

**Julia Heskel**

# **The North Aegean Wars, 371–360 B.C.**

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JULIA HESKEL

THE NORTH AEGEAN WARS,  
371–360 B.C.

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To My Parents,  
who taught me how to ask questions,

and to Ernst Badian,  
who taught me how to ask new ones



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## PREFACE

This book has its origins in my Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, "The Foreign Policy of Philip II down to the Peace of Philocrates". I realized while revising the thesis that Philip's policies regarding Athens and the North Aegean could not be properly understood without an investigation of the events of the 360s. What began as a prolegomenon to an analysis of the reign of Philip, however, soon emerged as a self-contained study in its own right, as it became apparent that the North Aegean during the 360s was a hotbed of diplomatic and military activity.

The aid of a number of institutions was instrumental in the production of this book. The Center for Hellenic Studies, under the aegis of its co-directors Deborah Boedeker and Kurt Raaflaub, provided the ideal environment for wrestling with many of the chronological puzzles that I was forced to confront. A Grant-in-Aid from the American Council of Learned Societies made it possible for me to complete the book at Harvard University, where I was a Visiting Scholar. I also wish to thank the A. Whitney Griswold Fund of Yale University for a grant to cover the editing of the manuscript, and the Classics Department of Harvard University for allowing me full access to its computer facilities and to Widener Library.

This study has greatly benefitted from the advice and criticism of a number of scholars: Deborah Boedeker, Eugene N. Borza, John Buckler, Paul Cartledge, Michael A. Flower, Edward M. Harris, Lisa Kallet-Marx, Christoph Konrad, Elizabeth A. Meyer, Margaret C. Miller, Kurt A. Raaflaub, Raphael Sealey, and Harvey E. Yunis. Gregor Anderson read the draft at various stages to check for errors. Cambridge University Press generously granted permission to reprint its maps of Macedonia/Chalcidice and Asia Minor from the *Cambridge Ancient History* Volume 6, Second Edition (1994).

I owe by far my greatest scholarly debt to Ernst Badian, who painstakingly read numerous drafts of each chapter and spent many hours discussing them with me. His ability to analyze ancient evidence and his impeccably high standards were a constant source of inspiration. Words cannot express the tremendous gratitude I feel to him for the care and attention he gave me for many years, from my first days as a student in his seminars to the completion first of my thesis and then of this monograph. Suffice it to say I have learned far more from him than this book will ever reveal.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my family and friends. Their patience and encouragement were enormously helpful, especially in the final stages of writing.



## INTRODUCTION

It is well recognized that the Athenians' attempts in the fourth century to reestablish their fifth-century empire came to an end with the rise of Philip II. This development is imperfectly understood, however, because scholars have failed to pay sufficient attention to the decade before Philip's accession, the 360s, when the Athenians made great efforts to recover the cities they had once controlled in the North Aegean. Although this region is generally viewed as peripheral to central and southern Greece, the abundance of literary and epigraphic references suggests that it was a major theater of action in this period. It is clear that a number of other powers besides Athens were involved in affairs in the north at that time, but no one has ever done a comprehensive political study of the region. Previous studies have tended to concentrate on the policies of individual states that had interests in the northern Aegean. Buckler focuses on the Thebans' efforts to build a naval hegemony, and considers the actions of Athens, Macedon, and Persia where they are relevant to that policy.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Sealey discusses events in the north from an Athenian perspective.<sup>2</sup> Borza focuses on events in Macedonia,<sup>3</sup> whereas Hornblower examines only those events in which Mausolus played a part.<sup>4</sup> In presenting the events from a single perspective, each of these works tells only part of the story. A study that makes the north the central focus is needed to fill in the gaps in our knowledge. An essential first step for a study of this sort is the construction of a systematic chronology of the events in this period, i.e., a discussion of the ordering and dating of all the relevant events for which there is evidence.

