

New Critical Writings in Political Sociology

Volume Three: Globalization and
Contemporary Challenges to the
Nation-State

Edited by

**Anna Marie Smith, Alan Scott and
Kate Nash**



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Volume Three

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Series Editors: Kate Nash, Alan Scott and Anna Marie Smith

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**New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,
Volume One:
Power, State and Inequality**
Alan Scott, Kate Nash and Anna Marie Smith

**New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,
Volume Two:
Conventional and Contentious Politics**
Kate Nash, Alan Scott and Anna Marie Smith

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Volume Three:
Globalization and Contemporary Challenges
to the Nation-State**
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Globalization and Contemporary
Challenges to the Nation-State

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Series Preface

This series of three volumes of ‘critical writings’ in political sociology seeks to provide a balanced and comprehensive range of influential essays and, in exceptional cases chapters, within this subfield published since the 1970s. There is a bias towards the more recent period partly because many earlier pieces are available in similar collections, but, more importantly, because the shifts of direction that political sociology has taken over the last 20 years make some earlier debates look – at least for the moment – somewhat arcane. One example is the heavy emphasis on class in the earlier period (see the Introduction to Volume Two for a fuller discussion). The influence of feminism and post-structuralist thought, as well as empirical evidence of the shrinking of the working class, and thus the decline of its political significance (discussed in Volume One by Colin Crouch), have shifted attention away from social class as a (at one time *the*) central concern. Some analysts (for example, Pakulski and Waters, 1996) have gone so far as to argue that class is now largely an irrelevance in understanding political phenomena, while others (for example, Savage, 2000) have sought to redirect and reshape our understanding of the class–politics nexus.

A further example of shifting interests is the fading into distant memory of the dispute between instrumentalist and structuralist Marxists (represented by Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas respectively) that was so central to debates in political sociology in the 1970s. There is a brief discussion of the issues involved in the essay by Steven Lukes (Volume One), and Louis Althusser’s Marxist–structuralist analysis of the state (the *locus classicus* in this literature) can be found in Volume Two, but Miliband and Poulantzas themselves are not reprinted here. What is still influential in Poulantzas’s work is rather represented in this series by the generation(s) of political sociologists who have followed him and who continue to extend this Gramsci–Althusser–Poulantzas line of thought, notably Bob Jessop and Neil Brenner (both in Volume One).

There is a thematic division of labour both between and within the volumes. Volume One covers power, the state and inequality; Volume Two covers conventional and contentious politics; and Volume Three brings the story up-to-date by covering globalization and other ‘contemporary challenges’ to the nation-state. This is, of course, a loose classification. For example, while Volume One contains many of the ‘traditional’ concerns of political sociology – such as, state formation, power and legitimation in its coverage of the more recent literature it inevitably touches on themes, such as the emergence of ‘new state spaces’ (Brenner) below and above the level of the nation-state, that are taken up again in Volume Three.

We should also say something here about the criteria we have applied in making this selection. While the volumes contain many seminal and famous contributions of the kind that would appear in any such collection – for example, Steven Lukes and Michel Foucault on power (Volume One), Claus Offe on social movements and Judith Butler on (the end of) sexual difference (Volume Two), or Ernest Gellner on nationalism (Volume Three) – we have not simply used citation indexes to identify the ‘greatest hits’, since to have done so would have produced a thematically very unbalanced collection. As one of the central aims was to

retain a balance in order to provide potential users with the full range of work that can be gathered under the – admittedly wide – umbrella of political sociology, we have used a more thematic approach – one that seeks to cover the full range of empirical and theoretical issues that have been of concern to political sociologists. As a result, some extremely influential pieces have not been reproduced here. For example, you will not find Michael Mann's 'The Autonomous Power of the State' (1984), one of the most frequently reproduced and cited papers in political sociology to have appeared in the period covered here. This is because we wanted to include one of Mann's more recent pieces (on globalization, in Volume Three) and because the topic of state formation and the sources of state power are well represented by other important authorities, notably Charles Tilly and Gianfranco Poggi (Volume One). The essay by Tilly is an example of another feature: we have not always chosen to represent well-known political sociologists by reproducing their best-known work. Instead, we have tended to go for pieces that are either representative or which display their more recent thinking. The Tilly piece, for example, is an introduction to an edited collection, but it contains some useful indications as to how his thinking about state formation slightly altered after the publication of *Coercion, Capital, and European States* in 1992.

Despite our efforts to provide a balanced and comprehensive collection, it would, of course, be foolish to claim that the interests and preferences of the three editors played no role. There is also some bias towards theoretical, synthetic and broad-brush approaches rather than the reporting of empirical data that may be of interest primarily to specialists.

Finally, political sociology is a subfield that crosses disciplinary boundaries: sociology, anthropology, human geography and political science. To have included only essays that are representative of a strictly political sociology enterprise (whatever that might be) would have restricted the scope of the series too severely, and we have not attempted it. There are thus essays quite directly addressed to, for example, geographers (for example, David Harvey, Volume One), which nevertheless are of direct relevance to key issues in political sociology. In this respect, the series is eclectic as well as broad, but this strikes us as a fair reflection of work in the field. A similar point can be made with respect to its theoretical pluralism: for better or worse, there is nothing like a dominant paradigm in political sociology.

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Introduction

Contemporary political sociologists are confronting an extraordinary challenge: the entire global system underwent a radical transformation in the final decades of the twentieth century. These enormous changes can be thematically summed up in regional and systemic terms. In Southern Europe, democratic forces triumphed over right-wing authoritarian regimes. Military dictatorships were also replaced by elected civilian governments in several Latin American countries. Authoritarianism declined in East and South Asia. In Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet empire introduced major changes in the political landscape. No less than 15 post-Soviet republics were established after the Soviet Union broke up. If we add in the dissolution of the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak states, we can count a total of 27 new countries. One-party regimes were reduced in number in sub-Saharan Africa, and Mandela's African National Congress ushered South Africa into the post-apartheid era (see Carothers, this volume, pp. 169–85). Analysts have, on the whole, retreated from a strongly optimistic position on these changes; they now tend to regard these transitions as fragile, uneven, institutionally flawed, incomplete and stalled (see O'Donnell, this volume, pp. 187–204). The heady days of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when US leaders enthusiastically declared that the USA had won the Cold War – a time in which Huntington (1991) heralded the transitions as the forward march of the 'third wave' of democracy – are now long past. These profound transformations have stimulated the search for new social science and normative paradigms as scholars attempt to generate interpretations that are adequate to the complex historical moment.

An exclusive focus on these regional developments, however, would be insufficient; the entire world-system and its fundamental elements have undergone major changes. Continuing the pattern already established during the great European empires in the industrial era, capitalist accumulation is precipitating a transnational circulation of raw materials, finished goods, investment funds and technical knowledge. The exploitation of labour and the pressures exerted by capital's representatives on governing institutions are hardly new phenomena. However, capitalism became a truly global phenomenon for the first time towards the end of the twentieth century. State socialism, which had been held up as a viable and desirable alternative to capitalism by Soviet leaders, crumbled. In China, market reforms introduced direct foreign investment and capital accumulation under the continuous leadership of the Communist Party and the national elite. In the former Soviet bloc, the disintegration of Communist Party hegemony and the rejection of state socialism by the political actors who gained some decision-making power after 1989 – that is, the elites and, to a lesser extent, the masses – ushered in privatization and the free market. For a time, leaders across the globe overwhelmingly endorsed the 'Washington consensus' in favour of deregulating investment relations and financial transactions, selling off all publicly-owned industries and resources, reducing public expenditures on social programmes and prioritizing measures necessary for the maintenance of sound monetary indicators (Bunce, 2001, p. 44).

The precise character of the relationship between democratization and economic development remains a debated topic (Robinson, 2006). Although the cross-national evidence

suggests that democratization and free-market policies are, to some extent, compatible and mutually supportive, this relationship varies in form and strength from region to region. The lingering effects of the previous authoritarian regimes remain salient; as such, cross-regional variations are inevitable. Other influences that yield region-specific results include the exact nature of the reform agenda and the 'payoffs attached to different approaches to democratization and economic reform' (Bunce, 2001, p. 45).

The world-system and the nation-state have also been radically transformed by various types of global interconnectedness. Trade, investment, cultural exchange, travel patterns, and communication lines that criss-cross nation-state borders have dramatically accelerated over the last few decades. Transnational social movements and international organizations have become much more prominent, while the power of the largest global corporations now surpasses that of most countries. War, economic crisis, famines and state failure have spurred large-scale migrations, humanitarian aid projects and the formation of substantial refugee settlements. At the same time, diasporic identification, ethnic cleavages, gender differences and socioeconomic inequality are complicating the whole question of the isomorphic 'fit' between 'nation' and 'state'.

In this volume we present essays that explore the exposure of the nation-state and the post-Second World War world-system to global forces. Is globalization actually reducing and transforming state sovereignty? Do we now inhabit, as Hardt and Negri (2001) suggest, a single empire with an increasingly homogeneous structure – domination by the corporate elite of the proletarianized masses? Or are we witnessing the deployment of plural labour-disciplining regimes and a wide variety of state structures and official discourses (Ong, 2006)? Clearly, ethnic, racial and religious identities remain salient, but how do they correspond to and intersect with continuous nation-state spaces that are demarcated by legally recognized borders? Have transnational movements, migration, sociocultural exchange and the displacement of massive refugee populations seriously undermined the nation-state? Are international and non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs) becoming, in the eyes of the stateless and the excluded, the only credible representatives to whom one must address one's rights claims? In what conditions do democratic state-building projects actually enhance political, civil and social rights, and when do they tend to contribute to the consolidation of elite power? How are the dilemmas surrounding state-building projects complicated by factors such as the pursuit by major powers, like Russia, the USA and China, of their geopolitical interests, and the consolidation of regional institutions such as the European Union (EU) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)? International organizations, for all their rhetorical endorsement of human rights, often fail to advance peace and social justice. The United Nations, for example, has not been able to act decisively at key moments to stop famines and genocidal wars, and major international actors, such as the USA and the most powerful corporations, tend to regard international law in an instrumental manner. Should democratic forces put their faith in a cosmopolitan vision of global citizenship, especially when they tackle quintessentially international and transnational problems like peace, terrorism, the drug trade and the protection of the environment?

Globalization Processes, Undecided and Complex Outcomes

By the end of the nineteenth century, the economies of the great European imperial metropolises were heavily dependent on trade with their colonies; in this sense, there is nothing new about the formation of deep economic linkages between the developed countries and the rest of the world. Looking beyond the data on the sheer volume of trade as a proportion of the national economy, however, we can grasp the novel character of contemporary globalization. Technological innovations have massively diminished time and distance in today's capitalist markets. The amount of investment capital and speculative funds that transnational corporations send around the globe on a daily basis is gigantic compared with the cross-border financial flows of previous eras, while passenger numbers and cargo loads continue to grow every year. Fibre optics, satellite communications, digital technology and the Internet have made it possible for various actors, from entrepreneurs coordinating multinational production sites to radical activists engaged in local or transnational forms of protest, to benefit from the 'information age' (Savitch, 2002, p. 181).

