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Ann J. Cahill & Christine Hamel

SOUNDING BODIES

An abstract, artistic representation of a human figure, possibly a dancer or performer, created from numerous thin, golden-yellow light trails. The trails are dense and overlapping, forming the outline and internal structure of the body. The figure is positioned in the center of the cover, with its arms and legs extended in a dynamic pose. The background is a solid black, which makes the glowing lines stand out prominently. The overall effect is one of movement and energy, suggesting the 'sounding' or 'vibrating' nature of the bodies mentioned in the title.

IDENTITY, INJUSTICE
AND THE VOICE

Sounding Bodies

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Identity, Injustice, and the Voice

Ann J. Cahill and Christine Hamel

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*For Shelley
with all kinds of love*

Contents

Acknowledgments	viii
About the Authors	xii
Introduction	1
1 Voice	15
2 Vocal Injustice	39
3 The Ethics of Envoicing	61
4 The Gendered Voice	83
5 Envoicing in Sex, Maternity, and Childbirth	107
6 Ethical Spotlight: Envoicing in Voice Pedagogy	131
7 Ethical Spotlight: Envoicing in/and Philosophy	159
Conclusion: Shifting Vocal Soundscapes in the Age of Trump and Covid-19	179
Notes	195
References	201
Index	225

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Portions of this book found earlier expressions in two journal articles: *Voice and Speech Review* published the coauthored "Toward Intervocality: Linklater, the Body, and Contemporary Feminist Theory" in 2019 (13[2]: 130–51), and *PhiloSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism* published Cahill's "Vocal Politics" in 2020 (10[1]: 71–93). Anonymous reviewers from both journals provided insightful and productive feedback that helped us to improve the articles significantly, and we thank them for their efforts. We also thank Kat J. McAlpine and Art Jahnke for their coverage of our work in Boston University's research publication *The BRINK*. We presented aspects of this work at a variety of conferences, including at the meetings of the Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, the American Philosophical Association, the Society for Analytic Feminism, the Voice and Speech Trainers Association/Association for Theatre in Higher Education, and BU's "Day of Collective Engagement: Racism and Antiracism, Our Realities and Our Roles," and we are appreciative of the generative discussion afforded at those gatherings.

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At a presentation of our work, one philosopher asked in a somewhat bewildered tone, "But how does cowriting work? I imagine it would be positively painful!" She imagined incorrectly. I could never have written this book without Chris, whose expertise, good cheer, and honesty simply never failed. Over and over again, I thanked my lucky stars to be able to work through ideas, struggle over phrasing, and worry over whether we were saying anything at all with such a brilliant friend. This project has brimmed with both delight and challenge, and I am indebted to her for taking it up with me.

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sexism, white supremacy, homophobia, ableism, and cisnormativity, in favor of more democratic, more just, and more inclusive ways of being-with. Close to home, the ladies of FIND (Friends of Immigrant Neighbors facing Detention) showed me how to undertake meaningful, local actions to challenge the US detention and deportation system, and the board and staff at FaithAction International House modeled for me time and again what it meant to keep doing the work with integrity and grace. All across the country, health care workers, frontline responders, essential workers, and hundreds of thousands of people who lost their lives (or who continue to live with long-lasting, often devastating health conditions) bore the brunt of the individual and collective failures to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic in effective, ethical, and responsible ways. I am sorry that we let them all down. I hope we at least have the decency, at some point, to acknowledge our failures.

As the pandemic raged, and antidemocratic forces turned to violence to achieve their ends, and institutions that had seemed solid and sure teetered, Mary, Maggie, Sarah, and Abby, and their utterly delightful progeny and partners, made sure that I laughed and ranted in good company on the regular. May I never live to face a challenge without my sisters beside me.

The Coauthors (Again):

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About the Authors

Ann J. Cahill is Professor of Philosophy at Elon University. She is the author of *Overcoming Objectification: A Carnal Ethics* (2010) and *Rethinking Rape* (2001). Her research interests lie in the intersection between feminist theory and philosophy of the body, and she has published on topics such as miscarriage, beautification, and sexual assault.

Christine Hamel currently serves as head of the BFA Acting Program at Boston University School of Theatre where she is Assistant Professor of Voice and Acting. She is a professional actor, voice/dialect coach, and director whose credits include work on Broadway, off-Broadway, and regional theatre. A Designated Linklater Voice Teacher certified in the Michael Chekhov acting technique, she founded *Femina Shakes*, a BU initiative committed to feminist retellings of Shakespeare exploring a wide range of gender identities unconstrained by the limitations of conventional gender narratives.

