

Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the European Theater/ **Volume 3**

Force Posture Alternatives for
Europe After the Cold War

EDITED BY

Hans Günter Brauch
Robert Kennedy



*ALTERNATIVE
CONVENTIONAL
DEFENSE POSTURES
IN THE EUROPEAN
THEATER*



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ALTERNATIVE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE POSTURES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

*Volume 3:
Force Posture Alternatives
for Europe After the Cold War*

Edited by
Hans Günter Brauch
Robert Kennedy

With forewords by
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker,
physicist and philosopher, and
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**ALTERNATIVE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE POSTURES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER:
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Foreword

This volume, edited jointly by the American strategic expert Robert Kennedy and the German peace researcher Hans Günter Brauch, takes up conceptual ideas developed by Horst Afheldt and myself, as well as others on both sides of the Atlantic, since the 1960s. Our aim has been to contribute to the development of concepts that would reduce the danger of a third world war by the creation of more stable structures in the context of a defensively oriented conventional defense posture. In this volume a variety of alternative approaches to European conventional defense, driven for the most part by similar strategic considerations, are presented by German and American experts to a larger international audience.

Changes in the declaratory military policies of former Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev, which were being reflected in a Soviet move toward "defensive defense," German unification, and the immense political changes now under way in Central and Eastern Europe, require a rethinking of the force structures for European defense in terms of a changing structure of peace and security in Europe. In moving toward a new political structure of peace in Europe, technical force structure designs, such as those developed by Horst Afheldt, Lutz Unterseher, Steven Canby, and others, can contribute to the avoidance of a third world war by overcoming the dilemmas of deterrence, by avoiding a new arms race, and by enhancing a process that will in the long run eliminate the institution of war as a means for the resolution of conflicts.

Over the years, my own ideas on the problems of war and peace have focused on two hypotheses:

1. A third world war was possible under Cold War conditions.
2. It is necessary and possible to eliminate the institution of war.

Logically, both hypotheses are not closely connected. So far, both major powers have succeeded in avoiding the third world war. Some deduce from this the sanguine hope that a nuclear war will never occur. However, deterrence has not and probably never will be able to eliminate totally the possibility of war as an institution. Since 1945 the avoidance of nuclear confrontation offered the yardstick for war prevention. Those wars that did occur were regional conflicts considered highly unlikely to result in a nuclear escalation. It is questionable whether such a global situation can be maintained permanently. Conflict resolution through limited war is a pattern of stability for a specific historical period. Moreover, it may be added that the old approach to nuclear deterrence in Europe, e.g., NATO's former concept of flexible response, was based fundamentally on the threat of limited nuclear use. This is so, in my view, because strategic weapons only deter an opponent's use of his own strategic weapons. Thus an attack that includes the employment of limited nuclear forces cannot credibly be deterred by a major

strategic threat. Hence, NATO's former concept of flexible response made it inevitable that limited threats were deterred by the threat of limited use of nuclear weapons.

War prevention by nuclear deterrence can never be absolutely certain. Technical errors are possible, and a single breakdown of control in a century is sufficient to cause a catastrophe. More likely are miscalculations with respect to escalation. Thus in the long run, a deterrence system that relies on nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Nuclear weapons have offered a pause in "great power" conflict that may come to an end tomorrow. They have not provided a framework for a political system that can offer long-term peace and security. Rather they threaten the existence of human kind. We must therefore now focus our efforts on developing a nonnuclear security system.

In Europe, as a minimum one must develop a conventional defense posture that does not rely on the threat of a "nuclear-first" use. However, here a sharp distinction has to be made. Only a purely *defensively* oriented conventional force posture would be better than one that relies on the threat of nuclear use. It would be wrong to believe that the elimination of nuclear deterrence alone would make war less likely. Nuclear weapons have not been sufficient to prevent war. However, they have not been the cause. The return to purely or predominantly conventional defense postures in their more traditional forms, which have included offensive capabilities, could drastically increase the likelihood of war. The traditional approaches to conventional defense enhance the risk of entering into a race between tank and antitank weapons. Thus official NATO plans pertaining to conventional armament modernization will not provide an effective deterrent force. The lesson we have learned from nuclear weapons should not be forgotten, and that lesson must be extended to conventional weapons as well: war prevention, not victory is the task. Even if peace can be maintained, nuclear weapons will remain with us both physically and, even if all of them were destroyed, intellectually. We cannot afford any war, not even a conventional one, in our region. Therefore, conventional force structures must fulfill three conditions:

1. They must not offer any incentive to engage in conventional arms races.
2. They must provide stability during crises, i.e., they must not be structured so as to invite rapid preemptive conventional attacks.
3. They must not offer any targets that invite nuclear attacks.

