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HEGEL AND RESISTANCE

Rebecca Comay and
Bart Zantvoort

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Hegel and Resistance

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Frequently Cited Works

Frequently cited works by Hegel are referenced with the corresponding abbreviation below, followed by the page number in the English translation (except where no English translation is given), or the paragraph number. Works by Hegel cited occasionally, as well as all other references, are referenced in full in the individual chapters.

‘R’ is used to refer to the ‘remarks’ (*Anmerkungen*) in Hegel’s text; ‘A’ is used to refer to the ‘additions’ (*Zusätze*) based on lecture notes.

- EL *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1830. 1. Teil, Wissenschaft der Logik. Werke, vol. 8 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).
- EPN *Philosophy of Nature. Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of The Philosophical Sciences (1830)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1830. 2. Teil, Naturphilosophie. Werke, vol. 9 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).
- EPS *Philosophy of Mind. Being Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1830. 3. Teil, Philosophie des Geistes. Werke, vol. 10 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).
- PH *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* [introduction only], trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Werke, vol. 12 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).

- PR *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A.W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Werke, vol. 7 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).
- PS *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. J. N. Findlay, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Phänomenologie des Geistes. Werke, vol. 3 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).
- SL *The Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanity Books, 1969).
Wissenschaft der Logik I. Werke, vol. 5 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986). *Wissenschaft der Logik II. Werke*, vol. 6 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986).
- VPG *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin 1827/28* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).
- VRP III *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831*, vol. 3: *Philosophie des Rechts. Nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H.G. Hotho 1822/23*, ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1973–1974).
- VRP IV *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831*, vol. 4: *Philosophie des Rechts. Nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift K.G. v. Griesheims 1824/25*, ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1973–1974).

Introduction

Bart Zantvoort

The history of modern philosophy can be read as a history of resistance to Hegel. For many major post-Hegelian philosophers, Hegel represented philosophy at its worst: a catastrophic relapse from Kant's critical philosophy into metaphysical obscurity, a dangerous ideological affirmation of the historical destiny of the modern state, a megalomaniac delusion regarding the power of mankind, in the form of Spirit, to dominate nature, contingency and otherness. In its unceasing drive to integrate every aspect of reality as well as thought into a closed, coherent and all-encompassing system, Hegel's philosophy provoked the ire of generations of critics from all over the philosophical spectrum: from the founders of the analytical tradition, G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, who sought to save philosophy from the rot of British Idealism, to a whole range of post-metaphysical and anti-totality critiques running from Heidegger to Levinas, Derrida and Deleuze, with all their contemporary offshoots.

As Frank Ruda recently wrote, for his critics, Hegel was too much of everything, falling foul of both sides of most central philosophical controversies. His absolute idealism, which sought to sublate everything into the movement of the absolute concept, eventually inverted into, as Marx had it, a 'crass materialism'.¹ His philosophy espoused a naïve belief in progress, while at the same time thwarting progress by sanctifying the status quo. He sought to forcibly squeeze all phenomena into the corset of the dialectical movement, while undialectically imposing the closure of his own system on dialectics. He was too much of a historicist, subjecting everything to the necessity of historical development, yet also proclaimed the end of history and its culmination in his own system. His philosophy was too 'concrete', indiscriminately drawing everything from natural phenomena to politics, psychology and art into the realm of philosophical speculation, yet at the same time disregarded the empirical by proclaiming it irrelevant in the face of philosophical truth ('Too bad for reality!' as the apocryphal Hegel quote has it).

