

Migrations in Medieval and Early Colonial India

Edited by
Vijaya Ramaswamy



A Routledge India Original

Indian migration history so far has been dominated by studies about indentured labourers going overseas, and the diaspora. Unlike in other parts of the world, where this field is much more extensive, this book makes a fresh start by pre- and early-colonial peasant, artisan and merchant migrations taking centre stage.

Jan Lucassen, International Institute of Social History,
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MIGRATIONS IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY COLONIAL INDIA

This book looks at movements of communities which formed the lower and middle rungs of society in medieval and early colonial India. It presents migration, mobility and memories from a specifically Indian perspective, breaking away from previous Eurocentric studies. The essays in the volume focus on labour, peasant and craft migrations, and in fleshing out the causes and trajectories taken by these communities, they speak to each other by addressing similar issues as well as documenting varying responses to analogous situations.

A fascinating history of migrations of 'people from below', the volume adopts a trans-disciplinary approach and uses inscriptions, official records and literary texts along with community narratives and folk tradition. This will be of great interest to scholars and students of migration and diaspora studies, medieval and modern South Asian history, social anthropology and subaltern studies.

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FOREWORD

Bridging Turki Ottoman migrations and medieval Indian migrations

It may appear presumptuous that a person with no background in the history of the Indo-Pakistani-Bangladeshi subcontinent dares to comment on a distinguished project concerning migration in the different worlds that made up pre-colonial and colonial southern India. However, Vijaya Ramaswamy has emphasised in her introduction that migration and mobility are now subjects of study in many parts of the world, and that the Ottoman Empire has left us an unusually large collection of relevant archival materials, on occasion going back to the mid-fifteenth century. Ever since the 1940s, historians have principally been using this accumulation of documents when constructing their images of the Ottoman world.

At present, migration studies are in the process of enlarging their horizons and moving beyond research on migrant Europeans and later Americans during the 1600s, 1700s and 1800s; and as the present volume shows, migration is also a concern of scholars studying southern India. In this context, it may be of interest for historians of the subcontinent to see what kinds of movement on the part of the sultans' subjects Ottoman bureaucrats considered it necessary to record. For from the outset, we must keep in mind that many migrants and migrations – likely the great majority – never entered any official document; and often it was a matter of pure chance whether such movements attracted the attention of the sultans' bureaucrats, and – sad to say – whether the relevant records survive in the Ottoman archives. Furthermore, when the sultans' subjects tried to make their voices heard, it was through highly formalised petitions whose wording must have usually been the work of specialised scribes. What people 'on the move' actually thought about their migrations thus has rarely entered the records; and while folk poetry which forms such an important source for similar questions on the subcontinent does survive for the Ottoman world

as well, these texts are very difficult to date and thus have attracted the attention of historians only to a limited extent.

***Governmental control of migration as a research problem
and a trap for unwary historians***

Even so, the results which Ottomanists have derived from Ottoman – and to a much lesser extent from foreign – source material may repay a closer look, particularly since the systems of governance developed by Ottoman officials and their Mughal counterparts have certain affinities in spite of their even more obvious differences; unfortunately, the scope for comparison is much more limited once we enter southern India.¹

Especially when it came to wealth and population, the resources that the Ottoman sultans could command were very moderate when compared to those available to Akbar or Jahangir: around 1,600, the sultans in Istanbul controlled a taxable population which oscillated between 20 and 30 million, while the Mughal emperors could count on the taxes paid by 100–145 million persons.² Moreover, the Ottoman sultans governed large areas that were mountainous or else dry steppe, while India's agricultural productivity was and is a great deal higher. These differences in resource availability may explain why the Ottoman sultans attempted to control migration much more stringently than Babur and his descendants ever considered necessary, to say nothing of the various rulers governing southern India.

On the whole, the elite of the Ottoman Empire kept a fairly tight control over its territory. Thus, there were no enclaves settled by foreign merchants comparable to Bombay/Mumbai or Madras/Chennai. Certainly during the 1600s, English, French, Dutch and Venetian merchants traded in Izmir and their business made the tiny settlement of the sixteenth century into a major *entrepôt* of Mediterranean trade. Quite likely, this development was only possible because the sultans were willing to somewhat reduce the deliveries which the Aegean seaboard had previously owed to the Ottoman government and its capital Istanbul. For, it was only when foreign merchants were permitted to export local cotton that Izmir's trade really 'took off'. Moreover, this place in spite of its importance during the early modern period did not become the centre of a province, with only an Islamic judge (*qadi*) and a number of tax farmers representing the sultans' government. But if in the 1600s and 1700s, Ottoman control over Izmir was not exercised with a heavy hand, this did not mean that the various communities of foreign merchants possessed any kind of extra-territorial status. Even less were they able to attract primary producers into their orbit, and all the goods these traders purchased first passed through the hands of local

merchants and tax farmers.³ Furthermore, goods made by craftsmen were only a relatively minor part of Izmir's export trade, in which raw cotton and angora wool were of central importance, although at least by the 1800s, the export of carpets from western Anatolia reached appreciable levels. In consequence, Izmir – or other ports where foreign merchants congregated such as Salonika – did not attract many craftspeople who gained their daily bread by supplying the needs of traders from outside the sultans' realm.⁴

This relatively strong presence of the Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus throughout the sultans' domains means that Ottomanists for a long time have viewed history through the lenses of officialdom. However, this approach would not have continued unchallenged for many decades – and it is widespread even today – if the political situation in Turkey had not encouraged scholars to retain it. For due to the manner in which the Ottoman Empire came to an end and the Republic of Turkey was founded, for at least a century the 'interests of the state and its chief representative the military' have been sacrosanct in public discourse; and it is only at the present time that the right of the military to direct the course of politics – if desired even by coup d'état – is being seriously challenged.

Given the changing political context, today many Ottomanist historians try to reduce the emphasis on the aims and intentions of the sultans and their ruling elites, thus making room for the 'other side', including merchants and craftsmen, to enter the picture, put differently the urban and rural migrants whose movements the sultans' officials attempted to control. But as we shall see, this is a laborious process with many pitfalls.