Wallerstein (2000, p. 250) maintains that the term 'globalization' is itself misleading. He contends that it is premature for intellectuals to declare that state sovereignty has withered away, that our identities have become profoundly unstable, and that the free market has triumphed once and for all over democratic forces. Instead, he identifies the present moment as an age of transition and instability that could give rise to any number of different outcomes. The period between 1945 and the 1970s saw the consolidation of the USA's political and economic power. Emerging from the war as the only industrialized country with an intact industrial base and a virtually undamaged infrastructure, the USA easily dominated this era of capitalist growth. It depended heavily, however, on a stable world order and an ever-expanding demand for its goods, both domestically and abroad. When Western Europe and Japan recovered and began to compete effectively with the USA, and the global economy was hit hard by rising oil prices and stagnating demand levels, economic crisis became the order of the day. Developing countries were crippled by unmanageable debts, while the USA itself spent its way out of recession and into its own international indebtedness over the long term by indulging in massive military expenditures, inegalitarian tax cuts, inadequately regulated mortgage schemes and consumerism on credit. Although East Asia seemed to be the exception during the 1980s – the economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore flourished, followed by South-east Asia – they too succumbed to a spectacular crisis only a few years later. Although capital is cunning enough to exploit the latest technological innovations in communication and transportation to relocate production time and time again across numerous far-flung sites in search of lower wage costs, Wallerstein contends that it is possible that this process will finally come up against its own limits and that the resistance of low-wage workers will culminate in a full-blown crisis in legitimacy. This outcome is especially likely insofar as the 'Washington consensus' monetary policies make compensating the lower strata through benefits and service provision increasingly difficult (Wallerstein, 2000). This is not to underestimate the tremendous diversity of resistance practices on the part of the displaced and unemployed. The latter may forego democratic coalition-building in favour of millennial myths or xenophobic attacks on migrant workers, for example (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2002). In our globalizing conditions, legitimacy crises can take on an infinite variety of guises.

The nation-state would face a serious challenge in each of the possible scenarios Wallerstein proposes. Whether these globalizing pressures yield a complete triumph of capital or a massive legitimacy crisis, non-state actors are bound to become more salient. Corporations, private police forces, ethnic group-based militias, mercenaries, pirates, drug cartels and terrorist organizations are encroaching upon the state's monopoly over security in an increasingly chaotic world (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 263). Multinational bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional supranational organizations such as the EU appear to be displacing the autonomous nation-state once and for all (Spruyt, 2002, p. 127). National governments are increasingly relying on for-profit non-state actors, such as banks, Internet service providers, mercenaries and service delivery contractors, to act as their proxies (Farrell, 2006; Singer, 2001). International transitions, domestic pressures, internal violence and economic crises have caused several states to fail, such that they can no longer control their peripheral regions or make a meaningful contribution to the security and welfare of their citizens. In wholly failed states like Somalia and Sudan, the putative national government lacks the capacity to command its constituents' loyalty; indeed, the most powerful forces in a failed state often undermine security and foment ethnic antagonisms themselves to advance their own instrumental interests (Rotberg, 2004). In legal discourse the principle of territorial sovereignty remains intact, and we can now speak of a 'world society' that has generated standardized and highly influential models of nation-state identity and purpose (Meyer, 2000, p. 234). Nevertheless, transnational interdependencies, both military and economic, and regional trade agreements have profoundly undermined the autonomy of all but the most powerful states (Spruyt, 2002, p. 142). Although scientists are now absolutely certain that human-created climate change will have a major impact on the globe, and transnational activist organizations are mounting an unprecedented campaign to promote global environmental protection, it is far from clear exactly how the nation-states and the global system as a whole will respond to the social, economic and political pressures related to climate change and environmental degradation (Speth and Haas, 2006; Wapner, 1996; Schreurs, 2003).

The regulation of economic processes is increasingly a polycentric matter in which the nation-state is obliged to cooperate with – or at least contend with – the interventions of IOs, supranational or multinational regional organizations, and subnational governmental actors such as large cities and semi-autonomous territories. A whole range of governmental institutions, working at diverse levels of jurisdiction, may be acting simultaneously, with greater or lesser degrees of coordination, in the same geographic area. Each of them may be working to adjust trade barriers, stabilize markets, and build up the infrastructure so that it favours particular economic sectors. They might also be working to enhance the potential for collective action among local stakeholders by setting up business federations, consumer groups or labour councils. Their policies could be designed to attract certain types of direct investment through targeted corporate tax policies, subsidies and sector-specific deregulation. At the same time, they might be seeking to discipline unruly labour or to protect the interests of the vulnerable wage-earners and the poor, depending upon their alliance with labour and the low-income sector (Le Galès, 1998).

What appears to us as a 'global economy' may be more accurately described as a cluster of regional trading blocs: the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners, Mercosur or Latin America, and the members of ASEAN. The growth in trade and investment within each of these four blocs is far greater than the increases between the blocs, or between

them and the rest of the world (Berger, 2000, pp. 47–8). From this perspective, the entire question of the major factors behind the expansion of economic interconnectedness takes on a new shape. Instead of concerning ourselves exclusively with the impact of independent variables, such as changes in communication and transport technologies, or the trends in comparative advantage, we should also be exploring the political processes that lead to the formation of effective regional trade agreements.

Regional Governance and the European Union's 'Democratic Deficit'

Väyrynen argues in Chapter 15 that the shifting and complex nature of regionalism necessitates careful attention to definitional and methodological issues. Given the variety of regional agreements, we should not assume that we will always be able to use a 'jigsaw' approach in which the borders of each region are given to us in discrete, sharply bounded and static forms. Clearly, geographical proximity is a key factor behind regional agreements; neighbouring states often have strong incentives to form an economic trading bloc or a security alliance, for example. In other cases, geographical proximity is enriched by the formation of shared identities based on common norms and shared cultural orientations. A regional trade agreement may depend upon the fact that the businesses in neighboring countries subscribe to a common approach to the market, the legitimacy of governmental regulation and the desirability of free trade. In some cases, the demand for regional integration can come 'from below': that is, from the market and civil society actors who are responding to externalities. Take, for example, the dilemmas faced by the fishing industries located in several different countries that are located on the shores of the same ocean. Each national industry might understand that over-fishing is taking place, and that the trend is introducing a negative externality, namely the depletion of the common stock. However, each national fishing industry would probably not choose to voluntarily submit to rules limiting its catch unless it could be reassured that all of the other national fisheries would be bound by a common set of seasonal quotas, and would face significant sanctions for any violation. Wary of a free rider problem, the national fishing industry would probably oppose restrictive domestic legislation until a regional agreement guaranteed collective action.

Market actors and civil society organizations may be enduring high opportunity costs because of the prevailing institutions, and they may therefore seek relief in the form of regionally coordinated rules, regulations and policies. The constructivist tendency within international relations places the emphasis, with respect to regionalism, on shared norms and values, such as the common subscription among ASEAN members to the 'ASEAN way' of resolving mutual conflicts. With the stress on the common exposure to externalities and the salience of norm sharing, these approaches to regionalism adopt a view that is much less static than the traditional state-centric security perspective.

Although the decline of the bi-polar Cold War system, the rise of globalization, and the shrinking of the state has made room for the rise of regionalism, Väyrynen also cautions against taking a one-sided perspective on the phenomenon. In the post-Cold War period, supraregional, subregional and microregional organizations have also flourished. Further, the conditions in most regions are not conducive to the establishment of the primacy of regional governance over state sovereignty. In the case of ASEAN, for example, the sharing of 'ASEAN way' dispute resolution principles (mutual respect, noninterference in domestic

affairs, consultation, and the dedication by each member state to building up a resilient government that can ward off internal threats) and the establishment of intraregional ties among the member states has not meant that the region has been able to eliminate mutual conflicts or to lead its member states to adopt a common approach to extraregional economic problems. In other cases, such as Latin America and the Middle East, regional unity remains relatively weak and uneven in part because external powers, such as the USA, continue to exert a great deal of influence.

By contrast, the EU has achieved the highest degree of integration of all the regional bodies and has expanded eastwards. For all its relative success, the EU has nevertheless been widely criticized as insufficiently representative and accountable. Habermas (2001) contends that a pan-European identity, based on a commitment to human rights, a shared concept of social justice and a European public sphere, should become the foundation for an EU *demos*. ‘Public-interest’ critics counter that citizens seek certain goods from their governments – high employment, economic growth and environmental protection – and they expect them to deliver these goods through effective and equitable policies and corrections for market failure. Excessive democratic deliberation, they continue, would make the EU inefficient; in some cases, intergovernmental bargaining or the delegation of decision-making to unelected expert bodies are far preferable to processes involving popular participation. In Chapter 16 of this volume Richard Bellamy holds that both approaches cannot avoid the difficulties that arise from the lack of a democratic consensus in Europe on ‘rights’ and the ‘public interest’ in the first place. If the EU precociously promulgates human rights principles or regulatory standards before the European *demos* emerges and democratic endorsement is given, then the EU might exacerbate its own ‘democratic deficit’.

The implications of the EU’s democratic deficit are serious. Not only does an EU democratic deficit render its institutions illegitimate, it also spreads corrosively into the societies of the member states. The actors within the EU that are primarily responsible for setting economic development, monetary and trade policies – the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank – are largely insulated from democratic accountability. With the shift in economic steering functions, such as monetary and trade policies, to the supranational level, the governing executives in the member states can increasingly ignore their national legislatures. It is entirely rational for them to seek to influence the EU bargaining sessions that take place behind closed doors instead of prioritizing domestic deliberation. Voters may have the greatest purchase in terms of democratic accountability where the representatives in their national legislatures are concerned. However, if EU supranational government has effectively stripped these bodies of their policy-making capacity, the citizens of the member states will lack democratic control over the policies that have the greatest impact on their everyday lives (Offe and Preuss, 2006). The problem is only exacerbated by the fact that powerful economic actors can utilize the EU’s provisions for capital movement within the region to press member states for favourable policies even where EU law leaves national sovereignty more or less intact. (Pollack, 2005, p. 385). Without institutionalized dissent, effective vehicles for blocking arbitrary decision-making and the popular teaching effects of vigorous political contestation, the EU’s democratic deficit becomes an almost unavoidable outcome. An anti-democratic cycle can be set into motion, as popular perception of the EU as an unaccountable and alien government stimulates apathy and fatalism, and encourages political illiteracy instead of engagement. Offe and Preuss (2006) nevertheless hold open the

possibility of addressing the EU's democratic deficit. Rejecting the view that European society is too differentiated to support a supranational *demos*, they envision the consolidation of an organic supranational republicanism based on the shared values of tolerance and respectful coexistence.

