Negotiating Political Identities

Multiethnic Schools and Youth in Europe

Daniel Faas

NEGOTIATING POLITICAL IDENTITIES

Monitoring Change in Education

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Change is a key characteristic of the worlds of business, education and industry and the rapidity of change underlines an urgent need to analyze, evaluate and, where appropriate, correct its direction. The series is aimed at contributing to this analysis. Its unique contribution consists of making sense of changes in education and in offering a timely and considered response to new challenges; the series, therefore, focuses on contemporary issues and does so with academic rigour.

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To my family, with love

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Foreword

Questions of migration, ethno-religious belonging, nation-making and citizenship are key elements of today's rapid social and cultural transformations. These aspects of today's world are accompanied by pervasive feelings of anxiety, risk and dislocation, as well as new opportunity. The process of globalization means old polarities between First and Third World are less relevant and have been replaced with mass movements of capital, technologies and people. Shifting political mobilizations and the remaking of policies within these conditions of late modernity have witnessed a wider move from the politics of distribution to the politics of recognition, in ways that affect a diverse range of established migrants, faith communities, economic migrants and asylum seekers.

The fragmentation of social relations brought on by globalizing processes is reflected in the increasing range of social and cultural explanations of our rapidly changing social world. Much contemporary social and cultural theory examining these issues has been developed at an abstract level that is not embedded in 'old' institutional sites (such as workplaces or schools) or in individual subjects' lived realities. Herein lies the contribution of this book, which reconnects that which has become disconnected – schooling and social theory. The author's theory-led comparative methodology wonderfully narrates the centrality of modern European schooling for the making and remaking of societies around a dynamic and contested notion of multiculturalism.

Negotiating Political Identities presents a sociological analysis of the post-war historical relationships between national, European and multicultural political and educational agendas in Germany and England, and extends the findings to transatlantic discussions of immigrant incorporation. The research challenges, with a generous and creative reading, earlier work in the field of inquiry that has tended to focus on a more conventional approach in examining notions of citizenship, multiculturalism and belonging. Simultaneously, the author makes a substantial contribution to the field, offering real insights, at an epistemological level, into a contemporary understanding of discursive constructions of a multi-narrative sense of citizenship that explores the interconnecting social forces of school policies, peer groups, social class and the accompanying different histories of migration. His specific focus is a fascinating narrative centred on identity formation among young people – 15-year-old ethnic majority and Turkish minority students – located within schools. The book takes up an area in urgent need of critical exploration within conditions of late modernity, the institutional and self-positioning of ethnic majority and Turkish minority secondary students with reference to local, national, and European political agendas. This important

book expands sociological understanding of contemporary youth by placing negotiated political identities at its centre. Even more impressively, the study serves to interrogate established theory at a macro-level by delving deeply into the reinforcement of national agendas within an English context, and contrasting it to Germany's prioritization of European agendas. There is a real sense here of a new generation of writing around the institutionally situated national/ethnic self, one which applies not only to European scholarship on immigrant incorporation, but to transatlantic dialogues around the integration of the second generation as well.

This challenging text, combining scholarship and accessibility, will appeal to multiple audiences, including academics, policy-makers, and the general reader.

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Máirtín Mac an Ghaill
University of Birmingham

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Acknowledgements

The idea for this project dates back to the late 1990s when I was teaching at King Edward VI Aston and Handsworth Schools in Birmingham. There I experienced life in multiethnic inner-city schools for the first time, since I had attended more rural and suburban white schools for my own education. While teaching in these schools, I became more and more interested in different levels of interaction and integration as well as how students from different backgrounds are positioned and position themselves, and decided to study these issues in greater depth. I have worked in five countries since doing my fieldwork for the project, labouring over this manuscript while living in Germany, Britain, Greece, Ireland and the United States. Spending time in each one of these countries has added to my own identity and what it means to be a European or global citizen in the twenty-first century. I have learned so much from listening to all of my respondents in this project and am forever grateful for their insights.

Chapter 1

Political Identities in a Multicultural Europe

Processes of European integration, globalization and migration are currently challenging national identities and changing education across Europe.[1] The nation-state no longer serves as the sole locus of civic participation and identity formation, and no longer has the influence it once had over the implementation of policies. Current trends show power moving both to the regional and supranational levels, for example through greater autonomy in how regions organize their school systems, and increasing involvement of European Union (EU) institutions in formerly national educational matters through the promotion of European citizenship and identity. At the same time that government power shifts levels, educational systems and schools face growing pressures to respond to migration and transform nation-centred approaches into more inclusive schooling processes. While the scale of change is clear, it is less clear how the national, European and multicultural agendas are intertwined at EU and national levels, or more importantly, how schools and young people interpret the development of these policy agendas. This book therefore relates a study of how EU and national policies connect to what is happening on the ground in two European countries. I argue that school-level actors mediate multiple levels of government policies, creating distinct educational contexts that shape youth identity negotiation and integration processes in quite different ways. By focusing on identity negotiation among immigrant youth, I provide evidence that expands discussions of youth integration beyond the traditional emphasis on educational outcomes.

In recent decades, EU institutions have become a major supranational player in education (e.g., Council of Ministers of Education 1993, 2007, European Commission 1995, 2002), with school-related issues shifting from a small concern of the EU to a major focus of the organization's activities. Only a few educational issues were mentioned in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, including provisions for vocational training and for the mutual recognition of diplomas and certificates (Phillips 1995). Not until 1971 was education first mentioned as an area of interest to the then European Community, when the European Commission set up two bodies focused on educational issues: a working party on teaching and education, and an interdepartmental working party on coordination (Hansen 1998, Ryba 2000). At this time, the European Ministers of Education stated that the provisions on educational measures in the Treaty of Rome should be complemented by increasing

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1   There are other factors, such as devolution (e.g., Taylor and Thomson 1999, Wyn Jones 2001, Bond and Rosie 2002) and democratization, which have reshaped national identities but these are not the main focus of this book.

co-operation in education. The Ministers argued that the final goal was 'to define a European model of culture correlating with European integration' (Neave 1984: 6-7), recognizing for the first time the close relation between educational policy and European integration. Then in 1974, the Ministers argued for the need to institute European co-operation in education by emphasizing that the national diversity of education systems should be respected.

