous approaches to discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) elastically tackles the phenomenon of discrimination and is suitable for my purpose. Formerly named Critical Linguistics (CL), CDA consists of assorted elements such as classical rhetoric, text linguistics, socio-linguistics, applied linguistics and pragmatics. Yet not limiting themselves to linguistic analyses, scholars, following their differing interests, examine discourse from various kinds of perspectives, e.g. narrower semiotics (e.g. Hodge & Kress, 1991; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1991/1996), history (e.g. Wodak, 1989, 1991; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), and cognition (e.g. van Dijk, 1984, 1998; Lakoff, 2002). Basically sharing the ideal of the Critical Theory of "creating/transforming the world," the primary purpose of CDA researchers is to question the power-relation and inequality in society being realized in discourse; the discrimination of the "other" is a crucial target of CDA. Its founding scholars, Ruth Wodak and Teun A. van Dijk, define discrimination as a particular relationship of inequality and dominance, established among social groups, one of which (typically Caucasian European males) has preferential access to and control of scarce social resources (Wodak & van Dijk, 2000, p. 20). Such an unequal relationship is a complex phenomenon composed of various elements ranging from history to social psychology. Aiming at its effective "deciphering", CDA breaks the barrier and incorporates useful theories and techniques of other

---

10 Habermas emphasizes the potential of the ideal discourse, in which citizens engage in sound communication. For the debate between Foucault and Habermas on the concept of power relation in society, see Flyvbjerg, 1997; Delanty, 2000.

disciplines in the analysis of discriminatory language (van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 2000).

CDA researchers share the following postulate with sociologists dealing with the use of language in society: the analysis of language is an effective approach to discrimination because it deconstructs and changes the structure of dominance and inequality. Critical Discourse Analysis draws inspiration from the ideas on language, power and society of Foucault, Bourdieu or Habermas, briefly shown above. It thus regards discourse as a social phenomenon historically put into the structure of dominance. In the eyes of CDA researchers, discourse, i.e. forms of language use (van Dijk, 1998, p. 194), is a social practice, which is incorporated in the dominant structure of meanings, i.e. the unequal power-relation in society. Discourse is further a means by which ideology, especially racism, is reproduced to maintain the dominant structure.[11] It is thus a political and ideological practice, which establishes, naturalizes, sustains and changes power relations in society (Fairclough, 1992, p. 67). This dominant structure of language can be changed through the critique of ideology (Fairclough, 1989, Chap. 9; Fairclough, 1995, pp. 82-83). Following the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), CDA stipulates the dynamic relationship between the social structure and the agency; it holds that the counter-production of discourse amounts to the dialectic creation of social processes and structure (Blommaert, 2005, pp. 27-28). The analysis of discourse is thus an effective act of questioning the structure of domination and countering discrimination produced and reproduced in society.

Among methods of CDA, the "discourse-historical approach" led by Ruth Wodak correctly considers the social/historical contexts, which surround discriminatory discourse, as the most crucial element for analysis. In the study of language, "discourse" as an object of analysis is distinguished from "texts" and "contexts." Spoken or written "text," which is a discursive event, alone remains "silent" and does not tell its meaning (Ricoeur, 1976/1989, p. 161). Only when situated in a certain social-historical condition, i.e. "context," does the text acquire a meaning and present it to the researcher (Thompson, 1985, p. 135); meanings of utterances/texts are embedded in contexts and circulating in the social world (Thompson, 1990, p. 59). Discourse can thus be clarified as a "process," which activates historically formulated social contexts of the text and which produces a specific meaning of the text (Widdowson, 2004, p. 8). Wodak regards these discursive contexts as the primary materials for its analysis. According to Wodak, the contexts consist of the following four levels: 1) the level of language, e.g. lexical solidarities, connotations, mitigation, hesitation; 2) the

---

11   Confer Thompson, 1990, pp. 55-56; van Dijk, 1998, pp. 135-139.

intertextual/interdiscursive level, i.e. the relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourse; 3) the level of social/sociological information, i.e. the "context of situation" (e.g. formality of situation, place, time, the group of recipients/participants and their political/ideological orientation, sex/gender, age, profession, level of education, ethnic/regional/national/religious affiliation or membership); 4) the broader sociopolitical and historical level, i.e. the history to which the discourse topics are related.[12] Among other scholars who analyze racist/discriminatory discourse (especially prejudice), Quasthoff (1973) misses the necessity of examining such discursive contexts of prejudices, which transcend the narrow linguistic unit of a single sentence, while van Dijk (1984) has rightly offered a method of analyzing prejudice generated from a discursive unit larger than a sentence. Siegfried Jäger (1993) and Margaret Jäger (1996) also contributed to the integration of social/political/historical contexts in discriminatory discourse analysis (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 31).

