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# CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING

*Planned Change*

*Fifth Edition*

**Wayne N. Welsh and  
Philip W. Harris**



# *Criminal Justice Policy and Planning*

Unlike other textbooks on the subject, *Criminal Justice Policy and Planning: Planned Change, Fifth Edition*, presents a comprehensive and structured account of the process of administering planned change in the criminal justice system. Welsh and Harris detail a simple yet sophisticated seven-stage model, which offers students and practitioners a full account of program and policy development from beginning to end. The authors thoughtfully discuss the steps: analyzing a problem; setting goals and objectives; designing the program or policy; action planning; implementation and monitoring; evaluating outcomes; and reassessing and reviewing. Within these steps, students focus on performing essential procedures, such as conducting a systems analysis, specifying an impact model, identifying target populations, making cost projections, collecting monitoring data, and performing evaluations. In reviewing these steps and procedures, students can develop a full appreciation for the challenges inherent in the process and understand the tools that they require to meet those challenges.

To provide for a greater understanding of the material, the text uses a wide array of real-life case studies and examples of programs and policies. Examples include policies such as Restorative Justice, Justice Reinvestment, Stop-and-Frisk, and the Brady Act, and programs such as drug courts, community-based violence prevention, and halfway houses. By examining the successes and failures of various innovations, the authors demonstrate both the ability of rational planning to make successful improvements and the tendency of unplanned change to result in undesirable outcomes. The result is a powerful argument for the use of logic, deliberation, and collaboration in criminal justice innovations.

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# *Criminal Justice Policy and Planning*

Planned Change

*5th edition*

*Wayne N. Welsh  
Philip W. Harris*

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## PREFACE

The purpose of this book, broadly speaking, is to acquaint students, practitioners, and policymakers with scientific techniques for analyzing criminal justice problems and developing solutions. We not only offer guidelines for developing new programs and policies, but we also suggest ways to analyze existing criminal justice interventions, asking to what degree such efforts were guided by logic and planning, rather than by partisan politics and untested hunches.

Change, some of which is planned, touches every aspect of our lives. In criminal justice, new interventions aimed at reducing crime seem to constantly spring up. Some notable interventions of recent years have included “three strikes and you’re out” laws (aimed at incapacitating repeat felony offenders), the Brady Act (requiring waiting periods and background checks for prospective firearm purchasers), drug courts, boot camps, “Weed and Seed,” prisoner reentry initiatives, Stop-and-Frisk, and others. But to what degree are such interventions guided by a rational planning approach? What problems do they attempt to address, and what causal theory about crime do they assume? What difficulties could have been anticipated (e.g., a shortage of prison space; criticisms that programs or policies are inconsistent, unfair, or even unconstitutional)?

Our point is this: What we call “planned change” encompasses a multitude of criminal justice policies, programs, and projects that are developed, implemented, revised, torn down, and recreated every year. We are interested in how such policies, programs, and projects are currently developed and in how they should be developed. Poor planning and faulty problem analysis, we argue, are the primary reasons that so many criminal justice interventions fail to live up to their promises.

Consider the example of three-strikes laws. Evidence suggests that the laws are unfair, expensive, and ineffective. As Dickey (1997) argued, “When the law’s hidden costs and unintended consequences are assessed, its simple goal is obscured by effects that are alarming in their scope” (p. 62). We illustrate some of the pitfalls of poor planning in Case Study I.1, using the seven-stage framework that guides our work (see “Introduction”).

Where the costs of unsuccessful intervention are high, in terms of human suffering and finances, we can and must do better in devising solutions to criminal justice problems. One should be skeptical, even critical, but not cynical. In spite of the pitfalls of poor planning, it is possible to address and reduce even the most pressing problems in criminal justice. We invite students, practitioners, politicians, academics, and planners to subject their own assumptions, decisions, and plans to scrutiny.

In this newly revised fifth edition, we discuss both successful and unsuccessful programs and policies. We include new case studies and examples that examine recently identified problems (e.g., illegal immigration policies, human trafficking, officer-involved shootings, and mass incarceration) and innovations (e.g., justice reinvestment, Stop-and-Frisk, Project HOPE, the Secure Communities policy, and Operation Ceasefire).