### The Ancient Evidence

The nature of the ancient evidence makes this a difficult task. Our chief literary sources are speeches delivered by the Attic orators Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Apollodorus, who lived contemporaneously with the events they describe. Three speeches are particularly important for understanding the events of the 360s. First, there is Demosthenes' speech *Against Aristocrates* of 352/1,<sup>5</sup> in which he narrates the early career of Charidemus, who at the time was being considered for a grant of personal protection. The second is Aeschines' speech *On the False Embassy*. He delivered this in his own defense in 343 after being charged with collaborating with

1 J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 B.C.* (Cambridge, Mass. 1980).

2 R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat* (New York 1993).

3 E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton 1990).

4 S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982).

5 For the date, see Dion. Hal. *Ad Amm.* 1.4.

Philip during the negotiations that led to the Peace of Philocrates in 346. In this speech Aeschines gives an account of the speech he delivered to Philip during those negotiations. The third is Apollodorus' speech *Against Polycles* ([Dem.] 50), in which he discusses his trierarchy in the Hellespont in the years 362–1. He probably delivered this speech shortly after returning to Athens in early 360.<sup>6</sup>

All three of these speeches raise important problems of interpretation. First, the orators in general mention only the events that are relevant to their case. Since their audience was already acquainted with the history of the period, there was no need to fill in all the details. Apollodorus, for example, was concerned with defending his own trierarchy and with attacking Polycles for his failure to succeed him at the proper time. For this reason he discusses only those events that directly affected his command.

Second, the orators present the events from a purely Athenian perspective. Athenian actions are generally cast in the most favorable light, and the actions of Athens' enemies in the worst. Amphipolis appears only as an object of the actions of other states, never as a state that pursued its own policies.

Related to this is a third problem of interpretation. Because each orator is interested primarily in making his own case, the accounts of all three are riddled with personal bias. This is a complicated matter in the case of Demosthenes. Vehemently opposed to granting Charidemus personal protection, he was intent on portraying the condottiere's actions in the worst possible light. We must also take into account the fact that Demosthenes delivered this speech in the late 350s, when the good relations Athens had enjoyed with the Thracian king Cotys had long been forgotten, and he was remembered only as an enemy of the city. Interpretation of Aeschines' speech is no less complicated, however, because there the bias exists on two levels: there is the version of events that he actually presented to Philip, and the one that he gave the Athenians at his trial three years later. Then there is Apollodorus, whose interest in defending his trierarchy colors his account of the actions of the generals he served, some of whom he later prosecuted.<sup>7</sup> The other sources also have their biases, such as Isocrates, who in the *Antidosis* presents an encomium of Timotheus, and Xenophon, with his encomium of Agesilaus in the essay of that name. Xenophon's *Hellenica*, with its anti-Theban slant, omits many events crucial to our understanding of the period, e.g., the liberation of Messene.<sup>8</sup>

Our only major literary source for the whole of the period, the universal history of Diodorus Siculus, presents other problems of interpretation. Book 15 of his *Library of History*, which covers the 360s, is a brief summary of the non-extant accounts of fourth-century historians like Ephorus. Because Diodorus greatly compresses his sources, he tends to group too many events under the heading of a single year, and so it is often difficult to determine which events belong under which year.

6 J. Trevett, *Apollodorus the Son of Pasion* (Oxford 1992) 42 n. 25.

7 See M. H. Hansen, *Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians* (Odense 1975) nos. 90, 91, 92, 94, 95.

8 See the excellent discussion by G. L. Cawkwell, ed. in *Xenophon. A History of My Times*, tr. R. Warner (Harmondsworth 1979) 7–46.

Inscriptions, an important contemporary source of information, are free of the problems that permeate the literary sources, but they pose other difficulties. Although they often provide information not contained in the literary evidence, their value is limited by the fact that only a small number are internally dated. As a result, a certain amount of conjecture is involved in using them. The problems of interpretation involving both the literary and the epigraphic evidence will be treated as they arise.

When all of the evidence is pieced together, it will become apparent that the 360s were a period in which the Athenians waged two wars simultaneously in the North Aegean, the War over Amphipolis and the War over Chersonese. Several other powers besides Athens were involved in these wars. By establishing a firm chronological foundation, we are able to examine these wars from the perspectives of all the major powers involved: not only of Athens, but also of Sparta, Thebes, Olynthus, the Macedonian dynasty, King Cotys of Thrace, the Great King of Persia, and a number of his satraps. It is only by examining the events in this way that we can understand why the Athenians lost both wars and consequently failed to rebuild their hegemony in the north. Although the Amphipolitan and Chersonesian Wars involved many of the major powers in the Greek and non-Greek world, my aim is not to write a history of Greece in the 360s. Rather, I wish to examine how the interests of these different powers converged in the North Aegean during that decade. It will become apparent that this region was, like southern and central Greece, a major theater of operations, and is equally critical to our understanding of fourth-century Greek history.