Yet, the kind of resistance that Hegel has generated and continues to generate – unrelenting, multifarious, almost obsessive in nature – is also indicative of his central place in the development of modern thought and the enduring power of his ideas. This resistance is never a simple rejection, but a continuing need to engage with an annoying force of opposition that refuses to go away. Foucault famously described the difficulty of extricating oneself from Hegel as follows:

To truly escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us.²

Hegel is the itch that keeps nagging contemporary philosophy, and the various ways of dealing with this itch have done nothing to relieve the pain. The so-called Hegel revival of recent decades has sprouted a variety of new interpretations seeking to adapt Hegel's thought to this or that philosophical end, which may give the impression that 'Hegel' is merely a trendy brand signifying a rather incoherent reservoir of themes and ideas, from which would-be followers or renewers may pick and choose at will. It is the contention of this book, however, that both the irritating need to continue to refer to Hegel and the great variety of interpretations is not just a result of the contentious nature of his philosophy (or its irresolvable obscurity, which prevents us from reaching agreement) but of the fact that he touched on the critical points that continue to animate modern thought.

The question of Hegel and resistance can be broken up into three distinct points. First, there is the question of resistance *to* Hegel: what are the limits of Hegelian thought? The systematic aspirations of Hegel's philosophy have led critics to suggest various things which Hegel cannot think, which escape or are systematically obscured by his system, which resist appropriation by the integrating force of speculative philosophy. Examples are the object or 'remainder' in Adorno, difference and event in Derrida, Deleuze and others, material conditions in Marx, or the (non-European, female, etc.) other. The trope according to which Hegel's system always already includes its other, so that to posit something which Hegel 'could not think' is effectively to show that you are still stuck in the system of dialectics and there is therefore no resisting Hegel, is overly simplistic. Yet, as Foucault suggests above, we must strive for a maximum of self-reflectivity with regard to the question of the extent to which

we are still Hegelian. The ambitious scope of Hegel's philosophy is not a matter of dialectical trickery but consists, firstly, in the fact that the Hegelian text is almost always more complex than it is made out to be, certainly allowing for more 'difference', contingency and so forth, than traditional interpretations have it but also for widely diverging interpretations. And secondly, in the fact that Hegel was also an empirical thinker, integrating a wide range of facts and evidence from the literature, science and politics of his day, while also (in certain – perhaps rare – moments) allowing for the fact that he might be wrong. This means that attempts to criticize Hegel for what he did not or was unable to think always run the risk of being challenged, not by abstract claims of 'not being dialectical enough', but by actual elements of Hegel's philosophy that they have ignored.

This leads us to a second point: resistance *by* Hegel. Because of its complexity, its scope and its systematic character, Hegel's philosophy is notoriously resistant to appropriation and interpretation, which is always at risk of being selective, reductive or one-sided. It seems that we either have to try to absorb Hegel's thought in all its aspects and risk being unable to take a sufficiently critical stance towards it, or take some particular element which we still find to be relevant today at the risk of ignoring its context, both in relation to Hegel's system and to its wider historical and philosophical background. Is it justifiable to extract from Hegel a pragmatics, a social theory or a coherence theory of truth? To focus on epistemological concerns over metaphysical or social and cultural aspects? Or to privilege a particular text or period over another?

Certainly, the question of what is living and what is dead in Hegel's philosophy must always be asked. Hegel's context is not ours, and appropriate respect for the philosophical power and enduring relevance of his ideas must never be confused with uncritical adulation or mere scholastic explication. Reactualizing Hegel will always involve a significant degree of reinterpretation, selectivity and, not unimportantly, translation – a restating of Hegelian concepts in terms which both make sense in the context of contemporary philosophy, whichever particular field one is working in, and which make sense to contemporary readers. Yet, keeping in mind the aforementioned point, this selectivity, translation and process of 'updating' should always be accompanied by the highest degree of reflection on the choices we make in interpreting and the limits of our own position, as well as a continuing awareness of the complexity of Hegel's thought. In practical terms, this means that an ideal contemporary reading of Hegel will always have a double aspect. The first of these corresponds to what Robert Brandom calls a *de dicto* reading, which seeks to explicate what a