We have also updated all research findings and statistics relevant to numerous other programs and policies (e.g., DARE and “DARE PLUS,” three-strikes laws, and the Brady Act). Highlights of changes to the fifth edition include the following:

- Updated research and statistics on diverse criminal justice problems (school violence, domestic violence, AIDS, drug abuse) and interventions;
- Updated examples and case studies, including more currently relevant topics, an enhanced policy focus, and coverage of all branches of the criminal justice system;
- Two new case studies: Case Study 1.2: *Officer-Involved Shootings in Philadelphia*; and Case Study 4.3: *Justice Reinvestment: Action Planning*.
- A new section on translational criminology in Chapter 5;
- Updated material on the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) monitoring requirements for grantees and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Standards for Financial Management Systems;
- Updated discussion of evidence-based programs, logic modeling, and propensity score analysis;
- New citations and Web links to relevant articles and reports to illustrate key concepts;
- New student exercises and assignments to provide more in-depth examinations of case studies and concepts;
- Newly developed online resources for students, including links to articles, reports, and videos; detailed PowerPoint chapter outlines; and additional case studies;
- Newly developed online resources for instructors, including tests, quizzes, exercises, discussion topics, assignments, group projects, answer keys, and PowerPoint presentations for class lectures.

Two changes deserve brief mention. Since the Fourth edition, the Introduction is no longer numbered as a chapter. Instead, each of the seven chapters has been renumbered to reflect its corresponding stage in the seven-stage model of planned change (e.g., Chapter 1 now covers Stage 1: Analyzing the Problem; Chapter 2 covers Stage 2: Setting Goals and Objectives; and so on). This change will make it easier

for instructors (and students!) to match up each stage with its corresponding chapter. Second, we continue to make a clear distinction between two different uses of the seven-stage model: (1) for developing new interventions and (2) for analyzing existing interventions. Two tables in the Introduction (Tables I.1 and I.2) summarize major steps of the seven-stage model separately for each of these two purposes. This distinction is maintained throughout the book, noting differences between the two uses where appropriate.

As authors, the challenge we face is to present and communicate the methods of analyzing criminal justice problems and interventions in a clear, concise manner. We have found no existing book adequate to the task. Some are simply far too jargonistic or technical; others are idiosyncratic, abstract, or unfocused. And to make life even more difficult for us, none presents a systematic model for either analyzing or planning criminal justice programs and policies. This book attempts to meet these challenges. No doubt, even in its fifth edition, it is still less than perfect, and we welcome all comments and suggestions for improvements. Could advocates of planned change do any less?

## REFERENCE

Dickey, W.J. (1997). The impact of "three strikes and you're out" laws: What have we learned? *Corrections Management Quarterly*, 1, 55-64.

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## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Wayne N. Welsh** is a Professor of Criminal Justice at Temple University. He received his PhD in Social Ecology from the University of California, Irvine, in 1990 and his MA in Applied Social Psychology from the University of Saskatchewan (Canada) in 1986. Undergraduate courses he has taught include Introduction to Criminal Justice; Violence, Crime, and Justice; Environmental Criminology; and Planned Change in Criminal Justice. Graduate courses include Violence, Crime, and Aggression; Criminal Justice Organizations: Structure, Process, and Change; and Rehabilitation, Re-entry, and Recidivism. He is the author of *Counties in Court: Jail Overcrowding and Court-Ordered Reform* (1995) and *Criminal Violence: Patterns, Causes and Prevention*, 4th ed., with Marc Riedel (2016). He has published more than 50 peer-reviewed articles in journals such as *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, *Drug and Alcohol Dependence*, *Crime & Delinquency*, and *Criminology*. Welsh served as Deputy Editor of *The Prison Journal* from 1993 to 2000. He has conducted research in two broad areas: (1) applications of organizational theory to criminal justice and examinations of organizational change and (2) theories of violent behavior and intervention/prevention programs. Welsh has been Principal Investigator or Co-Principal Investigator on numerous federal and state-funded research grants. He is currently working on a project called CJDATS (Criminal Justice Drug Abuse Treatment Systems), which is a national collaborative research project funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which is part of the National Institutes of Health. It includes ten research centers (including Temple University in Philadelphia) and a coordinating center (CC). Key research questions address the need to develop a better understanding of the organizational and systems issues that can facilitate or hinder implementation of effective drug treatment and other services. Based upon a collaborative research partnership between the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and Temple University that began in 1998, a series of projects examined critical interactions between inmate characteristics, treatment program characteristics, responsiveness to treatment, and post-release outcomes such as recidivism, relapse, and employment. This ongoing research relationship has increased the capacity of both agencies to produce useful knowledge. Other research projects have included a school violence study titled "Building a Culture and Climate of Safety in Public Schools: School-Based Management and Violence Reduction in Philadelphia," and a three-year study funded by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, "Reducing Over-Representation of Minorities in the Juvenile Justice System."