The force structure design by Horst Afheldt and his colleagues claims to fulfill these three conditions. In his major work *Defense and Peace* (1976), Afheldt offered the framework for fundamental reconsiderations on the conditions under which deterrence can be kept stable. His solution was not the repulsion of numerically superior tank armies by numerically inferior tank armies, not even an arms race in tanks or nuclear antitank weapons, but a defensive defense that would not lead to an arms race. In the late 1970s, this model initiated a lively debate, first in Germany and later in other parts of Europe. In a simplified manner, I have argued that what is clearly needed is a system that does not require the threat of a mutual suicide, as well as one that avoids any inherent pressures for acquisitions, i.e., an arms race. The first requirement is violated by the present countervalue nuclear strategy, and the second by the counterforce strategy.

The first 20 years of NATO strategy were influenced by the relative security of

a countervalue strategy, which, at a potential price of unacceptable damage in case of war, provided a low probability that such a war might occur. The last 20 years appear to have been influenced increasingly by counterforce strategies brought about by the increasing weapons accuracy. Counterforce strategies have given impetus to increased arms production and sophisticated, highly mobile, and clearly more capable conventional forces. This has increased the likelihood of war and made an arms race inevitable.

However, Afheldt was not satisfied with the critical attitude of his older study. He wanted to demonstrate in a model that his conditions for a more stable deterrence could be fulfilled. Only such an offer for a problem solution could expect to have any impact on armament decisions. Afheldt's positive proposal was limited to the conventional realm: area defense by "technocommandos" with tank-crushing, precision-guided munitions.

Today, modern high precision weapons permit the development of a truly defensive defense, i.e., forces that have a "structural inability to attack." The typical argument that weapons may be used both offensively and defensively can be made only if one ignores the structure of one's forces. It is true that a single weapon can be used both offensively and defensively depending on the weapons system in which it is integrated. A weapons systems, however, that is deployed on the terrain without any means to transport it forward for an attack is a different thing. A force structure that includes only such "defensive" systems would structurally preclude the possibility of offensive war and also would be unlikely to stimulate a new arms race. Moreover, by a reduction of mutual threat perceptions, it would clearly be a step toward stability.

Defensive defense would be a contribution to the creation of more stable military structures. Perhaps more importantly, it would render the deterrent threat of limited nuclear use unnecessary as a means of deterring war. For reasons of mutual interest, the dialogue among the superpowers should now focus on eliminating the potentially dangerous technical approach to war prevention by examining a new political structure of peace. But toward that goal, intermediary technical structures will be inevitable.

The fundamental goal of this change in awareness (*Bewußtseinswandel*) must be to eliminate the institution of war as a means of resolving conflicts. Is there any chance that this can be accomplished? First, we must stress the word *institution*. An institution is a societal structure that has deliberately been created and recognized by human beings. It is man-made and, in principle, it can therefore be overcome by humans. War has been an internationally legally recognized institution. In a formal sense, it should be possible to delegitimize it by international agreement. This was as major goal behind the League of Nations in 1920 and the United Nations in 1945. Nevertheless the institution of war has yet to be eliminated.

However, in the nuclear age, we must recognize that its abolition is a necessary precondition for the continued existence of humankind. Political common sense requires a major change in attitude. This attitude change must be reflected in the objective contents of culture, in its institutions. This insight must be made a part of public conscience. War can be eliminated as an institution once humankind decides to do so. Humankind in this respect does not mean any human being but those that represent and influence the public conscience.

In a postcold war environment as a consequence of political changes taking

place in Europe, war between NATO and Russia appears rather remote. Nevertheless, the task will be with us to eliminate war as an institution through the gradual creation of a new security system in Europe. This book contributes significantly to the important debate that must now take place and is highly commended to those who are interested in a new and more cooperative, highly stable system of security in Europe.

