

# ORGANIZING EARLY EXPERIENCE

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## **Imagination and Cognition in Childhood**

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Editor:  
DELMONT C. MORRISON



CRC Press  
Taylor & Francis Group

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DELMONT C. MORRISON



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# PREFACE

The chapters in this text reflect a significant change in the focus of developmental psychology over the last twenty years. The dominant explanatory models have emphasized lawful relationships between environmental events and observable behavioral change. An example of this model is Reinforcement Theory. The theoretical shift is to models that include environmental events in the analysis of behavior change but also focus on the contribution of the child's cognitive organization to the observed change in behavior. The explanation of a child's behavior cannot be complete if behavior is viewed simply as a reaction to an external stimulus event. An adequate explanatory model must include the child's active and changing perceptions, affects, wishes, fantasies and cognitive organization that determine his/her interpretation of events. The cognitive organization itself is the result of the interaction of stage-specific cognitive structures and significant environmental events. There are numerous reasons for this change in focus but certainly the theories of Jean Piaget and John Bowlby have contributed to this process. Both of these theories stress the interaction between a child's cognitive organization during particular developmental periods and environmental events occurring during that period. Of major importance is that both theories have been stated in clear enough terms to be evaluated by research. A major difference between them is that Piaget does not stress interpersonal events while Bowlby does. The reader will find that the authors in this text give major consideration to the contribution of early interpersonal events to the child's imaginative, cognitive and affective development.

Eight of the following chapters have been published earlier in *Imagination, Cognition and Personality*. However, only one, Chapter 11 by Ravenna Helson, appears as it was originally published. Chapters 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 have been published earlier but in modified form. The current versions have been expanded significantly to include more research and theory than was possible in the earlier publications. The remaining chapters are original contributions written specifically for the purposes of this text.

I wish to thank Kenneth Pope and Jerome Singer who encouraged me in the early stages of the book. Jerome Singer not only co-authored a chapter but also made useful suggestions concerning the organization of different sections as the book finally began to take its final shape. As an editor and contributor to this

effort, I have enjoyed the experience and expanded my understanding of the development of imagination and cognition in childhood. I trust that the reader will have a similar experience.

*Delmont Morrison*  
*San Francisco 1988*

## **PART I**

### ***Overview***





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## CHAPTER 1

# ***The Child's First Ways of Knowing***

DELMONT MORRISON

This chapter describes the developmental process resulting in the differentiation and integration of two major sources of information in human experience: subjective and objective. The major theme in this effort is the differentiation in the child of the subjective and objective perspective and the rich but constantly changing information and awareness that evolves from the interaction of these two different ways of knowing. The subjective perspective in its earliest form is similar to what has been described as primary process thinking by Freud and sensorimotor intelligence and preoperational thought as described by Piaget. The development and change occurring in the subjective interpretation of experience has been explained by Freud and Freudian theorists in terms of instincts and conflicts between id, ego, and superego [1]. The objective awareness of reality grows as the ego modifies instinctual expression and satisfaction. Pathological cognitive states seen in neurosis are due to anxiety and the influence of the unconscious process on conscious thought. Cognitive development occurs in an affective context. The differentiation of subjective and objective awareness is the basic issue in the study of intelligence according to Piaget. However, in contrast to Freudian theory, this awareness occurs through inborn mechanisms developing largely in the context of the process of maturation and adaptive orientation to the external world. Affect may contribute or interfere with this process to some degree but is not a major factor in the sequence of cognitive development [2].

Recent research and theory indicate that both Freudian and Piagetian theory are inadequate explanations of how children evolve an understanding of the contribution of their inner states in the interpretation of experience and subsequently acquire a more objective view of experience. In this chapter, the cognitive aspects of this process are examined in the context of the development of self-nonsel self differentiation [3] as the child experiences those early interpersonal relationships that contribute to attachment [4]. This approach differs

significantly from both Freudian and Piagetian theory in that the most important modifications in the subjective and objective perspective are seen as due to an inseparable interaction between the child's cognitive organization and his/her first emotional personal relationships.

