

RADICAL POLITICS IN MODERN TURKEY

Jacob M. Landau

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RADICAL POLITICS IN MODERN TURKEY

BY

JACOB M. LANDAU



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1974

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“Novarum rerum cupidi...”
Cicero, *Pro Rabirio*, 33

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| PREFACE | IX |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | XII |
| 1. INTRODUCTORY: TURKEY IN THE 1960's | 1 |
| a. The background | 1 |
| b. The 1960 military intervention and the 1961 Constitution | 6 |
| c. Political parties in the 1960's. | 14 |
| d. Some radical trends in the literature of the 1960's | 21 |
| e. Turkish youth and radical activities. | 29 |
| f. The 1971 military intervention and its aftermath. | 44 |
| 2. THE TURKISH MARXIST AS JOURNALIST | 49 |
| a. Radicalization of the Turkish press. | 49 |
| b. <i>Yön</i> | 50 |
| c. <i>Ant</i> | 64 |
| d. Other radical journals | 74 |
| e. Avcıoğlu and <i>Devrim</i> | 79 |
| 3. THE ORGANIZED LEFT: FROM TRADE UNIONISM TO COMMUNISM | 88 |
| a. Trade unionism | 88 |
| b. The Turkish Communist Party | 95 |
| c. Other leftist parties and groups. | 113 |
| 4. LAWFUL MARXISM: THE LABOR PARTY OF TURKEY | 122 |
| a. History and organization | 122 |
| b. Ideology | 137 |
| c. Aybar, Aren, Boran, and Altan. | 147 |
| 5. THE GROWING INVOLVEMENT OF ISLAMIC AND PAN-TURK GROUPS | 171 |
| a. Islam and politics | 171 |
| b. Pan-Turk trends | 193 |
| 6. THE POLITICAL RESPONSE OF THE RIGHT: TURKEY ÜBER ALLES | 205 |
| a. History and organization | 205 |
| b. Ideology | 217 |
| c. Periodicals supporting the party. | 232 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 7. TURKISH ELECTIONS: LEFT VERSUS RIGHT | 243 |
| a. The parties and the elections. | 243 |
| b. The 1965 elections. | 247 |
| c. Senate elections, 1966-1968 | 264 |
| d. The 1969 elections. | 276 |
| 8. IN CONCLUSION | 287 |
| SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY | 292 |
| a. Works in Turkish. | 292 |
| b. Works in other languages. | 296 |
| INDEX. | 305 |

PREFACE

Turkey is European in orientation, but has one of the lowest per-capita incomes and probably the highest rate of illiteracy in the Continent. These disadvantages are, to a great extent, offset by the determination of its leadership to modernize its economy and political culture. Turkey is indeed a fascinating country for the student of politics, no less than for the tourist. In recent years political analysts, both Turkish and others, have published an impressive body of research on modern Turkey. Its emphasis, however, appears to have been on the larger political formations. On the Turkish political scene other aspects of domestic policies have been rather less thoroughly investigated. One of these is the current radicalization of politics, that is the tendency to adopt extreme ideological attitudes.

There are perhaps two main reasons for this neglect:

a. In relation to the total Turkish population of over thirty millions in the 1960's, the number who actively participated in radical politics was small. However, like the drop of dye that suffuses the wool, it was they who colored the political life of the decade.¹

b. The very newness of active and organized radical involvement in Turkish politics renders its investigation difficult. In order to be truly meaningful, "left" and "right" have to relate to a situation where they can be defined as such in the context of freedom of action. In Turkey, therefore, they should be studied chiefly in the years following the 1960 Revolution—a period which is the main concern of this book.

In the following pages, the terms "left" and "right" will be used frequently. The fact that the Turks themselves employ them regularly in their press and political literature, as *sol* and *sağ*, respectively, does not mean that they are exact equivalents of those terms when used in Europe or the United States. Such terms mean different things to different men and, as noted by Professor Lipset² and others, their use varies from country to country (and from time to time inside countries, for that matter).

¹ To give one instance: the term *devrimci*, which formerly meant "reformist," acquired, through radical usage, the connotation of "revolutionary" — which is its almost-general meaning today.

² S. M. Lipset, *Political man: the social bases of politics* (New York: 1963), ch. 5.

To approach Turkish politics in such terms would be an obvious oversimplification. Leftist and rightist parties in Turkey have their own, local characteristics; a fact which is of even greater significance, since this study is concerned with radical organizations. While the center parties in Turkey tend to be conservative, both the extreme left and the extreme right are committed to change, although their messages are distinct. The journalist Nadir Nadi, in a leading article, in the Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet*,³ expressed this as follows, "Where does the extreme right start? — Beyond Atatürk's reforms. Where does the extreme left start? — Where totalitarian trends begin." Actually, the situation is more complex. As Professor Weber has pointed out,⁴ left has ceased to be synonymous with progressive, right with reactionary (and, then, what precisely is "progressive" and "reactionary"). Indeed, both radical extremes, and some other groups in-between, address their socio-political credo to much the same strata, usually the masses, the basic difference being one of approach and emphasis, that is, tactical rather than strategic. This would seem to apply to the politics of many states, Turkey included.

Since to the best of my knowledge this is the first attempt to discuss the radical left and right in Turkey in book form, it is evidently far from complete. I have scarcely touched on external ideological influences — a topic that deserves full treatment in a tome of its own. Instead I have concentrated on the domestic ideological propaganda of radical groups and on the political activity of organized parties. Although this is necessarily a profile, rather than a full-scale portrait, it is hoped that the materials brought together and the conclusions reached will interest those concerned with the nature of politics in Turkey.

The following study is based on extensive reading of the available Turkish press and political literature of the 1960's, as well as on election results and other statistical data. These sources are so vast that I have preferred to remain within the context of domestic politics, touching only briefly on the economic and social situation in Turkey, and only incidentally on its foreign relations. Nor have I been able to conduct quantitative research by systematic interviewing during my visits to Turkey. Conducting empirical surveys in Turkey is not impossible, but the difficulties involved are so great,⁵ that in the context of the present

³ Feb. 7, 1965, reprinted in Nadi's *27 mayıs'tan 12 mart'a* (Istanbul: 1971), p. 200.

⁴ Eugen Weber, in his introduction to Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), *The European right: a historical profile* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1966), pp. 1 ff.

⁵ L. L. Roos and N. P. Roos, "Secondary analysis in the developing areas," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* (Princeton, N. J.), XXXI: Summer 1967, pp. 272-278. E.

study their usefulness was open to doubt. I have, however, attempted to verify some disputed facts and several of my premises and conclusions with political scientists in Turkey, to whom I offer my thanks for their unstinting advice.