philosopher him- or herself believed and would ascribe to, based on contextual and textual evidence; the second corresponds to what Brandom calls a *de re* reading, which seeks to establish how an author's views and claims correspond to what *we*, as interpreters or communities of interpreters, hold to be true and valid.³ Derrida expressed a similar distinction with his notion of *vouloir-dire*, of 'meaning (to say)', which refers to the fact that the meaning of a text, while on the one hand tied to the intention of the author, also goes beyond this intention and must be understood in terms of its wider implications.⁴ This is a distinction which is hardly straightforward to make but must nevertheless always be kept in mind. Reconstructing what Hegel said (or meant to say) and interpreting what that means (now, to us) are, of course, deeply connected and should always go hand in hand, but interpreters should always seek to have an eye to both aspects, avoiding both a scholastic reiteration of Hegelian notions and freely picking from Hegel's ideas to fit them into one's contemporary research programme, but rather striving for clarity with regard to both the historical context and the contemporary relevance of Hegel's thought.

The final point and most important topic is that of resistance *in* Hegel. The core operations of Hegel's thought have always been understood and, to an extent, misunderstood, to be *identification*, *totalization* and *internalization*. The basic principles of Hegelian dialectics would be to reduce all difference to identity, to see everything from the perspective of the monolithic, systematic whole, and to internalize the whole of nature and history into the eternal conceptual clarity of Spirit's self-presence. What unites these three aspects with the whole machinery of Hegel's thought – with its teleological view of history, with the process of alienation and reconciliation, with the process of *Aufhebung* – is that these are all forms of *overcoming resistance*. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel presents his own method as follows: it is the 'absolutely infinite force, to which no object, presenting itself as something external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer resistance or be of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be penetrated by it' (SL 826). Similarly, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 'absolute freedom' is hailed as the 'undivided Substance', which 'ascends the throne of the world without any power being able to resist it'.⁵ Nature, the external world, other human beings at first appear as things that stand against us and resist us, but once we learn, through our shaping and cognizing of reality that, as Hegel puts it, consciousness 'is all reality' (PS 138) resistance disappears: 'Having discovered this, self-consciousness thus knows itself to be reality in the form of an individuality that directly expresses *itself*, an individuality which no longer encounters resistance from an actual world opposed to it, and whose

aim and object are only this expressing of itself' (PS 217). The logical aim and endpoint of Hegel's philosophy thus appears to be a system that does not ignore difference but rather contains it within itself, a harmonious machine where everything moves in its proper place such that it generates the least amount of friction and resistance; as Hegel writes of the absolute concept: 'as all-present' it is 'neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself all differences, and also their supersession; accordingly it pulsates within itself but does not move, it trembles internally without being restless' (PS 100).

Even if the method and movement of Hegel's philosophy thus appear to be essentially characterized by the overcoming of resistance, this does not mean that resistance is merely an illusion. For Hegel, dealing with resistance is not only the teleological endpoint, but the very substance of philosophy and history. This is why Spirit's unfolding in history is not a purely conceptual exercise, but a 'path of despair', a long, difficult process, characterized by hard labour, violent struggle and suffering.⁶ Without resistance there would be no philosophy, no history, since it is only in the confrontation with its other that spirit or consciousness can become what it is. But the essential question is, therefore: is resistance in the end overcome, and totality or identity achieved?

The answer to this question is by no means straightforward, and much of the history of interpretations of Hegel turns on it. Globally speaking, traditional readings of Hegel can be divided into two camps (more or less contiguous with the left-/right-Hegelian split): both of them took Hegel's answer to this question to be 'yes', and either criticized him for it (in the case of left Hegelians), or embraced this aspect of his philosophy (in the case of right Hegelians). In the twentieth century, the response became more complicated. While Hegel, on the one hand, became the symbol for everything that was wrong with Western philosophy – foundationalist metaphysics, the exclusion of otherness and contingency, teleology, anthropocentrism, Eurocentrism, phallogocentrism and so on – there was, at the same time, a significant revaluation. Adorno can be considered a most significant figure here. In his *Hegel: Three Studies*, he develops a way of reading Hegel 'against the grain' that, in terms of its method, is representative of many other more recent approaches.⁷ On the one hand, Adorno levels many of the traditional criticisms against Hegel: Hegel's philosophy is politically conservative and reduces everything to the identity of thought; it is a closed system, a 'gigantic credit system' where all debts are reconciled.⁸ On the other hand, Adorno clearly appreciates the subtlety and rigour of Hegel's thought, and greatly values its social, dialectical and conceptual insights. The key to 'going beyond Hegel' is, for Adorno, contained within Hegel, in notions