The main drawback dwellings in the discourse-historical approach and generally in CDA lie at the very benefits of these methods: overt political engagement and the necessary reflection of the researcher's subjectivity. The word "critical" signifies the researcher's distance from the data, which at the same time means the reflection of the researcher's political stance onto the data. Famously, Henry G. Widdowson (1996, 1998) renounces the CDA's biased interpretations of discourse; likewise, Emanuel Schegloff, a conversation analyst, has continued to battle with CDA proponents in the journal *Discourse & Society* since 1993, claiming that the CDA analysts reflect their prejudices on their "relevant" choice of contexts concerning the "other" (especially cf. Schegloff, 1999, 2000). The opponents' arguments do not overturn the crucial role of the researcher, who discloses and "counters" the domination and inequality produced and reproduced in society. CDA regards it as favorable; it even requires that the researcher clarify his/her stances toward the object of particular studies (cf. van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 2000; Kalmus, 2003). However, the issue of subjectivity/objectivity remains unresolved in CDA studies; the heretofore suggestion is the "principle of triangulation," i.e. the incorporation of multiple perspectives/approaches from different fields of study (e.g. sociology, political science, psychology) into each CDA project.

The sociological discussion on the objectivity of the researcher would here provide a suggestion to this problem. The CDA researchers' manifest subjectivity derives from their ardent orientation to critical theory, especially that of Jürgen Habermas. The unsuccessful critique of Habermas on the "objectifying attitude" of Alfred Schütz suggests their need for compromise. For Habermas, who

---

12   Confer Wodak, 2000, pp.65-67 and Reisigl & Wodak, op. cit., p.41.

aims at remedying "distorted communication," the dialogue between the researcher and the "laypeople" in the lifeworld is the condition of the validity of social science. Schütz, one of the inspirers for Habermas, separates the researcher from the ordinary actors; while understanding the "subjectively intended meanings" of the actions of the laypeople, the researcher draws away from the stage and maintains the "objectified" stance toward the people's actions (Schütz, 1962, 1932/1970). Habermas criticizes Schütz's concept of the lifeworld, which is "abridged in a culturalistic fashion" and does not address institutional orders (Habermas, 1981/1987a, pp. 126-132). He further argues that the "objectifying attitude" is inconsistent with the postulate of intersubjectivity (Habermas, 1981/1984, p.123), and he calls for the need of political engagement. However, the objectifying attitude complies with the researcher's intersubjectivity in the lifeworld (Harrington, 2000) and is a needed element. Provided the value-freedom unduly demanded by the philosophy of science (Mokrzycki, 1983), keeping the researcher's presence at the level of "environmental interference" (Kapralski, 1995, p.147) is a minimum and necessary requirement for the objectivity of social science. The concession to Schütz in this respect seems to enable a CDA researcher to acquire the minimal objectivity for the analysis of discriminatory discourse. The construction of appropriate Schützean "puppets" (Schütz, 1943, pp. 81-88) for the discourse is therefore a crucial step for obtaining such an objectifying attitude. In other words, the re-conceptualization of the discursive actors (i.e. the discriminator and the discriminated) from another perspective would offer the CDA analyst an objectified stance toward the very discourse.

The recent tendency within the discourse of discrimination, i.e. its increasingly allusive character, shows that these sociologists offer an appropriate framework for objectifying the discursive actors. Due to the sense of taboo and political correctness, discriminatory discourse often takes indirect forms (Wodak & Matouschek, 1993). In recent years, the use of allusion has become prevalent as a discriminatory strategy (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Kowalski & Tulli, 2003). Especially in the case of discourse in official settings, the use of nationalist/racist/anti-Semitic stereotypes occur in vague forms, e.g. tacit references by adoption of particular vocabularies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 43). The euphemism prevailing in the discourse of discrimination thus requires more sensitive insight into the social/historical/cultural contexts. For coping with such a tendency, Wodak suggests the efficiency of a cognitive approach, which has been attempted by van Dijk (Wodak, 2006, p. 182). This renowned scholar formulated a socio-cognitive model that explains people's production and reproduction of stereotypes and prejudices out of their long-term memories (van Dijk, 1984); he further tries to offer a socio-cognitive framework of ideology and racism (van

Dijk, 1998). In other words, a precise analysis of how culture affects the cognitive activities of the discriminator is required.

