

The Union for the Mediterranean

Edited by
Federica Bicchi and Richard Gillespie



The Union for the Mediterranean

This is the first comprehensive analysis of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), launched in 2008 amid great controversy within the European Union. Affected from the start by negative fallout from the failure of Middle East peace initiatives, its inadequacies have been underlined by the popular movement for regime change in the Arab world.

Leading experts provide here the first integrated analysis of the significance and shortcomings of the UfM. Beginning with critical questioning of the motives and institutional logics informing this venture, the collection proceeds to analyse its key actors, as well as major policy dossiers such as energy and development.

The book explains how and why an initiative aiming to depoliticize Euro-Mediterranean relations in fact proved wide open to political discord, bringing huge disruption to UfM activity. While some aspects are found to have merit, the volume is critical of the way in which EU Mediterranean policy became driven by a narrow range of national interests, lost sight of the political objectives of the preceding Barcelona Process and became overwhelmingly bilateral in approach, at the expense of more ambitious region-building efforts.

It concludes by highlighting the need to reform the EU Mediterranean policy framework in the light of the Arab uprisings of 2011.

This book was previously published as a special issue of *Mediterranean Politics*.

Federica Bicchi is Lecturer in International Relations of Europe at the London School of Economics.

Richard Gillespie is Professor of Politics at the University of Liverpool and founding editor of *Mediterranean Politics*.

Acknowledgements

This publication stems from a collaboration based in the Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool and in the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics, where a highly productive workshop was held on 10 May 2010. This event was funded by a British Academy grant to Richard Gillespie for a project on ‘The Union for the Mediterranean: Significance for the Barcelona Process’ (SG-51979) and contributions from the Centre for International Studies, LSE, as well as Routledge, our publisher. We would also like to express our thanks to EU officials and diplomats from France and the UK for their active participation in the workshop, to the anonymous external reviewer of the collection for some very valuable feedback on an earlier draft, and to all contributors for bearing with us during several rounds of revisions of the papers: we learned a lot in the process and hope the readers will do so too.

Federica Bicchì

Richard Gillespie

The Union for the Mediterranean

Edited by

Federica Bicchi and Richard Gillespie

First published 2012
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2012 Taylor & Francis

This book is a reproduction of *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 16, issue 1. The Publisher requests to those authors who may be citing this book to state, also, the bibliographical details of the special issue on which the book was based.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN13: 978-0-415-68964-9

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Taylor & Francis Books

Disclaimer

The publisher would like to make readers aware that the chapters in this book are referred to as articles as they had been in the special issue. The publisher accepts responsibility for any inconsistencies that may have arisen in the course of preparing this volume for print.

Contents

1. The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean Relations <i>Federica Bicchì</i>	1
2. The UfM's Institutional Structure: Making Inroads towards 'Co-Ownership'? <i>Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués</i>	19
3. France and the Union for the Mediterranean: Individualism versus Co-operation <i>Mireia Delgado</i>	37
4. Adapting to French 'Leadership'? Spain's Role in the Union for the Mediterranean <i>Richard Gillespie</i>	57
5. Germany and Central and Eastern European Countries: Laggards or Veto-Players? <i>Tobias Schumacher</i>	77
6. The UfM and the Middle East 'Peace Process': An Unhappy Symbiosis <i>Rosemary Hollis</i>	97
7. <i>Plus ça change. . .?</i> Israel, the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean <i>Raffaella A. Del Sarto</i>	115
8. The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations <i>Oliver Schlumberger</i>	133
9. A New Beginning? Does the Union for the Mediterranean Herald a New Functionalist Approach to Co-operation in the Region? <i>Patrick Holden</i>	153

CONTENTS

10. The UfM and Development Prospects in the Mediterranean: Making a Real Difference? <i>Diana Hunt</i>	169
11. Third Time Lucky? Euro-Mediterranean Energy Co-operation under the Union for the Mediterranean <i>Hakim Darbouche</i>	191
12. The UfM Found Wanting: European Responses to the Challenge of Regime Change in the Mediterranean <i>Richard Gillespie</i>	211
<i>Index</i>	225

The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean Relations

FEDERICA BICCHI

Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, UK

ABSTRACT *This contribution analyses the set of conditions that made the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) possible, highlighting the change vis-à-vis the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). First, it develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of the actors contributing or opposing the initiative, according to their attitude, motivation and resources invested in the process. Second, it examines the institutional logics that underpin the UfM. It suggests that the UfM was launched because a very small group cajoled an uninterested majority into yet another initiative for the Mediterranean. The outcome represents a shift away from regionalism as conceived in the EMP. At the same time, the Arab–Israeli conflict has politicized and disrupted the agenda of the UfM, as national interests have come to the fore and democracy and human rights have receded.*

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), launched by the French President Sarkozy on 13 July 2008, is the latest development in the history of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The creation of the EEC, which established a customs union among European states, early on posed the problem of how to relate to their southern neighbours in economic terms and then, as the Europeans endeavoured to find a common voice in foreign affairs, in political terms too. The Global Mediterranean Policy (1972), the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (1990), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (1995), all embodied these attempts at finding a common platform for dealing with Mediterranean non-members.

The latest addition by Sarkozy introduces a set of novelties, the consequences of which are still unknown. It creates a co-presidency for the southern rim, while it institutionalizes meetings at the top level of heads of state and government, as well as a small Secretariat.¹ It emphasizes the partnership between the public and the private sectors. It stresses functional projects among bordering countries.²

It expands membership to include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Monaco. After the ‘big bang’ of the EMP, which expanded the number of issues on the agenda and the institutional setting of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the UfM thus recalibrates the balance by fine-tuning some key aspects.

In academic terms, this represents a challenge, as it raises a set of important questions. Why was the UfM launched? What conditions made it possible (and, for some, desirable)? What is the meaning of the changes it has introduced? What likely outcomes can we expect? These are the issues that this collection sets out to address. The aim in this contribution is to look at the broad framework, the specific parts of which will be the focus of the following contributions.