already present within Hegel's thought which the philosopher himself failed to make explicit. More is 'expressed' in a philosophical work than that which is actually (explicitly) 'thought' in it, Adorno argues; consequently, as Hegel does himself, we have to think starting from the subject matter, *die Sache selbst*:

Immanent fidelity to Hegel's intention requires one to supplement or go beyond the text in order to understand it. Then it is useless to ponder cryptic individual formulations and get involved in often unresolvable controversies about what was meant. Rather, one must uncover Hegel's aim; the subject matter should be reconstructed from knowledge of it. He almost always has certain issues in mind even when his own formulations fail to capture them. What Hegel was talking about is more important than what he meant.⁹

A very similar approach can be found in Derrida. Like Adorno, Derrida was not only one of the twentieth century's main critics of Hegel, but he was also tremendously influenced by him. Derrida's central notion of *différance*, he claims, is 'at a point of absolute proximity to Hegel';¹⁰ 'Hegel is *also* the thinker of irreducible *différance*'.¹¹ As for Adorno, for Derrida the central point is that Hegel correctly diagnoses the negative, self-differentiating, unstable character of all meaning and identity – of concepts, the subject or social formations – but, Derrida maintains, in the end Hegel subjects everything to a monotonous, mechanical process of sublation (*Aufhebung*, *relève*), subsuming all difference in an 'economy of meaning' where every dialectical move gives rise to a proportional countermove, where everything has its place and nothing is ever lost.¹²

Nevertheless, Derrida too believed that the key to going beyond Hegel – and everything he stood for, that is, metaphysics, identity thinking, teleological and historical determinism – is contained within Hegel's own thought. Despite Hegel's pretence at system-building, Hegel's work is not a closed, fully coherent whole, but a complicated composition of many different arguments and strands of thought that have been more or less effectively coordinated; thus, Hegel's own valid insights can be turned against the more problematic tendencies of his thinking. 'No more than any other', Derrida writes, 'the Hegelian text is not made of a piece. While respecting its faultless coherence, one can decompose its strata and show that it *interprets itself* ... Hegel's own interpretation can be reinterpreted – against him'.¹³

Of course, it is true that this tactic of reading Hegel 'against himself' is as old as the left-Hegelian tradition, starting with Feuerbach's emphasis on Hegel's historical dialectical method over its supposed theological and metaphysical substance.¹⁴ But in readings such as Adorno's or Derrida's, this theme gets

a specifically postmodern twist, where Hegel 'the author' recedes into the background and the autonomy and undecidability of the meaning of the text take centre stage. This development is due primarily to the influence of psychoanalysis. For this approach – and this is the crucial difference between this left-Hegelian current and many contemporary Anglo-American readings of Hegel – it is not simply a matter of sorting out the bad elements and the good elements in Hegel, as if we were in a position to authoritatively and infallibly judge Hegel's thought and its bearing on reality. We have to realize that, just as Hegel had no final say over the meaning and import of his own ideas, we too, as reading and thinking subjects, are ourselves implicated in the movement of thought; our interpretation is partially determined by our subjective and historical position. Reading Hegel is therefore an open-ended process; we have to continually return to or, as one prominent contemporary Hegelian, Slavoj Žižek, likes to say it, 'repeat' Hegel.¹⁵

