



Franz Höllinger, Markus Hadler (eds.)

# **CROSSING BORDERS, SHIFTING BOUNDARIES**

*National and Transnational Identities  
in Europe and Beyond*

**campus**

Crossing Borders, Shifting Boundaries

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# Crossing Borders, Shifting Boundaries

National and Transnational Identities  
in Europe and Beyond

Festschrift for Max Haller

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# Introduction

This Festschrift is dedicated to Max Haller on the occasion of his 65<sup>th</sup> birthday. The subject of this book – the relationship between national and transnational identities in Europe and beyond – has been a central area of Haller's research. His interest in the question of collective identities and the problems involved in the process of the political integration of Europe originates from his attentive observation of the socio-political developments in this region. However, his commitment and dedication to this issue may also be related to his personal background.

Max Haller was born on March 13, 1947 in the town of Sterzing in South Tyrol, a German-speaking region which was part of the County of Tyrol and the Austrian part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for centuries until it was annexed to Italy after the First World War. Spending his childhood as a farmer's son in a small mountain village in South Tyrol, he has maintained close emotional bonds to his home during his lifetime. However, after finishing the Gymnasium in Sterzing, his cultural affinity to German-speaking areas and his early ambition to follow an academic career as a sociologist directed him to Vienna. From 1966 to 1974 Max Haller studied sociology, philosophy, psychology, and history of arts at the University of Vienna, completing the discipline of sociology with a doctoral thesis about the role of young women in work and family (*Die Frau in der Gesellschaft. Eine soziologische Studie junger Frauen in Beruf und Familie*, advised by Prof. Leopold Rosenmayr). Already in this first scientific work Haller demonstrates his talent of focusing his attention on social phenomena that are undergoing dramatic change and thus subject to intensive political and public debates (in Austria and Germany, the rise of labor force participation of women and the related changes of gender-roles, parent-child-relationship and family life started in the 1970s).

In the last two years of his University-studies, Haller was a post-doc fellow at the *Institut für Höhere Studien* (Institute for Advanced Studies) in

Vienna. After his graduation to Dr. phil. in 1974 he started his professional career as Assistant Professor at the Institute's Department of Sociology. The *Institut für Höhere Studien* (IHS) in Vienna was and continues to be a prestigious post-doctoral training and research institute in the areas of economy, sociology, and political sciences. IHS was important for Max Haller's career development in two regards: First, the post-doc-training and his participation in various research projects allowed him to enlarge and deepen his knowledge of empirical research methods. At the same time, the intellectual climate at IHS stimulated his interest in social scientific theories as well as in sociopolitical issues and problems. In 1979, he was promoted to the head of its Department of Sociology.

One year later, in 1980, Haller accepted the opportunity to collaborate as co-director in the large-scale empirical research project *Vergleichende Analysen der Sozialstruktur mit Massendaten* (VASMA; English: Comparative Analyses of Social-Structure Using Mass-Data) at the University of Mannheim, Germany, under the direction of Walter Müller. In 1983 he defended his Habilitation *Theorie der Klassenbildung und sozialen Schichtung* (Theory of class-formation and social stratification) at the University of Mannheim. In the same year, he was appointed to Scientific Director of the *Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen* (Center for Survey Research, Methodology and Analyses), the largest and most renowned center for survey research and quantitative methods in the social sciences in Germany, located in Mannheim. Only two years later, in 1985, Max Haller accepted a professorship at the Karl-Franzens-University of Graz. Since then he is *Professor of Sociology at the Department of Sociology at Graz University* and in charge of the area of *Macrosociological Analyses and Methods of Empirical Research*.

Parallel to the chronological sequence of work-places, we can find a sequence of three principal areas in the sociological work of Max Haller:

During the first two stages of his academic career – the periods he spent in Vienna and in Mannheim – Haller's research activities focused on macro-sociological analyses of change in occupational structures, systems of social stratification, and trends of social mobility in highly developed Western societies. Starting from the case of Austria (*Klassenbildung und soziale Schichtung in Österreich*, 1982. English: Class Formation and Social Stratification in Austria), he gradually extended his area of investigation to Germany, France, the United States, Italy, and the highly developed countries of the world in general (*Klassenstrukturen und Mobilität in fortgeschrittenen Gesellschaften*, 1989; English: Class-Structures and Mobility in Advanced

Societies). His scientific publications of this period are characterized by sophisticated statistical analyses of sociological mass-data and their interpretation by using relevant sociological theories regarding social stratification. The dominant position among social scientists in the German-speaking language area was that distinctions between social classes would erode in advanced post-industrial societies and that the concept of “class” (class-structure, class-formation) should be abandoned in favor of the more fluent and less ideologically-charged concept of “strata” (stratification). Contrary to this view, Max Haller emphasized that the concept of “social classes” should be maintained and is applicable to post-industrial societies. The high quality of Haller’s research in this area is reflected in the fact that his publications were well-known and discussed in the international research community; two of his articles, *Marriage, Women and Social Stratification*, 1981, and *Patterns of Career Mobility and Structural Positions in Advanced Capitalist Societies. A Comparison of Men in Austria, France and the United States*, 1985 (with W. König, P. Krause and K. Kurz), were published in the prestigious journals *American Journal of Sociology* and *American Sociological Review*.

The second principal area of Max Haller’s work is the analysis of social attitudes and value-change in different areas of social life (politics, family, work, religion, environment etc.) by using cross-national comparative survey data. Closely related to Haller’s research activities in this area is his engagement in the creation of research cooperatives and research programs providing the organizational requirements for carrying out high quality social surveys on a regular basis. Haller was involved in this new area of research for the first time when he was responsible for the conception and implementation of the *German ALLBUS* (Social Survey for Germany) in his position as scientific director of ZUMA in Mannheim (1982–1984). At that time, he established contacts with sociologists from Great Britain, the United States and Australia who were in charge of the national surveys in their countries in order to establish a continuous cross-national comparative survey research programme. As a member of this initiative he was co-founder of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 1984. When Haller moved to Graz in the following year, one of his principal concerns as a newly appointed professor was to introduce a longitudinal National Social Survey in Austria and to incorporate Austria into the *International Social Survey Programme*. He organized a research cooperative which carried out three waves of the “Austrian Social Survey” (in 1986, 1993 and 2000). In addition, due to his initiative, Austria was one of the six partici-

pating countries when ISSP carried out its first survey in 1985. During the last 25 years, ISSP has expanded to over 40 member states, including most countries of Europe and roughly 20 countries from the other continents.