As with any political initiative, the UfM epitomizes a time-specific political context, which is bound to affect future developments. It is borne out of and interacting with the political agential inputs that key players in the area aim to impress onto the overall system, within a broader set of macro- and micro-trends. At the same time, it is bound to have an impact on future interactions. In this respect, the UfM is not exceptional, as various types of institutionalist analysis argue. As Riker put it (1980: 445), institutions are ‘congealed’ preferences. Whereas preferences tend to vary relatively often, the decision to establish an institutional framework crystallizes a set of preferences and a specific constellation of powers. The reach of those preferences and powers is thus extended across time. The institutional setting is therefore not only the symptom of its time, but it also affects the near future by creating the playing field within which new and possibly different preferences will come to have relevance. This argument is shared by scholars from a sociological perspective, who contest the micro-analysis of rational choice, but embrace the view of institutions as shared rules, practices and normative understandings that resist change (March and Olsen, 1989).

The academic challenge is to understand where the UfM comes from, what set of preferences, rules and practices it embodies and to which likely outcomes and appropriate behaviours it is going to lead. More specifically, the UfM must be understood in relation to the EMP and to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004. While the UfM embodies a dynamics of its own, it was established in a thick institutional context. Therefore, while bringing a degree of novelty and rising out of a radically different political context, the UfM is expected to relate to an already well-established set of practices and roles.

There are elements of both continuity and change embodied in the UfM. Much can be said in favour of continuity. The country promoting the UfM was no surprise for Euro-Mediterranean relations. Once again, France championed the cause of the Mediterranean while making a case for France’s international profile.³ The processes that motivated the actors involved also seemed very much the same. Security, migration, energy, development, Arab–Israeli relations – all are issues the roots of which go back at times to the 1970s. They seem to remain the top priorities for all countries involved, regardless of the everlasting differences in approach. The southern Mediterranean countries welcomed the international attention that the initiative once again drew. Moreover, much of the fundamental structure of the EMP went untouched. At the core, the organizational setting remained the same, despite

the addition of the Secretariat, co-presidency and top level meetings. The issues addressed in the multilateral discussion also continue to largely reflect the agenda of the EMP, although it could be argued that their normative value has changed.

Much can also be said in favour of change, regardless of the degree of apparent continuity. It cannot be assumed that an exuberant French president is all it takes to explain the new initiative, if only because the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations has substantially changed since the EMP was launched. The EU has undergone its biggest enlargement, nearly doubling in size. The shadow of enlargement was one of the triggers of the EMP (Barbé, 1998) and was thus somehow encompassed in the Euro-Mediterranean architecture of the 1990s. Most importantly, the nature of European integration seems to have subtly changed, and so has the EU agenda. The Franco-German integration engine has largely ground to a halt, leaving room for initiatives led by a small number of countries and, most crucially for our case, for French efforts to regain a leading role. The attack on multilateralism seems to have occurred in Euro-Mediterranean relations too, with a shift of emphasis in governance structures for co-operation. The existence of multilateral fora (a legacy of the EMP) seems to have lost relevance vis-à-vis the increase in bilateral relations (especially with the ENP) and notwithstanding the continuity of the EU unilateral financial instruments towards the area. The 'dialogue' about democracy and human rights has vanished. Moreover, in the Middle East there is no peace process to speak of. The Obama Administration faces a particularly hard-line Israeli Administration and no serious negotiations are in evidence. While falling short of a revolution, all these changes certainly represent a substantial evolution from the mid-1990s to now.

The argument presented here, which is to be read in dialogue with the following contributions, is that, despite appearances, change prevails over continuity. Although people not versed in the details of Euro-Mediterranean relations would be excused if they struggled to perceive a difference between the EMP and the UfM, this contribution will put forward the thesis that the UfM is the symptom of different political preferences on the part of the main actors and it is going to impress a different direction on Euro-Mediterranean relations, marking the UfM as a step in the fragmentation of an artificial region.

The following analysis focuses on actors and institutional logics, and on how the institutional order of Euro-Mediterranean relations has reflected a change in emphasis in these two dimensions. The first part focuses on the conceptual categories for the analysis of actors, in order to examine which actors have made the UfM possible and which have resisted it. The second part will address institutional logics, namely regionalism-bilateralism and functionalism-politicization, showing that the UfM reflects a weakened regionalism in the area (including within the EU) and displays a high degree of regional politicization, due to the collapsed Arab-Israeli peace process. The last part will bridge the analysed dimensions and compare them across time. It will show that, thanks to the entrepreneurial and/or leadership efforts of key actors, the institutional setting of Euro-Mediterranean relations has shifted from 'regionalism+politicization' in the EMP, to 'bilateralism+functionalism' with the ENP, to 'bilateralism+politicization' in the UfM.

Actors

The focus on actors and the UfM raises the questions of who did it, why, by what means, and what role the other actors played or, to put it differently, what kind of dynamics emerged among so-called partners. The story of how the UfM came about has been told elsewhere (see Bauchard, 2008; Gillespie, 2008; Balfour, 2009). It is well established that France was in the driving seat in leading the initiative. While the UfM can be seen as a one man's effort, in the person of the French president, the dynamics that it engendered were much more complex than that. The issue arrived on the political agenda 'from above', as a result of high domestic politics. But the structure launched in 2008 differed from the early proposal by Sarkozy in 2007 in several respects, most importantly in terms of membership, which eventually included 43 countries (27 EU member states, 12 EMP partners on the southern Mediterranean rim and 4 new additions, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Monaco). Moreover, very much like the run-up to the Barcelona Conference, the momentum behind the launching of the UfM developed 'first and foremost [as] an aspect of European foreign policy' (Gillespie, 2008: 278). But the preliminary interactions went beyond the borders of the EU. The reaction of the southern countries to the preliminary version of the UfM showed an increased determination to participate as full members in the new framework and criticisms tended to focus on the extent to which the new initiative would allow the full expression of such an intention.⁴ It is thus important to scrutinize the role of the participant countries in bringing about the initiative, in order to forecast the potential for change of the UfM.