The reason why Hegel remains one of the most important philosophers today is, of course, because he himself analysed the self-reflexivity of thought and the vicissitudes of the process of gaining knowledge like no other. For Žižek, it is such elements that make Hegel the most 'radical' and relevant philosopher today.¹⁶ In terms of his method, Žižek is remarkably close to Adorno and particularly Derrida, arguing that the point of 'repeating' Hegel is to conceptualize the hidden 'rational core' of Hegel's thought that Hegel himself was unable to think.¹⁷ Elaborating the Heideggerian idea of the 'unthought', Žižek maintains that this hidden core (which he identifies with Lacan's notion of the 'drive') is in fact constitutive of Hegel's philosophy, and that it necessarily remained obscure to Hegel himself.¹⁸ In a psychoanalytic sense, this hidden 'truth' of Hegel's philosophy appears only as a moment of resistance, as a disavowed truth which occurs in Hegel's thought and text only as a series of symptoms: in various forms of hesitation, delay, tarrying or negation, which resist the movement of thought (on this topic, see Rebecca Comay's contribution in this volume).

The topic of resistance in Hegel is thus key to twentieth-century and contemporary continental and, broadly speaking, 'left Hegelian' approaches to Hegel; and in fact, as this book seeks to show, to reading and reactualizing Hegel in general.¹⁹ Responding to Hegel does not take the shape of a straightforward rejection, or an adoption of one or several particular elements of his philosophy, but rather consists of turning to those symptomatic moments of resistance internal to Hegel's thought, moments where this thought appears to come into conflict with its own presuppositions, often making it appear strikingly contemporary. These moments of resistance can be particular concepts or

topics which, as various authors have argued, represent moments of important friction in Hegel's conceptual edifice which either 'deconstruct' Hegel's system from the inside, or rather challenge the standard notion of Hegel as a thinker of progress, identity or totality; moments such as madness (Žižek), laughter (Derrida/Bataille) or the rabble (Ruda).²⁰ Or, even more important, the notion of resistance can become the central concept for a revaluation of the overall structure and method of Hegel's philosophy. Insofar as Hegel's philosophy has always been understood as a philosophy of movement, development and actualization, and in particular as a philosophy which overcomes all resistance, such an approach would show how the moments of resistance – to movement, development, sublation, integration, identification – are themselves key not only to understanding Hegel's philosophy but also to the process of thinking and its relation to reality in general.

The chapters in this volume are divided into three parts. The first part takes up the fundamental question of resistance in relation to Hegel's philosophical method. In his chapter, Frank Ruda shows that Hegel's method, while appearing to aim at overcoming all resistance, in fact contains an internal moment of resistance in the form of the speculative sentence. By comparing Hegel to Foucault as a thinker of resistance to power, he shows that Hegel's philosophy is actually more effective in theorizing resistance than many more recent anti-Hegelian philosophers. Rebecca Comay reads Hegel 'backwards' through Freud in order to explore the intricacies of the concept of resistance. Both Freudian psychoanalysis and Hegelian phenomenology, she argues, have been misunderstood as offering a story of 'demystification' or 'consciousness-raising' where we get to the truth only through the overcoming of resistance. As Comay shows, however, we can find in both Freud and Hegel a different theory where resistance is never definitively overcome but only displaced, stalled or delayed. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, she argues, can effectively be read as a catalogue of resistances, showing how progress occurs only through an endless series of detours, moments of stagnation, repetition and forgetting. In the following chapter, Rocío Zambrana reconstructs Hegel's speculative dialectics in the light of Benjamin's notion of the dialectical image and Adorno's negative dialectics, arguing that all three ought to be understood as forms of resistance. Hegel thus appears as the source and inspiration for a contemporary critical theory, where speculative dialectics serves as a method of thought that interrupts and resists the positivity and reification characteristic of capitalist modernity.

