Family: Change or Continuity?

Faith Robertson Elliot

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
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1

Introduction

In many modern Western societies, the regulation of sexual and parental relationships has become the subject of vigorous and heated debate. On the one hand, traditional values define sexual relationships, procreation and child-care as properly taking place within a family unit based on lifelong marriage and women's mothering, and the naturalness, importance and moral superiority of 'the family' is asserted. On the other hand, there is pressure for the legitimation of different ways of ordering sexual and parental relationships – such as unmarried cohabitation and/or parenthood. same-sex pairings and multiple sexual relationships – and 'the family' is attacked as an 'oppressive and bankrupt' institution whose 'demise is both imminent and welcome' (Rossi, 1977, p.1). Traditional family ideologies assert that the family is basically the same everywhere, arises out of fundamental biological or societal processes, and is the arrangement that can best provide the stable, intimate relationships necessary to the care and support of children and adults. From this ideological stand, other ways of ordering sexual and parental relationships may be defined as pathological or deviant, and stigmatised. In contrast, alternative life-style ideologies insist on the variability and social nature of sexual and parental relationships and assert that the conventional family, together with women's mothering and men's breadwinning, are the outcome of specific cultural, economic and political processes. From this point of view, alternative arrangements are possible and their legitimation desirable.

Alternatives to 'the family' have been advocated in the past – in certain sections of nineteenth-century socialist and feminist thought, for example. However, contemporary anti-family movements have an exceptional vitality and spring from a wide range of 'causes'. They are part of a more general estrangement from the social order, an element in a counter-culture founded on visions of individual freedom and on beliefs in the viability and desirability of a social life ordered, not by prescribed rules, but by the mutual negotiation

of commitments. They also have specific impulses. One such impulse is a revolt by young people against traditional restrictions on sexual behaviour; another is women's protest against their imprisonment within the wife-mother role; a third is pressure for gay liberation; a fourth is the resurgence of Marxist thought and the development of a Marxist critique of 'the family' as an instrument of capitalist oppression; a fifth comes from the development by radical psychiatrists such as Laing and Cooper of a critique of the family as destructive of individuality. These anti-family forces have, in turn, evoked a strong reaction in favour of traditional values and well-organised pro-family groups have emerged on both sides of the Atlantic. The pro-family movement, like the anti-family movement, is an agglomeration of 'causes'; it arises from traditionalist fears about 'permissiveness' becoming 'decadence', from a male backlash against feminist demands, and from attempts by the political Right to resolve the problems of unemployment and rising welfare expenditure by sustaining ideas of the family as a unit of care.

These debates about appropriate ways of ordering sexual relationships, child-care and the roles of men and women are not simply private debates about personal values and codes of conduct. Reproduction and child-care are critical to the social group as a whole and are a matter of public concern and social regulation in every society. Moreover, the 'moral' debate interweaves with 'academic' debates about the origins of 'the family', the forms it takes in different social classes and societies, how and why it changes over time and the interests that particular arrangements serve.

This textbook is about these debates. The primary intent is to provide a dispassionate review of the major sociological accounts of change in the family. However, in the study of the family boundaries between sociological, psychological and political (including feminist) thought are not easily drawn and this book refers to the insights of writers in all these fields.

This introductory chapter is concerned with basics. It looks at the problem of defining the family and highlights the way in which definitions of 'the family' incorporate ideas of what the family ought to be. It also outlines, in very general terms, the way in which the study of the family is approached in two major schools of sociological thought – functionalism and Marxism – and in feminist thought.

Chapter 2 examines the question of the relative role of the biological and the social in shaping the familial. This nature-nurture

debate, as it has sometimes been called, is examined in relation to the ubiquity (near universality) of the nuclear family unit, the dependence of the child and the sex-ascribed division of labour.

Chapter 3 considers accounts of the development of the conjugal family as the dominant family form in modern Western societies. It begins with a look at functionalist views of the relationship between urban-industrialisation and the emergence of the nuclear family as a relatively isolated unit concerned primarily with child-rearing and emotional supportiveness. Empirical accounts of change in extranuclear kin bonds and in the role of the family are then examined. This is followed by an outline of Marxist views of the relationship between the conjugal family and capitalism. The chapter concludes by examining the construction in religious thought of ideas of the family as a sentimental reality.