There are three characteristics that are useful in identifying the role that various actors played in bringing about the UfM (and policy initiatives in general): attitude, motivation and amount of resources invested. The attitude of actors is the first step in analysing the dynamics of agenda setting and decision making. Did actors support the initiative or did they try to resist it? In general terms, we can distinguish actors among leaders, laggards, and fence-sitting actors. According to the amount of resources invested, leaders playing a central role *against* an initiative can, however, act as veto-players, blocking its adoption. Moreover, the motivation of leaders helps to distinguish between, on the one hand, strategic leaders and, on the other, genuine entrepreneurs that strive to achieve consensus in the name of the common good. Finally, marginal players might behave as low-profile supporters or unhappy laggards, but they can also strategically look for side payments in exchange for their support or collectively block developments through lack of enthusiasm.

While France obviously supported the initiative and can be identified as the main actor behind it,⁵ the other key actor was Germany, though not in its traditional role. France put the issue of the Mediterranean on the EU agenda in an indirect way, as the *Union Méditerranéenne* (UM) was sketched out to a domestic audience, by a yet-to-be-elected candidate for the Presidency. Once the elections were over, the new president did not involve the EU and on the contrary continued to work on a proposal that would have marginalized it. Germany's reaction was fence-sitting at first, and then 'calling the bluff' by acting as a veto-player.⁶ Based on the old saying of 'no taxation without representation', Germany's role was pivotal in bringing

about substantial changes to the initiative and in establishing a role for the EU. While the amount of material resources invested by Germany in the endeavour was not high, the political capital invested in facing Sarkozy was substantial and very public, although it was not alone. In fact, Germany spearheaded a group of countries that preferred the involvement of the entire EU and the continuation of the EMP in a different guise. This silent majority was composed not only of northern European countries, but also of Arab ones (see Driss, 2009: 2; Kausch and Youngs, 2009: 963; Schlumberger, this collection). These countries were unhappy laggards, which at times played fence-sitting and waited for Germany to take the lead in suggesting/imposing reforms to the initial project.⁷

Since the shift from the *Union Méditerranéenne* to the UfM, central and eastern European countries oscillated between being low profile supporters, favour exchangers and unhappy laggards, calling for an eastern equivalent and thus supporting the Eastern Partnership (see Schumacher, this collection). Other northern European countries, such as the UK, maintain a low profile on the issue, reflecting the low priority assigned to the dossier and the lack of interest in what is regarded as an essentially French political game.

Spain and Italy tried to work as co-entrepreneurs,⁸ but they met with the determination with which France tried to establish itself as the sole leader. This pattern broke with the co-operation that had emerged between France and Spain in the run-up to the Barcelona Conference, and it was instead inspired by previous forms of co-operation. In the case of the EMP, Spain invested a great deal of political capital in promoting the initiative from the early 1990s, but it was ready to co-ordinate with France, which since 1994 and until the Barcelona conference behaved as a de facto co-entrepreneur with Spain (Gillespie, 1997: 38). The run-up to the launch of the UfM was instead a very French endeavour, which resembled French behaviour leading to the GMP in 1972. At the time, capitalizing on the ongoing discussions about the role of Mediterranean countries during a period of détente, France outmanoeuvred other proposals on the table to promote the first EEC initiative towards the Mediterranean (Bicchi, 2007: 91–7). Similar to the UfM, the French activism entailed a number of ‘surprises’ for its European partners before they reached a common decision on the GMP.⁹ In 2008, France did not limit surprises for its partners to the issue of the Mediterranean (Schwarzer, 2008: 366), although the lack of communication on this dossier represented a major breach to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’s plea for solidarity among member states on matters of foreign policy. Southern European partners were thus relegated to the role of low-profile supporter or favour exchanger, despite the amount of resources poured into the issue, as has been the case for Spain.

Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Israel were the countries whose attitudes remained consistently (although not vocally) negative about the new endeavour. From the point of view of Turkey, a central role in the Mediterranean could not in any way compensate for the lack of a role in Europe (Schmid, 2008). At the same time, Turkey’s attitude was also lukewarm towards the EMP; yet, despite that, Turkey has been very active in negotiating free trade agreements with southern Mediterranean countries along the lines of the Euro-Med Association Agreements. Although this is a legal requirement related to Turkey’s customs union with the EU in 1995, Turkey

has embraced the endeavour with both an economic and a political interest, at times succeeding where the EU has failed, as in the case of Syria or Georgia.¹⁰ The attitude is thus negative but functional and conditional on the achievement of some tangible benefits. Israel is a similar case (see Del Sarto, this collection). Having largely benefited from the increased bilateralism embodied in the ENP, any return to a multilateral forum detracted from the status quo. However, while France represented for Turkey an obstacle on the path to full membership, Israel perceived France (and more specifically Sarkozy) as a crucial ally in relations with the EU. Both countries thus were laggards that needed to be bought off at specific moments in time in order to become favour exchangers instead of veto-players.

The picture that emerges from this analysis thus suggests that the UfM developed as the outcome of the efforts of a small number of countries. France, supported at its discretion to by Spain and Italy, accepted a crucial change in the original plan in order to achieve the acquiescence of a large set of countries, represented by Germany, which favoured more continuity with the EMP than in the original plan. Since this fundamental compromise, the history of the UfM has comprised a set of small compromises to buy off a number of strategic but relatively marginal players against a background largely of indifference to or disillusion with political change in Euro-Mediterranean relations. To put it in politically incorrect terms, the UfM was launched because a very small group cajoled an uninterested majority into yet another initiative for the Mediterranean. However, now that potential dissenters have been bought off with side payments, a majority of participants have a stake in the project, though generally small and potentially counterproductive for the common good of Euro-Mediterranean relations. As a consequence, the UfM can rely on a limited amount of political capital in case of difficulties, because it represents different things to different actors.

