

Whitehead Studien
Whitehead Studies 6

Maria Regina Brioschi

Creativity Between Experience and Cosmos

C. S. Peirce and
A. N. Whitehead
on Novelty

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The book investigates the topic of creativity by focusing on C. S. Peirce's and A. N. Whitehead's accounts of novelty. It is divided into three parts. The first part considers the problem of novelty from a philosophical point of view and examines the historical and theoretical connections between the two authors. The second and third parts explore, respectively, Peirce's and Whitehead's thoughts on novelty, analyzing their views from three different perspectives – phenomenological, gnoseological, and cosmological. Finally, their thoughts are compared in order to show their contributions to the issue of novelty.

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Maria Regina Brioschi

Creativity Between Experience and Cosmos

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To Giuseppe

At this moment scientists and skeptics are the leading dogmatists. Advance in detail is admitted; fundamental novelty is barred. This dogmatic common sense is the death of philosophic adventure. The Universe is vast.

— Alfred North Whitehead

Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.

— Charles Sanders Peirce

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List of abbreviations

Charles Sanders Peirce's Works

CP	<i>Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce</i>
EP	<i>The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings</i>
NEM	<i>The New Elements of Mathematics</i>
R	<i>Manuscripts of C. S. Peirce</i> (L refers to Peirce's correspondence)
RLT	<i>Reasoning and the Logic of Things</i>
W	<i>Writings of Charles S. Peirce</i>

Alfred North Whitehead's Works

AE	<i>The Aims of Education and Other Essays</i>
AI	<i>Adventures of Ideas</i>
CN	<i>The Concept of Nature</i>
D	<i>Dialogues of A. N. Whitehead</i>
FR	<i>The Function of Reason</i>
MT	<i>Modes of Thought</i>
PNK	<i>An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge</i>
PR	<i>Process and Reality</i>
PRel	<i>The Principle of Relativity with Applications to Physical Science</i>
RM	<i>Religion in the Making</i>
S	<i>Symbolism</i>
SMW	<i>Science and the Modern World</i>
SP	<i>Essays in Science and Philosophy</i>

Part I
The Problem of Novelty
Between Peirce and Whitehead

Chapter 1

At the Margins of Philosophy: The Problem of Novelty

The present work explores the problem of novelty according to Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947).

Generally speaking, the topic of novelty seems to be so vast and vague that it does not deserve an entire investigation. What does novelty mean? What are we referring to? Before answering these questions, and in order to tackle them, we need first and foremost to understand how this topic concerns us, why it represents a *problem* – that etymologically means »something thrown, put forward to us« – one that is related to our world today, and a philosophical one. Indeed, the more we will grasp the currency of the issue, its philosophical pertinence, and how it is still far from being solved, the more we will understand the relevance of Charles Sanders Peirce’s and Alfred North Whitehead’s reflections on the subject. Accordingly, we do not intend to start with a definition of novelty, but rather to get acquainted with the problem and shed light on those fields in which novelty emerges as a pivotal topic, continuing even today to challenge our mindset. Only after this progressive approach to novelty, the investigation will explore Peirce’s and Whitehead’s contributions to the issue, aiming at reaching a deeper conception of novelty.

1. The Contemporary Salience of Novelty

On the one hand, the »history of novelty« can be traced back to Plato or even earlier, as Michael North has recently done;¹ on the other hand, the issue became an explicit and widespread subject of reflection

¹ Cf. North 2013. In this remarkable book, titled *Novelty: A History of the New*, Michael North illustrates the »history of novelty« ranging from the Bible and pre-

only in the 20th century.² Furthermore, over the last decades the topic of novelty has become more and more prominent and its currency can mainly be ascribed to three extra-philosophical sources:

(i) Above all, novelty is related to the field of aesthetics and art. We are not here referring to the way novelty has been specifically taken into consideration from time to time in the history of art,³ but rather to that intrinsic characteristic of *creativity* that every artwork carries within itself. In fact, every artistic work is to some extent creative, its forcefulness consisting in bringing about something new, something that did not exist previously, unpredictable before its appearance.⁴ As Deleuze has acutely noted when talking about cinema: »novelty is the sole criterion of any work of art. If you don't feel you have seen something new, or have something new to say, why write, why paint, why shoot a film?« (Deleuze 2003, 220; 2006, 217).⁵ In this way, the relevance of novelty, understood as the criterion

Socratic philosophers to the art criticism of the 1970s and from Darwinian evolutionary thought to probabilistic theories.