The book is published with the help of a grant from the late Miss Isobel Thornley's Bequest to the University of London. I am grateful, for this and, also, for research grants, to the Central Research Fund and the Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, both at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; the Ford Foundation, whose grant was received through the Israel Foundations Trustees, Tel-Aviv; the Mashav Devorah Company, Tel-Aviv; and the Mif'al Hapayis, Tel-Aviv, and its President, Mr. Isaac Oren. My assistants, Y. Zingil and A. Fattal, were particularly helpful. The views expressed in the following pages do not necessarily reflect those of the above institutions and persons. I accept responsibility for any errors of fact or judgment that remain.

J. Cohn, "The climate for research in the social sciences in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* (further: *MEJ*) (Washington, D.C.), XXII (2): Spring 1968, pp. 203-212. Nevertheless L. L. Roos and N. P. Roos did administer questionnaires, in 1956 and 1965, and published the results in their *Managers of modernization: organizations and elites in Turkey (1950-1969)* (Cambridge, Mass: 1971).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------------|--|
| <i>AFDI</i> | <i>Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul.</i> |
| DİSK | Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions Federation). |
| DP | Democrat Party. |
| JP | Justice Party. |
| LPT | Labor Party of Turkey. |
| <i>MEA</i> | <i>Middle Eastern Affairs</i> (New York). |
| <i>MEJ</i> | <i>The Middle East Journal</i> (Washington, D.C.). |
| NAP | Nationalist Action Party. |
| NDR | National Democratic Revolutionaries. |
| NUC | National Union Committee. |
| PNO | Party for National Order. |
| RP | Reliance Party. |
| RPNP | Republican Peasant National Party. |
| RPP | Republican People's Party. |
| <i>SBFD</i> | <i>Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi</i> (Ankara). |
| <i>TYIR</i> | <i>The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations</i> (Ankara). |
| UP | Union Party. |

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTORY: TURKEY IN THE 1960's

a. THE BACKGROUND

This introduction will examine briefly the conditions under which Turkish domestic politics¹ developed in the 1960's. The period chosen is conveniently defined by the military interventions of May 1960 and March 1971, when the armed forces for a time virtually controlled Turkey (although not in an identical manner, as we shall see). For the political analyst, one of the most interesting developments in this period of almost eleven years is the growth of radical groups and their increasing involvement in domestic politics. Some Turks too must have considered political radicalism important, for the military intervention of March 1971 was to no small extent directed against extreme radical groups.

Perhaps the most momentous decision affecting Turkish domestic politics in the post-Atatürk period was the move of the People's Party, later renamed the Republican People's Party (further: RPP), in 1945, to change Turkey's single-party system into a multiparty one — with free elections.² New parties were set up and each began to assiduously court the voting masses, who were, and are, primarily the villagers. Each established local branches in all large communities and in many of the small ones, including most of the villages. In this manner, new vistas towards political modernization were opened.³ This does not mean that apolitical peasants⁴ changed overnight and became politically alert.

¹ My work will not touch on Turkey's foreign relations, which have been extensively dealt with by others. For recent studies, see F.-W. Fernau, "La Turquie, l'alliance atlantique et la détente," *Orient* (Paris), 47-48: 2e semestre 1968, pp. 73-89; and E. Weisband, *Turkish foreign policy 1943-1945* (Princeton, N. J.: 1973).

² On which move the best work is still K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's politics: the transition to a multi-party system* (Princeton, N. J.: 1959). Cf. id., "Political developments in Turkey, 1950-70," *Middle Eastern Studies* (London), VIII (3): Oct. 1972, pp. 349-375. See also "Türkei," in: Dolf Sternberger and Bernhard Vogel (eds.), *Die Wahl der Parlamente*, vol. I (Berlin: 1969), pp. 1331-1363.

³ As observed on the spot by J. S. Szlyiowicz, *Political change in rural Turkey: Erdemli* (The Hague and Paris: 1966), pp. 156, 175, 199.

⁴ That is, apolitical with regard to state problems. On the villagers, in addition to Szlyiowicz's book, see Paul Stirling, *Turkish village* (London: 1965). U. S. Agency for International Development, *Yasshöyük: a village study* (Ankara: 1965). Joe E. Pierce, *Life in a Turkish village* (N. Y.: 1967). İbrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlu* (Ankara: 1957). Id., *Yirmibeş yıl sonra Hasanoğlu köyü* (Ankara: 1969).

However, their interest was stimulated; and there are indications that in subsequent years they began to differentiate between the parties. Indeed, according to local interviewing by Professor Roos, increasing political instability contributed to the politicization of Turkey, including its rural element. This was already felt at the start of the multiparty era and the pace of change later quickened.⁵

The 1946 general elections to the National Assembly were contested by several new parties which, however, lacked the necessary time to organize adequately. The result was that the RPP gained a majority of the vote. In 1950, however, a rival party, the Democrat Party (further: DP), led by dissidents from the RPP, and an active contender for the vote in 1946, after an extensive grass roots campaign, won an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly⁶ and in subsequent elections managed to retain its majority. DP Cabinets, consequently, governed Turkey from 1950 to 1960.

The decade of DP rule concerns us here only insofar as it affected the 1960 Revolution and subsequent events in Turkey; particularly so, as a detailed Ph.D. thesis on this party has recently been published in monograph form.⁷ Domestic politics during the 1950's were characterized by the struggle between the two largest parties, the DP and RPP. There was an obvious sharp personal rivalry between the leader of the RPP, the elderly İsmet İnönü,⁸ Atatürk's trusted aide and Prime Minister, and subsequently his successor as Turkey's President, and the DP's leaders Celal Bayar, Prime Minister in 1937-1939, and State President during the 1950's and Adnan Menderes,⁹ the Prime Minister. Obviously, however, more than mere personal rivalry was at stake.

Although led and generally supported by not dissimilar groups of urban and rural notables, there were some basic differences in the makeup and appeal of the RPP and DP. Since both parties were composed of various interest groups, banded together to attain certain objectives, the differences between them were not always well-defined. However, among others, two cardinal variations in approach stood out. First, the DP

⁵ L. L. Roos, "Attitude change and Turkish modernization," *Behavioral Science*, XIII (6): Nov. 1968, pp. 433-444.

⁶ For the significance of this event see Bernard Lewis, "Recent developments in Turkey," *International Affairs* (London), XXVII (3): July 1951, pp. 320-331.

⁷ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat parti (tarihi ve ideolojisi)* (Ankara: 1970). A French summary is appended *ibid.*, pp. 215-221.

⁸ On whom see, for the 1950's and early 1960's, Ş. S. Aydemir, *İkinci adam, III. 1950-1964* (Istanbul: 1968).