Official attempts to enforce (re)settlement

Much of our documentation concerning mobility in the Ottoman world results from the government's will to transplant populations or else prevent the movements that its subjects might undertake on their own initiative. In the mid-fifteenth century, after Mehmed the Conqueror (r. 1451–1481) had added the former capital of the Byzantine emperors to his rapidly expanding domains, he certainly tried to promote the resettlement of the much depleted city by building covered markets and complexes of pious foundations that might provide work to immigrants. But in addition, he forced his free subjects, to say nothing of prisoners and slaves, to settle on the site which as yet did not possess the attractions for which Istanbul was to become famous in later centuries.⁵ In sultanlic instructions, we find resettled persons of free status described as *sürgün*, in other words they were 'banished' to their places of resettlement. While not considered slaves, these people were expected to stay in the locality where the ruler had placed them. This special status might turn into a social disability as

locals of non-*sürgün* status might not wish to marry a man or woman tied to a given town or city.

Later Ottoman sultans also tried to secure their conquests by removing large numbers of people from their homelands and resettling them somewhere else. Thus, after the Ottomans had conquered the town of Lefkoşe/Nicosia on the hitherto Venetian Cyprus, some 12,000 people were taken prisoners, probably enslaved and for the most part carried off to other parts of the Empire. At the same time, inhabitants of southern Anatolia were drafted to repopulate the island, a move that many did their level best to avoid, fleeing before they even reached the sea or else decamping shortly after resettlement.⁶

After the sixteenth century, the emphasis shifts: now the sultans are out to force people who had migrated on their own initiative, often to Istanbul, to return to the towns and villages from where they had come. For by the early seventeenth century, numerous refugees from the military rebellions that made life in Anatolia quite hazardous had settled in Istanbul and the surrounding towns. When Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) apparently assumed – on the basis of slender evidence – that he had succeeded in suppressing these rebellions he forced some of these refugees to relocate to their Anatolian hometowns at considerable danger to life and limb. On the other hand, it seems that during the late 1500s and early 1600s numerous young peasants left their homes to become mercenaries in the sultans' armies, partly because of climatic disasters and partly because an increased population made it more difficult for young men to find a vacant farmstead and found a family.⁷ In addition, life as a soldier offered opportunities for enrichment through booty, which seem to have attracted many villagers probably too young to appreciate the risks of military life.

In the end, many military men found that their service was temporary as the sultans tried to keep down the costs of much enlarged wartime armies by dismissing numbers of soldiers as soon as a peace treaty made this policy seem feasible. Some of the mercenaries concerned might rebel to demand integration into the standing army, in which the *Janissaries* formed the best-known contingent.⁸ Others took to the highways attempting to survive through robbery, thus contributing to the unrest that had caused the flight of Anatolian villagers in the first place, to say nothing of the fact that quite often in these unsettled times the booty was too meagre for the robbers to survive for any length of time.

In the eighteenth century, official concern to limit or even to prevent immigration to Istanbul apparently intensified, although in part this impression may be due to the fact that much more written evidence survives from the 1700s than for the preceding period. But at least, in part, the growth of official concern was quite real.⁹ For in earlier times we do not

hear of roadblocks on the principal routes leading into Istanbul nor of the requirement that people living in the Ottoman capital but who had been absent for some time provide witnesses to their status as bona fide residents. To some extent, this concern may have been due to the fact that while military rebellions had been common enough ever since the sixteenth century, those of 1703 and 1730 had been serious enough to result in the deposition of the sultans involved and the murders of their closest advisors. But after the defeat of the Ottoman armies in the war against Russia (1768–1774), the food supplies of Istanbul were in acute danger as the Black Sea was no longer an Ottoman lake and much of the fighting took place in Moldavia and Wallachia, both in modern Rumania, which previously had supplied much of the grain consumed in the capital. Certainly, Istanbul was not under siege in any literal sense of the term, yet the administration visibly wished to get rid of people whom its officials considered ‘surplus to requirements’.

By the end of the century, the authorities had all the more reason to fear the reactions of a poorly fed population, as Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) was trying to institute a ‘new model’ (*Nizam-ı cedid*) army to supplant the *Janissaries* who had become an integral part of the craft and trade world of the major Ottoman cities. This move, once Selim’s successor Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) succeeded in pushing it through, resulted in a regime that might be called ‘neo-absolutist’, while the capital’s poor people lost much of their bargaining power.¹⁰ As noted, it was thus in part with the aim of removing from Istanbul that section of the population which the authorities deemed ‘surplus’ that around 1,800 Ottoman bureaucrats produced detailed counts of artisans and shopkeepers. But beyond this immediate consideration, historians working on the massive data collections resulting from this endeavour also have come to regard them as examples of ‘modernity in the Ottoman style’. Thus, this special brand of modernity did not begin with the mid-nineteenth-century top-down reforms (*Tanzimat*) or even with the abolition of the *Janissaries* in 1826, but goes back into the eighteenth century and owes less to European models than had previously been assumed.¹¹

***Townsmen moving on their own initiative –
if not always by choice***

In our discussion of artisan movements, we will now ‘jump’ from the Ottoman capital to the region south of Delhi, for Nandita Sahai’s analysis of artisan migration between Marwar and Malwa focusses on just this region. Here, when crops failed, not only marginal peasants but also craftspeople migrated from drought-ridden Marwar to the more hospitable region of

Malwa, often returning when conditions permitted. Certainly, the author discusses 'push' and 'pull' factors and thus implies that the migrants had some choice in the matter; yet the famines and elite oppression that form the subject of Sahai's study show that in real life, artisans migrated to avoid dying of hunger so that – as the author is well aware – their choice was more apparent than real. Given the vastly different climatic conditions in the Ottoman world, people probably moved for somewhat different reasons, as we will see.