Chapter 4 considers relationships within the conjugal family. It looks first at empirical accounts of changes in marriage, parenthood and the roles of women and men, and then at theoretical explanations of gender divisions.

Chapter 5 counterposes traditional images of the conjugal family as a private arena of love and intimacy and present-day images of the conjugal family as supportive of capitalism, oppressive of individuality and oppressive of women. The significance of these ideas of 'the family' for legitimating change in conventional ways of ordering sexual and parental relationships is briefly sketched in.

Chapters 6 and 7 consider changes which are currently taking place in sexual and parental relationships. Chapter 6 considers the legitimation of divorce, the emergence of one-parent families and remarriage families and the restructuring of 'the family' which these developments entail. Chapter 7 explores the search for alternatives to the conjugal family. It provides a general sketch of alternative life-style movements, examines in detail cohabitation, same-sex pairings and group living and ends with an evaluation of the impact of the alternative life-style endeavour on conventional ways of ordering sexual and parental relationships.

A brief epilogue summarises these debates.

The issues discussed in this book have become matters of debate within the context of attempts to understand the structures of Western capitalist societies, and are in different ways and to different degrees relevant to all such societies. However, every society has its own history and for this reason the substantive material used relates

to a particular society, Britain (or more specifically and accurately to England), as the birthplace of capitalism, though American theoretical material is also used and some American experiences are recounted by way of comparison and contrast. There are many topics to which limited reference is made; among them sexuality, fertility control and the medicalisation of childbirth, family violence, the family life of the aged, religious, ethnic and regional (and in particular Scottish and Welsh) variation and state regulation. The length and disparateness of this list of 'omissions' is, in itself, indicative of the formidable selection problem which must be confronted in writing a short textbook. Clearly, the scope for debate over inclusions and exclusions is considerable. The choices made here reflect in part the wealth or paucity of the sociological literature and in part the author's predominant concern with macrosocial trends

1.1 WHAT IS THE FAMILY?

In modern Western societies 'the family' denotes a unit consisting of a husband and wife, and their children. This unit is widely thought of as a group based on marriage and biological parenthood, as sharing a common residence and as united by ties of affection, obligations of care and support and a sense of a common identity. This taken-for-granted conception of what the family is clearly reflects traditional beliefs as to the way in which sexual and parental relationships ought to be ordered. It also informed some early social science definitions of the family.

However, this way of delimiting the family is problematic. Ball (1974) points out that it conflates two logically distinct categories, 'the household' and 'the family'. The household, he says, is a spatial concept and refers to a group of persons (or a person) bound to a place whereas families are groups of persons bound together by ties of blood and marriage. They are thus analytically distinct categories. They are also empirically differentiated because, although families may form households, they do not necessarily or always do so. For example, children may live away from home if they are at boarding school. Conversely, unrelated people – for example, students – may live together and form households but they are not families. The family (a kin group) must therefore be differentiated from the household (a spatial group).

This distinction is critical to our understanding of the family. However, it does not resolve the definitional problem. This is because the range of blood relationships that are used to form familial ties varies considerably: at one extreme, the married couple and their dependent children may be encapsulated within a large-scale cohesive kin group based on descent from a common ancestor; at the other extreme, they may form a more or less independent unit and only a limited range of blood ties may be given social recognition. Moreover, sexual unions and marriage may not coincide, as in unmarried cohabitation. Biological parenthood and social parenthood may also not coincide, as in adoptive families.

So how do we define 'the family'? A recent text (Worsley, 1977, p. 168) asks, do we confine our definition to a group consisting of a legally married couple and their children or do we extend it to include groups such as adoptive families, foster families, cohabiting units and so on? Do we confine our definition of marriage to a union that has been formalised by a legal ceremony or do we extend it to include consensual sexual unions? If so, then at what point does an 'affair' become a 'marriage'? How do we deal with remarriage, same-sex pairings and group marriage? Similarly, do we confine our definition of parenthood to biological parenthood or extend it to include social parenthood such as that found in adoptive families? How do we deal with families who delegate child-care to paid persons, as in the Royal Family and in the Israeli kibbutzim? And how do we deal with residential child-care?