Institutional Logics¹¹

The institutional architecture embodied by the UfM is another aspect worth considering in detail. Every institutional design expresses a political plan. In relation to the Euro-Mediterranean organizational context within which it is situated, the UfM represents a shift of emphasis in two key dichotomies: regionalism/bilateralism, and functionalism/politicization. The UfM represents a shift away from regionalism as conceived in the EMP and a further weakening of the region-building strategy of the EU in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the expected depoliticization of the regional dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations is unlikely to take place.

Regionalism/Bilateralism

The regionalist strategy of the EU¹² has a long, dual history (Bicchi, 2007). It started with the GMP, when member states ‘invented’ the Mediterranean as a political area that was homogenous enough to justify addressing all parts in the same way. The GMP consisted in nearly identical, parallel bilateral channels, with no multilateral framework however. One of the main novelties of the EMP (if not the main one) was

rather the degree of regionalism embedded in the endeavour and the multilateral setting it created. The EMP thus set out to ‘construct’ the Mediterranean, by establishing a semi-permanent, multilateral dialogue on a very broad agenda, as indicated by the three baskets of the Barcelona Declaration. Faced with a number of perceived security issues, the EU addressed them by region-building, in the form of regional dialogues, rather than by intensifying intra-European security co-operation (Adler and Crawford, 2006). The extent to which this was done with the final goal to create a common Euro-Mediterranean region, rather than a separate non-European Mediterranean region (e.g. Pace, 2006) is a matter for discussion. The nature of the relationship often corresponded ‘more to a soft form of hegemony than to a partnership’ (Philippart, 2003: 215), largely reflecting the imbalance in terms of economic and political power (cf. Holden 2009). Nevertheless, the institutionalization of the EMP’s multilateral dimension was an undeniable achievement in comparison with the former 20+ years of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The ENP, on the contrary, re-introduced a strong degree of bilateralism (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005). The ‘regatta approach’, the granting of ‘advanced status’ to selected partner(s) and the negotiation of agreements in addition to the Euro-Med Association Agreements signalled that the relationship between the multilateral dialogue among all participants and the agenda for bilateral relations was reversed: rather than the multilateral dialogue setting the themes to be then adopted and adapted in bilateral relations, bilateral relations were to explore avenues that could not be addressed at the multilateral level. Only one indication remained of the ambitious plan for a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, namely the pan-Euro-Mediterranean protocol on rules of origins, which does contribute to the original goal, but in a much less demanding way.

The Union for the Mediterranean represents a further step towards bilateralism and away from regionalism, in at least two ways. First, a key aim of UfM is to promote projects among groups of willing countries (see Darbouche, this collection; Hunt, this collection), especially in geographically contiguous areas. Potential for sub-regional co-operation certainly exists (see Darbouche, this collection). Moreover, the shift of emphasis can be depicted as a sign of pragmatism (Seeberg, 2010), attracting rather than coercing countries into co-operation. At the same time, the importance assigned to the sub-regional level implicitly recognizes that the regional level cannot deliver. Its institutionalization sets an order of preferences different from the all-inclusive, multilateral setting. It stresses coalitions of the willing based on functional complementarities or overlapping visions more than it promotes ambitious plans to create common political projects out of dissent. In short, it downsizes the political significance of EU foreign policy towards the area, although it also introduces a degree of realism.

Second, the increase in the number of participants further contributes to the dilution of regionalism. If consensus in the EMP was difficult, the addition of three south-eastern European countries is not going to make it easier. On the contrary, by increasing the range of diverse interests that must be accommodated, it amplifies the need to focus on sub-regional projects and the related impossibility to achieve anything substantial with over 40 members.

The diminished emphasis on regionalism and multilateralism is not limited to Euro-Mediterranean relations. On the contrary, it very much characterizes intra-EU relations on matters of foreign affairs, as best exemplified by the substance of the UfM and by the way in which EU member states came to an agreement on the UfM. The matter focused on different visions about the extent to which Europe and the EU should have featured in the new initiative, which sparked an intergovernmental discussion among member states. While the matter was debated at EU meetings, the main decisions were not taken therein, but rather at the national level or in bilateral contacts. The French proponents of the UM looked to the EU to provide a large proportion of the mixed funding plans for the new initiative, but their thinking was not about how to work through the EU framework to bring about the new initiative. Rather, France sought to offset German pre-eminence in the EU by thwarting attempts to adopt common EU positions in relation to the Mediterranean, while getting its UM initiative off the ground through selective unilateral approaches at the bilateral level, initially primarily to the Mediterranean countries.

Since the formal launch of the UfM, all participants have more or less readily accommodated an intergovernmental(ist) approach to the UfM (Gillespie, forthcoming), which contributes to the fragmentation of the multilateral logic previously embedded in the EMP. France has continued to impress an intergovernmental character on the debate, by managing to extend its co-presidency of the UfM to two years. It did so by persuading the Czech Republic, Sweden (reluctantly) and Spain to surrender their own rights derived from their successive EU presidencies.¹³ Italy has also embraced an intergovernmentalist approach under its traditional 'European' discourse (Tassinari and Holm, 2010: 15–16). More generally, this chimes well with the nature of discussions within the CFSP, which since the 2004 enlargement have emphasized the relevance of minilateral gatherings, with a small group of countries co-ordinating their actions with a view to affecting the negotiations between the 27.¹⁴ Southern Mediterranean countries have happily followed the new tune, which suits their geopolitical strategies much better.

In the light of the above, the discussion about the extent to which the UfM reinforces rather than replaces the EMP is anodyne, as the UfM follows from the EMP but it fundamentally changes one (though not just one) of its main aspects. While the UfM *de facto* continues the EMP, its structures and its agenda, it has scaled back its multilateral component. The substance of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation is thus no longer bloc to bloc (EU+Med) as in the EMP, or bloc to single country (EU+single Med countries) as in the ENP, but single country to single country.