## COGNITIVE STATES

As a working definition, the subjective perspective contributes to a child's interpretation of events through information, unconscious or conscious, that has an internal source. The most important cognitive source of this information is the child's affects, memory, wishes, and fantasies that contribute to his/her interpretation of early experience. The objective perspective, in contrast, is influenced by information that is external to the child. Like the subjective perspective, the objective is influenced by the child's unconscious and conscious information. The differentiation of the subjective and objective state is the complex reasoning children evolve to understand themselves, other people, social relations, social groups and institutions [5]. The child structures early experience with a perpetual confusion between inner and outer sources of information and it is only when the child is able cognitively to recognize consciously the contribution of his/her own internal states to the interpretation of experience that objective thought is acquired [6]. This objectification of experience is gradual and is acquired in the process of an expanding awareness of self that is by its nature affectively charged. As the child's awareness of events is more complex, there is a gradual recognition of a world that operates independent of self. With reflective thought the child becomes aware of self as thinker and the center of a will. With experience the child becomes aware that this will must be modulated in terms of objects and people that are not always influenced by the child's will as the child wishes or anticipates. This process is hypothesized to begin at about age two with the development of preoperational thought [3], but there is evidence that major interpersonal events occur before age two that probably greatly influence the differentiation of self-nonself [7].

When thought occurs under conditions where subjective sources of information are dominant and a limited capacity for reflective thought exists, as is true during the first years of life, children live within their presently occurring experience and assume that their actions bring events into existence, and that when their attention moves elsewhere the event ceases to exist. This narcissistic state of sensorimotor intelligence is transformed by the growing cognitive capacity to discriminate between internal and external sources of information and the consequent discovery of self and will. Events do not change but the child's experience of the event is changed by the cognitive capacity for objectification. This new understanding of a familiar experience is reorganized by preoperational systems of thought that structure the child's interpretation of the event, as well as the memory of the event and the anticipation of future events.

Preoperational thought is egocentric and action oriented. Assimilative functions are dominant and a major modality of representation is the metaphor. Through the metaphor unfamiliar events are transformed into relatively familiar ones, thereby reducing the cognitive aspect of novelty and the affective reaction to the unknown and strange. These representational systems are dominant between the ages of two and eight and are gradually modified by the development of the various forms of operational thought [8].

## INTERPERSONAL EVENTS

A major transition occurs in the infant-parent interaction during the second half of the first year of life. Prior to this the infant has been engaged in a variety of sensorimotor explorations, such as the circular reactions, that contribute to the objectification of experience. However, at about six months, major motor milestones occur and the child's exploration of environmental novelty becomes more elaborate. The child now will subordinate and order his/her motor responses to obtain a goal: one of the first cognitive signs of the child's recognition of external information and an indication of intention. Prior to six months of age the infant has been engaged in an interpersonal relationship characterized by the management of the infant's tension by the caregiver. After six months the infant is more cognitively aware of the caregiver and behavioral interactions with this person are characterized by separation protests, retreating to the caregiver when too distressed by novelty, and positive greetings when the caregiver appears after an absence [7]. These exchanges are indicative of a major modification in subjective states reflected in a growing sense of self and will fused with anxiety and reduction of anxiety in an interpersonal context. The initial anxiety is intense and generalized and is reduced if the caregiver is reliable and consistent in mitigating stressful situations. This exchange results in the reduction of gross anxiety into more manageable signal anxiety which serves to indicate that under stressful situations the child can anticipate that the stress will be mitigated and anxiety reduced [9]. This mutual exchange between child and caregiver results in the child experiencing his/her pleasurable and negative subjective states as generally ending satisfactorily with a result that there is a continuity to the experience of self and increased self-esteem. The growing self-awareness of will is closely associated with the child's increasing awareness and eventual understanding of both love and aggression. In these continuing interpersonal exchanges the child becomes conscious that components of self are accepted and encouraged in the interpersonal events with the parent. However, these exchanges are also concluded at times with the child experiencing the parent in the context of frustration and rage. These images and feelings of anger are initially experienced cognitively as independent of the feelings of love and pleasure that are also directed at the same parent [10]. The repeated experience of receiving love and reducing anger satisfactorily with the same person results in

the integration of these two feelings into a synthesized rather than fragmented cognitive-affective system [9].

With the development of crawling and walking during the interval of six to sixteen months the child's capacity to explore the environment is greatly increased. Cognitively, children demonstrate an awareness that an object continues to exist even when the child is not acting on it or cannot see it. Major modifications in subjective information occurs at this time when the child is able to decenter, process, and conserve two or more sources of perceptual information regarding objects and events at the same time. These cognitive shifts in the objective-subjective perspective are dependent on interpersonal experience. Although the child is curious and has an increased capacity to assimilate and accommodate more sources of information in an event, there is considerable evidence that there are limits to how much novelty a child can process comfortably. Too abrupt a shift in complexity, such as a stranger and/or a strange situation, arouses anxiety [11]. In the context of change and novelty the child must experience the parent as a familiar and anxiety reducing figure or there is a major disruption in the exploration of novelty [7-12]. The parent must become a constant reliable source of security for the child to apply his/her increasing cognitive skills to transform complex events into cognitive systems that further differentiate the subjective-objective perspective. As symbolic thought and language develop, the child and caregiver can remain in psychological contact, even when at a physical distance.