The second part deals with forms of resistance in nature, history and anthropology. Resistance in Hegel is operative at many levels: from the organism's

assimilation of food to the subject's relation to the object of labour and from the formation of personal identity to mental illness, from religion to social development. Howard Caygill analyses the *Science of Logic*, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Hegel's early writings on religion to show there is a *spirit* of resistance at work in Hegel's system that is not recognized in the *letter* of Hegel's text. In his chapter, Kirill Chepurin explores resistance in the relation between the body and *Geist* in Hegel's anthropology, arguing that subjectivity emerges through resisting nature and through nature's resistance, while at the same time aiming at the assimilation of the natural to *Geist*. Bart Zantvoort analyses forms of resistance and inertia in Hegel's theory of social-historical development. While Hegel presents a narrative of moral, political, social and intellectual progress, he also maintains that consciousness, in its process of necessary self-overcoming, tends to get stuck in what he calls 'unthinking inertia'. In social-historical development, too, societies do not necessarily change for the better at all, but often get stuck in social and political inertia; institutions and laws which once appropriately expressed the spirit of their time continue to exist long after they have become obsolete and regressive.

The third part of this volume takes up the question of political resistance. Is there a place, according to Hegel, for political resistance? Or are we – as the traditional reading of Hegel has it – ineluctably forced to submit to the power of the state, to the status quo, or to historical necessity? Three chapters provide a balanced discussion: Karin de Boer analyses Hegel's critique of democracy and the limits he places on political dissent, which on her view are motivated by his concern to restrain arbitrariness and the rule of private interests in the modern state. De Boer argues that Hegel fails to distinguish adequately between justified grievances about political institutions and protests motivated by particular interests, and thus allows too little room for dissent. Nevertheless, the conflict between the rule of private interest and rational freedom is still a determining factor in contemporary politics, giving Hegel's diagnosis of the modern state, if not his remedy, enduring relevance. By contrast, Klaus Vieweg maintains that Hegel is, in fact, a theorist of political resistance. In a series of stages of rights of resistance, from Hegel's treatment of the right to self-defence (*Notwehr*) to the right to rebellion, he tries to show there is a continuous and consistent basis for political resistance in the form of a 'second coercion', a legitimate resistance against an usurpation of rights that is itself illegitimate. Finally, Louis Carré takes up the much-discussed notion of 'the rabble' in Hegel, comparing it to the proletariat in Marx and arguing that, while the rabble represents a phenomenon that resists Hegel's political philosophy 'from the inside', this may in fact be a

strength of Hegel's philosophy, because unlike Marx, Hegel does not eliminate the difference between politics and philosophy.

Notes

- 1 Frank Ruda, *Abolishing Freedom: A Plea for a Contemporary Use of Fatalism* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 101–2.
- 2 Michel Foucault, 'The Discourse on Language', in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 235.
- 3 Robert Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 94–103.
- 4 Jacques Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010).
- 5 PS 357. As is well known, however, Hegel is actually critical of this notion of absolute freedom, which stands for the desire to abolish all social differences during the French Revolution.
- 6 On labour, see PS 118. On the path of despair, see PS 49. On struggle and violence, see esp. PS 51.
- 7 Theodor Adorno, *Hegel: Three Studies* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 138–9.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 147.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 131.
- 10 Jacques Derrida, *Positions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 41.
- 11 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 26.
- 12 Jacques Derrida, 'From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve', in *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge, 2001). On the same topic, see also 'The Pit and the Pyramid', in *Margins of Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 89; and *Glas* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 167a.
- 13 Derrida, 'From Restricted to General Economy', 329. See also Fredric Jameson, *The Hegel Variations* (London: Verso, 2010), 7.
- 14 Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986).
- 15 Slavoj Žižek, *Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012), 500.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 20.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 393, 500–1.
- 18 Slavoj Žižek, *Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2014), 33–4.

- 19 Besides Adorno, Derrida and Žižek, see, for example, Catherine Malabou, *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic* (London: Routledge, 2005); Karin de Boer, *On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Fredric Jameson, *The Hegel Variations*; Rebecca Comay, *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Frank Ruda, *Hegel's Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (New York: Continuum, 2013); Rocío Zambrana, *Hegel's Theory of Intelligibility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
- 20 Slavoj Žižek, 'Discipline between Two Freedoms: Madness and Habit in German Idealism', in Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek, *Mythology, Madness and Laughter* (London: Continuum, 2009).

