GILLES DELEUZE AND THE THEATER OF PHILOSOPHY

Edited by
Constantin V. Boundas
and Dorothea Olkowski

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Volume 3

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Gilles Deleuze

and the Theater of Philosophy

EDITED BY CONSTANTIN V. BOUNDAS
& DOROTHEA OLKOWSKI

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For Choi Ke Ryang

For Max and Kurt

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1

Editors' Introduction

Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski

> From an always nomadic and anarchical difference to the unavoidably excessive and displaced sign of recurrence, a lightning storm was produced which will, one day, be given the name of Deleuze: new thought is possible; thought is again possible . . . genital thought, intensive thought, affirmative thought, acategorical thought—each of these an unrecognizable face, a mask we have never seen before; differences we had no reason to expect, but which nevertheless lead to the return, as masks of their masks, of Plato, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and all other philosophers. This is not philosophy as thought, but as theatre . . .
>
> —Michel Foucault, *Theatrum Philosophicum*[1]

FROM DELEUZE'S EARLY WORK on Hume, Masoch, and Nietzsche to his later collaborations with radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, Deleuze's thought *is* startling—a lightning storm for thinkers like those who have contributed to this volume of critical essays. But in what sense are Deleuze's works of philosophy theater? For one, these works are marked by the constant invention of conceptual characters: the inquirer, the judge, the friend, and the rival are such conceptual characters invented and put on stage by Deleuze. They are not meant to resemble the philosophers (Hume, Kant, Plato) whose work they stage. But they are meant to assist in the arrival of a new image of thought. Unlike Platonism, which determines the question of the Idea in the form "What is F?," Deleuze brings Ideas closer to accidents and argues that they can be determined only with questions like "Who?," "How?," "How many?," "When and where?," that is, with questions that plot their true spatiotemporal coordinates.[2]

If, as Deleuze says, philosophy is the activity that traces a prephilosophical plane of immanence (reason), invents prophilosophical characters (imagi-

nation), and creates philosophical concepts (understanding), it is with the invention of the conceptual characters that the creation of concepts and the tracing of the processes that form the plane of immanence begins in earnest.[3] It is through "dramatization" that the virtual Idea is incarnated and actualized (Deleuze 1967, p. 96).[4] Without it, the concept would never be divided and specified. Pure spatiotemporal dynamisms have the power to dramatize concepts because they are the ones that incarnate and actualize Ideas: "There is a drama beneath every logos" (p. 101).

Deleuze makes it clear that this drama is taking the place of the Kantian schema. It constitutes "a strange theatre made up of pure determinations, agitating space and time, acting directly on the soul, having larvae as actors—a theatre for which Artaud has chosen the expression 'theatre of cruelty'" (p. 95)—all this, of course, provided that the conceptual character is not mistaken for the philosopher's representative. "The philosopher is the envelope of his main character, and of all the other characters who are the real subjects of his philosophy" (Deleuze 1991, p. 62). If then Deleuze's philosophy is a theater, as Foucault thought, it is most certainly a minor theater. Only a minor theater can address the sense in which Deleuze's work always opens up an area of inquiry that had been thought to be completely exhausted and long since abandoned by philosophy or, at least, by any novel inquiry. Only a minor theater can retrace these abandoned philosophies so as to transform each one so completely that it is barely recognizable and bears no resemblance to the old exhausted ideas.

The present collection of essays—the first, we believe, in any language—is intended as a tribute to Deleuze. One, of course, does not pay Deleuze a tribute by canonizing his texts or by fencing them in with commentaries and annotations. This is the reason why we solicited essays that would be like gusts of fresh air from the outside. We tried to trade off the search for hidden signifieds for a better understanding of how Deleuze's texts work. We wanted to trace the diagram of the series that make up his work, instead of "representing" it or blurring its lines altogether, making it totally unrecognizable. The essays that we included enact a variety of research styles and ambitions. American, Canadian, French, and Australian scholars, fairly well distributed among philosophers, literary theorists, sociologists, and women's studies specialists came together to form the diverging, yet resonant, series that made this volume possible. Deleuze, with his usual grace, responded to our intrusive request for participation with his never before published essay "Begaya-t-il," which we decided to place at the beginning of the collection, in order to avoid creating the impression that this essay in any sense stands for the customary "response" to one's critics. In the beginning was the stuttering, and the stuttering was

of the outside. *Stutterer, thinker of the outside*—what better way is there for registering the passage of a philosopher?

Delimiting even the six areas that constitute this volume was, for us, the editors, an arduous task. Although our six chosen "themes" resonate throughout Deleuze's writings, these themes (difference and repetition, subjectivity, desire and the overturning of Platonism, becoming-woman, minor languages and nomad thought, and lines of flight) are not developed *thematically* in any sense by Deleuze himself. Deleuze's nomadic thought cannot give way to thematic organization because so much of what Deleuze thinks and writes has to do with the overturning of all familiar themes and of thematization itself.

The first section of our collection consists of two essays that analyze and discuss the Deleuzian themes of difference, sameness, and singularity. Todd May's essay, "Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze," attempts to disentangle Deleuze from the nets of a total affirmation of alterity and anarchism. Redescribing this affirmation, May argues that Deleuze cannot coherently maintain the primacy of difference over unity without lapsing into the kind of transcendentalism that his entire philosophy was poised to denounce, reducing language to unintelligible verbiage, or letting the very surfaces upon which thought is supposed to happen break up into a host of unrelated molecules. "Difference," May writes, "must be thought of alongside unity, or not at all!" May does not deny that there is a tendency in Deleuze's thought toward pure difference and its resounding affirmation, but he is struck by what he takes to be the presence in it of an opposite tendency that makes Deleuze appeal constantly throughout his work to writers whose work is "unitary and monistic" (Scotus, Spinoza, Bergson). In order to resolve this "tension," May finds it necessary, first, to ponder over the role that Deleuze assigns to philosophy (the creation of concepts), in order to decide subsequently what a typical Deleuzian philosophical claim looks like, given that the primary task of philosophy is normative. Philosophy, on this reading, is a practice that can be evaluated only on the basis of the effects that it brings about, and this evaluation can have no recourse to any transcendental standpoint. From such considerations about the nature of philosophy, May concludes that the correct approach to the Deleuzian concept of difference is the investigation of how it functions, and not of how one can ground its metaphysical priority. Difference, he concludes, functions as a concept that resists transcendence in all its forms. Positive in maintaining the irreducibility and contingency of singularity, and disruptive in resisting all principles of unification, Deleuze's difference, according to May, is not mobilized against unity, but only against those transcendental principles of unification that preclude difference and rele-

gate it to the status of the negative. With Deleuze, May finds in Spinoza's expressionism the best guarantor of the compossibilty of difference and unity, provided that, as in Spinoza, expressionism is put in the service of univocity. In the figure of the rhizome, May reads the univocity of being, that is, "the affirmation neither of difference nor of unity but of the surface which is the intertwining of the two."