Introduction

As embodied beings immersed in a sonorous world, vocal humans generate sound replete with social and political meanings that exceed linguistic signification. Yet there are few explorations, in any discipline, of those meanings, how they are shaped, and how they in turn shape subjects, shared worlds, and injustices of all sorts. In *Sounding Bodies*, we argue that the meanings that voices carry, and the ways in which voices are carried (both by those who generate them and by those who receive them) are inextricably, and complexly, interwoven with dynamic social structures marked by injustices and oppression. Unpacking those meanings requires a new conceptualization of voice—one that refuses the (perhaps related) assumptions that language, as opposed to sound, is the properly privileged conveyor of meaning and that bodily phenomena are to be understood as reducible to biological and apolitical forces. It also requires a keen awareness of the sonorous possibilities of human vocalizations, possibilities borne of complex physiological events, all of which always and only occur within specific social contexts.

Our aim as coauthors in initiating this scholarly conversation embracing two distinct fields (feminist philosophy and theatre studies) is to focus attention on the politics of voice and to increase attunement to various forms of vocal injustice. We invite our readers, who may include theorists and voice practitioners alike, to dally with, consider, and take time to examine the voice—an under-theorized subject—as an embodied site worthy of ethical attention. In the wake of the social, political, and racial reckoning of our time, there is a call for voice pedagogues to question every aspect of teaching and coaching practices; we aim in this text not simply to provide (or rush to the edification of) “best practices” (though some possibilities will be provided) but, first, to develop a set of theoretical principles and frameworks out of which new practices may be born. Our desire to collaborate, as practitioner and theorist, centers philosophy

itself as a practical tool—one that can navigate a thorough conceptualization of voice and help us take responsibility for the event of embodied human sound as it either sustains justice or enacts harm.

As we will establish, the lived, embodied, often quotidian phenomenon of voice is ineluctably marked by material and social/political realities, including systemic inequalities related to gender identity and presentation, race, class, ability, and others. Our analysis unpacks how the sonorous capacities of voiced human beings are deployed, taken up, experienced, and constructed by complex social and political relations. Such a project necessarily requires a multidisciplinary approach, particularly given significant lacunae in each of our respective fields.

The field of philosophy, represented by Cahill, brings to the analysis highly developed theories of embodiment, the self, and systemic oppression, and our analysis is particularly influenced by the extensive scholarship that feminist theorists have produced demonstrating that bodily phenomena long considered to be natural or pre-political are in fact deeply shaped by social and political forces.¹ However, while feminist philosophers of the body have grappled with a wide scope of modes of embodiment (see Iris Marion Young's classic description of feminine bodily comportment [2005]; Patricia Hill Collins's analysis of Black female sexuality [2004]; or Cressida Heyes's exploration of bodily transformations, including weight loss and cosmetic surgery [2007]), the phenomenon of voice has been largely neglected. When philosophers have turned their attention to voice, their analyses have been largely apolitical (Ihde 2007 and Appelbaum 1990), highly focused on questions of language rather than sound (Kristeva 1984 and Roudiez 1984), and/or centered on musical phenomena (James 2010). Even historical analyses of the profound links between the political oppression of women and the control of women's voices (Carson 1995 and Beard 2017) provide neither a detailed theory of voice itself nor a fine-grained description of how those controlling forces and listening practices are experienced. The few philosophical works that do address the ethical and political meanings of voice (e.g., Cavarero 2005), as we will argue in the first two chapters, do not take into sufficient account theories of systemic injustice, identity, and intersubjectivity that we hold to be central to our analysis. What is needed from the discipline of philosophy, and what we hope to contribute here, is a more carefully developed critical phenomenology of voice.