Max Haller is not only co-founder of ISSP, he is also one of its most important members in terms of promoting new research proposals and developing research instruments. He succeeded to introduce three new modules – *Social Networks and Social Support* (ISSP-1986), *National Identity* (ISSP-1995) and *Leisure Time and Sports* (ISSP-2007). As the convener of the questionnaire-drafting group he had a major influence on the conception of these surveys, and he also made substantial contributions to many other survey-modules of ISSP. With admirable efforts and with the support of his research team in Graz he succeeded to raise the funds to carry out almost all annual ISSP surveys in Austria since 1985. He and his collaborators in Graz have produced more than a hundred scientific articles based on ISSP data, many of them published in highly ranked international sociological journals. Max Haller demonstrated his central position within ISSP once again when he offered to host the 25<sup>th</sup> annual meeting of ISSP in Vienna in 2009. On the occasion of this jubilee meeting he organized the edited volume *Charting the Globe. The International Social Survey Programme, 1984–2009* (together with Roger Jowell and Tom W. Smith) which won an award from the ASA Section on Global and Transnational Sociology for the best publication by an international scholar in 2010.

The third focus of Max Haller's scientific work is on developments, opportunities and problems related to the political and economic integration of Europe. One of the first issues which attracted his attention was the question of ethnic-national identities and relations within the European Union, with a particular reference to the case of his home country South Tyrol. In the 1990s Haller organized several scientific events dealing with different aspects and problems surrounding the question of national identity and the process of European integration: a lecture-series on *The Reawakening of Ethnicity and Nationalism* (1992); the conference *Social Justice and Democracy in the United Europe* (1993), a symposium about *National Identity in Austria* (1996) and the symposium *Societal Integration in Europe*. This last symposium was held in Vienna on the occasion of the Austrian presidency of the European Union in 1998.

Among the numerous publications of Max Haller in this area of research two books merit particular attention: The first is *Identität und Nationalstolz der Österreicher* (Identity and National Pride of the Austrians,

1996). The main part of this book, written by Max Haller, is based on the results of two large cross-national-comparative surveys (WVS 1990 and ISSP-1995 on “National Identity”); these analyses are complemented with contributions from other authors: an in-depth interview study on the image of Austria and its population among Austrian emigrants and Neo-Austrians, an analysis of the historical development of Austrian identity since 1945, an investigation of the role of politicians and intellectuals in the making of the Austrian nation, and a study on the relevance of the nation for the social identity of high-school students. Combined with each other, these studies give a comprehensive and complex account and analysis of the historical formation and the characteristics of Austrian national identity. The second book to be mentioned here, published in 2008, is *European Integration as an Elite-Process. The Failure of a Dream?* The central thesis of this book is that European integration has given rise to a new political and bureaucratic elite, termed “Eurocracy”. The members of this elite have a strong tendency to pursue their own financial and political interests. In order to maintain their power and to legitimize further growth of the EU bureaucracy, they glorify the advance of European integration with dubious myths concerning the benefits of this process and ignore the interests, problems, and fears of the population of the countries they represent. Thus, there exists a considerable split between elites and citizens, which has become more profound over time. The book ends with a fervent plea in favor of strengthening the social and democratic character of the European Union. Haller’s fundamental and provocative critique of the European Union received much attention and gave rise to controversial debates not only among social scientists, but also in the quality press.

In addition to the three principal areas mentioned so far, Max Haller has done research and published on a number of other sociological problems, as can be seen in his publications listed at the end of this volume. He has carried out research projects on various issues concerning family and gender roles (e.g., health-problems of employed married women; children of divorced parents, family violence, and care for the elderly); some of these activities were related to his membership in an interdisciplinary work group for research in the area of communal social planning, established by the provincial government of Styria. He has done research on the state of sociology as a scientific discipline and its position in the Austrian society (conditions of production and forms of application of social research; the teaching of sociology at universities; the employment of sociologists out-

side scientific institutions). Last but not least he has written a textbook on Sociological Theory (1999, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition in 2003), in which he undertakes a systematic comparison of important contemporary social science theories (behavioralist theories, structural functionalism, system theory, and the rational-choice approach), and proposes principles for a new concept of sociology as a “Science of Reality” (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft), inspired by the scientific positions of Max Weber, Erving Goffman, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Karl Popper.

Max Haller has not only done an enormous amount of research and publications, he has also spent a lot of his time and energy in service to the scientific community and the development of international professional networks. He was an active member of the Austrian Sociological Association for many years, and its President from 1986 to 1989; in 1994 he was appointed corresponding member of the Austrian Academy of Science; he was member of various sections of the German Society of Sociology and of the American Sociological Association; and he had a crucial role in the foundation of the European Sociological Association (1989–1992). In addition to his organizational activities in connection with ISSP and his research on European integration, Haller has co-organized, among others, the annual conference of the Austrian Society of Sociology in Graz in 1987, the combined congress of the German, Austrian and Swiss Societies of Sociology in Zürich in 1988, the First Conference of Sociology in Central Europe in Krakow in 1989 and the First European Conference of Sociology in Vienna in 1992.

A last area of Max Haller’s lifework that we would like to recognize here is his study and research visits, guest professorships, and lecturing activities. Haller was visiting professor and/or research fellow, among others, at the “Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung” in Berlin (1990 and 2008), the “Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques” in Paris (1991), the University of Antwerpen (1994), the University of Waterloo, Canada (1995), the Emmanuel College in Cambridge (1996) and the University of California in Santa Barbara (1999). From 2002 to 2005 he held the position of “Professore di fama internazionale” at the Università degli Studi in Trento, Italy. He has given more than 100 lectures and papers at scientific conferences, and a similarly high number of guest-lectures and talks at universities and other institutions around the world.

Concluding this account of Max Haller’s academic career and his scientific achievements one can say that he undoubtedly belongs to those soci-

ologists who are guided by an inner vocation, and who consider their work not only as a profession, but a mission. This strong intrinsic motivation allowed him to pursue his goals, to carry out his research activities and to disseminate and defend his ideas with an enormous energy, determination and perseverance, sometimes close to the point of obstinacy – qualities which perhaps refer back to his descent from a Tyrolean mountain-farmers family. Apparently, Max Haller's energy and his ambition to "cross borders" in order to establish new scientific contracts and to discover new fields of social research has not diminished even in the last stage of his academic career: A few years ago, after the death of his wife, he undertook a journey from Cairo up the Nile by ship and overland by train and bus through Sudan to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. On this journey, which was planned as a mixture of a touristic and scholarly trip, he made contact with sociologists from Ethiopia and Tanzania. These contacts were expanded to a partnership agreement between the Universities of Graz and St. Augustine in Tanzania, involving the strong personal engagement of Max Haller in founding a new sociology department at this university. With these activities, he has once again made a contribution towards extending the boundaries of the international sociological community and opening new perspectives for sociological research.