² For a detailed analysis of the early 20th century's reflections on novelty, see also Part III, §1. For the moment, it can be sufficient to note that it is only with Bergson's and James's thoughts that the topic was broadly, philosophically discussed. Cf. also North 2013, 6, 75–83.

³ For an analytic study on this historical tradition, cf. North 2013, 144–202.

⁴ This passage is based on a peculiar definition of creativity, very close to Whitehead's one (cf. PR: 21), such that we can compare, or at least connect, *creativity* to *novelty*: on the one hand, something is creative because it »creates« something new, on the other, novelty is both the product of creativity and a distinct feature of it. But the comparison works well only to this extent, otherwise it would be misleading. Indeed, if creativity implies novelty, novelty does not necessarily entail creativity. For instance, a new event cannot result from any creative act: its unpredictability can be independent of any creative processes and may also assume a destructive power, as in the case of hurricanes or natural disasters, whereas creativity is usually associated with some positive addition with this regard, cf. also Part II, Ch. 2, §4.2.

⁵ Translation partially mine. The English translation adopted the word »originality« instead of »novelty.« I chose to translate it with »novelty« because it corresponds literally to the French term »nouveau-té,« used in the original edition. Moreover, though novelty and originality are concepts belonging to the same semantic area, their meanings are neither equivalent nor interchangeable. An *original* painter can make »original« paintings but they may not represent something new. They can seem original as well as old-fashioned. In this regard, a passage from Ernst Bloch's *The Principle of Hope* can help us in taking notice of the difference. The author states, defining the role of genius: »Mastery in the work of genius, a mastery which is foreign to what has normally become, is also comprehensible only as a phenomenon of the Novum. Every great work of art thus still remains, except for its manifest character, impelled towards the latency of the other side, i. e. towards the contents of a

ion of creativity, lies at the very heart of art, and its central role has been even more emphasized, from the 60s onwards, by the continuous growth of the fields of advertisement and media, which enlarges the boundaries of this discipline and enriches its possibilities. Additionally, contemporary psychological and neuro-scientific researches have provided a new method and perspective to investigate creativity or – better yet – creative cognitive processes.⁶

(ii) Secondly, novelty is connected to technology and science, and more particularly with scientific progress. With regards to technology, we can say that mankind has from its very outset been marked by novelty.⁷ If »man came silently into the world,«⁸ surely technology made noise, and pushed the human being toward its fast-paced evolutionary itinerary, for any time technology reaches new achievements, it opens up new paths of development, and new ways of living, never explored until that moment. But the relationship between human existence and technology is even more essential. We do agree with Helmut Plessner when he says that »Man is by nature artificial.«⁹ Yet, it is not easy to realize that in saying so we must continuously face new problems and issues, starting from: »What is man?« In fact, if nowadays we look at the unceasing discoveries in terms of robotics, nanotechnologies, as well as digital technology and the new media, it is apparent that the very concept of man, if any, has to be rethought and re-defined. So, technological improvements not only require (our) acceptance but they also demand new, broader, non-tech-

future which had not yet appeared in its own time, if not towards the contents of an as yet unknown final state. For this reason alone great works have something to say to all ages, a *Novum* pointing onward in fact, which the previous age had not yet noticed; only for this reason does a fairytale opera like ›The Magic Flute‹, but also a historically localized epic like the ›Iliad‹, possess so-called eternal youth« (Bloch 1995, vol. 1, 127, emphasis added).

⁶ Cf., among others, Glăveanu, Gillespie, Valsiner 2017, Csikszentmihalyi 2015, Elliot and Kaufman 2014, Gardner 1982.

⁷ As Carlo Sini puts it, it is impossible to draw a line between *homo sapiens* and *homo technologicus*. The human body has always been expanded toward the world, by means of tools which strengthen some abilities and weaken others. We cannot think about the human body in abstraction from its expansion toward the world thanks to external tools, because from the very outset mankind has always been expanded using some types of instruments. (Cf. Sini 2009 and Longo 2005).

⁸ Cf. Teilhard De Chardin's masterpiece *The Phenomenon of Man*, where he points to the birth of thought on Earth using the phrase quoted above. (Cf. De Chardin 1955/2008, 184).