**Philip W. Harris** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Temple University. He received his PhD in Criminal Justice from the State University of New York at Albany in 1979. His teaching and research have focused primarily on the areas of juvenile justice, juvenile correctional strategies, and organizational and systems development. He serves as the Strategic Planning Adviser to the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, which he cofounded in 1994, and is a member of Pennsylvania's Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Committee. Prior to arriving at Temple in 1980, he served as a professional services administrator for a private juvenile correctional agency in Montreal, where he was responsible for assessment services and staff training. Beginning in 1992, he and Peter Jones designed and implemented an outcome-based information system, ProDES, that for 10 years provided a continuous flow of outcome information on all programs that received youths from Philadelphia's Family Court. Output from this system has included multiple evaluations of more than 90 programs. In 1999, ProDES was a finalist in the Innovations in American Government competition sponsored by Harvard University and the Ford Foundation. His publications include articles such as "The Role of Crime Specialization, Neighborhood Social Disorganization, and Spatial Contagion in Determinants of Juvenile Recidivism" in the *Journal of Adolescence* (2011); "Effects of Neighborhood Context on Juvenile Recidivism Rates: Does Recidivism Offense Type Matter?" in *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* (2010); "Identifying Chronic Juvenile Offenders," in *Justice Quarterly* (2001); "A Century Of Juvenile Justice," in the National Institute of Justice volume, *The Nature of Crime: Continuity and Change* (2000); "Substance Abuse and Race in a Delinquent Population" in *The System in Black and White*, edited by Michael W. Markowitz and Delores D. Jones-Brown (2000); and "Differentiating Delinquent Youths For Program Planning And Evaluation" in *Criminal Justice and Behavior* (1999). He recently completed an evaluation of a juvenile sex offender program and is currently working on a book on matching delinquent youths to programs. Harris is the 2001 recipient of the Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Government Service Award, given annually by the American Evaluation Association, and was awarded the 2005 Marguerite Warren and Ted Palmer Award from the Sentencing and Corrections Division of the American Society of Criminology.

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# Introduction

## CHAPTER OUTLINE

- ◆ **Examples of criminal justice interventions** include gun control and regulation (e.g., the Brady Act), “three strikes and you’re out” laws, juvenile waiver laws, and specialized problem-solving courts (community courts, drug courts, and domestic violence courts).
- ◆ **Planned change versus unplanned change.** Any project, program, or policy, new or revised, is intended to produce a change in some specific problem. It is limited in scope, it is aimed at improving quality of life for its clients, it includes a role for consumers, and a “change agent” guides it.
- ◆ **There are three approaches to planned change.** They include policy, program, and project.
- ◆ **The need for planned change has been sharpened by three trends.** They are declining resources, accountability, and expansion of knowledge and technology.
- ◆ **The perils of planned change.** Any change to existing procedures and conditions is likely to be resisted. Two broad approaches to change should be carefully considered: *collaborative strategies* versus *conflict strategies*.
- ◆ **A seven-stage model for planned change** specifies the sequence of steps required for analyzing a problem, determining its causes, and planning and carrying out some intervention. The seven stages consist of (1) analyzing the problem, (2) setting goals and objectives, (3) designing the program or policy, (4) developing an action plan, (5) developing a plan for monitoring program/policy implementation, (6) developing a plan for evaluating outcomes, and (7) reassessment and review.



There are many different types of “programs,” “policies,” and “projects” in criminal justice, that is, different interventions within government (federal, state, and local), community, and private agencies. In fact, one could argue that these many interventions comprise a majority of what criminal justice really is all about: a series of constant innovations and experiments attempting to discover what works to meet the goals of criminal justice (e.g., to reduce criminal behavior, to protect public safety). These numerous innovations attempt to change *individuals, groups, organizations, communities*, and even *societal and cultural norms* in some cases, to improve the achievement of criminal justice goals. Criminal justice, then, is much more than just the daily business of police, courts, and corrections that forms the grist for many university courses and professional training in criminal justice. Here are just a few examples of criminal justice interventions (Figure I.1).

The problem is that many criminal justice interventions fall short of their goals because of poor planning, poor implementation, and poor evaluation. It is fair to say that we have not yet discovered “what works” to reduce crime. What we truly need, though, is not more programs, or new programs, *per se*; we need *better*

- Prisoner reentry policies and programs, including the Second Chance Act (P.L. 110–199), prison-based drug treatment and community aftercare, vocational and basic education, post-release employment assistance, and reintegration assistance.
- Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF)—a crime prevention tactic whereby a police officer may stop a person based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and perhaps conduct a frisk or pat-down when based on reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. In recent years, the policy of SQF has been criticized as unfairly targeting innocent persons and minority groups.
- Specialized problem-solving courts—community courts that seek to improve the quality of life in high-crime neighborhoods, drug courts that combine criminal sanctions with treatment for addicted offenders, and domestic violence courts that emphasize victim safety and defendant accountability.
- Chicago’s Operation CeaseFire attempts to reduce violence by changing community norms about violence, changing perceptions of the risks and costs associated with violence, and widening decision alternatives for individuals involved in conflicts. Critical components include street intervention, client outreach, clergy involvement, community mobilization, educational campaigns, and policing and prosecution strategies focused on high-risk offenders.
- Mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence offenders.
- “Three strikes and you’re out” laws that aim to put away repeat offenders for long periods of time.
- Juvenile waiver laws—serious juvenile offenses may be transferred to adult courts, or automatically tried as adult offenses.
- Megan’s Law (federal law mandating that every state develop a procedure for notifying residents of the location of convicted sex offenders residing in their communities). Convicted sex offenders are required to notify authorities of their current address at all times, and states are required to make this information available to the public.