⁹ *Id.*, *Menderes'in dramı (1899-1960)* (Istanbul: 1961).

limited the RPP's earlier economic etatism (which had imposed and maintained strict state monopolies in many fields) and encouraged private enterprise at its expense, being also less strict and officious in its daily contacts with the population. Secondly, it took a less ardent attitude towards secularism, allowing — according to its rivals, even encouraging — an Islamic revival in Turkey, complete with permission to use Arabic in the call to prayer and in the printing of Arabic books. As a result, Islamic groups increased their political activity¹⁰. The DP had much less support than the RPP among the intellectuals who, after all, had been reared on loyalty to the latter party. However, the DP successfully sought support among the large landowners (who, incidentally, controlled the peasant vote) and strove to ensure the village vote by the extensive development of the rural economy.¹¹ Indeed, thanks to massive United States financial aid, which included some 40,000 tractors, the DP was able to finance a large program of farm mechanization, which resulted in an economic boom in the countryside. A comparative easing of state controls, helped by government road-building plans and increasing hydro-electric power, encouraged both agriculture and industry.¹²

Initially after attaining power, the DP enjoyed great popularity in Turkey — among businessmen, who benefitted from the move away from etatism; religious Turks, who could again practice their faith in public; and, above all, the peasants, who had good harvests in the early 1950's and appreciated the advantages of the government's rural development plans — the most obvious sign of which was the many new roads. In 1954, the DP won 503 out of the 541 seats in the National Assembly (the success was partly due, indeed, to the electoral system — based on the plurality vote). However, the economic boom was deceptive and partly dependent on unusually good harvests. From the middle 1950's, crops were less successful (Turkey had to import agricultural products once again), there was an unsound over-extension of economic activity, imports greatly exceeded exports and inflationary trends were very much in evidence. The cost of living rose by approximately 150 per cent between 1953 and 1958.¹³ Inflation affected the peasants less, since they could subsist, at least

¹⁰ This is discussed at greater length below, ch. 5.

¹¹ On which see, *inter alia*, J. S. Szyliowicz, "The political dynamics of rural Turkey," *MEJ*, XVI (4): Autumn 1962, pp. 430 ff.

¹² K. H. Karpat, "Economics, social change and politics in Turkey," *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* (further: *TYIR*) (Ankara), I: 1960 (publ. 1961), pp. 2-5.

¹³ D. J. Simpson, "Development as a process: the Menderes phase in Turkey," *MEJ*, XIX (2): Spring 1965, pp. 150-151.

partly, on what they produced.¹⁴ However, even their loyalty to the DP was somewhat shaken, when DP governments were less able to assist them financially. In the towns, economic hardship underscored political differences.¹⁵ Opponents were quick to point out that DP Cabinets had not planned the development of Turkey's economy seriously and had paid insufficient attention to its socio-cultural problems, notably education (during the 1950's, reportedly, more mosques were built than schools¹⁶). In foreign affairs, the stalemate in Cyprus, under conditions which many saw as a Turkish political defeat, was also blamed on the DP leadership. The latter's reaction, natural perhaps but unwise, was to show increasing impatience with criticism, shut down newspapers, generally muzzle the press, and intimidate the Opposition.¹⁷ This attitude on the part of DP ruling circles became even more pronounced after the fall in the party's majority in the National Assembly in the 1957 general elections.¹⁸ There were unmistakable signs that the party was determined to perpetuate itself in power by authoritarianism.

A classical situation was therefore developing in which DP opponents and critics were faced with the lack of any democratic alternative to gain power (or even to air their views). Violent upheaval seemed the only immediately available option for sweeping change. And the agent of change was, as it had been earlier, after the First World War, the Turkish armed forces, with their great number of dedicated officers.

Among the elements which the Turks call "the vigorous forces" (*zinde kuvvetler*)¹⁹ referring to the intelligentsia, the youth and the military, the last-mentioned have a very special place. All three, indeed, are largely made up of people who are both out-of-money and educated,

¹⁴ See, e.g., R. D. Robinson, *The first Turkish republic: a case study in national development* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1963), ch. 6. On these peasants, see also J. F. Kolars, *Tradition, season and change in a Turkish village* (Chicago, Ill.: 1963) and Eva Hirsch, *Poverty and plenty on the Turkish farm* (N. Y.: 1970).

¹⁵ Nuri Eren, "Turkey: prospects for democratic development," *Journal of International Affairs* (N. Y.), XIX (2): 1965, pp. 170-180.

¹⁶ F.-W. Fernau, "Le néo-kémalisme du comité d'union nationale," *Orient*, 16: 4e trim. 1960, p. 56. Indeed, the expense of some of the mosques which were built was defrayed by public donations.

¹⁷ Examples in Bernard Lewis, "Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (further: *MEA*), X (2): Feb. 1959, pp. 55-72; and Geoffrey Lewis, "Turkey: The end of the first republic," *The World Today* (London), XVI (9): Sep. 1960, pp. 377 ff.

¹⁸ On which see K. H. Karpat, "The Turkish elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (2): June 1961, pp. 436-459.

¹⁹ Cf. Bernard Vernier, "L'armée turque et la république néo-kémaliste," *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), XXX (3): 1965, pp. 259-279.

while most other social groups in Turkey are generally either out-of-money and uneducated, or well-off and educated. The intelligentsia, youth and officers have much in common, in their attitudes towards social reform and modernization. Many intellectuals and young people in Turkey, conscious of the immensity of these problems, sought refuge in political radicalism.²⁰ In the past century, however, the military have probably been the most active modernizing force in the country, and have never given up this role. They also form a very substantial group numerically, for Turkey now has about half-a-million men under arms. During the 1950's, when fewer in number, Turkey's military Establishment was extensively modernized with United States assistance and by increasing military expenditure.²¹ Simultaneously, they continued to be an instrument for general cultural development in areas near military installations, and among the trainees in general — thus contributing to "rising expectations" and "rising frustrations."²² It was considered by almost everybody as the mark of sovereignty for Turkish statehood, and as such was universally respected.

Nevertheless, the Turkish military were reluctant to take a hand in politics — a tribute to the policy of depoliticization in the armed forces, energetically pursued by Atatürk and, after his death, by İnönü. Atatürk's rule was a remarkable case of a military oligarchy contributing fundamentally to social modernization; he insisted, however, that this be done within a civilian framework and officers who wished to be active in politics had to resign from the armed forces.²³ Indeed the military were precluded from voting. Menderes, however, increasingly drew the military towards politics, particularly in the late 1950's, when he sensed that his popularity was waning. His *protégés* were appointed to key positions. More than that — to quote Professor D. A. Rustow — "by his indiscriminate use of martial law, he was forcing the army willy-nilly into a political role; in the end the officers could choose only

²⁰ Aydın Yalçın, "Turkey: emerging democracy," *Foreign Affairs* (N. Y.), XLV (4): July 1967, pp. 706–714.

²¹ Daniel Lerner and R. D. Robinson, "Swords and ploughshares: the Turkish army as a modernizing force," *World Politics*, XIII (1): Oct. 1960, pp. 19–44. F. C. Shorter, "Military expenditures and the allocation of resources," in F. C. Shorter (ed.), *Four studies on the economic development of Turkey* (London: 1967), pp. 33 ff.

²² Lerner and Robinson, p. 39.