Perhaps, the Ottoman administration made such strenuous efforts to contain mobility, because in real life villagers and even urban dwellers were quite mobile. Mobility on the most modest scale involved townspeople who in the summer left their shops and workshops to harvest and preserve the fruit of their gardens, for the latter might be at a distance of several kilometres from the town centre. This migration over short distances, caused in part by limited demand for craft products, continued through the ages, and appears not only in seventeenth-century records but also in twentieth-century work. According to an English observer of the nineteenth century, the central Anatolian town of Kayseri was reasonably healthy because summer migration eased congestion and thus diminished the risks of contagion.¹²

Other townsmen migrated periodically over yet longer distances. Thus, in the seventeenth-century southern Anatolia where malaria was a serious problem during the summers, the town of Silifke virtually emptied and people moved into the mountains taking with them even quite heavy equipment such as dyers' vats. However, this instability probably prevented the accumulation of people and goods in the town, although the port of Silifke had an important role in the traffic between Anatolia and Cyprus; for the Ottoman traveller and generally optimistic observer Evliya Çelebi (1611–after 1683) described the inhabitants as rather poor and the site full of ruins that testified to the past prosperity and current decay of the town.¹³

Some migrations had political causes. As previously noted, quite a few inhabitants of Anatolian towns sought the relative safety of Istanbul during the military rebellions of the years before and after 1600. When the sea was close and ships at hand, refugees of this kind might cover very long distances. Thus, people from the eastern Anatolian town of Trabzon and surroundings wound up in Varna on the coast of present-day Bulgaria, where they angered the locals by trying to survive as petty tradesmen in what must have been a strictly limited market. Overtaxation also was quite often a reason for flight; in the 1700s, the artisans of the northern Anatolian town of Tokat, at that time an industrial centre of some importance, seem quite often to have been on the run to escape the depredations of tax farmers and their minions.¹⁴ Here, we find a parallel to the situation discussed by Sahai: for in southern India, too, artisans might threaten to leave their places of

settlement if elite demands became too pressing, and in some cases they actually acted on their threats.

Last but not least, we need to consider the accumulation of resources in Istanbul that attracted provincial artisans and labourers to the city where, according to the proverb, 'stones and earth were of gold'. Put differently, in Istanbul the phenomenon of serial migration was quite widespread. People from a given village or region moved to the capital to work in a type of job to which they had access because their fathers and uncles had laboured in the same trade. Once they reached a certain age, these craftsmen or workers retired to their provincial homes and their sons, nephews or other young relatives took their places. This phenomenon is well-known from the later 1800s, when first Armenians and later Kurds monopolised the loading and unloading of ships in the port of Istanbul, while gardeners in the capital came from a small number of villages on the Anatolian Black Sea coast. But already by the mid-1700s, this type of migration had not been unknown, with gardeners in the Istanbul 'service town' of Eyüp – today an integral part of the city – coming from Albania and grocers from a small section of what is today central Greece.¹⁵ Sometimes, we have to infer that what we are dealing with is in fact serial migration, but the registers of the *qadi* of Eyüp frequently provide reasonably reliable indicators, including the fact that the practitioners of a given trade all came from a small recruitment area. Moreover, the *qadi*'s scribes recorded occasional property sales in the home regions of migrant artisans that perhaps had decided to stay in the capital.

As these remarks will show, the situations of the textile producers of the Ottoman Empire and South India differ so much that comparison is almost impossible. Even if today we no longer believe that the sultans' officials could impose their wishes on local artisans without any trouble, it is still clear that the Ottoman bureaucracy controlled the Empire's craft world in a manner that no ruler of southern India could have envisaged. As the Ottoman Empire was a massive, fairly coherent entity stretching from Hungary to the Iranian border and from the Crimea to East Africa, no group of producers could have envisaged migrations to the realms of other rulers, of the type analysed by Vijaya Ramaswamy or Nandita Sahai; for the latter presupposed a welter of small and middling kingdoms and principalities. In the Ottoman case, by contrast, leaving the territory of the sultans to settle in that of another ruler in most contexts simply was not an option.

Also, famines certainly were not unknown in the Ottoman heartlands, the years around 1600 being especially catastrophic on account of drought, and the same calamity occurred in the region of Ankara toward the end of our period, in 1845.¹⁶ Yet, only in exceptional cases did these famines apparently take on the disastrous forms known from the subcontinent,

perhaps also because the Ottoman world was home to a much smaller population. Moreover, while Ottoman manufacturers also might work for distant markets – as an example, we might mention the export of Anatolian textiles to the Crimea – the market for Indian textiles was worldwide already in the 1600s. As a result, Indian weavers were linked to the European trade companies in a manner that would have been unimaginable in the Ottoman world. And last but not least, the coherence of textile-producing communities seems to have been much weaker in the Ottoman world than in the south of India. Thus, the changes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries seem to have led to a much more rapid disappearance of local craft traditions.¹⁷

In this context, the Ottomanist historian may learn much by reflecting on Naveen Kanalu's study of Muharram festivities, which in some parts of southern India were shared by Muslims and Hindus until recently and to a limited extent are shared even today. Where the Ottoman world and Turkey are concerned, a few analogies do exist. Already at the beginning of the twentieth century, the British classicist Frederick W. Hasluck had pointed to sanctuaries frequented by Christian and Muslim populations, often because adherents of the two rival faiths viewed the saint venerated on this site as possessing two separate identities. More recently, Meropi Anastasiadou has studied the festival of Aya Yorgi on Büyükada within the Istanbul city limits, where an Orthodox pilgrimage site has been 'adopted' by Istanbul's Muslim population. But none of these shared holy sites have anything to do with the artisan world, and the tribulations of late Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim artisans do not seem to have resulted in shared religious practices.¹⁸

Artisans migrating under duress

In addition to refugees and people in search of work, we need to consider the migrations of craftsmen mobilised by the Ottoman central government for a specific task; in some instances at least, the sultans' officials assumed that the men in question would return to their home towns after the job was done. The best documented enterprise of this kind was doubtless the construction of the Süleymaniye (1550–1557), when in addition to large numbers of masons and stonecutters, artisans from a variety of more specialised trades were drafted to build the sultan's mosque as well as the juridical cum theological colleges (*medreses*) and other charities associated with it.¹⁹ Some of these people may have been migrant builders by trade, but others had workshops back home that they did not necessarily want to leave. In other cases, the sultan seems to have aimed at a more long-term relocation. Thus, when at the end of the sixteenth century carpet makers

from Cairo were told to relocate to Istanbul, the relevant order said nothing about an eventual return.