The formation of a robust pan-European consensus in favour of human rights may prove to be an increasingly difficult task. As the East European countries from the former Soviet bloc and Russia have joined the Council of Europe, they have signed and ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and have accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It remains to be seen, however, whether these new member states will comply with the Court's rulings. As an aside, it should be noted that the relationship between the ECHR and the European Court of Justice remains an open question.

We should also consider the risks inherent in the construction of a robust pan-European identity. If the solidarity between two Europeans who are 'foreign' to one another – such as a Belgian steelworker and a Greek olive-grower – is founded upon their shared opposition to the figure of the non-European and non-Western 'other' who threatens to penetrate the borders of 'Fortress Europe', European republicanism could ultimately be harnessed to advance highly illiberal policies targeting both non-European immigrants and the ethnic/racial minorities that are already settled within the member states. It is not clear, for example, that the European republicanism envisioned by Offe and Preuss would serve as an adequate antidote to racism in France. French republicanism claims to transcend minority particularism in favour of Enlightenment universalism, but French society is deeply marked by post-colonial racial antagonisms, social exclusion and xenophobia (Leca, 1992; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). The EU did not intervene effectively in a timely manner to stop the obvious forward march of extreme chauvinism and to block ethnic cleansing before bloodshed took place within its own region – that is, in the former Yugoslavia. Certainly, Bosnia can be constructed as the 'exotic' atypical case in which the lines of cultural, religious and national divisions are deeply rooted in complex historical patterns, as well as a bitterly contested zone made up of multiple civilizations that dangerously overlap one another. Because it was not a monolithic entity, the former Yugoslavia had plenty of pressure points that were ripe for exploitation by right-wing populist leaders. However, it could also be argued that these same features actually make Bosnia an exemplary European case. The interpretation of history is hotly debated throughout Europe, just as it is in Bosnia. Even if we set aside the whole issue of the settlement of the post-colonial populations within the EU member states since the Second World War, there is no place in Europe that is not the site of religious, linguistic, cultural and ethnic tensions (Balibar, 2004, p. 6). A European republican movement could only spawn a truly democratic civic consciousness insofar as it found the political will to confront the profound problem of racial discrimination and ethnic exclusion. Not only would it have to unify diverse citizens across the borders of the different member states without conjuring up the threat of a common enemy – the non-European and non-Western 'other' – it would have to make anti-racist multiculturalism one of its foundational values. The enormous extent of the challenge becomes clear when we recall the degree of diversity and the presence of ethnic tensions that exist within each member state as well.

Bhabha (1999) also points out that the EU's displacement of national sovereignty is uneven. For example, each member state retains its traditional prerogative over naturalization and

citizenship law. Paradoxically, an immigrant cannot gain EU citizenship without obtaining member-state citizenship; but he or she must negotiate the specific naturalization and citizenship law of the EU country that he or she enters the region. The immigrant cannot challenge the legitimacy of naturalization law or appeal a member state's decision on citizenship in the European Court of Justice. The EU does not require its members to conform to a uniform minimum standard of justice where naturalization law is concerned. EU protection against the unjust actions of the member state therefore arrives only after the naturalization and citizenship decisions have been made, at a time that is too late for those who have been arbitrarily excluded.

Anti-globalization 'Backlash'?

Hirst and Thompson argue that as globalization begins to substantially challenge the sovereignty of the nation-states and as transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations, regional governments and international agencies continue to push their way on to the world stage as the primary political forces, we will see a 'severe anti-globalization "backlash" as nationally-rooted publics experience a loss of the benefits of domestic governance and increased exposure to international pressures' (Hirst and Thompson, 2002, p. 249). In fact, the late twentieth century witnessed the enormously important expansion of transnational movements, international non-governmental organizations, and advocacy networks that are challenging the forward march of global capital, the violation of human rights, the USA's pursuit of worldwide hegemony, and the perpetuation of gender-based oppression (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Carr, 1999; Tarrow, 2001; Desai, 2005; Smith, 2001).

But Hirst and Thompson also point out that the globalizing forces may be perversely creating favourable conditions for the generation of their own limitations insofar as they give rise to the reassertion of the nation-state. The USA's self-interested position on trade is a case in point. Even as the Americans demand the submission of other trading partners to free-trade policies, such as the dismantling of protectionist tariffs, they have been quite selective in applying the same principles at home. US negotiators have ensured that, for the most part, the sectors in the US economy that are exposed to liberalized trade rules are the ones in which the country enjoys enormous competitive advantage (Hirst and Thompson, 2002, p. 249). Moreover, there are limits to globalization in the developing regions as well. Even if the states in the developing world lost their capacity to exercise their sovereignty to a meaningful degree, the hegemony of globalizing forces would remain contested. Both the masses and the elites in the developing countries would deeply resent the economic power exercised by the developed world. If capitalist forces ever managed to completely absorb or displace the nation-states in the developing world, they might nevertheless encounter serious challenges in the form of terrorism, widespread violations of intellectual property law, popular protest, petty theft, and the growth of informal economies and organized crime (Hirst and Thompson, 2002, p. 249).

There is, in fact, some evidence that middle-income and poor countries have suffered from the dismantling of trade barriers, while a small number of wealthy industrialized countries have gained significantly. The intensification of poverty in Africa during the final decades of the twentieth century, during which protectionist trade policies were weakened, is particularly dramatic (Brune and Garrett, 2005, p. 410). Scholars have reached a consensus

on the fact that as China and India opened up their economies, they experienced spectacular growth rates. However, it is very unclear whether we can build a generalizable model out of their particular records, and insufficient data and serious disputes among scholars about methodology continues to bedevil these comparisons. For example, economists influenced by the work of Amartya Sen favour 'human development' indexes over the measurement of GNP per capita (Beneria, 2003, pp. 16–21); and feminist advocates who are eager to critically assess country-specific progress towards the gender justice objectives outlined in the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing and in subsequent international agreements lament the fact that comprehensive and gender-sensitive data sets have been slow to develop (Walby, 2005).

Countries which lack strong domestic financial institutions that can handle the volatility that inevitably follows from trade and direct foreign investment appear to be particularly ill-equipped to reap significant gains from global economic development (Brune and Garrett, 2005, p. 411). Income inequality within Britain and the USA has increased since the 1970s, and most scholars agree that the introduction of neoliberal reforms is at least partly responsible (*ibid.*, p. 415).¹ Although studies on the relationship between globalization and inequality within other countries have generated mixed results, it seems clear that it is the poor who have borne the brunt of the adjustment costs in the developing world (*ibid.*, p. 416) and that the widening of the social divide between the haves and the have-nots has become an almost worldwide phenomenon (de Senarclens, 2001, p. 509). Global trade and investment patterns have produced spectacular crises such as the collapse of the East Asia economy between 1997 and 1999 (Wade, 2000); extreme volatility and deep recessions are bound to make an already inequalitarian pattern of distribution even harder to bear for the unskilled and the poor.

Paradoxically, to the extent that globalization aggravates inequality, exclusion and social upheaval, it may very well contribute to the rise of aggressive nationalist movements and the adoption of severely reactionary social policies by domestic governments (Appadurai, 2006). Liberal modernists have claimed, for example, that we are moving along a more or less unilinear evolutionary path that will culminate in a post-national era as we transcend archaic communal ties. The persistence, resurgence and remarkable malleability of nationalist identification – organized around a deep sense of communal identity, based on collectively shared symbols and myths, and yet mobile and pliable in the sense that it is capable of responding to an endless series of sociopolitical shifts (Anderson, 1991; Smith, 1996; Croucher, 2003) – call into question these liberal and modernist claims about our historical position.

Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the intensification of various nationalist sentiments will strengthen the legitimacy of the state. With political institutions failing to accommodate nationalist ambitions and with the resurgence of national communities that criss-cross territorial lines or remain stateless, the precise 'fit' between 'nation' and 'state' remains a vexed question (Guibernau, 2004). Turner and Corbacho optimistically contend that:

... national governments will continue to perform the tasks that their citizens want them to perform [such as the] regulat[ion of] the private sector, assur[ing] at least a minimum standard of living for their most needy citizens, and set[ting] out goals as clearly as possible so that the efficiency of public agencies can be measured and evaluated. (Turner and Corbacho, 2000, p. 110)

¹ Other major factors include the relative weakness and continuing decline of organized labour and the intensification of skill-based technological change (Brune and Garrett, 2005, p. 416).

However, to take but one example, the dismal performance of the Bush administration during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 casts serious doubt on this sort of rosy scenario. In the developed world alone, we will probably continue to witness a wide variety of nation-state responses to economic development and inequality, ranging from egalitarian and democratic responsiveness along the lines practised by the Scandinavian countries to the Bush administration's model of divide and rule in the USA, in which the wealthy were showered with tax breaks and the least well-off were subjected to aggressive policing and enormous economic pressures (Wacquant, 2002; Piven and Cloward, 1993).

All this implies that we can only make, at best, a conditional prediction with respect to the state's response to social cleavages. The fulfilment of the ideal functions specified by Turner and Corbacho requires a domestic balance of power among the prominent political actors that favours an egalitarian ethos, as well as a sufficiently powerful national government. To the extent that these are lacking, and the ideal functions enumerated by Turner and Corbacho are not fulfilled, we will probably witness even greater sociopolitical tensions. Turner and Corbacho are on firmer ground, however, when they predict that the highly functioning nation-states will continue to jealously guard their jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization policies (2000, p. 111).

Sassen (1999) usefully reminds us that the complex realities of our globalizing conditions are such that we cannot sustain an 'either/or' approach. It is from only the most reductionist perspective that we can conclude that there are only two possible outcomes: either the nation-state will be utterly displaced by corporations and supranational institutions or it will adapt perfectly to the new interdependencies and emerge out of this historical moment with renewed strength and vitality. Sassen, by contrast, rejects this sort of reductionism. The states themselves are actively participating in the construction of the legal and regulatory environment in which global capital conducts its business. It is the nation-state, for example, that sets tariffs, signs regional trade agreements and adopts a common currency. Sassen further argues that domestic governments and societies are undergoing their own transformations as a result of their profound involvement in global economic development. The governmental sectors that are linked to international finance may substantially augment their authority, even though the influx of foreign capital might remain quite minimal. By the same token, the nation-state must cope with global firms that are acquiring legally enforceable 'rights' and with supranational organizations that exert an unprecedented degree of influence on domestic decision-making. 'Washington consensus'-styled International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality, for example, entails a standard package of domestic institutional features, including the autonomy of the central bank, anti-inflation fiscal discipline and parity in exchange rates (Sassen, 1999). In this manner, Sassen returns to the themes introduced by Linda Weiss in Volume One on the remarkable adaptability of the nation-state in globalizing conditions and, in the case of those states with strong capacities, the renewal of state power in the international economic system.