Deleuze's choice and affirmation of alterity requires the creation of new concepts, and our inclusion of Alain Badiou's essay—a long meditation on *Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque*—is dictated by the fact that it explores in an exemplary fashion the function and resonances of such a concept. From a position proximate to, and yet distant from Deleuze's own, Badiou discusses the concept of the fold and finds it to be an antiextensional concept of the multiple, an antidialectical concept of the event, and an anti-Cartesian concept of the subject. According to Badiou, the cross of metaphysics has been the impossible choice between the animal and the number. Against this background, Deleuze's fold, a figure of the multiple anchored in an anti-set-theoretical ontology, a continuist horror of vacuum, and an organicist vision, opts without hesitation for the animal. Deleuze's multiple, argues Badiou, "is a *living tissue* which folds and unfolds as if under the effect of its organic expandings and contractings, in perfect opposition to the Cartesian concept of extension which is punctual and regulated by the shock." The fold is the triumph of the wave over the particle. Badiou realizes, of course, that such an organicist vision of the multiple puts the singular at risk. This is why he reminds us that singularities and events are not, for Deleuze, points of rupture, but rather "what singularizes continuity in each one of its local folds." The event is an immanent activity against the "dark" background of a preexisting world; it is a creation, a novelty, that is thinkable only inside the interiority of a continuum. It follows, argues Badiou, that the multiple and the concept (the multiple and the one) are not opposed to each other, since the multiple exists by the concept and is warranted by the universality of continuity; but, at the same time, the multiple is the condition of the possibility of concepts. As for Deleuze's organicism, Badiou adds, it is not built around the Leibnizian compossibility of worlds, but rather around Nietzsche's (and Mallarmé's) resonant and vibrant diverging series.

In the sequence, Badiou's essay assimilates the Deleuzian fold to the concept of a subject that is neither Cartesian (reflection, cogito) nor Husserlian (focus, relation to, intentionality) nor Lacanian (eclipse). The articulation of this concept of the subject requires the outside to be thought as the exact inversion of the inside, the world as a texture of the intimate, and the macroscopic as the torsion of the microscopic. For Badiou, the advantages of such a concept are obvious: the subject emerges as multiple series, a veritable

unfolding of predicates, and not as a substance; it is a point of view from which there is a truth, and an "objectless subject," since it frees knowledge from all relations to objects. Badiou's essay concludes with an extremely nuanced and yet thorough critique of Deleuze's "ontological choice"—a critique based on his own alternative choice, focusing on number, set theory, and the admission of the vacuum. We leave it to the reader to assess the advantages and disadvantages of this choice over Deleuze's.

For the second section of our collection, we chose two essays that promise to initiate discussion concerning the role and function that subjectivity has in the writings of Deleuze. We think that the North American reception of the poststructuralist "death of man," or "death of the subject," thematics and rhetoric has not been adequately discussed. The Deleuzian inflections of the problem and our assemblage aim at filling this deplorable lacuna.

Peter Canning's essay, "The Crack of Time and the Ideal Game," returns to the questions of multiplicity, time as the multiplicity of the eternal return, and subject as the kind of multiplicity that one finds suspended over the crack of time. His essay is itself a multiplicity, successfully preventing its own forms of expression and content from sedimenting around any one unifying principle, rhythm, or theme. Deleuze's multiplicity, argues Canning, is not the One turning into many, but rather an assemblage that changes dimensions and mutates constantly, according to its own lines of flight. Real time has nothing to do with the passing present; it starts when the present stops: it affects itself not with itself, but with becoming, and emerges as pretime from the crack between times. Repetition is the power of the rhythmic idea that produces differences, intensities, and disparities as its own excess. As the repetition of the future, it has nothing to do with the return to the past, which is accomplished in memory. It begins with metamorphosis and forgetting—*Chaosmos*, the between of chaos and order where structures form and dissolve—and has its own rhythms that account for the intensities and originary differences produced by repetition. Canning argues for the proviso that repetition is not to be seen as the function of the subject, because the subject is the result of the rhythm that creates and selects the intensive traits and the directional components of the plane of immanence. Under these circumstances, is it still possible to speak about the subject? Canning does not address this question directly, but he does speak, nonetheless, of the subject as an intervention and interval. The subject, for Canning, who echoes the Deleuze of *Foucault*, is the splitting between the virtual (Idea-multiplicity) and the actual (individual-multiplicity), and the folding of the one upon the other. The human subject is a being suspended over the caesura of time.

Constantin V. Boundas's essay makes the claim that a powerful theory of subjectivity can be teased out from Deleuze's texts, provided that the processes of serialization and subject formation were to be explored together. Boundas proposes to read Deleuze the way Deleuze reads others, that is, according to the series he creates, the ways in which these series converge and become compossible, and the means by which they diverge and begin to resonate together. The author's proposal is made in the context of recent discussions attempting to elucidate subjectivity in terms of narrativity, but it stays clear of the phenomenological and hermeneutic postulate of the unity of the self or the assumed coherence of lived-time consciousness. Deleuze, for whom narrativization is serialization and for whom the conjunctive linkages among series are subordinated to their disjunctive resonances, is able to provide us with a theory of subject formation liberated from old phenomenological trappings. For this purpose, Boundas spreads Deleuze's contributions to a theory of subjectivity across several series, each one of which he identifies by means of the question/problem that the series helps to introduce: the *Hume series* (how does the mind become a subject?), the *Bergson series* (how can a static ontological genesis of the subject be worked out beginning with prepersonal and preindividual singularities and events?), the *Leibniz series* (how can there be a notion of individuality that is neither a mere deduction from the concept "subject"—in which case it would be contradictory—nor a mere figure of an individuality deprived of concept—in which case it would be absurd and ineffable?), the *Nietzsche-Foucault series* (how can a dynamic genesis of subjectivity be given, with the subject as the fold and the internalization of outside forces, without giving in to a philosophy of interiority?), the *Michel Tournier series* (how is the field of subjectivity affected by the presence or absence of the other?), and the *Nietzsche-Klossowski series* (how is it possible to think the subject in terms of inclusive disjunctions and simultaneously affirmed incompossible worlds?). Boundas then goes on to show that the formation of the subject, in Deleuze, is indissolubly linked with the question of the becoming world. In fact, the series listed here would have run along their own lines of flight without ever permitting the construction of planes of consistency, were it not for Deleuze's concepts *chaosmos (= chaos + cosmos)* and "cracked I" (= *Je* fêlé), which in their capacity as portmanteau words circulate among the series and make possible the inclusive, disjunctive affirmation of all of them at once. It is *chaosmos,* that is, the becoming-world, that posits the constitution of the subject as a task, and *chaosmos* again that guarantees that the constituted subject will not emerge as a substantive *hypokeimenon,* but rather as an always already "cracked I."

