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Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism

European perspective(s)

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Content

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Martina Topić and Siniša Rodin
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Cultural diplomacy and Cultural imperialism:
A Framework for the analysis

Martina Topić and Cassandra Sciortino

The intention of this interdisciplinary volume is to contribute to the ongoing debate on cultural diplomacy in Europe and to discuss it also inside a framework of cultural imperialism since cultural imperialism often comes together with cultural diplomacy. We are looking into art, externally oriented cultural diplomacy, stereotyping and into so-called, Inside-Outside oriented, cultural diplomacy. The discussion is centred on the issue of how cultural diplomacy manifests itself in a variety of practices and policies.

It is apparent that cultural diplomacy manifests in many fields and that, sometimes, it becomes exceptionally difficult to distinguish where cultural diplomacy ends and public diplomacy begins. Sometimes it is difficult even to distinguish among policies of cultural diplomacy itself where placing these policies in one place becomes a rather difficult task because each aspect has various connotations. This is why there is no agreement on what cultural and public diplomacy are, how they are being enforced, how they manifest in practice, what effect do they have or even how to define them.

Problems of Definition

Both the terms public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are new and sometimes used interchangeably. However, current scholarship generally views cultural diplomacy as conceptually and practically a subset of public diplomacy (Mark 2009; Signitzer 2008; Higham 2001; Marsden 2003; Leonard et al 2002; Schneider 2005).

The placement of cultural diplomacy within the realm of public diplomacy reflects a massive change in the way cultural diplomacy is currently viewed and applied. As Mark (2009) has stressed, historically cultural diplomacy was associated with implementing cultural agreements, rather than with the practice of public diplomacy. Despite its position within the domain of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is not synonymous with it. Recognizing this vital difference has been complicated by the lack of clarity of what exactly the practice of cultural diplomacy entails and by what Fox (1999) calls the "semantic baggage" of the terms

"Diplomacy" and "Culture." Lending (2000) has pointed to the "major semantic differences" in connotations of the term that vary from country to country. For instance, as Wyszomirski (2003) notes, the French term 'diplomatie culturelle' designates international cultural *policy* in Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden; while it refers to cultural *relations* in Australia, Canada, Singapore, and the UK.

This analysis does not intend to propose a fixed definition of the term. It considers some of the problems of definition, some of the ways it is used, and scholarly work to differentiate between public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations.

While the constituents of public diplomacy are as old as statecraft, it was first used in 1965 to mean efforts of international actors to achieve foreign policy objectives by interacting with foreign publics since the close of the Cold War (Cull, 2008). Diplomacy is conventionally understood to mean government-to-government (and diplomat-to-diplomat) exchange. The term *public* diplomacy draws itself to the level of the people – to indicate government to people (of another country) and further to the level of people more generally (of one country) to people (of another country) (Manheim 1990; Henrikson 2006). It encompasses a wide and shifting terrain of processes and activities which can range from government actors speaking by way of the media to the people, or in people-to-people exchanges, such as an academic exchange between professors from different countries articulated in a Cultural Agreement ratified by the Minister of Education of both countries. These two approaches may be loosely divided into two functions, which (Signitzer, 2008) quotes:

1. "Public diplomacy (is) a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as well as its national goals and current policies" (Tuch, 1990)
2. "[The goal of public diplomacy is] … to influence the behavior of a foreign government by influencing the attitudes of its citizens" (Malone, 1988)

Following Signitzer (2008) and Deibel and Roberts (1976), these two approaches constitute the two fundamental elements of public diplomacy: persuasion by way of political information; and cultural communication that aims at cultivating mutual understanding. Political information operates within a short-term time frame from meditated dissemination to crises management of government policies or actions. The mutual understanding sought through cultural communication is long-term in scope, aiming at the presentation of one's own society (Signitzer 2008; Deibel and Roberts 1976; James 1955). Political information is disseminated with *fast media*—mainstream news media (newspapers, radio, television internet etc.) —in what James (1955) calls a "tough minded" school. Cultural communication he frames as "tender minded" *slow media*—academic

and artistic exchange, exhibitions, films, language instruction, etc.) (Frankel,1965).

For Leonard (1997) and Sablosky (2003) it is the long-term relationship building that distinguishes cultural diplomacy from public diplomacy. Leonard (1997) articulated an influential three-tiered conceptualization of public diplomacy with time as its metric. The first tier is short-term and may take hours or days. The next tier is medium-term strategic communication that is executed within months. The last tier, which is the province of cultural diplomacy, is tied to the long-term relationship building and may take years (Leonard, 1997).