\* \* \* \* \*

We will proceed now to a short introduction to the contents of this Festschrift. The idea of this book is to focus on one specific area of Max Haller's work – national and transnational identities – as this topic has accompanied him throughout his life. A considerable number of the articles presented in this volume are based on new empirical research, drawing upon topics, theses and results from Haller's publications, and/or reanalyzing the cross-national comparative ISSP-surveys on national identity that he designed. The contributions of this book, thus, are intended to continue, to complement and also to criticize the work of Max Haller in search of a deeper understanding of social reality.

Corresponding to the subtitle of the book – "National and Transnational Identities" – this volume is divided into two parts: The first part, "Determinants and Effects of National Identity", includes contributions about the meaning and developments, the determinants and effects of ethnic and national identity, addressing also questions of collective memo-

ry. The second segment focuses on the path from national to transnational identities and includes several empirical studies on the development and formation of such identities.

## Determinants and Effects of National Identity

Following the introduction, the book begins with the chapter *Postmodern Ethnicities: Diversity and Difference* written by Albert F. Reiterer. The author starts with more general reflections on the historical roots and the psychological and sociological approaches to the concepts of identity and collective identity, and also addresses the problem of ethnic identity, a phenomenon which – according to some theories – constitutes the basis and origin of national identity. Reiterer then presents a typology of ethnic identities, and concludes with the thesis that the concept of ethnic identity takes two meanings in postmodern societies: Ethnic identity in the sense of a positive evaluation of ethnic *diversity* and ethnic authenticity, and ethnic identity which stresses the *difference* towards other ethnic groups which are viewed as (potential) threats to the own ethnic group.

The following chapter also deals with two opposed types of collective identity. In their paper *National Pride, Patriotism and Nationalism* Franz Höllinger, Jürgen Fleiß and Helmut Kuzmics investigate whether the distinction between a positively evaluated form of national pride (patriotism) and a negatively evaluated form (nationalism) can be validated empirically. This question is analyzed by means of a mixed methods approach, combining statistical analyses of ISSP data, a qualitative probing study, and a content analysis of a novel. Considering the inconsistencies between different results, the question arises whether a strict distinction between nationalism and patriotism is theoretically meaningful and whether the customary way of measuring these constructs is empirically valid.

The differentiation between patriotism and nationalism is also relevant for the article *National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigrants in a Comparative Perspective*. Jorge Vala and Rui Costa-Lopes investigate the impact of two sets of concepts on attitudes towards migrants: In the first part they present data confirming the hypothesis that positive or negative attitudes towards immigrants can be better explained by a comparative identity indicator (taking into account both identification with one's nation and

identification with Europe) than by the indicator of national identification alone. Results of empirical studies in the second part confirm that nationalism is positively correlated with xenophobia, while there is a negative correlation between patriotism and xenophobia.

Miroslav Tizik analyses in his article *Religion and National Identity in Central and Eastern European Countries* how collective identities have been affected by political transformations such as the enlargement of the European Union. It is often stated that religion has played an important role in forming national identities throughout this process. Using survey data collected within the ISSP framework, Tizik, however, shows that such a revival of religion in former state-socialist countries cannot be confirmed. A trend towards a rise in the importance of religion is present only in some former state-socialist countries. The author concludes that religion and its idealized importance as societal foundation can become a basic source of collective identification only when other ideological and mobilizing sources are absent.

While the first chapters are concerned with the question of ethnic and national identity in the context of Europe, the fifth contribution extends the perspective to Non-European countries. Bernadette Müller focuses in her chapter *A Success Story of Creating National Identity in Tanzania. The Vision of Julius K. Nyerere* on identity formation in Africa. Analyzing Afrobarometer data, Müller shows that a national identity is most prevalent in Tanzania among all sampled twenty African countries. The author describes in detail the plans and the impact of the first Tanzanian president Julius K. Nyerere in creating a national identity. His success is reflected in the finding that within Tanzania, “modern people”, are not more likely to identify with the state than those who are largely excluded from the modernization process. National identity, therefore, encompasses all groups despite being a “modern” phenomenon.

In the last contribution of the first part – *Collective Representations of Atrocities and National Identity: The Case of Darfur* – Joachim Savelsberg and Hollie Nyseth investigate how this African conflict was reported and perceived in different Western countries. Analyzing newspaper articles from eight countries and several interviews with Africa correspondents, representatives of NGOs, and policy makers, the authors show that both global forces and national idiosyncrasies are reflected in these news reports. For example, the potato famine in Ireland and the holocaust in Austria and Germany have left an imprint on what national newspapers write about

Dafur. At the same time, however, their interviews suggest that global communities of journalists and NGO representatives are at work in spreading similar knowledge across countries.

## From National to Transnational Identity

The second part of this volume views transnational and national identities through the lenses of the historical formation of Europe and contemporary global developments. Josef Langer discusses in his contribution *The Contingency of European Boundaries* divergent ideas of political and geographical borders and the importance of historical events such as the breakdown of the communist system for these boundaries. The author claims that the European Union is built on relentless expansion and resembles in doing so – as Langer phrases it – “a cyclist who has to continue treading in order not to fall.” Concluding, a few possible scenarios of this continuous process are highlighted: A “federal Europe”, a “post-national Europe”, a “national revival”, a “Europe of fatherlands”, and a “Europe of proximity”.

After this discussion of possible future scenarios, Magdalena Piscová and Miloslav Bahna consider Europe’s past in their chapter on *Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Memory Trace in the Central European Countries*. The integration at the European level was – as scholars claim – foreshadowed by the unique multi-national and multi-cultural alignment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The authors’ research hypothesis regarding contemporary attitudes towards the Monarchy is that the main split should run along the line of the former “ruling” countries Austria and Hungary versus the “subordinate” countries Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. Their results, however, show that the attitudes are relatively similar in Austria and the Czech Republic, while the attitudes of the former members of the Hungarian part of the Monarchy are rather divergent.