⁹ Plessner 1931/1982, 199.

nical advancements. They make us new, and at the same time push us toward new ideas of identity, personality, otherness, community, knowledge, etc ... always in accordance with the latest discoveries. It is exactly due to the importance of discovery that novelty has been always associated with science, both with the history of science in general and with the very process of scientific research. As Thomas Kuhn underlined, novelty lies at the heart of every change of paradigm, of every scientific revolution.¹⁰ Moreover, with reference to novelty, biology has probably been the most stimulating science for philosophy in the last two centuries, especially Evolutionary Biology and Epigenetics. Overall, Darwin's evolutionary thought, from its very beginning, has been posing a challenge to philosophy because it points out that the nature we face is not of a fixed, immortal kind; rather, it uncovers a dynamic world, ever-changing and always in development.¹¹ Accordingly, the more physical and biological sciences improve their understanding of these changes, the more philosophy needs to answer questions like: »Can we actually speak of novelty?«; »In which way can we conceive of those changes and developments, testified to by a vast number of scientific results?«; »How is it possible for something new to appear?«

(iii) Thirdly, novelty can be considered as an issue of public interest, because of the rapid changes affecting our pluralistic society and

¹⁰ Cf. Kuhn 1962/1996, 52. The author explains: »Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none. New and unsuspected phenomena are, however, repeatedly uncovered by scientific research, and radical new theories have again and again been invented by scientists. History even suggests that the scientific enterprise has developed a uniquely powerful technique for producing surprises of this sort. If this characteristic of science is to be reconciled with what has already been said, then research under a paradigm must be a particularly effective way of inducing paradigm change. That is what fundamental novelties of fact and theory do. Produced inadvertently by a game played under one set of rules, their assimilation requires the elaboration of another set. After they have become parts of science, the enterprise, at least of those specialists in whose particular field the novelties lie, is never quite the same again.« Moreover, the author distinguishes between a factual novelty (namely, novelty of fact) and a theoretical novelty (novelty of theory), essentially intertwined in every scientific discovery.

¹¹ In this regard, see especially Ernst Mayr's works, in particular Mayr 2004. As North also underlined, the centrality of novelty in biology does not correspond to a widespread agreement on the topic among scientists. Indeed, the explanation of evolutionary novelty is one of the most controversial topics, not only as a point of contention between developmentalists and traditional molecular biologists, but especially since its definition still remains uncertain (see North 2013, 2, 61–62).

demanding new measures, policies and laws. Indeed, nowadays one can observe a political, cultural and economic instability, such that we cannot take these structures for granted anymore. Both at international and national levels, at least in western society, these structures continuously need modifications and innovations in order to be in step with the times. Therefore, these socio-political challenges call for novelty, even more in this period of financial turmoil, global crisis and changes of cultural paradigms. As Maddalena and Zalamea have recently suggested: »Perhaps due to the period of international crisis, appeals to creativity multiplied in any field. Sure enough, when the status quo cannot grant welfare conditions anymore, something new is needed« (Maddalena/Zalamea 2013, 6).

As we have now briefly touched upon, the salience of novelty seems undeniable, a problem that everybody has to face, not confinable to philosophy. However, as soon as one begins to discover how relevant the issue of novelty is, or to connect the topic to certain phenomena, the topic itself becomes as interesting as it is hard to be analytically scrutinized. And the same problem can be found at the level of personal experience. As North has wittily said: »How does the quality that makes a new shirt or a new friend such a positive experience turn into something almost sinister in the abstract?« (North 2013, 1). Such facts show that the meaning of novelty is usually either taken for granted or just considered puzzling or impossible to grasp (cf. Hausman 1975, v, 1–3). For this reason, a philosophical inquiry on it is imperative, to help us clarify and understand better the issue here at stake, and therefore its relevance and implications at all levels.