Signitzer (2008) is sensitive to the slippage between dissemination of political information and cultural communication. He sees them operating on a continuum with parameters that are unclear and unstable and proposes to "accentuate them by radicalizing them". Along with Malone (1988), Signitzer positions political information in terms of *political advocacy;* while cultural communication is conceived as moving beyond the cultivation of mutual understanding, "to include sensibilisation of one's own society as to how it is seen by the other society" (Signitzer, 2008). This concept of co-orientation is well established in the communication sciences (McLeod and Chaffee, 1973). The concept of co-orientation or "sensibilisation" may be implicit in the goal of cultivating mutual understanding, but it is an objective that is little highlighted in standard definitions of cultural diplomacy, even in the recent revisionary work of Donfried and Hecht (2010).

Following Signitzer (2008), public diplomacy is found in the political arena of the foreign ministry that is at the higher echelons or top of policy making. Cultural communication, on the other hand, may be free to operate apart from the daily pressures of foreign policy. It extends into institutions entrusted with the international section of education or culture ministry or partially autonomous institutes abroad (Signitzer, 2008), such as the British Council, *Alliance française*, the *Società Dante Alighieri,* the Cervantes Institute, the German Goethe Institute, or the Adam Mickiewicz Institute.

Mitchell (1986) divides cultural communication into two categories: cultural diplomacy and cultural relations (see also Signitzer and Coombs, 1992). According to Mitchell (1986), *cultural diplomacy* has two levels of meaning: "One refers to the negotiation of formal cultural agreements, the other applies to the execution of these agreements and the conduct of cultural relations flowing from them."

Both may be directly underwritten by political entities or delegated by governments to external cultural institutions and agencies. According to Signitzer (2008), who follows Mitchell (1986), "the goal of cultural diplomacy is to produce positive attitudes towards one's own country with the hope that this may be beneficial to over-all diplomatic goal achievement. Scholars such as Fox, Lending, Cummings and Mitchell define a range of structural mechanisms through

which cultural diplomacy is administered—for example government ministries and departments, independent agencies, and private, not-for-profit foundations.

Cultural Relations develops mutual understanding between countries or states for mutual benefit and is marked by various forms of exchange rather than selective projections of national identity or character. Higham (2001) makes a strong distinction between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy:

> International Cultural Relations, as funded and encouraged by national governments at least, generally have a different objective, cultural development…that of building a country's competence and capacity for its own artistic expression through international exposure and collaborations abroad with other artistic or cultural professionals. The Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute, the British Council, the Japan Foundation and even Canada Council were founded in varying degrees on the cultural development/international cultural relations rationale and less as tools designed exclusively for cultural diplomacy.

L'Etang (2006) is sceptical of the possibility of symmetrical relations between states in public relations, even in the more limited category of cultural relations. Drawing a distinction between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, within the broader category of public diplomacy, represents one school of thought. One implication of this separation is that cultural diplomacy supposes tighter control, since the actors are narrowed to instrument of the state to produce specific "positive attitudes" toward a nation and so are fundamentally propaganda.

Mitchell (1986) states that cultural diplomacy "is essentially the business of governments." Contrary to this position are approaches that see cultural diplomacy as a means to act apart from politics; in this sense, collapsing into Mitchell's category of cultural relations (Feigenbaum, 2008) and separated from governmental exigencies and administration. Finally, a third group of scholars, such as Donfried and Hecht (2010) have sought to liberate the term "cultural diplomacy" from a one dimensional assignment as an instrument of the state, an association which tends to tie it to state manipulation, and consequent marginalization within diplomatic activities. Donfried and Hecht explore the fine, porous, and fluid line between propaganda and information, between institutions operated by the state and those independent, nongovernmental organizations. They have complicated assumptions about cultural diplomacy instituted by political agents by pointing to the dependency of government organizations on non-governmental actors. Artists, teachers, curators, students etc. who have agendas and interests of their own may blur state drawn policy lines, regardless of the governmental program under whose jurisdiction they may operate.

Donfried and Hecht underline the problem with Mitchell's (1986) implication that cultural diplomacy is more subject to state control and manipulation, while international cultural relations is freer to operate in substantially more idealistic terms. It is polarization of terms that has flaws on both sides. This is a point that

Mark (2009) also underlines. He points out that to suppose that cultural diplomacy uses flattering, "selective self-projection" would undermine the credibility of cultural diplomacy, a key property of effective soft power (Nye, 2008). There are numerous examples of this in films, where a film presents its country of origin in an unflinchingly honest light. Mark points to the New Zealand film, *Once there Were Warriors* (1994)*,* but many other examples may be found, such as *Waltz with Bashir* (2008)*,* an animated Israeli documentary film about the 1982 Lebanon War. Credibility, in an era marked by a dramatic increase in access to alternative sources of information, has become increasingly relevant to cultural diplomacy. Perceptions of credibility are a critical check in the flattering self-projection strategies of nations' employment of cultural diplomacy.

