

# Unveiling Emotions III

Arousal, Display, and Performance  
of Emotions in the Greek World

Edited by  
Angelos Chaniotis

HABES

Heidelberger Althistorische Beiträge | 63

Franz Steiner Verlag







# H A B E S

Heidelberger Althistorische Beiträge und Epigraphische Studien

Begründet von Géza Alföldy

Herausgegeben von Angelos Chaniotis und Christian Witschel

Beirat: François Bérard, Anthony R. Birley, Kostas Buraselis, Lucas de Blois,

Ségolène Demougin, Elio Lo Cascio, Mischa Meier, Elizabeth Meyer,

Michael Peachin, Henk Versnel und Martin Zimmermann

Band 63

Unveiling Emotions III  
*Arousal, Display, and Performance of Emotions  
in the Greek World*

---

Edited by Angelos Chaniotis

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildung:

The funerary stele of Aristobola from Thera (third century BCE).

Archaeological Museum of Thera, inv. no. 321.

© Department of Antiquities of Cyclades / Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sport

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek:

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über  
<<http://dnb.d-nb.de>> abrufbar.

Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt.  
Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes  
ist unzulässig und strafbar.

© Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2021

Druck: Druckerei Steinmeier GmbH & Co. KG, Deiningen

Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier.

Printed in Germany.

ISBN 978-3-515-12950-3 (Print)

ISBN 978-3-515-12952-7 (E-Book)

## CONTENTS

Preface.....	7
<i>Angelos Chaniotis</i>	
Display, arousal, and performance of emotions: Introduction.....	9
PART ONE: EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS	
<i>Dimos Spatharas</i>	
Projective disgust and its uses in ancient Greece.....	33
<i>Angelos Chaniotis</i>	
Power relations as emotional relations: Hellenistic and Imperial realities and fictions .....	75
<i>Sophia Kravaritou</i>	
Displaying guilt, remorse, and redemption in Greek public contexts.....	105
<i>Maria G. Xanthou</i>	
Isocrates and emotional intelligence theory: from local audience to international politics.....	127
<i>Vasiliki Giannopoulou</i>	
Emotions and politics in Polybios Book Six.....	159
PART TWO: AROUSING EMOTIONS	
<i>Matthew Peebles</i>	
Threatening gods for fearful mortals: Weapon-brandishing divinities in ancient Greek art .....	193
<i>John Tait</i>	
Examining the exploitation of the emotion in Demotic Egyptian letter- writing .....	231
<i>Vasiliki Giannopoulou</i>	
<i>Autopatheia</i> : personal empathic experience, didactic mission, and reader- shaped empathy in Polybios.....	243

*Elizabeth Potter*

Learning emotion: the *progymnasmata* and the rhetorical education of the ancient audience ..... 281

*Bernhard Palme*

Emotional strategies in petitions of Dioskoros of Aphroditon ..... 321

### PART THREE: PERFORMING EMOTIONS

*Marco Fantuzzi*

Describing images, connoting feelings: choral ecphrasis in Euripides ..... 345

*Helen Slaney*

Repetition makes it tragic: emotion in ancient pantomime ..... 373

*Elizabeth Potter*

Emotion, performance, and persuasion in Philostratos' *Lives of the Sophists* ..... 399

*Dimitris Karambelas*

Emotions in court: judicial display and psychic audience between the Imperial period and Late Antiquity ..... 449

*David Frankfurter*

Desperation and the magic of appeal: representation of women's emotion in magical spells and ritual figurines ..... 517

Index ..... 537

List of Contributors ..... 543

## PREFACE

*Angelos Chaniotis*

This is the third and final collective volume produced by the project ‘The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions: the Greek Paradigm’ (University of Oxford, 2009–2013), generously funded by the European Research Council with an Advanced Investigator Grant. The ERC grant was used in part for the employment of research associates, whose work was presented in *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World* (2012) and in part for scholarships given to ancient historians, philologists, and archaeologists to assist them in projects related to the study of emotions in the Greek world. The project also organized the Table Ronde ‘Emotions as Historical Factor’ (Amsterdam 2010) and a series of workshops in Oxford; it also sponsored a panel on emotions in papyri at the 26th International Congress of Papyrology (Geneva 2010). This volume assembles studies written in association with this project by recipients of scholarships, participants in workshops, and research associates.

The common themes of this volume, arousal, display, and performance of emotions, are explained in the Introduction. The expression ‘Greek world’ in the volume’s title should not be understood as reference to a world either exclusively inhabited or dominated by the Greeks; it refers to a world in which the Greeks interacted with native populations and neighbors. This phrase is used because the focus of most contributions to this volume are on Greek texts and works of art. Two studies consider Demotic and Coptic material, four papers are concerned with orators and mimic dancers in the world of the Roman Empire, and one paper studies papyri from 6th-century CE Egypt.

This volume comprises a representative sample of sources (drama, historiography, oratory, inscriptions, papyri, statues, and magical figurines), approaches (analysis of texts and images), emotions (disgust, anger, pity, hope, fear, and affection), and themes. It continues the *problématique* explained in the volume *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World*. Four introductory essays in that volume describe the problems connected with the study of emotions in papyri, inscriptions, literary texts, and archaeological sources. The chapters in *Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture* and in this volume present further case studies on different subjects and types of sources.

The editorial work for this volume received valuable help from research assistants that I employed after I moved from Oxford to the Institute for Advanced Study. Matthew Peebles (Columbia University) and Eric Hensley (New York University) proofread the volume and corrected the English of those contributors



who are not native speakers. I would like to express my thanks to Stefanie Ernst (Steiner Verlag) for her technical support.

For assistance in acquiring images, I am very grateful to Dimitris Athanasoulis, (Director of the Department of Antiquities of the Cyclades), Joachim Heiden (Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Athens), Despoina Ignatiadou (National Archaeological Museum, Athens), Charalambos Intzesiloglou (Director emeritus of the 13th Department of Antiquities), Daria Lanzuolo (Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Rome), and Maria Vaiopoulou (Director of the Department of Antiquities of Karditsa).

I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the European Research Council, which funded the Oxford project. This volume would have not been possible without the ERC's generous funding.

Princeton, October 2020

# DISPLAY, AROUSAL, AND PERFORMANCE OF EMOTIONS

## Introduction

*Angelos Chaniotis*

### 1 EMOTIONS MATTER

When a few years back, I told a prominent German ancient historian that I had a research project dedicated to emotions in Greek history, he expressed his surprise. History, he responded, is the answer to the questions ‘who’, ‘when’, ‘where’, and ‘why’. Without realizing it, he had offered the most eloquent advocacy for the historical study of emotions. The ‘whos’ of history – the agents and subjects of history – are individuals and groups with feelings; the search for a ‘why’ cannot ignore emotions – if one had doubts about this, the role of emotions in recent elections teaches us otherwise;<sup>1</sup> and the ‘where’ and ‘when’, i.e. the contexts of history, always have emotional components.

Thucydides knew that. His account of the civil war in Korkyra in 427 BCE includes a discussion of the impact of uncontrolled political passions (3.82):

In peace and fortune, states and individuals show better judgment, because they do not find themselves involuntarily confronted with necessities; but as war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, he becomes a violent master, adjusting the temper (ὀργαί) of most men to the present situation.

Then he comments on how internal violence changed the evaluation of behaviors and feelings:

Reckless daring (τόλμα) came to be regarded as loyal courage (φιλέταιρος ἀνδρεία); prudent hesitation, disguised cowardice (δειλία); moderation, an excuse for unmanliness; to prudently consider all aspects, meant not to act on any. .... They regarded to take revenge more important than not to be harmed first. .... The dishonest more easily gain credit for cleverness than the simple for goodness, pleased for the one, and ashamed (αἰσχύνονται) of the other. The cause of all this is the lust for power arising from greed (πλεονεξία) and ambition (φιλοτιμία). ... Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the fight, or because envy (φθόνος) would not tolerate them to escape.

Thucydides both directly mentions and alludes to emotions: envy and rage, greed, ambition, and the hope for victory and gain, fear and courage, joy, pride, and

1 On the importance of fear in the 2016 elections in the USA and the Brexit referendum see e.g. Cockerell 2016 and Eaton 2016.

shame, hatred and the lack of pity, rage and loyalty to political friends. Although he does not mention grief, this was ultimately the outcome of this civil war – or any civil war for that matter.

Later, his account of how news of the disaster in Sicily arrived in Athens in 413 BCE is a masterly description of collective psychology (8.1.1–2):

When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved (ἡπίσταντο) even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry (χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν) with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were enraged (ὀργίζοντο) also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all other omen-mongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope (ἐπήλπισαν) that they should conquer Sicily. Already distressed (ἐλύπει) at all points and in all quarters, after what had now happened, they were seized by fear (φόβος) and dread (κατάπληξις) quite without example. It was grievous enough (ἐβαρύνοντο) for the state and for every man in his proper person to lose so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied troops, and to see none left to replace them; but when they saw, also, that they had not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships, they began to despair of salvation (ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν). They thought that their enemies in Sicily would immediately sail with their fleet against Piraeus, inflamed by so signal a victory; while their adversaries at home, redoubling all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates.

The perceptive historian describes here the complex emotional state of an entire citizen community using an emotional vocabulary and clearly identifying the feelings of the Athenians. His account of the gradual emotional movement from disbelief to anger, fear, dread, and finally to measures closely corresponds to the famous model of the ‘five stages of grief’ proposed by Elizabeth Kübler Ross in her book *On Death and Dying*: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.<sup>2</sup>

The study of emotions has emerged in the last two decades as a major research subject in ancient studies, not only in philosophy and philology, disciplines that have traditionally considered the perception and representation of emotions, but also in ancient history and archaeology.<sup>3</sup> The new interest in emotions goes along with an interest in the study of the senses<sup>4</sup> and increased awareness in ancient studies of the importance of cognitive perspectives. Emotional aspects, in-

2 Kübler-Ross 1969; see also Kübler-Ross and Kessler 2005.

3 For some bibliography see Chaniotis 2012b, 15 note 18, 24 note 50 and Konstan 2015. More recent publications: Athanassaki 2012; Caston 2012; Kalimtzis 2012; Scheid-Tissinier 2012; Chaniotis and Ducrey (eds.) 2013; Fulkerson 2013; Renaut 2014; Sanders 2014; Sistikou 2014; Patera 2015; Caston and Kaster (eds.) 2016; Thumiger 2016; Herrin 2017; Sanders and Johncock (eds.) 2016; Cairns and Nelis (eds.) 2017; Lateiner and Spatharas (eds.) 2017; Rey 2017; Cairns (ed.) 2018; Allard and Montlahuc 2018; Spatharas and Kazantzidis (eds.) 2018; Karanika and Panoussi (eds.) 2019; Spatharas 2019; Bettenworth and Hammerstaedt (eds.) 2020; Ehrenheim and Prusac-Lindhagen (eds.) 2020.

4 A small selection of recent books and collective volumes dedicated to the study of the senses: Harvey 2006; Schettino and Pittia (eds.) 2012; Butler and Purves (eds.) 2014; Hamilakis 2013; Bradley (ed.) 2015; Emerit, Perrot, and Vincent (eds.) 2015; Squire (ed.) 2016; Betts (ed.) 2017; Purves (ed.) 2017; Butler and Nooter (eds.) 2018; Rudolph (ed.) 2018.

cluding the representation, display, arousal, and perception of emotions, are common themes in current philological studies, revealing unknown or understudied aspects of ancient literary texts. The emotional background or the emotive intentions of ancient authors are essential for a better understanding of their works. Beyond the ‘usual suspects’, lyric and tragic poetry, and the ancient novel,<sup>5</sup> significant progress has been made in the study of emotions in ancient oratory,<sup>6</sup> to some extent also in ancient historiography.<sup>7</sup> But some areas of enquiry, especially political history, still resist this trend,<sup>8</sup> and the documentary sources – inscriptions and papyri – still have a lot to offer.<sup>9</sup>

In the case of the Greek world in the Archaic and Classical periods and the *oikoumene* after the conquests of Alexander the Great, we are in the fortunate position of being able to study emotions with an abundance of sources and within a culture that had a very distinct interest in emotions. From its very beginning, Greek literature made emotions the center of its observation and treatment. The subject of the *Iliad*, the subject that the rhapsode asks the Muse to sing, is not war, but an emotion: Achilles’ anger (*menis*), caused by an insult. The *Iliad* begins by explaining the cause of the indignation, describes its manifestations and consequences – Achilles’ retreat from battle and the death of his friend Patroclus –, continues with Achilles’ return to combat, and finds closure in the mourning of Achaeans and Trojans for their fallen heroes Patroclus and Hector. Four centuries before Aristotle formulated a systematic theory of emotions in several of his works<sup>10</sup> and highlighted the emotions of *phobos* (fear) and *eleos* (pity and empathy) in his definition of tragedy, with the *Iliad* we encounter an already fully developed reflection on emotions, their causes, and their impact. Emotions dominate also the second early epic, the *Odyssey*: its main subject is Odysseus’ desire to return home (*nostos*). It is also the narrative of the loyal affection shown to Odysseus by his wife, his son, his slaves, and his dog. Ancient Greek may have a limited vocabulary with regard to colors, but already in the *Odyssey* we find a rich and nuanced vocabulary to describe emotions, e.g. the various aspects of anger, from light exasperation and justified indignation to wrath and blind rage.<sup>11</sup>

5 Among the more recent studies, I mention Visvardi 2015 (drama and Thucydides); Cummings 2018 (novel); González González 2019, 77–111 (friendship and marital love in funerary epigrams).

6 Sanders 2012 and 2016; Rubinstein 2013 and 2016; Griffith-Williams 2016; Fisher 2017; Spatharas 2019, 80–122, 159–188. See also the contributions of Elizabeth Potter (pp. 281–320 and 399–448), and Dimitris Karambelas (pp. 449–515) in this volume.

7 E.g. Desmond 2006; Visvardi 2015; Tamiolaki 2016.

8 There are exceptions. See e.g. Wohl 2002, on affection in discourse about democracy in Athens; Ballot 2014, on courage in democratic Athens; Hagen 2017 and Vekselius 2018, on tears in Roman political culture.

9 Inscriptions: Chaniotis 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020; papyri: Kotsifou 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Clarysse 2017; Bryen 2017; Skarsouli 2020; see also the studies by Sophia Kravaritou (105–125), Bernard Palme (pp. 321–342), and John Tait (231–242), as well as my contribution to this volume (75–103).

10 Konstan 2006.

11 Irmischer 1950, 3–25; Considine 1966.

While the rhapsodes were singing of the emotions of past heroes, Archilochos, a Parian poet of the mid-seventh century BCE, was singing about his own emotions: affectionate friendship, love, hatred because of betrayal, fear of death, and courage. He is the first poet who addresses his soul (*thymos*), urging himself to take joy and bear grief with measure, and to be stronger than hope and fear. The lyric poets of the next generation were quick to follow, and Sappho was the first poet to describe the pathology of love in her most famous poem:<sup>12</sup>

My heart	see nothing, my ears roar,
flutters in my breast whenever	cold sweat
I quickly glance at you –	rushes down me, trembling seizes me,
I can say nothing,	I am greener than grass.
my tongue is broken. A delicate fire	To myself I seem
runs under my skin, my eyes	needing but little to die

The Greeks also personified emotions: *Phobos* (fear), *Aidos* (modesty and shame), *Eleos* (pity), *Elpis* (hope), *Himeros* (sexual desire), *Pothos* (longing), *Hedone* (delight), *Mania* (frenzy), *Penthos* (mourning), *Phrike* (horror), and *Pthonos* (envy). They made them divine beings. In Hesiod's *Theogony*, one of the children of the Nyx (Night) at the beginning of creation is *Philotes*, the affection that brings two beings together. *Eros* is not the god of love; he *is* love. While the Spartans offered sacrifices to *Phobos* (fear), gluttony (*Adephagia*) is said to have had a shrine in Sicily.<sup>13</sup>

Such a distinct interest in emotions is a historical phenomenon in itself. Although we can recognize it as early as the late eighth or early seventh century BCE, we can study its development adducing a large variety of sources beyond poetry – historiography, oratory, philosophy, epigraphy, art – mainly from the late fifth century BCE. Two important factors influenced the manifestation of emotions in texts and images: the frequency and diffusion of dramatic performances, and with them the development of elaborate acting skills, and rhetorical training. The impact of these two factors can be recognized especially in the main themes of this volume: the display, the arousal, and the performance of emotions.

## 2 MEDIA OF EMOTIONAL AROUSAL AND DISPLAY

A funerary stele from Athens shows a smiling child that holds a bird; his dog jumps up, trying to catch the bird (Fig. 1). There is no doubt about the emotion that the image shows: the joy of a smiling child. His name is written next to his head: Πολύευκτος, 'the one for whom many prayers were made'. There is no doubt about the emotions that the boy's name displays: the affection of his parents and their hope that their son would have a long and happy life. There is also no doubt about the emotion that this image intends to arouse among the viewers. By

12 Fr. 31; translated by Diane Rayor (Rayor and Lardinois 2014, 44).

13 *Phobos* in Sparta: Patera 2013, 113. *Adephagia*: Whitehead 2002. On such personifications: Webster 1954; Stafford 2007.

contrasting a joyful moment in Polyeuktos' short life and the hopes that his name alluded with the eternal grief of death, the image intensifies the sorrow of those who knew Polyeuktos and invites future viewers to feel empathy, to become part of an eternal emotional community of grief.<sup>14</sup>



Fig. 1. Funerary stele of Polyeuktos playing with his dog. Athens, ca. 410-400 BCE.

This image exemplifies the difference between the representation of emotion (joy), the display of emotion (hope), and the arousal of emotion (grief and empathy). In the monument's original setting there was also a performative element. The grave was periodically visited by family members for the performance of funerary rites; and even decades after the boy's death, when passers-by stopped at the grave, they read the inscription aloud, lending the boy their voice to answer their question 'who is this boy?', and they repeated the name that alluded to deceived hopes.