**FIGURE I.1** *Examples of Criminal Justice Interventions*

programs. We need a better understanding of planned change, and the methods and processes through which policies and programs are developed, implemented, evaluated, and managed, in order to improve the effectiveness of such interventions. Such change is ubiquitous in governmental, community, private, and nonprofit agencies. This book provides a systematic framework for analyzing and improving existing interventions, but also for planning new ones so as to maximize chances of success.

## PLANNED CHANGE VERSUS UNPLANNED CHANGE


*Planned change* involves planning. Planning means that some person or group of persons has explicitly thought about a problem and developed a specific solution. However, solutions (interventions) vary considerably in the degree to which thorough, explicit, or deliberate planning has been undertaken (Figure I.2).

### *Planned Change*

Any project, program, or policy, new or revised, intended to produce a change in some specific problem. The intended change may occur within individuals, groups, organizations, systems of organizations, communities, cities, regions, states, or, much more rarely, within entire cultures or societies.

As the examples and case studies in this book will illustrate, interventions are often poorly planned or even unplanned. *Unplanned change* means that little explicit or proactive planning has been undertaken at all. Instead, unplanned change often comes about as a reaction to a crisis, a dramatic incident publicized by the media, a political opportunity, a lawsuit against criminal justice officials, or an untested set of assumptions about a specific problem. Unplanned change, even if it is motivated by sincere intentions, is more likely to be ineffective *and* wasteful of valuable public resources.

Planned change improves the likelihood of successful intervention, but it cannot guarantee it. Even when planned change is successful, it may not be permanent. Planned change is *dynamic*, like the problems it seeks to address. People who play critical leadership roles come and go over time, initial shock about a problem and enthusiasm about an intervention abates, the political environment changes, other problems demand greater attention, and the impact of the intervention may be unknown. Good planning, however, increases the odds of success by explicitly considering such factors.



**FIGURE I.2** *The Birth of a Program or Policy: Examples*

In general, planned change differs from unplanned change in at least three ways (Kettner, Daley, & Nichols, 1985):

1. *Planned change is limited in scope, and specific.* It is confined to specific goals and achievable objectives; it seeks to develop clear, precise definitions of problems before developing solutions.
2. *It includes a role for consumers.* Programs and policies must consider the unique perspectives and needs of the people affected by the intervention. In addition to the “targets” of the intervention (ex-offenders in a halfway house, for example), “consumers” include those within a specific area likely to be affected by an intervention. Neighbors, local schools, and crime victims are examples of consumers who may be affected by a halfway house program. Cooperative planning of the intervention is an important part of program planning, monitoring, and evaluation.
3. *A “change agent” guides planned change.* Some individual must be responsible for coordinating the planning and development of a new program, or the revision of an old one. Such an individual will guide the analysis of the problem to be solved, search for causes of the problem, review similar interventions in use elsewhere, and facilitate the collaboration of clients,

staff, and consumers involved in the planning process. This individual may come from various backgrounds: she may be a program director appointed by a specific agency such as county probation, a university professor with a research grant, a director of a nonprofit agency such as an ex-offender program, a consultant hired by a criminal justice agency to formulate a plan, or perhaps even a state representative who introduces new legislation authorizing alternatives to incarceration.

### THREE APPROACHES TO PLANNED CHANGE: POLICY, PROGRAM, AND PROJECT

There are three general approaches to planned change, which differ in terms of their specificity and complexity. The most specific type of intervention is a *project*, the next most specific is a *program*, and the most complex and comprehensive is a *policy*.

*Policies* vary on the complexity of the rule or guidelines (simple to complex), and the amount of discretion afforded to those who apply policies (constrained to flexible). How an instructor calculates grades in a course is a matter of policy, and students are typically informed of this policy at the start of a course. The existence of a grading policy helps to ensure that all students are treated fairly. Similarly, police officers are required to read *Miranda* warnings to people they have arrested before beginning to ask questions that might be used in court against the defendant. Both of these examples pertain to relatively simple rules designed to protect the interests of individuals. Discretion is relatively constrained, although the Supreme Court has formulated specific exceptions. Sometimes policies are much more complex: the federal government may construct a “social” policy, such as President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty in the 1960s, designed to address large-scale social and economic problems. Organizations, too, create policies specifying how they are going to expend their resources: the U.S. Health Department’s emphasis on juvenile violence prevention was tied to its budget in such a way that specific resources were set aside to deal with this problem. The policy was relatively complex (different rules and guidelines applied to different situations, and guidelines were quite broad) and flexible (the policy allowed decision makers to use discretion to develop or fund specific programs). Complexity and flexibility do not always correspond: for example, state sentencing guidelines are generally complex (different rules apply to different offenders and offenses) but vary considerably in the amount of discretion afforded to the sentencing judge. We address these issues in more depth in Chapter 3.