²³ See Morris Janowitz, *The military in the political development of new nations: an essay in comparative analysis* (Chicago: 1967), pp. 104–105. Janowitz considers this in some respects a unique case.

whether they were to be in politics for Menderes or against.”²⁴ This was particularly true, since the military were practically the only important organization not penetrated by the government’s *Millî Emniyet* or “National Security.”

b. THE 1960 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE 1961 CONSTITUTION

Both the role of the Turkish military in politics²⁵ and the 1960 Revolution itself²⁶ have been extensively researched and will be treated here only summarily. The fact that the officers’ plot was prepared carefully for some time (several months, according to some sources, a few years, by other accounts) and afterwards widely supported by the armed forces, indicates the existence of serious grievances. Most of these trends were

²⁴ D. A. Rustow, “Turkey’s second try at democracy,” *Yale Review*, LII: 1962, p. 523.

²⁵ On which see Ergun Özbudun, *The role of the military in recent Turkish politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1966). E., “Le rôle de l’armée en Turquie,” in Léo Hamon (ed.), *Le rôle extra-militaire de l’armée dans le Tiers Monde* (Paris: 1966), pp. 215–257. Robinson, *op. cit.*, ch. 9. Lerner and Robinson, *op. cit.*, in *World Politics*. Vernier, *op. cit.*, in *Politique Etrangère*. G. S. Harris, “The role of the military in Turkish politics,” part 2, *The Middle East Journal* (further: *MEJ*), XIX (2): Spring 1965, pp. 169–176. J. A. Brill, “The military and modernization in the Middle East,” *Comparative Politics*, II (1): 1969, pp. 41–62. Wolfgang Höpker, “Türkische Revolution und türkische Armee,” *Aussenpolitik* (Stuttgart), XI (12): Dec. 1960, pp. 789–804.

²⁶ On which see Ali Fuad Başgil, *La révolution militaire de 1960 en Turquie (ses origines)* (Geneva: 1963). W. F. Weiker, *The Turkish revolution 1960–1961: aspects of military politics* (Washington, D. C.: 1963). Weiker’s book was translated into Turkish by Mete Ergin along with two other works on the 1960 revolution (in French and Russian) and published as *1960 Türk ihtilâli* (Istanbul: 1967). See also Geoffrey Lewis, *op. cit.*, *The World Today*, XVI (9): Sep. 1960, pp. 377–386. Eric Rouleau, “Les nouveaux ‘Jeunes Turcs,’” *Etudes Méditerranéennes* (Paris), VIII: Nov. 1960, pp. 67–73. M. Perlmann, “Upheaval in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Affairs*, XI (6–7): June–July 1960, pp. 175–179. Id., “Turkey on the eve of 1961,” *ibid.*, XII (1): Jan. 1961, pp. 2–7. E. D. Ellis, “Post-revolutionary politics in Turkey,” *Current History*, XLII (248): April 1962, pp. 220–226, 232. G. S. Harris, “The causes of the 1960 revolution in Turkey,” *MEJ*, XXIV (4): Autumn 1970, pp. 438–454. M. A. Гарсатян, „Мероприятия комитета национального единства в государственном строительстве Турции“, *Краткие сообщения Института Народов Азии* (Moscow), LXXIII: 1963, pp. 179–186. Much has also been published in Turkish, e.g.: Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, *Birinci cumhuriyet biterken* (Ankara: 1960). Vecdi Bürün, *Şanlı Türk ordusunun zaferi: kansız ihtilâl* (N. p.: 1960). Haydar Vural, *Hürriyet savaşımız* (Istanbul: 1960). Avni Eleвли, *Hürriyet için 27 mayıs 1960 devrimi* (Ankara: 1960). Yalçın Günel, *Seçkin devrim: 1960 millî inkılâbın ilim ve sanat yönünden izahı* (Ankara: 1960). R. Ümit Tokar, *İnkılâp mevzuatı* (N. p.: 1960). Ali İsmet Gencer, *Hürriyet savaşı* (Istanbul: 1961). Muhittin Koran, *İhtilâlîm* (N. p.: 1961).

grouped under a commonly-agreed slogan of “a return to Atatürkism” or “Neo-Kemalism”.²⁷ The Turkish military, in its role as guardian, applied what Prof. Huntington calls a “veto coup,”²⁸ to prevent a further appeal of the government to the more religious-minded and conservative rural masses. Even so, one may still observe noticeable variations of emphasis, depending on ideological approach or personal view. Most officers in the plot, perhaps all, stood for speedier modernization, more comprehensive reforms and the safeguarding of democracy. These points coincided with their own individual grievances. It was simple to contrast their own straitened circumstances, rendered more difficult by inflation, with the luxurious life of reportedly corrupt DP politicians who neglected the military, since they were barred from voting. Officers believed that what looked like vote-oriented uneconomic spending in rural areas could more profitably be directed to planned reform, to development geared to Turkey’s modernization, and to improvements in the armed forces, including their own financial lot.²⁹

The chain of events that led to the military coup was a logical consequence of the DP’s use of the military against its political foes — both real and potential. This was expressed in ordering the army (instead of the police) to stop the train on which İnönü was traveling to deliver a speech in Kayseri (April 1960), or to forcibly disperse anti-government demonstrations of students in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Rioting, if on a minor scale, became a daily occurrence in April and May. Probably the most striking event leading up to the coup was the silent procession along one of Ankara’s main avenues by about a thousand cadets of the officers’ academy. This served notice that the armed forces now considered themselves truly involved — and not necessarily on the side of the government. Indeed, to quote Professor M. Halpern, “the army intervened because its established role of political neutrality was in danger. Either it must willingly become Menderes’ tool for repressing all opposition, or it would

²⁷ These have been variously analyzed in Turkey and abroad. For two different interpretations, see F.-W. Fernau, “Le néo-kémalisme du comité d’union nationale,” *Orient*, 16: 4e trim. 1960, pp. 51–68; and Илдыз Сертель, „Экономическая политика кемализма и отношение к ней современной турецкой интеллигенции“, *Народы Азии и Африки* (Moscow), 1967, no. 2, esp. pp. 31 ff. See also Э.Ю. Гасанова, „Об идеологических основах кемализма и их современном толковании в Турции“, *ibid.*, 1968, no. 3, pp. 25–35.

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political order in changing societies* (New Haven: 1968), pp. 223–224; cf. *ibid.*, p. 221.