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker
March 1992

Foreword

The rapid change in the international political environment has exceeded the ability of Western governments to adjust. Just three years ago, a major debate within NATO had to do with the proposed deployment in the Federal Republic of Germany of a new generation of nuclear missiles with range enough to strike targets in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. That target area is today all friendly territory. But the contention is still made that Western Europe needs a nuclear defense and plans proceed for an advanced air-to-surface tactical missile.

At the same time, the inescapable (if somewhat grudging) recognition that the Cold War is over has led Western military leaders to consider new force structures, designed to react rapidly to crises within Europe and to engage in low intensity conflict in other regional areas. The speculation about the nature of these crises has been, somewhat paradoxically, high in hypothesis and low in imagination. It is still grounded on the concept of the inviolability of state borders, engrained in historical consciousness and enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

Developments in the Gulf War and its aftermath illustrate this preoccupation with national sovereignty at the expense of human rights. The international community, acting through the United Nations Security Council, was able to react rapidly and drastically to the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, a fellow U.N. member. But organized world response to the subsequent barbarities inflicted upon the Iraqi Shiites in the south and the Iraqi Kurds in the north has been slow and stumbling. Today, the only likely sources of conflict have nothing to do with the classic confrontation between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. The remaining significance of the ceilings imposed in the treaty limiting conventional forces of Europe (CFE) is the major reduction in the offensive equipment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and not any need for equality between NATO and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact.

Civil war bubbles near the surface, notably in Yugoslavia, but also in other nations carved out of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. The compelling question today is not what weapons are needed to fight and win the Third World War, it is instead how military forces can be structured and organized, most desirably within a United Nations framework, to help bring about peaceful solutions to nationalistic movements within existing borders and to traditional ethnic and religious confrontations.

For this task, the Gulf War provides few if any political or military lessons. As commendable as opposition to international aggression is, the human and material costs of this massive application of military force deprive it of any precedential value. It can be said to have demonstrated again that nuclear weapons have no practical military utility and serve only to deter their use by others. But better

ways must be devised to manage conflict, particularly in the much more ambiguous situations that may develop.

The governments of Europe and their North American colleagues need expert help in moving from outdated force postures to a new security structure. The essays in this compendium provide both food for thought and a resounding call for reasoned response to realistic security needs.

*Paul C. Warnke
Washington, D. C.
March 1992*

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*Hans Günter Brauch
Robert Kennedy
Mosbach, Germany and Atlanta, Georgia
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Introduction

This book addresses the security implications of the momentous political and geostrategic changes that have taken place in Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989. It examines the relevance of the more traditional forms of defense as well as the future appropriateness of nonoffensive or confidence-building defense philosophies and principles, and specific alternative concepts for defense in Central Europe in the post-Cold War era.

Fifty years ago, on June 21 and again on December 7, 1941, first the Soviet Union and then the United States were victims of surprise attacks. The attacks, one by Hitler's Germany, and other by militarist Japan, propelled both into the largest war in history. The "war to end all wars" had, instead, led to yet another. However, even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met on the battleship H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in Placentia Bay off of Argentina, Newfoundland. On August 12, 1941, the fourth day of their five-day meeting, they signed the Atlantic Charter, setting forth "common principles . . . for a better future for the world." Among the principles set forth that day were the "right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live"; the "desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between nations in the economic field"; and the encouragement of measures "which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

The war, however, changed the geostrategic landscape. Europe emerged in shambles. The Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the world's only superpowers. Their historical experience had a long-lasting impact on their post-war strategic concepts and on the force structures and planning of the two competing alliances that would come to dominate the future landscape of Europe. Joseph Stalin, determined never again to see the Soviet Union invaded from Eastern Europe, embarked on a course that ultimately lead to the complete domination of that part of the world by the Soviet Union. Western European, the United States, and Canada, concerned over Soviet expansion, forged a political/military alliance to deter any further Soviet advance. Within a few years, Europe was transformed into the largest peacetime armed camp in history. The dreams of Roosevelt and Churchill had been dashed.