Sections three through six of our volume make a turn, not just in the direction of *chaosmos*, but toward becomings, insofar as they articulate desiring production, minoritarian groups and their discourses, nomadic distributions, and lines of flight, and insofar as becoming is no longer the simple reversal of Platonism. In "Theatrum Philosophicum," Foucault had asked, "What philosophy has not tried to overturn Platonism?" (p. 166). In the history of philosophy, the overturn of Platonism has always meant nihilism: the necessity of embracing nothingness as well as the nullity of all values, even the highest. Understood in these terms, all philosophy subsequent to Plato might be nothing more than anti-Platonism. However, there is another way to take measure of this limit: active destruction of everything that is passive in oneself. As Deleuze writes, "Destruction becomes active to the extent that the negative is transmuted and converted into affirmative power: the 'eternal joy of becoming.'"[5] Such a strategy amounts to accounting for a philosophy in terms of its "Platonic differential, an element absent in Platonism but present in other philosophies" (Foucault 1977, p. 166). Indeed, the question of a differential at the origin is fundamental to any Deleuzian encounter with philosophy. But the organization of this difference is also a key factor in Deleuze's work.

Foucault points to Deleuze's articulation of Plato's "delicate sorting operation which precedes the discovery of essence, because it necessitates the world of essences in its separation of false simulacra from the multitude of appearances" (p. 167). It is the process of division that enables Plato to discover true being, establish its *identity*, separate it once and for all from all impostors, which are "reduced to nonexistence" by the mere presence of the Idea (p. 167). Deleuze sees Plato's philosophy organized in accordance with two dimensions: (1) that of limited and measured things including the establishment of "presents" and of "subjects" with a certain size at a certain moment or "present"; and, opposed to this, in fact, subsisting beneath it, (2) pure becoming without measure, escaping the present, thus escaping identity and making past and future coincide.[6] Deleuze's philosophy is organized not as a simple reversal of impostors and true being, but as an element of the Platonic differential, the pure becoming that is a divergence from the Platonic series.

With this, Deleuze leads us to the surface where it is not possible either to signify or to denote. That is, if we are looking for language and sense, we will find it only at the surface, between the Platonic heights of signifiers (Ideas) and the depths of designation (of bodies). On the surface there are only pure events, and it is on the surface that Deleuze locates language, and not only language, but all regimes of signs: cinema, painting, literature,

social organizations, cultural life. Without significations and designations, whatever takes place between these two realms can only be wholly contingent, thus wholly singular. Independent of Ideas, which will actualize them, and bodies, in which they are manifested, events are the expressed or expressible of bodies. It is these considerations that are addressed variously in the remainder of this collection.

Partly in response to what she takes to be a current misreading of Deleuze's working out of desire and partly as an exploration of issues centering on the body assemblage in Deleuze, Dorothea Olkowski has written "Nietzsche's Dice Throw: Tragedy, Nihilism, and the Body without Organs." Olkowski begins with Deleuze's discussion of the body in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. What stands out in this discussion, according to Olkowski, is Deleuze's insistence that the 'body' is no medium and does not designate a substance, rather, "it expresses the relationship between forces," and "it becomes . . . semiological, a question of different regimes of signs." Olkowski discovers that Nietzsche's conception of the body remains coded by a certain image of the body as force. Not even the Heraclitean image of forces prevents Nietzsche from inscribing the name of the Greek hero on the qualities of force. Olkowski goes on to argue that such inscription does not take place with regard to the Deleuzian body assemblage. In *Différence et répétition*, Deleuze has certainly left behind the image of the Greek hero. What is at stake there, she notes, is the ontological proposition that "Being is univocal." Being is univocal, but it is "said" of difference itself. Such metaphysical flux is the Nietzschean dicethrow wherein the relation between forces (body assemblages) is subject to chance. This, then, is the meaning of "tragedy" in Nietzsche's work. "Every body is nothing but the arbitrary relation of force with force; every body, every difference between forces . . . is chance and nothing but chance." Not only does this make existence radically innocent and just, but also it releases it from any specific purpose or end. Thus when Deleuze reads Nietzsche's claim that forces affirm or deny, he *does not read this oppositionally*, nor does he read it with the Greek heroic inscription Nietzsche gave it; rather, it is a question of the action and reaction of forces, of body assemblages.

With this, the essay turns to the question of how active body assemblages become reactive. The answer Deleuze provides, says Olkowski, is Law. "Law, by separating active force from what it can do, leads to nihilism." For Deleuze, desire, which *experiments* with forces, is the limit of a power in that "every body extends its power as far as it is able"; so a limit is nothing but the point from which a force deploys all its power. Such a deployment is measured not by Law but by a *nomadic nomos*, which is without property, enclosure, or measure and distributed in a space without precise limits

so as to make possible experimentation, wandering distribution, and even delirium. Olkowski concludes by noting that in this context, the Nietzschean question of "how one becomes what one is" brings forth the body assemblage, and with it the inquiry: What forces have taken hold of each series and struggle for domination? Given Nietzsche's insight that base evaluations dominate Western culture, the only possible solution to this is total nihilism. Deleuze, Olkowski believes, ever aware of Nietzsche's cultural inscriptions, turns instead to the "real," and "Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche," she states, "is part of a line of flight that eventually commits him to that aspect of the body assemblage which is called the Body without Organs, what remains when all is taken away, when the dice are thrown and only enough organism is kept for it to reform each day." For, she concludes, the removal of codes and inscriptions leaves nothing to interpret; there is only the real.