### **INITIAL WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING: COGNITION AND AFFECT**

Probably the most important aspect of these earliest attachments is that they occur when the child interprets events with sensorimotor schema and pre-operational thought. These cognitive systems are greatly influenced by the subjective perspective with its idiosyncratic-egocentric images. The integrating effect of secure attachment eventually enables the child to elaborate on the various dimensions of self explored through events by the less subjective systems of operational thought. As a consequence, the probability is increased that a balance between subjective and objective perspective will develop. However, the chronic exposure to the unfamiliar without adequate attachment increases the chance that the growing cognitive capacity to attend to self becomes evaluative and negative. This inner conclusion regarding self is demonstrated in preschoolers who were known to have histories of anxious or avoidant attachment. When rated by their teachers on a measure of self-esteem, these children were rated as having lower self-esteem than children with earlier histories of secure attachment [13]. The pleasure the two year old has in exploring novelty with the familiar parent, and the growing awareness and assertion of will, can tax the parent's capacity to assert control, use discipline and set limits. At times the child may

wish to explore in a situation that the caregiver perceives as inappropriate. The new process of self-assertion occurs in the child who is emotionally narcissistic and cognitively omnipotent. This combination sets the stage for the negativistic behavior observed during this time and the child's use of temper tantrums to negotiate in situations where caregivers must assert their will [14]. By its nature, this process of self-assertion is charged with emotional overtones and the temper tantrum, which is the prototype for future aggressive reactions to ego denial, becomes a major event for definition and evaluation of self. In the normal course of events the unbridled urge for pleasure and immediate gratification of will becomes modified by the need for parental approval. If parental methods for controlling negativism involve the overuse of verbal or nonverbal negative evaluations of the child, then low self-esteem can develop in the context of a preoperational understanding of self-assertion and anger.

Two major affects, anxiety and anger, experienced in the interpersonal exchanges basic to attachment and later interpersonal events such as the Oedipal triangle, contribute significantly to the child's objectification of experience. Affects do not emerge fully formed but must undergo their own extensive period of development. Initially, affective states may involve elements that are highly differentiated, such as the eight month old infant's greeting of the mother in the strange situation, without these elements being integrated or organized into a hierarchical structure [15]. The object of the affect is not differentiated from the affective event and the representation of self and others is fused with the affect. Because the preoperational child centers on the predominant isolated experience in an event, the dominant affective component may capture the child's attention and determine his or her total conception of the interpersonal interaction. Preoperational thought is unstable, discontinuous and irreversible. The latter means that the child cannot carry out transformations in thought that are necessary to solve perceptual problems such as the conservation of volume and number. This irreversibility is observed in the preoperational child who in one affective state cannot conceptualize having other contrasting affective states or evaluations of the same person. As objectification of self and affect occurs, the object of the affect and the affect itself are differentiated from each other. A further cognitive advancement occurs when the child recognizes that he/she may have mixed or contradictory feelings toward the same person and that some feelings toward a person have more personal meaning than do other feelings.

In summary, affects are initially experienced in the psychological state of an undifferentiated self and only with experience do affects become articulate. Affects such as love and anger are initially experienced as fused and later become differentiated. The attribution of affects to self or others and the expression of an articulated affect to a person can only occur after the representations of self and others are each integrated and consequently differentiated from the affect itself [10-15].