The institutionalization of education at the EU level took on ever more tangible forms in the mid-1980s, with programmes such as Erasmus (higher education exchange) and Lingua (language learning exchange). At the same time, EU policy debates saw a new emphasis on issues of identity and citizenship, with the Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Education on the European Dimension in Education (1988: 5), prompting educators to 'strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilization and of the foundations on which the European peoples intended to base their development today'. The Maastricht Treaty further provided the EU with a legal framework to involve itself in all levels of national educational systems (Council of the European Communities 1992). Importantly, EU policy documents have since emphasized that European citizenship should be viewed as supplementing national citizenship and not replacing it (see Council of the European Union 1997, 2007). Taken together, these activities and resolutions show an increasing EU involvement in national education systems, in both tangible and symbolic ways.

Other organizations have also worked to influence and reshape national identities through the promotion of European citizenship and identity, both inside and outside schools. For example, the Council of Europe,[2] a less influential but more diverse supranational organization than the EU, issued Recommendation 1111, which defined Europe 'as extending to the whole of the continent and in no way synonymous with the membership of any particular European organization' (Council of Europe 1989). The document further stressed the importance of encouraging the European dimension in teacher training and teacher exchange; giving more emphasis to the teaching of history, geography, citizenship and modern languages; and encouraging links between European schools through new information technologies (see also Council of Europe 1991). The Council's activities also include the Education for Democratic Citizenship programme, established in 1997 and still ongoing, which seeks to identify the 'values and skills individuals require in order to become participating citizens, how they can acquire these skills and how they can learn to pass them on to others' as well as identifying 'the basic skills required to practise democracy in European societies' (Bîrzéa 2000: 3-4). The EU, for its part, has launched an equally diverse range of

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2   The EU currently has 27 member states, each of which has had to meet strict political and economic standards in order to gain entry. Membership of the Council of Europe is determined solely on the basis of political concerns, and, as a result, the institution has a larger and more diverse set of 47 members.

educational initiatives including defining eight key competences that education systems should foster, such as language learning and civic knowledge (Council of Ministers of Education 2006).

Despite these unifying calls for European identity and citizenship and a European dimension in education (see also the analyses in Lewicka-Grisdale and McLaughlin 2002, Soysal 2002a, 2002b), all EU countries presently govern education with nearly absolute autonomy, which complicates the development of a common approach to these policy agendas. EU actions therefore serve mainly to complement national level initiatives, for example through the increasingly important Open Method of Coordination (OMC),[3] an intra-European means of governance through which the EU identifies common challenges across the current 27 member states, pinpoints best practices, and encourages countries to review their existing national policies. Researchers debate the extent to which these initiatives penetrate national education systems. Some scholars argue that the promotion of a European dimension in education has helped transform nation-centred schooling approaches and curricula into more inclusive ones (see Schissler and Soysal 2005, Philippou 2007). Others, however, hold that the EU 'still adheres to some of the key components of the nationalist discourse it seeks to evade' (Hansen 1998: 15), pointing to the ways in which EU education policies assume the idea that a common pan-European 'culture' is inherent and inherited, despite the rhetoric of 'unity in diversity' and multiple identities. These debates leave unexamined the ground-level interpretations of EU-level policies by teachers and students in different countries. Given the growing size of the immigrant second generation across Europe, this study of how young people from different backgrounds relate to Europe as a political identity thus contributes important insights about how these macro-level policy debates play out on the ground, across national contexts.

In response to educational initiatives by the Council of Europe and the EU, some researchers have studied youth political identities and conceptualizations of Europe, but these studies have been mostly quantitative and therefore paid less attention to the discourses young people employ when positioning and repositioning themselves in relation to citizenship, Europe and cultural diversity (e.g., Angvik and von Borries 1997, von Borries 1999). For example, a series of six Eurobarometer surveys conducted on request of the European Commission (1982, 1989, 1991, 1997, 2001b, 2007) showed that being able to work, live and study in any of the member states were the three main advantages young people saw in European citizenship. Chisholm, du Bois-Reymond and Coffield (1995) explored the question 'What does Europe mean to me personally' with different groups of university students across Europe and found that some respondents saw a positive balance of perceived advantages (i.e., Europe as a multicultural adventure playground) and

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3 The OMC rests on soft law mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking and sharing of best practice. This means that there are no official sanctions for laggards. The method's effectiveness relies on a form of peer pressure and naming and shaming, as no member state wants to be seen as the worst in a given policy area.

disadvantages (i.e., Europe as a bureaucratic and self-centred monster), and that national identities and nationalism generally were seen as dangerously suspect phenomena. In a more recent study, Grundy and Jamieson (2007: 663) surveyed the European identities of young adults aged 18-24 in Edinburgh and found that 'for many being European remains emotionally insignificant and devoid of imagined community or steps towards global citizenship'. Instead, most had strong Scottish identities and some had strong British identities. Moreover, the EU-funded project 'Orientations of Young Men and Women to Citizenship and European Identity' highlighted that both national location and schooling played an important role in shaping young people's responses to Europe. The study also found that European identity was most marked amongst German and Czech youth, and lowest in Spain and England (see Ros and Grad 2004, Fuss and Boehnke 2004). The findings of these studies raise important questions about the complexity of factors affecting identification with Europe and youth identity negotiations more broadly, questions addressed by this book.

Examinations of civic participation in the 1990s further investigate the level of active citizenship and political identities among multiethnic youth in Europe (e.g., Spannring, Wallace and Haerpfer 2001, Ogris and Westphal 2005).[4] Spannring, Wallace and Haerpfer (2001: 36) grouped participating countries into six geo-political regions and argued that there has been 'a general rise in civic participation' over the 1990s but also that 'the most astonishing growth in civic participation among young people is in the South-West [i.e., Spain] where it has increased from 9% to 35%'. This, they argue, shows a convergence in Western Europe in terms of civic participation and integration, while also demonstrating an increasing divergence between young people in these countries and those in the former Soviet Union and Balkan Peninsula, where civic participation has declined or only modestly increased in the same time period.