The research actuality of CDA, i.e. the emphasis on the cognitive activities of the discriminators and the need of further examining the impact of culture, meets culture-focused cognitive sociological theories. Cultural cognitive sociology, a group of theorists rather than an organized theoretical system,[13] researches into the cognitive activities of persons and groups focusing on cultural aspects; it avoids both cognitive universalism and cognitive individualism and tries to connect different approaches in each research project. This tolerance encourages theoretical and methodological cooperation with CDA and the conceptualization of actors in the discourse discriminating against the "other." Among classic cultural-cognitive sociological theories, the concept of the "stranger" introduced by Schütz and Simmel as well as their surrounding discussions of categorization, typification, and knowledge community offer basic materials for conceptualizing the discriminatory discourse actors. Aiming at setting an objectifying ground for CDA, the following section presents a framework that conceptualizes the contemporary actors of discriminatory discourse, i.e. nationalists and their "other."

I-2.   Strangers to the Nation

What is to be done now is the conceptualization of Schützean "puppets," or the two actors of discriminatory discourse: strangers and nationalists. In this section, the sociological features of the stranger will be overviewed in the first part, especially turning to the reference frame of phenomenological sociology. The second part in turn presents nationalists as a group of actors, who not only forge out the nation, but also the nation's strangers.

I-2-1.   The "Stranger" in Sociological Theories

Rudolf Stichweh, a system-theory German sociologist, compactly summarizes a social history of the stranger and introduces representative types of societies for locating the stranger. In early times, there was such a society, where strangers were perceived as ancestors/gods, and a society in which people eliminated their "strangeness" even by simply killing them; in the third type, the status of the strangers was stratified into toleration, privilege or subjugation (Stichweh,

---

13   For a mapping of different positions of cognitive sociology, confer e.g. Strydom, 2007. The study of the field of cultural cognitive sociology is advocated by e.g. Zerubavel, 1997; Brekhus, 2007.

2005). If modified, Stichweh's first type corresponds to the antique "stranger" established in Japanese folklore. When the ancients recognized the world beyond the sea, they held a common imagination on this "strange world (*i-kai*)." The stranger is a god, who lives in this imagined utopia (*toko-yo*), and who visits the community in feastful occasions from afar, over the sea (Yanagita, 1952/1997). The ancients' imagery of the god's world fuses with that of the dead's world to produce the image of the dead-god-stranger of *marē-bito*, (literally: a rare person) who came from this utopia. Shinobu Orikuchi, an eminent folklorist, argues that this non-real stranger's "visits" were concretized by spherical objects ("*yori-shiro*") and perceived by the ancients (1921/1997).

The non-scientific vision of the Japanese folklorists shows a core component of this concept: the stranger directly reflects people's cognition/perception of foreign lands – "elsewhere." A German phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels would agree here, adding to explain the meaning of "elsewhere" embedded in the word "strange/other." Waldenfels considers the etymology of the adjective "*fremd*" (strange, other) and extracts three senses of "otherness": the "other" is something, 1) which is beyond one's own territory (cf. exterium, extraneum, peregrinum; ξένον; étranger, foreign); 2) which belongs to someone else (cf. 'αλλότριον; alienum; alien); or 3) which is of a different kind (cf. insolitum; ξένον; étrange, strange). Out of the three aspects of the "other" (i.e. place, ownership, species), he rightly puts the emphasis on the first, i.e. the aspect of place. The "other" is what appears through the "bordering and demarcation" of its place, i.e. its being (Waldenfels, 1997/2002, pp. 16-17). It is not that the stranger lives elsewhere; s/he *is* rather "being" elsewhere, delimiting his or her place to every encounterer. We are "answering" to the phenomenon of this self-demarcating stranger; in other words however, it is we who always demarcate and create ourselves upon encountering the other (ibid., pp. 52-53). The stranger is a person symbolizing/being elsewhere and incessantly letting us recognize our being.