Moreover, after 1718, when a spate of wars had resulted in a long period of neglect, the Ottoman administration began to not only refurbish fortresses on the pilgrimage route to Mecca but also on the empire's northern borders. Once again, artisans and labourers for these projects were drafted often from fairly remote provinces; thus, at one point we find Cretans sent to the bleak borderlands of the Empire in today's Ukraine. In another case of this type, perhaps the administration was out to 'kill two birds with one stone' by recruiting men from Istanbul who were too young to be qualified masters in any trade for a repair project in distant Hotin, also on the border of the sultan's domains in what is nowadays the Ukraine. These youths were often Albanians, whom the Ottoman authorities tended to regard as troublemakers. After all, given the distance between Istanbul and Hotin, it was likely that many of the men drafted would not return, or if they did they might have trouble finding witnesses who would testify to their status as Istanbul residents.²⁰

Coerced migrants normally received payment as long as the ruler required their services; however, wages might be lower than those which these artisans could command in the open market. As in the case of the resettlement projects previously discussed, officials do not seem to have had any doubts that the sultans had a right to dispose of their subjects' lives in this fashion. This fact is worth recording as, for instance, Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566) before building his foundation complex took special care to legally acquire the land needed for this enterprise, for a failure to do so would have cancelled out the religious merit that the monarch hoped to gain from this project.²¹ Measures of this kind had a long history; Timur (1336–1405), the ancestor of the Mughal dynasty and victorious opponent of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I Yıldırım (r. 1389–1402), had acted in the very same way when he brought prisoners from all over the Islamic world to his capital of Samarkand.²²

Coerced migration also plays a significant role in the study of Vijaya Ramaswamy. She has highlighted the plight of weavers whom the East India Company obliged to move into the coastal 'Black Towns'. But in this case, the agent enforcing migration was not the state; and this is perhaps one of the major differences between the world that emerges from the studies in this volume and that with which Ottoman historians are familiar. Only in the later colonial period does the British government of India appear to have had an impact on society resembling that which the Ottoman Empire seems to have had throughout its history. If parallels need to be drawn – and I am not sure whether that is even apposite – we might compare the role of the colonial state in India and the 'reforming' Ottoman

administration after about 1850. It is perhaps not purely by chance that Istanbul bureaucrats of the late nineteenth century tended to see the populations of outlying possessions like Yemen or Iraq as 'primitive people' whom the government needed to 'civilize', perhaps by converting them to Sunni Islam.²³

Trading in a diaspora

Trade diasporas existed in the Ottoman world, although they did not determine the fate of any region in as dramatic a fashion as must have been the case on the western coast of southern India, or at least that is the impression that the reader will obtain from the work of Pius Malekandathil, who discusses an impressive array of Christian, Jewish and Muslim traders, some of local background and others immigrants. Where the Ottoman Empire is concerned, some work has been done on the merchants of Dubrovnik, a small port town on the Adriatic that paid tribute to the Ottoman sultan in exchange for trading privileges. In the 1400s and 1500s, these merchants criss-crossed the Balkans buying leather, wax, hides and skins; as was often true of successful diasporas, the traders were of a different denomination than the host societies, for while the Balkan population was Orthodox or Muslim, Dubrovnik was self-consciously Catholic.²⁴

Another significant diaspora, based in Isfahan/Iran but active also on Ottoman territory, involved Armenian merchants who imported Iranian raw silk and cloth. Other Armenians based this time on Ottoman territory traded in cotton and angora wool that they shipped from Izmir and sent to Amsterdam.²⁵ The latter are of special interest because their status as 'Oriental non-Muslims' has exposed them to a variety of prejudices; to begin with, their methods were supposedly those of unsophisticated pedlars, and to make matters worse they were supposed to have been the compradors for European traders and thus contributed to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. However, as Kadı has shown, in reality these men were simply merchants out for profit. If the playing field was more or less level, as it apparently was in eighteenth-century Holland, these diaspora merchants were more than ready for cut-throat competition against the Dutch. In this enterprise, they succeeded brilliantly, managing to oust from the Amsterdam market due to their contacts with western Anatolia that enabled them to acquire high-quality goods at competitive prices. A small diaspora of Indian traders was also active on the sultan's territory, but we have very little information about its operation; and it bears repeating that southern India seems to have been a much more profitable venue for merchants operating in a diaspora.

Pilgrimages

Islamic law requires that people with the necessary means undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. Ottoman pilgrims had needs that differed substantially from those of their counterparts from the subcontinent, for the vast majority did not arrive by sea, and thus thorny problems like the Portuguese attacks on Indian Ocean shipping were not of any great significance to Ottoman pilgrims. On the other hand, as most of them travelled through the desert, they needed more or less reliable sources of water. In other words, the Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus needed to protect the scanty sources available by setting up desert fortresses and paying for small garrisons to man them. Often, it was also state power which obliged the inhabitants of wayside towns to sell the pilgrims food at affordable prices; and in the Hejaz where agriculture was marginal, the pilgrims could feed themselves only if whoever governed Egypt was able and willing to send out significant amounts of grain.²⁶ As to the numbers involved, we remain in the dark, for as Mecca pilgrims paid no taxes, there was no reason to record numbers. But quite a few observers saw the outgoing caravans in Damascus and Cairo, and refer to many thousands of pilgrims.

Thus, the Ottoman sultan derived significant legitimacy from his position as the protector of Mecca and Medina, and also of the pilgrimage caravans. This legitimisation cost sizeable amounts of money, for not only the caravans and the inhabitants of the Hejaz had a claim on the sultans' bounty, the Bedouins in the desert also received sizeable grants-in-aid officially because they allowed the pilgrims access to food and water and in practice, as a payment for the safe passage that they granted the pilgrims. While otherwise in the eyes of the elite the sultans' subjects were defined by the fact that they stayed in their places and paid their taxes, the pilgrimage made it necessary not only to condone but also to actually promote self-motivated movement on the part of prospective *hajjis*. Protection of the pilgrimage also required the payment of scarce resources to tribesmen who lived on the margins of the Empire and had no claim whatsoever to be part of the Ottoman elite.