In addition to changes due to European citizenship and identity, national identities have also been challenged by the migration of people into and across Europe since World War II. According to Stalker (2002), there have been four main post-war phases of migration: refugees who were forced to resettle as a result of border changes (especially between Germany, Poland and former Czechoslovakia); economic migration from colonial countries to the 'motherland' (e.g., England) or under labour contracts (e.g., Germany); migration of family members after the 1973 oil crisis and recession; and asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants (see also Düvell 2009). Arguably, a fifth phase could be added here to account for

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4   Ogris and Westphal (2005) conducted a European survey in eight countries (Austria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Britain) and found that the 'majority is not very interested in politics, but there is hope that interest increases with age'. They also found 'evidence that identity is related to voting participation on the EU level: feeling as young European to a certain extent also means feeling obliged to vote at European elections'.

the intra-European flow of migrants from East to West following EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007.[5]

These migration flows have been shaped and controlled by national and European policies, with an increasing emphasis on EU-level involvement. For example, the 1999 Tampere European Council established the need for a common European policy on asylum and immigration (Council of the European Union, 1999). Ten years later, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (Council of the European Union 2008) outlined for the first time five basic supranational commitments: organize legal immigration to take account of the needs and priorities of member states; curb illegal immigration; establish more effective border controls; implement a European asylum policy; and create a partnership with the countries of origin to encourage synergy between migration and development.

While EU-level involvement in migration policies has been growing, national policies have been changing as well. National policies were relatively liberal during the 1950s and 1960s and have become more restrictive since the 1970s. Some countries (e.g., Britain, France, the Netherlands) accepted immigration from former colonies whereas others (e.g., Germany, Denmark, Switzerland) were without a colonial reservoir and recruited contract workers, so-called 'guest' or 'migrant' workers,[6] mostly from south and southeast Europe. In this book I dedicate two chapters to a discussion of the national policies of Germany (Chapter 2) and England (Chapter 5) to contextualize not only the school responses to diversity (and Europe) but also young people's political identities. These two countries are very interesting to look at because both are long-term immigration hosts, but have had different responses to diversity. Germany has traditionally adopted a more monocultural approach based on an ethno-cultural conception of citizenship while England has favoured multiculturalism (see Faist 2007, Modood 2007). The two EU member states also differ in that Germany has been at the forefront of the EU political integration project whereas England has viewed Europe in more economic terms. These legacies are likely to have different impacts on contemporary youth in schools, and how they see their identity in relation to their nation and Europe.

Taken together, these trends toward increasing migration and differing responses to diversity in schools point to an ethnic dimension at play across member states and education systems. The EU and the Council of Europe have responded to these changes with calls for multicultural (intercultural) educational initiatives (more on this below). At the same time, European political agendas

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5   Ireland for instance has since tightened its citizenship legislation, adding ius sanguinis to the ius soli principle and only granting citizenship after five years of residence. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment has revised eligibility requirements for new work permits for those entering the Irish labour market for the first-time from 1 June 2009. It is too early to comment on the implications of this for legal, let alone undocumented, migrants.

6   In the remainder of this book, I call this population 'migrant workers' because of their economic reasons for migration.

have polarized in ways that increasingly influence educational institutions. Indeed, many argue that processes of European integration and the legal and illegal migration of people into Europe have led to a rise of far-right parties in many European countries since the 1990s (e.g., Roxburgh 2002, Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan 1995). For example, in the Dutch 2002 general elections, Pim Fortuyn's List came second on a campaign for border closure, obligatory integration, and measures against Muslim extremists. The Netherlands' restrictive asylum laws also led to a decrease in the number of applications from 43,000 in 2000 to 13,400 in 2003 (Duval Smith 2005). And the racist killing of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 has not only led to attacks on mosques, religious schools and churches, but also shows the contradictions in Holland's liberal society between legalizing euthanasia and the selling of cannabis, on the one hand, and applying restrictive and exclusionary asylum and immigration laws, on the other. Since 2005, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Austria and France have also experienced a right-wing swing in their national governments, often on anti-immigration, anti-Muslim platform (see Koopmans et al. 2005).

These political developments have led to a new debate about multiculturalism in Europe and new research on attitudes towards migrants. In 2005, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)[7] found that 60 per cent of respondents in the EU-15 felt multiculturalism had certain limits as to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society could accept, compared with 42 per cent in the ten new member states.[8] There is considerable intra-European diversity on the issue, however, with Greeks, Germans, Irish and British most strongly supporting the view that there are limits to a multicultural society while the Spanish, Italians, Swedes, Finns and most of the new Eastern European member states being less critical. The report also showed that support for different forms of immigrant exclusion (i.e., resistance to multicultural society, opposition to civil rights for legal migrants, or support for repatriation policies) was more prevalent amongst older people with lower education levels. In other words, economic prosperity appeared to lessen the perceived threat posed by migrants, and young people exhibited less support for ethnic exclusion than older people. This supports Chisholm's (1997: 5) view that 'reservations in the presence of "foreigners" are at a low level' amongst young Europeans.

The increasing migration-related diversity in Europe has also been associated with increasing pressure on countries to transform their nation-centred and often Eurocentric curricula into more inclusive learning approaches (see Coulby and Jones 1995, Coulby 2000). Much of this pressure has come in the form of EU and

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7   The EUMC was renamed European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2007.

8   The EU-15 consisted of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. On 1 May 2004, ten Eastern European countries joined the then EU-15 and, three years later, Romania and Bulgaria also joined to make it the EU-27.