2. Novelty: At the Threshold of Philosophy

The limits above indicated in defining novelty are indeed not merely linguistic, rather they all lead to an essential philosophical question: can novelty really be comprehended? The very possibility for novelty to be a philosophic issue depends to some extent on the answer we give to this question, because if novelty were absolutely inaccessible to the mind it would be impossible to investigate it. At the same time, the problem I want to draw attention to here goes rather deeper than this: indeed, in its turn the question concerning the intelligibility of novelty is rooted in a basic assumption, that cannot be postulated, as

the entire history of philosophy exhibits. This assumption consists in admitting the existence of novelty, or radical novelty, on the ontological level. In other words, the problem can be formulated as follows: does novelty really exist? If we consider – even hastily – our experience, we can find a trace of it in the pressing and unceasing desire for novelty, and that reveals also how important it is for human beings in general.¹² But for ages philosophy did not admit such a possibility. Why? Let me briefly explain by analyzing novelty's peculiar connection to philosophy according to the three levels just mentioned, which are intertwined and all essential to properly think through the matter, namely: the ontological level (›Does novelty exist?‹), the gnoseological one (›Is novelty comprehensible?‹), and the phenomenological/experiential one (›Is novelty actually experienced?‹). On the ontological level, from Parmenides¹³ onwards novelty has not been explicitly taken into account because of the acceptance, assumed by Occidental philosophy, that nothing comes from nothing (*ex nihilo nihil fit*).¹⁴ For being is and nothing is not. Implicit in this is an idea of being as unchanging and undifferentiated. Indeed, given this general framework within which traditional metaphysics arose, no question about novelty could have been posed; there was at most room for change, conceived as a mere superficial metamorphosis of antecedent state of things, therefore not involving any modification of the static structure of being.¹⁵

From a gnoseological point of view, the matter is more subtle: on the one hand it pertains to novelty's paradoxical structure,¹⁶ on the other it revolves around the way *understanding* and *knowledge*, and therefore *philosophy*, are conceived. Once the possibility of novelty

¹² On this point, cf. also North 2013, 2. The author states: »Desire for the new, however, seems to be a fairly durable human quality, and interest in it persists even now, after its role in the worlds of art and fashion has been exposed and debunked.«

¹³ Cf. North 2013, 34 and Mourelatos 1981.

¹⁴ A separate discussion should be made about Christian philosophy, that was rooted in the concept of *creatio ex nihilo*, established as a dogma in 1215 but already thought by Augustine. See North 2013, 36.

¹⁵ It is worthwhile to note that the lack of any direct discussion of the topic of novelty does not imply the impossibility to trace the topic back to the beginning of philosophy, or to analyze it in the classical philosophers. Nevertheless, as I shall show in the following §3, novelty was not considered a philosophical issue until the dawn of the 20th century.

¹⁶ Hausman 1975, 53–59.

has been admitted on the ontological level,¹⁷ it is not easy to sustain both its understandability and its irreducible structure, which is paradoxical because in order to be new something needs on the one hand to have an irreducible side – irreducible to previous elements or previous knowledge –, such that one can properly recognize it as new, and on the other it needs to show some aspects that, on the contrary, are comparable with old, or ordinary, objects and experiences.

From another perspective, if novelty were absolutely incomprehensible, one would not even be able to indicate or speak of it, because without any comparison with the old, the common, and the absolutely expected, it would be impossible also to define novelty, to say that something is »new.« In this way, the paradoxical structure of novelty can be comprehended as a peculiar twist of continuity and discontinuity, relative and absolute. Moreover, to this extent we can also detect the problem of novelty as inextricably linked to that of knowledge, as it has been presented from the outset of philosophy. Let us consider, for instance, the paradoxes of Plato's *Meno*: »How can I know something that I didn't know before?« Similarly, »How can I know something new?« As we can see here, the problem of novelty can be apprehended as *the* problem of knowledge.

However, apart from these paradoxes lying at the very heart of both knowledge and novelty, their connection has often been neglected in the history of philosophy, at least until the 20th century, and especially if we limit our consideration to the case where novelty is conceived of as an object of understanding and knowledge. Why? As Hausman suggested regarding creativity,¹⁸ this is probably due to a certain conception of knowledge (and reason), commonly shared by traditional metaphysics and grounded in a rationalistic perspective. Indeed, referring to traditional Western philosophy, especially in the Modern Age, novelty as such can not be an object of knowledge, because every object of knowledge must be subjected to the rules of reason. In this perspective, reason would reduce novelty according to

¹⁷ Cf. the following §3.