The 'convergence of civilization', in favour of which Adler and Crawford (2006) have argued, has thus suffered a setback because of the weakened region-building strategy of the EU.¹⁵ This development is related not only to developments in the Arab–Israeli peace process (on which more below), but also to the intra-European fragmentation. How lasting the consequences of this shift are going to be remains to be seen, although at the moment it is fair to agree with Kausch and Youngs (2009: 963) that the legacy of the EMP is 'on life-support'.

Functionalism/Politicization

The second fundamental dichotomy in the analysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations is the juxtaposition of functionalism and politicization. Much of this dichotomy reflects the low/high politics spectrum (see Holden, this collection). In this respect, the UfM displays a complex pattern. It was marketed as a 'relaunch' of Euro-Mediterranean relations, which would rescue it from the creeping politicization of all dossiers. However, at the moment it is questionable whether it has delivered an increase in the functional logic. At the same time, it has so far decreased the overall political significance of Euro-Mediterranean relations, while being unable to resist the creeping ascent of national interests. In the shift from a more regionalist to a more bilateral and intergovernmentalist approach, the level of politicization of technical dossiers has remained relatively high, thanks to the collapse of the Arab–Israeli peace process, although preferences institutionalized in the new structure are more parochial and partisan than before.

At first glance, there is an increase in functionalism.¹⁶ The UfM has been defined as 'a union of projects' (or, more to the point, 'a project of projects'). In this respect, it represents a number of ambitious innovations, leading to the creation of specialized technical agencies as well as new political and administrative institutions. It also calls for a new partnership between public and private, especially in the financing of the new projects, including the possibility of an involvement of capital from the Gulf countries and the creation of a new financial instrument, possibly funded by creating a subsidiary of the European Investment Bank.¹⁷ The new projects would however occur in an area in which there is already substantial activity, much of which was set in motion by the EMP (Emerson, 2008). It is thus difficult to see the UfM as a genuine 'opportunity' to introduce more enlightened policies in this respect, as diplomatic circles in Paris suggest.

Moreover, apart from the case of solar energy (see Darbouche, this collection), the current situation does not suggest how opportunities might turn into concrete achievements, as little interest has so far emerged on several dossiers and rumours abound about the potential bankruptcy of the UfM Secretariat. A test of commitment will be whether southern Mediterranean countries start to propose new fields of action for future UfM projects. Thus far the project proposals have come mostly from France and then have been modified and reduced in number on the basis of negotiation with interested EU member states and Commission officials.

While functionalism might not become the new foundation stone of Euro-Mediterranean relations, politicization at the regional level of dossiers remains high, although in a different form than in the EMP. At present, we can distinguish three separate processes affecting the politicization of the UfM: 1) the Arab–Israeli conflict has come to affect the schedule of and the topics on the Euro-Med agenda, 2) national interests, promoting country-specific issues, have also come to the fore, 3) good governance and human rights have descended in the list of priorities.

First, the most prominent driver of politicization in Euro-Mediterranean relations is the Arab–Israeli conflict. The link between Euro-Mediterranean relations and the Middle East (and Arab–Israeli relations more specifically) exists for a number of

reasons: the symbiotic relationship that many (especially in the EU) saw between the Barcelona Process and the Middle East peace process in the past; the direct involvement of several Mediterranean partners in the conflict; the wider resonance of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the Arab countries and in Europe; and the fact that, among several conflicts around the Mediterranean Basin, it remains a ‘hot’ conflict, rather than a frozen one. The UfM came into being without any contemporaneous progress in diplomatic peace-making efforts between Israel and the Arab countries, although diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon were being normalized at the time. This was a development showcased at the Paris summit in 2008, but which in fact has not shown any progress since.

We are now witnessing a nearly complete symbiosis between the UfM and the Arab–Israeli conflict (see Hollis, this collection). The merger has occurred slowly but relentlessly, as demonstrated by the increasing relevance of the fallout from Arab–Israeli relations on the EMP/UfM agenda, helped by the increasing importance of parochial national interests. The sequence is worth looking at in detail¹⁸ in order to fully appreciate the growing impact of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the parallel slowdown of the proceedings.

The first very public halt to the EMP occurred in 2005, when the first top level summit, organized by the British Presidency of the EU and Spain to mark 10 years since the Barcelona Conference, failed at the last minute when all the southern Mediterranean heads of state and government, apart from Turkey and the Palestinian Authority, failed to show up in a loosely organized protest against the perceived pushiness of the EU in promoting the ‘fourth basket’ (migration and internal security). This had little direct link to Arab–Israeli relations. Prior to 2005, however, Lebanon and Syria had already boycotted ministerial meetings in Egypt and in Morocco because of Israel’s official presence in an Arab country, as well as sending low level representations at times of tension on the Arab–Israeli front.

Interestingly, the war in Lebanon in 2006 did not halt the EMP proceedings. Arab countries threatened to boycott meetings, but the Finnish Presidency of the EU at the time made it clear that meetings would take place whether participants liked it or not. It thus exerted a steering role that it will be impossible to achieve under the UfM co-presidency without the co-operation of the co-president (unlikely, in such an occurrence).

The ink on the UfM Declaration was not yet dry when the working schedule ground to a halt because of Israel’s opposition to the incorporation of the Arab League as an observer with rights to intervene (see Del Sarto, this collection). While it had become customary for a representative of the Arab League to participate in EMP meetings, the UfM offered the opportunity to formalize this participation. Participant countries found an agreement in that sense, as expressed in a mention in the Declaration issued at the Paris summit in July 2008. However, when the Arab League representative made a statement at the very first meeting in September 2008, Israel objected and argued that in its understanding, the Paris Declaration did not grant the right to speak to the Arab League representative. The issue brought meetings to a stop until November 2008. Shortly afterwards, the Gaza war, which spanned across December 2008–January 2009, led this time to the Arab boycott of

all meetings, which was protracted until July 2009, when meetings were restarted first at the very low end of the hierarchy and progressively climbing to higher levels. The election of Netanyahu further complicated things during this period, as it hardened both sides, with some Arab countries objecting to a restart of the proceedings with an Israeli government that had not yet recognized the two states solution.