Council of Europe (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007) guidelines. For example, in 2002, the Council of Europe launched a project called 'The New Challenge of Intercultural Education', which aimed to increase awareness of the necessity of including interfaith dialogue as an element of intercultural education, and focused on analysis of religion as a 'cultural phenomenon' (Council of Europe 2002). This was further highlighted in a project called 'Policies and Practices for Teaching Socio-Cultural Diversity' (Council of Europe 2005) whose main objective was to propose the introduction of common European principles for managing diversity at school. The Council highlighted that this should include the teaching of diversity through curricula, teacher training, and training for diversity in rural and urban areas. In 2007, ministers asked for the development of measures for inclusive education, particularly for the socio-culturally excluded; and called for the development of key skills for social cohesion including interculturalism, multilingualism and citizenship (Council of Europe 2007). Similarly, the EU has responded to the educational challenges arising from migration-related diversity by making 2008 the Year of Intercultural Dialogue (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2006: 46) and adopting the Green Paper 'Migration and Mobility: challenges and opportunities for EU education systems' (European Commission 2008). The document lists earlier findings from international student assessment tests which show that migrants have lower educational achievement than their peers and that, in some countries, second-generation students have lower grades than first-generation students.[9] This clearly highlights the importance of schooling for migrant integration and educational achievement. The document also stressed learning of the host language as a way of creating social cohesion together with promotion of the heritage language as a way of respecting diversity. Such focus on early language learning contrasts with countries like the United States.

European initiatives for political integration and migration not only received different national policy responses across member states but have also been interpreted differently at the level of schools and youth. This suggests that youth identities are likely to vary within EU member countries, especially among migrants. As a result, a complex story of young people's political identities unfolds – a story that departs from more traditional two-way comparisons of either national versus European (e.g., Ryba 2000, Hinderliter Ortloff 2005) or national versus multicultural agendas (e.g., Wilhelm 1998, Graves 2002). This book delves into this story, exploring questions of what drives identity formation among ethnic majority and minority youth on the ground; how governments and schools respond to the challenges posed by globalization, European integration and migration; and what this means for the development of inclusive political and educational frameworks. Previous studies have tended to have a narrow emphasis on either white and ethnic

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9   The tests the document draws on are the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), a triennial global test of 15-year-old's scholastic performance and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), a survey on literacy amongst fourth graders in primary school.

minority identities (e.g., Mac an Ghaill 1988, Dyer 1997, Sewell 1997, Waters 1999, Youdell 2003, Byrne 2006) or citizenship identities (e.g., Barrett 1996, Cinnirella 1997, Osler and Starkey 2001, Hussain and Bagguley 2005).[10] In contrast, this study adopts a more comprehensive approach to the study of youth identities, drawing on the insights of post-structuralist theories of identity.

Theorizing Political Identities

Scholars have conceptualized identity in various ways, including social psychological approaches that mainly draw on Tajfel's (1974) social identity theory; Turner's (1987) self-categorization theory; Moscovici's (1981, 1984) concept of social representation and acculturation models (e.g., Berry 1997, Cinnirella 1997, Barrett 2007, Nigbur et al. 2008); and post-structuralist approaches (e.g., Brah 1996, Nayak 1999, Rassool 1999). Social psychologists tend to assume that the nature of the person who is interacting with the world is 'a complete whole', a non-fragmented self, whereas post-structuralists see the subject as discursively constructed by the social context, such as government policies and school approaches. The work of Caglar (1997), Mac an Ghaill (1999), Tizard and Phoenix (2002), Dolby (2000, 2001) and Hall (1996), among others, is particularly important for the present study as as it shows that 'identity' is not a product, but a complex and multifaceted process of negotiation. Foucault (1980, 1988) and Derrida (1981) believe that there is no individual 'I' that interacts with the social context but that the only way an 'I' comes to exist is through the productive power of discourse. Post-structuralist approaches allow for multiple categories of identity and, most importantly, these do not have to be reconciled. A post-structuralist framework also challenges the idea of a single monolithic truth and identity (as opposed to the Enlightenment and modernity) and regards all absolutes as constructions.

Drawing on post-structuralist notions of multiple, fragmented and discursively produced identities, Hall (1992b: 275) argued that the 'post-modern subject' is conceptualized as 'having no fixed, essential or permanent identity, [and] is historically, not biologically, defined'. Brah (1996: 124) added that identity may be understood as 'that very process by which multiplicity, contradiction, and instability of subjectivity is signified as having coherence, continuity, stability; as having a core – continually changing core but the sense of a core nonetheless – that at any given moment is enunciated as the "I"'. Brah's conceptualization of identity leaves open the possibility for individuals to feel strongly about their identities, to construct subjects that can be 'spoken'. Hall (1996: 5) goes further to maintain that identity production also involves processes 'which attempt to "interpellate",

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10   The only exception to this is perhaps Raymond and Modood's (2007) edited volume which compares and contrasts how ethnic (racial and religious) and political identities have become increasingly intertwined in the twenty-first century in Britain and France, notably following the 2005 communal violence in Birmingham and Parisian suburbs.

speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses'. Hall (1996), among others, has also suggested that within a post-structuralist framework, identities can be understood as 'performed'. In this way, identities carry a sense of 'performativity' (see also the discussions in Butler 1997). The notion of performativity, relating to young people's negotiations of their identities, was important for the design of the study because performativity suggests that identities are a continual establishment and articulation of binaries. The linking of techniques of the self (Foucault 1988) and performance opens up an exploration of the ways in which the social context, such as schools and government policies, mediates how individuals deal with the lived realities of specific institutional locations (see Mac an Ghaill 1999, Papoulia-Tzelpi, Hegstrup and Ross 2005, Fülöp and Ross 2005).