In sociology, the stranger's status of being elsewhere is deciphered as his/her specific "distance" from community members.[14] Georg Simmel concretely locates the concept in a community: the stranger is the one, who comes today and stays tomorrow (1908/1964, p. 402). The stranger comes to a community and does not leave soon; s/he stays there to be constantly encountered by the members of the community. The medieval European "wanderer," who resides on a community's territory in a suspended way, represents this stranger. Simmel's essay portrays the European Jewry, who exemplify this locational

---

14 Stichweh (2005) sets the period, in which sociologists intensively dealt with the issue of the stranger, from around 1890 to 1945. Among others, Simmel, Park and Schütz chiefly fall into this time (Stichweh, op. cit.).

feature. Together with heretics and local pagans, Jews were the religious outsiders for the established Christian community; yet they also comprised the community's "spatial" stranger. The stranger is the trader and wanderer, who cannot be a full community member. S/he is always being close to the inhabitants and nevertheless being remote at the same time. This wanderer, occupied with intermediary trade and finance, interacts with the inhabitants in a unique way. S/he absorbs a wide range of people as customers, but does not solidify "organic" or kinship relationships with these people. The synthesis of such "nearness and remoteness" is the mobility, i.e. the symbolic status of owning no soil (ibid., pp. 403-404). The wandering stranger cannot demarcate his/her space and distance from the community.

The stranger's objectivity is another sort of distance, which shows the unbridgeable gap between the stranger and the community. To present the significance of objectivity, Simmel refers to the judge-stranger employed by Italian cities from outside the territories. Noticeably enough, the inhabitants of the community behave relatively openly to the stranger coming from the outside. It is because the stranger is, besides being "near and remote," all the more free and possesses the detached, or objective, sense of judgment of the community's issues (ibid., pp. 404-405). The inhabitants' reaction also signifies that the stranger reflects the "otherness" of the community, or abnormal elements embedded in the community (ibid., pp. 402-403). S/he brings the "outside" in to the community, with which the inhabitants resonate and in turn open themselves up to the stranger. The inhabitants' openness towards the stranger would at first sight suggest the possibility of filling the gap between the former and the latter. However, this instant openness, which apparently suggests the dissipation of the distance, usually ends up with a mere closure. When both parties' vested interests clash, the stranger becomes mistrusted and regarded as a threat (Schermer, 1988). The mobile and objective stranger thus presents his/her "belonging to the lack of membership" (Waldenfels, 1997/2002, p. 36) and remains suspended in Simmel's community.

The distance of the stranger being elsewhere is explained from the perspective of knowledge by Alfred Schütz, who depicts the "community of knowledge" inhabited by the daily interpreters of social interaction. The ready-made standardized "cultural pattern" of the community primarily offers an individual a sufficient coherence of "knowledge" for life; this inner-circulating knowledge is the necessary "recipe" for interpreting the social world (Schütz, 1944, p. 95). The stranger is the one, who does not belong to this "community of knowledge." Since the person newly approaching the community does not have this taken-for-granted knowledge, s/he is not capable of interpreting people's interaction or cannot fully "live" in the community.

The difficulty of entering the community has thus been discussed in the essays of Simmel and Schütz as well as those of other sociologists.[15] Concentrating on Schütz's frame of reference, it is clear that this difficulty derives from the stranger's possession of a different system of interpreting the lifeworld, and also from his/her "challenging" of the taken-for-granted knowledge of the encounterer's lifeworld (cf. Schütz, 1962). In one of his essays, Schütz introduces the lifeworld, or the "world in which we are living," as a place that offers an individual a chance of experiencing culture and society by being influenced by them and returning influence upon them (1975b, p. 116). This lifeworld is an exhaustive "stock of knowledge," which is available to anyone, yet is not fully understood as a whole (Schütz, 1946/1976e, p. 120). It is an almost consistent quasi-system of knowledge, which is transmitted to the individual in the form of "insight, beliefs…, maxims, instructions for use, recipes for the solution of typical problems, i.e. for the attainment of typical results by the typical application of typical means" (1975b, p. 120). From such a jumble of knowledge, the individual chooses useful materials for coping with problems and people s/he encounters in the world. The paramount character of the lifeworld is thus its unquestionable "givenness" and familiarity. Due to the reliable presence of this lifeworld, individuals smoothly attain mutual understanding and agreement upon things and expect continuity and legitimacy of their existence. The problem is that the Schützean lifeworld comprises the basis of the closed community.