Some writers have sought to resolve these definitional problems by arguing that 'the family' is what a particular social group believes it to be. On this view, the attempt to define 'the family' in a specific way is misconceived because it obscures the diversity of family arrangements. Thus it has been argued that we are all engaged in 'defining "the family" by the ways in which we think and act in relation to those whom we label as family or non-family', that these definitions vary over time, between cultures and even within cultures, and that we should be wary of 'giving the idea of "the" family some fixed "thing-like" quality, thereby perhaps smuggling in some notion of a universal or unchanging family' (Worsley, 1977, pp. 169–70).

This approach to the problem of defining 'the family' is now generally accepted and the old concept of 'the family' has given way to a new concept, that of 'families'. Berger and Berger (1983, pp. 59-65) point out that this change in terminology recognises the empirical fact of diversity and reflects a shift in ideological positions.

It reflects, they say, the normative acceptance of diversity and a reluctance to accord any particular arrangement moral superiority as the family.

However, this change in terminology does not solve the definitional problem for it raises the question: What is it that is varying but is regarded as familial? Moreover, it leaves us with the problem of labelling and differentiating between the various arrangements that are regarded as familial. For example, we still have the problem of devising a classificatory scheme which will enable us to distinguish between the biological group of parents and their natural children, the adoptive family, the foster family and residential care.

However, although this problem remains unresolved in formal terms, distinctions are made in practice and some have become common currency in sociological discourse. The term 'nuclear family' is used to refer to a unit consisting of spouses and their dependent children. This term, Skolnick (1978, p. 43) notes, is sometimes used to refer to an observable group of people who live together and are set off from the rest of society in tangible ways, but it is also used in an abstract way to denote simply the recognition of bonds between parents and children. This abstract usage treats the form and content of this set of relationships as an empirical question. It does not imply that parents and children live together and act as a unit, or that relationships within nuclear families or between related nuclear families are the same in all societies or historical periods. The term 'the conjugal family' is then used to refer to a family system in which the nuclear family unit is more or less independent of kin and in which the main emphasis is on the marital relationship (Goode, 1963). The conjugal family may be contrasted with the 'extended family', a term used to denote 'any grouping, related by descent, marriage or adoption, that is broader than the nuclear family' (Bell and Vogel, 1968, p. 3.). Distinctions may also be drawn between extended families. One such distinction is that made by Litwak (1960a and 1960b) between the 'classical extended family' - a family system based on the geographical propinguity of related nuclear families, economic interdependence, the authority of extended family groupings over the nuclear family and stress on extra-nuclear kin relationships – and the 'modified extended family' – a loose set of kin relationships in which nuclear families, though geographically dispersed and autonomous, value and maintain extra-nuclear kin relationships. The term 'descent group' is used to refer to a social group based on common descent from a real or mythical ancestor (Abercrombie et al., 1984). Such groups commonly constitute corporate groups in that their members act together and form political and economic units. Finally, as in everyday usage, units which do not consist of a married couple and their children are specifically labelled 'adoptive families', 'one-parent families', 'remarriage families', 'cohabiting units', 'lesbian families' and so on. Common to all these specifications of various types of families is a conception of 'the familial' as referring to social units based on biological reproduction and blood relationships (or simulated blood relationships, as in the adoptive family).

Some of the terms commonly used in the sociological literature in discussing the roles of women and men also need clarification. To begin with, it is now customary to distinguish between women and men as persons with specific biological characteristics and as persons to whom we have attributed specific social attributes. 'Sex' is used to refer to women and men as biologically-differentiated beings while 'gender' is used to refer to women and men as sociallydifferentiated beings. They may thus be seen as belonging to female/ male sex categories and to feminine/masculine gender categories. (The debate which has given rise to this distinction is discussed in Chapter 2.) The phrase 'the sexual division of labour' is commonly used to refer to the ascription of different social tasks to women and men on the basis of sex. It refers in particular to the allocation of primary responsibility for mothering and related nurturant tasks to women, and of primary responsibility for economic activity and the defence of the society to men. This terminology may seem confusing, given the distinction between 'sex' and 'gender', so it must be emphasised that it denotes only that tasks are allocated on the basis of sex, not that women's mothering and men's breadwinning are biological characteristics. The phrase 'sexual relationship' is sometimes used to refer to relationships between men and women in general and sometimes to refer to specific relationships involving physical sexuality. This is confusing and to clarify matters we shall use the phrase 'sexual relationships' to refer only to relationships associated involving coition and activities. while relationships between men and women will be referred to as 'gender relationships'. The term 'gender inequality' is used to refer to power

and status differences between women and men. This concept is distinct from that of the sexual division of labour since it is, in principle, possible for women and men to perform specific tasks and to be equally rewarded, though in practice this rarely seems to happen. In addition, the term 'patriarchy' has come into common use. This term was in the past sometimes used to refer to a type of household in which older men dominate the whole household, including younger men, and it has sometimes been used in this way in feminist discourse. However, it is now more commonly used to refer to the power relationships through which men dominate women.