One of the primary aims of the study of emotions in the context of Greek and Roman Antiquity is to explore the means through which emotions are displayed and aroused, the contexts in which these media were applied, and the aims that they served. The various methodological problems involved in the study of emotions in cultures and a times very distant from ours – problems that range from difficulties in the translation of emotional terms and the filtered representation of emotions in written sources to the limited knowledge of the contexts in which emotions are manifested – as well as the perspectives of research of emotions in ancient studies, and the sources that can be used have been discussed in the first volume of the series *Unveiling Emotions* and will not be repeated here.<sup>15</sup> In this short introduction to the main themes of the volume, I shall focus on the media of

14 The relief: Clairmont 1993, no. 0.691; the inscription: *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1293*. On the construction of emotional community through epitaphs see Chaniotis 2016, 105–107.

15 Chaniotis 2012b.

emotional arousal and display, and the value of their study for the interpretation of the sources and, therefore, for better understanding of ancient society and culture.

An advanced and sophisticated culture had a variety of sometimes subtle means at its disposal to represent, display, and arouse emotions. Some of them are lost in translation, others (visual or vocal) can no longer be observed. For instance, in our direct communication, we have various media to enhance and specify the emotional meaning of a verbal message. As a Greek, in order to communicate my anger, I may select one of the modern Greek words for anger (θυμώνω, αγανακτώ, οργίζομαι, τσαντίζομαι) or, to be more effective, one of the countless and culture-specific metaphors and metonyms that usually defy translation (σκάω, 'I burst', είμαι έξω φρενών; 'I am outside of my brains'; τα πήρα στο κρανίο, 'I have taken them on my skull'; έγινα Τούρκος, 'I became a Turk'; μου την έδωσε, 'it gave it to me'; είμαι εκτός εαυτού, 'I am outside of myself'). We notice that these metaphors imply loss of control and personality change. I can also change my facial expression, raise my voice, or use body-language and gestures. When we study ancient Greek texts, we usually lack most of these additional media that enhance the verbal message. But in some cases, the verbal media alone – for instance the choice of the vocabulary or repetition – may serve as the equivalent of a raised voice, a facial expression, or a gesture.

Moral disgust is a case in point. The facial expressions that accompany moral disgust may be similar to those of core disgust, that is, to the revulsion caused by diseases and unpleasant tastes: a wrinkled nose, narrowed brows, a curled upper lip, and visible protrusions of the tongue.<sup>16</sup> Although we do not have visual media to study such facial expressions in communications that took place hundreds of years ago, the vocabulary sometimes compensates for the lack of images. In a number of petitions and letters preserved in papyri, most recently discussed by Ari Bryen and Chrysi Kotsifou,<sup>17</sup> the victims of attacks or abuse complain that their abusers spoke words through their nose. In a dispute over property, a woman was attacked by a man, who 'spoke to my face through his nose, wishing to end my life'.<sup>18</sup> Another woman, involved in a case of divorce, narrates how her husband attacked her 'speaking many terms of abuse into my face and through his nose'.<sup>19</sup> When an official attempted to collect taxes, a man 'snorted his contempt for me and wanted to attack me'.<sup>20</sup> John Winter' comment that 'only the indignant memory of an angry and tortured soul could have added the supreme touch about talking through the nose',<sup>21</sup> does not identify the biological origin of this behav-

16 See the study of Dimos Spatharas in this volume (p. 42). On the facial expressions of disgust see below, note 23.

17 Bryen 2008; Kotsifou 2012, 81f.

18 *P.Mich.* XVIII 793 (381 CE): λέγων εις πρόσωπόν μου δια της έαυτοϋ ρινός βουλόμενος με τοϋ ζήν απαλλάξει; cf. Bryen 2008, 193f.

19 *P.Oxy.* VI 903 (Oxyrhynchos, fourth century CE): πολλά άσελήματα λέγων εις πρόσωπόν μου και δια της ρινός αϋτοϋ. Cf. Winter 1933, 126f.

20 *P.Col.* VIII 242 (Arsinoite nome): περιερρόχασέν μοι και έβουλήθη μοι έπελθειν. For περιπρογγάζω see Schol. Arist. *Equites* 694 (*LSJ*, s.v. 'mock, ridicule').

21 Winter 1933, 127. Cf. Bryen 2008, 194.

ior: it is disgust. The feeling of disgust, as a disease-avoidance mechanism,<sup>22</sup> is accompanied by autonomic physiological responses that aim at protecting the body from the intrusion of pathogens. These responses include changes in respiratory behavior, unpleasant sensations in the throat and mouth, decreased skin conductance, reduced blood pressure, and heart rate deceleration.<sup>23</sup> What these papyri describe – ‘speaking through the nose’ and snorting – are not just facial and vocal expressions of contempt; they are displays of disgust in conflict situations. Such displays, that clearly had a performative quality, could arouse disgust also in those who observed them.<sup>24</sup> In cases such as these, the awareness of the emotional background of documentary sources allows us to better understand them. The contributions to this volume demonstrate precisely this: we do not only study texts as historians or philologists in order to understand emotions; we also, perhaps more so, study emotions in order to understand texts.

Besides the selected vocabulary, repetition is another textual medium that somehow compensates for the lack of information on the sound and the volume of an angry or an imploring voice. Let us take for instance a letter written on papyrus and sent by a master to a servant. The master notes that he had told his servant ‘a thousand times’ to cut down the vines. Now that the servant asked again what to do with the vines, he gets a reply that expresses indignation: ‘I reply: cut them down, cut, cut, cut, cut: there you are, I say it again and again’.<sup>25</sup> Here, the repetition is the linguistic equivalent of a raised voice and aggressive gesticulation. In a grave epigram from Aizanoi (247 CE), repetition and the use of a synonym is the equivalent of an imploring voice: ‘Stand by me, as you pass by! Stand, stranger! Do not pass without noticing me’.<sup>26</sup>

For certain emotions, especially love and grief, the techniques of emotional display and arousal are both more elaborate than in the case of other sentiments and better represented in the sources: drama, love poetry, funerary epigram, novels, and private letters. The following representative examples of media of expression mainly concern these two emotions. I have intentionally selected examples from the epigraphic evidence, because it is often ignored in studies on emotions in the Greek world, with the notable exception of the inscribed epigrams.

I have already mentioned metaphors as an enhancer of emotional display and arousal, and Douglas Cairns has made path-breaking contributions to this subject in Greek literature.<sup>27</sup> Inscriptions and papyri offer still unexploited material. As an

22 Oaten, Stevenson, and Case 2009.

23 On the facial expressions of disgust see Rozin, Lowery and Ebert 1994; Phillips et alii 1997.

24 Observation of a facial expression of disgust results in neural activity that is similar to that produced by contact with a disgust elicitor; see Wicker et alii 2003.

25 *P.Oxy.* XLII 3063 (Oxyrhynchos, second century CE): πρὸς ἣν ἀντιγράφω ἔκκοπον ἔκκοπον ἔκκοπον ἔκκοπον ἔκκοπον ἰδοῦ, πλειστάκις λέγω. See Kotsifou 2012a, 68.

26 *Steinepigramme* 16/23/06: μεῖνόν μοι π[α]ράγω[v], μ[ε]ῖνον, ξένε, μή με παρέλθης; cf. *SEG* XXXI 1283: μεῖνον, ξένε, μή με παρέλθης.

27 Cairns 2012, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017; see also Bowie 2005, 70–74, for metaphor and emotion in the novel; on the perspective of a linguist see Theodoropoulou 2012. See also, in this volume, pp. 176 and 179 (metaphors in Polybios).



example, I mention forms of address that express affection by using metaphors. The object of affection is addressed as ‘my own god’ (ἐμὸς θεός, ἴδιος θεός; see pp. 83f. in this volume), ‘my soul’ (ψυχή μου), ‘my life’ (ζῆν μου, ζωή), ‘honey’ or ‘Attic honey’ (μέλι, μέλι ἄττικόν), ‘flower of nature’ (ἄνθος φύσεως), and ‘my light’ (φῶς μου).<sup>28</sup> The metaphor of slavery indicates complete submission of the (male) lover to the woman he loves, calling her ‘mistress of my soul’ (δέσποινα τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς), ‘my mistress, my golden one’ (δέσποινα ἐμή, χρυσή), and ‘my own mistress’ (ἰδία κυρία).<sup>29</sup>

When Cole Porter attempted to express complete devotion to an object of affection in his song ‘You are the top’, he made the singer confess the weakness of his words – ‘at words poetic, I’m so pathetic’ – and turn instead to a litany of comparisons between the object of his affection and monuments, landscapes, cultural heroes, and ‘icons’ of both high and pop culture:

You’re the Coliseum.	You’re an O’Neill drama,
You’re the Louvre Museum.	You’re Whistler’s mama!
You’re a melody from a symphony by Strauss.	You’re camembert.
You’re a Bendel bonnet,	You’re a rose,
A Shakespeare’s sonnet,	You’re Inferno’s Dante,
You’re Mickey Mouse.	You’re the nose
You’re the Nile,	On the great Durante.
You’re the Tower of Pisa,	You’re a Boticelli,
You’re the smile on the Mona Lisa,	You’re Keats,
You’re Mahatma Gandhi.	You’re Shelly!
You’re Napoleon Brandy.	You’re Ovaltine!
You’re the purple light	You’re a boom,
Of a summer night in Spain,	You’re the dam at Boulder,
You’re the National Gallery	You’re the moon,
You’re Garbo’s salary,	Over Mae West’s shoulder,
You’re cellophane.	You’re a Berlin ballad.
You’re sublime,	You’re the boats that glide
You’re turkey dinner,	On the sleepy Zuider Zee,
You’re the time, the time of a Derby winner	You’re an old Dutch master,
You’re a Coolidge dollar,	You’re Lady Astor,
You’re the nimble tread	You’re broccoli!
Of the feet of Fred Astaire,	You’re romance
You’re the steppes of Russia,	You’re the pants, on a Roxy usher.

The closest equivalent of such a profusion of metaphors in an ancient text is the funeral oration of Gregory Nazianzenos for the empress Flacilla (386 CE). The rhythmical array of sentences with the same structure – with the verb in the initial position followed by the grammatical subject –<sup>30</sup> recalls the rhythmical beating of

28 For examples and discussion see Bevilacqua 1991, 226–232.

29 Chariton 3.3.7; *IG* XII.6.1213; *CIL* IV 4839 = *SEG* LV 1052; cf. Bevilacqua 1991, 229f.; Chaniotis 2020, with further examples of the metaphor of love as slavery.

30 For this lament form see Cosgrove 2018, who quotes this text and adduces further parallels: *Greek Anthology* 7.29, 467, 7.612.

the chest by mourners; and the metaphors (lamp, sunrays, rudder, statue, pillar) enhance the sense of loss:<sup>31</sup>

ἐκεῖ ἐσκοτίσθη ὁ λύχνος, ἐκεῖ κατεσβέσθη τὸ φέγγος, ἐκεῖ αἱ ἀκτῖνες τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡμανρώθησαν.

οἴχεται τῆς βασιλείας τὸ ἐγκαλλώπισμα, τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πηδάλιον, ἡ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας εἰκὼν, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον. ...

οἴχεται ὁ τῆς πίστεως ζῆλος, ὁ τῆς ἐκκλησίας στύλος, ὁ τῶν θυσιαστηρίων κόσμος, ὁ τῶν πενομένων πλοῦτος, ἡ πολυαρκὴς δεξιὰ, ὁ κοινὸς τῶν καταπονουμένων λιμὴν.

Here darkened is the lamp; here, extinguished is the light; here, the rays of the virtues are dimmed. Gone is the ornament of kingship, the rudder of righteousness, the icon of philanthropy, or rather the archetype itself. ... Taken is the zeal of faith, the pillar of the church, the adornment of altars, the wealth of the poor, the much-helpful right hand, the common harbor of the distressed.

Ancient texts do associate the object of praise with cultural ‘heroes’ and forces of nature. For instance, the grave epigram for a young man in Nikopolis (Egypt, Imperial period), compares him with mythical figures:

Here lies the fair Herakleides, like Osiris, or Adonis [the lover] of the Paphian goddess, or Endymion the one of Selene, or Alkmenes’ son Herakles, surely the accomplisher of twelve labors’ (Ἡρακλείδης ὁ καλὸς κεῖτ’ ἐνθάδε | ὥς Ὅσειρις ἢ Παφίης ὁ Ἄδωνις, | ἢ Ἐνδυμίων ὁ Σελήνης, | ἢ τῆς Ἀλκμήνης Ἡρακλῆς δωδεκάεθλος πάντως).<sup>32</sup>

Affection and admiration of beauty is often expressed with the metaphor of the statue,<sup>33</sup> the lament of mothers with the mournful singing of birds,<sup>34</sup> people who died young with flowers wasted away,<sup>35</sup> gratitude towards people with a higher

31 *Patrologia Graeca* 46.884.

32 Bernand 1969, no. 76 I.

33 Philostratos *Vitae Sophistarum* 2.25.611: ἐπίχαρις καὶ ἀγαλματίας; Heliodoros, *Aithiopika* 2.33.3: καθάπερ ἀρχέτυπον ἀγαλμα.

34 *Steinepigramme* 09/01/03 (Kios, Hellenistic period): μήτηρ δ’ ἐν οἴκοις, ᾧ τάλαινα, ὀδύρεται | νικῶσα θρήνοις πενθίμην ἀηδόνα (‘your mother at home, oh, the wretched one, mourns, defeating in her lament the mourning nightingale’); ᾧ τάλαινα is the reading of Prodi 2017; Coughlan 2017, prefers ἁ τάλαινα; for the mourning of the nightingale cf. Sophokles, *Ajax* 628–630; Heliodoros, *Aithiopika* 5.2.6. Cf. *Steinepigramme* 01/12/20 (Halikarnassos, Hellenistic period): οἰκτρὸν δὲ θύγατρα κατεστενάχῃσε Στρατεία | οἶά τις εἰναλία δάκρυσιν ἀλκυονίς (‘Srateia groaned for her pitiable daughter, shedding tears like some alkyon of the sea’);

35 *IG* IX.2.649 (Larisa, second/third century CE); Peek, *GVI* 988; ὥς νέον ἄνθος ὥρης παντοθαλοῦς πρωτο[φ]ανῆ<ς> καλύκων (‘like a young flower in the all-blooming season, showing my first petals’); *IG* V.1.960 (Boiai in Lakonia): ὥς ῥόδεος στέφανο[ς] (like a garland of roses); *Steinepigramme* 01/20/23 (Miletos, late second century BCE): τέκνου νεοθλέα βλαστόν (‘the fresh-budding branch of a child’); 16/31/90 (Appia in Phrygia, 4th cent. CE): ἄνθεα πάντα φύουσιν, κάλλος δὲ σὸν μεμάρανται ... κλάδος ἐλαίας, ταχὺ πῶς ἐμαράνθης (‘all flowers grow, but your beauty was wasted away; ... you, branch of olive, how fast you were wasted away!’); *IG* XII.3.53 (Arkesine, 242 CE): ὥσπερ δένδρον εἴμερον εὐθαλὲς ὑπὸ [π]νεύμ[ατο]ς ἐκρεῖζοθὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔπεσεν, οὕτως [κ]αὶ Ὀκτ[άβ]ιος μοιριδίως ἔπεσεν (‘as a cultivated blooming tree falls on the ground, uprooted by wind, so did Oktavios fell following his destiny’). On the theme of the ‘flower of life’ see Lattimore 1942, 195–198.

position with the metaphor of the star that shines from above, gratitude for generosity and greatness with the metaphor of the Ocean, and so on. For instance, the honorific decree of the priests of Karnak for Kallimachos, a high officer in the reign of Kleopatra VII (42 BCE), makes abundant use of similes ('he labored like a father, as one labors for his own fatherland and his own legitimate children', 'he brought everyone, together with their wives and children, to sheltered harbors, as if from a squall and adverse storms') – and praises Kallimachos with the metaphor of a star and a god: 'he shone from above to all like a bright star and a good demon'.<sup>36</sup> The same metaphor is also used in a funerary epigram for a statesman in Crete: 'having shone like a star, he was extinguished by the bad judgments of some demon.' Consolation is offered by comparing his sons with the columns that support a house.<sup>37</sup> The metaphor of the Ocean is attested in acclamations in which a benefactor is addressed with the cry Ὡκεανέ.<sup>38</sup> The meaning of the acclamation is explained by John Chrysostom in his treatise *On Vanity*. When a certain Philotimos was praised for his generosity through acclamations, his donations were compared with the flow of the Nile and the greatness of his magnanimity with the Ocean.<sup>39</sup>

they call him "the Nile of donations" (Νεῖλον αὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν τῶν δωρεῶν); ... and introducing the Ocean, they say that what the Ocean is in waters, this man is in generosity (τὸν Ὡκεανὸν εἰς μέσον ἀγαγόντες τοῦτο αὐτὸν εἶναί φασι, ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ὕδασι, τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς φιλοτιμίαις).

Alliteration is also a powerful medium of emotional display in any sophisticated culture, whether we are dealing with the repetition of the liquid l ('love me or leave me and let me be lonely') that expresses the longing for a kiss in a Broadway song<sup>40</sup> or with the repetition of the labial p and f in a funerary epigram in or-

36 Bernand 1992, no. 46 LL. 11f.: πονήσας | [ὥσπερ πατὴρ ὑπὲρ] οἰκείας πατρίδος καὶ τέκνων γνησίων; LL. 21f.: πάντας σὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ τέκνοις καθάπερ ἐκ | [ζάλης καὶ ἀντι]πάλων χειμῶνων εἰς εὐδινὸν λιμένας ἤγαγεν; LL. 19f.: ὥσπερ λαμπρὸς ἀστήρ καὶ δαίμων ἀγαθὸς | [τοῖς ἄπασι]ν ἐπέλαμψε.