## REFLECTIVE THOUGHT AND THE PROCESS OF OBJECTIFICATION

The child's growing capacity to employ preoperational and operational systems of thought contributes to the reduction of egocentrism. This is a gradual process with a major shift occurring at about age nine [16]. Prior to age nine the child's capacity to reason about self and other people along psychological dimensions, or conceptualize relationships between individuals and groups, is characterized by concrete situation-specific thought that is dominated by the subjective perspective. For example, the preoperational child's perception of an authority or person who is in a position of leadership is determined by the child's own wishes and needs, while the nine year old can include concepts regarding reciprocity and contractual agreement in his/her understanding of such a relationship. As suggested by Piagetian theory, the development of reflective thought is characterized by stage-related cognitive capacities. However, the individual cognitive differences in children of the same age who demonstrate similar levels of cognitive organization suggest the importance of experience. In contrast to children who have an anxious or avoidant attachment, preschool children with secure attachment are capable of making friendships and are liked by other children. In terms of relationships with adults, preschool children with histories of secure attachment are treated matter of factly by their teachers whereas the same teacher will interact with children with histories of anxious attachment with much more control and the expectation that the child will not comply [17]. The influence of subjective affective states in the child's perception of other children and the effect of this perception on interpersonal relationships is seen in latency-aged children who are socially rejected or neglected by their peers. When compared to more popular children, the social perceptions of these socially isolated children are less accurate and the errors they make are biased toward attributing hostile motives to others [16].

Reflective thought, or thought that thinks about its own thinking, will be modulated by interpersonal experience and affects such as anxiety. Undifferentiated anxiety experienced intensely and chronically probably results in the pathological cognitive organization observed in the borderline child [9]. As anxiety becomes differentiated in later development it can signal an anticipated situation of stress which is instrumental in the child's effort to modify images and wishes to accord with the anticipated experience. These events and the psychological reactions may be transitory. However, if the anxious state becomes chronic the anxiety laden preoperational images may not be subject to the cognitive reorganization of operational thought because they cannot be manipulated by conscious effort. However, these subjective images will continue to determine the child's interpretation of experience. This is seen in latency aged children with an attributional style of ascribing negative events to internal, stable and global factors. There are indications that this particular cognitive style results in a negative self-concept and social withdrawal [18].

## THE SOCIALIZATION OF THOUGHT

The reduction of egocentric thought is a continuing process. Although the child's assertiveness and expanding awareness of self will almost always result in conflict with major caregivers and peers, the compensating need for attachment, love, and human affiliation provides the impetus for conflict resolution. As has been noted, the child's first knowledge of experience will be greatly influenced by narcissism and preoperational thought. Between the ages of two and eight, knowledge of events is a somewhat unstable cognitive conglomeration of the earlier representations interacting with developing operational systems. A great socialization influence is the child's tendency to imitate and identify with peers and adults who have emotional meaning for him/her [19]. Although there are cognitive stages in the development of social and moral cognitions, the child's developing awareness of self in a social system that is influenced by broader moral issues is greatly influenced by affect experienced in an interpersonal context. In the day to day interaction with the parent, the child negotiates to maintain the subjective perspective and protect narcissistic needs while the parent negotiates to develop shared semantic systems that become implicit and explicit contracts for certain situations. As a result of the parent's style, and a history of shared discipline encounters, the child and parent mutually assign the same social and moral meaning to particular social acts [20]. Through identification, the movement out of the subjective perspective and the objectification of experience not only involves information regarding self and others but social systems linked to the child's broader cultural history.

The child's subjective experience is one of constant assimilation and accommodation: existing preoperational systems assimilating the new information by metaphors that in turn accommodate to operational schema that are more socialized and based on stable hierarchies. In a stable home the child will have periods of time when explorations of this novelty can be done leisurely in isolation or in a social environment that allows assimilation to dominate. If the parent values imagination and creativity and the child has the opportunity to engage in creative activity, the child will use these as mediums to understand and organize experience. If the parents' style of understanding themselves, social relationships and moral behavior involves exploration and reviewing experience in a flexible, communicative way, their children will demonstrate a similar cognitive style [20-22].

## CREATIVE THOUGHT: THE CONTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

The earliest signs of objectification are seen when the child at about age two is able to decenter and simultaneously conserve major perceptual elements in the process of reasoning about an event. Eventually the child is able to conserve subjective and objective information to differentiate aspects of self and



intention as interacting with causality and the event which is thought about. Interpersonal events are the most important and although this sequence begins at about age two, it is obvious that the process of objectification goes on for a lifetime. As children become more aware of self and self-evaluative, they enter major social experiences, such as school, which are geared to educate them in the development and application of operational systems. The use of operational systems and achievement in the application of these systems in Western society contributes significantly to a child's self-esteem. In fact, the traditional definition of intelligence has been the measurement of skills that are mostly acquired through classroom experience [23]. As thought becomes socialized, external sources of information play an increasingly dominant role in the child's use of reflective thought and evaluation of self. Freud referred to this cognitive level as secondary process and Piaget referred to it as concrete and formal operational thought. It is clear that both viewed this level of cognitive organization as superior in terms of human adaptation to earlier occurring forms of thought [3-24]. This chapter concludes with an examination of the positive contribution of the child's first subjective images, symbols, affects and representations of experience in the enrichment and objectification of later human experience.