A country that only opens its national economy up to the global system in a minor way might still witness a major transformation in its domestic politics. The board of directors for a US industrial firm, for example, does not have to hire illegal workers from Mexico and Central America or relocate production south of the border in order to press its US workers to accept lower wages and thereby contribute to the general disempowerment of labour. The board merely has to make a plausible threat to do so. Relatively small increases in the hiring

of migrant workers, trade and foreign direct investment can set significant shifts in domestic conditions into motion (Berger, 2000, p. 46). The relationship between nation-states and private firms becomes all the more complicated insofar as intra-industry trade constitutes impressive proportions of cross-border transactions (*ibid.*, p. 47).

Where structural adjustment policies and cuts in social spending lead to unemployment, social service reductions, and impoverishment, women are typically expected to pick up the slack as unpaid care-givers. The decline in men's wages can also trigger renewed pressures on women to increase their paid labour efforts, especially insofar as food and other necessities become more expensive (Beneria, 2003, pp. 47–53). Although claims for public support addressed to the nation-state remain an indispensable tool for the advance of gender justice, the nation-state has been much too ambivalent and uneven where the interests of low-income women are concerned to be considered as a reliable ally against the gendered inequality that can arise as a result of globalization.² Global capital's expansion of the service sector and semi-skilled labour-intensive manufacturing for export in developing countries has had a wide variety of effects on women workers. While low wages and exploitative conditions remain commonplace, some of these women have obtained a higher income and have enhanced their bargaining power within their kinship groups as a result (*ibid.* pp. 91–130). A few women are even using their wages from export-production-oriented work to found women's centres and legal assistance programmes that have, in turn, transformed their social status and political identities (Bergeron, 2001).³

In Chapter 1, Michael Mann tackles the challenge of predicting the nation-state's future in our globalizing conditions. His conceptual framework establishes five different categories of sociospatial networks. Contemporary social interactions may take the form of local networks located at the level of subnational social relationships; national networks, whose boundaries more or less correspond to those of the nation-state; international networks: the relations between national entities or the nation-states themselves; transnational networks: the relations that pass through and criss-cross national boundaries, such as those that create and sustain a common cultural or ethnic identity in multiple countries; and global networks that operate effectively across most, if not all, of the globe. Mann's perspective allows us to probe the question of globalization's impact with much more precision. The expansion of international networks can be entirely compatible with the maintenance of a strong nation-state, for example. During the era of industrial capital accumulation, the rise of the industrialists coincided with the enhancement of the nation-state and its international networks. It was the local networks that were displaced by industrial capital's transnational networks; by and large,

² As an aside, we should note that the rhetoric about globalization often takes a gendered form. When, for example, global capital is depicted as a great masculine force naturally destined to overwhelm and victimize the feminized local economy, this deployment of gendered tropes may contribute to a popular sense of apathetic resignation about global corporate power and the concealment of local capital's interests.

³ This is not to suggest that feminists approach the existing data-sets and models on the socioeconomic impact of globalization in an uncritical manner. Many feminist economists who are studying the impact of structural adjustment policies have argued that many of the dominant social science models, such as neoclassical economics and rational-choice analyses of decision-making, are radically insufficient interpretive paradigms, and that the capturing of gendered injustice requires alternative methodologies (Beneria, 2003, pp. 41–62).

the consolidation of the nation-state was compatible with, and was sometimes complemented by, the emergence of these particular transnational linkages.

Whereas Sassen points out the mutual interdependence between the relevant sectors of the nation-state and contemporary global capital, Mann argues that even when a country's economy is being opened up to globalization, it may be benefiting from the assistance of national and international networks. The ownership, assets, and research and development arms of the global corporations are disproportionately located in their 'home' country's territory. Of course, economic integration in Europe has created a fully transnational market system and supranational form of governance. For Mann, however, Europe remains an extreme case that cannot be generalized to the globe. Globalism will remain 'impure' and the relationship between national and transnational networks will retain its symbiotic character. Even the quintessential phenomenon of globalization, the relocation of a factory from the developed West to a low-wage developing country, can be partly explained in terms of factors that are linked to national and international networks. Mann contends that it is 'the Koreans' and 'the Mexicans' – that is, the countries that have the closest trade ties and friendliest relations with the developed nations – that tend to play host to the factories that were previously located in the OECD nations (p.12). (It is not clear exactly how Mann would account for production migration to China and India, however.)

To take another example, transnational social movements can end up enhancing many different types of networks, thereby generating mixed results where the nation-state is concerned. Environmentalists, for example, may seek to build a transnational civil society, but they may also find themselves obliged to appeal to the nation-state representatives who populate the intergovernmental organizations that are increasingly charged with ecological preservation (p. 21). Mann concludes that the only network that is bound to decline is the local one; ethnic tensions may lead to the fragmentation of existing states into smaller and more homogeneous nation-states (pp. 25–26).

War, Terrorism and Transnational Ethnic Conflict

It is also unlikely that global disarmament treaties, international law tribunals and the consolidation of international norms will completely displace the nation-state in the security arena. Once again, the trends are complicated in their variety and mixed in their structures. After the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC on 11 September 2001 by the terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda, the USA and Britain ushered in a historic turn towards a re-legitimation of warfare. In Afghanistan, the USA sought to destroy Taliban strongholds by engaging in what Shaw (2002) has dubbed 'risk-transfer militarism'. In some respects, the Americans and the British tried to adopt a similar strategy when they invaded Iraq. (In fact, Mann (2004) suggests that the lack of a reliable local surrogate force, as well as ineffective political and ideological strategies, made the failure of imperial hegemony for the Americans highly likely in Iraq, regardless of the USA's obvious military superiority.)

In a 'risk-transfer' operation, the Western countries seek to minimize their own military casualties. The Western countries target hostile forces through this operation, and they tolerate a substantial death toll where their local surrogate forces and civilian populations are concerned (Shaw, 2002). Thus the 'risk-transfer' approach could weaken humanitarian norms,

since the latter value all human lives equally, oppose military aggression and condemn civilian losses. In Chapter 2 Paul Hirst takes a pessimistic view on the consolidation of international human rights norms and holds that while it seems likely that most states will generally respect economic regulations, Western countries will probably continue to practise a double standard. The USA abides by international law on security matters quite narrowly and only insofar as such compliance allows it to advance its geopolitical interests. The USA and the EU counsel non-European governments to respect human rights norms, but they often refuse to be bound by them in turn (pp. 41–42). Indeed, the USA has unsigned the Rome Treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the grounds that it encroaches upon its sovereignty and illegitimately exposes individual US citizens – especially military service personnel and administration officials – to criminal prosecutions and convictions (McNerney, 2001). By the same token, it could be argued that the international human rights movement has achieved a great deal, especially since the early 1990s. With several international and regional treaty bodies now holding individuals and states accountable for human rights violations on a regular basis, and with the growing trend among international non-governmental organizations to establish partnerships with local democratic forces to expose wrongdoing, a certain degree of guarded optimism on human rights may be in order, especially where the core geopolitical interests of the great powers, such as the USA, Russia and China, are not at stake.

Although terrorist organizations seem to be rivalling the nation-states in the security arena in several regions of the world, we are actually witnessing a blurring of the line between state and non-state actors (Kaldor, 2003, p. 175). Kaldor (2003) cautions against an ethnocentric interpretation of Islamic fundamentalism and its impact on the international system. Sweeping generalizations about the more than 1 billion Muslims across the globe cannot be sustained in light of Islam's tremendous diversity; even within a single country, Sunni/Shia, urban/rural, and class differences among and between Muslims can be quite pronounced. From a political perspective, the apolitical pietist movements and secular Muslims share very little in common with political Islam, the mass movements that seek political power to establish a God-fearing society (Sadowski, 2006; Mahmood, 2005). Kaldor points out that the trend towards extremist political mobilization, which often involves violent strategies, can be found among many national groups and that terrorist organizations proclaim affinities with all the major world religions (Kaldor, 2003, p. 174). The sheer sum of terrorist-related incidents may not have increased since the 1970s; what is new in recent decades is the complex integration of violent religious and secessionist organizations with traditional political actors, such as political parties, key leaders and governing regimes (*ibid.*, p. 175). Long-running conflicts in the Middle East or in African countries, such as Sudan and the Congo, themselves produce pockets of lawlessness in which extremist ideologies, arms dealing, insecurity and the recruitment of new volunteers can flourish (*ibid.*, p. 187). Kaldor calls the major terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda 'regressive globalizers': they respond to the insecurities associated with globalization and they take the form of complex transnational networks that rely on cross-national fundraising, criminal activity and the latest digital communication and media technologies. At the same time, however, they pursue an altogether familiar goal: they seek to control existing nation-states or to bring new ones into being. They claim that such control would allow them to roll back the degenerate effects of globalization and to establish ethnically homogeneous and/or morally pure societies within a sovereign territory (*ibid.*, p. 195).

In extreme cases, ethnic conflict can become so widespread and destructive that it can bring a nation-state to the verge of failure and even total collapse. Country-specific analysis may remain indispensable, however, even where the outcome, such as state failure, is the same. Peter Uvin argues in Chapter 3, for example, that the ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, two neighbouring countries in East-Central Africa, belong to distinct paradigms. In Burundi, severe ethnic-based discrimination and inequality gave way to a full-blown civil war. Resources in Rwanda, by contrast, were distributed along regional and social lines, rather than ethnic differences. Although the governing class was Hutu in Rwanda, there were many Hutu have-nots as well. The elite Hutu deflected popular discontent by fomenting the aggressive exclusion of the Tutsi minority, despite the fact that most of the previous Tutsi rulers had fled the country. With the routinization of Hutu violence against the Tutsi, it was a small step to genocide.

From the perspective of many democratic theorists, the presence of plural ethnic and religious groups does not necessarily constitute a threat to a liberal democratic polity; rather than exclusion and suppression, they propose various models for accommodation, compromise, deliberation and mutual learning across differences (Bellamy, 2000; Kymlicka, 1995; Benhabib, 2002; Young, 2000). By the same token, nationalist identification remains salient in the midst of increasing transnational interdependencies; the dislocations that often arise out of globalizing conditions may even be strengthening an 'us' versus 'them' attitude (Croucher, 2003; Kaldor, 2004) that can animate many different types of collective action, from the relatively benign formation of sports fan clubs to the most vicious types of ethnic cleansing (Mann, 1999). Looking in particular at the 'nationalism of resistance', Ashutosh Varshney (Chapter 4) contends that we can best understand nationalist or ethnic identification as a combination of what Weber called 'value rationality' with 'instrumental rationality'. Extreme acts of self-sacrifice on behalf of one's 'people' appear to be irrational if we uncritically define reason in an exclusively instrumental manner. Because the 'nationalism of resistance' prizes dignity and self-respect above all else, even when the assertion of a collective identity and the pursuit of a shared world vision is likely to end in defeat, actors who are compelled by this type of belief system are primed to accept costly sacrifices and to remain steadfast to their cause over long periods of time.