²⁹ Which was in fact improved after the Revolution, when, on March 1, 1961, a law came into effect increasing the salaries of military personnel.

have to intervene at its own initiative to protect both Turkish democracy and its own position above parties."³⁰ Nevertheless the DP leadership was surprised when a group of thirty-eight officers struck in the early hours of May 27, 1960. Following well-prepared plans, trusted units seized key points, took over the radio station and other offices, and simultaneously arrested the State President, the entire Cabinet and the DP members of the National Assembly. All this was done with virtually no bloodshed (only two were killed).³¹

The success of the military coup was due mainly to its brilliant planning and execution, which forestalled resistance by the Democrat Party or by anyone else. Many who had reason to be dissatisfied with the rule of DP hailed the coup joyfully and expectantly. The thirty-eight revolutionary officers, grouped in a National Union (or Unity) Committee (further: NUC), enhanced their popularity by proclaiming their desire to be political umpires rather than rulers. In practice they were soon to find out that this was hard to achieve. Numerous decisions had to be taken, and the practical political experience of NUC members was limited. This was apparent at once in the NUC's expressed desire to return the government to a civilian parliament, within three months; the transfer actually took nearly fifteen. This was due to the over-optimistic estimate of three months, the complexity of the problems NUC had to tackle, and, lastly, to differences of opinion within the NUC itself.

Among the subjects occupying the attention of the NUC in the first months were the public trials of more than four hundred of the ousted DP leaders, which ended with severe sentences on the accused. Menderes and his Ministers of Finances and Foreign Affairs, Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu were executed; President Bayar's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment on account of his advanced age. Many other DP members were jailed for various terms.³² These trials did not end with the sentences, which were regarded by many as harsh (although the fairness of the legal proceedings was so obvious that it was never

³⁰ Manfred Halpern, *The politics of social change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N. J.: 1963), p. 315.

³¹ In addition to sources quoted in previous footnotes, see also René Giraud, "Vers la seconde république turque," *Orient*, 14: 2e trim. 1960, pp. 18 ff.

³² These trials had a strong echo both in Turkey and abroad. See, *inter alia*, Tekin Erer, *Yassıada ve sonrası* (2 vols., İstanbul: 1964-1965). Tarık Güryay, *Bir iktidar yargılanıyor* (İstanbul: 1971). Weiker, *op. cit.*, ch. 2. R. Giraud, "La vie politique en Turquie après le 27 mai 1960," *Orient*, 21: 1er trim. 1962, pp. 19-21. Geoffrey Lewis, "Turkey: the thorny road to democracy," *The World Today*, XVIII (5): May 1962, pp. 187-188.

questioned). Powerful elements demanded an amnesty of those imprisoned — a matter which became an important political issue in subsequent years.

Meanwhile, the NUC was no less firm in dealing with the vestiges of the DP's rule: it liberalized press censorship; allowed suppressed newspapers to reappear;³³ attempted to control food-prices; and issued several decrees of a social character (such as an eight-hour work day).³⁴ It seems however to have considered its main task as returning government to civilian hands, under a new and better constitution, and with representative institutions elected under revised election laws.

Immediately after the coup the NUC commissioned several university professors to prepare a new constitution.³⁵ In actual practice, its drafting and approval took just over a year. After lengthy consultations, and some pressure from the political parties,³⁶ a draft constitution was finally approved by a national referendum on July 9, 1961. The voting figures were as follows:³⁷ 12,735,009 had the right to vote, of whom 10,322,169, or 81 %, cast their ballots. Of these, 10,282,561 were valid votes. 6,348,191, or 61.5 % of these, voted "yes"; 3,934,370, or 38.5 %, voted "no." On closer inspection it is clear that the constitution gained very low proportionate support — indeed, the number of those voting "yes" was just under half of those having the right of vote. It amounted in fact, to a snub to the National Union Committee and the 1960 Revolution. This was certainly true of the heavy "no" vote in Western Anatolia, a DP stronghold.

The 1961 Constitution³⁸ contained much from that of 1924, as well as a number of concepts and ideas from the Constitutions of several West

³³ Sulhi Dönmezer, "Evaluation of legislation regulating and limiting the freedom of the press," in *Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul* (further: *AFDI*), XVI (23–25): 1966, esp. pp. 161–177.

³⁴ Further details in V. I. Danilov, "Le caractère du coup d'état du 27 mai 1960 en Turquie," *Etudes Balkaniques* (Sofia), V: 1966, especially pp. 15–19.

³⁵ For the report of the Constitutional Commission, in a slightly abbreviated French translation, see *AFDI*, XIV (20): 1964, pp. 241–245, reprinted *ibid.*, XVI (23–25): 1966, pp. 267–271.

³⁶ Weiker, *op. cit.*, pp. 65 ff.

³⁷ Published in the official gazette of July 20, 1961, and reprinted in *AFDI*, XIV (20): 1964, p. 307 and again, *ibid.*, XVI (23–25): 1966, p. 335.

³⁸ On which see E. E. Hirsch, *Die Verfassung der türkischen Republik* (Frankfurt a. M. and Berlin: 1966). İsmet Giritli, "Some aspects of the new Turkish constitution," *MEJ*, XVI (1): Winter 1962, pp. 1–17. C. H. Dodd, *Politics and government in Turkey* (Manchester: 1969), ch. 8. J. S. Szyliowicz, "The 1961 Turkish constitution," *Islamic*

European states.³⁹ Furthermore, it was obviously inspired by the social, economic and juridical debates among Turkish intellectuals in the years following the Second World War, as well as by reaction from the authoritarianism of the Bayar-Menderes era. Consequently, the Second Turkish Republic was to assume a "social" character in addition to a "democratic and secularist" character. Out of the new constitution's 157 basic articles, 19 (arts. 35–53) were devoted to "social and economic rights and duties." Briefly, the 1961 Constitution guaranteed the Turks individual liberties considered fundamental in West European democracies. Individual rights were complemented by the duties assigned to the state (chiefly in welfare and planning).⁴⁰ Among other concepts, the new constitution laid down that political parties are necessary in a democracy (arts. 56–57), hence may be formed freely and function unhindered, although accountable for their revenues and expenditures. Parties there-

Studies (Karachi), II (3): Sep. 1963, pp. 363–381. R. Devereux, "Society and culture in the second Turkish republic (the new constitution)," *MEA*, XII (8): Oct. 1961, pp. 230–239. Mümtaz Soysal, *Anayasaya giriş* (Ankara: 1968). Id., *Anayasanın anlamı* (Istanbul: 1969), esp. pp. 58 ff. Л. А. Орнатская, „О конституции 1961 года“, *Проблемы современной Турции* (Moscow: 1963), pp. 110–128. Hamza Eroğlu, "La constitution turque de 1961 et les relations internationales," *TYIR*, II: 1961 (publ. 1963), pp. 62–90. Bahri Savcı, "Yeni bir anayasa rejimine doğru gelişmeler," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (further: *SBFD*) (Ankara), XVI (1): Mar. 1961, esp. pp. 81 ff.; XVI (4): Dec. 1961, pp. 93–145; XVII (1): Mar. 1962, pp. 21–87. Nermin Abadan, "1960 S.B.F. anayasa seminerlerinde beliren esas düşünceler," *ibid.*, XVII (2): June 1962, pp. 251–280. Bahri Savcı, "1961 anayasasının müdir prensiplerine ve müesseselerine mukayeseli kısa bir bakış," *ibid.*, XIX (3–4): Sep.-Dec. 1964, pp. 11–36. Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, "Les traits dominants de la constitution de la seconde république turque," *AFDI*, XVI (23–25): 1966, pp. 240–263. Yavuz Abadan, "Die türkische Verfassung von 1961," in *Das Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart*, Neue Folge, XIII: 1964, pp. 325–436. This comprises, *ibid.*, pp. 412–436, a German translation (by E. E. Hirsch) of the 1961 Constitution. English translations of the text have appeared in *MEJ*, XVI (2): Spring 1962, pp. 215–235; in *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), XLIII (1–2): Jan.-Feb. 1963, pp. 1–28, reprinted in *Islamic Studies* (Karachi), II (4): Dec. 1963, pp. 467–519; and in İsmet Giritli, *Fifty years of Turkish political development, 1919–1969* (Istanbul: 1969), pp. 167–224. A French translation of the 1961 Constitution (by Tefvik Orman) appeared in *AFDI*, XIV (20): 1964, pp. 246–307; and a revised version *ibid.*, XVI (23–25): 1966, pp. 272–335. Selected paragraphs were also translated into French in *Orient*, 21: 1er trim. 1962, pp. 160–164. A useful summary will be found in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* for Mar. 17–24, 1962, pp. 18647–18649.