Crucial to such a phenomenology is a nuanced understanding of not only the physiology of the voice (the specific muscles, bodily cavities, tissues, and mechanisms involved in its production as human-generated sound), but also its

grounding in a complex interplay of vocal, psychological, and emotional bodily events. This is where Hamel's expertise as a voice and speech trainer comes in, as she has worked extensively with the expressive, embodied voices of actors, with a particular pedagogical emphasis on psychophysical approaches to both voice and acting. Yet this discipline has not consistently engaged with the cutting-edge theories of embodiment and systemic injustice that feminist theory has developed, and there are gaps to be addressed in voice trainers' fluency with the underlying philosophical assumptions embedded in the practical matters of voice work. The arena of speech training (as distinct from voice training) has received the preponderance of critical analysis (including Knight 1997, Brown 2000, Colaianne 2011, Ginther 2015, Oram 2019, 2020a, Coronel et al. 2020) centering primarily on the racist, classist, imperialist demands of "standard" accents. Such analyses emphasize "authenticity" as a marker of culturally embodied language and frame "liberation" as resisting erasure by shedding prescribed, highly constructed standards of "good," "neutral," or "clear" speech so that culturally (ethnic-, class-, ability-, etc.) specific speech markers may be retained, valued, and centered. However, liberatory models of voice training consistently align "authenticity" with the absence of—or freedom from—cultural or social markers (and therefore "limits") in the voice, thus tethering it to the pre-cultural, pre-social, and pre-political realms of the universal and/or natural. This model of vocal freedom does not adequately acknowledge that the voice is, in fact, deeply social (as well as constructed) from the outset, rendering it vulnerable to enacting various injustices in the name of liberation. A more thorough investigation into the mechanics of oppression within voice methodologies is therefore needed, not only because there is a deep interest within the field to engage with voice as an anti-oppression tool—in performance as well as beyond—but because voice as a site of embodiment warrants ethical attention.

One challenge/problem that occurs across many disciplines, particularly in the work of scholars who seek to understand and challenge oppressive systems, is that references to voice are often only metaphorical (Dunn and Jones 1994a: 1). Carol Gilligan (1982) referred to women's "different voice" to articulate gendered patterns in moral thinking; "finding" one's "voice" is constituted as both an end and a means in the struggle to dismantle oppressive systems (e.g., Bacharach 2018); and exhortations for the inclusion of marginalized persons and groups call for "more voices at the table." Such metaphors point to the identification of the voice with both the self and the self's (often distinctly epistemological, but also ethical) worth. However, they also deflect ethical attention from the embodied

voice, the sonorous phenomenon of human-generated sound involving muscles, air, mucous membrane, and bone. What is both missing and mystified in the persistent use of vocal metaphors within academic and activist discussions of inequality is the possibility of the ethical, social, and political relevance of the embodied voice as sound—not (only) as a vehicle for thought, language, and expression of interiority, but as a sonorous, embodied phenomenon replete with meaning on its own terms.

Unpacking the many salient aspects of the ethical and political meanings of voice as human-generated sound has required us to engage substantially with cognate fields such as sound studies, musicology, and voice studies. In doing so, we hope to initiate an ongoing, multidisciplinary scholarly conversation on the politics of voice, and foster a heightened attunement to vocal injustice. The material, embodied voice matters: to one's sense of self, to systems of oppression, to the meanings of personal interactions and public discourse, and to the ways that all three co-constitute each other.

The Object of Analysis: Parameters, Caveats, Pitfalls

We center our explorations of voice as employed in a range of informal and formal vocal interactions, with a particular interest in everyday human experience, thus distinguishing our focus from scholarship grounded in musicology, which focuses primarily on the singing and/or performing voice. In addition, we will largely confine our considerations to the sonorous experience of human voice and its phonemic content, touching only occasionally on matters related to linguistic or semantic content. Our focus on the sounding of voice thus distinguishes our work from that of feminist linguistics such as Deborah Tannen (2007), who analyze gendered patterns of word choice and rhetoric. Yet in focusing on sound rather than on linguistic content, we do not mean to imply that the meaning of human vocalization can be separated entirely from speech; sounded voices are constructed in linguistic contexts, and those contexts leave sonorous marks. We suggest that there is no voice unmarked by speech, though it is not necessarily the case that vocal sound's destination is always, necessarily, language.