Concluding this section is Paul Patton's essay, "Anti-Platonism and Art," which is directed specifically to the overthrow of Platonism in Deleuze's writing. Overturning Platonism, Patton writes, is part of a larger task in *Différence et répétition*; that task is a critique of representation. In turn, such a critique, even while overturning Platonism, nonetheless, conserves certain aspects of Plato's thought. Such is Deleuze's larger strategy—to develop the neglected aspects of major thinkers, which themselves constitute "minor traditions." Patton notes that for Plato, difference is only understood as the comparison between Ideas and their copies, which are similar to the Ideas themselves; in other words, in terms of Plato's foundations of representation. But simultaneously, the ensuing ordered hierarchy of representation is threatened by mimicry: the production of semblances and the mere imitation of appearances. Patton points out that while a philosopher like Jacques Derrida sees the reproduction of the real (Ideas) on a continuum with the reproduction of appearances (simulacra), Deleuze finds no possible common ground between the two. The distinction Deleuze finds here, Patton insists, is between figures (copies), which internally and spiritually resemble what they reproduce (Forms), and those "simulacra" that resemble only superficially. Simulacra are so different from copies that they internalize dissimilarity.

The purpose of this distinction, according to Patton, is purely moral. Hence, to overturn Platonism is to deny the primacy of originals over copies to the benefit of the simulacra and to the detriment of representation, which is ultimately denied legitimacy. What then are the consequences of the denial of representation? Patton answers this by turning to an examination of contemporary art. In the work of Andy Warhol, for example, he finds that art is made to be simulation, the production of an "effect of resem-

blance by means of difference," and not even the reproduction of an appearance. Difference, then, becomes the primary relation, and "'[a]rt does not imitate . . . because it repeats.'" Warhol's "serial" works, for example, deliberately draw attention to the reproductions of newspaper or publicity photographs, which they reproduce. By repeating these images, Warhol is engaged in the production of difference insofar as "simulation is a matter of displaced or disguised repetition. The moral issue in these works is the loss of hierarchy and privilege in a world of simulacra. Without a hierarchy of representation guiding one's encounter with the work of art, it becomes possible to make sense of a work of art not only in terms of its conceptual framework, but also as "'an encounter, a passion.'" Here Deleuze's minor theater comes into full play. Any nonrepresentational conception "embraces precisely that power of poetry which rendered it most dangerous in Plato's eyes," and this, Patton makes clear, is an encounter that is possible, not only with regard to art, but with regard to all thought.

Section four extends these lines of thought to Deleuze's articulation of the practices of minoritarian groups. This aspect of his thought has been of particular interest to feminists insofar as Deleuze (along with Guattari) maintains, in *A Thousand Plateaus*,[7] that of all processes "the becoming-woman of everything, the whole," which is never a representation, imitation, or conformation to a model of any sort, is the key to all other becomings. Luce Irigaray and Alice Jardine are preeminent among feminists who have addressed this with some concern. Jardine has asked if it is not the case that "to the extent that women must 'become woman' first . . . might that not mean that she must also be the *first* to disappear . . . There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations . . . necessary only for *his* metamorphosis?"[8]

Ever mindful of these words, Rosi Braidotti, in her essay, "Towards a New Nomadism, Feminist Deleuzian Tracks, or: Metaphysics and Metabolism," seeks to both meet these criticisms and to extend them in the depth of her own research on feminist political practice and feminist discursive, methodological, and epistemological premises: in short, the political practice of sexual difference insofar as it intersects with the Deleuzian project. Given this, the question of the moment for feminist thinkers is, according to Braidotti, how to reconcile historicity and, so, agency with "the political will to change, which entails the (unconscious) desire for the new, which, as Deleuze teaches, implies the construction of new desiring subjects." For Braidotti, "women's desire to become," as opposed to their will-to-have, which produced an objectification of the subject, is what is at stake in articulating new definitions of female subjectivity that seek to express women's structural need to posit themselves as female subjects, as corporeal and

sexed beings. Such a move requires that thought start with the body and with subjectivity rooted in a body, the site of physical, symbolic, and material overlappings. It is then a site of differences rather than a universal, ungendered, knowing subject. "[T]his puts a great deal of emphasis on the question of how to rethink alterity and otherness . . . so as to allow differences to create a bond, i.e., a political contract among women, so as to affect lasting political changes." In this project, Braidotti argues, feminists can profit from the inclusion of the Deleuzian project of transforming the image of thinking as well as that of the subject. In fact, Deleuze's vision of thought and subjectivity as an intensive, multiple, and discontinuous process has much to offer feminists willing to look at it concretely.

For Deleuze, notes Braidotti, the body is not a natural biological materiality; it is the play of forces (affects) and a surface of intensities: mobile and transitory. This is of great help to the feminist attempt to deessentialize the body and sexuality. Given the absence of any interiority in this thought of the body, thinking is the process whereby a multiplicity of impersonal forces establish connections with one another. Such an image undermines both Lacan's negative vision of desire and psychoanalysis's metaphysics of the unconscious. Instead, for Deleuze, the unconscious is a process of "displacement and production," desire and affirmation. This conception has the advantage of replacing the traditional (allegedly neutral) writer/reader coupling in philosophy with writers and readers in an "intensive mode," and who act as "transformers" and "processors" of intellectual energies and extratextual experiences.