The question of state control and image projection raises the issue that has significantly contributed to cultural diplomacy's historical marginalization: that it is, as Higham (2001) suggests, at the most basic level "self interested propaganda". The contention is obviously based on how propaganda is defined. If the definition is "information, ideas, opinions or images, often only giving one part of an argument, which are broadcast, published or in some way spread with the intention of influencing people's opinions" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2009) then clearly cultural diplomacy and propaganda may be linked. But as Mark (2009), drawing on the work of Melissen (2005; 2006), has argued it is an error to see cultural diplomacy as synonymous with propaganda. The analysis of Melissen (2006) provides a useful framework for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the terms.

Melissen places public diplomacy and propaganda on a "continuum ranging from the crude and manipulative propaganda aiming at short-term political effects to two-way public diplomacy for the 'long haul' based on dialogue with foreign audiences." Instead of seeking to prove differences between the two terms in relation to objectives, he looks at the form their communication takes. Propaganda and crude forms of public diplomacy engage in the "rather primitive business of peddling one's own views and narrowing other people's minds. If experience with propaganda is any guide – it may work, but its effect will not be lasting. It does not make friends… [and] has no listening capacity and is not dialogical—and not being 'interactive' is the kiss of death in the age of ICT [Information Communications Technology]." In contrast, he states "the new public diplomacy … is marked by distinct traits: first, it is two-way communication. Its keywords are 'engagement,' dialogue', and 'mutuality'" (Melissen, 2006). This framing of public and/or cultural diplomacy in terms of interactivity is extremely important in light of the radical changes in technology and the traffic of information and images through a far wider range of conduits than in the past. Apart from political information, as a component of the public diplomacy (Signitzer, 2008) already

discussed earlier—where speed is the metric—news and crises management may still operate in classically one sided terms. But beyond this kind of immediacy of information dissemination, Melissen sees public diplomacy, which can be related here to cultural diplomacy, as containing many similarities to the relationship-building characteristic of foreign cultural relations. At the same time, Lending's (2000) proposal that propaganda is fundamentally "the dissemination of more or less doubtful truths for the purpose of influence and manipulation" does under-line the challenge of untangling the practices of cultural diplomacy from propa-ganda. As Mark (2009) has stated, "one government's cultural diplomacy 'truth' undertaken to influence could conceivably be another government's 'lies' for the purposes of manipulation." However, it should be clear enough that the terms of cultural diplomacy and propaganda are not synonymous.

Melissen's stress on the new age of Information Communication Technology and the new kinds of demands it is making on the practices of cultural diplomacy raises the important issue of how the practice of cultural diplomacy changes in relation to information technology and the way it engages new media, new audi-ences, and new kinds of disseminators of information.

P. van Ham in his analysis of the rise of the "Brand State" and the nature of post-modern politics has argued that the terrain of geopolitics and power is shift-ing to a post-modernist one defined by images and influence. Ryniejska (2009) provides a clear analysis of these issues and draws on the work of E. Gilboa who perceived public diplomacy in relation to the media and frames it as a channel for a wide range of state and non-state actors who utilize it to influence external public opinion abroad. Ryniejska (2009) believes that media, even the short-term variety, representing one country to another, via state or non-state actors, should not be excluded from the realm of diplomacy, if it is engaged in creating an image of a state in an international context.

This is contrast to Signitzer (2008) and Szondi who place public diplomacy under the purview of foreign policy, while the vast range of other mechanisms conveying the image of a country—nation branding, tourism promotion, image production and management etc.—fall into the category of international relations. One of Szondi's apparent objectives is to establish nation branding in a field where it has received little attention, compared to public diplomacy. To establish a stron-ger force of presence of the concept of nation branding, specifically, he tends to want to sever it from a diplomatic context to avoid conflation with it. Ryniejska (2009) aptly notes that this overlooks numerous points of convergence between public and cultural diplomacy and international relations and contests the practi-cal implications of Szondi's stress on separation in the interest of encouraging cooperation and mutual implementation between the two fields. Such mutual col-laboration is especially relevant to the EU's cultural diplomacy where the inter-

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est is constructing a European identity in terms of a state or nation's diversity. Creating a division between branding and diplomacy, as Szondi does, may have policy implications that limit the efficacy of actors and activities in the realm of international relations to strengthen the policy driven goals of public diplomacy.