Some philosophers of voice, such as Karmen MacKendrick (2016), move so quickly from the spoken voice to the authorial written voice, word choice, and linguistic meaning, as to risk conflating the two. Mladen Dolar's Lacanian analysis of voice (2006) avoids that conflation, yet retains the centrality of

questions of language and signification. His analyses of the politics and the ethics of voice do not address, as ours do, the ways in which voice is implicated in and utilized by oppressive social structures, but rather how the figure of voice has been deployed in philosophical theories of politics and ethics. Thus, while Dolar illuminates the role that voice plays in the psychoanalytic drama of the emergence of signification and the construction of the embodied, linguistic subject, he says little about how the sonorous phenomenon of voice reveals patterns of structural injustice regarding race, gender, class, ability, and so on. Our discussion also parts ways with the philosophical critique of phonocentrism, often understood as instigated by Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (1976; although at least one scholar [Siisiäinen 2012] has argued that Foucault anticipated Derrida's point by several years) on similar grounds. Derrida argues that philosophers, linguists, and anthropologists, ranging from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Edmund Husserl to Levi-Strauss, have associated the spoken voice with unmediated authenticity, thus endowing it with a privileged relationship to both truth and reality, in contrast with which the written word is considered to be mediated, partial, and tainted with the specter of absence that voice manages to escape. Derrida's criticism of phonocentrism is aimed less at the sonorous aspects of voice itself, and more at the ways in which voice was conscripted into a metaphysics of presence that undergirds (in Derrida's view, profoundly mistaken) theories of language, being, and the linguistic human being.

We agree with Derrida that a theory of the voice that assumes it to be a neutral medium by which interior thoughts are expressed, or that aligns it with self-contained subjectivity and presence, is deeply flawed. Indeed, the very association between voice and authenticity that Derrida diagnoses would serve as a barrier to our lines of inquiry, as our approach to the embodied phenomenon of voice holds that human voices are neither self-contained or self-defined; to the contrary, they are fundamentally relational and always marked by the other. Moreover, the conversation about phonocentrism seems inextricably implicated in questions about the nature of language and the linguistic being, while we seek to bracket (not entirely, but substantially) questions about language in order to place the sonorous, sounded voice—and its implication in inequality—at the center of our inquiry.

If our analysis largely parts ways with the phonocentrism controversy, it cannot fail to engage with the challenge of audism, the “normalizing discourse [that] privileges hearing bodies, spoken communication, and hearing culture over Deaf bodies, signed communication, and Deaf culture” (Levitt 2013: 77). There is a clear connection, of course, between phonocentrism and audism—if

the spoken voice is the incarnation of the authentic subject, then beings who do not receive or generate the spoken voice in normative ways can all too easily be dismissed as less than human, and should they engage in non-spoken languages, such as American Sign Language, the very linguistic value of their modes of communication can register as dubious (Bauman 2008, Bauman and Murray 2014). How can a philosophical analysis of voice as a phenomenon of human-generated sound refrain from perpetuating the audist assumptions of the centrality of voiced speech to human identity and existence, the cognitive superiority of voiced language to signed language, and the insistent pathologizing of forms of human embodiment with nonnormative capacities for sound generation and reception?

Our attempt to bracket the linguistic aspects of voice is an asset in this regard. By homing in, by and large, not on the linguistic content of vocalizations, but rather on their sonorous qualities, we sidestep the questions of language and being that make the stakes of comparing the merits and possibilities of spoken and signed language so very high (a comparison that is morally questionable from the outset). Moreover, our more nuanced, physiologically complex, and intersubjective approach to voice as a phenomenon of human-generated sound serves as a fruitful basis from which to undermine the hearing world's flawed assumption that D/deaf individuals live in a world absent of all experience of sound.

There are at least two aspects of this audist mistake that are relevant here. First, sound is received by bodies in multiple ways, a fairly obvious fact frequently missed by a cultural imaginary about sound that assigns an unearned monopoly to the ear. That D/deaf individuals experience a range of sonorous phenomena narrower than or otherwise different from the range experienced by many hearing people does not exile the former from the world of sound entirely. Deaf artist Christine Sun Kim describes how her transition from a painter to a sound artist hinged upon her encountering the dominance of auditory art in Berlin in 2008:

Now sound has come into my art territory. Is it going to further distance me from art? I realized, that doesn't have to be the case at all. I actually know sound. I know it so well—that it doesn't have to be something just experienced through the ears. It could be felt tactually, or experienced as a visual, or even as an idea. So I decided to reclaim ownership of sound and to put it into my art practice. And everything that I had been taught regarding sound, I decided to do away with and unlearn. I started creating a new body of work. (2015: 4:35)

Ableist assumptions and norms, including impoverished understandings of the experiences of D/deaf individuals; a failure to recognize the unnecessary, but persistent, structural barriers to full participation of D/deaf individuals in many central aspects of social life; and a general inability to understand deafness as a particular mode of embodiment that offers assets as well as limitations (Bauman and Murray 2014) are frequently grounded in impoverished understandings of lived experience of sound. Correcting for the monopoly of the ear in philosophical understandings of sound, as our analysis does, can thus provide important tools for countering anti-deaf ableism, while scholarship from the field of Deaf Studies can similarly ground more comprehensive theories of sonorous phenomena (see, for example, Summer Loeffler's analysis of Deaf music [2014]).

Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the construction of D/deaf experience as simply the totality of hearing subjectivity minus a certain capacity (one assumed to be so inherently valuable that its absence constitutes only a deficiency) is not only a descriptive mistake, but, as Ernst Thoutenhoofd articulates, a crucial foundation for the oppression of D/deaf people: "But deaf people never are merely 'like myself but without being able to hear sound'" (2000: 275). Even when the lived experience of deaf individuals is self-described as one that is marked by the absence of sound, as in Teresa Blankmeyer Burke's description (2017), to understand that absence as merely deprivation (rather than as a particular way of experiencing and moving through the world) would render the capacitating effects of such an embodied modality—effects that Burke describes in compelling and illuminating detail—unperceivable.

In seeking to explore the ethical, political, and social meanings of the sonorous elements of human interaction, then, we are not excluding D/deaf experiences, but rather understanding them as one of many sites at which different forms of human embodiment (with different relationships to sound and voice) are hierarchized. It is true, of course, that in keeping our focus on sound and voice, we will fail to sufficiently explore important aspects of D/deaf experience that exceed the sonorous realm (e.g., the visibility of signed language, and the question of the role that iconicity plays in it; see Rée [1999] and Thoutenhoofd [2000] for opposing views on that matter). But our point, particularly in this introduction, is to emphasize that we reject the ableist intuition that assumes that focusing on sound and voice inevitably excludes D/deaf experiences.

The question of ableist exclusion becomes perhaps even more acute when posed in relationship to our understanding of voice as deeply implicated in various forms of identity, including gender, race, class, and ability. In making this claim we are not arguing that having a voice (in the nonmetaphorical sense)

is central or necessary to being human, however one understands that term. Vocal capacity is a widely, but not universally, shared trait among human beings, and while it frequently plays a central role in human interactions, it is certainly not a requirement for either language use or communicative interactions with other human (and other-than-human) beings. As mentioned above, much of the philosophical conversation regarding the phonocentrism of Western metaphysics has at its core a set of concerns about the construction of the distinctly linguistic subject, the subject formed by psychoanalytic and linguistic dynamics themselves structured by processes of individuation and (paradoxical) alterity. Although our analysis does include a consideration of the sonorous aspects of the womb, our interest in prenatal experiences of vocalizations is generated not by questions of how the human being *per se* comes to be, or what its essential qualities are, but rather by questions of how this particular human capacity emerges.

In addition, to say that the voice is implicated in identity is not to say that vocalized and/or sonorous aspects of identity are more salient, or more revealing, or necessary to senses of self than other aspects of identity (such a presumption would commit us to the flawed “audiovisual litany,” which is described by Jonathan Sterne [2003] as a comparison between hearing and seeing that posits a focus on hearing as a corrective to a Western focus on the visual, which is associated with logos, rationality, and order). Nor are we turning to voice or sound as modalities that can ground new and liberatory political frameworks to counter the downfalls of modernity and postmodernity; Robin James (2019) has argued persuasively that instantiations of the sonic episteme that make such promises, either implicitly or explicitly, in fact reinscribe the very systems of domination and subordination that they ostensibly transcend. Our argument here is far less metaphysically burdened: as feminist scholars, we are interested in voice because it is an undertheorized embodied phenomenon, not because it is particularly well-suited to countering phallogocentric networks of meaning and power. We argue that the phenomenon of voice as human-generated sound (like many other phenomena, such as mobility, appearance, etc.) is related to identity in important ways, and that it is precisely those relations to identity that are both required and constructed by systemic forms of inequality.