The relationship between an overarching political structure and the underlying identifications are also addressed in the following contribution. Stefan Immerfall questions the roles of transnational independencies among European societies, mobility among Europeans, and cosmopolitan values in the integration process in his article *How Much Society in the European Union? On the Social Basis of European Integration*. The author con-

cludes that greater convergence among the policies of the members of the EU does not necessarily evoke European solidarity and supranational identifications. Interconnection between all countries of Europe may also lead to Europeans becoming increasingly aware of their specific national and ethnic characteristics as Norwegians, Germans, or Italians, or even as Bavarians, Piedmontese, or Catalanians.

This conflictual relationship between national and European identities is further analyzed in *All or Nothing: Identity Bonding to Europe, the Nation, or Neither in a Changing Geopolitical Environment* written by Markus Hadler, Lynn Chin and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. The authors use ISSP data on national identity from 1995 and 2003 to examine which social contexts promote a positive relationship between attachment to one's nation and Europe and which contexts cause conflict between them. Their results show substantial differences across countries, in ways that indicate that people in Western Europe during that period had different patterns of relationship between their national and European identity than those in former communist countries, even after controlling for different individual characteristics. An important promoter of European identity, however, is being an immigrant.

After identifying immigration background as an important factor in fostering European identity, Michael Braun and Walter Müller scrutinize this aspect in their analysis of *National and Transnational Identities of Intra-European Migrants*. The authors use data from the European Internal Movers' Social Survey (EIMSS) of the PIONEUR project. This survey includes nearly 5,000 intra-European adult migrants who moved between 1974 and 2004 from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to one of the other four countries. Braun and Müller show that identification with the European Union, the country of residence, and the country of origin co-exist for intra-European migrants, but also that there are specific determinants for each kind of identification. Identification with the European Union is strongly related to education and ties to third countries. Identification with the country of residence is only partly related to variables which are usually employed to explain the integration of migrants; in particular it is not related to education.

Immigration is often considered under benefit aspects. In *Interethnic Alliance" and National We-Images: An Analysis of Internet Fora Related to Sport and Migration*, Dieter Reicher compares the reactions of Austrians towards two different types of migrants: the "very useful" soccer player David Alaba and the "common migrant" Arigona Zogaj. His study is based on an

analysis of internet fora of two Austrian newspapers and shows that xenophobia is a major motive in the case of Arigona Zogaj, but is much less prevalent in the sport-related comments. Here, the topic of immigrants needed for the country is prevailing. The internet-postings about the football star Alaba however, also show, that “interethnic-alliances” are ambivalent in promoting universalistic values, in that the central motive for the approval of interethnic alliance is the wish to “defeat” countries considered as “enemies”. If success fails to appear, loyalty towards immigrant athletes may also decrease.

The final contribution of the second part approaches the topic of national and transnational identity from a global perspective. Education has played a major role in generating unified national citizenries in the past. In our contemporary social world, however, more and more global elements can be found among curricula. John W. Meyer and Francisco O. Ramirez discuss *Institutional Theories of Education in Supra-National Society* and show that global human rights and student-centered elements have been increasingly incorporated in textbooks throughout the world. They conclude that education is a central modern institution in every contemporary society and a core institution that reconstructed peasants as citizens. Currently education, however, reconstructs citizens as entitled humans on continental and global scales.

\* \* \* \* \*

Concluding this introduction, we would like to thank all the authors for their excellent work; April Angell for helping with the linguistic improvement of the articles; and Eva de Rouw for formatting this volume. Last but not least, we thank Dr. Max Haller for his support and mentoring during the formative years of our scientific careers at the Institute of Sociology, University of Graz, and the opportunity to collaborate with him in many interesting research projects.

*Franz Höllinger and Markus Hadler*  
Graz – Huntington, March 2012

Part I

Determinants and Effects  
of National Identity



# Postmodern Ethnicity: Diversity and Difference

*Albert F. Reiterer*

## Introduction: A political problem and its intellectual mastering

“Something new has appeared” (Glazer/Moynihan 1975, 2), the editors of a most influential reader about ethnicity start their introductory remarks. They continue by enumerating the issues: racial violence in the U.S., tribal wars in Africa, conflicts between majorities and minorities in Eastern Europe, etc. However, is this really something new?

*Racial violence:* Since the North American colonies and the Union were established, there has been a problem of discrimination and debasement founded upon ascriptive social traits and an identity which the people concerned did not choose. Since the 1960s, a lot of political effort has been spent to master this. However, in the understanding of a great majority of people, it is not possible to change such an identity, due to corporal markers even in cases in which the concerned would be willing to do so.

*Tribal wars:* There is a problem of distributing scarce resources between greater and smaller groups in which the bigger group feels entitled to decide because of its “democratically legalized” standing, that is, referring to the principle of majority.

*Conflicts between majorities and ethnic or national minorities:* Here, there is a question of equal footing in national and civil “honour”, “dignity” and recognition. These aspects will have a heavy impact upon the life-chances for those belonging to one group or the other.

Many years ago, I tried to draw the outline of a theory of ethnicity seen as a historical structure of *longue durée* (Reiterer 1998a). Comparing my own approach with that of Glazer/Moynihan, we are led to ask if we are, in fact, speaking of the same phenomenon. Is there something like a uniquely defined concept of ethnicity applicable both to segmentary societies and to highly complex modern systems? Of course, we can dispose of this epis-

temological issue by coining different concepts for such different contexts. However, it is clear that such a formalistic stance will do nothing to enlighten us about the importance of social identity.

Therefore, I want to propose that we cling to one unified concept of ethnicity; however, we must differentiate it according to historic circumstances and necessities.

## Identity

Let us start with some remarks about identity in general. Identity is a means of personal orientation in the world and of integration in a larger social body.

All modern societies are highly complex systems. Such a complex society consists of a number of stratified and specialized sub-systems meant to fulfil the wants and needs which a person as a social agent in the society has and is bound to satisfy within the social system. Thus, every person is participating in a variety of such sub-systems. In traditional settings, those sub-systems are almost all compressed into one single social figuration: the local group. Differently from that, modern societies consist of a number of specialized institutions, clearly demarcated and recognizable as separate units. As separate units with specialized functions, these institutions are guided by different sets of values and norms, (i. e. cultures), and by different “logics”. Therefore, they may sometimes clash. The person acting in such different institutions in this case has to decide to which norms he or she will adhere. For example, as a participant in the economic and professional system, I am inclined to stress the principles of efficiency and optimization, and to maximize my income or profit. My “interest” will prevail. As a member of a cultural association or a church, I surely want to be more lenient in this regard, and being more altruistic, I will be ready to give support to other co-members. As a citizen of a state, I will tend to strengthen the state’s ability to regulate social life; the logic of power and domination comes to the foreground. However, as a person and an individual, I am to coordinate and to reconcile at every moment those different and sometimes contradictory impulses. It is my *personal identity* which is the locus of integrating them into a single system of values and norms. If I do

not master this daily challenge and this diversity of emotions, I will become anomic.