In addition to recognizing points of convergence and collaboration between international relations and public and/or cultural diplomacy, recent scholarship has pointed to the new power of the individual in the age of the Internet. In the digital age, it is crucial to recognize how cultural diplomacy can operate beyond not only the top-level arena of policy making by government actors, but also that initiated by powerful disseminators of information who may operate from below. Historically, established national media conduits of the economically most powerful countries have the most powerful and the highest number of technological vehicles to generate and disseminate information on the international stage so easily becoming agents of cultural imperialism.

But new technology and networked communities, not only across national borders but also in opposition to dominant ideologies, open a window for a powerful, bottom-up manifestation of cultural diplomacy. Cull (2008) points to the power of new small technologies to derail the power of established media networks, and carefully orchestrated publicity events aligned to foreign policy objectives. He writes:

> Examples of the power of this new technology to wrong-foot the powers that-be abound, from the ability of a photograph from a cell phone to circle the globe and derail a carefully planned media event to speed with which an SMS text message can be passed from person to person and rally citizens to a protest. Besides new technology, it is equally important to also consider the new demography and political economy that underpin contemporary international relations. International communication is not necessarily about CNN or multi-million-dollar cultural centres overseas. Any message that crosses a frontier is an international communication.

Cull states that while the mobilization of digital technologies in the interest of cultural diplomacy may be daunting it could have major results. Among its potentialities is to act as a balancing mechanism to work against the top-down approach of conventional cultural diplomacy and cultural imperialist effects. Cull goes on to position *listening* as a critical part of cultural diplomacy; in other words hearing what kinds of ideas are emerging from a target audience and facilitating the kind co-orientation, mentioned previously. Developing awareness of foreign public opinion into the practice of public diplomacy is a neglected and critically important task in the digital age. Cull (2008) points to the way in which advances in software and "the proliferation of online source material have made it possible to monitor online media in English in real time, and other sources in near real time." He does not mention the advances being made in translation software that would broaden

the scope of this project of cross-cultural empathy to an even greater degree. For Cull, communication relations begin to operate in the realm of public and cultural diplomacy as soon they are recognized as tools to facilitate the fundamental goals of mutual understanding. He does not separate public diplomacy from public relations.

This kind of qualitative research on public opinion in the past may have been assigned to a press attaché or a diplomat in the field but now is accessible through new digital modes of communication. Precisely because the digital age produces vast amounts of data communication that is no longer a formal arm of the media or foreign policy, it has the power to be mobilized in ways that facilitate mutual understanding to a significant, and probably unprecedented, degree. Cull states that current public diplomacy needs to create a way of conceiving of the public diplomat, "as that of the creator and disseminator of "memes" (ideas capable of being spread from one person to another across a social network) and as a creator and facilitator of networks and relationships."

Both cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are examples of soft power. According to Nye (2008) soft power is not simply influence, though it is one kind of influence. Influence that is coercive can also rest on hard power—military or economic threats for example. Soft power is also more than a matter of persuasion or the ability to convince through argument, though this too is an important element of it. Soft power is fundamentally the ability to entice and attract; it is in behavioural language—the power of attraction.

For Verčič (2008) the mechanics of soft power are indistinguishable from those of public relations so calling attention to the semantic divisions in the academic field and the value of transcending them. In the political arena, soft power is mobilized as an instrument by governments to communicate and attract the publics of other countries, rather than at the high-level echelons of government. A range of strategies may be used to mobilize the power of attraction—broadcasting, cultural exports, exchanges and so on—but if they are not attractive they cannot generate soft power. While the soft power of the United States is well known, it may be undercut by policies that discredit values associated with it—most recently the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Nye isolates three resources enabling soft power: its culture (in so far as it is attractive); political values (when they are admired and when they are reflected in actions at home and abroad); and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and with an ethical foundation).

It should be born in mind that soft power may resonate and be effective in one country and have the opposite effect in another—for instance some American values may resonate in Australia, Europe, or South Korea in varying degrees, but be rejected in Iran or Saudi Arabia. Soft power has the power to repel as much as it attracts. This is especially evident if one looks closely at the assumptions of superiority of certain European or American values and how they can uncritically

inhabit structures of "artistic hegemony" or "cultural imperialism." For example Fundamentalist Christian values in the United States may resonate in Muslim countries but these are not internationally mobilized with moral authority as an attractive form of power, where other more comfortably "Western" values are.