Although this project does not aim at developing a comprehensive account of identity writ large (and thus does not engage with the many aspects of identity that are not sounded or voiced, such as some forms of disability, marital status, political persuasion, and so on), it is undergirded by a general understanding of identity as a sense of self that is under constant construction, profoundly

influenced and shaped by relations of all sorts, from overarching political structures to personal relationships. We take seriously, and do not view as contradictory, lived experiences that include both strong and weak senses of identity (i.e., experiences where one's identity seems to be clearly defined and persisting over stretches of time, and those where one's identity is ambiguous, uncertain, fragmented, or inaccessible). Although we will rely on the term "identity" for ease and consistency, its meaning should be taken as roughly equivalent with phrases such as "(inter)subjective becoming" or "self-in-process." In a related vein, we will make frequent references to "structural" or "systemic injustice," or "oppressive systems," using these terms as shorthand for complex interlocking networks of institutions, norms, habits, epistemologies, policies, and practices that result in unjust social hierarchies along axes of gender, race, ability, economic class, national origin, and other identity factors. While these networks are regrettably resilient, they are also dynamic, constantly shifting in intensity, orientation, and expression; they are not necessary features of social life but are contingent forms of sociality that can and should be transformed into more just ways of being-with.

Finally, we persistently train our attention on the phenomenon of voice as human-generated sound, seeking to identify ways in which the soundedness of voice is ethically, socially, politically, and existentially meaningful. We are aware, of course, that voice is not the only sound generated by human beings and that much could be said about the ethical, political, and social meanings of nonvocal human sounds (clapping, foot stomping, snapping, etc.). Moreover, we recognize that Aristotle's limitation of voice to human animals is certainly mistaken, and that much could be written about the meanings of other-than-human vocalizations. Both categories, however, are beyond the scope of this particular work.

Chapter Summaries

In the foundational concepts of the first chapter, we offer an understanding of voice as simultaneously material and political; relying heavily on contemporary feminist theories of the body, we argue that the embodied nature of the voice is inseparable from its social meanings, and cannot be understood in isolation from them, or conceptualized as standing in opposition to the forces of social order. While we distill important insights from Don Ihde and David Appelbaum, we note that their ostensibly apolitical approaches to vocal phenomena leave

critical elements unexplored. We also reject persistent descriptions of the recorded or transmitted voice as “disembodied,” noting that such descriptions privilege visuality and efface the materiality of vocalization. We provide an extended explanation of intervocality, a term referring to the fact that the material phenomenon of human vocality always emanates from, takes place in the context of, and is sonorously marked by human relations. Understanding voiced human beings as intervocal reveals the constitutive role of receiving sound in the construction of any vocal event, thus demonstrating that a specific vocal event cannot be reduced beyond the level of the relational. We conclude the chapter with an extended discussion of vocal identity, using Linda Martín Alcoff’s work on visible identity to establish the existential meaningfulness of voice to both a sense of individual identity and of group belonging.

We turn in the second chapter to the matter of vocal injustice, beginning with a brief description of the multiple forms of vocal injustice that mark contemporary US politics. Relying on scholarship produced by media studies, rhetoric, psychology, and other fields, we present empirical evidence regarding various identity markers (including gender and race) and what we’re terming “vocal social goods” (e.g., volume, airtime, and freedom from vocal critique and correction), while also noting important gaps in that data. We then explore three approaches to vocal justice emanating from distinct disciplines: Adriana Cavarero’s philosophical critique of the devocalization of logos, Kristin Linklater’s vocal pedagogy of liberation, and Nina Eidsheim’s analysis of sound and racial injustice, grounded in musicology and sound studies. We argue that all three approaches fail to sufficiently recognize the complex dynamics of intervocality. If vocal injustice is not to be ameliorated by relying on individuality (Cavarero), freeing the voice from the effects of socialization (Linklater), or conceptualizing racial vocal identities as solely produced by oppressive listening practices (Eidsheim), we are left to ask: how might we approach the problem of vocal injustice?