As soon as low level meetings had resumed in summer 2009, negotiations suffered a further setback. The personal row between the Egyptian and the Israeli ministers of foreign affairs escalated to the point of Egypt declaring a boycott of the ministerial meeting in Istanbul in November 2009. Here too, the institution of the co-presidency worked against a common political Euro-Mediterranean project, as Egypt called for the cancellation of the meeting in its role of co-president, claiming that it represented the position of all Arab countries, whereas North African countries did not see eye to eye with Egypt on this occasion. Turkey being the host of the cancelled meeting made it easier for Egypt to disrupt the UfM proceedings.

2010 did not start off any better and ended even worse. Three sectoral meetings (devoted to water,¹⁹ tourism²⁰ and agriculture²¹) were hampered because of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Despite having reached a consensus on the working programme, the ministerial meeting on water failed to issue a final declaration because participants could not agree on how to refer to the ‘occupied territories’. The difficulties in organizing the second summit bringing together heads of state and government soon became overwhelming, despite the efforts of Spain and of Moratinos in particular. In order to avoid clashes among foreign ministers, it was envisaged that the preparatory meeting might be held at the level of senior officials instead. However, the photo opportunity for all sides in the Arab–Israeli conflict was not justified by the results of the resumed proximity talks. There was very little chance of glory, and this (together with the thorny issue of the European co-presidency) affected the commitment of France to a summit in June. Spain had thus to accept a postponement to November 2010, although the venue would still be Barcelona. France tried to separate the Middle East from the UfM by suggesting a conference on the former in Paris at the beginning of November, followed by the UfM summit. But given the breakdown in negotiations after the resumption of construction of Israeli settlements in September 2010, both events were cancelled and, at the time of writing,²² no further date has been set for the UfM summit.

This timeline thus shows that while the EMP has encountered some substantial difficulties in the last few years of its existence, meetings in the UfM have been affected by the Arab–Israeli conflict to an unprecedented degree. Since the creation of the UfM, the calendar of meetings has hardly worked without disruption. In fact, there were barely any low level meetings in the first year of the UfM existence, while there have been no meetings of foreign ministers since the end of the French Presidency in 2008, not to mention the absence of further summits. Even sectoral meetings have now fallen prey to the Arab–Israeli conflict. It is thus ironic that some critics of the Barcelona Process have argued that it was too closely linked to the Middle East peace process initiated by the Oslo Agreements and that, in order to succeed in relation to regional development objectives, a new initiative was needed.

As the recent experience shows, the new institutional framework has not escaped the politicization of the issue. On the contrary, it has witnessed the near complete overlapping of agendas.

There is a second, less prominent but equally substantial, strand of politicization in the UfM, which relates to national interests. The UfM is vulnerable to fallout from an increased number of regional conflicts and disputes, now that the Partnership has expanded in the western Balkans. Tensions between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus also affected UfM activity in the first half of 2009, as Greece and Cyprus opposed Turkey being given a deputy secretary-general post in the UfM. The opposition faded when Turkey in exchange agreed to drop its standard opposition to Cyprus holding international posts. Cyprus, Greece and Turkey would have agreed to resolve their differences without blocking negotiations within the UfM, though. The whole process of the choice of deputy secretary-generals was a chapter in the increasing horse-trading techniques that participants were exerting in the definition of institutional details. Jordan secured the secretary-general position early on in the dispute, while the number of deputies, which eventually climbed to six, testifies to the various trade-offs (see Johansson-Nogués, this collection). Moreover, northern European countries kept themselves out of the dispute, and in fact of several other roles as participants, such as in the creation of the financial institution in which the Germans and the British, among others, have declined to participate.

These politicization processes parallel an equally strong third process, which works in the opposite direction. The UfM has marked the depoliticization of one of the very few progressive chapters in Euro-Mediterranean relations, namely human rights and good governance. As argued in the literature, the emphasis is shifting from good governance to 'good enough governance' (Kausch and Youngs, 2009: 974; Tassinari and Holms, 2010), which stems from 'pragmatic' considerations (Seeberg, 2010) and substantial downscaling of ambitions in this field. The political project of 'constructing a Mediterranean region' based on democracy and human rights has been largely abandoned amid a progressive fragmentation of efforts.

The overall balance of the UfM on the dimension ranging from functionalism to politicization is simultaneously an increase in the politicization of Euro-Mediterranean relations *and* a step in the direction of depoliticization.²³ It is highly politicized at the regional level, because of the Arab–Israeli conflict, while at the same time it is depoliticized in its content, because of the low interest in any project of political transformation. Paradoxically, but not so much so given the nature of internal Arab politics, the high politicization of Arab–Israeli relations is instrumental to the depoliticization of an agenda for domestic change: the higher the Arab–Israeli conflict remains in the attention of European and Arab audiences, the less scrutiny Arab rulers have to endure.

Therefore, the overall picture of the UfM in terms of institutional logics is complex. Regionalism has lost its appeal, while intergovernmental, bilateral relations have gained in relevance, both within the EU and in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Mediterranean countries never having been big fans of regionalism). Whereas a functionalist shift might take place, and if so only in the long run, the expected decline in politicization of the Arab–Israeli conflict did not occur. On

the contrary, it took a turn for the worse, with near complete overlapping between the two agendas. The Barcelona Conference declared the EMP and the Middle East peace process ‘separate but complementary’. The relationship between the UfM and the Arab–Israeli conflict can instead be described as ‘overlapping and contradictory’. In parallel, transformative projects of the international context in the Mediterranean and of the domestic context of Mediterranean countries have lost their urgency and have slipped down the political agenda.

From the EMP to the ENP to the UfM: The Evolution of Euro-Mediterranean Relations in the Post-Cold War Order

What is the evolution of Euro-Mediterranean relations since the end of the Cold War? The factors highlighted so far contribute to illuminate the trajectory from the EMP to the UfM, based on the assumption mentioned above that institutions embody actors’ preferences at specific moments in time, capturing the *Zeitgeist*-like pictures. If we cross the two institutional dimensions analysed above and assume that events ranging from entrepreneurial actors to the state of Middle East conflicts and securitization of EU policies drive the institutionalization process,²⁴ we come up with a picture that (in a broad generalization) resembles the one depicted in [Figure 1](#).