37 SEG XXXIX 972 (Lato, ca. 100 BCE): ὡς δέ τις ἀστήρ | λάμψας ἐσβέσθη δαίμονος ἀκρισίαις ... οἶκον ὃν οἱ δόξης κίονες ἐκράτησαν· | τρισσοὺς γὰρ λίπε παῖδας ἐοῦς ('the columns of glory supported his house; for he left three sons'). The metaphor of the star is attested until Late Antiquity. E.g. Bernand 1969, no. 76 I (Nikopolis, Egypt, Imperial period): ἀστήρ οὐράνιος; Dobias-Lallou 2017, no. 058 (Kyrene, 2nd/3rd cent.): ἄστρον ὀμυλική[ς]; MAMA I 238 (Laodikeia, ca. 4th cent. CE): ἀστήρ ὃς ἐν[έλ]αμπεν ἐν ἐκκλησίῃσιν θεοῖο. This metaphor differs from the assimilation of deceased persons with stars *after* their death, for which see Wypustek 2013, 48–64.

38 For the evidence see Kruse 2006, who argues that the acclamation Ὡκεανέ corresponds to the modern acclamations 'bravo!' or 'long live!' (p. 306). This is possible, but the origin of the acclamation undoubtedly is the comparison of a benefactor's generosity with the water of the Ocean.

39 John Chrysostom, *Περὶ κενοδοξίας*; quoted by Peterson 1929, 221f.; quoted by Kruse 2006, 305.

40 Gus Kahn's lyrics for 'Love Me or Leave Me' from the musical 'Whoopee' (1928).

der to express pain and arouse grief (λείψασα γονεῦσι δάκρυα | καὶ πάπποις τὰ ὅμοια, οὐ̐περ γαίης λίπε πένθη).<sup>41</sup>

Because the grief for a loved one is a universal feeling, the individual pain cannot be effectively expressed with stereotypical phrases and common places. Cemeteries are an arena in which the deceased compete for the attention of the passers-by, for the few moments that they will devote to a grave monument, reading the epitaph aloud, at times lending their voice to the dead person, at times reproducing for a brief moment the original lament, and ultimately defeating death by commemorating the deceased. Epitaphs may attempt to offer consolation by reminding that death is the common fate of all mortals,<sup>42</sup> but if they wish to arouse empathy, then they must stress the individual fate, not the common lot. For this reason, texts and images must break visual conventions to gain in power. While facial expressions may be ambiguous and conventional gesture may seem trivial, the composition has the power to convey emotion. In the case of a funerary stele from Thera, the traditional gesture of hand-shake is replaced by a complex use of the arms (depicted on the cover of this volume).<sup>43</sup> Alexibola, the young woman who has died, is about to depart. She gently touches the chin of an elderly parent, who tries to hold her back; the gaze of the living and the dead do not meet, thus expressing an irreversible separation and enhancing the feeling of grief.

In the case of texts, the individuality of pain can be expressed with detailed descriptions of incidents or with the references to objects. From the fourth century BCE on, a very common technique of emotional arousal is the ‘painting’ by a person of a scene with such vividness (*enargeia*) that the readers or listeners have the impression that they are eye-witness to the event that is being narrated.<sup>44</sup> The emotional impact was thereby increased. It is with *enargeia*, for instance, that the client of Demosthenes 47 arouses the indignation of the jurors against his opponents, describing their brutal attack on an elderly wet-nurse;<sup>45</sup> *enargeia* was the medium through which the historian Phylarchos ‘placed events in front of (the readers’) eyes’, in order to arouse their compassion;<sup>46</sup> with a vivid description of his quarrel with an Egyptian woman, a Greek author of a petition sought to arouse

41 SEG XLV 641 (Euhydrion, second/third century CE): Ἦν ἐσορᾷς στήλην μεστὴν ἐσορᾷς, φίλε, πένθους. | Κάτθνε γὰρ Ζώη οὔνομα κλησκομένη | ὀκτωκαιδεκέτης, λείψασα γονεῦσι δάκρυα | καὶ πάπποις τὰ ὅμοια, οὐ̐περ γαίης λίπε πένθη. | Ἦν δὲ γάμφ ζευχθεῖσα κύησέ τε <τ>έκνον ἄωρον, | οὐ̐ τεχθέντος ἄφωνος λίπεν φάος ἡελίοιο. | Πηνειὸς δὲ πατήρ χεῦον δάκρυ <υ> θῆκε τόδ’ ἔργον | σύν τε φίλῃ ἀλόχῳ, οἷς ἦν τέκνον ἔν τε κοῦκ ἄλλο. | Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔσχον τέκνον φῶς(ς) λιπούσης | ἀλλ’ ἄτεκνοι λύπη καρτέρεον βίον. We also note here the alliteration of lip- (λείψασα ... λίπε ... λίπεν ... λιπούσης ... λύπη). See Chaniotis 2012c, 111f.

42 Lattimore 1942, 250–256.

43 This unpublished stele is briefly presented by M. Efstathiou in Chaniotis, Kaltsas, and Mylonopoulos (eds.) 2017, 154 no. 58 (cf. 44 fig. 1). See also Zafeiropoulos 1961, 203f. pl. 164.

44 On *enargeia* see more recently Zangara 2007, 55–89, 233–307; Otto 2009; Webb 2009, esp. 87–105; Spatharas 2019, 80–122; see also the studies of Dimos Spatharas (pp. 64–69) and Elizabeth Potter (pp. 287–290 and 295f.) in this volume.

45 Demosthenes 47.55–59; discussed by Rubinstein 2013.

46 Polybios 2.56.6–8.

the king's indignation (see below p. 25).<sup>47</sup> And who cannot feel empathy reading this narrative of how a child drowned in a well?<sup>48</sup>

When the sun was setting towards the chambers of the night, after I had taken my supper, I came together with my maternal uncle to bathe. And, right away, the Fates made me sit on (the edge of) a well, there. As I was undressing, the worst Fate took me away. As soon as the demon saw me at the bottom of the well, he delivered me to Charon. But my uncle heard the noise of me falling into the well and started looking for me right away. However, there was no hope for me to live among the mortals. My maternal aunt came running; she tore off her tunic. My mother came running; she stood there beating her chest. Immediately my aunt fell to Alexander's feet, begging him. Seeing this, he no longer hesitated but jumped into the well right away. When he found me drowned in the bottom, he brought me out in a basket. Right away my aunt grabbed me, as I was wet, in a hurry, wondering whether there was any life left in me. Thus, a bad Fate covered me, the wretched one, before I could see a palaestra, barely three years old.

We see a scene in the twilight full of hectic movements. We hear the sound of the body falling into the water, the desperate cries of the mother, the begging of the aunt. We get a sense of touching, with the mother beating her chest and the aunt touching the boy's wet body. Here, the *enargeia* is so effective that we might overlook the fact that the narrator is not the child but an anonymous poet, who manipulates the child's voice and makes it narrate with details that appeal to our senses how it lost its life.<sup>49</sup> And we also might overlook the fact that the aim of this narrative is not only to arouse our empathy and make us members of an emotional community of grief but also to give testimony to their efforts to save the child.

Finally, a way to express the grief of loss is by pointing to objects that have lost their meaning because of the death of a person. An epigram for a young man from Aphrodisias resembles a 'still life', as the poet lists the objects that were connected with the deceased man's favorite activities. The images of objects, which have become meaningless now that Epikrates is gone increase the sense of loss.<sup>50</sup>

47 *P.Enteux.* 79 (Magdola, 218 BCE).

48 *Steinepigramme* 03/05/04 (Notion, Imperial period): ἡνίκα δ' ἡέλιος μὲν ἔδν πρὸς δώματα [νυκτός,] | δειπνήσας, ἦλθον μετὰ τοῦ μήτρω λο[έσας]|θαι, κεῦθὺς με Μοῖραι προκαθίζανον εἰς φ[ρέ]ϊαρ αὐτοῦ· ἔγδυνον γὰρ ἐγὼ|ι καὶ ἀπήγέ με | Μοῖρα κακίστη. χῶς εἶδεν δαίμων με | κάτω, παρέδωκε Χ[άρ]ωνει· αὐτὰρ ὁ | μήτρωσ μου ψόφον ἤκουσεν φρεα|τι-σμοῦ, κεῦθὺς μ' ἐζήτει γ' ἄρ'· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἐλπιδ' ἂν εἶχον ζωῆς τῆς κατ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μιγῆναι. ἔτρεχεν ἡ νάννη καὶ σχείζει | τὸν γε χιτῶνα· ἔτρεχε κῆ μήτηρ καὶ ἴσταλτο ἥγε τυπητόν. κεῦθὺς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πρὸς | γούνατα πρόσπεσε νάννη, κούκέτ' ἔμελλεν ἰδὼν, ἐνπῆδα δ' εἰς φρέαρ εὐθύς. | ὥς εὐρέν με κάτω βεβυθισμένον ἐξήνευ|[κ]εν ἐ<v> κοφίνῳ κεῦθὺς δὴ νάννη με διάβρολχον ἥρπασε θάσ<σ>ον, σκεπτομένη ζωῆς ἥ<v> τιν' ἔχω μερίδα· ὦ δ' ἐμὲ τὸν | [δύσ]τηνον τὸν οὐκ ἐφιδόντα παλαισί[τρα]ν, ἀλλ' ἥδη τριετῇ [-] Μοῖρα [κάλ]υψε κακῇ. I read ὦδ' ('thus') instead of ὦ δ' ('woe, me').

49 On the manipulation of the voice of children in epitaphs see Casey 2004.

50 Chaniotis 2009; *SEG* LIX 1197 (Aphrodisias, 1st cent. BCE): Ὁ πέτρος αὐδᾷ πατρός ἐξ Ἐπικράτους | Ἐπικράτην ὑπόντα τῷδ' ὑπ' εἰρίῳι, | ἔτ' ὄντα κοῦρον· ἅ κόνις δὲ [λ]εῖπεται | καὶ βάρβιτ' ἀκλόνητα, ταί θ' Ὀμηρικαὶ | καὶ ξυστά κεῦθ' ὀρπακος ἰτέας κύκλος, | τοῖ

The stone speaks of Epikrates,  
 the son of Epikrates, still a young man,  
 who lies under this mound.  
 The dust is left behind,  
 and the barbita, no longer strummed, also the Homeric (songs)  
 and the spears and the willow circle (of the shield) with the beautiful handle,  
 the halters of the young horses, covered with cobwebs,  
 the bows, and the javelins. Being distinguished in all this,  
 the glorious young man went to Hades.

One is reminded of the song ‘Without your love’ by Billie Holiday and Lester Young (1937):

Without your love,	A violin with no strings,
I'm like a song without words,	Without your love.
Just like a nest without birds,	Without your love,
Without your love.	I'm like a plane without wings,
Without your love,	A violin with no strings.
I'm like a plane without wings,	Without your love.

### 3 EMOTIONS AND CONTEXTS

Two millennia separate the use of similar media to express the grief for the death of a young man and the sorrow for a lost love. Such similarities in emotional expression and in responses to external stimuli create the impression that up to a certain degree manifestations of emotions are universal and diachronic. There are reasons for this impression, but the similarities in emotional responses have different origins than the similarities in the mode of expression. While the first are mainly related with the function of emotions as defense and survival mechanisms,<sup>51</sup> the latter are the result of the development and transmission of literary and rhetorical strategies. In any society and culture the absence of fear exposes an individual to danger; the absence of hope leads to passivity; the absence of disgust exposes to pathogens; the absence of sexual desire threatens the reproduction of the species; the absence of affection undermines the cohesion of a group; the absence of indignation and pride exposes to injustice and humiliation; the absence of gratitude undermines reciprocal interactions. We can, therefore, expect that, under normal circumstances, the death of a beloved person will be the cause of grief, inequality the cause of envy and hatred, a perceived danger the cause of fear, the birth of a child the cause of joy, and disappointed love the cause of sorrow. But how emotions are externalized and valued, controlled and dealt with, theatrically displayed or concealed, all this depends on social norms and conventions, philosophical ideas, literary traditions, and rhetorical strategies, to mention only some

πωλικοί τ' ἀγκυτῆρες ἠραχνωμένοι, | τὰ τόξα θ' οὔ τ' ἄκοντες· οἷσιν ἐμπρέπων | ἐς Ἀΐδαν ὁ  
 κούρος εὐκλεῆς ἔβα.

51 Le Doux 2012; see also p. 94.

important factors. These factors not only justify but demand the study of emotions in specific historical contexts.

As already mentioned in connection with the gravestone of Polyeuktos (p. 13), display, arousal, and performance of emotions are closely interconnected subjects, and the chapters of this volume could have been arranged in any number of ways to reflect this connection. For instance, the studies of rhetorical performances by Elizabeth Potter (pp. 281–320 and 399–448) and Dimitris Karambelas (pp. 449–515) connect the display of emotions by the speakers with their aim, which is the arousal of emotions among the audience. The arousal of fear and awe by weapon-brandishing statues of gods, studied by Matthew Peebles (pp. 193–229) was enhanced through rituals in which the statues played a part. Therefore, the division of the chapters into three parts is only meant to highlight the chapters' main connections, without excluding their relevance for all three notions that appear in the volume's title – and possibly for more.

The common theme of the first part of this volume ('Emotional constructions') is the role played by emotions for the shaping and/or the representation of social structures, values, hierarchies, power, and political relations. Dimos Spatharas' essay on 'Projective disgust and its uses in ancient Greece' (pp. 33–73) demonstrates how disgust, one of the least studied but most elementary emotions, was instrumentalized in Greek society in order to stigmatize and marginalize groups, impose moral values and social norms, and represent social hierarchies.

My own study 'Power relations as emotional relations: Hellenistic and Imperial realities and fictions' (pp. 75–103) exploits the epigraphic material in order to show how emotions were used in asymmetrical relations by focusing on four case studies: the display of indignation by the Romans in order to arouse fear in subordinate communities and express relations of dependence; the propagation by Hellenistic courts of the image of the loving royal family; the emotions of hope (*elpis*) and pity (*eleos*) as foundations of the relations between Roman emperors and Greek communities; and the construction of a humane image of slavery through the fiction of the loving master and the affectionate and loyal slave. A related subject is discussed by Sophia Kravaritou in her study 'Displaying guilt, remorse, and redemption in Greek public contexts' (pp. 105–125). She shows how Greek communities indirectly admitted their misconduct towards a superior authority – a Hellenistic king, the Romans, the emperor – by simply inscribing documents in public places. Displaying remorse in this way allowed them to achieve reconciliation and at the same time to demonstrate loyalty.

While these two chapters focus on asymmetrical power relations, the essay of Maria Xanthou 'Isocrates and emotional intelligence theory: from local audience to international politics' (pp. 127–158) deals with the relations between independent Greek *poleis* in the fourth century BCE. Xanthou argues that the concept of *eunoia* (favorable, benevolent disposition), which connects cognitive appraisal with emotional disposition, is very close to the modern concept of emotional intelligence. The orator Isocrates made *eunoia* to a central feature of his political advice that applied the management of emotions in order to achieve a co-operation between Greek communities. Finally, Vasiliki Giannopoulou ('Emotions and poli-

tics in Polybios' Book Six, pp. 159–189) demonstrates that Polybios' discussion of the Roman political institutions includes the observation of psychological processes – such as the collective emotions of the masses (envy, anger, fear), emotion management through education and training, and emotional arousal through rites. Polybios' narrative aims to have an emotional impact on the reader.

The Second Part ('Arousing emotions') presents case studies of how various types of texts (historiography, orations, letters, and petitions) and images arouse emotions. Matthew Peebles' study 'Threatening gods for fearful mortals: Weapon-brandishing divinities in ancient Greek art' (pp. 193–229) focuses on Archaic statues of Apollo, Athena, and Zeus, that share a similar iconography. These images represent the deities brandishing a spear (Apollo and Athena) or a thunderbolt (Zeus); by not representing an identifiable opponent, but alluding to incidents known by myth, they make every future enemy or transgressor of norms into a potential victim of the deity's punishing power. In this way, such images emotionally construct divine power and arouse the two related and fundamental emotions of belief in divine power: fear (of punishment) and hope (for protection).

John Tait's study 'Examining the exploitation of the emotion in Demotic Egyptian letter-writing' (pp. 231–242) is one of the two chapters in this volume that deals with emotions expressed in documents that were not written in Greek but whose authors lived in the same realm as Greeks, in Ptolemaic Egypt. The authors of these letters seek to arouse emotions in a very simple way, by communicating, directly or indirectly, their own emotions – usually, joy or grief. Similar observations can be made in Greek letters, although the Greek material does include cases of more sophisticated emotional arousal.<sup>52</sup>

Although every Greek historian aimed at arousing emotions in his readers, this feature is particularly clear in Hellenistic historiography. It is usually associated with the so-called 'tragic historiography' of a Phylarchos, but it is evident also in Polybios. The second study of Vasiliki Giannopoulou in this volume ('*Autopatheia*: personal empathic experience, didactic mission, and reader-shaped empathy in Polybios', pp. 243–280) demonstrates that the greatest critic of 'tragic historiography' was fully aware of the importance of emotions, which he placed in the service of the educational aims of his work. The description of the character, emotional state, and intentions of real people was for Polybios, a consciously empathic historian, a didactic instrument for his readers. *Autopatheia* is not simply personal emotional experience but empathy for others too, as well as the ability of a historian to communicate his perception of thoughts and emotions to readers and statesmen in an instructive way.

How emotions can be aroused in the audience of a historian and an orator was an important subject of rhetorical training already in the fourth century BCE. These techniques developed over the centuries and can be seen both in the surviving treatises of Latin authors and in the *progymnasmata* that are the subject of Elizabeth Potter's study 'Learning emotion: the *progymnasmata* and the rhetorical education of the ancient audience' (pp. 281–320). Potter stresses the importance

52 See Kotsifou 2012a, 40–42, 49f., 52f., 56f., 61–65, 76–79; Clarysse 2017.



of *mimesis* and imagination in rhetorical instruction, and the role of vividness as a medium of emotional arousal and persuasion. The arousal of indignation or empathy was a principal aim of ancient petitions. The work of one of the most sophisticated authors of petitions, Dioskoros of Aphrodito (567–570 CE) is the subject of Bernhard Palme's chapter 'Emotional strategies in petitions of Dioskoros of Aphrodito' (pp. 321–342). Dioskoros applied a variety of strategies in order to discredit his opponent, the pagarch Menas – metaphors, repetition, similes, and an emotional vocabulary –, and he did this so effectively that modern historians have sided with him, believing his accusations and taking his petitions at face value as a source of information for the social and economic conditions in sixth-century Egypt.