Finally, a note of caution must be sounded. Many of the terms which have been used to differentiate between family structures or between different aspects of the roles of women and men are, in fact, used in a variety of ways and we need always to be alert to these different usages. The foregoing definitions merely identify what appear to be common and sensible usages of these terms and the way in which they will be used in this text.

1.2 SOCIOLOGY AND THE FAMILY

Two important schools of sociological thought, functionalism and Marxism, provide radically opposed descriptions, explanations and evaluations of contemporary ways of ordering sexual and parental relationships. Functionalism emphasises the importance of the nuclear family to the stability and continuity of society and so meshes with traditional family values. This school of thought dominated the sociology of the family for a long time. However, it has been subjected to extensive criticism and now commands little support, while Marxist perspectives have come to the fore. This trend parallels similar developments in other fields of sociology, but in family sociology it derived a particular impetus from the growth of feminism and from the attempts of Marxist-feminists to reveal the blindness of traditional Marxist thought to the differential positions of women and men in society and to expand Marxist thought in ways that would remedy this 'defect'. Feminism has also produced a specific and distinctive 'radical-feminist' account of the family and of relationships between women and men. Unlike functionalism, Marxist and feminist perspectives challenge the existing social order and advance interpretations of the social world which legitimate demands for change.

Each of these schools of thought has a distinct unity and identity. Nevertheless, there are substantial differences within each approach as well as some similarities between them. Moreover, because they focus on different aspects of the social world and ask different questions, functionalism, Marxism and feminism are in some respects complementary. They are not, of course, the only approaches to the study of the social world, but they are the perspectives in which the most extensive analyses of the social structure of the family and of its changing relationship to other social institutions are to be found. They are therefore the perspectives on which we concentrate, though some phenomenological accounts of the family (those of Berger and Kellner and Laing) are examined in Chapter 5.

This section provides thumbnail sketches of functionalist, Marxist and feminist approaches to the study of the family. It simplifies what are complex theories, glosses over similarities between, and differences within, each of them and highlights their distinctive features so as to provide a basic introduction to the more substantial analyses of later chapters.

Functionalist theories are founded on conceptions of societies as systems of interrelated and interdependent parts and of the parts as having an in-built tendency to adapt to each other so that the society as a whole is in a state of equilibrium or balance. Moreover, the various parts of the society are seen as performing functions (having effects) which contribute to the maintenance, integration and continuity of the whole. This means that social arrangements tend to be accounted for in terms of the functions which they are presumed to serve. It also means that there is an overall emphasis on social integration – that is, on the way in which different parts of the system fit together. Furthermore, change in any one part of the system is seen as leading to change in other parts of the system. Functionalist theorists tend to regard change as slow and evolutionary, and as arising out of processes such as urbanisation and industrialisation which have a momentum of their own. Thus, from the functionalist perspective modern society is an 'urbanindustrial society' and its institutions are congruent with urbanindustrialisation.

Given this general orientation, functionalist analyses of the family

focus on the relationship between the family and other social institutions, seek to establish the way in which change in any part of the society affects the family and to identify the functions which the family performs. There are different approaches to the identification of functions performed by the family and rather different sets of functions have been identified (see Morgan, 1975, for an excellent discussion of various approaches) but, broadly speaking, the nuclear family and the sexual division of labour are seen as arrangements which meet certain basic societal needs, namely the need for the regulation of sexual behaviour and procreation, for child-care and for the socialisation of children into the values of the society. In other words, functionalism tends to treat the nuclear family and women's mothering as performing functions necessary to the survival of the society. These arrangements are in general regarded as universal but they are also depicted as changing in ways that fit with change in other parts of the society so as to meet specific social needs. For example, the nuclear family is very generally seen as having been submerged in wider kin groupings in premodern societies, but as becoming relatively independent of other kin in urban-industrial societies (see Chapter 3). Functionalist theory thus asserts that there are constants as well as variants in family structures. It also tends to presume that the family, as we know it, is functioning in ways that maintain the overall stability and integration of the society. There is, says Morgan (1975, p. 59), an overall emphasis on harmony and equilibrium and a strong presupposition that 'functional' equals 'highly important' in functionalist accounts of the family.