The empire's nomads

In addition to townspeople and villagers who migrated once or twice in their lives, there were people for whom movement was a way of life. Presumably, they had been more numerous in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries than they were to be after the population increase of the 1500s. Much less is known about nomads and semi-nomads than about the peasantry. Presumably, the sultans' officials sometimes had trouble even locating certain

groups of nomads to say nothing of the fact that these people owned horses and arms, and thus frequently needed to be persuaded rather than coerced. As a result, nomads and semi-nomads rarely occur in the great series of tax registers (*tahrir* or *tapu tahrir*) that Ottoman officials compiled between the mid-fifteenth and late sixteenth century in order to facilitate the assignment of revenue grants in exchange for cavalry service known as *timar* and *zeamet*. We may, albeit very loosely, compare these tax assignments to the *jagirs* of Mughal India, also based on detailed registers of taxpayers, which however differently from the Ottoman case do not seem to have survived.

The Ottoman sultans of the 1500s differed from their Safavid neighbours in excluding tribesmen from the army and also from the exercise of power in Istanbul. The heads of such units might be important in a local context; for instance, in present-day Syria on the borders of the desert where the security of the pilgrimage caravan depended on their cooperation, or in the mountains of eastern Anatolia. In the latter region before the 1830s, the Ottoman government typically condoned and even supported the activities of these tribal lords as they were Sunnis and thus likely to come to the aid of Ottoman armies when monarchs or viziers campaigned against the Shiite Safavids.²⁷

But differently from the Iranian dynasty, the Ottomans did not encourage personages of tribal background to attend the sultans' court, nor did these men get to marry women from the family of the monarch, as high-level personages serving the sultan so often got to do. We do not know much about the motivations for this momentous decision, for Ottoman officials quite often debated the 'when and how' of important measures in great detail, but probably because the reasons were familiar to all the participants, the documents normally did not say anything about the 'why'. But in all likelihood, as monarchs ruling mainly over sedentary people, the sultans were concerned that nomads would introduce an element of instability into the army, especially if as quite often happened the opponent was another Muslim ruler. After all, if the sultans' commanders in the Iranian wars fought armies containing a strong tribal contingent, members of related tribes if they had been integrated into the Ottoman military could have been tempted to change sides. Furthermore, the Ottoman army's core already in the fifteenth century consisted of professional infantry soldiers wearing uniforms and living in barracks; perhaps the cohesion of the army would have suffered if two very different groups of military men had been forced to coexist.

Be that as it may, matters were different in earlier times, for nomads did participate in the conquest of the Balkans during the 1300s and 1400s, and some of them remained in the area after the conquest. But for unknown reasons, these groups lost their tribal structure at an early date and the

Ottoman administration was able to reorganise them along military lines. A certain number of such nomads here called *yürük* or 'those who walk' formed a unit called *ocak*, some of whose members would participate in the sultans' campaigns. As for the currently non-combatant members, they were responsible for supplying their fellows who went to war. Because the sultans apparently needed the mobility only these men could provide, Balkan *yürük* were strongly discouraged from settling.²⁸ However, by the sixteenth century we observe a tendency to eliminate 'intermediate categories' between the tax-free elite and the taxpaying producers, and the *yürük* as non-elite soldiers clearly fell into this now undesirable category. Increasingly, they were demoted from active status to guard and transportation duties, services which they kept rendering well into the 1700s.

The *yürük* of the Balkans were the partial exception to the rule excluding nomads from the Ottoman army. Presumably, in addition to the political and military motivations just discussed, this exclusion had something to do with the sultans' resource base. In territories where rainfall agriculture was possible and wheat and barley could be grown albeit with difficulty even in the driest parts of Anatolia, the taxpayers were sedentary people who often complained about the aggression of nomads and their flocks. Certainly there was no enmity 'in principle' between 'the desert and the sown'; quite often nomads and villagers traded with one another and exchanged services to their mutual benefit. Even more than to other regions, this applied to Anatolia where there was – and is – steppe but no desert, and the borderline between settled people and nomads was often blurred. As noted before, townspeople and villagers escaped the heat and malaria of the lowlands by spending the summer in the mountains, while certain nomads in southern Anatolia took advantage of the warm climate by cultivating some cotton even in their winter quarters.

But if there was conflict and archival sources show it to have been common enough, nomads had the advantage over villagers who normally possessed neither horses nor arms. Nomads by contrast were strong enough to graze their animals in fields and gardens and slay the peasants who tried to prevent them from doing so. As a result, already the tax registers of the sixteenth century show that the Ottoman administration was quite willing to reclassify former nomads as villagers if there was even a slight pretext for doing so; and by the late 1600s, when long wars resulted in an urgent need for funds, the administration undertook to systematically settle Anatolian nomads.²⁹ While this early attempt was mostly a failure, it provided officials with a set of experiences which informed the policies of their successors during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when many nomads were settled, often much against their will. And for this late period, we do have popular poetry, for instance by Dadaloğlu of the *Avşar* tribal unit, which

makes this rejection of the sedentary life perfectly clear.³⁰ Given all this evidence, it makes sense to describe Ottoman bureaucrats as governing a sedentary empire, even though in certain regions the share of nomads in the population was substantial. Moreover, as nomadic communities have all but disappeared from today's Turkey, there is almost no parallel to the demand for living space and human rights for migrant groups, which informs the article by Shail Mayaram in the present volume. In a capitalist world, migrants in today's Turkey are people who travel because they work as seasonal agricultural labourers.