The power of a post-structuralist framework for the study of young people's identities in schools is highlighted, among others, by Youdell (2003), Nayak (1999), and Haywood and Mac an Ghaill (1997). Youdell (2003: 3) demonstrates 'how the privilege associated with African-Caribbean identities within student subcultures is recouped and deployed within organizational discourse as "evidence" of these students' undesirable, or even intolerable, identities as learners'. She argues that the discursive practices of students and teachers contribute to the performative constitution of intelligible selves and others. Using a similar approach, Nayak's (1999) ethnographic case study in Newcastle-upon-Tyne argues that many white students perceive anti-racism as an anti-white practice; that the identities of the white majority need to be deconstructed with as much vigour as that of minority groups to avoid any future 'white backlash'; and that local history helps students better to understand what it means to be white in Newcastle. The advantages of a post-structuralist methodology for the study of young people's identities are also discussed by Haywood and Mac an Ghaill (1997) who distinguished between the philosophical positions of materialism and deconstructivism. The authors argue that in order to generate more comprehensive accounts of educational identities, critical analysis needs to engage with both philosophical approaches. For Haywood and Mac an Ghaill (1997: 267-68), deconstructionist approaches involve fluid and fragmented formations of identities:

> One of the shifts from a materialist to a deconstructivist position in examining the formation of educational identities has been to focus on the constitutive dynamics of subjectivity. (…) At a social level, this [deconstructionist] perspective suggests that having a singular "identity" is inadequate, because social situations produce varied subjective positions that may be occupied. (…) In this way, subjectivity is conceptualized as a process of *becoming*, characterized by fluidity, oppositions and alliances between particular narrative positions.

While materialist accounts of identity formation have positioned females, gays and black people as subordinated, deconstructivist strategies favour a discursive identity formation enabling, for instance, gay and lesbian students to occupy

positions of power which allow the inversion and contestation of heterosexual power (Mac an Ghaill 1994). In other words, post-structuralist notions of deconstruction challenge the views of Enlightenment and modernity as well as the paradigm of acculturation studies that cultures and identities are fixed, static and of a binary nature (e.g., white/black, men/women) (Berry and Sam 1997), and instead perceive individuals as able to negotiate and renegotiate their identities discursively (see MacLure 2003). This study deconstructs the discourses of ethnic majority and Turkish minority youth and demonstrates how these socio-ethnically different groups of students – both of whom occupy positions of power at various times depending on the school context – negotiate their identities. However, other scholars have criticized deconstructionist accounts of identity formation 'for assuming that identities are available to everyone, with the opportunity to take up, reposition themselves and become powerful' (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 1997: 269). A constant theme across materialist and deconstructionist identity epistemologies is the idea that educational institutions impact identity formation, a notion taken up by the present study. Indeed, as this book demonstrates, not only schools but also a range of other factors such as government policies, socio-economic background and immigrant status affect the formation of youth political identities.

The concept of 'identity/identities', meaning the communities young people feel they belong to, differs from the concept of 'identification' which refers to the reasons and discourses students employ to identify with a particular community such as Britain or Europe (Skeggs 1997). It is further important for the purposes of this study to distinguish between hybrid (e.g., Hall 1992, Tizard and Phoenix 2002) and hyphenated identities (e.g., Caglar 1997). Bhabha (1990: 189) maintained that, rather than being about the fusion of different identities, hybridity sets out to signify 'the third space which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it [and] gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation'. Similarly, Hall's (1992a) pluralization of the concept of ethnicity with his 'new ethnicities' stimulated possibilities for the loosening and destabilizing of ethnicity so that it could be investigated as something capable of temporal and spatial change and emphasizing its performativity and not its ascription. In other words, Hall (1992a: 252-53) observed a shift in black cultural politics from 'the language of binary oppositions [e.g., black/white] in which blacks were positioned as the unspoken and invisible 'other'' to a politics of representation which recognizes 'that "black" is essentially a politically and culturally *constructed* category' and that not all black people are the same. Linked with the new politics of representation is the pluralization of the concept of ethnicity (i.e., new ethnicities/new ethnic hybrid identities). For Hall, Europeanization and globalization play a central role because they have a pluralizing impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions of identification, and making identities more positional, more political and diverse.

In contrast to hybridity, the idea of hyphenated identities, as understood by Caglar (1997), relates more to territorial or political identities, such as African-American, rather than the emergence of a new identity. Hyphenation implies that an individual continuously mediates between two disparate cultures and territories. Contrary to the binary oppositions that characterized modernization theory (e.g., white/black), 'no single mode has a necessary overall priority' in theories of hybridization and hyphenization (Pieterse 1995: 51). Instead, relations between cultures are conceptualized as flows that not only widen the field of identities but endow identities with a degree of fluidity. For example, both ethnic majority and minority youth in this study produced multi-layered identities that are constantly renegotiated and thus in a state of flux. 'Although hybridity [or hyphenization] ascribes cultures and identities with "fluidity", they remain anchored in territorial ideas, whether national or transnational' (Caglar 1997: 173). Also, Caglar (1997) observed that there is an assumption that hyphenated identities, such as German-Turks or British-Pakistanis, are potentially conflictual and problematic; that dual cultural 'membership' is a source of dual 'loyalties'. Implicitly, then, according to Caglar, culture posits a commitment and a loyalty to a 'people' and 'territory'. Such loyalties, the author argued, are incapable of true hybridization.

In order to explore how contemporary youth respond to national, European and multicultural political agendas, I draw on these post-structuralist notions of a fragmented society in which identities are hybrid and shifting. I contend that at a time of increasing globalization and migration-related diversity, it is useful to consider the post-modern subject as having fluid and situated identities.[11] Arguably, the fact that many young people in my study constructed their identities along ethnic and political dimensions, rather than mediating between two territories, suggests that the notion of hybrid identities is perhaps more accurate when analysing contemporary identities. Consequently, I avoided hyphenating by identifying for instance a 'Turkish-German' identity (which would refer to the territories of Turkey and Germany). Instead, I draw on the multiple ethnic, political and other categories elicited by the subjects themselves to allow for the emergence of new identities. As this book will show, young people (re)negotiate their identities within the world in relation to discourses available to them, rather than being born into a static identity tied with a particular territory.