As Simmel pointed out above, the stranger brings the outside world into the closed community. The stranger, who does not share the knowledge of a community, escapes the order circulating in the community (Waldenfels, 1997/2002, pp. 14-15). Generally speaking, the presence of the "other" allows one's self-formation and identification (Mead, 1934/1975; Goffman, 1959; Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1989). Yet for the existing community, the radical otherness of the stranger may not even offer the "possibility" of interpretation (Geertz, 1966, p. 61). The stranger goes through the resistance of the knowledge community, and when facing the stranger, people experience the overturn of the taken-for-granted community of knowledge (Schütz, 1962, pp. 207-208). The system of folkways (Sumner, 1906/1959) or "our" way, which formerly required no justification, becomes problematic (Schütz, 1955/1976f, pp. 230-231). The "plausibility" of the community, i.e. the legitimacy of the value system of the given lifeworld, thus faces a crack in its façade (cf. Berger, 1967/1990). The stranger, being the source of the concept of elsewhere (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1996, p. 252), brings about the "alternative reality" to the approached lifeworld (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1989, p. 156). By encountering the

---

15   For instance, see Park, 1928; Wood, 1934; and Merton, 1949/1982.

stranger, the community members come to doubt the plausibility of their own reality and consider the alternative value systems.

A primary answer of the community members against strangers is the act of categorization. Categorization is a necessary cognitive activity, without which people cannot think or function in the physical, social or intellectual world. Sociologists and anthropologists of culture discuss that categorizing what is "close" and what is "far" from oneself is a universal and primary need of humans (e.g. Levi-Strauss, 1968). Whenever people think and act in society, they automatically and unconsciously categorize animals, other people, and different kinds of physical objects (Lakoff, 1987). The people are separated into a "we-group" and a "they-group," in the former of which circulate the taken-for-granted folkways. Cultural cognitive anthropologists try to explain the process of categorization through the work of schemas in the following way: Cognitive schemas are the mental structures in which knowledge is represented; they are the automatic "processors" of information (D'Andrade, 1995, p. 122). Schemas guide perception, recall memories, interpret experiences, generate inferences/expectations, and they organize action. Schematic processing treats each new person, event, or issue as an instance of an already familiar category, i.e. schema. Schemas are shared in a particular culture, yet meanings generated by schemas are not rigidly structured but are shaped by life experiences (Strauss & Quinn, 1999, p. 50). Due to the work of schemas embedded in culture and modified through experiences, when a person encounters the "stranger" eroding the community, s/he usually puts the latter into a certain category, which has been established beforehand and functioning in the community.

Schütz's notion of the "system of relevancy" explains well the social process of categorizing the other/stranger through the work of schema. The act of categorization based on the level of knowledge is "typification" (Schütz, 1932/1970). An individual surrounded by a flood of objects manages to live by sorting things and people, whom s/he directly and indirectly encounters, into "general types" (Schütz, 1944/1976c, p. 96). In the sorting-out process, s/he applies particular schemas according to the level of "relevancy," i.e. how the objects have primacy to the person and the community s/he belongs to. The system of relevance and typification is a part of the social heritage, which is handed down in the educational process to the members of the in-group (Schütz, 1955/1976f, p. 237). The common schema for interpreting and solving a certain "problem" to a community consists of such forms of knowledge as insights, beliefs and instructions; in order to solve the problem, the schema, consisting of these forms of knowledge, helps one attain "the typical results by the typical application of typical means" (Schütz, 1975, p. 120). In other words, the schema tells the group members what aspects of the problem are relevant to them and

how these relevant aspects of the problem should be efficiently and effectively interpreted and digested. If applying this idea, the "stranger," who is the least intimate and is an unknown person, is a certain "problem" that a group member happens to encounter in the lifeworld. When facing such a figure, the in-group member of a community perceives and interprets this strange person, resorting to the appropriate schema transmitted by the community forerunners, and tries to "solve," or categorize this stranger.