The end of the Cold War, however, has brought new hope for a "better future." Germany has been reunited. By mid-1991 the Soviet Union had withdrawn its military forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and had agreed to withdraw forces from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic and Poland by 1994. The institutions of Soviet domination and influence in East-Central Europe have disappeared. The military command of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was dissolved on April 1, 1991. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was terminated in late June 1991. The political structure of the WTO came to an end on July 1. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in

December 1991 and the emergence of 15 independent states, the first objective of the Atlantic Charter (previously mentioned) was in the process of becoming a reality in Eastern Europe.

Progress also has been made toward further economic collaboration, at least on the European continent. Most former members of the WTO and the Soviet successor states forming the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) now have joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The USSR was offered observer status at the G-7 summit in London in early July 1991. As the principal successor state to the USSR, Russia was granted full membership in 1992. The way is now paved for its full incorporation into the world's economic mainstream. Moreover, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have associated themselves with the European Community (EC) and are looking forward to becoming full members during the 1990s. Thus, another of the principal objectives of the Atlantic Charter is coming closer to being realized.

The end of the East-West conflict also has facilitated progress on a third objective of the Atlantic Charter in the field of disarmament. The INF Treaty has eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons from Europe. Remaining disputes about the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) were resolved by former Soviet Union Foreign Minister Besmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State Baker in Lisbon in late May 1991 and hammered out by negotiators in Vienna in June 1991, paving the way for a speedy ratification. Although the demise of the Soviet Union posed some questions as to just how the treaty would be implemented since the forces of the former Soviet Union were now distributed among a number of successor states, the newly formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has made the successful completion of the CFE one of its principal tasks. Indeed, all remaining obstacles were resolved in the NACC framework in Spring of 1992. This will result in a significant reduction of conventional military forces in Europe. On July 31, 1991, Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the START (strategic arms reduction talks) Treaty. After nine years of negotiations, the superpowers finally agreed to a major reduction of their strategic armaments. As with CFE, implementation of the Treaty, in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, faced some difficulties. Today four states of the former Soviet Union have nuclear weapons—Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. However, nothing yet appears to be an eminent block to an agreement among the four Soviet successor states and the U.S. Thus, the major reductions in strategic arms called for by the Treaty appear likely.

Needless to say, such changes have dramatic geostrategic implications for security and defense in Central Europe. The Soviet threat is gone. With the final withdrawal of all Russian troops from Germany in 1994, nuclear disengagement, a principal policy goal set in the late 1950s, will be a reality. By 1995, there will be a *de facto* nuclear weapons free zone covering Scandinavia, the three Baltic Republics, Belarus, the former East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine, as well as a security "buffer" zone without the presence of foreign troops.

In 1989, Central Europe and specifically Germany had the world's highest concentration of both local and foreign conventional military forces and nuclear weapons. By 1994, about two-thirds of the troops will have been either demobilized or withdrawn. The equipment of an entire army (i.e., the former National People's Army of the former German Democratic Republic) will have been de-

stroyed. Arms control, even disarmament (destruction of hardware, demobilization of manpower, conversion of defense industries) with its regional and structural economic implications will have become a political reality, not only for Russia, but also for a united Germany.

Furthermore, geostrategic changes in Europe have rendered NATO's strategy of "flexible response" and its "forward defense" concept for the central front obsolete. At the London Summit in 1990, the Allies agreed "to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defense toward a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced alliance on nuclear weapons." At the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO heads of state and government set guidelines for a new Alliance force posture more reflective of contemporary realities. Those guidelines identified a posture that no longer will be deployed in a linear fashion in the central region, will be reduced in size, and, in many cases, readiness, able to be rapidly augmented, yet increasingly flexible and highly mobile.

Now the question to be answered is what force postures are most appropriate, given the changed environment and the Alliance's avowed determination to reduce the numbers of troops deployed, yet increase their capacity for augmentation, flexibility, and mobility. At present, the threat of an attack on NATO by one or more of the Soviet successor states is remote, yet the possibility of conflicts that might threaten the security interests of the European states remains. Indeed, the absence of the harsh and sometimes brutal order imposed by communist regimes during the Cold War, ethnic and national conflicts that harbor the potential threat to European stability already has reemerged in South-Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the broader security interests of European states could be threatened once again as they were with Iraq's attack on Kuwait.