#### *Policy*

A rule or set of rules or guidelines for how to make a decision.

An example of a *program* would be a local Boys and Girls Club that offers an after-school program for minority juveniles residing in a high-risk community. Another example is a boot camp correctional program that is intended to reduce the amount of time that offenders spend in custody. Offenders are sentenced to an intensive, short program of rigorous physical and academic services that is followed by probation rather than a term in prison. Theoretically, such programs may reduce the cost of corrections, increase the rehabilitative impact of corrections, and satisfy the aim of retributive punishment. Programs, then, consist of services that are linked together by a single set of goals and an organization.

### *Program*

A set of services aimed at achieving specific goals and objectives within specified individuals, groups, organizations, or communities.

Projects are usually intensive efforts by groups within an organization, a system of organizations, or a community to achieve a short-term objective. Evaluating a community corrections program, instituting a crackdown on drunk driving, or conducting an assessment of needs for a computerized information system are examples of projects.

### *Project*

A time-limited set of services provided to particular individuals, groups, organizations, or communities, usually focused on a single need, problem, or issue.

While the distinction between programs and projects is sometimes ambiguous, depending on whether the intervention is permanent or short-term, the distinction between programs and policies deserves more careful attention. Two examples illustrate the differences between a program and a policy, the two most common types of change (Figure I.3). In each of these two cases, a program is but one small component of a much larger policy formulated at the local, state, or federal level. In each case, a *policy* (legislation in these two examples) authorized or mandated the use of specific *programs* for certain populations.

Boot camps, rigid military-style drill camps intended as an alternative to incarceration for certain offenders, were mandated and funded by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The federal government allocated \$24.5 million in competitive funds available for boot camps in 1995, and authorized \$7.9 billion in the time period 1996–2000.

PROBLEM	PROGRAM	POLICY
Jail overcrowding→	Boot camps→	Federal crime bill
Drug abuse→	Operation “Weed and Seed”→	The federal “War on Drugs”

**FIGURE 1.3** *The Relationship between Programs and Policies*

Operation “Weed and Seed,” a U.S. Department of Justice initiative launched in 1992 as part of President Bush’s continuing “War on Drugs” campaign, is a two-pronged community intervention. First, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors cooperate in “weeding out” criminals who participate in violent crime and drug abuse and attempt to prevent their return to the targeted area. Second, “seeding” involves the development of community services including prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood revitalization. In each case, federal policy led to the formulation and funding of specific programs.

Policies, therefore, often contain the authorization or impetus for many specific programs, but policies often provide only very general prescriptions for what kind of approach should be used to solve specific problems. We can begin to see that the development of many programs and policies arises out of a political process that determines not only which problems will receive attention and priority in the first place, but also what kind of intervention approach (e.g., changing individuals versus changing specified conditions in a community) will be used to address those problems.

## THE NEED FOR PLANNED CHANGE

The quest to find “what works” to achieve the goals of criminal justice has not yet been fulfilled and will not likely be fulfilled anytime soon. In fact, many people (policymakers, academics, politicians, and citizens) disagree profoundly about the desirability of certain intervention approaches (e.g., drug treatment for convicted offenders versus tougher criminal sanctions to reduce drug abuse). Even if there were not such strong disagreement in values, it would still be difficult to find widespread agreement about how effective specific interventions have been (e.g., school-based delinquency prevention programs).

Several factors fuel debates over program effectiveness. For one thing, it is usually difficult to evaluate the long-term effects of social interventions. There are many different social variables to measure and control for, and this complexity often defies measurement. In addition, the objectives themselves may be poorly defined. Or, the problem may be poorly defined. Or, both the problem and the goals may be well defined, but the intervention was not implemented correctly, and thus we cannot have faith in any outcome results obtained by evaluation, whether they point to program success or failure. Indeed, evaluation results that do not address implementation problems should be treated with suspicion.

We will address these issues in more detail in subsequent chapters, but our point is that there is currently little consensus about “what works” in criminal justice. A major reason for this lack of consensus, we argue, is a lack of sufficient attention to principles of planned change. Three ongoing trends continue to sharpen our needs for planned change (Kettner, Daley, & Nichols, 1985): (1) declining resources; (2) accountability; and (3) the expansion of knowledge and technology.