As this survey of Ottoman nomads and semi-nomads shows, once again the differences to the southern Indian case are obvious. As far as I can see in today's historiography, there does not seem an extensive study of the memory cultures of former Ottoman nomads turned peasants, at least where Anatolia and the Balkans are concerned. One of the exceptions is the great novelist Yaşar Kemal, who in his many works among which *Memed, My Hawk* and *They Burn the Thistles* are perhaps the best known, has reworked the experiences of former nomads settled in the region of Adana in south-eastern Turkey.³¹ On the other hand, the historical ethnologist (please add first name) Gunasekaran has studied the memory of the peasants known as *Kongu Vellalar Koundar* for whom their position as 'new immigrants' was and is a source of pride and who, therefore, cultivate their collective memory as a means of preserving their social status.

When historians and social anthropologists with concerns similar to those of Gunasekaran study both public and private memories in Turkey, they are usually more interested in rather different matters. Scholars have focused on the memories of people who have things to say about the deportation of Anatolian Greeks from the coastlands during World War I, the deportation and killing of many Armenians in and after 1915 or the tribulations of new arrivals from Albania and the northern Caucasus, who fled or immigrated into the Ottoman Empire during the last years of its existence, and had trouble finding a place in the new nation state of Turkey.³² Yet others have studied memories of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923 and the experiences of non-Muslims who suffered discrimination at various points in time during the twentieth century.³³

In conclusion

Every perspective on historical events depends on two major factors, namely the concerns of the time in which the historian is writing and the sources available and/or currently being studied. Thus, the progressive cataloguing and digitalisation of the Ottoman archives, now about to move

into a purpose-built major complex, has allowed scholars to access many more documents than they could hope for in the past. At the same time, the present concern with Ottoman geographic mobility is connected with the increased facilities for travel available in our own time, for Turkish citizens as well as for others.

Moreover, now that 'the concerns of the state' no longer dominate historical research to the same extent as in the past, we have come to realise that Ottoman subjects might move for a wide variety of reasons, including pilgrimages or else the need for jobs and/or protection. On the other hand, historians of the 1960s, if indeed focusing on mobility at all, had studied the (re)settlement projects of Ottoman sultans and/or their construction of monumental buildings, for which many artisans needed to travel over long distances. In addition, we now focus on the differences between Ottoman governance typical of the 1400s and 1500s and the 'second Ottoman empire' of the period before 1826 or 1850, to say nothing of the post-Tanzimat state, caught between the danger of becoming an object of foreign colonisation and the ambition to acquire/retain colonial possessions. Given this context, our perspective on the mobility of the sultans' subjects thus has changed quite radically.

As a next step, it is worth trying to say more about direct links between the Ottoman world and the subcontinent, presumably mainly due to trade and pilgrimage. None of these activities is very well covered in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul, at least where the 1500s and 1600s are concerned.³⁴ But in all likelihood, more material is available for the eighteenth century when documentation increased while the importation of Indian cottons into the Ottoman realm was still flourishing. At least a few young scholars in Turkey now are developing an interest in these largely unknown connections between the Ottoman world and the subcontinent.

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PREFACE

Thank God, an author's preface does not have to be heavily academic but can afford to have a judicious mix of the personal and the professional tone.

I once had a dialogue with the young editor of this volume Aakash Chakrabarty who told me that he thought I was from Salem. That surmise set off a chain of thoughts. My maternal grandparents lived in Salem but actually our family comes from an Agraharam (Brahmin settlement) called Aasramam in Kanyakumari district. However, almost 400 years ago, my ancestors moved to the State of Travancore. Ramen Dalava, from whom (from his brother to be precise) we trace our family ancestry, was a legendary figure who served as the commander-in-chief and probably the chief minister of the Travancore King Martanda Verma.

However, our family lore tells me that we are not from the Travancore State of Kerala or the Tamil country, but are Sanketi Brahmins, originally from Karnataka, who migrated into the Tamil country, primarily into the Kanyakumari region around the fourteenth century. In my childhood, I was struck by the curious phenomenon of our family's coyness in disclosing that we belonged to the 'Sanketi' community. Some branches of our family created the euphemistic term of 'Sanketi-Vadama'. The 'Vadama' are regarded as the most superior among the Tamil Brahmins, and therefore the anxiety of the Sanketi Brahmins to claim connection with them. I can now see this is as a process of 'internal Sanskritisation' among the broad category of the Brahmin *Varna*.

I grew up haunted by the notion of a concealed inferiority. When I turned historian and started spending my time among epigraphical records, I began to come across references to the Sanketi community from the medieval period onwards in the context of temple disputes, both as official functionaries and as participants in these disputes. They came forth as a vibrant, powerful community, nothing to be ashamed of, I felt and so told my octogenarian elders.

The story of our migration from Karnataka into the Tamil/Kerala region (Kanyakumari was a part of the Travancore State in pre-independence India but is now a part of Tamil Nadu) was apparently based on the curse of Goddess Saraswati which drove us out of our original home into an altogether different region. Through the family game of 'Chinese Whispers', I gathered that my great-great-grandfathers had the temerity to laugh at a widow called Nachchiyar amma while she was serving them food on the occasion of her husband's *sraddha* (funeral obsequies) ceremony. What was a display of wit and humour by the Sanketi Brahmins, led to the curse of Nachchiyar amma who was veritably Saraswati herself. She cursed the Sanketis that however intelligent or hard working they may be, they will never gain the recognition they deserve. As they had ridiculed her, so will they also become objects of ridicule?

The crestfallen Sanketis migrated out of the Karnataka region, almost 600 years ago, but carried with them the legacy of the curse wherever they went.

This story had such a deep impact on my psyche that when my academic career hit rock bottom some years ago, the curse theory kept coming back to haunt me, overpowering my reason and crushing all sense of logic.

I have a book with me somewhere on the shelves, which is a *longue duree* account of the migration of the Sanketis. For me, this was the starting point of deeper research into my own roots. However, I did not dare present the story of the migration of the Sanketi Brahmins in the present volume for two reasons. First, Brahmins are believed to represent the upper echelons of the caste hierarchy while this volume essentially explores migrations 'from below'. Second, in all the 'received' information from my elders who had in turn heard it from their elders, one could not distinguish between folklore and fact. I have reserved the story of our migration for my memoirs where family folklore and fact can happily blend.