International Organizations, the 'Development Industry', and Non-governmental Organizations

According to Said (2003), Western discourse is shaped by 'Orientalism', the tendency to regard the developing countries as a more or less homogeneous bloc unified by the backwardness of their cultures. Although Said certainly recognizes that Westerners are capable of tremendous compassion and generosity towards the not-West, he cautions that even their most apparently altruistic engagements are generally framed by a confidence in the superiority of modern Euro-American values and knowledge, and by a firm belief in the deep-seated incompetence of the developing world where self-government is concerned. In a similar vein, Tim Mitchell (Chapter 6) dissects the rhetorical manoeuvres that lie behind the international development agencies' naturalistic description of Egypt as an 'overpopulated' country that is poorly endowed in arable land. He argues that Egypt has the potential to achieve self-sufficiency in food, given its modest population growth and its impressive record in agricultural productivity.

The problems of widespread malnutrition and dependency on agricultural imports cannot be blamed on the country's geophysical resources. For Mitchell, elite decision-making, acute socioeconomic inequalities, a lack of democratic accountability and foreign intervention all work together to produce a shortage in affordable food commodities. For example, domestic agricultural production has been dramatically skewed in favour of meat industry inputs. The resulting red meat, poultry and dairy products are largely consumed, however, by a relatively minute fraction of the country's population, namely the wealthy elite. This massive production imbalance has nevertheless been deliberately promoted by the Egyptian and US governments, as well as the IMF, through taxation, subsidy and loan schemes. The geographic determinism espoused by the 'development industry' – the international NGOs, UN agencies, the USA and other foreign donors – displaces questions of social inequality and conceals the influence of the US government and the development industry itself within Egypt.

In Chapter 5, Balakrishnan Rajagopal also seeks to enhance our interpretation of the expansion of international organizations (IOs) while rejecting a simplistic 'realist' argument that would reduce them to nothing more than the strategic instruments of powerful nation-states. Rajagopal also objects to the functionalist account that portrays the IOs' expansion between the late 1970s and 1990s as an apolitical and technical process. He seeks to demonstrate how the resistance practices of 'Third-World' social movements – peasants, ethnic and religious groups, environmentalists, disgruntled masses and poverty advocates, feminists and so on – were central to the IOs' development.

The picture becomes even more complicated when we take into account the various ways in which NGOs strategically position themselves as advocates for 'the people'. Indeed, NGOs and transnational advocacy networks have been able to reframe key issues, attract public attention and persuade reluctant governments to fulfil treaty obligations and address human rights claims, environmental demands, calls for peace and disarmament (Jacobson, 2000, pp. 156–59; Simmons, 1998). At the same time, NGOs have been drawn into a new series of difficult political dilemmas. In Latin America, feminist NGOs that might otherwise maintain an organic connection with social movements on the ground are pressed to take a technical-professional form by the neoliberal state, insofar as the latter deploys them in its policy-making process as 'gender experts' or as social service delivery subcontractors, thereby distancing them from their movement constituencies (Alvarez, 1999).

As Rajagopal explains, the response of the World Bank and the IMF to popular resistance and the NGO campaigns has certainly not been uniform in all cases. In some countries, they have encouraged particular movements. In others, however, they have deflected, demobilized, and coopted the dissenters. In a more general sense, the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the WTO, have intruded upon the policy-making areas that previously fell under the jurisdiction of national governments. Although these IOs have responded to both the prodding of NGOs and popular protest by adopting enhanced transparency and monitoring protocols, it is not at all clear that ordinary citizens can have a meaningful impact on their decision-making or effectively hold them accountable (Woods and Narlikar, 2001). Rajagopal nevertheless maintains that the structures, agendas and investments of the World Bank and the IMF result in part from their intensive, albeit ambivalent, interactions with subaltern political actors.

Democratization, ‘Transitology’ and Post-communism

Occupying a position adjacent to the development industry, the US ‘democracy promotion community’ has also built up a shared world-view, namely the democratic transition paradigm. As Thomas Carothers explains in Chapter 8, the US governmental bodies and NGOs that seek to promote democracy abroad tend to view virtually every collapsing dictatorship or authoritarian regime as if it were embarked upon a common and unstoppable journey towards economic liberalization and sociopolitical democratization. It would be unfair to describe this model as an unalloyed form of ‘Orientalism’; one of the virtues of the democratic transition perspective is that it rejects colonial racist ideas about the impossibility of democratic government outside the Western context, and, indeed, optimistically predicts the triumph of democracy in a wide range of cultural settings. Nevertheless, the democratic transition paradigm does construct Euro-American government as quintessentially democratic and also assumes that every country that has broken with a dictatorial tradition will naturally follow a teleological unfolding process that will culminate in the adoption of the Euro-American model. While that optimism has been proven well founded in a few cases – for example, in Spain, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Chile and Taiwan – the record in the vast majority of ‘third-wave countries’ is much more mixed. For all their post-authoritarian developments, such as the regular holding of elections and the acceptance of an organized political opposition, they nevertheless fail to satisfy the democratic conditions of ‘transitology’. Carothers argues that the democratic deficit in these countries is so great that the transitologists’ habitual attachment of qualified democratizing labels to these countries has become an act of wishful thinking.

Some societies in transition have broken decisively with authoritarianism but retain authoritarian enclaves. In other cases, transitioning countries have no coherent and competent state apparatus that can enforce the law and protect their citizens’ rights. An elected executive in these conditions may face such an incomplete set of constraints that it can easily step outside the rule of law. If a post-authoritarian society possesses any of these flaws, the society in question fails to meet the requirements for a ‘consolidated democracy’. In such a country, democracy is not yet ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Comparative overviews that merely locate various post-authoritarian societies along an ideal democratization trajectory can therefore lack analytical purchase. In Chapter 9, Guillermo O’Donnell borrows Dahl’s (1996) concept of ‘polyarchy’ to capture several Latin American countries in their mid-1990s conditions with more precision. A polyarchy has regular elections that are generally free and fair, a military that is subordinate to civilian rule, a relatively free press, and respects the people’s freedom of association. However, it also lacks key liberal democratic and republican features. For example, even though the polyarchal states are brought under the rule of law, they usually tend to lack ‘horizontal accountability’. State agencies are generally not brought under the scrutiny and control that ought to be exerted by other state agencies and branches of government. As such, claims O’Donnell, a polyarchy can be marred by clientilism, corruption, and the unchecked expansion of the executive branch.

The timing of the transition from authoritarianism is itself a complex puzzle. For example, Geddes suggests that because the officers in a military dictatorship tend to value the military institution itself above and beyond governing power, they may ‘cling less tightly to power’ when they sense that the unity and capacity of the military is becoming threatened (Geddes, 1999, p. 140). Military dictatorships, such as the junta that ruled Argentina between 1976 and

1983, are typically plagued by internal disagreements and splits before the transition. They often sit down at the bargaining table with the democratic opposition well before popular protests break out. 'Personalist' dictatorships, by contrast, usually attempt to hold on to power at all costs. Personalist dictators may be senior officers in the military, but they tend to prioritize their own individual agendas over the status of the armed forces as a whole. They usually strive to inculcate a cult of personality and prefer to concentrate power within a very small circle of family members and hand-picked and trusted advisers. They do not tolerate opposition from career military officers and sometimes establish an elite security force that reports directly to them. The latter in turn may enter into a rivalry with the traditional armed forces and be deployed in secret missions designed to root out alleged 'traitors' among military officers, the upper echelons of the dictator's own party, or the intellectual elite. The Somoza dictatorships in Nicaragua that ended in 1979 with the Sandinista uprising are classic examples of personalist dictatorships. Transition from this form of authoritarianism is often a drawn-out affair in which mass rebellion plays a key role (Geddes, 1999, pp. 140–41).

Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (Chapter 7) certainly recognize the plurality of democratic forms, but they nevertheless insist that, in every truly democratic society, policy-makers are held accountable in the public sphere by the citizens, usually through the indirect avenues afforded by the competitive election of representatives to legislative bodies. They argue that even where a democratic ethos is lacking – as in a society whose coherence relies on the strategic prudence of antagonistic actors rather than deeply held sentiments of egalitarianism, solidarity, liberty and the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities, for example – the democratic system of government can nevertheless be safeguarded by the contingent consent of the people. In this sense, Schmitter and Karl argue that democratizing transitions can succeed even where the society has not already established a robustly democratic way of life. Of course, such transitions may in fact create conditions conducive to the inculcation of democratic 'habits'; the authors' point is that the shift away from authoritarianism towards liberty, equality and freedom can proceed even where these values are not widely shared (p. 163).

Students of Rousseau are familiar with this paradox: how can a democratic government be successfully founded when the society in question has not yet given rise to a democratic people, given that the very founding of a democracy depends on the presence of an already constituted and vibrant democratic culture (Rousseau, 2006; Connolly, 1993; Honig, 2001)? Valerie Bunce's (Chapter 11) intervention on the importance of mass protest and the constraints upon elite decision-making is apposite. She argues that the post-communist cases present significant challenges to the received wisdom about democratic transitions that had been built up out of empirical research on southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. To take but one vector of her essay as an example, the transitologists had come to believe that, in an ideal path to democracy, a tightly restricted set of authoritarian elites and representatives of the democratic opposition would strive to 'forge compromises that promote political stability during the construction of a democratic order' (p. 219). Given the uncertain context, these pacts can usefully limit the range of reform issues that make it to the bargaining table and establish a functioning transitional government with representation from across the political spectrum.

In other words, this type of solution to the Rousseauian paradox is piecemeal and pragmatic, rather than radical and democratic. Paradoxically, it makes sense for the democratic opposition

to collaborate in the demobilization of 'the people' at this moment. From the transitology perspective, the democratic forces tactically gain from the foreclosure of mass protests because it helps them to carve out a limited and manageable agenda that they can then bring to the bargaining table, thereby enhancing their chance of successful negotiations with the authoritarian leaders. The authoritarians and their close allies in the military would, of course, seize upon any evidence of 'disorder' as an indication that only the return of a full-blown dictatorship would preserve the nation from total chaos. By blocking huge demonstrations in the streets and massive strikes that might cripple virtually every economic sector, the democratic opposition advances its position by weakening the authoritarians' ability to legitimate a coup d'état.

However, Bunce points out that the transition to democracy in many East European societies, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic states, actually began with mass protests. Popular mobilization aided democratization by expanding the political imaginary in a democratic direction, thereby opening up previously unthinkable governmental alternatives as genuinely legitimate, coherent and viable possibilities. With people demonstrating on the streets, the authoritarian leaders felt that they had to enter into negotiations with the democratic forces. The democratic leaders thereby gained an improved strategic position and the encouragement that they needed to press their case all the more assertively. Moreover, the protests helped to lay the basis for a strong performance by the democratically-oriented candidates in subsequent elections (p. 220). These transitions are all the more remarkable given the fact that they involved ambitious and radical political and economic reforms. Mass demonstrations caused the authoritarians to lose confidence in their power and encouraged the democratic leaders to set aside moderate compromises (p. 222). In short, these particular post-communist features cannot be reconciled with the transitologists' ideal narrative.