Part Three ('Performing emotions') focuses on performative media: drama, dance, oratory, and ritual. Marco Fantuzzi's essay 'Describing images, connoting feelings: choral ecphrasis in Euripides' (pp. 345–372) draws attention to an interesting medium of emotional expression in Euripidean drama (*Electra*, *Ion*, and *Iphigeneia in Aulis*): the description of images by the chorus. Artistic images are used by Euripides as vehicles through which female choruses communicate their emotional comments on events. Ecphrasis emerges in these tragedies as a sophisticated medium that enhances the emotional impact of the tragic action on the audience. Pantomime was a very popular genre of performative art that has left very limited evidence. How emotions were represented in and aroused by pantomimes is examined by Helen Slaney ('Repetition makes it tragic: emotion in ancient pantomime', pp. 373–398). The dancers used a repertoire of gestures that could be understood by an audience familiar with them from other contexts. The impact of mimic dance on the spectators depended on their ability to recognize, recall, and reactivate the emotions associated with specific gestures and movements.

The performative aspects of oratory in the Imperial period – in particular, the theatricality of delivery, and the control and display of emotions – are surveyed by Elizabeth Potter in light of Philostratos' *Lives of Sophists* ('Emotion, performance, and persuasion in Philostratos' *Lives of Sophists*', pp. 399–448). The information provided by Philostratos on successful rhetorical performances and the reputation of orators is of crucial importance for understanding the impact of declamations on audiences, the 'performance' of identity, and the creation of an emotional community between orator and audience. But it is also important for understanding Philostratos' own views on oratory and the part emotions should play in it. Although emotional control was expected of emperors and governors who served as judges, displayed emotion by shedding tears on several occasions in the second century CE. Their tears are a sort of an 'emotional verdict', the judge's performative response to the emotional performances of the litigants. Dimitris Karambelas places the communicative function of such tears in the historical context of the practice of law in the Imperial period and discusses the interaction between judges, litigants, and audiences ('Emotions in court: judicial display and psychic audience between the Imperial period and Late Antiquity', pp. 449–515). Finally, David Frankfurter analyses the way magic in Late Antique Egypt represented the emotions of women ('Desperation and the magic of appeal: representation of wo-

men's emotion in magical spells and ritual figurines', pp. 517–536). In the performative context of ritual, magical spells and figurines became media that both articulated emotions – mainly anger, desperation, and insecurity – and imagined resolution and satisfaction.

These fifteen chapters cover a period of ca. 1400 years, from the early Archaic period to Late Antique Egypt; they adduce literary texts, inscriptions, papyri, and images from Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt, and the Near East; they analyze texts representing a large variety of literary genres and documents: tragedy, historiography, oratory, rhetorical handbooks, biography, decrees, public and private letters, petitions, grave epigrams, and magical spells. What the analysis of these sources demonstrates, apart from the way the display and arousal of emotions shaped interpersonal and interstate relations, social hierarchies, and political processes, is the way emotions have shaped our sources and the way we view them. To mention an example, Bernhard Palme points out (p. 338) that the emotional strategies used by Dioskoros in his petitions

had considerable impact on many historians' evaluation of the social conditions and economic developments that Egypt underwent in the age of Justinian or in Late Antiquity.

Emotions are the background that allows us to fully understand most, if not all, the source material that philologists, historians, and art historians seek to interpret. Let us take the emotion of disgust. Dimos Spatharas (p. 49) mentions urinating or emptying a chamber pot on someone as a characteristic example of how disgust was used to establish domination and hierarchy. This observation allows us to interpret two documentary sources. A famous petition from Hellenistic Egypt narrates a conflict between a Greek man and an Egyptian woman, in which issues of ethnicity and gender undoubtedly played a predominant role.<sup>53</sup> However, in order to fully understand the indignation of Herakleides, we need to consider what provoked it:

As I was passing by [her house] an Egyptian woman, whose name is said to be Psenobastis, leaned out [of a window] and emptied a chamber pot of urine over my clothes, so that I was completely drenched. When I angrily reproached her, she hurled abuse at me. When I responded in kind, Psenobastis in her own right hand pulled the fold of my cloak in which I was wrapped, tore it and ripped it off me, so that my chest was laid quite bare. She also spat in my face, in the presence of several people whom I called to witness. ... I therefore beg you, O king, if it please you, not to ignore my being thus, for no reason, manhandled by an Egyptian woman, whereas I am a Greek and a visitor

Herakleides' feeling of humiliation and his indignation is directly connected with the form of abuse that he described in so many details: he was attacked with urine and saliva, substances that elicit disgust. The second document is an equally famous letter of Augustus, in which the emperor deals with an incident that had occurred in Knidos.<sup>54</sup> When a man was attacked by enemies in his house during the night, he responded by ordering a slave to empty a chamber pot on the attackers;

53 *P.Enteux*. 79 (Magdola, 218 BCE). Cf. Kotsifou 2012, 57f.

54 *I.Knidos* 24.

this form of defilement highlighted one's superiority in a conflict situation. If we know about this incident, it is because the pot fell on the head of one of them and killed him. If we can fully understand the details of the narrative, it is because we consider the role of emotional display.

Studying Greek culture without considering emotions is like cooking a Greek dish without olive oil; it is possible, but it does not allow the other ingredients to develop their full potential — and, of course, it does not leave any strong impression.

## REFERENCES

- Allard, J.-N. and P. Montlahuc (2018) The Gendered Construction of Emotions in the Greek and Roman Worlds, *Clio. Women, Gender, History* 47,1, 23–43 (translated by M. Rothstein).
- Athanassaki, L. (2012) Recreating the Emotional Experience of Contest and Victory Celebrations: Spectators and Celebrants in Pindar's Epinicians, in X. Riu and J. Portulas (eds.), *Approaches to Archaic Greek Poetry*, Messina, 173–219.
- Ballot, R. K. (2014) *Courage in the Democratic Polis*, Oxford.
- Bernand, É. (1969) *Inscriptions métriques de l'Égypte gréco-romaine. Recherches sur la poésie épigrammatique des Grecs en Égypte*, Paris.
- Bettenworth, A. and J. Hammerstaedt, eds. (2020) *Writing Order and Emotion*, Zurich.
- Betts, E. (2017) *Senses of the Empire. Multisensory Approaches to Roman Culture*, London.
- Bevilacqua, G. (1991) Osservazioni sualcuneformule affettuose e galanti di età imperiale, *Miscellanea Greca e Romana* 16, 225–237.
- Bowie, E. (2005) Metaphor in Daphnis and Chloe, in S. Harrison, M. Paschalis, and S. Frangoulidis (eds.), *Metaphor and the Ancient Novel*, Groningen, 68–86.
- Bradley, M., ed. (2015) *Smell and the Ancient Senses*, London.
- Bryen, A. Z. (2008) Visibility and Violence in Petitions from Roman Egypt, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 48, 181–200.
- (2017) Dionysia's Complaint: Finding Emotions in the Courtroom, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 57, 1010–1031.
- Butler, S. and S. Nooter, eds. (2018) *Sound and the Ancient Senses*, London.
- Butler, S. and A. Purves, eds. (2014) *Synaesthesia and the Ancient Senses*, London.
- Cairns, D. (2012) Vêtu d'impudeur et enveloppé de chagrin. Le rôle des métaphores de 'l'habillement' dans les concepts d'émotion en Grèce ancienne, in F. Gherchanoc and V. Huet (eds.), *Vêtements antiques: s'habiller, se déshabiller dans les mondes anciens*, Paris, 175–188.
- (2016a) Metaphors for Hope in Archaic and Classical Greek Poetry, in Caston and Kaster (eds.) 2016, 13–44.
- (2016b) Mind, Body, and Metaphor in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion, *L'Atelier du Centre de Recherches Historiques* 16 [DOI : 10.4000/acrh.7416].
- (2016c) Clothed in Shamelessness, Shrouded in Grief. The Role of 'Garment' Metaphors in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion, in G. Fanfani, M. Harlow, and M.-L. Nosch (eds.), *Spinning Fates and the Song of the Loom: The Use of Textiles, Clothing and Cloth Production as Metaphor, Symbol, and Narrative*, Oxford, 25–41.
- (2017) Mind, Metaphor, and Emotion in Euripides (Hippolytus) and Seneca (Phaedra), *Maia* 69, 246–267.
- (2018) *A Cultural History of the Emotions. Volume I. A Cultural History of the Emotions in Antiquity*, London.
- Cairns, D. and L. Fulkerson, eds. (2015) *Emotions between Greece and Rome*, London.

- Cairns, D. and D. Nelis, eds. (2017) *Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions*, Stuttgart.
- Casey, E. (2004) Binding Speeches: Giving Voice to Deadly Thoughts in Greek Epitaphs, in I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (eds.), *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden, 63–90.
- Caston, R. R. (2012) *The Elegiac Passion: Jealousy in Roman Love Elegy*, Oxford.
- Caston, R. R. and R. A. Kaster, eds. (2016), *Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical World*, Oxford.
- Chaniotis, A. (2009) Lament for a Young Man. A New Epigram from Aphrodisias, in A. Martínez Fernández (ed.), *Estudios de Epigrafía Griega*, La Laguna, 469–477.
- ed. (2012a) *Unveiling Emotions. Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World*, Stuttgart.
- (2012b) Unveiling Emotions in the Greek World. Introduction, in Chaniotis (ed.) 2012, 11–36.
- (2012c) Listening to Stones: Orality and Emotions in Ancient Inscriptions, in J. Davies and J. Wilkes (eds.), *Epigraphy and the Historical Sciences. XIII International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy*, Oxford, 299–328.
- (2013a) *Paradoxon, Enargeia*, Empathy: Hellenistic Decrees and Hellenistic Oratory, in C. Kremmydas and K. Tempest (eds.), *Hellenistic Oratory: Continuity and Change*, Oxford, 201–216.
- (2013b) Emotional Language in Hellenistic Decrees and Hellenistic Histories, in M. Mari and J. Thornton (eds.), *Parole in movimento. Linguaggio politico e lessico storiografico nel mondo ellenistico*, Pisa, 339–352.
- (2013c) Affective Epigraphy: Emotions in Public Inscriptions of the Hellenistic Age, *Mediterraneo Antico* 16, 2013, 745–760.
- (2015) Affective Diplomacy: Emotional Scripts between Greek Communities and Roman Authorities during the Republic, in Cairns and Fulkerson (eds.) 2015, London, 87–103.
- (2016) Displaying Emotional Community: The Epigraphic Evidence, in E. Sanders and M. Johncock (eds.), *Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity*, Stuttgart, 93–111.
- (2018) Elpis in the Epigraphic Evidence: From Rational Expectation to Dependence from Authority, in D. Spataras and G. Kazantzidis (eds.), *Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art*, Berlin, 351–364.
- (2019) Display and Arousal of Emotions in Panhellenic Sanctuaries in the Shadow of Rome, in M. Haake and K. Freitag (eds.), *Griechische Heiligtümer als Handlungsorte. Zur Multifunktionalität supralokaler Heiligtümer von der frühen Archaik bis in die römische Kaiserzeit*, Stuttgart, 137–154.
- (2020) Slavery and the History of Emotions: the Greek Epigraphic Evidence, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 164 (forthcoming).
- Chaniotis, A. and P. Ducrey, eds. (2013) *Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture*, Stuttgart.
- Chaniotis, A., N. Kaltsas, and I. Mylonopoulos, eds. (2017) *A World of Emotions: Ancient Greece, 700 BC-200 AD*, New York.
- Clairmont, C. (1993) *Classical Attic Tombstones*. I, Kilchberg.
- Clarysse, W. (2017) Emotions in Greek Private Papyrus Letters, *Ancient Society* 47, 63–86.
- Cockerell, B. (2016) The Election of Fear, <https://www.crimsonhexagon.com/blog/the-election-of-fear>, September 26, 2016 [accessed on March 8, 2019].
- Considine, P. (1966) Some Homeric Terms for Anger, *Acta Classica* 9, 15–25.
- Cosgrove, C. H. (2018) An Ancient Greek Lament Form, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 138, 2018, 173–181.
- Coughlan, T. (2017) A Tragic Mother at SGO 09/01/03, 7, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 207 39–40.

- Cummings, M. (2018) The Interaction of Emotions in the Greek Novels, in M. P. Futre Pinheiro, D. Konstan, and B. D. MacQueen (eds.), *Cultural Crossroads in the Ancient Novel*, Berlin, 315–326.
- Desmond, W. (2006) Lessons of Fear: a Reading of Thucydides, *Classical Philology* 101, 359–379.
- Dobias-Lallou, C. (2017) *Greek Verse Inscriptions of Cyrenaica*, Bologna, 2017 [online resource: <https://igcyr.unibo.it/>].
- Eaton, G. (2016) ‘Project Fear’ Is Back, and It’s Still Remain’s Best Hope, *New Statesman*, June 15, 2016 (<https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/06/project-fear-back-and-its-still-remains-best-hope>) [accessed on March 8, 2019].
- Ehrenheim, H. von and M. Prusac-Lindhagen, eds. (2020) *Reading Roman Emotions*, Stockholm.
- Emerit, S., S. Perrot, and A. Vincent (eds.) (2015) *Le paysage sonore de l'Antiquité. Méthodologie, historiographie et perspectives. Actes de la journée d'études tenue à l'École française de Rome, le 7 janvier 2013*, Châtillon.
- Fisher, N. (2017) Demosthenes and the Use of Disgust, in Lateiner and Spatharas (eds.) 2017, 103–124.
- Fulkerson, L. (2013) *No Regrets: Remorse in Classical Antiquity*, Oxford.
- González González, M. (2019) *Funerary Epigrams of Ancient Greece: Reflections on Literature, Society and Religion*, London.
- Griffith-Williams, B. (2016) Rational and Emotional Persuasion in Athenian Inheritance Cases, in Sanders and Johncock (eds.), *Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity*, Stuttgart, 41–56.
- Hagen, J. (2017) *Die Tränen der Mächtigen und die Macht der Tränen. Eine emotionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung des Weinens in der kaiserzeitlichen Historiographie*, Stuttgart.
- Hamilakis, Y. (2013) *Archaeologies and the Senses: Human Experience, Memory, and Affect*, Cambridge.
- Harvey, S. A. (2006) *Scenting Salvation: Ancient Christianity and the Olfactory Imagination*, Berkeley.
- Herrin, J. (2017) ‘Tantalus Ever in Tears’: The Greek Anthology as a Source of Emotions in Late Antiquity, in M. Alexiou and D. Cairns (eds.), *Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After*, Edinburgh, 75–86.
- Irmischer, J. (1950) *Götterzorn bei Homer*, Leipzig.
- Kalimtzis, K. (2012) *Taming Anger: The Hellenic Approach to the Limitations of Reason*, London.
- Karanika, A. and V. Panoussi, eds. (2019) *Emotional Trauma in Greece and Rome: Representations and Reactions*, London.
- Konstan, D. (2006) *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*, Toronto.
- (2015) Affect and Emotion in Greek Literature, *Oxford Handbooks Online. Classical Studies. Ancient Prose Literature*, Oxford (DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935390.013.41).
- Kotsifou, C. (2012a) Emotions and Papyri: Insights into the Theatre of Human Experience in Antiquity, in Chaniotis (ed.) 2012a, 39–90.
- (2012b) A Glimpse into the World of Petitions: The Case of Aurelia Artemis and Her Orphaned Children, in Chaniotis (ed.) 2012a, 317–327.
- (2012c) ‘Being Unable to Come to You and Lament and Weep With You.’ Grief and Condolence Letters on Papyrus, in Chaniotis (ed.) 2012a, 389–411.
- Kruse, T. (2006) The Magistrate and the Ocean: Acclamations and Ritualised Communication in Town Gatherings in Roman Egypt, in E. Stavrianopoulou (ed.), *Ritual and Communication in the Graeco-Roman World*, Liège, 207–315.
- Kübler-Ross, E. (1969) *On Death and Dying*, New York.
- Kübler-Ross, E. and D. Kessler (2005) *On Grief and Grieving: Finding the Meaning of Grief Through the Five Stages of Loss*, New York.
- Lattimore, D. (1942) *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*, Urbana.