Marxist theory, a large, diverse and complex body of social and political thought founded on the theories of Karl Marx (1818–83) provides a radical alternative to functionalism. Marx's conception of the social world is based on the simple observation that human beings must produce food and material objects in order to survive. Productive activity is therefore, Marx argued, central to the ordering of society. He maintained that the forces and relations of production form a base for all other aspects of the social order (the family, education, political and legal institutions, systems of knowledge, belief and value systems and so on). Marx in that way drew a distinction between base (constituted of the forces and relations of production) and superstructure (the other elements of the social

order) and maintained that the character of the superstructure is congruent with the character of the base. Marx further contended that the crucial feature in the social organisation of production is the division of society into two opposing classes on the basis of ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. Thus, in writing of capitalist society. Marx described a fundamental class division between a capitalist class who owned the means of industrial production and a non-property-owning proletariat who, having nothing but their labour power (capacity to work), perforce sold this to the capitalist in return for a wage. Moreover, Marx maintained that ownership of the means of production brings not only wealth but also political power; he thus saw the property-owning classes as dominant and the non-owning classes as subordinate and oppressed. However, Marx also believed that social relations are historically specific and subject to change. In his view, humankind's capacity to technology produce is constantly developing as Developments in the forces of production give rise to contradictions (tensions) in the social order and to change in the social relations of production. At certain moments in time, class conflicts erupt and, ultimately, the existing relations of production are swept away and a new social order based on a new mode of production comes into being. Thus, for Marx class conflict is endemic in the social order and change comes about, not through a gradual evolutionary process, but as a result of conflict between opposing forces.

Marx's treatment of the family is not entirely consistent with his central arguments and is fragmentary. McDonough and Harrison (1978) say that Marx seems to have viewed the family as a natural institution for the propagation of the human species and as lying outside the relations of production. As a consequence, he treated the family as peripheral to, and of marginal interest in the analysis of, social life. Marx's collaborator, Engels, developed an elaborate but problematic evolutionary account of the origins of the monogamous nuclear family (see Section 3.3). Thereafter, the family was more or less neglected in Marxist thought and it is only in recent years that significant Marxist accounts of the family have been developed.

Broadly speaking, Marxist accounts of the family take as their starting-point the premise that 'the family is ultimately dependent upon the dominant mode of production for its existence and form' (Seccombe, 1974, p. 5), and emphasise the impact of dominant class interests on family structure and functioning. However, Marxist

thought is elaborated in diverse ways. In some strands of Marxism the superstructure is said to be determined by the base in a fairly direct way. In line with this approach, ways of ordering sexual and parental relationships (like other aspects of the superstructure) may be seen as shaped by the material conditions and interests of the dominant class. This understanding of Marxism has led to economic reductionism and to somewhat static structural analyses in which capitalism is depicted as requiring and producing a certain family form which sustains the capitalist mode of production. For example, some writers have seen the modern family as reproducing a labour force for capitalism, socialising children into values which maintain the capitalist system and providing a refuge from, and counterbalance to, the oppressions of the workplace (see Section 3.3). On the other hand, some elaborations of Marxist thought posit only a general correspondence between base and superstructure and allow for the relative autonomy of social institutions. They may seek to show how capitalism developed out of, and acted upon, pre-existing social forms or they may emphasise class struggles, contradictions within the social order and pressures for change. Thus some Marxist writers (for example, Barrett, 1980, whom we discuss in Section 4.2) suggest that family forms, though transformed by the development of the capitalist mode of production, bear the imprint of their precapitalist pasts, and others (for example, Humphries, 1977, to be dealt with in Section 3.3) have shown that family forms are shaped by the class struggle and may reflect the interests of the working class.