### **Declining Resources**

Since 1980, there have been huge cuts in social services spending, especially programs affecting the poor and minorities (e.g., subsidized health care, welfare, day-care for working parents, school lunches, and after-school programs) (Gans, 1996). Since 2000, these cuts have continued (APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy, 2004; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2005). Since 1981, social service block grants (SSBG) have declined in constant dollars (i.e., controlling for inflation) by 77 percent (Dutta-Gupta, Pavetti, & Finch, 2012).

Part of the explanation for these changes lies in public concern over high taxes. However, it is obvious that taxes are the basis for the provision of public services, and cuts in taxes mean cuts in services (somewhere). Cuts in social services may have increased inequalities and magnified social problems that already existed (Piven, 2006). For example, the problem of homelessness was exacerbated by cuts in funding available for mental health care, substance abuse treatment, and health care (Rossi, 1991).

Partly as a consequence of declining resources, many groups have organized to promote change, both legally (through lawsuits) and politically (by advocating for changes in laws and government programs). Advocacy efforts have often succeeded in raising awareness about a particular problem and stimulating change. A good example is provided by the problem of domestic violence. In the early 1900s, women’s groups organized and protested for numerous changes, including the rights to vote and to work. Advocacy by women’s groups in the 1970s and 1980s led to changes in police and court policies for dealing with sexual harassment, rape, and domestic violence. Such advocacy contributed greatly to the perception that existing programs and policies were not working and that some kind of change was needed (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003). One can find numerous examples of groups that have campaigned for change in existing policies and programs (e.g., groups protesting welfare reforms that restrict eligibility and benefits; groups advocating for programs and policies to address problems of homelessness, AIDS, etc.).

### **Accountability**

As public resources have dwindled, agencies have increasingly been called upon to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency in meeting their goals. There has been suspicion by many that public money has not always been well spent.

A dialogue has resurfaced over the past decade about how to make public institutions more effective and accountable, although the means for achieving this goal are subject to debate (Welsh & Zajac, 2004a). This is especially the case within the public sectors of education, human services, and welfare, where there is considerable public expenditure, conflicting values and goals, and high stakes (Zajac, 1997). Annual budget hearings at the state and federal level are tense events for directors of publicly funded agencies, who are increasingly called upon to justify their funding requests with evidence of improved outcomes and cost-effectiveness (Cohen, 2000; Welsh & Farrington, 2000). There is currently a furor in criminal justice research and practice over the need for “evidence-based” programming, but much disagreement as to what the standards of “evidence” entail (Gandhi et al., 2007).

According to a report to the U.S. Congress, the effectiveness of most crime prevention strategies will remain unknown until the nation invests more in evaluating them (Sherman et al., 1998). Using rigorous, scientifically recognized standards and methodologies, a review of more than 500 impact evaluations revealed only a handful of definitive conclusions. Congress can solve this problem, the authors suggested, by limiting the scope of required evaluations but requiring that evaluations that are funded receive sufficient funding to answer questions about effectiveness. In order for this approach to be effective, Congress should match the funding earmarked for program spending with corresponding funding to pay for the evaluations.

## **Expansion of Knowledge and Technology**

We have greater technological abilities than ever before, and these changes have created both new opportunities and new problems. Improvements in computing technology have dramatically increased our information collection, storage, and retrieval capabilities. We now have ready access to many types of criminal justice data, including information about reported crimes, police arrests, convictions, sentencing, prison time served, parole, and recidivism. Improved data collection and access mean that our ability to analyze specific needs and problems has improved.

For example, improved justice information systems have contributed to our understanding of problems such as racial disparities in sentencing (Tonry, 1995). High-powered computers and statistical packages make it possible to collect and compare data on the processing of thousands of defendants in different regions over time, and statistically control for various legal (e.g., previous criminal record) and nonlegal factors (e.g., race, socioeconomic status) that influence sentencing. There are no longer disputes about whether sentencing disparities exist or not, but rather where, why, and how much. Computers have also increased the ability of researchers to discover what works. The effects of juvenile and adult correctional programs are increasingly the subjects of sophisticated outcome evaluations and meta-analyses (see Chapter 6).



Other technological changes have improved our ability to detect crime and monitor offenders. Computerized DNA and fingerprint identification systems have greatly reduced the amount of time required to scan and match potential suspects with forensic samples, and both regional and national data banks of criminal information are now available to criminal justice agencies for investigation. DNA testing and analysis technologies have become increasingly sophisticated, and forensic DNA evidence has been used with increasing frequency both to convict the guilty and to exonerate the innocent (Lovrich et al., 2003). Many previously unsolvable cases became solvable because viable suspects could be identified and arrested or removed from suspect lists.

Electronic monitoring equipment has made it possible for probation and parole agencies to more cost-effectively supervise certain offenders in a community rather than a prison setting, at least as part of their sentence. However, increasingly sophisticated drug-testing equipment has also made it possible to detect minute amounts of prohibited drugs in an individual's body, leading to huge increases in the number of parolees who fail to complete their parole terms successfully and must return to jail or prison (Petersilia, 2003).