Our third chapter argues that attending to vocal justice requires attending to the social, political, and material conditions in which voices emerge, are received, and are shaped, a complex phenomenon which we term “envoicing.” We develop in this chapter a notion of respiratory responsibility that highlights the phenomenon of breath as an essential building block of voice, and air as a relational and political material carrying with it (in a literal sense) the effects of social practices, policies, and norms. We also analyze how different vocal possibilities and traits are profoundly shaped by the specific individual bodies who receive vocal emanations, extending the work of musicologists and sound studies thinkers who have emphasized the environmentally intersubjective

nature of sound. An ethical approach to envoicing must value a multiplicity of vocal patterns and possibilities; push back against the ways in which vocal capacities are marshalled to reify and perpetuate various forms of systemic injustice; situate human voices as irreducibly emerging from a complex set of social and political relations; and conceptualize the material, embodied phenomenon that is human-generated sound as replete with both existential and political meaning. We argue that *vocal generosity* (a notion grounded in Rosalyn Diprose's concept of corporeal generosity [2002]), understood as a particular way of both comprehending and taking up the demands of respiratory responsibility, can provide a starting point for the development of such an approach.

Our next several chapters provide opportunities to deploy our notions of intervocality, respiratory responsibility, and vocal generosity in distinct social and political sites. The fourth chapter takes up questions of envoicing and gender identity. We argue against a biologically essentialist approach to the gendered voice, positing instead that such gendering occurs at the intersection of materiality and social and political norms and practices. We delve into the gendered ways in which people speak to babies, toddlers, and children to argue that the contemporary sonorous, vocal environments in which voices develop are marked indelibly by gender politics. Relying on the work of Judith Butler, we argue that the gendered voice is the result of vocal events and situations, and emphasize that the gendered voice is marked sonorously by a complex set of intersecting practices, norms, and materialities related to a wide variety of identity factors, including race, class, ability, and culture. Building on the insights of Anne Carson, Mary Beard, and Robin James, we hold that central to the social construction of nonnormative voices (including those racialized as non-white, and gendered as feminine, gender nonconforming, or insufficiently masculine) is their positioning as more appropriate targets of vocal policing than their normatively masculine, white counterparts. That is, while the racialized and gendered voices of members of marginalized social groups are often assumed to be characterized by certain sonorous traits, they may in fact be much more consistently characterized by the social assumption that they are *correctable*. If this is true, we miss the mark when we understand the gendered nature of voice to be found in register, tone, or timbre, when in fact it is largely to be found in gendered practices of hierarchized receiving of gendered voices. Given the ways in which gender hierarchies have resulted in vocal injustice, we call for compensatory practices of listening designed to undermine the affective responses to gendered voices that too often serve to perpetuate entrenched forms of gender hierarchy.

Chapter 5 highlights three areas of social interaction that bear highly fraught sonorous marks of systemic injustice related to gender as well as other identity factors: maternity, childrearing, and sex. We examine the sonorous environment of the womb as one that both precedes and marks the particularity of vocal and linguistic identities, thus countering conceptualizations of the voice as prior to culture and language. We then explore a range of socially constructed sites of childbirth and their accompanying limits, expectations, rules, and interpretations of vocalized sound, and articulate ways in which birthing environments could be rendered more vocally just. We conclude with an analysis of vocalizations in sexual interaction, arguing that a more phenomenologically robust understanding of the productive role that vocalizations can play in sexual interactions troubles both the model of voice as merely a medium of expression and insufficiently intersubjective models of sexuality.

The following two chapters are the only single-authored chapters in the book. In them, we explore the ramifications of our conceptual and ethical frameworks for our respective professions. In Chapter 6, Hamel argues that long-standing practices and values of voice training and coaching can be effectively transformed by engaging with theoretical analyses of structural injustice and that doing so can ground new, and more inclusive, pedagogical approaches. Such new approaches would be grounded in deeper understandings of the classroom as a complex social field, in which the political aspects of “the natural” and “universal” have been historically neutralized. These approaches would also question ostensibly value-neutral norms (e.g., “vocal hygiene,” or the assumption that sex understood as biologically determined is an accurate determination of pitch range) to determine whether they in fact perpetuate oppressive systems and further marginalize members of historically excluded social groups. Cahill then picks up the question for the discipline of philosophy in Chapter 7, analyzing two sites of philosophical activity (the conference and the classroom) for their capacities for both vocal injustice and vocal justice. Cahill argues that developing more just vocal and receiving practices in both sites is a crucial element of rendering philosophy a more diverse and just field of thought.

The final chapter of the book concludes our analysis with a consideration of contemporary vocal politics, with particular attention to how recent political and theatrical events speak to transformations in vocal politics. We track how seemingly transgressive vocal performances on political and theatrical stages have drastically different political meanings and effects; in some cases, they maintain and perpetuate existing power differentials, while in other cases,