³⁹ For legal borrowing, see "The reception of foreign law in Turkey," *International Social Science Bulletin* (UNESCO), IX (1): 1957, pp. 7–81.

⁴⁰ A. Ülkü Azrak, "Sosyal devlet ve 1961 Türk anayasasının sistemi," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası*, XXVII (1–4): 1962, pp. 208–224.

fore became institutionalized under the new constitution.⁴¹ However, the 1961 Constitution and a later "Party Law"⁴² stipulated that political parties which violated constitutional principles or threatened Turkish democracy might be dissolved. However this could be done only by the Constitutional Court—a new institution, brought into existence by the 1961 Constitution to safeguard it and all freedoms. Further, a Senate was added to the former National Assembly.⁴³

We have already referred to some difficulties within the National Union Committee itself. Besides a probable clash of personalities, there was a strong difference of opinion on the role of the military in politics, in which ambition and outlook played a part. While no officer dared speak out publicly against the dissociation between the armed forces and politics, some of the younger and more ambitious junior officers on the NUC wanted the continuation of military rule, in order to ensure the execution and safeguarding of reform and modernization. A return to civilian rule was never in any serious doubt; however, the younger officers claimed that if carried out prematurely, it would afford the politicians an opportunity to do away with the high ideals of the revolutionary officers. Not unexpectedly, perhaps, these officers also considered themselves most suitable to supervise future reform and modernization. The problem the NUC faced, therefore, was how to restore civilian government and yet see carried through a thorough program of reform.⁴⁴

In August 1960 the NUC purged from the military forces over 5,000 officers, including many generals and admirals; forcibly retired 147 University professors and assistants; and exiled a number of large land-owners to other parts of Turkey. It now felt strong enough to act against

⁴¹ Şerif Mardin, "Opposition and control in Turkey," *Government and Opposition* (London), I (3): Apr. 1966, p. 386.

⁴² The Party Law was adopted finally — after heated debate — on July 13, 1965, and conformed to the principles of the 1961 Constitution. It was largely inspired by the bill for the law on political parties in Federal Germany. Cf. Mehmet Ali Yalçın, *Siyasî partiler kanunu ve seçim kanunları* (İstanbul: 1965). Sait Çeşnigil, *Anayasa ve siyasî partiler kanunu* (Ankara: 1967). Yavuz Abadan, "Das türkische Parteiengesetz," in K. D. Baracher and others (editors), *Die moderne Demokratie und ihr Recht* (Tübingen: 1966), pp. 283–304. Id., "Türk siyasî partiler kanunu, *SBFD*, XXI (3): Sep. 1966, pp. 171 ff. Erdoğan Teziç, "Loi sur les partis politiques: note d'introduction," *AFDI*, XVII (26–28): 1967, pp. 341–347. For a French translation (by Ch. Crozat and E. Teziç), cf. *ibid.*, pp. 355–415.

⁴³ For the main political institutions, see B. N. Esen, *La Turquie* (Paris: 1969).

⁴⁴ See Jacques Lecercle, "Les problèmes internes et externes de la Turquie," *Revue de Défense Nationale* (Paris), XXII: Feb. 1966, p. 283.

the "radical" minority within its own ranks — those who were said to have advocated the continuation of military rule. On November 13, 1960, a majority of 23⁴⁵ dismissed a 14-member group from the NUC, retired them from the armed forces and sent them as advisers to Turkish diplomatic missions abroad. Foremost among "the fourteen" was Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, senior in rank and apparently the leader of this group of junior officers.⁴⁶ His political involvement will be discussed below.⁴⁷ The NUC then hoped to turn to the normalization of political life and the orderly transfer of government to the hands of constitutionally elected civilians. Soon after "the fourteen" were removed a Constituent Assembly was convened, which was "packed" with members of the RPP or its sympathizers.⁴⁸ This body considered and ratified the draft of the new constitution in May 1961. As mentioned above, the constitution was subsequently approved by a national referendum. The next step was the general elections held on October 15, 1961.⁴⁹ However, since no political party obtained an absolute majority in the new representative bodies, the officer junta, although technically it had ceased to exist, still felt it had to supervise politics in order to prevent a return to the pre-revolutionary situation, in other words to prevent the rehabilitation of the DP and the delay of reform and modernization. This was a distinct possibility, as the 1961 vote indicated that the Menderes regime had left behind it a large body of sympathizers.

Indeed, Turkey's political infrastructure had remained essentially the same as that before the 1960 Revolution.⁵⁰ The civil service, on both the national and local level, was almost unchanged. In addition, the leadership had put down two attempted military putsches by junior officers who apparently echoed certain views of "the fourteen" (on February 22,

⁴⁵ One of the 38 had died in a road accident.

⁴⁶ Nur Yalman, "Intervention and extrication: the officer corps in the Turkish crisis," in: Henry Bienen (ed.), *The military intervenes: case studies in political development* (N. Y.: 1968), esp. pp. 133 ff.

⁴⁷ See ch. 6.

⁴⁸ Cf. Bernard Vernier, *Armée et politique au Moyen Orient* (Paris: 1966), ch. 2, esp. p. 18. On this body's debates, see Suna Kili, *Turkish constitutional developments and assembly debates on the constitutions of 1924 and 1961* (Istanbul: 1971), pp. 64-145.

⁴⁹ See below, ch. 7.

⁵⁰ Cf. Piero Pettovich, "La vie politique et les partis en Turquie," *Res Publica* (Bruxelles), V: 1963, p. 74.