Eschewing the polarizations and "ex-communications" of feminist debate, Braidotti hopes to bring Deleuze's "rhizomatics" into feminist practice. However, this cannot be done blindly or without addressing the concerns of materialist feminists like Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, Monique Wittig, and Donna Haraway. Braidotti argues that "one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been fully granted control over." And yet—insofar as 'woman' has been excluded from masculine systems of representation, she is unrepresentable; she is the site of "an-other system of representation." Braidotti thinks that Butler is saying the same thing when she writes that "Deleuze's post-Lacanian reading of the subject as a libidinal entity, in constant displacement in language, situates desire not only as a positive force, but also as the point of vanishing of the willful, conscious self." In the work of Haraway, more than any other contemporary feminist, Braidotti discovers the Deleuzian impetus at work. Like Deleuze, she finds that Haraway is interested in rethinking the "unity" of the human subject without resorting to humanism, dualism, or the divine. Haraway's image of the cyborg, like Deleuze's machinic couplings and Body without Organs, is

a figure of "inter-relationality, receptivity, and global communication that deliberately blurs categorical distinctions." Still, Braidotti concludes her essay with a warning that the new "nomadism" she advocates is not simply a question of willful practice (a position, of course, that Deleuze never takes). It requires working through our historical condition, in particular, the mass of images, concepts, and representations of women, before women can hope to emerge into difference and, especially, into the difference that is becoming-woman.

Like Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz takes up "feminist suspicions" concerning Deleuze's rhizomatics and becoming-woman. In "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics," Grosz voices the concern expressed by Jardine that "'becoming-woman,' desiring machines, and other similar concepts are merely excuses for male forms of appropriation of whatever is radical and threatening about women's movements." Grosz takes it upon herself to determine whether or not such reservations and suspicions are warranted, and to determine whether rhizomatics is simply the future (as Braidotti implies), or whether it provides a "powerful ally and theoretical resource for feminist challenges" to philosophy now. For one, Grosz points to the overthrow of Platonism, and along with this, the "displacement of the centrality and pervasiveness of the structure of binary logic." Grosz recognizes that for Deleuze and Guattari, "metaphysical identities and theoretical models" are repositioned. The insight operating here is that, rather than being ultimate and global phenomena, such identities and models are merely the "effects or consequences of processes of sedimentation." What she reveals at work in Deleuze and Guattari is not only a new image of philosophy, but a way to look at the entire history of philosophy that does not mire contemporary thinkers in the residue of absolute interpretations and systems out of which new images could never be forthcoming. The provisionality of such "alignments"—though "deeply implicated in regimes of oppression and social subordination," especially with regard to women—nevertheless guarantees that such oppression and subordination can be "problematized" and even rendered "anachronistic." Thus, Grosz has seen clearly how Braidotti's reservations are met and answered by Deleuze and Guattari.

Grosz goes on to locate various conjunctions between key feminist notions and those of Deleuze and Guattari. Most common among these is the conceptualization of a difference that is in no way subordinated to identity or the same, and which makes way for the being of becoming and a radical form of multiplicity defined by the outside: "the abstract line, the line of flight, or deterritorialization." Along with this arises a notion of political struggle that is decentered, molecular, multiple, diversified, and only provisionally aligned in temporary and nonhierarchical networks.

Following this line of thought, the "body" is a discontinuous and nontotalized series of processes, organs, flows, energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal events, intensities and durations, a body of affects, not will, yet defined by what it can do. This makes way for the sense of desire as affirmative, immanent, positive, and productive, a desire which "forges connections, creates relations, produces machinic alignments." Finally, Grosz finds that this articulation of the body, inspired by a Spinozist frame of reference "resurrect[s] the question of the centrality of ethics, of the encounter with otherness," in ways not unrelated to feminist rethinking of the relations between dominant and subordinated groups, oppressor and oppressed. Given Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the body, ethics distances itself from the "rampant moralism underlying ecological and environmental politics, which also stresses interrelations, but does so in a necessarily prescriptive and judgmental fashion," ultimately, subordinating them to some hierarchical and totalizing order.

Grosz remains troubled by Deleuze and Guattari's use of "the most notoriously phallic and misogynist writers" to exemplify fields of becoming, and by the dubious privileging of women's bodies when becoming could have been less conspicuously articulated in terms of some "asubjective and asignifying becoming." This is why, she concludes, as long as they are able to see in "becoming-woman" only a stage in the movement of microscopic and fragmenting processes, feminists may yet view Deleuze and Guattari with suspicion.

The fifth section of our volume puts together three essays that deal with the question of "minor" languages and "nomad" arts. Derrida's theory of the deconstructive efficacy of language and the practice that this theory entails are already well-entrenched in our intellectual landscape. But Deleuze's (and Guattari's) "minor deconstructive" approaches to language and literature are more timidly involved in the context of our local discussions. Réda Bensmaia's and Dana Polan's essays have, therefore, been selected to remedy this deficiency.

Bensmaia has often and with subtlety written on minor literature.[9] In the essay included in this volume, "On the Concept of Minor Literature: From Kafka to Kateb Yacine," after a brief characterization of minor literature and its function, and after devoting some time to defending Deleuze and Guattari against misreadings and misappropriations of their writings on this subject, he assesses the potential of minor literature through an appeal to the work of the Algerian writer and theater producer, Kateb Yacine. For Bensmaia, the strength of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of minor literature lies in their demonstration that minorization is not the problem only of immigrants, marginals, and minorities. It is the problem of all those who

seek to open "the question of 'literature' to the forces and the differences (of class, race, language, or gender) that run through it." Moreover, Bensmaia argues, being a minor writer, from Deleuze and Guattari's perspective, is not a matter of an aesthetic choice made by a subject transparent to itself, but rather of the response to the exigencies of an existential situation. Minor literatures are characterized by the search for a language that could conjugate the lines of flight of the minority with the lines of flight of the majority in such a way that the combination could precipitate the minorization of the majority itself. Minor literatures are, therefore, political in the sense that the individual is always an arrangement whose function depends on its connections with other "machines." As such, minor literatures refer to a collectivity that is virtual (and real), albeit not yet actual. Bensmaia shows his subtle appreciation of Deleuze and Guattari when he states that minor literatures exist because peoples, races, and cultures have been reduced to silence. As the practical manifestation of this (absent) voice, minor literatures cannot adequately be thought as the products of our transgressive and anarchic (anti-Oedipal) thrust, as Louis Renza has tried to do.[10] They are not mere alternatives to the existing canon, on the way to establish their own canon. On this issue, Bensmaia quotes with approval David Lloyd, for whom the fact that the literary canon is not imposed today as a necessary and sufficient system of values is due, not only to the fact that literature has changed but also to the fact that institutions that used to shore it up are now in the process of disintegration.[11] We leave it to the reader to savor Bensmaia's discussion of minor literature in the context of Yacine's productions.