Personal identity, however, is always a *social identity*. The human is born into a society, and (primary) socialization endows him or her with the views of this society, such as how to behave properly in the ordered world of social relations. The most basic principles will be given to us, but they will be rather differently fashioned in different societies. Co-existing or living together means to share the same basic world view and attitudes as have the members of my group. Part and parcel of this is “solidarity”, the readiness to consider each other as fellow-humans as an *alter ego* to at least some degree and, therefore, to also share material means.

Identity is “the set of points of personal reference on which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit, to make sense of the myriad constellations of social relationships that they encounter, to discuss their place in these constellations, and to understand the opportunities for action in this context. [...] In the most basic sense, then, *groups* are defined by common relationships to points of social reference” (Hale 2004, 463).

“By *identity* [...] I understand the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or a related set of attributes, that is given priority over other sources of meaning. For a given individual, or for a collective actor, there may be a plurality of identities. Yet, such a plurality is a source of stress and contradiction in both self-representation and social action. This is, because identity must be distinguished from [...] roles, and role sets. [...] Roles [...] are defined by norms structured by the institutions and organizations of society. Their relative weight in influencing people’s behaviour depends upon negotiations and managements between individuals and these institutions and organizations. Identities are sources of meanings for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation. Although [...] identities can also be originated from dominant institutions, they become identities only when and if social actors internalize them, and construct their meaning around this internalization. [...] Identities organize the meaning while roles organize the functions. I define *meaning* as the symbolic identification by a social actor of the purpose of her/his action. [...] Meaning is organized around a primary identity (that is an identity that frames the others), that is self-sustaining across time and space” (Castells 1997, 6–7).

## Are there subhuman “identities”?

For a long time, in fact since antiquity, philosophers have been looking for *the* human trait, the single most important defining property of our *genus*. If we consider identity as a highly complex structure and not a simple feature, it would be an excellent candidate for the divide between humans and animals. Such a statement does *not* preclude that we can find basic elements of identity also in highly organized mammals.

Biological evolutionists have been puzzled for a long time by what they term “cooperative behaviour”, which they see as opposed to the principle of “survival of the fittest” (Silk 2006). Results from investigations of chimpanzees show clearly that – in a very limited way – these animals are able to cooperate on a level which can be compared to children of the age of 16 months. Similar evidence comes from investigations of baboons (Buchan et al. 2003). Baboons may recognize their hatching in the wilderness, but not in the laboratory. This is of some importance, for it shows us that such recognition is a complex behavioural activity not to be reduced on one or two keys. For a less prejudiced person, there is no puzzle at all. We have known for two decades that chimpanzees display elements of culture. If the concept has any meaning, “culture” is something which is learned individually and is not inherited in a genetic way. Of course, this pre-supposes the biologically based ability to learn. The mind has not come *ex nihilo*. There was a process of evolutionary emergence. Elements of culture must be present in pre-human beings. Cooperation is a behaviour learned by reflective perception of the social and natural environment. If there are the first traces of reflection, then the possibility of non-egotist cooperative attitudes is nearly self-evident. “Other” beings have to be recognized as similar to me or “of the same kind”.

However, we have to ask: Does this mean “identity”? This is, in some regard, a question of useful definitions. As baboons and, on a considerably more complex level, chimpanzees are acting essentially on behalf of instincts, it would be an overstatement to speak of identity which transgresses the boundaries between animal and humans. Nevertheless, the most basic biological precondition for identity has evolved in primates and gives us some right to speak of hominoid learning.

Identity in the above mentioned fully developed sense is a precondition of social relations. This entails that identity to be seen as an Aristotelian category in social science.

## Social identities of different brands

People are men and women and, possibly, something else. They have a *sexual identity* which does not necessarily coincide with anatomical givens. To complicate things, *gender identities* frame a variety of social relations based on sexual identities but fashioned according to the images men and women in society are expected to realize. *Professional identities* are becoming increasingly salient in a competitive society dominated by economic relations. Furthermore, in this way, we could enumerate a lot of possible identities in modern societies. In fact, to every social role there is a set of cultural values and norms which can be seen as special identity, as I would insist formally in spite of quoting *Castells* above. However, we are accustomed to labelling as “identity” only those distinctive frames of reference having paramount importance for our psychic balance and behaviour. A condition for this seems to be that such an identity covers more than one social aspect and tends to assume a “total” character. “People strive for certainty only in those areas of life that are subjectively important to them [...] When intergroup categorization and interpersonal similarity are pitted against each other, categorization prevails” (Hale 2004, 465).

Social identity may, therefore, be seen as a basic need and defining feature of human existence, or “the quest for security” (Dewey) in its social form. All such basic needs must be satisfied, but there are many different ways to do this. It is dependent upon scale and upon the developmental stage (productivity) of society and upon some other conditions whether ethnicity will become a defining trait.

Social identities become practical as solidarities between persons belonging to the same “group” and between groups. As there is some emotional economy, it is the size of the group which is determining to a high amount the degree of solidarity between individuals, with all their consequences for behaviour. In our individualized modern society, familial solidarity will bear a power incomparably stronger than, for instance, politicized ethnic solidarity. A nation consisting of millions of people can never claim solidarity in the same way as do small primary groups. Political categories larger than nations lack the emotional bond necessary to found “communities of transfers” in a more than trivial size.

At this moment, there are seven billion people inhabiting the earth. However, even if there were only 240 million, as was the case 2,000 years ago, or four million, as 12,000 years ago, I would not be able to identify

with all of them other than in a highly abstract manner. Therefore, I am under constraint to draw boundaries and to allot my solidarity in varied ways, supporting a tiny group of people in a comprehensive manner, and to identify with others, more distant to me, in a less obliging way. Social distance, however, may be framed in quite different ways.