Through such an act of typification/categorization, for avoiding the troubling of the community's order, the stranger is most often put into a marginal status. Simmel notably introduces the model picture, in which the stranger gets categorized and becomes the symbol of strangeness. Namely, Jews unilaterally levied with tax in the medieval community turn out to be a mere "type" and are categorically put into the symbol of strangeness (Simmel, 1908/1964, pp. 407-408). The act of categorical taxation on each single Jew erases his or her individuality. The community members lose the ability of distinguishing each of these persons; they cognitively and physically distance the stranger to the periphery of the community. The cognitive act of categorization/typification itself similarly leads to the establishment and fixation of a power relationship between the culturally distant stranger and the dominant community members. When encountered by community members, the stranger, necessarily owning a different worldview and culture (Schützean knowledge) and possibly disturbing the order of the knowledge community, is put into a category to be labeled or stigmatized as socially inferior.[16] While an "outsider" could be a positive differentiation and withdrawal from the norm of the majority (Becker, 1953, 1963), the "stranger," who is inherently conditioned by a peculiar culture, values, or biological conditions, is put into a vulnerable situation. The encounter with the "stranger" – a bilateral process of demarcating the boundaries of a community member and of the other – turns out to be an occasion of demonstrating power, dominance and inequality.

The core actor of discriminatory discourse, the stranger, has been thus conceptualized as a cognitively distant "elsewhere," who is encountered by the members of a particular Schützean knowledge community. The stranger, being different and troubling the order of the community, is a vulnerable object of categorization/typification that leads to automatic marginalization.

---

16   For the concept and typology of stigma, I refer to Goffman, 1964.

I-2-2. Discrimination against the Nation's Strangers

The discriminatory discourse on the stranger is an element of an ideology of nationalism. A nation, most notably defined as an "imagined and bounded political entity" (Anderson, 1983, p. 6), persists through a series of direct and indirect communications. The term "imagined" does not imply the nation's falsity, but it emphasizes that different nations signify different ways in which people may utilize their imaginations (ibid., p. 20). The definition thus signifies the creative character of the imagining process and the style of its development and maintenance (Janion, 2006b, pp. 261-262). Each nation consists of various "building blocks," such as language and religion, which culturally connect the major parts of social organization, and which enable the people living in society to engage in "common communication" with each other (Deutsch, 1966; cited in Kłoskowska, 2001, p. 22). The people, who are supposed to belong to the same nation, primarily *recognize* that they share such a culture, i.e. the system of signs, thoughts, behavior and communication. They assume that they commonly hold a set of beliefs, loyalty and a sense of solidarity toward the nation (Gellner, 1983, p. 12). Besides face-to-face direct communications, the indirect communicative activities, which horizontally connect people (e.g. the morning lecture of newspapers) as well as those which vertically connect people (e.g. worship of monuments and tombs of the unknown soldiers) together comprise the quasi-sacred "communion" of nationality based on the "faith" in the nation (Smith, 2003, pp. 30-31). Crucially, such nations and national cultures are not monolithic or uniform. Every nation is a specific "community of communication," which is based on people's real cultural experiences in the lifeworld (Kłoskowska, 2001, p. 77). A nation evolves as people divergently continue engaging in the everyday acts of imagination and communication.

Yet a nation is forcibly constructed and fixated by the ideological movement of nationalism. While the "universal" definition of the complex phenomenon of nationalism is impossible,[17] Anthony D. Smith "temporarily" clarifies its character as an ideological movement that demands unity, identity and authenticity from a human population called a nation (Smith, 2003, pp. 24-25). According to nationalism, a nation needs to be a single, uniform, and true community that is based on the sense of sharing a common ancestry and history, and that is to endure forever, unchanging. The ideology comprising the movement of nationalism is a set of quasi-sacred beliefs offering people a value system comparable to religion. These beliefs include the elements of the heritage of memories, myths,

---

[17] For debates over race/nation/ethnicity and nationalism, confer e.g. Ozkirimli, 2000; Delanty & O' Mahony, 2001; Delanty, 2003/2006; Fenton, 2003. The concepts will be further clarified in the fourth chapter.

symbols, values, and traditions of the community that are regarded as sacro-sanct, being the "sacred foundations" of the nation (ibid., p. 31). These ele-ments are the "deep cultural resources" from which members of the nation construct and maintain their national identities (ibid.). The sacredness of the value system, consisting of these national elements, functions similarly to reli-gion.[18] Just as the "sacred canopy" of religion offers people a meaningful val-ue system and prevents them from falling into the chaos of the unknown cos-mos (Berger, 1967/1990, pp. 152-153), the ideological movement of national-ism, wearing a quasi-sacred aura, offers people a convincing and protecting value system. In Berger's term, nationalism enforces a plausible (Berger, 1967/1990, p. 16) set of Schützean knowledge upon the people comprising a particular nation. Contradicting with the inevitable dissolution of the sacred canopy in the modern world, nationalism does not allow people an escape from the singular set of national values.