Credibility is also a critical element in the agency of soft power. In the age of information vast parts of the world have much greater access to information through a much wider range of news media, as well as information disseminated by critical non-government organizations, and networks of scientific communities (Nye, 2008). At the same time Simon (1998) and Nye (2008) have pointed to the "paradox of plenty" with regard to the quantity of information now accessible and suggest that capturing attention has become a critical factor in generating soft power. Consequently, garnering attention while carefully navigating political struggles over the creation of credibility are key components of soft power. Politics, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) have stated may be less about a traditional military victory, but in an information age, "may ultimately be about whose story wins."

Ryniejska (2009) makes an important point about the implications of the EU deployment of soft power. The United States' use of soft power, say, in Afghanistan, may possibly wane in relation to its involvement there. When a potential EU country falls under the sway of soft power, its strength "is broad and deep: once sucked into its sphere of influence, countries are changed forever" (Leonard, 2005). She points to the impact of the EU on Polish society—"from its economic policy, through property rights and treatment of minorities to what is served on tables." This example throws into high relief the issue of cultural imperialism and its inevitable tie to economic development. Tomlinson (2002) defines the term as "the use of political and economic power to exalt and spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture." Herbert Schiller (1976), the widely known writer on media imperialism, defined cultural imperialism as "the sum of the process by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating centre of the system."

The EU's well-known effort to counter this is evident in its search for a unifying European identity by pursuing "unity in diversity". Searching for intercultural dialogue is purportedly one of the primary objectives of EU cultural policy, and is behind numerous projects ranging from language initiatives to facilitating employability and mobility of people across borders.

A word should be said about the supposed dangers arising from "cultural imperialism', or "Coca-colonization or McDonaldization," debates which have raged, as Norris and Inglehart (2009) have observed, for half a century. This is not a relic from the Cold war era, as recent protectionist cultural policies have

taken shape in recent years—among these the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the European Union (Norris and Inglehart, 2009). In their new study, *Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World* (2009) they propose that the expansion of information from the so-called "global North to South" will have the highest degree of impact on converging values in the areas of integration into world markets, freedom of the press, and widespread access to the media. The authors drew from empirical evidence at both the societal and individual level, and drew evidence also from the *World Values Survey*, which encompasses 90 societies in all of the major regions of the world from 1981 to 2007.

Europe and Culture

When it comes to cultural imperialism that we just mentioned, it is notable that Europe is not immune to these practices either or, at least it is reasonable to state that Europe has a history of certain practices that could be considered as hegemonic and imperial due to its colonial past. This colonial past relates to individual European states and not the EU or Europe that, as some scholars observe, does not exist and particularly not as a sovereign power (Delanty, 2005).

A whole other question emerges when one asks what it means to be European and if it is possible to be one. For example, Delanty (2005, p. 11) argues that being European is "in a certain sense, optional or vague, lacking a clearly defined set of markers". Paul Valéry (1962), on the other hand, described Europe as a some sort of a supra state that created citizens that belong to it while others claim that being European means having a lifestyle that is related to the behaviour of the so-called West (e.g. Borneman and Fowler, 1997).

But, some sort of Europe and the notion of being European exists at least on the upper level within the European elite presented in the EU's governing bodies, while the feelings of European citizens toward being European remain rather unclear and problematic, as numerous research studies have demonstrated.

When it comes to culture and cultural diplomacy, Europe currently presents a case of an ongoing struggle with one joint cultural policy coming from the fact that cultural policies of different European countries still differ, while, at the same time, these policies always take the national as its foci.

It is beyond the possibility of one introduction study to address all relevant issues in an in-depth analysis[1] of the EU's cultural policy let alone to discuss all

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1 The same applies to the reference list we are using here and that we do not consider as complete nor do we imply that authors we cited here are the only authors in the field who should be considered as the only authorities on this complex matter.

distinctive policies that exist in the EU Member States and non-EU European countries. However, we will try to address certain turning points that might give a picture of the complexity of the issue when it comes to notions of Europe and its culture, heritage and civilisation that affect present dual and somewhat distorted cultural policy and cultural diplomacy of the EU.

When it comes to the notion of Europe, it is difficult to determine where to begin due to the complexity of the issue. However, Europe most certainly always had a hegemonic aspect, constructed in opposition to a certain 'other'. Calhoun (2003, p. 6) argues that the idea of Europe derives from "a claim to collective identity, 'we' in relation to 'the others'" and that "the idea of Europe continued to be invented in contrast to non-Europeans, especially in colonies". In this vision, as Calhoun observes, Europe was understood as a civilisation that has the right to dominate and this civilisational claim then developed into the project that eventually constructed 'Europeanness.' This challenge existed since the advent of colonialism, since colonies were taught European civilisation but this civilisational teaching was conveyed to those who were colonised and therefore "Europeans needed to learn how to understand and reproduce civilizational identities that were less problematic at home" (Calhoun, 2003, p. 6). To this, we may add that much of the European colonization was concerned with asserting its civilisational superiority (see e.g. Fisher−Tiné, 2005).