Unlike the past where the forces of the Western states could be structured to deal with the unidimensional threat emanating from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the potential security challenges of the future are likely to be multidimensional in nature. Thus, the tasks to be performed by military forces also will be multidimensional. Future force structures in the European theater must contribute to stability and continued confidence-building between the Western states and Russia. They also must contribute to a stabilized environment between and among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, they may need to be structured to respond to crises and conflicts within and among the newly emerging states of South-Central and Eastern Europe or even beyond Europe itself, as they were during the second Gulf War.

Thus, in a more specific way, the question arises: Are traditional approaches to defense, which include doctrines and tactics associated with firepower and maneuver (e.g., AirLand Battle), still appropriate, albeit at reduced force levels? Or, are other force structures, such as nonoffensive defense (NOD) or confidence-building defense (CBD), now more appropriate? Perhaps some combination of force structures might be necessary to meet the multidimensional nature of current and future challenges.

In the view of at least one of the editors, NOD or CBD philosophies and principles have much to offer in the search for security postures both for the post-Cold War environment in Europe and for the areas of continued high tension in the Middle East or in South Asia. Both editors agree that a thorough examination of alternatives is clearly warranted. Several NOD specific models have become obso-

lete with the disappearance of the central front in Germany. Others may have become obsolete with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. NOD principles, however, have won a degree of public acclaim since Gorbachev adopted the NOD philosophy in 1987–1988. References to NOD also can be found in NATO CFE position papers and in the German–Soviet and German–Polish treaties, partly reproduced in the appendices C and D of this volume. Thus, it seems appropriate to further explore NOD and CBD as potential alternatives for future Alliance force structures.

One thing is certain, new geopolitical and geostrategic factors have rendered old defense concepts obsolete. There is a clear need for new pragmatic approaches and conceptual thinking about Europe's future defense needs. NATO already has taken important first steps, yet more needs to be done. The editors hope that this volume contributes to the debate on security issues both in the peace research and strategic and security studies communities.

The editors and authors of this volume represent a diverse group of experts with frequently differing and competing views. They hope to stimulate a debate within and between schools of thought that during the period of the "Cold War" spoke past each other, seldom engaging in a real exchange of ideas.

A changed strategic landscape now yields a challenges of different nature than those that had to be confronted during the Cold War. The Gulf War and conflict between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, between Serbs and Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, between Armenians and Azerbaijanians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan, to name just a few, suggest the need for a collaborative search for peaceful solutions of conflicts, for mediation, economic sanctions, peacekeeping, and, as a last resort, for enforcement measures under Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter.

This third volume is organized into three parts. Part I provides a survey of the debate on force posture alternatives in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the United States. In Part II, six specific alternative force postures for Europe are explored by American and German authors. In Part III, the impact of the international and domestic changes on security planning in Germany and the future of European security and the new international order are addressed.

In Part I, Hans Günter Brauch and Robert Kennedy, respectively, survey the German and American debates on conventional alternatives for the defense of Central Europe. Given the changes that have taken place in Europe over the past three years and the interest in the former Soviet Union in "defensive defense" concepts, both authors believe that some of the analyses that have been done by those who have examined NOD force structure alternatives may be more applicable today than ever before and that a number of the conceptual elements of NOD may form the basis for a new European security system.

In Part II, six alternative force postures are examined. Manfred Hamm traces the evolution of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine, delineates the basic conceptual differences between ALB doctrine and the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept, analyzes criticisms of ALB doctrine, and offers strong support for the AirLand Battle doctrine and the FOFA concept. He further argues that both ALB doctrine and the FOFA concepts are compatible and complementary, while constituting no substantive obstacle to further arms control efforts. Although this chapter was completed before the momentous events since 1989, and the Gulf War, some defense specialists might argue that the Gulf War validated many of the AirLand

Battle concepts. Moreover, as both NATO and Soviet successor states reduce the density of their forces, ALB doctrine, which emphasizes firepower and maneuver, in the view of one editor, may prove to be more relevant than less for the forces that remain.