One of the many caveats and complexities noted by Bunce revolves around the timing of specifically nationalist types of popular protest. In countries such as Croatia, Georgia and Kosovo, nationalist mobilizations sprang up well before the fall of state socialism, due to the strong sense of national identity among the masses and local elites. In these cases, local ethnic minorities turned to the Soviet centre and the Communist Party for assistance in the face of the exclusionary nationalist movements. The Soviet forces in both Moscow and the satellite state in turn cracked down on the popular nationalist movement and advanced their divide-and-rule objectives by enhancing the power of the local minorities and suppressing the liberal-democratic opposition. In this sense, early nationalist protest was a symptom of, and a factor behind, the reduction of the political terrain to a bitterly contested zero-sum national/ethnic struggle. (Although this account is designed to capture a transitional pattern, it can nevertheless help us to understand the alliances that have endured well beyond the post-communist transition moment. Bunce's argument anticipates, for example, the tensions between Russia and the government of Georgia that flared up to the level of armed conflict in 2008, when Russia crossed over the Georgian border ostensibly to protect the separatist region of South Ossetia from Georgia's national government.)

It is no coincidence, then, that the Soviet bloc countries that had relatively early nationalist mobilizations now tend to lag far behind where democratization is concerned. As Bunce points out, democracy tends to be more advanced in the countries in which nationalist mobilizations began later, after state socialism had already begun its final decline. Critics have also pointed to a contiguous set of problems related to democratic mobilization. In countries like the

GDR, Slovenia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, popular protest movements played a key role in toppling the regime and voting their dissident leaders into government. Einhorn notes that women were 'active at all levels in pre-1989 peace, human rights, and other opposition or dissident movement in East Central Europe' (1991, p. 16). Nevertheless, they constituted only a small minority of the elected representatives in the new governments and were almost completely absent at the ministerial level. In this sense, the popular movements betrayed fundamental liberal-democratic principles by failing to secure an equitable representation of women. They also failed to preserve women's rights in key areas such as reproductive freedom and the provision of services like childcare that facilitate free decision-making in circumstances where paid labour has to be combined with care-work (Einhorn, 1991).

According to Ernest Gellner (Chapter 10), we can make sense of the fact that different nationalist movements are associated with such dramatically different outcomes by contrasting the East European nationalist narrative with that of its West European counterpart. The dawning of modernity and industrialization was central to the rise of nineteenth-century-styled nationalism in Western Europe. In the pre-industrial period, agrarian feudalism lent itself to the weaving together of an intricate cultural fabric that featured robust local particularisms and deeply held parochial sentiments. Modern industrialism, with its emphasis on universal education, a rationalized and codified legal system, countrywide standardization in market relations, a professional bureaucracy and a central government endowed with at least a minimal degree of authority and competence, is much more oriented towards the emergence of a nationwide culture and political ethos. From this perspective, nationalist identification is not so much the upwelling of an irrepressible atavistic 'herd instinct', but the by-product of the rapid bourgeoisification of modern society. In the Soviet case, by contrast, Leninist and Stalinist statism severely interrupted this trajectory; the Soviet bloc countries experienced industrialization as centre-periphery domination. The party, rather than the business leaders and the rapidly expanding middle class, became the vehicle for the introduction and enhancement of industrial development. Further, as Bunce points out, Brezhnev deliberately weakened the central state in order to appease otherwise restless rent seekers (pp. 233–34). Nationalist movements within the Soviet bloc therefore found great opportunity in state socialism's decline.

Lacking a foundation in modern industrialism, East European nationalisms have taken on highly diverse characteristics. Indeed, Gellner finds resemblances between various modern East European nationalist movements with each of Western Europe's historical stages of nationalist development. Where 'ethnic irredentism ... [and] murderous violence' was largely reserved, in the West European case, to the pre-1945 period, Gellner finds similar mobilizations in contemporary Eastern Europe (p. 212). Gellner recognizes that Northern Ireland and the Basque region are exceptions to what he regards as Western Europe's evolution beyond violent forms of ethnic nationalism. Going beyond this concession, it should also be noted that xenophobia and racial-ethnic nationalist movements are also thriving in Western Europe as well; even if they are rarely responsible for murderous violence, they can certainly rise to the level of severe exclusions. These nationalist forces take aim first and foremost at the non-European immigrant, rather than territorial claims that would conflict with the interests of other European countries. Gellner, however, overlooks their prominence in contemporary Western Europe, perhaps because they lack an irredentist orientation. Nevertheless, their ferocity and widespread appeal are such that they should not be underestimated.

Post-colonial theory regards nationalism as a ‘Janus-faced’ phenomenon; although it is all too often wielded by authoritarians, nationalism has also been a central rallying point for the anti-colonial struggles. Anti-colonial nationalism is not a throwback to a premodern period in which the timeless ethnic loyalties were more salient. As a response to colonialism, nationalist social movements were quintessentially modern, notwithstanding the fact that they were built out of a shared longing for a geographical homeland. The retrograde dimension of nationalism’s ‘Janus-face’ is all the more likely to come to the fore today, given that contemporary nationalisms seek to tie cultures and identities to a fixed territory and therefore work against the grain of the deterritorializing effects of migration and capital exchange (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge and Chakrabarty, 2000, pp. 578–89).

Authoritarian forces in the countries formerly governed by centralized state socialism (the former Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia and Albania) can still call up the reactionary energies of exclusionary nationalism today, more than two decades after Gorbachev launched the *perestroika* movement. In Gellner’s terms, these nationalist identifications are insufficiently mediated by a shared subscription to a common socioeconomic project, like industrialization, which can be persuasively depicted as serving the interests of every social sector and income bracket. Gellner also cautions that the ethnic patterns in these countries are enormously complicated (p. 212). In many cases, nationalist-ethnic affiliations are often the popular associations that lie most readily to hand in the chaos of the post-Soviet environment, especially in countries like Russia in which extreme social dislocations are common, and state weakness, governmental incompetence and corruption make an effective political resolution of competing demands unlikely. The investment among the governing elites in official secrecy and the renewal of the security apparatus is such that they continue to view the appeal to nationalist loyalty as a helpful tool for the deflection of popular calls for governmental transparency and accountability. Although Bunce’s research cautions against any simplistic dismissal of every nationalist mobilization as an intrinsically anti-democratic force, Gellner’s argument usefully draws our attention to the limitations of a political model that is explicitly or implicitly based on West European history and thereby sharpens our appreciation of the complicated post-communist terrain and the relatively high degree of uncertainty that characterizes many of the democratic transitions in the region.

At the same time, the durability of Russia’s flawed democracy is remarkable. Although the Soviet collapse teaches us to appreciate the brittleness of the state socialist institutions, post-Soviet Russian society has also proven that it possesses remarkably robust coordination mechanisms such that it can continue to function well enough under conditions of great uncertainty. Expectations about what fellow citizens will do in a new context – shaped not only by instrumentalist calculation and incentive, but also by cultural beliefs and historical legacies – can bring about a series of rapid cascading shifts across several equilibrium points in the midst of profound disorder (Laitin, 2000).

Human Rights, Migration and Cosmopolitanism

In Chapter 12, Bryan Turner argues that the slow development of a sociology of rights stems from the scepticism of Marx, Durkheim and Weber towards the universalism of human rights theory and natural law. Sociologists have found Marshallian discourse on citizenship that specifies civic, political and social rights much more attractive because it appears to be value-

neutral and does not depend on a universal ontology. Turner persuasively points out the covert normative dimension in Marshall: for Marshall, citizenship ought to evolve according to the three-stage narrative in order to address the needs of the working class without challenging the capitalist structure of the social order. He concludes that the concept of citizenship is too bound up with the nation-state system and domestic social control interests to operate as an adequate foundation for human rights in our globalizing condition. Turner proposes, instead, that we develop a set of human rights principles that would be binding for the nation-states throughout the global community on the basis of two fundamental tenets: first, our shared experience of vulnerability in the face of corporeal frailty and the precarious nature of our social institutions; and, second, our collective sympathy for the 'other'.

Turner's approach to the human body is reminiscent of various feminist phenomenological theories. However, the most promising feminist thinkers working in this vein propose an approach to reproductive rights that is simultaneously based on women's common experiences of the female body and yet sensitive to the stratification of women along racial, ethnic and national lines (Eisenstein, 2004; Petchesky, 2003; Silliman *et. al.*, 2004).

Martha Nussbaum (2006) has offered a vision of ethical cosmopolitanism that resembles that of Turner, but it has met with an ambivalent response. Clearly, if we could build up a 'thin' theory of universal human rights that would eschew Eurocentrism in favour of multicultural sensitivity and yet be substantial enough to endow the individual with meaningful protections and entitlements, we would be greatly enhancing the struggles for social justice around the globe. Although the USA has refused to support the International Criminal Court (ICC), scholars and advocates nevertheless argue that legal proceedings such as the international war crimes tribunals can persuade elites and masses alike to comply with international humanitarian norms and to moderate the cycles of revenge and counterattack in the aftermath of atrocities and genocide (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004). The stateless populations in particular – refugees, asylum seekers and indentured workers who are trafficked across international borders, and peoples displaced by major military conflicts (see Castles, Chapter 13; Bhabha, Chapter 14) – depend on international law when they advance their human rights claims. By the same token, an imperialist hegemon, such as the USA, can advance its strategic interests by constructing military intervention as a noble cause intended to defend the human rights of oppressed minorities, such as the Kurds in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or women in the Taliban's Afghanistan (Abu Lughod, 2002). Only a robust mobilization of local resistance, transnational human rights movements, and actors in the global civil society can guard against such an opportunistic distortion of the human rights tradition.

There is much to be admired in Turner's emphasis on human rights and Nussbaum's theory of ethical cosmopolitanism. Unlike Rawls, these thinkers do not accept the notion that the individual has a fully-fledged moral obligation only towards his or her fellow members of a given nation-state society. On the contrary, Turner and Nussbaum insist that the citizenship status or the geographic location of an individual human being has no bearing on the question of whether he or she is a person of moral concern for us. Like Young and Pogge, Turner and Nussbaum can move from the conceptualization of transnational and international morally binding ties to a theory of cosmopolitan obligation. Young, for example, proposes a model in which 'all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices' (Young, 2007, pp. 159–60). In particular, she praises the anti-sweatshop movement for grasping the morally binding

tie between affluent clothing consumers and the highly exploited workers in the textile manufacturing sector, even though that bond typically takes on a cross-national character (Young, 2007, pp. 159–86). For his part, Pogge (1992) proposes a model of institutional reform in which governmental authority would be subtracted from the nation-state and then vertically dispersed across a series of nested units operating at various non-state jurisdictional levels, from global administrations to local governments.