The masterpiece of the post-Cold War context was the EMP.²⁵ People launching the EMP captured the spirit of the time by thinking the previously unthinkable: the EU responded to newly perceived security threats with a highly political and innovative project to create a Euro-Mediterranean region (see Adler and Crawford 2006). It was a truly regional framework, for the first time in Euro-Mediterranean relations. And it was a very political initiative too, based on the intention by EU member states in particular to transform relations with and within their southern neighbours, the former being the precondition for the latter. The extent to which economic relations were the main driver of the process can be discussed. There is little doubt however that even the economic projects embodied by the EMP (most notably the Euro-Med FTA and the Euro-Med Association Agreements) had a highly political flavour due to their scope and breadth.

Fast forward a decade and in comes the ENP, with a very different institutional setting. The emphasis here is on bilateral relations, with no reference to regional

	Functionalism	Politicization
Regionalism		EMP (1995)
Bilateralism	ENP (2004)	UfM (2010)

Figure 1. The institutional logics of the EU initiatives towards its Southern neighbours.

aspects including all members beyond a generic reference to the ‘neighbourhood’. Moreover, the official discourse, as well as the daily practice, is imbued with references to specific projects and technical agreements. The common (bilateral) dialogues centre on the ‘management’ of the Association Agreements. There is a discussion about political issues, including political developments inside Mediterranean countries, but its value is limited and unconnected to the rest of the negotiations.

The UfM represents a further development. It is possible to argue that the original French project, which involved just countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, was a regional one, although not centred on a Euro-Mediterranean region. Moreover, part of France’s motivation for promoting a new institutional structure was to shift the focus away from the highly contentious and politicized issue of Middle East relations. In its early UM formulation, therefore, the project should have fallen into the empty cell in the matrix in [Figure 1](#), combining regionalism with functionalism. However, as this contribution has argued, the context within which the project was discussed did not allow for such an outcome and pushed the UfM into the ‘bilateralism+politicization’ category.

Despite its post-Cold War setting, the UfM, more than the EMP did, thus marks the current difficulties or even the impossibility to go beyond the challenges that have characterized Euro-Mediterranean relations since the end of World War II. In that respect, the decision by France to shake the institutional order of Euro-Mediterranean relations at a moment of low intra-EU and intra-Euro-Mediterranean co-operation was not helpful, as even if co-operation increases in the future, this institutional structure will continue to cast its shadow.²⁶

Conclusion

The institutional setting created in July 2008 represents a change not only in the name but also in the substance of Euro-Mediterranean relations, although the ultimate extent of its impact is still unclear.

The UfM developed as the outcome of the efforts of a minority of countries cajoling a majority into accepting a new initiative for the Mediterranean. France, supported by Spain and Italy when necessary, led the initiative, though at first restricted just to riverain countries. However, it had to accept the active involvement of the EU in order to achieve the acquiescence of Germany and of a broad set of other countries from northern and eastern Europe, as well as Arab countries, favouring more continuity with the EMP than in the original plan. Israel and, even more so, Turkey have been lukewarm supporters of the initiative, as it diluted their special relationship with the EU. Dissent has led to side payments in order to avoid laggards becoming veto-players. Given the ad hoc nature of this agential coalition, the UfM has come to represent different things to different actors, with a limited political capital at its core.

The institutional logics embedded in the new structure mark a further shift away from the region-building strategy of the EU, which characterized the EMP. As the emphasis falls on sub-regional projects and the participants’ number increases, the political project of creating a region in the area is diluted and political ambitions

downsized. Contrary to expectations, the Arab–Israeli conflict, which has loomed over the last few years of the EMP, is now in near complete symbiosis with the UfM, influencing the pace of proceedings as well as the substance of negotiations. The dialogue on democracy and human rights is silenced. The UfM thus displays a complex pattern of politicization and de-politicization, while the functional aspects have yet to come into fruition.

It would be pointless to be nostalgic regarding the EMP. The UfM has come about because of and reflecting a different constellation of preferences. Since the launch of the ENP, the political context around the Mediterranean has changed, both in the EU, with enlargement, and in the Middle East, with a hardening of positions around the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the last few years, the conflict has been more intractable than ever and counters any region-building attempts in the area. At the same time, the EU has not been particularly ambitious in its foreign policy and it is still digesting the effects of enlargement and of the Lisbon Treaty. As the game got tough, the EU members have not been among the toughest joining the play, at least in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The main criticism that can be levelled against the UfM is that it was created at a time when no common discourse of the Mediterranean really existed, not even in the EU, and therefore the UfM, because of the nature of institutions, has ‘congealed’ this set of preferences. Even if the context undergoes positive changes, including in the Middle East, the UfM might not be able to quickly take them on board.

One issue thus remains open: if this is the state of affairs, what can be achieved in the area via intergovernmental, sub-regional or bilateral, co-operation?²⁷ Are we going to witness an exponential growth of small projects, which ideally would combine to support a functionalist approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations? Or the little projects agreed will not be cumulative or even point in different directions? Or, finally, is the UfM the kiss of death for Euro-Mediterranean relations, doomed to oblivion? We are living in interesting times, but for reasons that profoundly differ from those highlighted after the creation of the EMP.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Richard Gillespie, whose idea it was to have an academic discussion and a special issue of *Mediterranean Politics* on the UfM and who co-drafted an earlier version of this paper, as well as commenting extensively on further versions. I am also very grateful for comments from the participants at the workshop ‘The Union for the Mediterranean: Continuity or Change in Euro-Mediterranean Relations?’ (London School of Economics, 10 May 2010) and to the participants at the workshop organised by Ulla Holm and Fabrizio Tassinari on Euro-Mediterranean relations (Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 4 June 2010). I also thank Michelle Pace for written comments and an anonymous (and very fair) reviewer. The usual disclaimers apply.