Other scholars have also argued that the idea of Europe existed in a much older form (Hay 1957; Delanty 1995; Pagden 2002; Perkins 2004) and at its beginning it was conceived as Latin Christendom as opposed to Islam and Orthodox Christianity. The notion of Latin Christendom is still found in the essence of Europe, although European integration remains secularly oriented due to the criticism of religious aspects (Calhoun 2003; Boldt et al 2009)[2].

This 'Europeanness' has always been particularly present among elites and, in this sense the notion of Europe and the European identity existed before European nation states were founded as an ideal political and cultural organization of the state (Calhoun 2003; Anderson 1991). Consequently, the notion of creating European identity certainly existed before the desire to create one common cultural identity (Calhoun 2003; Boldt et al 2009; Vidmar Horvat 2012). Competition in colonies brought wars and after two World Wars in Europe, European countries started to unite again in, what is today, the European Union. However, European heritage still remains founded on European values, traditions and practices but also on those practices Europeans brought from its colonies that enriched Europe (Calhoun, 2003, p. 11, 12).

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2 Some proposed that the European Constitution should contain preamble stating that Europe is founded on Judeo-Christian tradition (Weiler 2003 in Delanty 2005). Among other reasons, Weiler (2003) states that preamble is the place where Europe acknowledges its heritage and civilisational inheritance that might form the base for European identity (in Delanty 2005).

Many authors compared building of the EU with nation building because nation states built a sense of belonging and a common identity via the creation of national culture (Nederveen Pieterse 1991; Outhwaite 2008; Shore 2000; 2006; Mokre 2006). This is something the EU is also trying to accomplish by creating the common culture and a sense of belonging to it (Shore 2006 in Vidmar Horvat 2012). Because collective identities were often understood through their cultural identities this was not, for a long time, on the European agenda (Mokre, 2006). The EU has, since its beginning, been more preoccupied in producing common foreign and security policy than common European culture that came on the policy agenda rather late (Calhoun 2003; Shore 2006; Mokre 2006; Kraus 2011; Vidmar Horvat 2012).

European identity, on the other hand, came to the public agenda as early as 1973 when the *Declaration on European Identity* was introduced after the Copenhagen meeting. The Declaration outlined the need for European unification that was seen as having a dynamic nature and as open to every country that shares the same ideals and objectives. However, the *Declaration* specifically outlined that unification achieved until 1973 serves as a basis for further unification, creation of the EU and creation of the European identity. The common European identity was to be based on diversity of cultures inside common European civilisation with which the notion of European civilisation is being re-introduced. However, the European identity also entailed a reference to culture but a diverse culture and not one common European culture:

> "The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism" (Declaration on European Identity, 1973, I/3).

It appears that civilisation is to be kept in common to European citizens while the culture is designated to remain within national boarders as has been the case since the beginning, and as expressed in the Treaty of Rome that formed European Economic Community that had no reference to culture[3].

The Declaration on European Identity appeared to consolidate Europe as a player on the international world map and to construct the European identity and Europe's place in the world after two large financial crises (Strath 2002; Boldt et

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3   Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome formulated activities of the Community but there is no reference in creating a common European culture. Other articles also do not mention common culture. See Treaty of Rome, retrieved 8 July from European Commission's Website: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf

al 2009). This declaration also served as a legitimising aspect for the European unification (Shore 1993; Boldt et al 2009).

Numerous academic studies appeared and the majority of them concluded that the European identity is weak and presents a complex issue (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004; Bruter 2003, 2004, 2005; Hermann et al 2004; Gillespie and Laffan 2006, Risse 2004; Schild 2001; Strath 2002; Favell 2008, Fligstein 2008, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Medrano 2003).

Many also concluded that national still bears more relevance than the European (Carey 2002; Smith 2003; McLaren 2006; Boldt et al 2009).

The others expressed views according to which national and European need not to be exclusive of each other and seen as conflictive types of identification (Herb and Kaplan 1999; Diez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Risse 2004; Ichijo and Spohn 2005).