Needless to say, for some readers, the distinction between hybridity and hyphenation and post-structuralist understandings of hybridity may sound all too simplistic.[12] Indeed, several theorists who acknowledge the fluid and multidimensional nature of identities have challenged notions of hybridity in

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11   See Wetherell (1998) for a similar argument.

12   For example, Feminists and Marxists (e.g., Sarup 1993) have argued that post-structuralist intellectuals focus only on the heterogeneous, the diverse, the subjective, the relative and the fragmentary insisting that any general theory should be renounced and that life cannot be grasped from a single perspective. Such ambiguity, fragmentation and subjectivity can of course pose difficulties for practitioners and policy-makers.

identity formation processes. Modood (2000: 177), for instance, argues how cultural essentialism continues to underlie even some of the attempts to oppose it. Arguably, in terms of hybridity, cultures are still 'anchored in territorial ideas', whereby cultural essentialism is implicitly reinforced by being the norm to which hybridity is the exception. Modood thus maintains that hybridity offers only an illusory escape from essentialist modes of identity construction. Yuval-Davis (1997: 202) also warns of the possible danger of notions of hybridity and ambivalence to 'interpolate essentialism through the back door'. She argues that the supposed homogenous collectivities from which hybrid identities emerge invoke 'the mythical image of society as a "mixed salad"'. Before I move on to share a few methodological considerations underpinning the design of this study, I briefly introduce some of the analytical concepts and dimensions.

A Note on Europe, Multiculturalism and Citizenship

Politicians, academics and the media in countries in the EU and beyond debate the meaning of Europe (e.g., Neave 1984, Wallace 1990, Shennan 1991, Kuus 2004, Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003). Many assume there is an absolute truth to be found, a definitive answer to the question 'What is Europe', but disagree on which criteria or historical evidence could or should be used to define Europe. Some researchers survey national discourses to show that Europe is a concept that has many facets and acquires new meanings in different countries (e.g., Malmborg and Stråth 2001). Others adopt a more historical approach and often conflate the term Europe with that of the EU (Dinan 2004). Still others concentrate purely on the EU itself, and discuss the system of EU governance, the political will of member states to adopt one or another type of governance, and the decision-making dynamics and challenges that lie ahead in terms of widening and deepening the European project (e.g., Tsoukalis 2003). One issue that has been especially controversial for this debate is the question of Europe's eastern boundaries, and the extent to which Russia and Turkey can be considered part of Europe. The question of Turkey's accession into the EU has given rise to fervent debates about the Christian roots of Europe, the compatibility of a predominantly Muslim country with the EU, and the eastern borders of Europe. As this study shows, Turkey's role in the debates over how to define Europe is particularly important for the negotiation of political identities among Turkish youth in Germany and England.

While disagreement on how to define Europe abounds among scholars and policy-makers, the experience of people in different countries demonstrates that there can be no single definition of Europe. Europe has assumed diverse meanings in history, and at the same time, Europe may have multiple meanings at any given moment depending on the perspective we adopt. Not only has the definition of Europe varied through the past centuries and even decades, but its content and meaning also varies in relation to the different realms of social life. There is a cultural Europe or a European civilization (e.g., Catholic South, Protestant North and Orthodox East), a political Europe, a social Europe, a historical Europe, and

a territorial Europe. From a conceptual viewpoint, it is not possible to define a single Europe, drawing together all these meanings and perspectives into a single container. This is underlined, for instance, by Delanty and Rumford (2005) and Delanty (2005) who argue that 'being European' cannot be defined through distinctive European values, a European history, or a European polity. Instead, they put forth a cosmopolitan vision, maintaining that Europe is a multi-level polity with a plurality of centres and overlapping networks.[13] For the purposes of this book, the most important dimensions of this debate are the extent to which Europe is defined in inclusive (e.g., multicultural, multi-religious) or exclusive (e.g., Eurocentric) terms, and the implications these conceptualizations have for the identity formation of young people, particularly Turks, in different schools in Europe.

The concept of the European dimension in education is similarly contested. Researchers have taken up a broad sweep of projects, including describing and analysing EU and Council of Europe policy documents and directives concerning education in general and the European dimension in particular (e.g., Ryba 1992, 1995, 2000, Keating 2009); writing comparative accounts of European educational systems (e.g., Husén, Tuijnman and Halls 1992, Tulasiewicz and Brock 2000); and studying the meaning of European citizenship in education across various countries, subjects and sectors (e.g., Bell 1995, Davies and Sobisch 1997). In addition, Karlsen (2002) argued that the active use of symbols underlined the unity of the EU member states. Symbols such as the European flag (a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background), Europe day (9 May), the common currency (euro), the European anthem (based on the 'Ode to Joy' from the Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven), and a common motto (United in diversity) might help promote a sense of European identity and citizenship in young people. However, these potentially uniting elements have not yet found their way into many schools in Europe and are not part of European educational issues.

Another contested concept central to this book is multiculturalism, and the question of how it contrasts with interculturalism. Proponents of interculturalism emphasize communication, interaction and dialogue while those who favour multiculturalism argue that reciprocity, dialogue and civic integration are also central to most, if not all, contemporary accounts of multiculturalism. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 2006: 17-18):

> the term multicultural[ism] describes the culturally diverse nature of human society. It not only refers to elements of ethnic or national culture, but also includes linguistic, religious and socio-economic diversity. Intercultural[ism] is a dynamic concept and refers to evolving relations between cultural groups. It

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13   A study by Pichler (2009: 13) provides evidence for this idea, finding that cosmopolitans identify more strongly with Europe and see more reasons for being European than non-cosmopolitan people that are more closely tied with (sub)national communities.

> has been defined as the existence and equitable interaction of diverse cultures and
> the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and
> mutual respect. (...) Multicultural education uses learning about other cultures in
> order to produce acceptance, or at least *tolerance*, of these cultures. Intercultural
> education aims to go beyond passive coexistence, to achieve a developing and
> sustainable way of living together in multicultural societies through the creation
> of *understanding* of, *respect* for and *dialogue* between the different cultural
> groups.