My abiding interest in migrations thus essentially arose out of my own problematic. My four-decade-old involvement with the weaver communities of Tamil Nadu commenced in the 1970s and culminated in my dissertation on the weavers of Kanchipuram in 1978 and my PhD on the weaving communities of medieval South India in 1981. Since the study of cross-regional migrations of weavers constituted an intrinsic part of my research, I have now begun putting together my various pieces on weaver migrations into a monograph. In this connection, I would like to share something extremely interesting. After reading what I had been writing on the migration of the Pattunulkarar/Saurashtra weavers from Mandasor region into Madurai, a Madurai scholar, C. S. Krishnamoorthy, from the Saurashtra community, began corresponding with me, usually critiquing my dry

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intellectual approach to his community. I was delighted when this gentleman came to my home in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, to gift me a copy of his book titled *The Migrant Silk Weavers of Tamil Nadu – a study*. The book was published last year in 2014 by the Sakti Cultural and Educational Trust in Madurai. The author brings an ‘insider’ perception to the story of their migrations, and the strong faith in the community’s own oral traditions is an inherent part of his narration. I would strongly recommend his book to all those doing migration histories of communities in the Indian historical context.

The chapters in the present collection have an academic structure, but somewhere one can find echoes of folk memories of migrations, especially in the chapter by Naveen Kanalu who belongs to a migrant weaver community, a branch of the Telugu Saliyar.

The scholars who come from different disciplines and from different cultural backgrounds have presented a fascinating range of themes on migrations from an early period (which could be as early as the fifth century CE) to the period of the early colonial rule in India. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first volume of its kind which brings together scholarship on the pre-colonial period of migrations focusing on the agricultural, craft and merchant groups. It is hoped that this volume will provoke/inspire other scholars to delve deeper into the roots of early Indian migrations. An area well worth exploring in future studies would be that of women’s migrations, a domain only peripherally explored here.

Vijaya Ramaswamy
July 2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge with gratitude Professor Deepak Kumar who, as conference coordinator, inspired me to put together a panel on medieval Indian migration for the International Conference of Asian Historians, which met at Jawaharlal Nehru University in November 2008. This book grew out of this humble beginning, but went on to become a full-fledged volume. Papers which took up the story of Indian migrations from the late colonial to partition and post-independent India, hopefully, will come out in due course.

My warmest thanks must go to Jan and Leo Lucassen who brought a theoretical rigour to my study of weaver migrations by inviting me to the international conference at Taiwan titled 'Migrations and Mobility in a Global Perspective', held in collaboration with the Department of Geography, Taipei University, between 25 and 29 August 2010 at Taipei, Taiwan. The paper presented at that conference, under the title 'Mapping Migrations of South Indian Weavers before, during and after the Vijayanagar Period: Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries', was published by the Lucassens in their edited volume *Globalising Migration History* published by Brill in 2014. The greatest benefit of attending the Taipei conference was my growing awareness that the features which I thought were unique to the migrations of South Indian weavers, in fact found resonance with migrations across the globe, but more particularly China. I would like therefore to thank Jan and Leo for helping me put my factual chapter on migrations into a framework which showed greater theoretical awareness of the course of migration studies across the globe. I would also specially like to thank Jan Lucassen for his kind words, which the publishers have used for this book.

From the publishing side, I would like to thank Nilanjan Sarkar who was with Routledge at the time when this manuscript was first given for possible publication. Nilanjan left after a long and fruitful stint with Routledge but not before passing on the manuscript into the competent hands of Shashank Sinha and Shoma Choudhury. The referees' reports have really

helped me to lick this volume into shape, and therefore my heartfelt thanks to the anonymous reviewer(s) for those extremely sharp and critical but valuable comments on the chapters. Finally, Aakash resurrected this volume from the academic debris where it had lain and gave it a new lease of life. To him, my warm thanks.

I would like to thank all my contributor friends who patiently waited for this volume to see the light of day. My PhD students and now colleagues, Gunasekaran and Pragyan, have specially shown great restraint in not taking their chapters elsewhere, considering their anxiety to cite the publication in their CV for purposes of promotion and career advancement.

There may not be much point in thanking a contributor and colleague who is no more but I take this opportunity to express my deep sense of regret that my friend Prof. Nandita Sahai did not live to see this volume come out. Even when she was terminally ill with cancer, she would eagerly ask me when the volume would be out. Well, Nandita, here it is.

My thanks to my family, Krish and Ram, as always, for infusing my life with meaning.

Notes

- 1 To avoid confusion, twentieth- and twenty-first-century scholars studying the Ottoman world have been called Ottomanists in contradistinction to the Ottomans who were subjects of the sultan.
- 2 Steven Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 107–08.
- 3 Elena Frangakis Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century, 1700–1820* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992); Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, Bruce Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- 4 While from the 1700s onward a community of Frenchmen lived in Izmir permanently, a recent study has demonstrated their insertion into local society and also the limits of their power: Marie Carmen Smyrnelis, *Une société hors de soi: identités et relations sociales à Smyrne aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles* (Paris-Louvain: Peeters, 2006).
- 5 Halil Inalcik, 'The policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek population of Istanbul and the Byzantine buildings of the city', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 23 (1970), 213–49.
- 6 Şenol Çelik, 'Türk fethi sonrasında Kıbrıs adasına yönelik iskân çalışmaları', in *Kaf Dağının Ötesine Varmak. Festschrift in Honor of Günay Kut. Essays Presented by her Colleagues and Students*, edited by Zehra Toska, 3 vols., *Journal of Turkish Studies* 27, 1–3 (Cambridge, MA: Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, Harvard University 2003), vol. 1, pp. 263–304 [Attempts to settle the island of Cyprus in the wake of the Turkish conquest]; Vera Constantini, *Il sultano e l'isola contesa* (Turin: UTET, 20xx). [The sultan and the contested island].
- 7 Mustafa Akdağ, *Celâli isyanları 1550–1603* (Ankara: A Ü Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1963) [The Celali uprisings from 1550 to 1603]; Oktay

Özel, 'Population changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th and 17th centuries: The "demographic crisis" reconsidered', *International Journal for Middle East Studies*, 36 (2004), 183–205; Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

By contrast, Huricihan İslamoğlu has dwelt on the creative ways in which Anatolian peasants of the late 1500s may have coped with population increase: *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1994).