¹⁸ Cf. Hausman 1975, 2–17. Hausman's analysis sheds light on the difficulties of understanding creativity and novelty, and accordingly of a philosophical inquiry on it. However, the argument here provided differs from his insofar as (i) it focuses on novelty (and not creativity), (ii) the rationalistic approach is overall associated with the traditional metaphysics, (iii) rationalism is not investigated in alternative to a non-rationalistic approach, but it is rather the main reason for novelty's marginality in traditional philosophy.

its own schemes to its previous patterns, according to a pre-determined logic of cause-effect that would wipe novelty away. Thus, nothing that lies outside of reason's boundaries can be admitted as an object of knowledge, nor even recognized as a possible one: only what fits in the field of reason merits to be considered a matter of understanding. As Nietzsche pointed out, »rational bias forces us to postulate unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, materiality and being.«¹⁹ Accordingly, if understanding means explanation by rationalistic patterns and categories, novelty cannot be understood at all, since it breaks and escapes them by definition. On the whole, everything that exceeds such fixed categories is to be condemned to mere appearance. As a consequence, novelty, along with difference, change, accidents, becoming, etc. are repudiated and confined to the margins of philosophy.²⁰ The fact that those concepts and phenomena are not taken into consideration is not, however, restricted to a specific period in the history of philosophy. Rather, it reveals that the concept of novelty, as well as of those of change and becoming, etc. have always undermined metaphysics. It is exactly their characteristic of marginality which leads us beyond metaphysics, the latter conceived as traditional ontology. Indeed, we can identify *marginality* as the distinctive *status* of this range of phenomena; their very essence consists in continuously challenging reason, and pushing it beyond its own limits, thus driving towards a new, broader comprehension of reason and knowledge. Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph (»Can novelty be comprehended?«), the answer is that novelty is comprehensible on the condition that a new definition of knowledge and reason is assumed, away from any rationalistic (as well as irrationalistic)²¹ approach. But how to gain such a position? If it is unattainable to start from any determined conception of rea-

¹⁹ Cf. Nietzsche's *Twilight of Idols*, Ch. II, §5. Nietzsche 1889/2007, 19.

²⁰ As we will see in the next paragraph, this expression intentionally recalls Derrida's one, because he was one of the prominent philosophers of the 20th century who focused on this field of inquiry. (Cf. Derrida 1972/1986).

²¹ Indeed, the existence or possibility of novelty does not entail assuming an irrationalistic perspective. On the contrary, an irrationalistic perspective would eliminate the problem of novelty as much as rationalism does, because instead of encompassing the rules of reason, it denies reason's power of knowing and understanding. Consequently, the paradoxical structure of novelty is overlooked or flattened to simple elements, that in any case cannot be fathomed by reason. Cf. also Hausman 1975, 3, 6–7.

son, the most feasible path to a different perspective is rooted in the field of experience, as the 20th century has shown.

As I mentioned above, the *experience* of novelty seems to be the safest ground upon which a philosophical investigation on novelty can start, first by singling out those experiences we refer to as new, second by analyzing them and the meaning they carry within themselves. This solution may appear trivial and simplistic at first glance, but it reveals its philosophical originality, soundness and fruitfulness when compared to the mainstream of traditional philosophy. From Plato onwards classical metaphysics has usually submitted experience to logic and reasoning, because experience was not conceived as a reliable field of inquiry. On the contrary, in its broader sense, a phenomenological investigation, that is an investigation which explores and interrogates experience, confers a new meaning and value to experience, creating space also for those phenomena that do not correspond to the most traditional philosophical categories, and giving relevance to concepts such as becoming, difference, change and novelty, which are usually conceived as merely apparent, contingent or derivative ones.

So far, having roughly analyzed the three main perspectives to which the problem of novelty can be addressed (ontological / gnoseological / phenomenological), we can now proceed to the history of philosophy, touching briefly upon some of its most important tendencies and phases, which range from Parmenides up to the dawn of the 20th century. As already indicated, the 20th century can be regarded as the century in which, along with the pivotal role conferred to experience, the problem of novelty arose and became one of the topics most pondered in philosophy. But in what sense?