The child's first way of structuring and representing experience is preverbal and prelogical. Although these representations are in a constant state of disequilibrium, all new information is first assimilated into these systems: these representations are the first reality of the child. These early representations are constructed through interpersonal exchanges that establish the child's inner working models for attachment-trust, detachment, separation-individuation, assertiveness-aggressiveness, initiating-reciprocating, and competitiveness. Early experience is structured, and reality is interpreted through idiosyncratic cognitive systems of realism, animism, and artificialism [25]. As the child develops representational thought and sense of self, the words, thoughts, affect, postures and physical actions that represent the past and anticipate future experience are expressed metaphorically [26]. Major interpersonal events are experienced by the child as requiring constant shifts in the assimilation and accommodation of the representations of interpersonal experience and self. The stress and anxiety experienced can be mitigated by the adequate caretaking of the parent and by the child's exploration of the meaning of the experience without having to meet the demands of the experience.

Play serves a variety of developmental purposes [24], but the use of play by the child to reconstruct past experience and explore definitions of self contributes significantly to the development of reflective thought and objectification of experience [22-27]. Childhood is unique in that there is much more new information generated from experience than there is old information that has been acquired from experience. Assimilation and accommodation are much more complex processes during childhood than during adulthood. However, it is in the nature of human experience in general, and specifically during periods of

stress and major change, that previous definitions of experience and self are challenged and alternative sources of knowledge must be explored. The events that challenge adults will often be the same interpersonal events experienced in childhood and will often be understood by metaphors which are similar to the ones that were first constructed. In the mature adult, the self is differentiated from the event and analytical thought can be consciously manipulated toward a goal. However, if current experience is perceived to be psychologically similar to previous experience in childhood and evokes similar affect the individual will react in a similar way as in the past. There are clearly variations in this process and the degree to which the earlier metaphors are conscious and the affect manageable, the more unlikely the individual will be compelled to repeat previous experience. Thoughts organized by earlier metaphors will be particularly amenable to the evocation and expression of affect. In those situations where the adult experiences frustration in the pursuit of goals, or a threat to previous definition of self, the exploration and understanding of experience can be enriched by analytic thought which incorporates previous evocative metaphors accompanied by the remembered affect [3]. The two cognitive modes contribute to this process: the preoperational, organized by affect and metaphor, and the operational, organized by logical analysis and semantic structure. There may be a third: musical representation. Music is a mode of thought which is similar to preoperational modes in that it is evocative of affect and organized by cognitive structures that appear to be relatively independent of semantics. Music contributes to the emotional experience of an event and can be shared socially. Music is unique in that it is a way of expressing the subjective perspective of commonly shared emotional experiences through non-verbal means. If expressed by an exceptional composer, the music becomes a partial definition of the experience [28].

The content and structure of play changes significantly when the child is capable of using concrete and formal operational systems. Play at this time takes on a more realistic quality in that more children are included, it is less idiosyncratic, and sustained role playing is common. Although the assimilative compensatory quality of play dominated by preoperational modes is less common, the child can still construct and explore a world that is less susceptible to the demands of reality. These enduring organized fantasies are dominated by rules and order expressed in a society in which the compensatory wishes of the child find expression. However, self-observation is adequate and the child clearly discriminates between what is imagined and what really exists. These paracosms, or imaginary private worlds, have played a significant role in the lives of individuals who later became unusually creative such as C. S. Lewis and W. H. Auden [29]. The process of creative thinking is not necessarily the generation of new facts but the exploration of new ways of thinking about what had previously been obscure. The obscure quality to an idea may be in an intellectual context but it may be in an interpersonal context as well. There is evidence that conflicts

generated in early interpersonal experience can be a source of original and creative thinking [30]. Early representations of self and others that are associated with too much signal anxiety are overdetermined by the subjective perspective and not readily available to reflective thought. These metaphors of early experience have been subject to substantial preoperational learning but excluded from the reorganization that results from learning acquired with operational thought. The conflicts will express themselves in adulthood in various ways but when expressed creatively they tend to be reworkings of the old metaphors in an attempt to come to a more conscious awareness of various aspects of self [27-31]. This reworking of experience combining the preoperational and operational modes of thought can be both cathartic as well as a modality for expanding the boundaries of self-awareness with a consequent new perspective of reality.