- Lateiner, D. and D. Spatharas, eds. (2017) *The Ancient Emotion of Disgust*, Oxford.
- Le Doux, J. E. (2012) Rethinking the Emotional Brain, *Neuron* 73.4, 653–676.
- Müller, H. and G. Staab (2017) Dion. Ein pergamenischer Politiker im Himmel, *Chiron* 47, 339–365.
- Oaten, M., R. J. Stevenson, and T. I. Case (2009) Disgust as a Disease-Avoidance Mechanism, *Psychological Bulletin* 135.2, 303–321.
- Otto, N. (2009) *Enargeia: Untersuchung zur Charakteristik alexandrinischer Dichtung*, Stuttgart.
- Patera, M. (2013) Reflections on the Discourse of Fear in the Greek Sources, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (eds.) 2013, 109–134.
- (2015) *Figures grecques de l'épouvante de l'antiquité au présent. Peurs enfantines et adultes*, Leiden.
- Peterson, E. (1929) Zur Bedeutung der ὤκεανέ-Akklamation, *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 78, 221–223.
- Phillips, M. L., A. W. Young et alii (1997) A Specific Neural Substrate for Perceiving Facial Expressions of Disgust, *Nature* 389, 495–498.
- Prodi, E. E. (2017) *SGO* 09/01/03, 7, *ZPE* 201, 40.
- Purves, A. C., ed. (2017) *Touch and the Ancient Senses*, London.
- Rayor, D. J. and A. Lardinois (2014) *Sappho: A New Translation of the Complete Works*, Cambridge.
- Renaut, O. (2014) *Platon: la médiation des émotions. L'éducation du thymos dans les dialogues*, Paris.
- Rey, S. (2017) *Les larmes de Rome. Le pouvoir de pleurer dans l'Antiquité*, Paris.
- Rozin, P., L. Lowery, and R. Ebert (1994). Varieties of Disgust Faces and the Structure of Disgust, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 66, 870–881.
- Rubinstein, L. (2013) Evoking Anger Through Pity: Portraits of the Vulnerable and Defenceless in Attic Oratory, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (eds.) 2013, 135–166.
- (2016) Communal Revenge and Appeals to Dicastic Emotion, in C. Tiersch (ed.), *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert. Zwischen Modernisierung und Tradition*, Stuttgart, 55–72.
- Rudolph, K. C. (2018) *Taste and the Ancient Senses*, London.
- Sanders, E. (2012) 'He is a Liar, a Bounder, and a Cad:' the Arousal of Hostile Emotions in Attic Forensic Oratory, in Chaniotis (ed.) 2012, 359–387.
- (2014) *Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens. A Socio-Psychological Approach*, Oxford.
- (2016) Generating Goodwill and Friendliness in Attic Forensic Oratory, in Caston and Kaster (eds.) 2016, 163–181.
- Sanders, E. and M. Johncock, eds. (2016) *Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity*, Stuttgart.
- Scheid-Tissinier, É. (2012) Du bon usage des émotions dans la culture grecque, in P. Payen and É. Scheid-Tissinier (eds.), *Anthropologie de l'Antiquité. Anciens objets, nouvelles approches*, Turnhout, 263–289.
- Schettino, M. T. and S. Pittia, eds. (2012) *Les sons du pouvoir dans les mondes anciens. Actes du colloque international de l'Université de la Rochelle (25–27 novembre 2010)*, Besançon.
- Sistakou, E. (2014) From Emotion to Sensation. The Discovery of the Senses in Hellenistic Poetry, in R. Hunter, A. Rengakos, and E. Sistakou (eds.), *Hellenistic Studies at Crossroads. Exploring Texts, Contexts, and Metatexts*, Berlin, 135–155.
- Skarsouli, E. (2020) Some Remarks on the Use of and in Greek Documentary Papyri and Literary Texts, in Bettenworth and Hammerstaedt (eds.) 2020, 46–64.
- Spatharas, D. (2017) Sex, Politics and Disgust in Aeschines' *Against Timarchus*, in Lateiner and Spatharas (eds.) 2017, 125–139.
- (2019) *Emotions, Persuasion, and Public Discourse in Classical Athens*, Berlin.
- Spatharas D. and G. Kazantzidis, eds. (2018), *Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art*, Berlin.
- Squire, M., ed. (2016) *Sight and the Ancient Senses*, London.

- Tamiolaki, M. (2013) Emotions and Historical Representation in Xenophon's *Hellenika*, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (eds.) 2013, 15–53.
- (2016) Emotion and Persuasion in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, *Phoenix* 70, 40–63.
- Theodoropoulou, M. (2012) The Emotion Seeks to Be Expressed. Thought's from a Linguist's Point of View, in Chaniotis (ed.) 2012, 433–468
- Thumiger, C. (2016) Fear, Hope, and the Definition of Hippocratic Medicine, in W. V. Harris (ed.), *Popular Medicine in Graeco-Roman Antiquity: Explorations*, Leiden, 198–214.
- Toner, J., ed. (2014) *A Cultural History of the Senses in Antiquity*, London.
- Vekselius, J. (2018) *Weeping for the res publica: Tears in Roman Political Culture*, Lund.
- Visvardi, E. (2015) *Emotion in Action: Thucydides and the Tragic Chorus*, Leiden.
- Webb, R. (2009) *Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice*, Farnham.
- Webster, T. B. L. (1954) Personification as a Mode of Greek Thought, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 17, 10–21
- Whitehead, D. (2002) Observations on Adephagia, *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 145, 175–186.
- Wicker, B. et alii (2003) Both of Us Disgusted in My Insula: The Common Neural Basis of Seeing and Feeling Disgust, *Neuron* 40, 655–664.
- Winter, J. G. (1933) *Life and Letters in the Papyri*, Ann Arbor.
- Wohl, V. (2002) *Love Among the Ruins: The Erotics of Democracy in Classical Athens*, Princeton.
- Wypustek, A. (2013) *Images of Eternal Beauty in Funerary Verse Inscriptions of the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Periods*. Leiden.
- Zafeiropoulos, N. (1961) Ἀνασκαφὴ Θήρας, *Praktika tes en Athenais Archaialogikes Hetaireias*, 201–206.
- Zangara, A. (2007) *Voir l'histoire. Théories anciennes du récit historique, Ile siècle avant J.C.–Ile siècle après J.C.*, Paris.

#### LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1: Funerary stele. Athens, ca. 410–400 BCE. National Archaeological Museum Athens, 773. IG I<sup>3</sup> 1293. Photo: © National Archaeological Museum Athens.

PART ONE

Emotional Constructions





# PROJECTIVE DISGUST AND ITS USES IN ANCIENT GREECE\*

*Dimos Spatharas*

‘I know where she went, it’s disgusting, I don’t want to talk about it.  
No, it’s too disgusting. Don’t say it, it’s disgusting, let’s not talk.’<sup>1</sup>

Donald Trump

## 1 PRELIMINARIES

Disgust, perhaps the least noble of emotions, has attracted little attention in the frame of classical studies. With few exceptions, classicists have been reticent about the implications of disgust for the interpretation of ancient literature or cultures, even as the emotion is ubiquitous in our ancient sources, especially in genres, such as comedy and satire, which programmatically besmirch those who attract their attention. Until very recently, the only detailed study on ancient disgust concerned Roman *fastidium*.<sup>2</sup> The contributors to a recent co-edited volume on ancient disgust discuss the emotion’s uses in Greek and Latin literature, while the editors’ introduction addresses modern theories and ancient practices.<sup>3</sup> Despite these recent publications, there is more work to be done. Disgust is fervently researched and discussed by psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers.<sup>4</sup> More importantly for the purposes of the present study, focusing on the emotion’s deployment as a means of marginalizing individuals and constructing social hierarchies<sup>5</sup> the appropriateness of disgust as a socially instructive emotion is a highly debatable topic. Are, for example, the sentiments of repulsion that cloning allegedly causes to some individuals an appropriate criterion for our evaluation of re-

\* My warmest thanks to Angelos Chaniotis for his comments on previous drafts of this chapter and for giving me the opportunity to explore disgust in the frame of the ERC project on the social and cultural construction of emotions. I am also grateful to the members of the audiences where I presented earlier versions of my work on the extraordinary and overwhelming emotion of disgust.

1 Donald Trump’s response to Hillary Clinton’s bathroom break during a debate. I borrow the quotation from Richardson 2017.

2 See the excellent study by Kaster (2001), also in his book on Roman emotions (2005).

3 Lateiner and Spatharas (eds.) 2017a.

4 For a recent overview of the advancements in the study of disgust, see the *Emotion Researcher* website (<http://emotionresearcher.com>, consulted 29 December 2014).

5 See Lateiner and Spatharas 2017b.

cent advancements in genetics?<sup>6</sup> Is the heinousness of a crime relevant to the punishment of the wrongdoer?<sup>7</sup> Should we let disgust guide our sentiments towards forms of sexual behaviour which religion, ideologies, or totalitarian regimes describe as deviant or abnormal? My answer to these questions is NO. As we shall see, disgust is a particularly powerful tool of stigmatization, partly because it serves as a self-protective mechanism that makes it impossible not to say ‘don’t touch’. Hence, the cognitions that give rise to the emotion frequently involve reflexive responses rather than rational evaluation of our targets’ behaviour, preferences or dispositional characteristics. For this reason, propagandistic uses of disgust thrive in eliminationalism, stigmatization of social minorities, and racism. By projecting repulsive qualities upon its targets, disgust dehumanizes. Yet, or rather correlatively, thinking about disgust enables us to reconsider deeply embedded assumptions, prejudices, and stereotypes, especially so because disgust is employed by moral educators at an early stage of our lives.

In this contribution, I extend the discussion of the emotion’s projective uses in Lateiner and Spatharas (2017b) and discuss some pivotal issues surrounding the projective uses of disgust in Greek literature. My method relies on recent advancements in various principles, primarily in the fields of psychology and philosophy. The topic that I address in this chapter is the ways in which ancient sources employ disgust to construct social hierarchies and marginalize individuals. These uses of disgust predictably appeal to audiences’ potent cultural understandings. As we shall see, due to its immediacy and its visceral nature, the emotion stigmatizes with extreme effectiveness individuals, behaviours, and aesthetic preferences that transgress potent normative considerations. At the same time, disgust is particularly applicable to moralizing accounts seeking to control our indulgence in pleasures, especially sex. As the sources that I discuss indicate, disgust plays a predominant role in ancient social life. Furthermore, because projective uses of disgust are frequently enlisted in support of top-down stigmatization, the emotion’s deployment in our sources sheds light on ideological or normative concerns which constitute and perpetuate social hierarchies.

Because moral disgust predictably displays cultural variation, I avoid prototypical definitions of the emotion. Instead, I focus on *contexts* in an attempt to pin down some of the assumptions, norms or ideological considerations that inform the scripts of ancient disgust.<sup>8</sup> My emphasis on scripts also entails that I do not look for the emotion only in places where I can find relevant labels (such as βδελυρία, ἀηδία or δυσχέρεια and their cognates). To project disgust on one’s target involves the construction of scenarios involving the target’s social history, details about what s/he has come into contact with, or her/his predilections. It is

6 See Leon Kass’ article ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’, *New Republic* 216, no. 22 (2 June 1997) 17–26, where he claims that the ‘yuck factor’ must guide our sense of the appropriateness of cloning. See Lateiner and Spatharas 2017b, 2f.

7 For a discussion of the topic, see Kahan 1998, extending Miller’s analysis of disgust to the law.

8 On methodological issues concerning the use of scripts in the study of ancient emotions, see Cairns 2008; see also Kaster 2005, 8f.; Sanders 2014, 5–7; Lateiner and Spatharas 2017b, 4f.

only through the study of contexts that we can understand the semantic range of labels and use disgust (or other emotions) as a heuristic tool that enables us to locate and interpret with better hopes of accuracy the values that inform ancient social life. Lastly, the present contribution does not purport to be a diachronic approach to disgust. My concern is to show the different *uses* of the affect and, hence, I focus on individual synchronies. This enables me to look into *how* disgust operates to construct social hierarchies, and where appropriate I comment on the wider cultural contexts of the scripts that I choose to discuss.

## 2 CORE DISGUST: THE EMOTION'S PRIMARY ELICITORS

I start my discussion with 'core disgust',<sup>9</sup> even as I realize that it would be impossible and perhaps too pedantic to offer a full list of the substances that served as primary elicitors of disgust in antiquity. Despite differences in hygiene standards and tastes, Greeks shared our sensitivities to the physical substances or qualities that give rise to the affect. From an evolutionist point of view this is hardly surprising.<sup>10</sup> According to functionalist approaches, 'core' disgust developed as a self-protective mechanism and, therefore, its primary elicitors display cultural conformity. In this first section, therefore, I offer a preliminary presentation of literary representations of the emotion's primary physical elicitors, and, where appropriate, I comment on how cultural understandings shaped Greeks' responses to them. My first example is corpses. Responses to dead bodies illustrate that it is not always practicable to distinguish a clear line of distinction between physical and moral disgust (see discussion below). Heraclitus famously said that 'corpses are more fit to be thrown away than dung' (fr. 22 B 96 Diels-Kranz). Greek sensitivities about funerary decorum invest Heraclitus' saying with overt aggressiveness, but at the same time the fact that he compares corpses with excrement reveals lucidly that the products of bowel movement are emblematic among avoidable substances. The aversive sensory qualities of shit play a predominant role in Aristophanes' *Peace*, while numerous passages from his plays comically exploit shit and farts.<sup>11</sup> In the terms of Bakhtin's approach to low language, the orifices of the lower body and their products make comedy what it is.<sup>12</sup>

As Heraclitus' saying indicates, disintegration, rottenness, and the putrid are also common elicitors of the emotion. Indeed, some scholars interpret disgust as a response to substances that remind us of our animality and, therefore, our mortali-

9 I use 'core' disgust to describe the reflexive responses to the emotion's primary elicitors, involving foul substances, rotten corpses, excrement, disease vectors, etc. The term belongs to Rozin et al. 2008; see also Kelly 2011, 17–20.

10 See for example Rozin 2008; Kelly 2011, chapters 1–2.

11 On scatology in Attic comedy, see Henderson 1991, chapter 6; on Aristophanes' osphresiology, see Tordoff 2011.

12 See Bakhtin 1984, 319, emphasizing how the abusive language of the *agora* 'is flooded with genitals, bellies, defecations, urine, disease, noses, mouths, and dismembered parts'.

ty – but this hypothesis is highly speculative.<sup>13</sup> Hence, old age is associated with decay and, correlatively, the old body is frequently understood as putrid.<sup>14</sup> old bodies and their physical qualities, e.g., rotten teeth and bad breath, indicate that decay, and, ultimately, death are already present in living bodies. In comedy, putridity (σαπρότης) is the trademark of old women who, despite their age, engage in sexual intercourse, while the unpleasant olfactory qualities of rotten bodies enhance descriptions of the overused sexual organs of prostitutes (see §7). But as we shall see, in cases where our sources present the emotion as being generated by humans' sexual activities, the attribution of repulsive qualities to the body commonly requires socially constructed concepts about reproduction and sexual pleasure.<sup>15</sup> Hence, the disgust caused by the sexual organs and their products are just another point in a continuum of social readings of the body. Unlike others' feces, a substance that we don't want to touch or, for that matter, ingest, semen and vaginal secretions contaminate on account of markedly gendered conceptualizations of sexual practices that involve evaluations about our targets' status, our relevant position in social hierarchy, and freedom of choice.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, our responses to sexual substances are regulated by normative concerns regarding desire. Hence, elicitors of disgust surrounding procreation and sexual satisfaction offer a good example of the bidirectional relationship between 'core' and 'moral' disgust. The ambivalence of the emotion's sexual elicitors – sometimes desirable and sometimes detestable – makes it impossible to classify them along with other primary elicitors, such as vomit, mucus, and feces. One may compare here the 'ugliness' of a man's face during ejaculation,<sup>17</sup> or the slang expression 'bumping uglies' – and its use in the following lyrics from the song 'Feel It' (House of Pain): 'And let's get down to do the nasty, freaky, funky / stinky, junky, let's bump uglies in the nighttime.'

A passage in Galen significantly enhances our discussion of the primary elicitors of 'core' disgust associated with the human body. In this passage, Galen criticizes Xenokrates' pharmaceutical use of human excrement for the therapy of diseases. The passage, coloured by the author's disbelief at some of Xenokrates' prescriptions, offers an inclusive account of the disgust's primary physical elicitors:<sup>18</sup>

13 On the basis of Becker's (1973) notion that humans are the only animals that endure the anxiety caused by their knowledge of their inevitable death, Rozin argues that disgust reflects our need to forget our animal nature and, hence, our mortality (Rozin et al. 2008). For different approaches to the emotion's evolution, emphasizing disease, sex and morality see Tybur et al. 2009; Tybur et al. 2013.

14 On old age and disgust, see Miller 1997, 15.

15 See Miller 1997, 101–105.

16 For a recent discussion concerning disgust as a means of stigmatizing sexual orientation, see Nussbaum 2009.

17 Miller 1997, 103–105.

18 Galen, *De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus* XI 249–251: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσελγῇ γε. πόσις δ' ἰδρωτός τε καὶ οὔρου καὶ καταμηνίου γυναικὸς ἀσελγῇ καὶ βδελυρὰ, καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ κόπρος, ἣν διαχριομένην τε τοῖς κατὰ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὴν φάρυγγα μορίοις εἷς τε τὴν γαστέρα καταπινομένην ἔγραψεν ὁ Ξενοκράτης ὅ τί ποτε ποιεῖν δύναται· γέγραφε δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ

Although these medical practices are illegal, they are not offensive. By contrast, drinking sweat, or urine, or menstrual blood are both offensive and disgusting practices. Yet far more offensive and disgusting is the smearing of feces on parts of the mouth or the pharynx, a practice in which Xenokrates recognizes therapeutic potentialities, albeit at the cost of ingesting this substance. He also wrote about the ingestion of earwax, which I would not tolerate to swallow down, lest I fall ill. But I consider that feces is much more disgusting than earwax. No doubt, in the eyes of a sensible person, it is more shameful to learn that someone engages in scatophagy than that he pursues unspeakable practices or that he is a catamite. But still, we are more disgusted at people who perform cunnilingus than by those who perform fellatio, because cunnilingus seems to me to have the same effects as drinking menstrual blood. No normal person would tolerate to endure these therapies, not even therapies more moderate than these, which, however, are equally offensive: plastering feces on a specific part of the body that suffers from an illness, for example, or smearing human semen on it. Xenokrates labels semen as *gonos* and makes a clear-cut distinction between patients who benefit from suffusion of *gonos* and patients who benefit from semen collected from a woman's vagina. Only extreme shortage of available medicaments would justify the treatment of chilblains through the application of semen that did not stay inside, but dripped out of a woman upon sexual intercourse.