- 8 Halil Inalcik, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 283–337.
- 9 Münir Aktepe, 'XVIII. asrın ilk yarısında İstanbul'un nüfus mes'elesine dâir bâzı vesikalar', *Tarih Dergisi*, IX, 13 (1958), 1–30 [Some documents concerning the population of İstanbul in the first half of the eighteenth century].
- 10 Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 11 Cengiz Kırli, 'Surveillance and Constituting the Public in the Ottoman Empire', in *Publics, Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: SSRN, 2009), pp. 282–305; Betül Başaran, 'Between Crisis and Order: Selim III, Social Control, and Policing in İstanbul at the end of the 18th century' (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
- 12 Kemal Karpat.
- 13 Evliya Çelebi b Derviş Mehmed Zilli, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi Bağdat 306, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Pertev Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Hacı Beşir Ağa 452 Numaralı Yazmaların Mukayeseli Transkripsyonu – Dizini*, vol. 9, ed. by Yücel Dağlı, Seyit Ali Kahraman and Robert Dankoff (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), p. 162 [The travelogue of Evliya Çelebi].
- 14 Yüksel Duman, 'Notables, Textiles and Copper in Ottoman Tokat 1750–1840', unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Binghamton/SUNY, 1998.
- 15 Suraiya Faroqhi, 'Migration into Eighteenth-Century "Greater İstanbul" as Reflected in the Kadi Registers of Eyüp', *Turcica*, 30 (1998), 163–183.
- 16 White, *The Climate of Rebellion*.
- 17 Heidemarie Doganalp-Votzi, *Der Gerber, der Kulturbringer: Politik, Ökonomie, Zivilisation im Osmanischen Vorderasien* (Frankfurt/Germany: Peter Lang, 1997) shows how already by the 1980s craft traditions in a small Anatolian town had largely faded away.
- 18 Frederick W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, edited by Margaret Hasluck, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929), reprinted (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000); Meropi Anastassiadou, 'Festivities among İstanbul Greeks during the 19th–20th centuries', in *Celebration, Entertainment and Theater in the Ottoman World*, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi and Arzu Öztürkmen (Calcutta, New York: Seagull Press, forthcoming).
- 19 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Süleymaniye Cami ve İmareti İnşaatı*, 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1972–1979) [The construction of the mosque and other buildings of the Süleymaniye].
- 20 Suraiya Faroqhi, 'Controlling borders and workmen, all in one fell swoop: repairs to the Ottoman fortress of Hotin (1716)' in *Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Ottoman Empire: Halcyon Days in Crete VII, A Symposium*

- Held in Rethymno* 9–11 January 2009, edited by Antonios Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: University of Crete Publications, 2012), pp. 315–31.
- 21 Barkan, *Süleymaniye Cami ve İmareti İnşaatı*, vol. 1.
 - 22 Beatrice Forbes Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999).
 - 23 Selim Deringil, “‘There Is No Compulsion in Religion’: On conversion and apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 1839–1856”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, 3 (2000), 547–75.
 - 24 F.W. Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State* (London and New York: Academic Press, 1972).
 - 25 İsmail Hakkı Kadı, *Ottoman and Dutch Merchants in the Eighteenth Century: Competition and Cooperation in Ankara, İzmir, and Amsterdam* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
 - 26 Suraiya Faruqi, ‘Trade controls, provisioning policies and donations: The Egypt-Hijaz connection during the second half of the sixteenth century’ in *Süleyman the Second (sic) and his Time*, edited by Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1993), pp.131–44.
 - 27 [‘Azîz Efendi], *Kanûn-nâme-i sultânî li ‘Azîz Efendi’s Book of Sultanic Laws and Regulations . . .*, edited by Rhoads Murphey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1985).
 - 28 M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, *Rumeli’de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlad-ı Fatihan* (reprint İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 2008) [Yürüks, Tatars, and ‘The sons of the conquerors’ in the Ottoman Balkans].
 - 29 Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda aşiretleri iskân teşebbüsü (1691–1696)* (reprint: İstanbul: Eren Publishers, 1987) [Attempts to settle tribes in the Ottoman Empire].
 - 30 Nevin Akkaya, “Dadaloğlu’nun şiirlerindeki tarihi olaylar ve bu olaylarda yer alan özel kişi adları” in *Çukurova Üniversitesi Türkoloji Araştırmaları Merkezi, Makaleler*.

http://turkoloji.cu.edu.tr/CUKUROVA/sempozyum/semp_3/akkaya.php (accessed on 1 March 2013) [Historical events in the poems of Dadaloğlu and the personal names of people connected with these events]. This article contains lengthy citations of Dadaloğlu’s poetry.

- 31 Yaşar Kemal, *Memed, My Hawk*, translated by Edouard Roditi (New York: New York Review Books Classics, 2005); *They Burn the Thistles*, translated by Margaret Platon (New York: New York Review of Books Series, 2007).
- 32 Leyla Neyzi, *Ben Kimim? Türkiye’de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik ve Öznellik* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004) [Who am I? Oral history, identity and subjectivity in Turkey]; Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman nomads, migrants, and refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, ethnicity, and the end of the Ottoman Empire 1912–1923* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and state in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide. Imperialism, nationalism and the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). While only Neyzi’s book is specifically about memory, oral history and memory also play a role in the other studies as well.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- 33 Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: How mass expulsion forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (London: Granta Books, 2006); Leyla Neyzi (ed.) *Amele taburu: the military journal of a Jewish soldier in Turkey during the War of Independence*, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2005) [Workers' battalion].
- 34 This situation is clearly apparent from Naim R. Farooqi, 'Moguls, Ottomans and pilgrims: Protecting the routes to Mecca in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', *The International History Review*, X, 2 (1988), 198–220.