## Some hints about the dogmatism of ethnicity

Continuity in personal, cultural and social regard is obviously a constant worry of human beings. Ethnicity refers to ancestry and, therefore, offers some notions which would cover such a need. There are several approaches in dealing with identities as the basis for the *conditio humana*. By looking at the most important among them I want to stress the basic role social identity has in the reasoning about human's place in the world.

The most ancient approach to identity is surely the Western philosophical tradition. For nearly three thousand years, the social division of labour led persons disposing of leisure to put forth the rational, that is, non-mythic, question for "human nature". Identity was a focal point in this question. Protagoras, in spite of his generally sceptical mood, considered man as the only real value to which all other things have to be commensurate (*Ἀνθρώπος πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστίν*). Platon, in his Socratic turn, would conform to this view. Augustine, bishop of Hippo, gives us in his "Confessions" the evidence that individualism was a potential attitude even in traditional settings. In modernity, this attitude has become a norm for every person. Philosophy became the science of men. It was an individualist result which had consequences until modernity. Philosophy since has ceased to be an all-encompassing general science. However, identity as its core concept has survived its turn into, partly, a speculative anthropology and, partly, a pure epistemology (cf. Taylor 1989; 1992).

Psychology grew out of philosophy and was heavily influenced by such a parentage. Personal, individual identity came to be seen as its core (cf. Erikson 1973; 1982), even when more technical concepts are preferred (Tajfel 1981; 1982; Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel et al. 1986). Psychoanalysis may be considered a branch of psychology, more interested in intra- and inter-personal conflict. Unfortunately, its very fruitful ideas and insights are sometimes hidden under a suffocating mass of jargon (e.g. Volkan 1989).

Nevertheless, it is clear that political conflict solution without respect to personal and social identity is next to impossible.

*Sociology* became interested in social and political identity in two quite different branches. Some of its founding fathers put forth the question of the factors of cohesion in modern society. Durkheim (1986 [1893]) assumed “mechanical solidarity” – solidarity borne out of similarity – to weaken steadily in the process of modernization. “Organic solidarity”, solidarity due to complementary roles and interests, would step into its footprints. In a similar vein, although far more old-fashioned in the phrasing, Tönnies (1925) saw “society” as the modern principle substituting traditional “community” as the essential bond of social units. Weber (1976) corrected this view in a subtle but decisive manner, stating that every society has societal *and* communitarian aspects (Bentley 1987; Wimmer 2008).

More empirically oriented sociologists became aware of new problems due to the massive migration flows originating especially from Europe and going to a large degree to the Americas (Park/Miller 1969 [1921]). Migrants were impregnated by the attitudes of the societies into which they were born and socialized. In the host society, they had to adapt to new challenges and not all of them succeeded (Bieton 1964). The Chicago School started to study the issue in the frame of urban environment. It was, in some way, the study of ethnicity, although the word ethnicity was not used.

*Social anthropology* was dubbed ethnology in Europe. Despite such a label, ethnicity was not the object of its attention. Only post-war Africa offered the opportunity to draft such a conception. It was the new process of urbanisation, not traditional tribes, where related facts were observed (Epstein 1958; 1964; Mitchell 1956). “Tribal identities” in the copper belt came into existence, not out of traditional roots, but from scratch by the needs of mutual assistance and social organization. Nevertheless, the new identities had a distinctly ethnic smell (Eriksen 1993). European ethnology started late in this field (Mühlmann 1964; Francis 1965; Barth 1969).

Additionally, of course, *political science* became most interested in ethnic politics and ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985; 2001; Fearon/Laitin 2000). As it is the field of study which deals with political processes, institutions and policies, this was to be expected. Due to the variegated origin of this discipline and, especially, its proximity to journalism and politics, this was a mixed blessing for the theory of ethnicity. It is often a very superficial view

which is sometimes more confusing than illuminating, as we shall explain immediately.

We cannot avoid mentioning a special European practice of dealing with ethnicity and with minorities. Political science has arisen belatedly in Europe and against a lot of conservative enmity. This applies especially to the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria and most of Switzerland). Today's agenda of political science was cared for by various academic disciplines – *Contemporary History* and *Law* most prominent among them. Both disciplines were foremost interested in nations and nationalism. *History* believed itself able to trace nations back to time immemorial, even if historians invoked a progressive pedigree (Szücs 1981, rather different Hroch 2000 [1985] and Hobsbawm 1990). Like Herder two and one half centuries ago, they missed the fact that they were mostly speaking of ethnicity (White 2000).

*Law*, and especially *international law*, were either not interested in entities beyond the state or they designated nations as the “natural” units of international relations. In this manner, the so-called *principle of nationality* came into being – for every nation a state, and only one state by nation (Mancini 1978 [1873]; Bluntschli 1965 [1852]). At the end of World War I, the Habsburg-, Romanov- and Ottoman-empires fell apart. The new states had to draw boundaries and tried to maximize areas and populations. Therefore, many people claiming an ethnicity different to the titular nation of their own state came to the fore: national and ethnic *minorities* emerged. International law had to deal with that situation. Thus, lawyers felt competent for ethnic issues (cf. Frowein et al. 1993; Capotorti 1979; 1991; Ermacora 1978). The effect was, until the very present, a doubling of the terminology. Historians and jurists speak of nationalities and national minorities, while sociologists and political scientists use the term ethnic (cf. Banks 1996; Hedetoft/Mette 2002; Goldberg 1994).

Furthermore, some of the legal experts were inclined to some sort of “philosophical law” (Obieta Chalbaud 1980; Veiter 1970). They tried, with much success, to derive minority law from a conservative version of human rights. That is, they were not eager to analyse ethnic questions and conflicts – they longed to apply their personal (Catholic) values to this political field. Some experts of the Anglo-Saxon realm, especially Canada, took notice of this way of thinking (Kymlicka 1995). In truth, it was a rather coarse version more in the liberal strain than the European one which they accepted. However, consecrated by New World attention, this some-

what vulgarized version of dealing with minorities' issues as conflicts about human rights came back to Europe and had some success. For a better understanding of ethnic questions these approaches do contribute almost nothing.

In the wider audience, the term *ethnic* has become a very general and sometimes confused concept covering almost every sort of social identity. It is often used as a proxy for the now proscribed word "race" and "racial" in the sense used not so long ago. The dangerously dubitable notion of simply substituting "race" is found frequently in ridiculous terms such as "the ethnicity of this skull [...]" and the like in the widely distributed reference journals *Science* and *Nature*.