1962, and May 20–21, 1963).⁵¹ Supervision of the civilian government seems to have worked in three ways: a. Meetings — official and unofficial — between the high command of the military forces and the civilian Cabinet, in which the views of the former (on matters of principle) were made known to the latter. b. Officers who had carried out the Revolution — except “the fourteen” — remained Senators. c. General Cemal Gürsel, who had been retired from the military forces by Menderes shortly before the May 27, 1960 Revolution, and who had been chosen by the conspirators as their head, was elected President of the State. Of the other 23 officers, 22 (one had resigned from the NUC) became life members of Turkey’s newly-established Senate. In order to take their seats in the Senate, they had to retire from the military forces and agree not to join any political party — so as to serve collectively as an effective watchdog of democracy.

In retrospect, it seems that after the exile to foreign posts of “the fourteen” and the quashing of the putsches, those revolutionary officers in favor of maintaining the democratic process, even at the risk of slowing down socio-economic change, carried the day. They created no new system, but were apparently content with a moderate political regime based on a new constitution. This had the advantage of delaying the growth of antagonisms within the Turkish public, and steering it towards a comparatively high degree of consensus. The drawback was that this approach took the *élan* out of the revolutionary movement.⁵² Or, as Professor Türkkaya Ataöv has phrased it, the 1960 military intervention was essentially “a revolution that shook but did not change her (Turkey’s) political body.”⁵³ Even so, the NUC’s greatest problem⁵⁴ remained how to reintroduce democratic processes without jeopardizing the fate of the Revolution; and, when these processes were restored, how to ensure a positive, active stance towards reform by the new civilian governments,

⁵¹ W. F. Weiker, “The Aydemir case and Turkey’s political dilemma,” *MEA*, XIV (9): Nov. 1963, pp. 258–271. Erdoğan Örtülü, *Üç ihtilâlin hikâyesi* (Ankara: 1966).

⁵² As observed by Pierre Rondot, “Quarante années de république turque: du kémalisme au plan quinquennal et à l’association à l’Europe,” *Etudes* (Paris), 318: Sep. 1963, p. 198.

⁵³ Türkkaya Ataöv, “The 27th of May revolution and its aftermath,” *TYİR*, I: 1960 (publ. 1961), p. 13.

⁵⁴ For this and other problems of the military officers in 1960, see J. S. Szyliowicz, “Political participation and modernization in Turkey,” *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIX (2): June 1966, esp. p. 280.

without actually intervening and affecting the democratic process — something which later, in March 1971, they were forced to do.

Despite the realization that the military represented the ultimate power and that its supervision continued,⁵⁵ the general impression in Turkey and abroad was that this would be a remote control and that a multiparty parliamentary regime had been reconstituted, under civilian government. This was particularly so after the nineteen months of martial law ended, on November 30, 1961. What must have worried the May 27 revolutionaries and other Neo-Kemalist officers, however, was the fact that the whole civilian Establishment was little changed from pre-1960 days. The socio-economic facts of life in Turkey could not be transformed overnight, and the *ağas*, or large landowners, along with the urban uppermiddle class, were still behind most important decisions.⁵⁶ Ex-DP members and religious functionaries encouraged opposition activities against the NUC by handbills, speeches, small-scale demonstrations, and the spreading of rumors.

C. POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1960's

Nor was there much that was essentially new in the political parties.⁵⁷ True, the Democrat Party had been outlawed, but on January 13, 1961, the ban on party activity was lifted; parties were permitted to resume their activity, provided they registered within one month. Several did so.

Two pre-1960 parties resumed activity, the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP). The Republican People's Party, or *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, has already been mentioned as Atatürk's own party, dating from 1923, which, after having chosen to institute a multiparty system, was outvoted by the DP in 1950. First led by Atatürk, then by İsmet İnönü, it has shown a relatively high degree of cohesiveness. Although, like most other Turkish parties, it is made up of various groups, which sometimes quarrel among themselves,

⁵⁵ H. N. Howard, "Changes in Turkey," *Current History*, XLVII (285): May 1965, p. 296.

⁵⁶ Cf. E. J. Cohn, *Turkish economic, social and political change: the development of a more prosperous and open society* (N. Y.: 1970).

⁵⁷ Dodd, *op. cit.*, ch. 9. F.-W. Fernau, "Les partis politiques de la deuxième république turque," *Orient*, 39: 3e trim. 1966, pp. 35-59. For political parties before the 1960's see D. A. Rustow, "The development of parties in Turkey," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political parties and political development*, ch. 4. Further materials on several parties will be found in chs. 3-7 of our study.

in the RPP's case only a few of these groups have splintered off and left the party, because of the quality of leadership and its sense of purpose. After all, its program was identified with the principles guiding state policies. In the 1950's, during DP rule, the RPP was the largest opposition party, and rivalry between it and the DP was one of the main causes of the political tensions leading to the May 27, 1960 coup. In opposition, the RPP campaigned for sweeping constitutional reform under three main headings: the setting up of a second Chamber, the establishment of a Constitutional Court, and the introduction of a proportional representation system (instead of that allocating all seats in the National Assembly, in each electoral district, to the party gaining a plurality of the vote). All these were enacted in the early days of the second Turkish republic. The party has enjoyed considerable prestige, but has also appeared to suffer from having governed alone for an entire generation. Similarly, İnönü enjoys much personal fame, but his age (he was born in 1884) may well fail to attract the young.

The Republican Peasant National Party, or *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*, founded in 1948, took this name after the 1957 general elections. It was led by a group of conservatives, a substantial part of whose support came from the landowners of rural Turkey. The party was weakened visibly when, late in 1961, Osman Bölükbaşı, formerly a leader of the Nation Party (NP), which had merged with the Republican Peasant Party into the RPNP, left the RPNP with his followers and reestablished the NP, a similarly conservative party, representing landed interests.

In addition to the RPP and the RPNP, four new parties that stood out on the political scene in the early 1960's were the Justice Party, the New Turkey Party, the Labor Party of Turkey, and the refounded Nation Party. Several others were set up, but were of little or no consequence.

The Justice Party (JP)⁵⁸ or *Adalet Partisi*, set up in February, 1961, chose its name to express the desire of its leaders to redress the wrongs done to the DP. An amnesty for those condemned at the DP trials in 1960-1961 became for several years one of the most hotly debated political issues. Indeed, while formally accepting the May 27 Revolution, the JP attempted nonetheless to reestablish all the local organizations and recruit the support which the DP had enjoyed, by claiming unofficially to

⁵⁸ On which see, *inter alia*, W. B. Sherwood, "The rise of the Justice Party," *World Politics*, XX (1): Oct. 1967, pp. 54-65. Cf. Aydemir Balkan, "La Turquie à la croisée des chemins," *Orient*, 32-33: 4e trim. 1964-1er trim. 1965, pp. 130-133.

be its successor and, by implication, its avenger. The proofs of this claim were its closely similar ideology and the similarity of its leadership. In fact, the JP was not only headed by very much the same circles of notables, officials and politicians⁵⁹ which had led the DP, but many ex-DP members even became increasingly active in the JP, some in prominent positions. This — and particularly the party's hold on the DP's extensive organization — enabled the JP in the 1961 elections to come second to the RPP in the National Assembly and first in the Senate. The writing on the wall was clear: the effects of the May 27 Revolution were wearing off rapidly.