For the sake of clarity, I examine the two wars in two separate units. Each treatment is divided into two parts, the chronological discussion of the events of that war, followed by a narrative based on the chronology. I have tried to discuss chronological points separately from the narrative as much as possible, though sometimes overlap is inevitable. All of the dates established in the chronology are summarized in the table in the Appendix. Works cited in the footnotes in abbreviated form are cited in full in the bibliography.

### Historical Background

The Athenians' interest in Amphipolis and the Chersonese began in the second half of the sixth century and continued for the next two hundred years. The chief reason for this persistent interest is economic. Amphipolis, situated on a ford above the mouth of the Strymon River in western Thrace, offered access to natural resources that were essential for empire and trade. The abundant forests nearby and the plentiful gold and silver mines of Mt. Pangaeum provided timber for shipbuilding and precious metals for coinage.<sup>9</sup> The Thracian Chersonese, known today as the Gallipoli peninsula, was the gateway to the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) and the

9 On the timber of Amphipolis and the importance of timber for the Athenian fleet, see R. Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Oxford 1982) esp. 121–31.



Pontus (Black Sea), and thus to Athens' major source of grain during the Classical Period.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, there is reason to believe that both places were important sources of slaves, an essential part of the Athenian economy. This is suggested by the fact that *Thrax* and *Thracia* were, as far as can be determined, common slave names in Athens.<sup>11</sup>

Athenian activity in the regions of Amphipolis and Chersonese dates from the reign of Pisistratus, who made expansion in these areas a major component of his foreign policy. His interest in Amphipolis can be traced to the mid-550s, when, driven into exile for the second time, he went to Mt. Pangaeum to collect money needed to effect his return to power. During the reign of Pisistratus, the elder Miltiades founded a colony on Chersonese and became its ruler, thus establishing family control over the region. He was eventually succeeded by his nephew, the younger Miltiades, who strengthened Athenian control over Chersonese. It was also in this period that Pisistratus sent his son Hegesistratus to establish a colony at Sigeum on the opposite shore of the Hellespont.<sup>12</sup>

The Athenians' expansionist activity in the north came to a halt when Darius decided to expand his rule into Europe. Failing to subdue the Scythians, Darius left his general Mardonius to establish control over the Hellespont, Perinthus, and Thrace. At this time, Thrace became a Persian satrapy. After the Ionian Revolt, the younger Miltiades was forced to evacuate Chersonese, and the Persian navy occupied the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Chersonese remained under Persian rule until the end of the Persian Wars in 479, when the Athenians, led by Xanthippus, liberated Sestus and Cardia.<sup>13</sup>

Expansion in the Strymon valley and Chersonese was a major component of Athenian foreign policy after the Persian Wars. In the second quarter of the fifth century, Athenian settlers tried to establish a colony on the Strymon at Ennea Hodoi, site of the later Amphipolis, but were decimated by neighboring Thracians. Cimon in the 460s freed a number of Chersonesian cities which were still held by the Persians. Pericles, during the period of his ascendancy, followed up on these expansionist policies. As the first of the extant Athenian tribute lists indicates, the Chersonesian cities were tribute-paying members of the Delian League as early as 453.<sup>14</sup> In the early 440s, Pericles sent out Athenian cleruchs to strengthen Chersonese against Thracian raids. Equally interested in furthering Athenian expansion in the Strymon valley, he sent out colonists, who in 437/6 founded the city of

10 See P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis* (Cambridge 1988) esp. 106, 108, 118, 120–22.

11 Antiphon 5.20; M. I. Finley, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (New York 1983) 167–75, 271–73. I wish to thank E. M. Harris for pointing this out to me.

12 Hdt. 5.94–95, 6.34–39; Marcellinus, *Vita Thuc.* 5–6; For discussion see A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*, 2nd ed. (Chicago 1983) 33–34, and the bibliography in *CAH<sup>2</sup>* Vol. 3 Part 3 (Cambridge 1982) 480, 488, 507–508.