As computerized information systems have grown, a whole new field of crime dubbed "computer crime" has evolved, in which perpetrators attempt to break into secure computer systems of individuals and corporations, usually for the purpose of illegally obtaining classified information, money, or both (i.e., identity theft). Needless to say, methods of detecting, investigating, and prosecuting this whole new category of crime are evolving rapidly, but seemingly slower than the rate of growth in the crime itself (D'Ovidio, 2007; Rege, 2014; Stambaugh et al., 2000).

## THE PERILS OF PLANNED CHANGE

Any change to existing procedures and existing conditions carries a certain amount of risk. The proposed change is likely to be resisted by someone, perhaps even its intended beneficiaries (e.g., a city successfully lobbies for state funds to build a new prison, but then faces vigorous protests from communities being considered for the location of the new prison). Regardless of the specific change proposed, universal consensus is rare; resistance is the norm.

In many cases, people fear and resist change because it may threaten their job security or bring about unwanted scrutiny (e.g., citizen review boards for complaints against police). There is often a fear that the change might only make things worse. For example, critics argued that tough new government powers granted under the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October of 2001, led to the unwarranted harassment and detention of large numbers of citizens and legal immigrants (Babington, 2006). The U.S. government faced outrage in 2013 following unauthorized disclosures about the full extent of its national surveillance program by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden (Wilson & Goldfarb, 2013). President Obama later announced plans to tighten Section 215

of the PATRIOT Act that permitted the government to obtain the phone records of millions of Americans (ibid.).

Regardless of the many varied reasons for which resistance emerges in any specific case, those who propose change must be prepared for disagreement and resistance. Again, *planned* change, rather than unplanned change or poorly planned change, can go a long way toward minimizing resistance, especially if the “change agent” (the person or agency that has introduced the proposed intervention) has involved different constituents in the planning process from the beginning.

Even prior to beginning work on planning a specific intervention, the change agent should have identified potential sources of resistance, and considered the potential costs and benefits of two very different approaches to handling resistance: (1) *collaborative* strategies; or (2) *conflict* strategies (Babington, 2006). While the actual outcomes of either strategy are impossible to predict without knowing detailed circumstances of the case in question, there are several serious costs associated with conflict strategies that generally make them unattractive options:

- They create greater resistance;
- They require greater resources;
- They create more unexpected effects; and
- Change tends to be temporary (compliance) rather than long term.

Collaborative strategies seek involvement from all parties concerned. For example, a police commissioner might ask police officers about their views on community policing before it is adopted as a department policy and imposed on them. State sentencing commissions might ask judges about perceived difficulties in sentencing before drafting, adopting, or revising sentencing guidelines.

### *Collaborative Strategies*

Collaborative strategies emphasize participation from those affected by change. Individuals, groups, or organizations known to oppose the intervention in part or *in toto* are included in the design and planning of the intervention.

Conflict strategies are more likely to come into play where opposing parties have a strong history of disagreement; leaders favor a dictatorial, authoritarian style of management; resources are scarce and there is much disagreement over allocation; the stakes of the proposed change are high (i.e., large benefits to certain parties and perhaps large costs to others); time pressures are great; and the likelihood of successfully suppressing the opposition is perceived (correctly or incorrectly) as high. A good example is provided by brutality lawsuits launched against

local police departments. Because citizens perceived the existing system of reviewing complaints as ineffective and heavily biased in favor of police, legal reform in complaint review procedures has evolved. Another example is provided by lawsuits against local, state, and federal prisons for overcrowding and other conditions of confinement. Such lawsuits, some lasting as long as 13 years, usually followed a period of unsuccessful and rancorous discussion and negotiation (Welsh, 1995). Changes eventually resulted, but at considerable cost to human and fiscal resources.

*Conflict Strategies*

Conflict strategies approach resistance in an adversarial manner. Those who resist the proposed change are seen as opponents who must either be persuaded or coerced to change their views.

A SEVEN-STAGE MODEL FOR PLANNED CHANGE

A “model” specifies the sequence of steps required for (1) analyzing a problem, (2) determining its causes, and (3) analyzing (or planning and carrying out) a specific intervention. The model presented in this book may be used to plan new interventions, analyze existing interventions, or both (e.g., revising a current program or policy) (see Figure I.4).

Our model of planned change is based on a problem-solving approach: the goal is to develop solutions to specific problems through a rational process of planning. The 1968 President’s Commission report, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1968), was extremely influential in shaping current conceptions of criminal justice as a “system” (Walker, 1992), and it stimulated attempts to improve criminal justice programs and policies through *comprehensive, coordinated* planning. As Moore (1998) suggests,

The Crime Commission had two big things in mind: (1) how to produce an effective, decent criminal justice system and (2) how to deal with crime. . . . They also had a *managerial or implementation vision* [emphasis added], which was a theory about how the processes and institutions of the criminal justice system needed to be developed . . . (167-168).