Objectification of experience can be only partially established through the use of logic and reference to socially accepted systems of meaning. Reflective thought used to understand preoperational representations with their passionate aspects and wish for change can be used to define an individual's present reality as well as future possibilities [24]. Objectification of experience is a continuing process which is broadened when the individual is able to reflect upon past and current experience with the fullest range of thought enriched by emotions. Like play, this is probably best done at times when the immediate demands on the individual are reduced. The repeated use of this experience can result in a broader definition of current self but also offer an opportunity to explore possible selves [32]. Objectification for the mature adult includes the awareness of the self as it has been experienced in the past and is currently experienced, but also the possible selves defined by the individual's hopes, fears, goals and the wish for change. Conscious awareness of the various cognitive components and motivations for the anticipated experience contributes to the awareness of a possible self which in turn becomes an incentive for future behavior.

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## **PART II**

### ***Developmental Patterns***



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## **CHAPTER 2**

# ***Socialization and Moral Development***

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Together with the contemporary interest in attributional and person perception approaches to social interaction, increasing attention has been devoted to the development of moral judgment and behavior in children. The cognitive developmental approaches of Piaget [1] and Kohlberg [2] continue to influence and dominate much of the research in the area. In this chapter we seek to explore types of cognitive antecedents to moral behavior in early childhood which may serve as a theoretical bridge between traditional measures of moral judgment and moral action, particularly in the absence of an external authority.

Both Piaget and Kohlberg hypothesize a stage sequence in which development proceeds from an egocentric moral orientation to a mature concern for the interests and intentions of others. Transition through these stages is claimed to be accomplished through cognitive-developmental changes in social understanding often brought about through peer group contact. Although the two accounts share many fundamental similarities, Kohlberg has modified and differentiated his model as one distinct from Piaget's, proposing a more detailed sequence of stages which extend to development in adolescence and adulthood.

The importance of cognitive factors in moral behavior has been evaluated in a comprehensive review by Blasi [3]. Moral behavior has often been hypothesized to be directly dependent on the subject's stage of moral reasoning, most commonly as defined by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale. Behavioral control in the moral sphere has therefore been assumed to develop, at least, in parallel to moral judgment development. For example, behaviorally maladjusted children have been predicted to have lower stage scores than children who demonstrated more mature moral behavior. That is, they judge actions such as stealing in terms of the consequences of reward or punishment rather than orientations toward a consideration of the benefits of law and order or the rights



of individuals within society. According to Blasi, the clearest indication of any judgment-behavior relationship involves the association between delinquency and moral judgment. The link between judgment on the one hand, and honesty and conformity on the other appears to be particularly weak with at least half the studies reporting ambiguous or non-significant results.

However, a closer inspection of the studies which pertain to the judgment-delinquency relationship shows that, even in this case a substantial number, eleven out of twenty-seven, reported no association. This lack of support is underscored by Jurkovic who describes equivocal findings with regard to the hypothesis that delinquents' moral reasoning is not as mature as that of non-offenders [4].

Despite a number of reported positive correlations between moral judgment and moral action, overall the empirical findings are not impressive. They do not clearly indicate the presence of a direct link between behavioral and cognitive-developmental measures.

In order to achieve a fuller account, it is necessary first to appraise the contribution of cognitive-developmental approaches. This will lead toward a perspective which incorporates both affective and volitional factors that has been influenced by the work of James Mark Baldwin.

## COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES TO MORAL REASONING

In his broad two stage model, Piaget claimed that increasing cognitive competence permits the child to regulate emotional impulses [1]. With age, rationality comes to moderate wholly affective responses. In conjunction with the development of abilities to reason about causality and motivation, the child begins a transition from an egocentric orientation to one in which there is a coordination of differing viewpoints. The social world comes to be seen in terms of a logic or reciprocity and cooperation. While Piaget allowed that moral development is naturally capable of being reinforced by the precepts and practical example of the adult, he claimed that in practice a mature morality "is largely independent of these influences, assigning a central role to peer group relations" [1, p. 66].

Kohlberg [2, 5] originally proposed a six-stage model which more recently [6] has been revised to five stages. The initial stages describe a pre-conventional morality where the rights of others are respected only insofar as they serve the needs of the individual. Development through these stages progresses to a conventional level where constraints of law and order are paramount. Finally it culminates in post-conventional or principled morality where universal principles of justice and respect for the rights of the individual prevail. Kohlberg has claimed that his model has greater validity than Piaget's two-stage model,