Some other authors (Delanty, 2005) insist that in comparison to the American hyphenated identity of being, for example, Irish-American or Italian-American that makes the American identification possible, something like this does not exist in Europe where there is no, for example, German-European identity and particularly not, as in the US where African-American identification exists, African-European identity. On the contrary, what does exist, in this view, is the lifestyle that might be considered as European even if there is no personal identification. This means that being European can mean being cosmopolitan in orientation towards the world while remaining uninterested in culture and politics (Delanty, 2005). In this vision, a notion of cosmopolitanism is being introduced as a type of identification[4].

However, despite the ambitious plan to create a large and internationally important Europe, which some authors claim not to exist, particularly not when it comes to European culture (Delanty, 2005), culture remained in the shadow of this plan. This is particularly visible in Section I of the Copenhagen *Declaration on European identity* that reads:

"Although in the past the European countries were individually able to play a major role on the international scene, present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak

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4   European cosmopolitanism would mean: "Europeans are citizens with a world outlook. What can this consist of? In the most basic sense it means that the citizens of one country consider the citizens of another 'one of us'; it means the recognition of living in a world of diversity and a belief in the fundamental virtue of embracing positively the values of the other. While this was once an identity of the European elites, there is some evidence that it has become a more general identity for all Europeans (Delanty, 2005, p. 18).

increasingly with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world" (Declaration on European Identity, 1973, I/6)[5].

As well as in the Section III of the *Declaration*:

"The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They are convinced that building up this policy will help them to tackle with confidence and realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe thus making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their relations into a European Union" (Declaration on European Identity, III/22).

Recently, Europe has been preoccupied with diversity that is related to cultural matters and that is particularly visible in the EU's motto 'United in diversity'. This has been a highly contested issue due to the traditional divisions inside Europe that have existed since the beginning of the unification process[6]. This motto is also particularly visible in trans-European activities (Kraus, 2006), as well as in European activities against discrimination expressed in a motto 'For Diversity. Against Discrimination' (Kraus, 2011).

Kraus (2011, p. 8) states, "if cultural homogenization represented one of the dominant paradigms of European modernity and was an objective actively pursued by many state-makers and nation-builders, the embrace of diversity in a good part of contemporary political discourses must be considered a very significant change." He understands the term diversity as a cultural diversity meaning that diversity presents the pattern of identification that affects social life and it expresses itself in ethnicity, language and religion. According to this view, collective identities in present Europe are those of the majority and 'their' state, indigenous minority population and that of immigration. Nonetheless, he correctly observes that identity of the majority can hardly be considered as compact and united to consider it as one unique major identity and culture (Kraus, 2011).

In an enlarged and culturally enriched Europe, what it means to be from a certain country changed as well as did the meaning of what it means to be European. This is also changing due to naturalized citizens with non-European origins,

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5   The term *Nine* refers to nine Member States of the EU. At the time this Declaration was introduced the EU had nine Member States.

6   Europeans and the 'others' were first, as already noted, but there are also divisions on west and east, Christianity versus Islam, political right versus political left, etc. However, division on west and the east that still remains in the European public and political sphere remains one of the obstacles for full Europeanization and creation of the European identity since this division is a pure construct that was made by the West during the Cold war to prove western superiority and the east then became 'Other' (Wolff 1996; Neumann 2001).

who have citizenship of EU member states but a diverse cultural background (see Kraus, 2011) as well as other variable aspects. One is that the EU, when cultural diversity is at stake, largely protects its own cultural diversity or the cultural diversity of its member states (Kraus, 2011) and not the European culture for which some authors claim not to exist because there is no essence for such a concept (Delanty, 2005).

Strath (2002) argues that the fall of Communism that started in 1989 brought more consideration to the European identity and its redefinition.

This particularly makes sense in light of what Kundera said to Western Europe in his writings or, in his quest addressed to Western Europe, asking Europe to save Central Europe from Soviet influence based on the premise of its common heritage and values, regardless of its historical division between east and west. Kundera thought that Central Europe is the cradle of European identity (Kundera, 1984) and this is often seen in the former Communist bloc, where countries claim to be cradles of Christianity and an 'antemurale Christianitatis' to identify themselves as fully and unquestionably European (Topić et al, 2009). Nonetheless, Kundera thought that countries of the former eastern bloc belong to the West culturally and to the East politically because the identity of people and civilisation, in his view, "is reflected and concentrated in what has been created by the mind – in what is known as 'culture'" (Kundera, 1984, p. 2). Culture is in his view what unites Europe as one civilisation gathered around ancient Greek culture and Judeo-Christian thought.

However, Western Europe stood still and observed events surrounding the collapse of Communism without an appropriate reaction, even when the war in former Yugoslavia occurred (Vidmar Horvat and Delanty 2008; Vidmar Horvat 2012) and this has caused dual feelings in the former Communist bloc that today express a certain amount of reluctance to identify fully as European but for different reasons than those in the west where a similar situation also exists (e.g. in the UK citizens also feels a low degree of attachment to the notion of being European but for different reasons).