Planning a New Intervention	Analyzing an Existing Intervention
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Critical activities can be enacted (or avoided) so as to increase the likelihood that a proposed intervention will be implemented with fidelity (as planned) and effectively produce a desired change in a specific problem.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Critical activities and decisions that informed the planning process can be identified and analyzed so as to help understand why a particular intervention did or did not produce a desired change in a specific problem.</li></ul>

FIGURE I.4 Two Different Uses of the Seven-Stage Model

This vision was to be guided by data and knowledge rather than ideology and passion.

The Commission's report was the major impetus for passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the creation of the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The Commission's goals of rational criminal justice planning and social justice remain as relevant today as then. Reflecting on the positive contributions of the President's Commission report, Moore notes that "The authorization to experiment has been spread widely, and that turns out to be a very good thing for society" (176-177). At the same time, the goals of rationality and social justice have proven far more difficult to achieve than originally expected (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998).

We present our seven-stage model here with the assumption that either a *new* program or policy is being developed or an *existing* program or policy is being analyzed. Because procedures differ slightly depending on whether a new intervention is being planned or an existing intervention is being analyzed, we summarize the stages separately for each (Tables I.1 and I.2).<sup>1</sup> The seven stages are only briefly described in this chapter; each is described in detail in subsequent chapters.

## Stage 1. Analyzing the Problem

The first step is to analyze the problem, carefully collecting information about dimensions of the problem, the history of the problem, who is affected by the problem, and potential causes of the problem. For example, we ask the following questions: What and where is the problem? How big is it? How long has the problem existed? Do different groups of people have different definitions of the problem? Who is affected by the problem? What causes the problem? What theories do we have about causes of the problem? What kinds of interventions have been tried elsewhere? Who is likely to support a certain course of action, and who is likely to resist it?

The pitfalls of faulty problem analysis are enormous, and can completely subvert effective intervention. Many interventions fail not necessarily because the intervention itself is flawed, but because it addresses the wrong problem (or an inadequately defined problem). Major activities at this stage include the following:

- Document the need for change: collect and analyze data about the problem.
- Describe the history of the problem.
- Examine potential causes of the problem.
- Examine previous interventions that have tried to change this problem.
- Identify relevant stakeholders (those who have a legitimate interest in the problem and/or the intervention).
- Conduct a systems analysis.
- Identify barriers to change and supports for change.

**TABLE I.1** *New Interventions: A Systematic Approach to Program and Policy Development*

STAGE 1. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM	STAGE 2. SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES	STAGE 3. PROGRAM OR POLICY DESIGN	STAGE 4. ACTION PLANNING	STAGE 5. PROGRAM OR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION	STAGE 6. EVALUATING OUTCOMES	STAGE 7. REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW
Document the need for change.	Write goal statements.	Choose from different intervention options.	Identify resources needed.	Design instruments to collect monitoring data.	Develop outcome measures based on objectives.	Planning for Failure: Avoid exaggerated claims.
Describe the history of the problem.	Write specific outcome objectives for each goal.	Program Design: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Define the target population.</li><li>• Define target selection procedures.</li></ul>	Plan to acquire or reallocate resources.	Designate responsibility to collect, store, and analyze data.	Specify the research design to be used.	Planning for Success: Ongoing reassessment, learning, and revision are crucial.
Examine potential causes.	Seek participation in goal setting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Define program components and activities.</li><li>• Write job descriptions of staff and skills required.</li></ul>	Specify dates to complete implementation tasks.	Develop information system capacities.	Identify potential confounding factors.	Learning and Adapting: Successful interventions must adapt to change.
Examine previous interventions.	Specify an impact model.		Develop mechanisms of self-regulation.	Develop mechanisms to provide feedback to stakeholders.	Identify users and uses of evaluation results.	Initiate the Program or Policy Design from Stage 3.
Identify relevant stakeholders.	Identify compatible and incompatible goals in the larger system.		Specify a plan to build support.		Reassess the entire program/ policy plan.	Initiate the Action Plan from Stage 4.
Conduct a systems analysis.	Identify needs for interagency collaboration.	Policy Design: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Define the target population of the policy.</li><li>• Identify the responsible authority.</li><li>• Define the provisions and procedures of the policy.</li></ul>				Initiate monitoring of program/ policy (Stage 5).
Identify barriers to change and supports for change.						Collect and analyze evaluation data; provide feedback to stakeholders (Stage 6).
						Reassess the entire program/ policy plan and make necessary modifications to increase fit with environment.



**PROGRAM/POLICY REVISION**