However, Turner and Nussbaum must confront the consequences that follow from the fact that the human experience of the body is deeply mediated by culture. The project of constructing a universal principle of corporeal frailty, human capability and disability will always come up against cultural specificities. There will always be more than one possible way of constructing a rational argument about the ‘self’ and his/her relationship to the ‘community’. The best way for democratic political forces in the developed world to proceed is not to fall back on top-down liberal educational missions designed to instill the virtue of ‘compassion’ in the developing societies that lack democratic governments. Given that such a mission would inevitably champion a Euro-American-centred perspective, it would end up suppressing alternative ways of thinking about caring for the ‘other’ and thereby augment colonization. The task instead is to deepen the ‘democratization of knowledge’ and expand the mutually transformative dialogues between different ethical paradigms (Truong, 2006). We should turn up the volume on the voices of the subordinate groups who live in specific institutional conditions of exploitation and domination and take on the democratic lessons that are embedded in their diverse struggles against capitalist greed and racist discrimination, state-sponsored religious intolerance and the informal types of gendered oppression and homophobia that flourish all too often within the family (Young, 2000). This ‘minoritarian’ cosmopolitanism (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge and Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 582) can take various forms, such as the gathering of testimony from the individuals and groups who have been traditionally excluded, or the study of a truly comparative political theory, in which the works of Du Bois, Morrison, Gandhi and Muslim feminists are placed next to the canonical texts of Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls (Dallmayr, 2003). At the same time, we need to ‘provincialize’ the Euro-American tradition and consider the possibility that what Euro-American-centrism regards as universal moral principles may actually be a vernacular discourse that is heavily marked by historical context, local dialect, domination and exclusion. (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge and Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 582).

The treatment of refugees brings into sharp relief the contradiction between two foundational legal principles: the sovereignty of the state and the universality of human rights. On the one hand, the state has an absolute right as a sovereign power to police its own borders and to establish and enforce its own immigration policy according to its own interests. On the other hand, the enormously significant developments in human rights law since the end of World War II have had a significant effect upon state sovereignty. International customary law, the international human rights agreements and *jus cogens* (the international peremptory norms that do not allow any derogations whatsoever) all have their foundation in the universalistic concept of the dignity of the human being. From this perspective, each person, regardless of his or her nationality, is the bearer of inalienable rights that every nation-state must respect. Under *jus cogens*, severe violations of human dignity such as slavery, torture and genocide are now absolutely prohibited. Every state is bound by *jus cogens*; the obligation to refrain from these practices does not depend upon the state’s decision to sign an agreement or to

accept the jurisdiction of a treaty body. Sovereignty has also been transformed with respect to the state's authority over its own people. The Nuremberg trials established a new approach to sovereignty; the court's decisions clearly held that the state could not commit extreme human rights violations against its own population, and that wrongdoers would be held accountable by the international community. Since then, it has been argued, with increasing validity in many quarters, that the international community has the duty to intervene where such violations are taking place. Even further, various human rights bodies have formulated the principle of the nation-state's 'duty to protect'; under this emerging doctrine, the state's right to remain free from outside intervention diminishes insofar as it fails to protect the rights of the persons living in its territories or under its jurisdiction.

The duties of the nation-state with respect to refugees have been clearly established in several international human rights agreements. In the terms set down by the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), state parties may not 'expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected to torture' (Art.3) This duty is unconditional. Even if the state is itself undergoing severe disruptions as a result of a natural crisis, civil disturbances, or foreign invasion, it may not send a refugee back to his or her country of nationality if there is a strong likelihood that that person will be tortured within its territory. Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the state parties are prohibited from 'expel[ling] or return[ing] ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.' (Art 33). In the 1951 Convention, the 'non-refoulement' duty is given a wider expression than it is in the CAT. The 1951 Convention bans the return of the refugee wherever a threat to his life or freedom exists insofar as that threat arises out of his or her membership within one of the enumerated categories. The Convention allows for some conditionality; if it could be reasonably argued that the refugee poses a danger to the security of the host country, or if the refugee has been convicted in the final judgment of a legal process of a particularly serious crime and therefore endangers the community of the host country, the host country may legitimately disregard the non-refoulement duty. However, the Convention does not allow state parties to reserve the right to violate Art. 33. States that wish to sign and ratify the Convention may not carve out exceptions for themselves where the non-refoulement obligation is concerned. It could nevertheless be argued that the non-refoulement obligation is quite minimal; it merely stops a state party from returning a refugee to a country if there is reason to believe that he or she would face torture, or if there is reason to believe that he or she would face execution or persecution on one of the enumerated grounds. It does not create an affirmative right of the refugee to asylum in the host country. The host country could meet its non-refoulement obligations either by granting the refugee permanent asylum, by allowing the refugee to remain within its territory on a temporary basis until the risk of torture, execution or persecution ceased, or by transferring him or her to a third country in which the risk of torture, execution or persecution did not exist.

In Chapter 14, Jacqueline Bhabha addresses one of the more contested dimensions of refugee law, namely its application to cases involving gender-oriented oppression. Because the 1951 Convention makes no reference to gender-based persecution, women refugees who are fleeing this type of human rights violation and who wish to assert their non-refoulement

rights and to apply for asylum have had to engage in complex legal manoeuvres. They have had to argue, first, that women constitute a 'social group' and that where a woman is fleeing from gender-based oppressive practices in her home country, she can legitimately claim that she has a 'well-founded fear' of persecution that meets the Convention's threshold standard. However, the receiving countries have often had a strong bias against open border immigration policies and have wished to send signals back to the refugee's home country that it is quite difficult to gain asylum status. This is especially the case where the persecution in question is widespread; the concern of the receiving country is that large numbers of refugees would successfully press their claims for asylum in the wake of a favourable decision. For these reasons, the receiving countries have opposed the gender-based asylum claims of women refugees in their domestic courts.

Judges have therefore had to contend with a whole set of new and difficult questions. When a practice such as compulsory veiling, the mandatory practice of an extremely conservative variant of the Islamic faith, or submission to a strict family planning programme is widespread in the refugee's home country and enjoys the support of many men and women, can the receiving country legitimately argue, on cultural relativist grounds, that the refugee's claim lacks merit? Bhabha comments that the well-intentioned post-colonial critics who raise objections to the 'Western' universalistic approach to human rights might be unwittingly providing support for the officials in the receiving states who would like to downplay the significance of gender oppression in foreign countries in order to undermine this type of asylum claim. She readily concedes that, in some cases, feminist articulations of the universalist principle can be coopted by anti-Islamic discourse, such that the West is constructed as the perfect champion of women's freedom and equality, and the entire Islamic faith is associated with misogyny, cultural backwardness and human rights violations. She endorses a pragmatic and institutionally specific approach to human rights that is sensitive to these strategic complexities and that is capable of detecting the importance of the universalist principle in the context of refugee and asylum law.

The 1951 Convention, and the related international and state bureaucracies that have been built up to execute its terms, make a very clear distinction between the voluntary migrant and the officially recognized refugee. An individual can only gain recognition under the latter category insofar as he or she can demonstrate that he or she has a 'well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion' (Art 1.2). He or she must show that it is precisely because of that fear that he or she has left his or her country of nationality and that he or she is unable or unwilling to seek the protection of that country. As Castles argues in Chapter 13, this definition is becoming highly problematic. The developed countries were dismayed by the growth of refugees in the early 1990s after the fall of the USSR, the dismantling of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War. They adopted policies that were deliberately designed to stem the movements of migrants out of weak and failed states. In one notorious case, the US Coast Guard patrolled the waters off Haiti's shores to block the mass exodus of Haitian refugees who took to the seas in rickety craft after the 1991 military overthrow of the Aristide government. Castles notes that as a result of the discouragement of cross-border refugee movements, the numbers of officially designated refugees actually declined from 18.2 million in 1993 to 12.1 million in 2000. However, Castles also points out that these numbers are deceptive. They do not include the masses who are fleeing across borders to escape persecution but who do not fit

into the criteria established by the 1951 Convention. He uses the much more inclusive term of 'forced migrants'; he includes, within this category, the officially recognized refugees, the persons fleeing persecution who have not been designated as such, internally displaced persons, individuals who are obliged to migrate after man-made and natural disasters, and the men, women and children who are caught up in the exploitative labour trafficking networks.

According to Castles, the forced migrant often has complex motives for leaving his or her area of origin. He or she may be seeking to escape a failed state, like the Congo or Mugabe's Zimbabwe, where catastrophic economic conditions and human rights abuses are both rampant. Castles draws our attention to the 'asylum-migration nexus': the plural motivations among migrants and asylum seekers for their flight. Insofar as the political sociology of displacement expands its scope by looking beyond the specific group that has won official recognition as refugees, it becomes much better equipped to capture forced migration.

Castles notes that there are complicated hierarchies at work in forced migration. It is often the best-off workers who can migrate out of a crumbling economy or dangerous political situation. Even the undocumented migrants who cross borders illegally in search of work include many individuals who are relatively privileged with respect to their poorest counterparts in their home communities. In the absence of catastrophic conditions, economic migrants disproportionately come from families with middle-level incomes in their countries of origin, and the middle-range developing countries have more emigrating workers per capita than the poorest countries (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005, p. 101). Nevertheless, the forced migrants often become the 'have-nots' in their new surroundings. Forced migration is, in this sense, an expression of globalization's highly stratified character. Further, forced migration is a phenomenon that reflects our transnational connectedness: the ways in which social change in the South can have a major impact in distant lands. The developed countries of the North have been transformed by their legal admission of forced migrants, and their societies have also been transformed by the influx of undocumented persons. In addition, they have militarized their borders and adopted increasingly exclusionary immigration policies in response to migration and security concerns. The migrants who have been turned back from the borders of the developed world often end up settling in a third group of countries, namely the 'intermediate' states; their settlement in the latter countries has sometimes had a significant impact upon local labour markets, racial-ethnic tensions and political stability.

At the other end of the continuum of migrants, we can find the highly privileged border crossers for whom legal status and ease of mobility are signs of elite status and contributing factors behind social stratification. It is the people who are wealthy, respected and sociopolitically well connected who can become the true cosmopolitans by travelling at will, studying abroad, taking international vacations, spending sojourns in foreign countries, and settling comfortably in a new nation-state with full legal status. It could be argued, then, that the cosmopolitan sense that one is a 'citizen of the world' who is welcome almost everywhere and who can travel and sample various ways of life and normative perspectives at will is an experience that is reserved for the elite.