The Labor Party of Turkey (LPT) and the New Turkey Party (NTP), also established in February 1961, were very much smaller. The former, an articulate Marxist group, will be discussed in detail below.⁶⁰ The latter, in Turkish *Yeni Türkiye Partisi* and perhaps the most liberal⁶¹ of the conservative parties, appears to have made insufficient contact with the Turkish masses, and not to have projected effectively its somewhat abstract and intellectual program. In addition, the relatively moderate stance of the NTP's leader, Ekrem Alican, an ex-Finance Minister, was hardly calculated to attract wide support. Nevertheless, the party did win over part of the ex-DP followers, for whose vote it competed with the JP; in the 1961 elections, it came third, scoring best in eastern Turkey. However, the JP's substantial electoral gains in the following years were largely at the expense of the NTP. The Nation Party, already briefly mentioned, was headed by a group which had broken away from the RPNP, under Bölükbaşı's leadership. Even more conservative than other right-wing parties, the NP was strongly anti-communist and inclined, at least by implication, towards Islamic tradition within the limits of the laws safeguarding secularism.

Several other parties were set up in the course of the late 1960's, of which two will be mentioned here. Firstly, the Unity Party or Union Party (UP), or *Birlik Partisi*, was founded in October 1966 by a group

⁵⁹ Together with the military these make up Turkey's elite — which still comprises relatively few managers, technocrats and scientists. See Bülent Dâver, "Az gelişmiş ülkelerde siyasi elit (seçkinler)," *SBFD*, XX (2): June 1965, esp. pp. 531–535.

⁶⁰ See chs. 4 and 7.

⁶¹ Firouz Bahrampour, *Turkey: political and social transformation* (N. Y.: 1967), pp. 57–58. For further details about this and other parties, see W. F. Weiker, "Turkey," in T. Y. Ismael (ed.), *Government and politics of the contemporary Middle East* (Homewood, Ill.: 1970), pp. 138–140. Nuri Eren, "Turkey: problems, policies, parties," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (1): Oct. 1961, pp. 96 ff. For their programs, see Ferruh Bozbeyli, *Parti programları* (Istanbul: 1970).

of people, including its chairman, Hasan Tahsin Berkman, a retired general, and its secretary-general, Cemal Özbey, a lawyer. Later, its chairman became Hüseyin Balan, a member of the National Assembly for Ankara, who left the NP to join the party. While the party's opponents accused it of being supported and financed by Alevis, the UP maintained that it was a progressive, Kemalist party. The party's program declared for reforms and against all forms of capitalism, communism, fascism and fanaticism. Essentially a centrist party, the UP was torn by rifts and personal strife soon after its formation, which limited its effectiveness.

Secondly, the Reliance Party (RP), or *Güven Partisi*⁶² was founded in May 1967 by a group of members in the National Assembly and Senators who had resigned from the RPP in the previous month — accusing the latter of having moved too far left-of-center. The new party was led by ex-Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu, Member for Kayseri in the National Assembly. Its slogan was "Internal security, external security, rely on the Reliance Party!" The party platform claimed to be Kemalist, not socialist, but sympathetically inclined to the redress of economic grievances and social reform. Nonetheless, its strong support of the private sector underlined the fact that this was a party with a middle-class, bourgeois leadership. While its politics were anti-RPP and against all forms of leftism, the RP had to compete for popular support with several other right-of-center parties, mainly the Justice Party.

The impact of the May 27 Revolution on domestic politics in the subsequent decade is evident in the party system and the aggressive rivalry between the parties. The RPP-DP rivalry of pre-1960 days now changed into an equally bitter contest between the RPP and JP, particularly after 1965, when the JP, as the DP had done, obtained an absolute parliamentary majority. As in the pre-1960 period, compared with the large parties, the others had very little parliamentary influence and little impact in the country as a whole. The bi-polarity between the RPP and JP, and the unsatisfied ambitions of the smaller parties, were forcibly ventilated in the frequent general elections between 1961 and 1969.⁶³ Except for 1967, not a single year passed without elections to the National Assembly, or the Senate (a third of which changed every two years), or the municipalities and local councils. Extensive use of the state-owned radio and other

⁶² Its name was also translated as "The Security Party." The party has recently changed its name to *Millî Güven Partisi*, i.e., National Reliance (or: Security) Party.

⁶³ In 1970 the elections to a third of the seats in the Senate were postponed. The main electoral contests will be discussed in ch. 7.

mass media increasingly brought the acrimonious electoral propaganda into the living-room of every home.

The growing trend towards extremism in politics was not checked at the outset in the early 1960's because the military was unwilling to interfere again in lawful political activity, even if extreme, and because of the peculiar character of the Cabinets which followed the return to civilian government. After the May 27 coup, the NUC governed through an appointed Cabinet of civilians and military officers. However the 1961 elections, for the first time in Turkey's electoral history, did not give an absolute majority to any one party. In the National Assembly, at least, this was partly due to the new proportional representative system: its 450 seats were divided as follows: RPP 173, JP 158, NTP 65, RPNP 54. In the Senate the composition of the 150 elected Senators was JP 70, RPP 36, NTP 28, RPNP 16 (and, in addition, 15 appointed by the State President and the 22 Life Senators).⁶⁴ The differences were mainly due to the elections to the Assembly being proportional, and to the Senate — by simple plurality.

Retired General Cemal Gürsel, who had been elected State President in a joint session of both houses by a large majority, had the greatest difficulty in convincing the rival parties to form a coalition cabinet. This was composed of both RPP and JP ministers under İnönü's Premiership, lasted for only six months, and merely served to emphasize the abyss between the large parties. The same holds true of subsequent coalition Cabinets of the RPP and smaller parties, with the JP as the major opposition party, shrewdly placing the blame for every failure or inaction on the others. While successive amnesties of many DP members, sentenced at the 1961 trials, somewhat eased tension, mutual recrimination over the impasse reached in Cyprus and personal bickering kept controversy alive. The JP's achievement in gaining a plurality of the popular vote, both during the municipal and local elections of 1963 (when it came first in 42 provinces, while the RPP came first in only 23) and in those to a third of the Senate, in 1964 (where it gained eight additional seats⁶⁵), encouraged it to think it might soon obtain an absolute majority. Consequently some of its spokesmen spoke lightly of the May

⁶⁴ B. Lewis, "Turkey," in Ivison Mcadam (ed.), *The annual register: world events 1961* (London: 1962), pp. 276 ff. K. H. Karpat, "Recent political developments in Turkey and their social background," *International Affairs* (London), XXXVIII (3): July 1962, pp. 317-319.

⁶⁵ Cf. Geoffrey Lewis, "Turkey, 1962-4," *The World Today*, XX (12): Dec. 1964, p. 520, for this and the other election results.