It is worth recalling here that in *Différence et répétition,* Deleuze argued that the idea, in order to be grasped, requires a chain reaction of plateaus of intensity that can only start with sensible encounters. Only the violence of the *sentiendum* stands a chance to bring about the resonance and the compossibility of Ideas. In 1981, Deleuze decided to face this violence seriously, choosing the paintings of the British artist Francis Bacon.[12] Struck by the powerful tensions that run through these paintings (tension between figuration and defiguration; between unsettling, convulsive forces and an emerging balance; between motion and rest; contraction and expansion; destruction and creation) Deleuze concluded that their function is "to produce resemblances with nonresembling means." The violence of sensation tormenting Bacon's canvases trades off representation for the exploration of a world never before seen, and yet strangely familiar and near.

Dana Polan's essay reads Deleuze's *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* as a "pedagogy of the image," undertaken for the sake of a painterly practice that deforms the world in order to make it visible again. "How to make visible forces that are invisible?" is the question with which Bacon struggles

and on account of which Deleuze makes him the object of his meditation, in his attempt to build a general logic of sensation. Deleuze, according to Polan, chooses Bacon as the painter who defigures representation in search of a sensation that would give itself, in itself and for itself. This search constitutes a major revision of the kind of subjectivity that underwrites phenomenology. In Bacon, subjectivity is broken up, traversed by intensities, and hystericized. Deleuze suggests that sensation emerges in the encounter between a perceiving subject and the disintegrating figure of the painting. Bacon's practice, indebted to the Gothic tradition, is directed against the organic representation of classical art, but also against the kind of abstraction that moves toward geometric form. In between the two, Deleuze, according to Polan, focuses his attention on Bacon's modulation and gradation of significations, and on the slow meltings away of the body as the exemplary form of painting this modulation. In search of modulation, Bacon pursues the special project of undoing the face, and of rediscovering the head beneath the face. None of this would be possible, if sensation were a mere representation of the interaction of an eye and an object. But sensation is the response not to a form, but rather to a force, and Bacon's paintings aim at the capture of force. Since a force must itself exist on a body for there to be sensation, force is the necessary condition of sensation, provided, of course, that sensation is not asked to represent the force. Deleuze calls the logic of sensation that he finds in Bacon "haptic," in order to designate its ability to surpass simultaneously eye and hand into a singular logic of sensation—not of sensations. Sensations are extensive and contiguous, whereas sensation is intensive. In Polan's view, Deleuze's book on Bacon deserves high marks for its acute awareness of the problems generated by the attempt to speak in one medium about the practices of another; thus Polan particularly appreciates Deleuze's concern to overcome the verbal/visual dichotomy by making use of intensely imagistic and tableauesque language.

It is important to notice what Deleuze *never* does in his discussion of nomad arts. Deleuze is not visiting the artist's studio for themes and symbols capable of recharging dull senses and slumbering thought. In this sense, it is instructive to contrast Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization,* for instance, with Deleuze's writings on nomad art. *Eros and Civilization* witnesses, melancholically, the advancing colonization of all life activities by the performance principle; laments its dehumanizing and commodifying effects; and gratefully zeros in on the marginalized arts, which, because of their marginality, have preserved the dreams of the pleasure principle and the means (thematic and symbolic) to emancipation. But for Deleuze nomadism is the ability to be displaced in a certain way, transver-

sally or diagonally across all life activities—that is, an ability we encounter on all levels and in all territories. Hence, the laboratories of the artists are entered, by Deleuze, not for emancipatory potentials exclusively their own, but for the sake of a "confirmation of aparallel evolutions." In laboratories of research adjacent to one another, the painter, the cinematographer, the philosopher, and the scientist experiment with their own materials. Sometimes the porousness of the walls of the laboratories permit us to see that we have all been working with the same problems. But more often, an outside, which is the outside of all these laboratories, asserts itself, allowing an unstable, resonant communication, without wiping out the differences or the discordance of the "regional" concerns.[13]

It is because it speaks convincingly about aparallel evolutions that Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier's essay, "The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze," is included in this volume. It is faithful to Deleuze's warning: "[a] theory of cinema is not 'about' cinema but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices." Far from shutting himself within cinematic space, Deleuze asks cinema to intervene as accelerator of reflection. His cinematophilia, according to Ropars-Wuilleumier, is due to his perception of the aparallel evolution of world and cinema. His reflection on the seventh art is an attempt to show that cinema corroborates Bergson's pluralistic vision and that it makes possible the intuition of *durée* according to spatial and temporal flows that are no longer static surfaces or immobile points. Despite Bergson's skepticism, Deleuze's cinema has made possible our ascent to the nonhuman or superhuman moving images-*durées*. "Like the world," writes Ropars-Wuilleumier, "the cinema is Bergsonian . . . because it reactivates the concept of duration . . . [M]atter (which is image-movement) changes into memory (thus into image-time)." Or again, like the world, the cinema is Nietzschean, because in both "the circular becoming of time precipitates . . . short circuits, bifurcations, and detours, and irrational divisions where the notion of intensity is substituted for that of truth."

The author is convinced that Deleuze-Bergson's world can be conceived on the basis of the cinematic model, because cinema helps us recognize the world: Deleuze finds a kind of "catholicity" in cinema, a kind of universality that accepts, arranges, and reconciles everything inside an open-ended whole. The plane of consistency, therefore, which allows differences to resonate together without dulling their edges, is being modeled in and on the cinema. In fact, Ropars-Wuilleumier suggests that there is a conciliation, in cinema, that would make it possible to "negotiate[ ] an exchange between the image and the real." Such a conciliation, she argues, takes place

in the realm of belief (rather than certitude): there is an adumbration of redemption with the "wholeness of the aesthetic . . . responding to the nothingness of the ethical."