3. Novelty: The 20th Century's Renaissance²²

As Stephen Shaviro has pointed out,

The concepts [of creativity, novelty, innovation and the new] (or at least these words) are so familiar to us today [...] that it is difficult to grasp how radical a rupture they mark in the history of Western thought. In fact, the

²² I do not here intend to develop a historical reconstruction of the problem of novelty. Rather, the purpose of the paragraph is simply to show what great attention has been given to topics connected to novelty in the 20th century.

valorization of change and novelty, which we so take for granted today, is itself a novelty of relatively recent origin. Philosophy from Plato to Heidegger is largely oriented toward *anamnesis* (reminiscence) and *aletheia* (unforgetting), toward origins and foundations, toward the past rather than the future (Shaviri 2009, 70).²³

Accordingly, first and foremost it is worthwhile to note that nowadays we are all acquainted with this range of concepts. Secondly, and even before trying to understand *why* it happened in recent history of philosophy,²⁴ it is relevant to bring to light *how* this renaissance of novelty, if any, took place, and so to illustrate how relevant the topic has been in the 20th century, by referring to all those philosophers who tackled it, albeit from different perspectives or in connection to divergent problems.

Indeed, in the 20th century the mainstream manifestation of novelty can mainly be traced out under the label of »event«. The notion of *event* is comparable to that of novelty, insofar as event commonly expresses, as Žižek has recently suggested, »the effect that seems to exceed its causes – and the space of an event is that which opens up by the gap that separates an effect from its causes« (Žižek 2014, 2). Therefore, event can be thought of as the happening of novelty, to the extent that it irrupts and breaks previous connections and patterns, and so cannot be understood by them, inaugurating a new horizon.

The philosophy of the event, however, does not designate a unique school of thought, since this notion contaminates the most important philosophies of the 20th century: from Bergson's thought to phenomenology and deconstruction, up to the present time. By way of presentation, and so as to mention all of them, we can divide the thinkers committed to the *event* and *novelty* into four different phases, shown in chronological order.

- i. The forerunners of this kind of philosophy, the first ones who gave room to a concept like the event, actually lived between the 19th and the 20th century and opened up new consistent philo-

²³ It is worthwhile to note that this interpretation of Heidegger's work does not correspond to the one provided here. In fact, it does not take into account the second part of Heidegger's thought.

²⁴ This aim goes indeed beyond the purpose of the present investigation. For a critical account of it, see in particular North 2013 and Baumer 1977, which sketches out a history of ideas from 1600 to 1950, paying special attention to changes during the 19th century, especially relative to how »becoming« overcame »being«.

sophical perspectives, in opposition to classical metaphysics. They include first and foremost Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, who explicitly proposed the concept of the *event* against the category of *substance*;²⁵ the founders of Pragmatism: Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, who differently stressed the role of the event and the importance of novelty and radical creativity;²⁶ Henri Bergson, whose concepts, from *élan vital* to *creative evolution*, reshaped the way philosophy tackles classical issues (e.g. the mind-body problem).

- ii. Secondly, during the first decades of the 20th century, novelty became one of the most common topics of discussion among Anglo-American philosophers.²⁷ In particular, let us consider the pragmatic account of Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics of creativity, and also British Emergentism's definitions of emergence, connected to evolution (Conwy Lloyd Morgan, Samuel Alexander, Charlie Dunbar Broad).
- iii. In a later period, many authors came to the concept of the event, adopting it as a key one in their philosophies, while they remain absolutely divergent from one another, or even opposed. From Martin Heidegger, whose late thought pivots around the concept of *Ereignis* (»event«)²⁸ to Jacques Derrida's deconstructionist fig-

²⁵ Cf. the following quote from a document of 1885 found posthumously: »We have regarded changes in ourselves not as such but as an ›in-itself‹ that is alien to us, that we only ›perceive‹: and we have posited them not as something that happens but as something that is, as a ›quality‹ – and invented for them a being to which they inhere, i.e., we have posited the *effect as something that effects and what effects as something that is*. [...] – But this inference itself is mythology: it *divorces* what effects from the effecting. If I say: ›Lightning flashes,‹ I have posited the flashing once as activity and once as subject, and have thus added on to what happens [Geschehen] a being that is not identical with what happens but that remains, is, and does not ›become.‹ – To posit what happens as effecting, and effect as being: that is the *twofold error, or interpretation*, of which we are guilty. Thus, e.g., ›The lighting flashes‹ – ›to flash‹ is a state of ourselves; but we do not take it to be an effect on us. Instead we say: ›Something flashing‹ as an ›in-itself‹ and then look for an author for it – the ›lightning.‹ (Nietzsche 1885/2003, 75–76).

²⁶ We will consider more carefully their positions in Part II and Part III of the present book.

²⁷ For a more detailed exposition about these years and authors, see Part II.

²⁸ Cf. the collection of writings on the topic, translated into English in *The Event*, Heidegger 2009/2013.