European societies rely on different models to address cultural and religious diversity in education, with different potential consequences for the experiences youth have in schools. For example, Germany, Greece and Ireland prefer the term interculturalism and intercultural education. In contrast, Britain, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States and Malaysia, have historically worked with the concept of multiculturalism (see Nieto and Bode 2007). My view is that multiculturalism can be reconceptualized so that it addresses interaction and integration and thus redefines interculturalism as a form of inclusive or integrative multiculturalism.[14] I return to this point later.

According to Banks (1997), multiculturalism is a concept, an educational reform movement, and a process. For Banks, the intention of multicultural education is to create an environment offering equal education opportunities to students from different racial, ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds, thus preserving and promoting diversity while supporting students in becoming critical thinkers and responsible democratic citizens. To carry out these goals through multicultural education, Banks identified five crucial dimensions: content integration, knowledge construction, prejudice reduction, equity pedagogy, and an empowering school culture (see Banks 2004 for more about each dimension). These five components have a strong impact on the educational achievement of all students, not only ethnic minorities, and also improve intergroup relations among students and staff (Zirkel 2008).

At a time when many see a crisis for the concept of multiculturalism and its potential for integrating ethnic minorities (see the analyses in Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero 2005), governments are increasingly emphasizing social cohesion and return to either an assimilationist approach which emphasizes national culture and values, or an integrationist approach which recognizes cultural diversity but often leans toward assimilation (see also Vertovec 1999, Olsen 1997). The Netherlands, for example, has been a forerunner in multiculturalism since the 1980s, but has shifted recently toward a more integrationist approach with the introduction of integration courses for newcomers

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14   There are others (e.g., Lentin 2001, Malik 1998) who critique both multiculturalist and interculturalist politics as top-down policies. The ideology of multiculturalism, they argue, was developed not as eradication but rather as an accommodation of the persistence of inequalities despite the rhetoric of integration, assimilation and equality.

and a civics test to be undertaken by prospective migrants before departure from their country of origin (see Ter Wal 2007, Vasta 2007).[15] On the other hand, in the face of mounting civil unrest and social exclusion of second-generation immigrant youth, the French government reasserted its civic Republican integration model banning religious symbols from schools (see Kastoryano 2006, Guiraudon 2006).

In the debate over multicultural education and integration models, Germany and England pose uniquely interesting cases. Politicians in Germany recently officially acknowledged that it is now an immigration country and a multicultural society, but the restrictive implementation of the liberal citizenship law of 2000 has led to a decrease in naturalizations (see Schiffauer 2006, Green 2005). In contrast, Britain seems to be the only European country that has not abandoned multiculturalism as a public policy tool, although the Blair and Brown governments introduced a civic integration test and ceremonies in an attempt to revive community cohesion based on an inclusive understanding of Britishness. Meer and Modood (2009) term this a 'civic re-balancing' of British multiculturalism rather than a wholesale 'retreat' (Joppke 2004), or 'backlash' (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

The idea of interculturalism, as distinct from multiculturalism, has hitherto more commonly been found in Dutch and German accounts of integration, particularly in the field of education (Gundara 2000). The British diversity debate has largely excluded any discussion of interculturalism (Gundara and Jacobs 2000).[16] According to Wood, Landry and Bloomfield (2006: 9) 'communication' is the defining characteristic of interculturalism. They argue that communication is the central means through which 'an intercultural approach aims to facilitate dialogue, exchange, and reciprocal understanding between people of different backgrounds'. Given the diversity of migrant countries of origin, the result is not communities but rather a churning mass of languages, ethnicities, and religions all cutting across each other and creating what Vertovec (2007) has called a 'super-diversity'. It is often argued that multiculturalism places too much emphasis on difference and diversity, on what divides us more than what bonds societies together (Goodhart 2004). This then leads to fragmentation and disunity which can be overcome through emphasizing inclusion and cohesion. This study demonstrates how schools differently interpret and work with the concept of multiculturalism (and interculturalism) and the repercussions this has for the identity formation of young people.

There are those who view multicultural education as a response to the diversity and fragmentation of European societies (e.g., Modood 1997), and others who

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15   This 'retreat' from multiculturalism, as Joppke (2004) calls it, follows increasing tensions between national majorities and marginalized Muslim communities in Europe. Such conflicts have included the violence in northern England (2001), the civil unrest in France (2005) and the Danish cartoon crisis (2005).

16   In the late 1990s, a group of theorists around Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997) and May (1999) argued for a critical stance on multiculturalism. It could be argued that interculturalism needs a similarly critical perspective.

describe it as 'a critique of the Eurocentric and in that sense monocultural content and ethos of much of the prevailing system of education' (Parekh 2000: 225). The general ethos pervading the educational system, Parekh contends, highlights the glory and uniqueness of European civilization and underplays or ignores the achievements and contributions of others. A multicultural curriculum needs to satisfy two conditions, Parekh (2000) argues. Firstly, it should not be unduly narrow. Ideally, it should familiarize students with the major representative forms of the subject in question, concentrate on some of them, and so stimulate them that they follow up the rest on their own. Secondly, the way a curriculum is being taught is critical. The author suggests that it is not enough to include different religions, cultures and texts in the curriculum since these elements need to be brought into a dialogue. Multicultural education, Parekh concludes, neither undermines common culture and social unity, nor distorts history. Instead, it is committed to the basic values of liberal society, broadens them to include others, and helps create a plural and richer common culture. Moreover, it fosters social cohesion by enabling students to accept, enjoy and cope with diversity. I will return to this notion of balancing social cohesion and migration-related diversity later in the book.