In Ropars-Wuilleumier's opinion, Deleuze's preoccupation with cinema highlights his preoccupation with the prelinguistic, that is, with a material that bears, without expressing, everything "prior to all processes of signification." Deleuze's choice of Peirce against Metz makes this preoccupation very clear: it marks the yielding to the appeal of sight, and to the asignifying and asyntactic plentitude of the image against all operations of a signifying nature. The two volumes on cinema and, in fact, the way in which they are written, testify, according to the author, to Deleuze's desire to break "with the empire of the sign and with the exact coincidence of signifier and signified." Much more than in any of his other books, Deleuze seems now ready to borrow the completed analyses of other researchers, and despite his unfailing recognition of his debts, to mix and match them until they become fully inscribed in his own system of thought, as if he wants in this sort of inscription to cause viewpoints, hypotheses, and ideas to shed their initial sense and origin, and to circulate rhizomatically. But in the last analysis, Ropars-Wuilleumier observes, the reconciliation of Peirce's classificatory logic with Nietzschean displacing strategies is not an easy task. In fact, according to the author, to the extent that Deleuze leans heavily on Peirce for his analysis of classical cinema (in *Cinema 1*), and then on Nietzsche for his discussions of modern cinema (in *Cinema 2*), "the foundations of the first volume tumble down in the second." It is certainly the case that Deleuze describes an aesthetic and historical break that, around 1950, separates a cinema marked by a temporality based on the movement of action and the linearity of narration (organic cinema) from a cinema whose time is built on serialization, repetition, and discontinuity (crystalline cinema). But in Ropars-Wuilleumier's reading, Deleuze allows the two temporalities to coexist, without accounting for the contradiction between them or coping with the aporias that the contradiction generates.

The final section of our collection, "Lines of Flight," consists of two exemplary essays that take the work of Deleuze as their starting point and engage in lines of flight, movements of "deterritorialization" and "destratification," the dismantling of organic hierarchies and organisms.

Jean-Clet Martin's "Cartography of the Year 1000, Variations on *A Thousand Plateaus*," brilliantly works out the parameters of monastic space in Romanesque architecture. Within this configuration, Martin discovers experimentation: the dome is being developed and a new space is opening, a space of overlap, incompatibilities, proliferations, heterogeneities, and change. Such a space is a patchwork where "the rules of distribution and

dispersion change nature, without any law or superior principle capable of legislating and extending its homogeneous jurisdiction over them." Romanesque architecture is a matter, then, not of a theorem, but of a "problem" that can receive a variety of solutions whose outlines can be diagramed. Thus, in monastic art, one finds a singular and eccentric choice, the giving up of wooden frames for stone, a choice not separable from the agitations in Europe in the year 1000 A.D. "[P]eregrinations and crusades determine changes of itineraries, halts, and deviations, which are related to technical innovations; they also determine mutations of forms that participate in the same movement of deterritorialization." Simply put, the need to house travelers opens the monastery.

Thus, Gothic art demands more light and attaches itself to the psalmodic model with its fluid outline and variable flow of acoustic singularities in nonmeasured musical time—the kyrielle: tonic accents repeated in unequal intervals creating unequal and heterogeneous points. It is here, argues Martin, that Deleuze's philosophy comes alive. Monastic art is not the offspring of the royal science of geometry, but the art of a problem, a protogeometric choice "following heterogeneous bifurcations of the lines of material forces" such as those found in the proliferation of unclassifiable animal forms and subject to the forces of the material used. Insofar as the material is like a vein animated from the inside, matter and energy are in continual variation and even the artist must follow their plan. This intermediate zone between matter and form is the site of "creative dicethrows," which release their singularities in all possible directions—countless, diverging arabesques.

Within the social field of monastic art, Martin locates spreading, smooth space in the holy relics that challenge organized, striated space and its hierarchies of similarities, analogies, categories, resemblances, and identities. The relics deploy a plane of consistency around a function that cuts across the irreducible and incommensurate objects which are accounted for primarily in terms of pragmatics and semantics, not linguistics. These relics are expressed inside sign regimes marked by a particular proper name—the name of a saint—though with frightful, incorporeal effects. Such sign regimes, however, are everywhere. The despotic sign regime of the pope is successful in its drive to make Rome the center of holy places, and the pope the despotic center of significance, the site of absolute unity. Such unity is completely feasible insofar as the people see that "a God who dies on the Cross is not a sign of powerlessness." Instead, the message is that there are "plenty of other dreadful, atrocious, and eternal sufferings" available to those who might resist. Not surprisingly, this regime invents the face of the tortured, and blocks every line of flight and deterritorialization, except the

negative, the heretical—the scapegoat whose deviation is always already inscribed within the despotic sign regime.

Yet, this is not to say that there is not a mixture of semiotics operating here. There are at least three intersecting lines that guarantee the formation of ever-new assemblages. There is a line of deterritorialization from which emerges the hordes and packs of pilgrims and crusaders producing architectural, scientific, and political mutations. The despotic regime of the church is itself carried along this vector, deterritorialized, and barbarized, while the passional system of relics and saints' names migrates in all directions. Meanwhile, the "pontifical and imperial language begins to stutter," as the invaders begin to speak a vulgar form of Latin, minorizing the very language of church power, and the hordes continue the production of relics marked with the names of saints. What remains of this project, for Martin, is to develop the ethical, juridical, and political thresholds of monastic and Gothic space, to cleanse them of constraining theorems, and to constitute them as "problems." Such a move will enable continuous deviation on the "trajectories of a nomadic philosophy."

It is certainly on these nomadic trajectories that the work of Alphonso Lingis falls. His essay, "The Society of Dismembered Body Parts," begins by citing social contract theory's organic image of society as an integrated hierarchy of terms defined by function, and as individuals integrated as functions of an organism. But Lingis's purpose here is to dismiss such conceptions of the society and its body in favor of the "libidinal body of the primary process," the "anorganic-orgasmic body" derived from a structuralist model of interchangeable terms, a body that guides what Deleuze and Guattari have to say about society.

What is the anorganic body? Take, for example, the infant body, writes Lingis. It "closes its orifices, curls up upon itself, closes its eyes and ears to outside fluxes, makes itself an anorganic plenum, a 'body without organs,'" a state of "primary catatonia." The body of the infant does not consist of organs that lead to the inner functional body. Rather, they are themselves productive, as Freud had already noted, functioning "polymorphously perversely to extend pleasure surfaces." Such surfaces, however, are not a closed plenum. Vital systems are coded and the anorganic plenum is the site of inscription, as is the social system, the "socius." Lingis refers to the three kinds of codings that Deleuze and Guattari cite. The socius is determined as the body of the earth in nomadic society, the body of the despot in imperial society, and the body of capital in capitalist society.