Galen's programmatic distinction at the beginning of the passage between illegal medical practices that elicit disgust and legal, albeit 'offensive', medical practices that insolently ignore social taboos (ἀσελγή) indicates that discussion of 'core' disgust cannot be insulated from the emotion's rich moral signification. Yet, for the time being, it would suffice to focus on the 'raw material' that characterizes the emotion's 'affect programme',<sup>19</sup> that is, the vile human material to which the

κατὰ τὰ ὅτα ρύπου καταπινομένου. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἂν ὑπέμεινα καταπιεῖν, ἐφ' ᾧ γε μηδέποτε νοσήσαι. πολὺ δ' αὐτοῦ βδελυρώτερον ἡγοῦμαι τὴν κόπρον εἶναι. καὶ μείζον γε ὄνειδος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων σωφρονοῦντι κοπροφάγον ἀκοῦειν ἢ αἰσχρουργὸν ἢ κίναιδον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν αἰσχρουργῶν μᾶλλον βδελυττόμεθα τοὺς φοινικίζοντας τῶν λεσβιαζόντων, ᾧ φαίνεται μοι παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχειν ὁ καὶ καταμηνίου πίνων. οὐτ' οὖν τοῦτ' ὑπομείναι τις ἂν εἰς πείραν ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπος κατὰ φύσιν ἔχων οὐθ' ὅσα μετριώτερα μὲν τούτων, ἔτι δ' ἀσελγῇ, κόπρῳ καταχρίεσθαι τι τοῦ σώματος μέρος, ἔνεκα τοῦ κατ' αὐτὸ πάθους, ἢ ἀνθρώπου σπέρματος. γόνον δὲ αὐτὸ καλεῖν εἴωθεν ὁ Ξενοκράτης, καὶ διορίζεται γε μετὰ πάσης ἐπιμελείας τίνα μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ γόνος μόνος ὠφελεῖν πέφυκε καταχρίομενος, τίνα δὲ μετὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς, ὅταν ἐκπέσῃ τοῦ γυναικείου κόλπου. μεγάλην γάρ τίνα δεῖ γενέσθαι βοηθημάτων πενίαν, ἵνα τις χίμεθλα θεραπεύσῃ ὑπερχύσας ἀνδρὸς σπέρμα μὴ μείναν ἔνδον, ἀλλ' ἐκρυνὲν τῆς γυναικὸς ἐπὶ τῇ συνουσίᾳ. πολὺ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο τῆς ὕλης εἰδὸς ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ζώων ὠφελείας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου δηλονότι, τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πινόμενον οὖρον ἢ καταπινομένοις τε καὶ διαχριομένοις τοῖς ἐν τῷ στόματι μέρεσι κόπρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκάστου διηγείται, πολὺ δ' ἄλλο τῶν δυσποριστῶν, οἷον ὅταν ἐλέφαντος ἢ ἵππου Νειλίου μνημονεύῃ. βασιλίσκον μὲν γὰρ τὸ θηρίον οὐδὲ εἶδον οὐδέποτε, καὶ εἰ ἀληθὴ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτοῦ, κινδυνῶδές ἐστι καὶ τὸ πλησίον ἀφικέσθαι τῷ ζῳῷ τούτῳ. παραπλήσια δὲ τῷ Ξενοκράτει καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἔγραψαν περὶ ζώων, ἐξ ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἐξεγράψατο τὰ πλεῖστα. Πόθεν γὰρ ἂν ὑπόρρησε τοσούτων τε καὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων αὐτὸς πειραθῇ.

19 The term 'affect programme' describes the stimulus that gives rise to an emotion, the behaviour that it prompts, its physiological components and the feeling that accompanies it. For the affect programme of disgust, see Kelly 2011, 15–17.

author abundantly draws our attention and from which he tactfully distances himself. Throughout the passage, Galen not only questions the effectiveness of Xenokrates' therapeutic methods but also emphasizes their extreme indecorousness. Despite the fact that Galen is a doctor and, hence, exercises a profession that requires suspension of disgust (see §6), the discursive strategies that he employs scrupulously keep Xenokrates' questionable medical practices at bay lest they reflect badly upon him. As we will see, given the emotion's rich cultural signification, expression of sentiments of disgust is typically a social imperative rather than a choice.<sup>20</sup> Low sensitivity to the emotion's elicitors indicates low moral standards. Hence, Galen feels obliged to disclose his feelings of repulsion about the contents of his description. The empirical question of whether Galen recoils at Xenokrates' *Dreckapotheke* is immaterial.

Galen's list includes the following substances (qualified as ὀσελγῇ and βδελυρά): sweat, urine, menstrual blood, earwax, feces, vaginal excretions, and semen – notably, collected from a woman's vagina after intercourse. Despite the overflow of vile fluids in the passage, there are at least three more substances that are common elicitors of disgust which Galen omits: saliva, mucus, and vomit. Although it is impossible to explain the omission of saliva and mucus, I take the omission of vomit to be self-evident. Vomit is the only substance which *generates* disgust and *is caused* by disgust. In other words, oral incorporation of vomit is impossible. This is particularly important, because disgust is an extremely powerful signaling mechanism which owes its self-protective function to the rich sensory qualities of vomit, a loud, smelly, and, knee-jerk physical response.<sup>21</sup> As we shall see, the fact that disgust and its emblematic gag reflex are powerful signaling mechanisms that enable us to protect ourselves from possible contaminants explains why in its social uses the emotion serves as a perilous 'conversation stopper'.<sup>22</sup>

Disgust centers mainly, but not exclusively, on the mouth.<sup>23</sup> It is an emotion that protects us from oral consumption of vile substances, but, as Galen's text makes plain, it also prohibits tactile contact with foul material. Hence, disgust protects our body from real or perceived contamination: the emotion sets barriers between our body envelope and the external world. Furthermore, the intensity of disgust depends on both the nature of the substance that elicits the emotion and the part of the body affected. Hence, in Galen's discussion, oral incorporation of

20 Participants in an experiment involving communal and solitary eating of sweet and salty sandwiches tended to display their responses to what they were sampling when they were observed rather than when they ate alone (see Brightman et al. 1975 and 1977).

21 The communicative features of disgust are discussed by Kelly 2011, 62–69; neurobiologists have recently concluded that the sight of the facial expression of disgust activates brain areas that generate our own feelings of disgust (Wicker et al. 2003).

22 The locution belongs to Bloom (2004, 173).

23 On Rozin's emphasis on the mouth, see Miller 1997, 6–8. On the association of disgust and contempt with the nose, see Kotsifou 2012, 81f. and the comments of A. Chaniotis in this volume (pp. 14f.); for the facial expressions of disgust and contempt, see Ekman 2003, 180–187.

feces is unsurprisingly imagined as the most hideous scenario. Scatophagy implies a severe reversal of physiology: the mouth becomes a misplaced anus and is, hence, identified with the bottom end of the digestive process.<sup>24</sup> When patients are forced to tolerate scatophagy, they are asked to *re-digest* the disfigured products of others' digestion.

A particularly notable feature of human fluids is that they become disgusting only after they have left the body. To make this clear, I would like to engage readers in a mind test. As you are reading these lines, please sense the saliva in your mouth and then swallow it down – perhaps you have already done so. Imagine now that you spit your saliva in a glass of water during breakfast and that immediately after having done so you drink the water. *Your own* saliva has contaminated the water and the glass. Perhaps you would want to reuse the glass only after you have washed it thoroughly. Furthermore, you refuse to drink the defiled water from the glass, even if the contaminant is a fluid that you constantly have in your mouth. Rehearse now this scenario in the presence of an audience, say your roommates or your family.

The notions that human excrement and secretions cause disgust only after they have left the body and that disgust focuses on the cultural history of objects, that is, what has come into contact with them, also emerge in Galen's passage under discussion. Even as Galen does not seem to construe semen as a contaminating substance, he clearly recoils at the idea that doctors should ask their patients (male or female?) to swallow potions of semen that have come into contact with a woman's vagina after sexual intercourse. Notably, earlier in the passage, Galen observes that cunnilingus is a practice commensurate with drinking menstrual blood.<sup>25</sup> What makes the consumption of semen unimaginable is not so much the nature of the physical substance *per se* – note that according to Galen fellatio (τῶν λεσβιαζόντων) is less disgusting than cunnilingus (τοὺς φοινικίζοντας) – but the degradation caused by the mixture of semen with vaginal secretions.<sup>26</sup>

Galen's comments on Xenokrates' paradoxical pharmacology touch on pivotal aspects of the emotion's cognitive structure, a topic that has been studied by Paul Rozin and his team for some thirty years. According to Rozin, disgust is an emotion whose cognitive structure frequently involves ideations, and, hence, *real* danger is not always a constituent property of the cognitions that give rise to it.<sup>27</sup> Participants in Rozin's experiments expressed aversion towards sterilized objects which, as they were told, have had a problematic cultural history. That danger is

24 For the assimilation of the mouth with the anus in the language of abuse, see Bakhtin 1984, 317. For scatophagy in comedy, cf. for example, Aristophanes, *Ploutos* 706; Menander, *Dyscolus* 487f.

25 On menstrual blood in Rome, see Lennon 2010.

26 On φοινικίζω, see also Lucian, *Pseudologista* 28. On the association of menstrual blood with cunnilingus, see Williams, 2010, 223. Menstrual blood is not just disgusting but also polluting: see von Staden 2007, 48f.; cf. Parker 1983, 100–103. On oral sex and status, see Kurke 1999, 203, discussing what may be the only existing vase-painting that depicts cunnilingus. Deviant obsession with cunnilingus is discussed by Krenkel 1981.

27 See Rozin and Fallon 1987, *passim*.



not a necessary constituent element of disgust can be gleaned from the fact that we wince at the idea of swallowing a sterilized cockroach, while poisonous mushrooms do not cause sentiments of aversion. As Rozin has pointed out, disgust involves magical thinking and is governed by the two fundamental laws of sympathetic magic, that is the law of 'contagion' and the law of 'similarity'.<sup>28</sup> Contagion is summarized by Rozin with the locution 'once in contact, always in contact'.<sup>29</sup> This law assumes that 'a part is equal to the whole'. Hence, the waitress' hair in a glass of orange juice makes us reluctant to drink it, even after we have removed the hair from the glass. The second principle, namely similarity, means that partial similarity, 'resemblance in some properties' as Rozin puts it, 'indicates a fundamental similarity or identity'. Scatophagy scenes in Pasolini's film *Salò* (actors, of course, ingested chocolate soup) would not have been as shocking as they are if the 'law of similarity' did not contribute to the suspension of viewers' disbelief.

As we shall see in the next section, the two laws of sympathetic magic involved in the cognitions that elicit disgust are pivotal to the emotion's projective uses. By attributing repulsive qualities to individuals, disgust marginalizes them and turns them into untouchables. Note, for example, that in the Indian caste system the 'untouchables' were considered less than human on account of the fact that they cleaned the latrines of their social superiors.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, due to its function as a signaling mechanism, disgust is an irreplaceable, even if condemnable, means of stigmatization. By virtue of its being a self-protective emotion, disgust achieves with striking immediacy what no other social emotion, not even contempt, hatred, or anger, can achieve.

Animals are also common elicitors of disgust.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, plants do not typically cause the emotion unless they happen to incorporate animals' physical qualities. Animals and plants may cause sentiments of disgust on account of their sensory characteristics, such as stickiness or sliminess, while, as viewers of splatter movies can aver, crawling insects, especially when they appear in large numbers, commonly elicit shudders of revulsion. In a passage reminiscent of Hitchcock's *The Birds*, Philo Judaeus (*De vita Mosis* 1.103–112) points out that the God of the Bible employed the invasion of frogs and gnats as a form of punishment by way of indicating that injustice can be corrected through the use of the humblest beasts. In his treatise on the *Parts of Animals* (465a 15–23), Aristotle defends scientific investigation of 'unworthy' (ἀτιμότερον) beasts and emphasizes that the responses of repulsion that they cause (μὴ δυσχεραίνειν) are childish. Aristotle thus proclaims that all living organisms warrant our scientific attention – without compelling us to wear a face of repulsion (δυσωπούμενον) – thereby suggesting

28 See Rozin et al. 1986.

29 Rozin et al. 1987, 30.

30 On the untouchables, see Deliège 1999, arguing against the view that the Dalits are socially integrated.

31 Modern Cretans call beasts, especially those which interfere with their domestic or agricultural activities, such as mice and badgers, τα μυρά.

that scientific inquiry requires suspension of deeply embedded reflexive responses. Suppression of disgust distinguishes the scientist from the layman.

The laws of sympathetic magic that underlie the affect's cognitive structure sometimes explain the disgustingness of specific animals. As Galen suggests (*De rebus boni malique suci* 6.795f.), for example, κέφαλος – a fish that lives in muddy waters rather than in the open sea (τὴν δίαίταν ἔχουσιν ἐν ὕδατι μοχθηρῷ) acquires the disgusting qualities of its living environment. Its mucous and fat flesh is repulsive (ἠηδεῖς), giving off a disturbing stench (δυσώδεις), while it rots faster than other kinds of fish (σῆπονται). Yet the animal which is perhaps most frequently associated with its dirty environment is the pig, whose living conditions enhance anthropomorphic readings and inform metaphorical uses.<sup>32</sup> In Semonides' slander of women, the pig woman's house is as dirty as a sty (7.2–6), while in Plato's *Republic* (535e1–3), the uneducated soul is compared to a piggish beast that defiles itself with 'ignorance' (ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνεται).

### 3 FROM CORE DISGUST TO MORAL DISGUST: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

One of the most obscure points in recent approaches to disgust concerns the way in which the emotion developed into a response to non-material elicitors. Moral disgust includes among its elicitors political opponents, ideologies, serial killers or rapists, and works of art. E.g., Donald Trump has expressed his revulsion at the media, terrorism, the Obama administration, windmills and breastfeeding. In many instances, the embodiment of repulsive qualities is the work of projective disgust, an effective means of stigmatization that fully exploits the two laws of sympathetic magic, that is, 'contagion' and 'similarity'. In courtroom practice, jurors may experience feelings of disgust towards a serial killer if they are exposed to gory visual material or if prosecutors' forensic storytelling focuses on graphic details concerning the circumstances of the crime.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, we may be reluctant to shake hands with a child abuser, especially so if we are plagued by mental images created by vivid descriptions – what Greek literary theory labeled as *enargeia* – concerning his criminal actions. Some participants in Rozin's experiments refused to wear a clean jacket that, as they were told, belonged to Adolf Hitler. To put it succinctly, disgust makes agents of questionable morality untouchable. But how would we explain cases where people express sentiments of disgust towards groups of professionals or other social groups, such as politicians, lawyers, or priests? How would we account for instances where people recoil at

32 Cf. Plutarch, *Quaestiones convivales* 670D–671B.

33 On the inappropriateness of disgust as a criterion for legal deliberation, see Nussbaum 2001, 441–454, and 2004; Deigh 2008, chapter 5, addresses ethical questions regarding the uses of disgust and shame in the law. For methodological discussions concerning emotions and the law, see Kahan and Nussbaum 1996 and Bornstein and Wiener 2010. On ancient forensic uses of disgust, see Fisher 2017 and Spatharas 2017.

the ideological assumptions of communism or neoliberalism? And, perhaps more interestingly, how are we to explain cases of self-disgust, that is, cases where the emotion's elicitor is a third-person perspective observation of the self? In a passage from Sophocles' *Philoktetes*, for example, Neoptolemos observes himself and expresses sentiments of self-disgust because he realizes that he is about to act against his inborn moral values (902f.; see §6 below).<sup>34</sup>

Scholars and researchers have attempted to explain the transmutation of physical into moral disgust on different grounds, but no definitive answer has been given to the question of how moral disgust came to include 'abstract' elicitors.<sup>35</sup> Haidt and his colleagues have tried to explain moral disgust on the basis of Lakoff's theory of conceptual metaphors.<sup>36</sup> In his recent book, Kelly endorses an evolutionist approach and claims that because of its qualities as a protective mechanism, the emotion's elicitors involve a substantial number of 'false-positives': disgust says 'better worry than sorry'.<sup>37</sup> In addition, recent research shows that moral disgust sometimes causes the facial expressions of core disgust. Thus, it has been argued that moral disgust elicits responses akin to the revulsion evoked by diseases and unpleasant tastes and is thereby accompanied by bodily feelings.<sup>38</sup>

The question of how 'core disgust' came to include 'moral disgust' transcends the limits of the present study. As my brief outline of modern approaches indicates, the answers that scholars try to give to this question are speculative.<sup>39</sup> I therefore turn my attention to a set of relevant methodological questions. Do passages that refer to sentiments of moral disgust pertain to the emotion 'disgust', even when we are unable to know if the agent *experiences* the emotion? Or, given that disgust is a particularly visceral emotion, does the absence of feeling components mean that moral disgust is not an emotion at all?<sup>40</sup> This question is particularly pertinent to the purposes of the present study, because students of ancient emotions in general and disgust in particular necessarily draw their conclusions on

34 On self-disgust in the *Philoktetes* see Allen-Hornblower 2017 and Kazantzidis 2017, comparing Neoptolemos' responses to *Philoktetes*' wound with the *disembodied* attitudes of ancient doctors.

35 The inclusion of abstract elicitors in the cognitions that give rise to moral disgust raises the question of the affect's notional relationship with *miasma* (on which see Parker 1983). A full discussion of the topic would deserve an independent study. Be it sufficient to point out here that pollution and disgust are different at least in one important respect: the sources of pollution do not necessarily elicit disgust. On this issue, see Nussbaum 2004, 91f., with criticism of Mary Douglas' treatment of pollution and disgust as homologous concepts.

36 Haidt et al. 1997, 121–124.

37 Kelly 2011.

38 See Chapman et al. 2009.

39 For an inclusive, interesting, and up-to-date summary of the debate about the origins of disgust and the ways in which 'core' disgust developed into 'moral' disgust, see the web journal *Emotion Researcher* (<http://emotionresearcher.com>, consulted 20 December 2014).

40 On the 'ontology' of emotions and the importance of their feeling components, see Goldie 2000.

the basis of literary texts or visual representations rather than through the employment of *in vivo* observation.