Nationalism needs strangers in order to establish and maintain this particular type of a knowledge community. Such a necessary political function of the stranger, involving power and enmity, intensified in accordance with the rise of modern nation-states in Western Europe and led to the incorporation of the stranger in the ideology of nationalism. A community stopped stratifying the stranger; authorities came to apply radical bifurcation, i.e. the membership and non-membership within a nation-state, to its territory's inhabitants (Stichweh, 2005). With the emergence of the modern world consisting of nation-states, the stranger has become the one who does not belong to the state and does not have the same nationality (Kristeva, 1988/1991, p. 96). The clear-cut dichotomization of "us" and "them" appears; thus Carl Schmitt notoriously reinstated the sover-eign's political duty of dividing the actor into "friend and enemy," the latter of which is allegedly so "alien and different" that it only generates conflict to the modern state (Schmitt, 1937/1996, p. 27). The enemy, or the different stranger, falls into the ideology of nationalism as an indispensable component of its structure – indispensable for the systematic false views regarding the nation for its proper function as an integrated whole (Žižek, 1989/1999). The installation of an institution, in which the stranger is denied his/her place, i.e. the territory to which s/he can belong and which guarantees rights, has thus led to historical ca-lamity (Arendt, 1951/1994, pp. 296-297); the stranger, incorporated in national-ism was ousted from the nation imagined by ideologues.

---

18 Anthony D. Smith (op. cit., pp. 9-18) clearly summarizes the intertwining similarity be-tween religion and nationalism pointed out by the classic work of Elie Kedourie (1960). Also confer Babiński, 1995.

The nationalists, the political players of such an ideological movement of nationalism, are at the same time social phenomenological actors, who perceive and interpret the lifeworld. Among social actors, nationalists comprise a social group of people whose aim is the imposition of the nation on the society as a whole. Differing from people's "unintentional" reproduction of a nation through the "flagging" of identity (Billig, 1995, pp. 93-94), the purposefulness of nationalists in the reproduction of a nation is of no doubt. Yet if daring to reverse Billig's viewpoint, the nationalists are also being social phenomenological actors, who perceive, interpret and typify the stranger in the lifeworld. For instance, nationalist politicians belonging to a certain radical rightist party are required to present sufficiently coherent and integral knowledge, i.e. the systematic view on the nation. They usually hold beliefs and ascribe them as the nation's "truth-value" (cf. Schütz, 1974). The conceptualization of nationalist politicians as social phenomenological actors allows us to explain the process of the political formation of the stranger. Encountering the stranger, nationalists offer an "answer" to that which is elsewhere and distant. Their perception of a person or a social group leads to categorization; the crucial thing is that nationalists have power and access to the discursive sphere. It produces and reproduces categories and directs conflicts towards the categorized objects in society.

Such a Schützean framework of the stranger and nation is relevant for the broader sense of a "community" composed of "indifferent" people. In modernity, community traditionally understood as a certain territory based on common ties and social interaction (MacIver, 1926) has changed its character; community rather arises through the "other" and for the "other" (Nancy, 1991/2001, p. 28; cited in Delanty, 2003/2006, p. 189). It is a cognitive phenomenon for people demarcating themselves through the encounter with "others"; there the stranger also appears as a contingent "event" of passers-by (Bauman, 2000, pp. 95-98; Rundell, 2004). Stichweh, who also takes interest in the transforming nature of the community, asserts that strangers in today's society are the "indifferent ones," i.e. persons being neither friend nor enemy (Stichweh, 1997, pp. 5-8). Here arises the role of political parties in formulating social phenomenological difference (Fernandes, 2005). For "converting" the people being indifferent toward each other, the actors of nationalism, most notably politicians belonging to nationalist parties, need to offer an explainable value system of differentiating the world and to appeal to all the indifferent strangers. The topic of the stranger and nation becomes a valid tool for these political actors for coming up with "individualizing" perspectives (Kłoskowska, 2001, p. 63).

So far I have been referring to the Schützean understanding of the lifeworld and the community of knowledge. It should be noted that Jürgen Habermas argues that Schütz's concept of the lifeworld is ineptly limited to the cultural