In mainstream functionalist and Marxist accounts of the social world 'man' is the reference point, the 'norm' against which all else is measured. Feminist theories seek to redress this balance. They take 'woman' as their starting-point to which all else is to be related, assert women's subordination to men and seek to describe and explain the world from woman's position of subordination (Spender, 1985). Marxist-feminists take as their question the relation of women to the economic system. They explain women's subordination to men in terms of their position in the relations of production and utilise and expand Marxist theory to argue that capitalism uses women for the tasks involved in reproducing the labour force (the rearing and socialisation of children and the servicing of men) and as a reserve army of labour. In contrast, radical-feminist thought

takes as its question the relation of women to men, explains women's subordination in terms of that relation and emphasises men's power over women rather than capitalist domination. For radical-feminists, social relationships in all societies are based on male domination and gender divisions (not class divisions) constitute the basis of social life. This perspective leads to a view of modern society as patriarchal and of the family as shaped by patriarchal imperatives. More specifically, the sexual division of labour is seen as securing personal domestic services for men and the family is seen as socialising girls and boys into their sex-designated roles and thereby reproducing the patriarchal order. From this point of view, the family is an institution that oppresses women. Pressures for change are seen as stemming from women's struggle to establish a social order based on gender equality.

Functionalist, Marxist and feminist approaches to the family are in certain respects similar. They each see social institutions as interrelated and the family as consonant with and in some measure adapted to other social institutions. Moreover, in each approach, the family is seen as playing a critical role in biological reproduction and in social reproduction (that is, in maintaining, replenishing and transmitting social values and structures from generation to generation). However, as the foregoing account has shown, functionalist, Marxist and feminist approaches to the family have different starting-points, focus on different aspects of the social world and provide different kinds of explanations of the relationship between the family and other social institutions. Functionalist approaches to the 'modern' family take as their starting-point the notion of society as an integrated whole and as their frame of reference urban-industrial society, and see the family as serving fundamental societal needs. Marxist models take as their startingpoint the notion of society as class divided and as their frame of reference capitalism, and see the family as structured by capitalist imperatives. Radical-feminist theories take as their starting-point gender divisions, and as their frame of reference partriarchy, and see the family as the primary site of patriarchal power. Thus, functionalist models see the family as reproducing members of society and values which are generally shared; Marxist models see the family as reproducing a labour force for capitalism and capitalist values and relations, while radical-feminism sees the family as

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reproducing a patriarchal social order. Marxist models highlight class conflict and exploitation, radical-feminist models highlight gender conflict and exploitation. By contrast, functionalist models see co-operation and consensus rather than conflict and oppression as inherent in the system and highlight the positive aspects of family living.

The different accounts which functionalism, Marxism and feminism provide of the relationship between the family and society are more or less supportive of change in that relationship. Functionalism, with its positive evaluation of the family as important and valuable, its stigmatisation of alternatives and its emphasis on stability and the maintenance of the social order, provides support for traditional family values. Conversely, Marxist and feminist theories provide a critical analysis of the family and society and so lend support to demands for change.

Family Structures: Biological or Social?

The role played by human biology in the social organisation of sexual and parental relationships is a central issue in contemporary family debates. Though the arguments are diverse, three broad positions may be identified.

The first and most traditional position insists on the fundamental importance of biology. It asserts that the nuclear family and the sexual division of labour arise almost naturally and universally out of the conditions of human reproduction. This mode of explanation assumes that biology limits the variability of family patterns, that some familial behaviours are instinctive and unlearned, and that there is continuity between the behaviour and characteristics of animals, primates and human beings. This argument is advanced in the biological and psychological sciences, is found in various forms in functionalist sociology, and is commonly used to 'back up' traditional beliefs in the naturalness and moral superiority of the nuclear family.

The second position denies biology a role in the organisation of sexual and parental relationships and insists that the nuclear family and the roles of women and men are socially constructed. This mode of explanation suggests that family patterns are shaped by economic, political and ideological processes. It assumes that human nature is pliable and social arrangements variable, that the behaviour of humans and animals is discontinuous, and that family roles are learned. This position is espoused in the main strands of feminist thought and in Marxist theory. It is commonly used to 'back up' beliefs in the cultural relativity of moral values and the desirability of legitimating alternatives to the nuclear family.

The third set of arguments suggests that, while there is variability in the needs of the child and in parental and sexual relationships, there are also basic continuities so that both biological and social factors must be taken into account. This argument suggests that