My contention is that while our task is partly to look for cases where our sources provide evidence for the body language of disgust and explain how gestures affect the meaning of individual contexts, it is unnecessary, indeed impossible, to deal with the empirical and, hence, unapproachable question of whether moral disgust was *felt* in cases where the emotion was projected onto morally condemnable individuals or social groups. No doubt, disgust is a particularly visceral emotion, but, like all other emotions, it possesses a cognitive structure that makes it intelligible.<sup>41</sup> Hence, our task is to turn our attention to scripts that make it possible for us to pin down behaviours or dispositional moral traits that our sources describe as disgusting. These scripts may or may not involve labels such as βδελυρία, δυσχέρεια, or ἀηδία or their cognates. More importantly, even in cases where these labels do appear, their exact meaning can only accurately be pinned down by considering the ways in which their wider contexts frame their meaning.<sup>42</sup>

#### 4 THE FUNCTIONS OF ‘PROJECTIVE DISGUST’<sup>43</sup>

The two principles of sympathetic magic that govern disgust are particularly relevant to a pivotal aspect of the emotion, namely the *inclusiveness* of its elicitors (see §3). As we shall see, the fact that the elicitors of disgust transcend the limits of vile physical substances – thereby encroaching on marginal social categories –, is a property that makes the emotion an irreplaceable means of stigmatizing individuals. Indeed, as we saw earlier, no other emotion, not even contempt, indignation or hatred, can achieve what disgust achieves. Unlike projective disgust, these emotions involve ethical justification and, therefore, treat their targets as rational agents of moral responsibility. Furthermore, these nobler emotions cannot give rise to disgust, while, on account of its dehumanizing effects, disgust intensifies the negative emotions that we most commonly employ to assert our shared values and norms by keeping others at bay.

The targets of projective disgust are perceived as less than human; they are ‘sub-humans’, to use the idiolect of Nazi propaganda, which saliently enlisted disgust in support of stigmatization or atrocious violence. Contagion, the first principle of sympathetic magic, identifies the targets of projective disgust with the vermin that they supposedly carry. Nazi propaganda, we should remember, portrayed the Jews as a race of migrating rats. Hitler once said that

41 As Lateiner and I suggested (2017b, 4f.), the visceral nature of disgust may explain its omission from ancient philosophical definitions of emotions, which are distinctively appraisal-oriented.

42 For a critical approach to methodological issues revolving around the discussion of ancient emotions, see Cairns 2008.

43 I borrow the term projective disgust from Nussbaum 2004, chapter 5.

the discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions that have taken place in the world. The battle in which we are engaged today is one of the same sort as the battle waged, during the last century, by Pasteur and Koch. How many diseases have their origin in the Jewish virus! [...] We shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jew.<sup>44</sup>

Furthermore, the use of projective disgust, emphasizing the danger of contamination, is encapsulated in the Nazi propagandistic assumption that the Aryans' physical contact with the Jews resulted in assimilation, a process described with the neologism 'verjudet' ('jewified').<sup>45</sup> The Nazis' obsession with racial purity is depicted lucidly on a propagandistic pamphlet warning Aryans against the threat of mixed marriages, i.e. marriages between Aryans and non-Aryans, showing a white woman being threatened by a sexually abusive man whose face has the characteristics that the Nazis typically attributed to the Jews. *Rasseschande* and *Blutschande*, punishable by the law, set the standards of racial hygiene by fully exploiting the sensitive domain of sexual disgust. Veronique Mukasinafi, a rape survivor during the genocide in Rwanda, explains how over the years the Hutu attempted to dehumanize the Tutsi, thereby facilitating their extinction. When the Hutu apprehended her father 'because they wanted to kill him', they

took him and they were going to kill Tutsi, saying that they were cockroaches. They were calling their children snakes. Even in schools they were calling upon Tutsi to stand so that they can see them and Hutu to stay seated. Children were growing up knowing that they were either Tutsi or Hutu.<sup>46</sup>

Another important aspect of disgust that makes it particularly useful in propagandistic uses of social stigmatization is that it operates as a powerful signaling mechanism. As we saw, unlike other bodily products, vomit is evoked by disgust but also causes disgust. Thus, in the light of functionalist views, the sight and smell of vomit warn us against possible contaminants by signaling the existence of a foul substance in one's close vicinity. Yet projective disgust also enlists other bodily products in support of 'deviant' individuals' dehumanization. In Galen's passage quoted above, 'deviants' who assent to ingesting the semen of other men are conceived of as disgusting, while tasting vaginal secretions, i.e. a substance that Galen associates with menstrual blood, is even more abominable. Similarly, in Aeschines' speech of prosecution (Aeschines 1), Timarchos is construed as 'disgusting' (βδελυρός) because he engages in buggery willingly, thereby show-

44 See Glover 1999, 339, who adduces many examples of how disgust enhances atrocities.

45 See especially the Nazi 'documentary' under the title *Der ewige Jude* ('The Eternal Jew'), where the spread of Jews is depicted as a plague of bacillus-carrying rats. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler wrote: 'By their very exterior you could tell they were no lovers of water, and, to your distress you often knew it with your eyes closed. Later I often grew sick to my stomach from the smell of these caftan-wearers. Added to this, there was their unclean dress and their generally unheroic appearance.'

46 Goldhagen 2009, 353. In his book, Goldhagen shows convincingly how the rhetoric of disgust prepares the ground for the atrocities committed in the frame of eliminationalist policies.

ing insensitivity to the fact that by doing so he commits *hybris* against himself.<sup>47</sup> Projective disgust thus exploits individuals' contact with degrading substances or exposure to the sexual organs of other people with the purpose of defining social categories whose members must be kept in isolation. At the same time, however, by ascribing abhorrent physical practices to its targets, projective disgust conveys the message that its targets are unable or unwilling to protect their bodies' borders from defiling substances. Hence, the projective uses of disgust not only indicate that the healthy members of society must protect themselves from contaminated individuals but also exploit the self-protective function of the emotion to highlight 'deviant' individuals' insensitivity to its primary elicitors. Tolerance to disgust shows that marginal individuals are liable to contamination and must therefore be kept at bay.

Suppression and suspension of disgust, however, are not always condemnable. Suspension of disgust is either an indicator of empathy in cases where self-sacrifice and professionalism are required or a prerequisite for the satisfaction that we derive from sexual pleasure. Hence, suspension or suppression of disgust is commendable or just acceptable in the frame of specific types of relationships that meet culturally acceptable normative standards. Parents come into contact with their babies' feces; doctors and nurses see and smell unpleasant things – patients' internal organs, excrement, urine, saliva and pus; lovers taste their partners' semen or vaginal secretions. Indeed, in some extreme cases of Christian self-abasement, suspension of disgust shows that someone has come close to God.<sup>48</sup>

## 5 PROJECTIVE DISGUST AND SOCIAL HIERARCHIES

In his narrative concerning the concentration camps, Primo Levi stresses that the Nazis dehumanized prisoners who spent hours of inhuman travelling on trains by forcing them to urinate and defecate on platforms.<sup>49</sup> According to the Nazi officers, this behaviour proved that prisoners were less than human, they were 'sub-humans'. In the *Ekklesiastousai* (832), Karion expresses his fear that women will establish their transgressed domination over men by urinating on him. In the *Frogs*, bad poets empty their bladders on Lady Tragedy (92–94). In the *Wasps*, a statue is defiled because incontinent Philokleon habitually pisses on it (394). During their military service at Panakton, Konon's sons urinate on Ariston's slaves and empty their chamber pots over them.<sup>50</sup> In all these scenes, urination is a form of defilement, essentially an act of *hybris*, that highlights one's superiority. The victims' defilement is permanent: 'Once in contact always in contact', as Rozin

47 Cf., for example, paragraphs 40 and 71 and see Fisher's notes ad loc. (Fisher 2001). On Timarchos' disgustingness, see Spatharas 2017, where I argued that the qualifications *bde-luros* and *miaros* enhance the presentation of the defendant as shameless.

48 For an example, see note 57 below.

49 Levi's description is discussed by Glover 1999, 342f.

50 Demosthenes 54.4; further examples in A. Chaniotis' Introduction (p. 25).

puts it. These are crude examples of how disgust operates through the employment of physical defilement to degrade individuals or stain respectable literary genres.

Foul substances, smells, and disease vectors frequently indicate social status. In his vivid book under the title *The Road to Wigan Pier*, George Orwell describes the conditions of poor hygiene that haunted the houses and neighbourhoods where miners lived with their families.<sup>51</sup> According to Orwell,

the real secret of class distinctions in the West – the real reason why a European of bourgeois upbringing, even when he calls himself a Communist, cannot without a hard effort think of a working man as his equal. It is summed up in *four frightful words* which people nowadays are chary of uttering, but which were bandied about quite freely in my childhood. These words were: *The lower classes smell*.<sup>52</sup>

Orwell's points eloquently reveal how the perceived olfactory qualities of lower social groups contribute to social stratification – and exclusion. Not only do the middle and upper-middle classes refuse to come into contact with their social inferiors on account of their filth, but their disgust fosters the lower classes' sentiments of shame that perpetuate social inequalities. By intimidating social inferiors, disgust eliminates egalitarian claims because it fosters essentialist readings of the social order that allow the elites to enjoy the lofts of purity. Physical cleanliness is a token of moral cleanliness, and, thereby, high thresholds of disgust indicate low moral standards. Note that for Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1381b1), a fundamental criterion that we employ when we choose our friends is their clean appearance, clothes and *lives as a whole*. Clean souls are accommodated in clean bodies. Or, reciprocally, unclean bodies contaminate the souls that inhabit in them.

The notion that disgust establishes social hierarchies is clearly attested in our sources. In Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, for example, the poet questions Kratinos' citizenship (852f.). Kratinos' father, Aristophanes says, was from Tragasai, a city in the region of the Troad, which, in the present context, refers to Kratinos' unpleasant underarm odour: Kratinos' armpits smell like a he-goat.<sup>53</sup> The appalling olfactory qualities of Kratinos' body are suggestive of his foreign descent: Kratinos is smelly by virtue of his non-Athenian origin. No doubt, the bodies of Athe-

51 Compare the vase-painting discussed by Mitchell (2009, 71), depicting a servant named Damolyte bringing a chest to her seated mistress (a queen) and pinching her nose in the presence of a half-naked and presumably sweating carpenter.

52 For discussion of the passage, see Miller 1997, chapter 10. Cf. also Zizek's remarks (2008): 'For the middle class, lower classes smell, their members do not wash regularly – or, to quote the proverbial answer of a middle-class Parisian to why he prefers to ride the first class cars in the metro: "I wouldn't mind riding with workers in the second class – it is only that they smell!" This brings us to one of the possible definitions of what a Neighbor means today: a Neighbor is the one who by definition smells. This is why today deodorants and soaps are crucial – they make neighbors at least minimally tolerable: I am ready to love my neighbors ... provided they don't smell too bad.'

53 Other examples of men who smell like he-goats: Aristophanes, *Pax* 812 (τραγομάσχαλοι); Theokritos 5.51f. and Longos 1.16.2, discussed below; Athenaios 402c–d. For a 'scientific' explanation of the odorous armpits, see Aristotle, *Probl.* 908b 20–22.

nian citizens also give off vile stench in Aristophanes, but no Athenian smells on account of his Athenian citizenship. In Ps.-Lucian's *Kynikos* (17), the Cynic philosopher claims that wealthy people, and especially the most prosperous among them, exhale the smell of *kinaidoi*. Aristophanic comedy besmirches abstract notions by afflicting on them foul stench, excrement or vile substances: libations in the *Acharnians* (189f.) are said by Dikaiopolis to give off the strong smell of pitch, but they also revolt him because he associates their stench with the building of ships (παράσκευῆς νεῶν). War is smelly.

Repulsive odours acquire significant salience in contexts of erotic communication, implicit to which are issues of social hierarchy. Some good examples from the *Greek Anthology* are Tellesila's 'epic' disgustingness (11.239) and Theodoros' mouth, which smells as bad as his arse (11.241; cf. Catullus 97). In Lucian's *Dialogues of the Courtesans*, filth and vile odours, such as the stench of he-goats (7.3.12–18), are associated with rusticity, on account of which courtesans reject the overtures of unwanted lovers. Significant examples of how projective disgust defines social status in the context of erotic communication appear in Theokritos (5.51–52) and its derivative in Longos' narrative (1.16.2), where the cowherd Dorkon emphasizes his merits as a lover. His self-adulatory comments are based on a comparison with Daphnis, whom he describes as a goatherd who lives in extreme poverty. Due to his mingling with goats, Daphnis gives off an unpleasant stench, while his skin is dark. Cowherds, it seems, identify themselves as superior to goatherds in the social stratification of herdsmen, and smells are pivotal to this social ordering. Chloe is therefore invited to reciprocate the love of a man who holds a superior position in the social hierarchy.

In a pseudepigraphic poem of Theokritos (*Idyll* 20), Eunika, obviously a *hetaira*, refuses to reciprocate a shepherd's kiss because, as she says, his mouth is ailing, his hands are black and because he gives off a repelling smell.<sup>54</sup> As Eunika's appeal to these elicitors of disgust suggests, her negative response to the shepherd's overtures is not just one of contempt. Immediately after her accusations concerning the repulsiveness of his poor hygiene, Eunika expresses her fear that the goatherd's kiss will defile her. Her anxiety about possible contamination, which prompts the apotropaic gesture of spitting three times into her bosom, indicates that she views the shepherd's body as socially contagious. Disgust makes the shepherd untouchable. The use of projective disgust in the present context identifies dirt with rusticity. In the prideful defence of his bucolic beauty, including a renunciation of Eunika's folly of refusing his rustic love, the shepherd maintains that the girl from *the town* despises him because of her urban origin; in his revengeful curse, he proclaims:

never may she either, Kypris, whether *in the city* or on the hill, kiss her darling, but let her sleep lonely all the night.

Top-down projective disgust, however, not only causes the contemptible low(ness) to be conceived of as dangerous but also establishes, perpetuates and,

54 On this poem, see Fantuzzi 2007.



thus, asserts the physical and psychic cleanliness of the elites. By virtue of essentialist readings, when the source of the emotion's elicitors is the bodies of the powerful, they either cease to cause disgust or the disgust that they cause must tactfully remain unnoticed by their inferiors; kings, tyrants, or just social superiors embody a godlike purity, and, consequently, physical contact with their defiling substances is either benign or even a privilege for which social inferiors must be thankful.

In a passage from Machon referring to Demetrios Poliorketes' sexual relationship with the pipe-player Lamia (fr. 13 ed. Gow), we find a witticism – one with political implications – that exploits the osphresiological properties of the king's penis. At the beginning of the passage, Lamia disdainfully refuses to accept the perfumes that Demetrios gives her as a present. The king handles his penis in front of her, anoints it with one of the perfumes, and invites her to smell it. Lamia responds with laughter and points out playfully, or rather provocatively, that his smell is the most putrid (σαπρότατον) of all. Demetrios does not respond with anger but appeals to his royal status, thus emphasizing the source rather than the nature of the smell: the scent, he says, is given off from his royal 'nut' (βαλάνου).

As the discussion of the passage under review shows, erotic persuasion sometimes requires suppression of disgust, even in cases where the emotion is feigned by a professional courtesan. In the present context, Lamia teases Demetrios, who wishes to satisfy his desire quite urgently. She refuses his costly gifts, while he handles his penis ready for sexual action, and, more importantly, she refuses to offer him sexual satisfaction with a witticism that displays her relative superiority in the present situation. Demetrios is therefore forced to appeal to his royal status and, thereby, redefine one of the most common elicitors of disgust, that is, putridity. Demetrios trivializes his royal status with the purpose of convincing a social inferior, and, indeed, one whose profession requires tolerance to disgust, to overcome the emotion and offer him satisfaction (orally?).

However, the passage under discussion notably exploits a paradox that further enhances Demetrios' emphasis on the purificatory qualities of his status. This paradox springs from the asymmetry between positive and negative contamination. As a garage mechanic put it, '[a] teaspoon of sewage will spoil a barrel of wine, but a teaspoon of wine will do nothing for a barrel of sewage.'<sup>55</sup> In our passage, Demetrios resorts to the royal status of his *putrid* penis in order to 'transvaluate' the rejected perfume, that is, an agent of positive contamination. He thus misrecognizes that negative contamination is more powerful than positive contamination, but this misrecognition is a requisite for his *para prosdokian* appeal to his status. Necessitated by his sexual arousal, Demetrios' misrecognition of the social asymmetry of his relationship with Lamia further establishes, albeit comically, the notion that social status purifies what is otherwise a common elicitor of 'core'

55 Cited by Rozin 1987, 32. The asymmetry between positive and negative contamination is encapsulated in a metaphor from Aeschylus' *Eumenides* (694f., the law is conceived of as clean drinking water which should not be besmirched with mud).

disgust. As McClure points out, the present passage, like other passages from Machon, carries the imprints of 'status reversals of gender and class'.<sup>56</sup>

Status is also particularly salient in an anecdote about Dionysios of Syracuse. This passage, focusing on the relationship between the tyrant and his flatterers, exploits vomit and its privileged position among the emotion's elicitors: as we saw earlier, vomit is the only human substance that both causes and is caused by disgust. According to Athenaios, at Dionysios' sympotic feasts, flatterers mimicked the tyrant, who was blind due to excessive consumption of wine (249f–250a). On account of their dramatized short-sightedness, they put their hands in the dishes; more significantly, when Dionysios spat, they put out their faces to receive his saliva, which they licked. Yet their dramatized performance of self-abasement reached a climax when they tasted the tyrant's vomit, which they found to be sweeter than honey. This is an impossible act of self-effacement.<sup>57</sup> As we saw, the rich sensory qualities of vomit are an extremely strong signaling mechanism that invests with salience the presence of contaminants in one's vicinity.