The final concept informing this study is citizenship, which is also linked with notions of nationality and national identity (Pfetsch 1998). Citizenship is a concept that not only links the nation-state with belonging to Europe but is also important for migrants in the sense that it can be used as a political and educational tool for bonding together ethnic majority and migrant minority communities. Such an integrative or inclusive view of citizenship can be developed at local, national or supranational level. I return to this discussion later in the book. The difference between nationality and citizenship, according to McCrone and Kiely (2000: 25), is that 'the former is in essence a cultural concept which binds people on the basis of shared identity (…) while citizenship is a political concept deriving from people's relationship to the state'. Scholars dispute the relationship between citizenship and identity, with some claiming that citizenship involves a sense of group membership and 'imagined community', while others claim awareness of being a citizen is often no more self-defining than membership of other abstract bureaucratic categories (Jamieson 2002). Definitions of national identity and citizenship often overlap in these debates (see Werbner and Yuval Davis 1999).

Citizenship status continues to be largely granted by nation-states, with many academic commentators seeing European political identities as complementary to, or interacting with, national identities (e.g., Castano 2004, Citrin and Sides 2004, Risse 2004). Yet, according to Faist (2007), there has been a gradual shift from exclusive allegiance across most of the twentieth century to multiple allegiances of citizens at the beginning of the new millennium. Today, more than half of all states tolerate some form of dual citizenship. This shift is inextricably linked with processes of globalization, European integration, democratization, devolution[17]

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17   Devolution describes the pooling of powers from central government to government at regional or local level. It differs from federalism in that the powers devolved

and migration (Beck 2000). Guibernau (2007: 50) observes that 'devolution has strengthened regional identity in Spain, Britain and Canada and, in all three cases, it has promoted the emergence or consolidation of dual identities – regional and national'. The governments of many emigration countries have also encouraged multiple citizenship as a means of maintaining contacts and transnational economic and political links with their diasporas abroad.

In contrast with national citizenship, post-nationalism links citizenship with rights and democratic norms beyond the nation-state, including European and global – or cosmopolitan – citizenship (e.g., Delanty 2000, Kastoryano 2002, Parekh 2008).[18] Transnationalism on the other hand refers to the cross-border lifestyles of citizens and the attempts by national governments to regulate these social formations (e.g., Bauböck 1994, Çaglar 2007, Smith 2007, Wessendorf 2007). Both schools of thought are relevant for understanding the discussions in this book because young people identify with political entities other than the nation-state and, in the case of migrant youth in particular, also develop transnational ties as a result of increased mobility between countries. Habermas (1994), a proponent of post-nationalism, argues for a citizenship model based on residence, a strong public sphere, and constitutional principles. Identity and affiliation, he maintains, are to have the constitution as their reference point (*Verfassungspatriotismus*) rather than the nation, culture or territory. Consequently, Habermas has also argued strongly in favour of a European Constitution. He imagines that when citizens are united by their common affiliation to constitutional principles and are members of a shared political community, citizenship becomes decoupled from national or socio-cultural practices. This conceptualization would allow for social multiculturalism as immigrants and others are not required to surrender their cultural traditions in order to be part of the community (Habermas 1992). Using a similar post-national approach, Benhabib (2005) argues that national identities are undermined by Europeanization, globalization and migration. She divides citizenship into three components: the 'collective identity' of those who are designated as citizens along the lines of shared language, religion, ethnicity, common history and memories; the privileges of 'political membership', in the sense of access to the rights of public autonomy; and the 'entitlement to social rights and benefits'. According to Benhabib, it is no longer nationality or origin but EU citizenship which entitles people to these rights. This gives rise to sub-national as well as supranational modes of identities, and this study demonstrates how ethnic majority and minority youth in Europe relate to these citizenship categories.

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are temporary and ultimately reside in central government. In the United Kingdom, for instance, devolved government was created in 1998 in the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Quebec and Catalonia are further examples of devolved regions.

18   Key authors in the post-national citizenship tradition include Habermas (1994, 2003), Benhabib (2004, 2005), Delanty and Rumford (2005) and Soysal (1994).

Research Design and Methodology

In recent decades, three major approaches have emerged within comparative research in education. Firstly, the detailed documentation approach which, at an early stage of the development of comparative education, established a respect for careful description of the different ways individual systems have for providing for the organization and delivery of education (Crossley and Broadfoot 1992). Secondly, a positivist approach driven by the desire to apply the scientific method in the search for generalizability (e.g., Holmes 1981). And thirdly, a more holistic approach arguing that 'the forces and factors outside the school matter even more than what goes on inside it' and that 'hence the comparative study of education must be founded on an analysis of the social and political ideas which the school reflects (…)' (Kandel 1933: 19). I drew on this latter holistic approach when designing this study.

   The goal of comparative education, according to Broadfoot (1999: 26), is to:

> build on systematic studies of common educational issues, needs or practices as these are realized in diverse cultural settings in order to enhance awareness of possibilities (…) and contribute to the development of a comprehensive socio-cultural perspective. (…) The adoption of a comparative perspective establishes the socio-cultural organizational setting of the education system as the starting point to explore the way in which different approaches to the formal organization of education impact on the development of individual identity and learning.

For a study to be genuinely comparative and cross-national, according to Hantrais and Mangen (1996), researchers should set out to study particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries. In addition, researchers should compare the phenomena in different socio-cultural settings, using the same research methods. The authors argue that comparative studies can result in fresh insights and a deeper understanding of issues that are of central concern in different countries. Comparative studies may also point to possible directions for policy and change.

   However, there are several methodological issues to consider while conducting exploratory cross-national comparative case studies, including that of *equivalence*, or how to study the same issue in different cultures and societies. Pepin (2005) defines conceptual equivalence as referring to the question of whether or not the concepts under study have equivalent, or any, meaning in the cultures which are being considered. This meant that to compare the different meanings of citizenship, Europe and multiculturalism (interculturalism) in the countries under study and look for commonalities and differences, I took measures to ensure that respondents understood exactly what was being examined and asked of them. To this end, I will relate the rather general discussions on Europe, multiculturalism and citizenship in this chapter to the specific German and English contexts in Chapters 2 and 5, thereby showing readers the ways in which I was attentive to local understandings of these broader concepts. Another problem identified by Pepin is that of linguistic