13 See A. Fol and N. G. L. Hammond, *CAH<sup>2</sup>* Vol. 4 (Cambridge 1988) 234–46, J. P. Barron, *ibid.* 592–622, and the bibliography, esp. 801–10, 842–55.

14 B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, Vol. 3 (Princeton 1950) 28.

Amphipolis in conjunction with settlers from Argilus and probably also Chalcidians from Thrace.<sup>15</sup>

Both Amphipolis and Chersonese played prominent roles in the Peloponnesian War. The capture of Amphipolis by the Spartan general Brasidas helped convince the Athenians to make peace with Sparta in 421. Their failure to regain control over the city after the peace was one of the reasons war was resumed soon afterwards. After the Sicilian disaster, the Athenians won important victories in the Hellespont that turned the war in Athens' favor and led to the restoration of democracy. Their final defeat in 404, however, resulted in the loss of the Chersonesian cities.

In the early fourth century, the Athenians resumed their attempts to regain their empire in the north. During the Corinthian War, Thrasybulus made treaties of friendship and alliance with the Thracian kings Amadocus and Seuthes; he also made alliances with various cities off the coast of Thrace and in the Propontis. The King's Peace, strictly enforced by Sparta, prevented the Athenians from taking any aggressive action against Amphipolis or Chersonese. During the 370s, they devoted their energies to building a new league within the confines of the Peace. It was not until 371, when the King was preoccupied with problems within his empire and the Spartans were unable to enforce the Peace, that the Athenians found their long-awaited opportunity, and began taking steps to recover their hegemony of the northern Aegean.<sup>16</sup>

15 See Graham, *Colony and Mother City* 37–38; D. M. Lewis, *CAH<sup>2</sup>* Vol. 5 (1992) 13–14, 127–28.

16 Antiphon 3.15; Hornblower, *Mausolus* 184–7. For bibliography, see Cawkwell, *Xenophon* 47–48; B. S. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* (London/Sydney 1986) 183–84; and the extensive list in *CAH<sup>2</sup>* Vol. 5 (1994) 922–29.



## PART I. THE WAR OVER AMPHIPOLIS, 371–360 B.C.

### CHAPTER I. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR OVER AMPHIPOLIS

The chronology of the events of the War over Amphipolis is difficult to disentangle because there are few actions that can be securely anchored. In order to circumvent the problems of interpretation posed by the literary and epigraphic evidence, we need to begin by addressing two major problems: first, the dates of the reigns of the Argeads from Alexander II to Alexander III; and second, the dates of the commands of the Athenian generals Iphicrates and Timotheus in the North Aegean and the events associated with those commands.

#### I–1. The reigns of the Argeads

Diodorus states in a chronographic entry under the archon-year 370/69 that Amyntas III died and was succeeded by Alexander II, who ruled for one year (Diod. 15.60.3). This would seem to put Alexander's death in the following archon-year, 369/8. A problem arises, however, because there is no entry for Macedonian affairs under that year. Rather, in a chronographic entry under the year 368/7, Diodorus says that Ptolemy of Alorus murdered Alexander and ruled for three years (Diod. 15.71.1). This seems to contradict his statement that Alexander ruled for one year. In order to solve this apparent contradiction, we need to examine Diodorus' entries for the Macedonian kings from Amyntas III to Alexander III and then compare them with the other transmitted regnal dates, the Parian Marble, Oxyrhynchus Chronicle, and Eusebius tradition.

##### *Diodorus*

370/69	Amyntas III dies; Alexander II succeeds him and rules for one year. (15.60.3)
368/7	Ptolemy of Alorus murders Alexander II and rules for three years. (15.71.1)
365/4	Perdiccas III murders Ptolemy of Alorus and rules for five years. (15.77.5)
360/59	Philip comes to the throne and rules for twenty-four years. (16.2.1; 16.1.3)
336/5	Philip dies after ruling for twenty-four years, and Alexander succeeds him. (16.95)
335/4	Alexander, having succeeded Philip, punishes the assassins of Philip. He rules for twelve years and seven months. (17.117.5)