If it is possible at all, to consume the vomit of another person requires suspension of physiological functions over which we have no control whatsoever. Vomit's disgustingness is non-negotiable, even in cases where social norms or professional training impose suspension or suppression of the emotion. According to a recent study, participants who, due to brain damage, were unable to experience the emotion of disgust – for example they mistook vomit for food – were also unable to recognize it in the facial expressions of others.<sup>58</sup> Dionysios' flatterers are not just social outcasts who fail to exhibit dignity. Given the offensiveness of vomit, their dramatized act of self-effacement places them in the realm of beasts.<sup>59</sup> The script of disgust, or lack thereof, that we find in this passage detracts from the flatterers' basic human functions and thereby questions their humanness. Disgust therefore enhances the political implications of Athenaios' account. The flatterers accept to engage in an impossible act of self-humiliation that honours their despot by indicating the dignifying effects of his status upon a bodily substance, i.e. vomit, which is produced by his lack of sympotic restraint. Indeed, the vomit that the flatterers ingest is the product of Dionysios' surfeit, or lack thereof, and hence reflects a typical characteristic of tyrants' behaviour, namely excess (see §7 below). But, more importantly, Dionysios does not seem to respond with disgust to the flatterers' ingestion of his vomit. By contrast, the fact that the flatterers express overtly their delight at the taste of his vomit indicates that the tyrant relishes the

56 McClure 2003, 93.

57 As Miller's discussion of the life of Catherine of Siena indicates (1997, 158–163), Christian love and self-abasement lead to extreme cases of suspension of disgust at the cost of fetishizing the flesh.

58 See Calder et al. 2001; Adolphs et al. 2003; Wicker et al. 2003.

59 The only example of a beast eating its own vomit that I was able to trace appears in the Old Testament (*Proverbs* 36.11): 'As a dog returns to his vomit, so a fool repeats his folly'; cf. Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* (The Parson's Tale): 'the hound ... retourneth to eten his spewying' (my thanks to Angelos Chaniotis for this reference).

spectacle that he is unable to see. Insensitivity to disgust in the present passage, therefore, fosters characterization bidirectionally: the social inferiors' extreme dare game underlines their bestial nature, but at the same time it reveals the tyrant's inappropriately high threshold of disgust and thereby disputes his humanness.<sup>60</sup> Thus, it enhances a description which emphasizes typical features of tyrants' relationships with their subjects.

## 6 PITY AND SUPPRESSION OF DISGUST

So far, we have seen how disgust delineates social status and how status operates to transvaluate and, thereby, purify common elicitors of the affect. Suppression of disgust, however, is sometimes necessary or even desirable. As is expected, medical texts describe disgusting practices or illnesses that cause ugly symptoms. Doctors come into physical or visual contact with ill bodies and their fluids. Notably, however, in the Hippocratic corpus doctors never express their sentiments of disgust.<sup>61</sup> Suspension of disgust is discussed briefly by Aristotle in his treatise *Parts of Animals*, in a context where he argues that scientific examination of animals' anatomy is not of negligible importance (ἄτιμον). As he claims, our knowledge of human anatomy requires exposure to sights that generate knee-jerk responses (πολλῆς δυσχερείας).<sup>62</sup> Aristotle's points are important because they reveal that in his view human anatomy can be no less disgusting than animals' anatomy. But whereas Aristotle emphasizes the disgusting *sight* of organs, such as bones, blood vessels, and flesh, that presumably belong to dead people, the Hippocratic treatise under the title *On Breaths* stresses that doctors both *see* and *touch* unpleasant things, thereby referring to the visible symptoms of suffering bodies. In this context, suspension of disgust is not just a requirement for scientific knowledge, but a deontological issue that brings to the fore doctors' empathy for their patients.<sup>63</sup>

Even as the qualification ἀηδέα (commonly designating 'unpleasant' rather than 'disgusting' things) in this passage underplays the ugly symptoms of diseases that laymen would recoil at and, therefore, underscores doctors' professionalism and their habituation to diseases' smelly, noisy, and visually unpleasant symptoms, the author invites his audience to imagine what it means to see and even worse to touch ill bodies. Interestingly, unlike Aristotle, who refers to specific bodily parts, the author refrains from giving examples of appalling symptoms. By stressing that doctors experience distressful feelings for the sufferings of their patients, the author downplays disgust in favour of another emotion, namely pity. This passage displays significant verbal affinities with Gorgias' discussion of the psychological effects of serious poetry upon its listeners. As Gorgias says (*Helen*

60 König 2012, 243 with note 43.

61 On Hippocratic doctors' professionalism and disgust, see Kazantzidis 2017.

62 Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* 645a 28–30.

63 Hippocrates, *De flatibus* 1, 6.90 L.: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἱητρὸς ὁρῇ τε δεινὰ, θιγγάνει τε ἀηδέων, ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίῃσι τε ξυμφορῇσιν ἰδίας καρποῦται λύπας.

9), (serious) poetry generates in the soul a ‘suffering’ (πάθημα) of its own for the (mis-)fortunes of others (ἐπ’ ἄλλοτρίων τε σωμάτων καὶ πραγμάτων). The similarities between the two texts indicate that the author of the Hippocratic corpus emphasizes empathy, namely doctors’ ability to understand patients’ pain from a third-person perspective and thus invites comparison with the feelings experienced by tragic audiences. The fact that, just like the spectators of tragedy, the doctor sees ‘terrible things’ (δεινά) not only enhances his description of doctors’ emotional experience but also blurs the limits between the responses elicited by staged representations of sufferings and professionals’ daily exposure to adversities which are commensurate with tragic suffering. One may compare here the double use of *deinon* in the description of the Chorus’ reaction to the abhorrent sight of the blind Oedipus (*Oedipus Tyrannus* 1297–99).<sup>64</sup> Pity not only suppresses disgust, but also facilitates a broader perception of the disease as a suffering that goes beyond the adversities represented by pain and physical symptoms. Pity requires the understanding of disease as a calamity (συμφορά). This conceptualization of disease enhances saliently the author’s epideictic defence of his art.<sup>65</sup>

Tragedy itself offers at least one example of how pity eliminates disgust. In the *Philoktetes*, Sophocles frequently refers to the unpleasant features of the hero’s disease. However, even as Philoktetes assumes that Neoptolemos is reluctant to help him because of the repulsiveness of his wounds (900), Neoptolemos eventually comes to realize that Philoktetes’ misery invites sentiments of pity. Perhaps more importantly, pity, an emotion that requires a deeper understanding of Philoktetes’ unpleasant condition, leads Neoptolemos to express a sentiment which we may call self-disgust (902).<sup>66</sup> Neoptolemos’ response to Philoktetes’ suffering guides spectators’ emotional responses. Neoptolemos observes himself from the outside and what he discovers is a noble man whose upbringing excludes deception. This self-observation leads him to understand that deception is shameful and that, despite the appalling appearance and smell of Philoktetes’ wound, the appropriate sentiment towards the suffering hero is pity. It is this view of the self that gives rise to *self*-disgust and blocks Neoptolemos’ physical disgust for the ugly symptoms of Philoktetes’ illness.

64 ὦ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν πάθος ἀνθρώποις, ἢ δεινότατον πάντων ὅς· ἐγὼ ἢ προσέκυρσ’ ἤδη. On *phrike* in this passage, see Cairns 2013, 94f. On the passage from *De flatibus* and tragic pity, see Kosak 2005, 263.

65 I am skeptical about Kosak’s argument that doctors ‘feel with’ rather than ‘feel for’ their patients and that for this reason they foster sympathy rather than empathy (2015, 264). As is the case with Gorgias’ passage from *Helen*, emphasizing that the soul suffers a suffering of its own (ἰδίον τι πάθημα) for the sufferings of others, the author of *De flatibus* says that doctors reap their own (ἰδίας) sorrows for the misfortunes of their patients (ἐπ’ ἄλλοτρίησί τε ξυμφορῇσιν), thereby indicating that doctors’ emotions are not identical with those of their patients. On the basis of comparison between the two texts, Schollmeyer (2017) suggests that Gorgias’ *Helen* served as a model for *De flatibus*.

66 For a detailed discussion, see Allen-Hornblower 2017.

In modern societies, illness and death are sanitized. In ancient Greece, people took care of patients in many different areas of their lives.<sup>67</sup> This is obvious from Thucydides' description of the plague in Book 2 and from other sources, such as Apollodoros' *Against Neaira*, emphasizing the central role of women as caretakers.<sup>68</sup> No doubt, unprofessional nursing in the private space of the house, in military tents or in the agrarian surroundings of farmhouses exposed relatives and friends to unpleasant sights, smells, and noises, but it also made it necessary for them to come into physical contact with lesions, blisters, and excrement. A notable example of how an ancient caretaker had to suppress his feelings of disgust derives from Isocrates' *Aeginetan Oration*.<sup>69</sup> The speaker seeks to show his affection for his friend, Thrasylochos, and, therefore, describes in detail how he nursed him during the last months of his life, thereby denigrating through contradistinctive characterization Thrasylochos' negligent half-sister:<sup>70</sup>

For being difficult by nature, he became, because of his disease, still harder to handle. It is not surprising that they did not stay beside him, but much more so that I was able to hold out in tending such a disease; for he suffered suppuration for a long time and was unable to move from his bed; and his suffering was such that we did not get through a single day without tears, but we were continually lamenting both each other's hardships and our joint exile and isolation. And these things went on without a break at any time; for it was not possible to leave him or to seem to neglect him, which to me would have been more dreadful than the existing evils. I wish it were possible to make clear to you what I became with respect to him, for I think you would not tolerate the voice of my opponents. Now it is not easy to tell the extremely difficult duties in my care of him, duties that were very hard to handle and involved most unpleasant tasks, and demanded the greatest care. But you yourselves consider with how much lost sleep and what toilsome miseries one would nurse such a disease for so long a time. In my case, I fell into such a bad state that all my friends, those who visited at least, said they were afraid that I, too, would die, saying that most of the people who had nursed this disease had also died. (translated by Rachel Sternberg)

The present passage is full of emotion scripts. Given that the rest of his closest female relatives were unable to take care of Thrasylochos, the speaker decided to

67 On this topic, see Sternberg 2006, 29. Note that in Appian, *Mithridates* 66f., the disgusting sight of enemies' dismembered bodies induces soldiers to flee from the battlefield.

68 Ps.-Demosthenes 59.56. On male caretakers, see Sternberg 2000.

69 For detailed discussion of the passage, see Sternberg 2006, 32–41.

70 Isocrates, *Aegineticus* 26–28: Καὶ γὰρ φύσει χαλεπὸς ὢν ἔτι δυσκολώτερον διὰ τὴν νόσον δέκετο, ὥστ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἄξιον θανμάζειν εἰ μὴ παρέμενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὥπως ἐγὼ τοιαύτην νόσον θεραπεύων ἀνταρκεῖν ἡδυνάμην· ὃς ἔμπρος μὲν ἦν πολλὸν χρόνον, ἐκ δὲ τῆς κλίνης οὐκ ἡδύνατο κινεῖσθαι, τοιαῦτα δ' ἔπασχεν ὥσθ' ἡμᾶς μηδεμίαν ἡμέραν ἀδακρύτους διαγαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ θρηνοῦντες διετελοῦμεν καὶ τοὺς πόνους τοὺς ἀλλήλων καὶ τὴν φυγὴν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν. Καὶ ταῦτ' οὐδένα χρόνον διέλειπεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπελθεῖν οἶόν τ' ἦν ἢ δοκεῖν ἀμελεῖν, ὃ μοι πολὺ δεινότερον ἦν τῶν κακῶν τῶν παρόντων. Ἡβουλόμην δ' ἂν ὑμῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι ποιῆσαι φανερόν οἷος περὶ αὐτὸν ἐγενόμην· οἶμαι γὰρ οὐδ' ἂν τὴν φωνὴν ὑμᾶς ἀνασχέσθαι τῶν ἀντιδίκων. Νῦν δὲ τὰ χαλεπώτατα τῶν ἐν τῇ θεραπείᾳ καὶ δυσχερέστατα καὶ πόνους ἀηδεστάτους ἔχοντα καὶ πλείστης ἐπιμελείας δεηθέντ' οὐκ εὐδιήγητ' ἐστίν. Ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς αὐτοὶ σκοπεῖτε μετὰ πόσων ἂν τις ἀγρυπνίων καὶ ταλαιπωριῶν τοιοῦτον νόσημα τοσοῦτον χρόνον θεραπεύσειεν.

nurse his friend and adoptive father, even as this task was aggravated by his difficult character. Given that the illness produced unbearable symptoms, the speaker was left alone, while the condition of his friend's health produced sentiments of (tragic) compassion emphasized in the speech by the emotional language with which he describes his mourning over Thrasylochos' suffering. Even if the speaker refrains from describing the stomach-churning symptoms of his friend's illness in detail, lest he generate jurors' negative feelings or offend their sense of appropriate language, he insists that his tasks were both toilsome and unpleasant (*δυσχερέστατα καὶ πόνους ἀηδεστάτους*). Since, as the speaker says earlier, his friend was unable to move, we have to imagine that the patient had lost voluntary control of urinating and defecating. But although the speech omits graphic details, the speaker states that Thrasylochos suffered from suppuration (*ἔμπος*). Note that according to the speaker's words, his friends knew that Thrasylochos' illness was contagious and, thereby, that the speaker risked his own life.<sup>71</sup> As he says, his mother and sister died from the same disease.

Isocrates constructs here a scenario that emphasizes his client's compassion for his friend and adoptive father. Suspension of disgust is therefore offered as another example of his affectionate involvement in Thrasylochos' suffering – even if the fact that he delivers this speech to dispute his half-sister's claims to Thrasylochos' property must make us cautious. His elliptical language, which, as I suggested, may be due to the decorum of forensic courtroom practice, clearly suggests that his audience was familiar with the adversities of nursing a patient who was unable to perform even the most basic human functions. In this case, suppression of disgust underlines feelings of compassion and therefore offers a good example of how our affection for others mitigates or eliminates our sentiments of disgust.

Suspension of disgust, however, is not a requisite just for nursing or childcare. As I argue below, disgust kills sexual desire, while sexual desire typically urges us to crave others' bodily fluids, e.g., semen, saliva, and vaginal secretions, which are common elicitors of the emotion. Projective uses of disgust, however, commonly exploit the sexual mechanics of the body by way of marginalizing out-groups' 'deviant' sexual behaviour. Sexual behaviour is so commonly the target of projective disgust because our sexual activity, involving physical contact with the bodies of others, is conceived of as a cause of contamination.<sup>72</sup> Chastity is purity. Modern pornography, an extremely profitable industry, fully exploits disgust. Despite the ethical problems raised by the ways in which pornography depicts sex and the exploitation of 'actors' and, especially, 'actresses', the fact that pornographic producers sell millions of scenes by using titles such as 'Soaked panties', 'Stained lips', or 'Sweaty, dripping sex' indicates that 'dirt' makes sex interesting.<sup>73</sup> Clean sex is unattractive. Pornographers *employ* disgust to entice viewers, partly because the elicitors of disgust incite viewers' *curiosity* or because viewers

71 Isocrates, *Aegineticus* 29.

72 On sex and disgust, see Miller 1997, *passim*.

73 Anti-pornography arguments frequently rest on disgust, but see Nussbaum 2004, 139–144.

sadistically enjoy the sight of other people's defilement. The next section will find its focus in specific uses of projective disgust. As we shall see, the effectiveness of these uses is significantly enhanced by emphasizing targets' inappropriate tolerance to the emotion's elicitors.

## 7 THE USES OF PROJECTIVE DISGUST AND THE LAWS OF SYMPATHETIC MAGIC

In view of the emotion's power to establish social hierarchies, projective disgust thrives in cases where individuals are presented as breaching powerful social norms. Projective uses of the emotion marginalize not only by making their targets appear disgusting but also, and perhaps more effectively, by indicating that the targets have an inexcusably high threshold of disgust. A good example can be found in Aristophanes' vilification of Ariphrades in the *Knights* (1281–1289).<sup>74</sup>

He pollutes his own tongue with disgraceful gratifications, licking the detestable dew in bawdyhouses besmirching his beard, disturbing the ladies' hotpots, acting like Polymnestus and on intimate terms with Oenichus. Anyone who doesn't loathe such a man will never drink from the same cup with me (translated by Jeffrey Henderson).

In this passage, Aristophanes' personal attack on Ariphrades relies on ideations which are characteristic of the cognitions that evoke disgust. A few lines earlier, Ariphrades is presented as the inventor of cunnilingus. Aristophanes' language exploits the visceral nature of disgust. Ariphrades collects with his tongue the vaginal fluids of prostitutes and thereby defiles his beard with residual shit.<sup>75</sup> Status is also particularly important. Ariphrades' obsessive preference for performing oral sex on prostitutes indicates his insensitivity to the rules of purity. If, as we saw in the previous section, disgust operates to define social hierarchies, coming too close to social inferiors indicates misrecognition of one's relative position in society.

As Kapparis has recently shown,<sup>76</sup> prostitutes were frequently described as filthy. Thus, Ariphrades' habitual practice of oral sex on prostitutes is a practice that defiles him both physically and morally. The law of contagion that underlies the cognitive structure of disgust is here fully exploited, but at the same time Aristophanes' authorial voice functions as a warning against the threat posed by the physical presence of a contaminated citizen among healthy Athenians. Construed as a community of fellow-symposiasts, the polis can remain clean by keeping

74 τὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γλῶτταν αἰσχροῖς ἡδοναῖς λυμαίνεται,  
ἐν κασωρείοισι λείχων τὴν ἀπόπτυστον δρόσον,  
καὶ μολύνων τὴν ὑπὲρ τὴν καὶ κυκλῶν τὰς ἐσχάρας.  
καὶ Πολυμνήστεια ποιῶν καὶ ξυνὸν Οἰονίχῳ.  
ὅστις οὖν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα μὴ σφόδρα βδελύττεται,  
οὔ ποτ' ἐκ ταύτου μεθ' ἡμῶν πίνεται ποτηρίου.

75 On cunnilingus, see also notes 18 and 26 above. On Ariphrades, see Degani 1960.

76 Kapparis 2011, 227.