Ethnicity is currently part and parcel of a globalized discourse controlled by academic U.S. hegemony. At the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the mainstream in the U.S. admitted neither difference nor diversity as part of its intellectual heritage. The tone was set with Israel Zangwill's Broadway piece "The Melting Pot", which advocated "a new race". Soon after, the U.S. closed its territory to immigrants. In the 1960s, some social scientists discovered that there were groups in the country who claimed a distinct ancestry and were rather surprised (Glazer/Moynihan 1987 [1967]). Harvard discovered ethnic diversity. At the same time, an ambitious policy ("The Great Society") was no longer willing to accept the fact that there were disadvantaged persons because of belonging to another "race" – that is, having a dark taint. At the core of both phenomena, there stood a different social identity, and they were, therefore, token for one another.

The career of a most successful concept started. Besides *class* and *nation*, it turned out to be the pivot of a new social science meant to be emancipative. Eurocentrism, and of course, US-centrism, did a lot in terms of such considerations.

## Ethnic identity and ethnicity

It is not identity *per se* which is of the main interest here. It is *ethnic identity*, and above all, *ethnicity*. These are two different phenomena to be distinguished carefully. Ethnic identity is the personal identity stemming from the social consciousness of *belonging* to a certain grouping – most often, but not always, a regional society. This identity is usually supplemented by a

strong emotional bond which sometimes makes this grouping and the loyalty to it seen as a question of meaningful existence. *Ethnicity*, however, is a system of social and political relations derived from the fact of such a consciousness and belonging, shared with the other members of that society. But we shall be careful; while social identity seems to be a universal feature of human existence, this must not necessarily bear consequences for social and political organization.

Social identities are, therefore, of utmost salience in finding one's place in this highly complex world of competing meanings. Everybody has to make his or her choice in selecting the identity he or she wants to be considered paramount for their life. The result will depend mostly upon two factors:

(1) The type of dominant social identity is dependent upon the degree of socio-political integration of the world system. If small regional or local structures determine everyday experience, then identity will rest on boundaries to the neighbours displaying the same characteristics as ego. There is a high probability that horizontal, local and regional identities, will prevail. If, however, the world system is conceived and experienced as one system, hierarchically articulated into world, cultural area, and nations, then ethnic identities in all likelihood will have almost no salience. Other forms of identities like gender, political orientation or professional status will become more important (Mathews 2000). (2) Moreover, the concerned person's choice will be dependent upon the experience of equal opportunity or discrimination in his social network. Groups or individuals who are denied equal access to the chances of social or political life on the grounds of ascribed or freely chosen traits and identities will tend to stress those same identities and see them as the most characteristic features of personal idiosyncrasy. For example, if a person's sexual identity is contested, he or she will tend to see every social relation in the light of this discrimination. In a world which defines legitimate national belonging on the basis of qualities considered as ethnic (language, religion, certain cultural symbols), ethnic definitions of national identity will prevail.

If people are discriminated against, they have available basically two strategies: They may try to *assimilate* into the higher valued group, if they are allowed to do so; or they may stick to their contested identity: the result is social or political *conflict*. If these persons decide to look for others in the same situation of a "typical brand of personality" (Weigert et al. 1986), and they organize to better collectively their fate, *ethnic politics* starts.

Modern societies claim to work on the basis of personal achievement and merit. They see themselves as having passed the epoch of groups bound by ascribed identities and positions. It is their pretension to enable individuals to get their social locations by achievement and to choose freely their preferred identities. “To be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences, and choice” (Apter 1964, 10). However, in many regards, this is an illusion and wishful thinking. True, the valuation of bounded existence has changed. It has even become a moral quality to be part of supra-local and supra-regional networks. Postmodern ideology has gone a long way in acutely formulating such ideas. It was Zygmunt Bauman (2001) who gave these ideas their most overstretched version. To say it in the words of another author of similar brand,

“Contemporary societies are increasingly characterized by their fragmented, fissured, and fractured nature. [...] Hyper-differentiation [prevails] in which spheres of social life become increasingly internally fragmented and diverse, and de-differentiation in which boundaries between spheres progressively erode. [...] With the collapse of social structures (!!! – *note of the author*), consumption or, more particularly, consumerism comes to occupy the centre of identity formation in postmodernity. [...] These identities are expressed through individual and idiosyncratic styles of consumerism. Social identity in postmodernity therefore exhibits a tendency away from substance and continuity towards instability, fragility, contingency and contextuality and the links between identities and social structures are broken” (Phillips/Western 2005, 165).

However, the authors realize that such a wording tests the limit of respectability, and they continue in a more moderate flavour:

“People exercise increasing choice over the identities that they want to matter to them and those that they do not. Just as new and appealing identities are able to be selected and lived out, those forms of social identity which lose meaning and social significance are discarded. [...] [There is] increasing ‘voluntarism’ around identity processes and formation” (ibid., 166).

If these propositions are tested in an empirical way (referring to an inquiry done in Australia), the result is:

“This evidence undermines postmodern and reflexive modernisation claims about the declining significance about traditional work-based and community-based identities, but does provide some support for claims about re-emergence of new structural sources of identity, such as gender” (ibid., 175).

Learned and socialized in the context of families, local life worlds, formal education in schools and by the impact of media, the hegemonic identity

gets a lot of autonomous force as is the case with most cultural matrices. *Intellectuals* are always interested in the logical coherence or in the aesthetic quality of notions like specific identity. Political leaders are looking for the instrumental value or the potency to mobilisation. Unfolded on several such dimensions, once-dominant identities may live a long life, at least if they are fulfilling some personal or social needs. Even if such qualities fade away, identities may continue to exist for some time.

## Types of ethnic identities

Completely different types of social or political identity are required for different types of societies. Of the factors influencing the choice of a specific type we have to mention the *size* of a society, material *productivity*, the *type of stability* social systems demand for their continual existence (ultrastability; multistability)<sup>1</sup>, and, finally, the form of *political legitimacy* warranted.