Notes

- ¹ See Johansson-Nogués (this collection) on the novelties introduced by the UfM and its institutional structure.
- ² For energy co-operation, see Darbouche (this collection).
- ³ On French entrepreneurship, see Delgado (this collection).
- ⁴ On the reaction of Southern countries, see Del Sarto and Schlumberger (this collection).

THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

- ⁵ On France, see Delgado (this collection).
- ⁶ As Tobias Schumacher puts it (in this collection).
- ⁷ Interview, official in Germany's Permanent Representation in Brussels, May 2008.
- ⁸ On Spain, see Gillespie (this collection).
- ⁹ Including, arguably, in the run-up to the Euro-Arab Dialogue in 1973–74 (Bicchi, 2007: 102–103).
- ¹⁰ I would like to thank Serah Kecec for this point.
- ¹¹ This part benefits from an earlier draft written jointly together with Richard Gillespie.
- ¹² See Holden, this collection, for a discussion of the terms regionalism and regionalization.
- ¹³ At the time of writing, it is not yet clear how the controversy is going to be resolved within the EU. The most likely scenario is that the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) is to replace country representation in the European co-presidency of the UfM. However, it remains to be seen whether the high representative/vice president will design a role for member states e.g. for deputizing to the high representative/vice president.
- ¹⁴ The Common Security and Defence Policy is a case in point.
- ¹⁵ I would like to thank Stefania Panebianco for raising this point.
- ¹⁶ For a more thorough analysis of functional aspects in the UfM, their significance and limitations, see Holden, this collection. See also the contributions by Darbouche and Hunt.
- ¹⁷ See *The Financing of Co-Development in the Mediterranean*, Final Report of the High-Level Working Group chaired by Mr Charles Milhaud, May 2010. Available at: http://www.economie.gouv.fr/directions_services/dgtpe/publi/rap_milhaud1009_en.pdf (accessed 18 October 2010).
- ¹⁸ I would like to thank an official in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU for contributing to fine-tune the timeline in a phone interview, 15 July 2010.
- ¹⁹ It was held in Barcelona, 13 April 2010.
- ²⁰ It was held in Barcelona, 20 May 2010.
- ²¹ It was due to be held in Cairo 15–16 June 2010.
- ²² December 2010.
- ²³ For the depoliticization side of the argument, see Kausch and Youngs (2009); Seeberg (2010); and Schlumberger (this collection).
- ²⁴ On the interaction between entrepreneurs and windows of opportunities, see Bicchi (2007).
- ²⁵ Despite the fact that strictly speaking, it was not the first post-Cold War initiative, the Renewed Mediterranean Policy being the one.
- ²⁶ It casts a shadow also on arguments about Europe as a 'force for good' or as a 'normative power' (Manners, 2002). (See also Schlumberger, this collection.).
- ²⁷ I would like to thank Fabrizio Tassinari for raising this crucial question.

References

- Adler, E. & Crawford, B. (2006) Normative power: the European practice of region-building and the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: E. Adler, F. Bicchi, B. Crawford & R. A. Del Sarto (2006) *The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (Toronto, Buffalo, NY, and London: University of Toronto Press), pp. 3–47.
- Balfour, R. (2009) The transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean, *Mediterranean Politics*, 14(1), pp. 99–105.
- Barbé, E. (1998) Balancing Europe's eastern and southern dimensions, in: J. Zielonka (Ed.) *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy* (Leiden: Kluwer).
- Bauchard, D. (2008) L'Union pour la Méditerranée: un défi européen, *Politique étrangère*, 1, pp. 51–64.
- Bicchi, F. (2007) *European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Del Sarto, R. & Schumacher, T. (2005) From the EMP to ENP: what's at stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern Mediterranean? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10(1), pp. 17–38.
- Driss, A. (2009) Southern perceptions about the Union for the Mediterranean, *EuroMeSCO Paper*, produced by the Instytut Spraw Publicznych/Institute of Public Affairs. Available at <http://www>.

THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

- euromesco.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1201&Itemid=53&lang=en (accessed 29 November 2010).
- Emerson, M. (2008) Making sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean, CEPS Policy Brief, 155 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies).
- Gillespie, R. (1997) Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med partnership Initiative, *Mediterranean Politics*, 2(1), pp. 33–48.
- Gillespie, R. (2008) A 'Union for the Mediterranean' ... or for the EU? *Mediterranean Politics*, 13(2), pp. 277–286.
- Gillespie, R. (forthcoming) The Union for the Mediterranean: an intergovernmentalist challenge for the EU? *Journal of Common Market Studies*.
- Holden, P. (2009) *In Search of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate).
- Kausch, K. & Youngs, R. (2009) The end of the 'Euro-Mediterranean vision', *International Affairs*, 85(5), pp. 963–975.
- Manners, I. (2002) Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 235–258.
- March, J. G. & Olsen, J. P. (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics* (London and New York: Macmillan and Free Press).
- Pace, M. (2006) *The Politics of Regional Identity. Meddling with the Mediterranean* (London and New York: Routledge).
- Philippart, E. (2003) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: a critical evaluation of an ambitious scheme, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8, pp. 201–220.
- Riker, W. H. (1980) Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions, *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2), pp. 432–446.
- Schmid, D. (2008) La Turquie et l'Union pour la Méditerranée: un partenariat calculé, *Politique étrangère*, 1, pp. 65–76.
- Schwarzer, D. (2008) La présidence française de l'Union européenne: quels objectifs, quels partenaires? *Politique étrangère*, 2, pp. 361–371.
- Seeberg, P. (2010) *Union for the Mediterranean* – pragmatic multilateralism and the depoliticization of EU–Middle Eastern relations, *Middle East Critique*, 19(3), pp. 287–302.
- Tassinari, F. & Holms, U. (2010) Values promotion and security management in Euro-Mediterranean relations: 'making democracy work' or 'good-enough governance'?, DIIS Working, 17.