With Castles, Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider (Chapter 17) call for the displacement of 'methodological nationalism' – the assumption that the nation-state is the structuring principle of social and political action – with a cosmopolitan sociological perspective. Beck and Sznaider hold that it is only by adopting the 'cosmopolitan outlook' that we can adequately grasp contemporary phenomena such as the transnational networks of production and consumption

or the growing popular awareness of ecological and terrorist threats that criss-cross national boundaries. Although nation-states will continue to thrive, transnational relations of interdependence are ubiquitous and are becoming the object of popular consciousness. It is certainly true that globalization has led to the standardization of commodities, information systems and management styles. This homogenization has been greatly aided by the rapid growth of mass educational systems and transnational intellectual exchange (Meyer, 2000, p. 235). Nevertheless, Beck's and Sznaider's empirical claim about the profound shift in popular frameworks may require further discussion. Can we assume that a transnational phenomenology would be equally valid when we compare, for example, the salience of transnational connectness in the perceptions of elite individuals, as compared to those of the people who suffer from severe poverty and social exclusion?

In addition, the political consequences that follow from the assertion that more individuals are aware of our transnational connectedness are unclear. People could react to the perceived intensification of international security risks, for example, in any number of ways. If popular fears about terrorist attacks become commonplace, right-wing forces could seize upon that sense of vulnerability as an opportunity to advance an authoritarian agenda. By the same token, it is possible that President Barack Obama benefited from American voters' exhaustion with the Bush administration's fear-mongering in his historic 2008 election victory, and that many were genuinely concerned about the fact that the USA was widely regarded abroad as a 'rogue' nation.

The abstract theory of ethical cosmopolitanism risks becoming parochial insofar as it eschews engagement with the messy world of concrete political struggles; an adequate moral theory must value the empowerment of the subordinated groups and excluded individuals in their specific locations within institutional settings (Dallmayr, 2003, p. 438). In addition, cosmopolitan discourse does not have a natural partisan tendency; in its abstract form, it is normatively ambiguous. It is possible, for example, that the leading candidate for a truly global ideology is the neoliberal belief in the virtue of limited government and the primacy of the free market. Born out of the Thatcherite and Reaganite transformations in right-wing parties in the developed countries and followed soon after by various accommodations on the part of centrists and some leftists, neoliberalism received a major boost as the shockwaves from the collapse of the Soviet bloc were felt throughout the world. Emerging in domestic political battles and greatly aided by the contingent downfall of state socialism, neoliberalism was then aggressively promoted by the USA as it enjoyed an unrivalled dominance over global financial and trade institutions (Berger, 2000, pp. 51–52). At the same time, the disadvantaged have definitely benefited from the progressive cosmopolitan outlook that has affirmed the universal dignity of the human person, bolstered human rights claims, and inspired the effective political mobilization of the excluded. We can observe this progressive type of cosmopolitan orientation at work in the remarkably vigorous transnational movements that are addressing issues related to human rights, peace, aboriginal rights and environmental justice.

Social justice struggles targeting the nation-state remain crucial to the advance of liberty, equality, solidarity and democracy. Even if progressive cosmopolitanisms did bear fruit in the form of redistributive policies, the advancement of gender justice, the promotion of human rights and the mobilization of the excluded, each social justice struggle would still have to retain deep roots in the local resistance traditions and would still have to usher into the local political process a series of radical transformations. As Calhoun cautions in the closing essay

to this volume, 'cosmopolitanism without the strengthening of local democracy is likely to be a very elite affair' (p. 397).

ANNA MARIE SMITH

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Part I
Crisis of the Nation-State?

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[1]

Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?

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ABSTRACT

Using a model distinguishing local, national, inter-national, transnational and global interaction networks, I analyse four supposed 'threats' to nation-states – global capitalism, environmental danger, identity politics and post-nuclear geopolitics. All four actually impact differently on nation-states in different regions, contain both state-weakening and strengthening tendencies, and increase the significance of inter-national as well as transnational networks. Capitalist transformation is slightly weakening the nation-states of the north (most clearly so within the EU), yet economic development would strengthen southern nation-states. The decline of 'hard geopolitics' in a post-nuclear age weakens northern, but not most southern, states. Yet 'soft geopolitics' is everywhere bringing new state functions and maintaining the strength of inter-national networks. Identity politics, contrary to most views, probably strengthens nationally bound politics. These patterns are too varied to permit us to argue simply *either* that the nation-state and the nation-state system are strengthening or weakening. But the expansion of global networks seems to weaken local interaction networks more than national ones.

KEYWORDS

The state; capitalism; new social movements; globalization; networks.

INTRODUCTION

The human sciences seem full of enthusiasts claiming that a new form of human society is emerging. The most enthusiastic compare today with the eighteenth century, whose Industrial Revolution, whose 'modernism' and whose 'Enlightenment' supposedly revolutionized human society. They say we are in the throes of a comparable transition to a 'post-industrial' or 'postmodern' society. Other terminologies imply rather less revolutionary change. Terms such as 'late capitalism',

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'late modernity' or 'radical modernity' are used to suggest varying degrees of continuous versus disruptive change. 'Globalist' words also invoke varying degrees of enthusiasm: 'global capitalism' may refer only to a major extension of an old economy, while 'global society' usually implies a radically novel phenomenon in the history of human society.

The enthusiasts comprise a very varied group of *littérateurs*, *philosophes*, historians, sociologists, political and business economists, geographers and environmentalists. They agree about very little – especially about whether the changes are to be welcomed. But on one point they do agree: contemporary changes are weakening the nation-state. From postmodernists like Baudrillard or Lyotard or Jameson to geographers like Harvey or Taylor to sociologists like Giddens or Lash and Urry, to the business economists well represented by *The Economist*, come similar statements about the 'undermining', 'undercutting', 'outflanking' or 'marginalization' of the nation-state (for recent exemplars, see Taylor, 1996; Lash and Urry, 1994; Featherstone, 1990; Harvey, 1989; *The Economist*, 1995). Some qualify this in one respect. Since 'ethnicity' looms large in scenarios of 'postmodern fragmentation', these often see *nationalism* as resurgent in the world today. But for the old nation-state, we find largely epitaphs.

Many enthusiasts are west Europeans – not surprisingly, since this particular region of the globe offers most political support to their epitaph for the state. Many (both marxian and neoclassical) are materialists who point to the great changes under way in capitalism and believe these will necessarily transform the rest of the social structure. The core of most arguments rests on the technological-informational innovations of our times. Transport and information systems providing rapid (often instantaneous) access to the world provide the infrastructures of a global society. I accept that this potential infrastructure of globalism exists: the logistics of communication and so of power have indeed been revolutionized. Persons, goods and especially messages circulate the globe so that the enthusiastic vision of a single global society is a technologically possible one. But is it actuality? To suggest that it is, various groups of enthusiasts advance four main theses.

- 1 Capitalism, now become global, transnational, post-industrial, 'informational', consumerist, neoliberal and 'restructured', is undermining the nation-state – its macroeconomic planning, its collectivist welfare state, its citizens' sense of collective identity, its general caging of social life.
- 2 New 'global limits', especially environmental and population threats, producing perhaps a new 'risk society', have become too broad and too menacing to be handled by the nation-state alone.

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- 3 'Identity politics' and 'new social movements', using new technology, increase the salience of diverse local and transnational identities at the expense of both national identities and those broad class identities which were traditionally handled by the nation-state. For this and for the previous reason we are witnessing the stirrings of a new transnational 'civil society', social movements for peace, human rights and environmental and social reform which are becoming truly global.
- 4 Post-nuclearism undermines state sovereignty and 'hard geo-politics', since mass mobilization warfare underpinned much of modern state expansion yet is now irrational. Martin Shaw's perception of the emergence of a 'world state' is perhaps the most measured version of this thesis (see pp. 497–513 of this journal). It is very much a minority view in the discipline of International Relations, most of which remains attached to the study of the sovereign state.

So the empirical part of this article will investigate whether these four nation-state-weakening theses are correct. Since they downplay political power relations, it also considers two political counter-theses.

- A State institutions, both domestic and geopolitical, still have causal efficacy because they too (like economic, ideological and military institutions) provide necessary conditions for social existence:¹ the regulation of aspects of social life which are distinctively 'territorially centred' (see Mann, 1986: Ch. 1). Thus they cannot be the mere consequence of other sources of social power.
- B Since states vary greatly, if (A) is true, these variations will cause variations in other spheres of social life. Even within Europe states differ in size, power, geography and degree of centralization. Across the globe, variations dramatically increase: in degree of democracy, level of development, infrastructural power, geopolitical power, national indebtedness, etc. They also inhabit very different regional settings. Can contemporary capitalism, even if reinforced by environmental limits, 'cultural postmodernity' and demilitarization, render all this variation irrelevant, and have the *same* effects on all countries? Or will these variations cause variation among these forces, and so limit globalization?

Only the most breathless of enthusiasts would deny all validity to these counter-theses – or to the survival of the nation-state as wielder of some economic, ideological, military and political resources. The task is to establish *degrees* of relative causality: to what extent is the nation-state being transformed, to what extent is it declining – or even perhaps still growing?

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But to establish this we must also make some conceptual distinctions. We can roughly distinguish five socio-spatial networks of social interaction in the world today:

- 1 *local* networks – which for present purposes just means subnational networks of interaction;
- 2 *national* networks, structured or (more neutrally) bounded by the nation-state;
- 3 *inter-national* networks, that is relations between nationally constituted networks. Most obviously, these include the ‘hard geopolitics’ of inter-state relations which centre on war, peace and alliances. But they also include ‘soft geopolitics’ between states – negotiations about more peaceable and particular matters like air transport communications, tax treaties, air pollution, etc. And they include relations between networks that are more nationally than state-constituted: for example, the emergence of ‘national champions’ playing on a broader playing-field – whether these are football teams or giant corporations;
- 4 *transnational* networks, passing right through national boundaries, being unaffected by them. These might not be very extensive – perhaps a religious sect organized across two neighbouring countries – or they might be continent-wide or even worldwide. Many transnational arguments about contemporary society rest on a ‘macro-regional’ base. Examples are the frequent distinctions between ‘Liberal / Anglo-Saxon’, ‘Nordic / Social Democratic’ or ‘Christian Democratic / corporatist’ forms of contemporary social organization;
- 5 *global* networks cover the world as a whole – or, perhaps more realistically, they cover most of it. But we should distinguish between networks which radiate universalistically or particularistically across the globe. The feminist movement may spread through almost all countries, but usually only among rather particular, smallish groups. The Catholic Church has some presence in all continents but only has quite a narrow base across Asia, while being near-universal across Latin America. The capitalism evoked by many of the enthusiasts is a universal global network, evenly diffusing through economic and social life just about everywhere. Thus global networks might be formed by either a single universal network or by a more segmented series of networks between which existed rather particularistic relations.

Over the last centuries local interaction networks have clearly diminished in relative weight; while longer-distance networks – national, inter-national and transnational – have become denser, structuring more of people’s lives. Genuinely global networks have emerged relatively recently. Note that global networks need not be the same as transnational networks, though many enthusiasts equate them. Nor are they necessarily economic in nature. Global networks may be constituted by