Ethnicity is an identity which refers to a common ancestry and aims for a comprehensive solidarity between the members satisfying the conditions by which the (mostly fictitious) shared ancestry is proven (language, religion, folkloristic markers). There are three basic expressions of ethnic identity derived from the size of the social system and its integrative force:

1. *Gentilistic ethnicity* occurs in small societies only as it is dependent essentially on face-to-face-relations. It is an all-encompassing and comprehensive readiness to accept the primacy of the group, at least ideologically, and the social and moral superiority of the collective existence above the individual one. It is of a social character and does not need a formal political organization. Low material productivity and high vulnerability in the face of natural and social disaster make it imperative to its members to share most resources and proceeds.
- 1.1 A special variant of gentilistic ethnicity is *traditional ethnicity*. It may occur in the frame of large polities forced together by violence (em-

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<sup>1</sup> Ultrastability means the property of a system to change its mode of working (its "function") while remaining a system with given boundaries. Multistability signifies a completely different systemic behaviour: If the system comes under severe stress, it falls apart into several autonomous sub-systems. These aim individually at finding a new brand of functioning. Ultimately, they re-unite into a single system not necessarily with the same boundaries as before.

pires, oriental despotisms), and complete solidarity works similar to gentilistic bonds *at the local level* and against the outside world which is organized along other principles. For example, the Egyptian or Indian village was responsible as a corporate entity for delivering its taxes to the pharaonic monarch or, later, to the pasha. Local solidarities were stressed and strained by such collective obligations.

2. *Modern ethnicity* is a *political* phenomenon, and is, in fact, essential for the legitimacy of the political class in bureaucratic states. There are several subtypes:

- 2.1 *Nationalized ethnicity* aims for a sovereign polity or state.

- 2.1.1 Early modern *nations* long for a state recognized by international law.

- 2.1.2 *Nationalities* are sub-national (regional) units of an ethnic character which demand sovereign rights of a rather comprehensive nature; while they are prone to accept a national sovereignty as a roof together with other regional-political units, they claim principally the right to decide their fate without regard to the paramount unit ("right to self-determination"). That is, they claim sovereignty in theory, but, in practice, are satisfied with the appearance of it and some (strong) competences. Let us come back for a moment to the definitions of identity quoted above and give some more from the same author(s):

*"Legitimizing identity* creates a civil society, that is, a set of organizations and institutions, as well as a series of structured and organized social actors which reproduce, although sometimes in a conflictive manner, the identity that rationalizes the sources of structural domination" (Castells 1997, 11).

*Resistance identity* "leads to the formation of communes or communities [...] This may be the most important type of identity-building in our society, [...] the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded" (ibid., 9).

And, finally, we may also speak of *project identity*, an identity won by a shared political target. Every nation may be seen as a political project, although interpreted differently by the competing political forces of its elites. Thus, Austrian identity in the interwar period was seen as a conservative project by the social democrats, and therefore abnegated; and it was seen as the image of "better Germans" by the Catholic main-stream.

We want to show by these definitions that modern identities are vehicles for political mobilization. Therefore, it is understandable that bureaucracies are afraid of them. The EU, and the European Commission as its speaker, supports linguistic minorities, as long as they

do not act in a political way. Thus, EBLUL (*European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages*) has close ties to the Commission as well as to the European Parliament. To ethno-national identities, both bodies are inimical, and the “founding principles” of EU (that is: the so-called “freedoms”, especially the free movement of capital and of labour force) are set into motion against them. In this way, the fine-grained regulation in Southern Tyrol got a severe blow by several judgements of the European Court meddling in this field, which has been deliberately foreclosed to this Court by the Treaties: Minorities’ policies do not account among the competences of the Union.

- 2.2 *Culturalist sub-national ethnic groups* claim political rights in some symbolically highly loaded fields or policies (such as education, familial organisation or civil status). Maintaining their special identity and equal dignity as well as equal access to social/political resources is their overarching target. They see their own existence ordinarily in a rather substantialist way as being a “biological” unit since time immemorial, but they refer mostly to *symbolic* “culture” (that is, folklore).
  - 2.2.1 Most *European national and ethnic minorities* of the twentieth century are to be classified here.
  - 2.2.2 Transnational identities, like permanent diasporas or groups claiming a “mother nation” (a reference nation) in a neighbouring state, are another category under this heading.
3. Modern ethnicity is giving way to *postmodern ethnicity* during the last few decades (cf. Gans 1979; Alba 1990). Former national or ethnic minorities are ready to retrocede from most political claims and accept a far more limited status. In this stage of ethnic development, the driving force behind sticking to a special identity is no more political sepa-rateness. The main impetus seems to be a need for *a distinctive personal identity* based on one’s roots. It is significant that some decades ago for many persons it was shameful to be considered a member of a minority. Nowadays, for those declaring to be members of a minority, it is a matter of pride. It is a distinction not only to be bilingual, but to come from a group distinguished by cultural peculiarities and a tradition of resistance against assimilation. This becomes a de-politicized ethnicity nearly void of any meaningful social ambition. The only demand is *recognition*. This sort of ethnicity has been called “symbolic ethnicity” – “symbolic” meaning, in this context, “not of social or political salience” (Kempny/Jawłowska

2002; Reiterer 2001). This is supposedly the ethnicity of the near future in highly developed and highly integrated societies organized politically as parliamentary democracies.

## Postmodern ethnicity: Ideology and facts

The recent trajectories of ethnic groups in Europe are marked by two contrasting trends:

(1) Ethnic stratification, that is: the ethnically differential distribution of group members to positions of different wealth or power, is no longer characteristic for ethnic relations in Europe, as far as we are dealing with so-called “traditional minorities”. Ascriptive identities in ethnic terms do not determine furthermore the life chances of linguistic minorities. However, a cursory glance at statistical data seems to contradict this categorical statement. Unexpectedly, persons declaring to speak Slovenian or Croatian, etc., are better educated and situated than are persons belonging to the majority in bilingual Carinthia or Burgenland. This is a matter of self-selection. Slovenes with higher education tend to stick to their ethnic origin, while lower strata assimilate. To them, a special identity based on a diverse tradition seems a luxury they cannot afford. Most traditional European minorities had their social and occupational core area in rural societies, and especially with the peasants. In the process of de-agrarianisation, there were two tendencies. The greater part of those leaving behind agriculture turned toward material production (such as industry, construction, and similar trades). A majority of their offspring (that is, the following generation) switched identity and did not see any further point in remaining “ethnic”. Assimilation led to a sharp decrease in the size of such groups.

However, there was another considerable part which tried successfully to climb up the educational and social ladder. It was a matter of opportunity; many of those persons who had access to higher educational institutions, made their entry into the ranks of qualified service positions. Instead of traditional elites (for instance, clergy) they started to prefer the more promising professions of modern society and became teachers, scientists, managers, and such. This group had enough self-confidence to supplement their social success by a self-definition of their own. Thus, they resisted assimilation and chose to cling to their roots.