The changes that occurred after 1989, general divisions between east and west, and also the enlargement process of the EU into the former Communist bloc, have influenced the feelings toward the European identity (Vidmar Horvat, 2012). These processes of enlargement brought about a rise in considerations on what it means to be European and to have a European identity, and a vast number of research studies have been conducted to explore this. The enlargement processes caused a new division within Europe. Whereas before there was a division between eastern and western Europe, today we have a division to the so-called old and new Europe and this is expressed even in some studies conducted by the EU itself, such as *Eurobarometer* which examined habits of the 'new' Europeans

which includes cultural habits and feelings of belonging as well (Eurobarometer 2011; for the analysis of these practices see Vidmar Horvat, 2012)[7]. And, this then influences the cultural identities and poses a question whether there is a common European culture and identity and is it possible to have one.

As already noted, not much attention has been paid to drafting a joint cultural policy at the beginning of the European unification process. It took until the Treaty of Maastricht[8] in 1992 to list culture as the "European competence" (Culture Action Europe, 2012) and this was done in Article 151 that regulates

"the flowering of cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore" (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, Article 151, Clause 1)[9].

However, actions that Community planned to undertake were centred on culture and history of the European peoples and promotion of diversity as well as to encourage cooperation between Member States but also between Member States and the third countries:

"Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
– improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
– conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance; - non-commercial cultural exchanges; - artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.
The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.
The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures." (Treaty of Maastricht 1992, Article 151, Clauses 2, 3, 4).

This document laid down the ground for the motto 'United in diversity'. Vidmar Horvat (2012, p. 31, emphasis from V. H.) argues that this notion of diversity

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7   To the certain extent Survey on European culture and cultural habits conducted for the European Commission also enforces 'western' and 'eastern' view on culture and cultural habits by often outlining 'western' views. See 'The Europeans, culture and cultural values: Qualitative study in 27 European countries'. Retrieved 8 July 2012 from European Commission's Website: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/pdf/doc964_en.pdf

8   Treaty of Rome only briefly mentioned elements that later became used in drafting the cultural policy of the EU such as unifying factor that will eliminate barriers that divide Europe and closer union among people in Europe. Treaty of Rome, retrieved 8 July 2012 from European Commission's Website:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf

9   This was at first Article 128 but it became Article 151 after changes made in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

"entailed the protection of cultural expression *against* the pressures of Americanization and globalization". However, as Calhoun (2003) observed the intention behind this policy was to Europeanize Europe and this has also been done, as Shore (2006, p. 14) argues, by "Europeanising the cultural sector" through a whole set of policies meant to foster one European cultural space based on distinctive European heritage and civilisation (e.g. Europe day). This motto 'United in diversity' does tend to diminish presupposed differences between the east and the west since it acknowledges diversity however it is questionable to whom this characteristic of diversity is pointed to and how we can understand this. But, since there is no explanation and due to the enormous campaign of the EU to present itself as diverse, we might believe that elites in the EU think on all diversities present in the EU.

The EU recognized cultural cooperation as vital in its policies during the 1990s and in line with that the EU launched several programs to foster cultural cooperation with which it sought to "achieve three main objectives: to promote cross-border mobility of those working in the cultural sector; to encourage the transnational circulation of cultural and artistic output; and to foster intercultural dialogue."[10] But, it took until the new Millennium for the EU to start engaging in fostering cultural policy further.

Therefore, in 2005, The General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, at the meeting in Paris from 3 to 21 October 2005 at its 33rd session a *Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, Annex 1.a)* was introduced. That *Document* in the preamble lists 21 point that serves as a basis for promoting cultural diversity that is understood as the common heritage and the basis of humanity that should be preserved and cherished. This document apparently served as a basis for a new document introduced two years later.

In 2007 the Commission of the European Communities introduced a document entitled *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions on a European agenda for culture in the globalizing world {SEC(2007) 570}*[11].

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10   EU Culture Programme. Retrieved 7 July 2012 from European Music Council Website: http://www.emc-imc.org/cultural-policy/eu-culture-programme/

11   This Document was introduced after several public discussions on European culture and policy implementation of cultural activities to be financed by the EU. In 2006 the European Commission introduced a Document entitled 'European agenda for culture' that was build "on the result of a commissioned report on the 'Economy of Culture' (published in November 2006) and on the added profile for cultural actions that the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008 was expected to bring" (Culture Action Europe, 2012a). In September 2006