In savage, hunter-gatherer societies, the earth is the Body without Organs, the undivided plenum to which humans' organs are attached. As such, humans are not separated from the earth and experience their own

bodies not as individual wholes, but as attached to the earth. Social interaction, rather than being a case of rights and responsibilities, is a matter of initiation, of being marked as belonging in some way to the earth. Membership in the society is "attachment to the earth," organs are "attached to the full body of the earth." And such attachments, Lingis informs us, are a matter of couplings: couplings of voice with hearing (there are over 700 languages among hunter-gatherers in New Guinea), hand with surfaces of inscription (hand craft and the immediate imitation of physical skills), and eye with pain (the excitement, even jubilation, at the spectacle of pain). When savage society is transformed and incorporated into sedentary and imperial societies whose organs converge on the body of a despot that has been detached from the earth, barbarian society arises. The hand is coupled onto the voice and the voice coupled with hearing by means of graphics (the signs of spoken words necessary for legislation, accounting, tax collecting, state monopoly, imperial justice, historiography), while the eye is uncoupled from the vision of pain. "[T]he eye no longer winces when it sees the mark . . . it does not see the incision, the wound, it passes lightly over the page." The eye becomes the passive receptor of abstract patterns. Lingis's analysis evokes Martin's exposition of the Kyrielle and the pontifical power that pursued it: "Now the voice no longer resonates, chants, invokes, calls forth; one hears only the voice of the law." And to make sense of this voice, one must subject oneself to the law.

If you were able to listen, Lingis continues, to the voices of the Quechua people without knowing their language or anything about "imperial society," what you would hear is the vocalizing of their togetherness. But as soon as you know that they are speaking about drug deals with Colombians, hearing is transformed, incorporated into the "codings of imperial society," an international code established in "Washington and Bonn and Tokyo." Now, these voices mean "crime," while you, listening, mean "tourist," an observer of the empire. The only possible resistance is to speak the language of the imperial code against itself: words lose consistency, become nonsensical, and turn against their own order. Thus the question, for Lingis, seems to be how not to speak the law of imperial discourse; how, instead, to speak the language of becoming-minor, even if your own language is English, German, or Japanese.

Yet capitalism, insofar as it subordinates the body of the entire productive enterprise (including the limbs and members of others) to the "integral body of the individual," responds primarily with privatization. Capitalist privatization is the removal of organs from the social field, "decoding their couplings with their immediate objects, and making their flows of substance and energies abstract." As a result, we "individuals" have substi-

tuted for the real pleasures of the body the imaginary or symbolic pleasures of meaning. Lingis complains that "[i]n our societies the flows for pubescent semen and blood are decoded, deterritorialized, privatized: it is supposed to take place behind locked doors at night." Individual privacy, then, is constituted around such privatized organs and flows, and Marx's "integral man" is nothing but a moment in capitalist coding. While Lingis seems to lament the loss of primitive public territorializations of the body, he nonetheless recognizes that Deleuze and Guattari do not seek primitive coding but, rather, seek even greater deterritorialization and decoding, freeing organs for ever more diverse couplings, and in this too, he finds much to lament.

With Martin and Lingis, our volume passes through the primitive territorial machine, the imperial despotic machine, and the capitalist machine, and the image of a theater of philosophy gives way to that of rhizomatic mapping, minoritarian becomings, packs, waves, intensities, and lines of flight. As editors, we have a sense that this is not simply possible, but necessary, given the new image of thought, the creation of concepts, and the mapping of processes that form the plane of immanence that we predicted at the beginning of this introduction. The "theater of cruelty" is cruel insofar as even the concept of the theater has been discarded in the very moment of its articulation. Just as, in the Deleuzian process, life is continuously phased out for something new, so philosophy as theater is phased out in the face of new modes of thought, new deterritorializations, destabilizations, and becomings that also cannot be stopped.

Notes

1. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice,* trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
2. Gilles Deleuze, "La Methode de dramatisation," *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie,* 61.3 (1967).
3. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1991), p. 74.
4. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 276–285.
5. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 174.
6. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense,* trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 1.
7. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987; orig. published in 1980).

8. Alice Jardine, "Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others), *Substance* 44/45 (1984): 46–59, p. 54.
9. See Réda Bensmaia, "L'effect-Kafka," *Lendemains,* no. 53 (1989): 63–71; "Un philosophe au cinema," *Magazine Littéraire,* no. 257 (1988): 57–59.
10. Louis Renza, *"A White Heron" and the Question of Minor Literature* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).
11. David Lloyd, *Nationalism and Minor Literature: James Clarence Mangan and the Emergence of Irish Cultural Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
12. Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation,* 2 vols. (Paris: Editions de la Différence, 1987).
13. See Constantin V. Boundas, "Editor's Introduction," *The Deleuze Reader,* Constantin V. Boundas, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 1–3.

2

He Stuttered

Gilles Deleuze

PEOPLE LIKE TO SAY that poor novelists experience the need to alternate their dialogic markers and to replace "he said" with "he murmured," "he stumbled," "he sobbed," "he sneezed," "he cried," or "he stuttered"—all of them being expressions that mark different voice modulations. It seems, in fact, that the writer, faced with such modulations, has only two possibilities: either to do it[1] (as did Balzac, who used to make Father Grandet stutter, whenever the latter said anything at all, and Nucingen speak in a distorting patois—cases in which Balzac's pleasure is easily felt); or else to say it without doing it, and to be satisfied with a mere indication that the reader will have to actualize: this is the case with characters who always whisper with a voice that *must* be a scarcely audible murmur. Melville's Isabelle has a voice that is little more than a whisper, and the angelic Billy Budd does not stir without us having to reconstitute his stutter; Gregor, in Kafka's *Metamorphosis,* warbles more than he speaks, but this again is according to the testimony of others.

It seems, however, that there is a third possibility: the performative. This is what happens when the stuttering no longer affects preexisting words, but, rather, itself ushers in the words that it affects; in this case, the words do not exist independently of the stutter, which selects and links them together. It is no longer the individual who stutters in his speech, it is the writer who *stutters in the language system* (*langue*): he causes language as such to stutter. We are faced here with an affective and intensive language (*langage*) and not with an affection of the speaker. Such a poetic undertaking seems to be very different from the previous cases, but it is perhaps less different from the second case than is usually thought. The fact is that in the cases where the writer is satisfied with a merely external marker, leaving the form of expression intact ("he stuttered . . . "), we understand the efficacy of this operation poorly unless a corresponding form of content,