In Chapter 4, John Weinstein recognizes that the outbreak of war in Europe as a result of an adverse turn of events may not be likely today. However, U.S. and European security should not be mortgaged on the unsupportable promise that today's good times will continue indefinitely. It is upon this note of caution that he endorses the continued need for nuclear weapons, albeit at reduced levels, in Europe. Weinstein argues that while advanced conventional munitions (ACMs) have a number of desirable military and political advantages, it may be illusory to expect ACMs to eliminate completely NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. Changes now underway in Europe, however, do support the cuts in NATO's current short-range nuclear forces that are being made. Nevertheless, Weinstein contends nuclear forces able to be projected from land, sea, and air to cover short and longer ranges with precision remain a prudent option for deterrence and defense in Europe. The acquisition of a nuclear tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) and providing Harrier V/STOL aircraft with a nuclear capability are partial answers to NATO's potential future needs. Weinstein also suggests that the Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) be reconsidered as a flexible and all-weather replacement to the artillery-fired atomic projectile (AFAPS), which are being withdrawn from Western Europe. He also suggests that insertable nuclear component (INC) technology may be a politically acceptable way for the Atlantic Alliance to retain a short-range nuclear capability deployable to Europe should a future crisis so warrant.

In Chapter 5, Franz Uhle-Wettler contends that the debates on force improvements in NATO have concentrated heavily on weapons, equipment, and force structure. Seldom, if ever, have they concentrated on morale, motivation, tactics, and training. He believes that there is a clear danger of "high tech" with the consequent neglect of opportunities offered by the more traditional technologies and, especially, training. According to Uhle-Wettler, if NATO wishes to improve its military capabilities, it should focus on morale, training, tactics, and weaponry. He concludes that force improvements that concentrate on weaponry to the detriment of other factors will inevitably be deficient. Again, while this chapter was completed before both the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Uhle-Wettler's concerns, cautions, and recommendations have a certain timelessness, which makes them worthy of consideration as we move to develop new force structures and postures to deal with the challenges ahead.

In Chapter 6, Horst Afheldt, one of the fathers of the contemporary German debate on alternative approaches to defense in Europe, identifies what he considers to be fundamental building blocks for a new security policy in Central Europe and outlines his own alternative force structure for a "Mutual Defensive Superiority" with conventional weapons. In his "ideal" case, Afheldt argues for a dispersed defense that provides no fixed targets and makes no effort to hold fortifications or fixed defensive lines. He contends that such a "hidden mode of battle" could be made possible by "autonomous technocommandos" employing weapons and tactics specialized for defense and supported by modern rocket artillery in the form of cheap, single use launch tubes and an operative command specialized for defense. Afheldt believes that if such forces were developed by all parties there would be no need for potentially offensive air and ground forces or a NATO nuclear first use

strategy. According to Afheldt, such a model promises increased stability in Europe and a more credible deterrent and defense doctrine for NATO, given the changes taking place in Europe today.

In Chapter 7, Lutz Unterseher outlines the international Study Group for Alternative Security Policy (SAS) case for a "Confidence-Building Defense (CBD)." Unterseher notes that the concept of a CBD rests on four maxims: (1) military forces must be structurally unable to invade or bombard an adversary's territory; (2) force structure vulnerabilities should be minimized; (3) force structures should be designed to limit rather than extend damage or escalate conflict; and (4) the defender's inherent advantage of operating on familiar terrain should be optimally exploited. Unterseher sees the SAS "spider and web" concept as the key paradigm for such a defense. Unterseher's CBD model would include network infantry, mobile forces, and homeguard forces. *Network infantry* battalions would be assigned to fixed areas covering 7 to 10 interlinked zones of key strategic importance. Their tasks could include delaying, attriting, splitting up, and channeling attacking forces. *Mobile forces* would be composed of armor, cavalry, and light mechanized infantry capable of blocking, containing, counterattacking, and ultimately destroying intruding formations. Finally, *homeguard forces* would be designed to protect infrastructure against airborne, commando, and other lower-level threats. Since according to Unterseher, it is force structure that determines "defensivity" not the acquisition of "defensive" weapons, the SAS weapons mix is not fundamentally different from NATO's arsenal for conventional defense on friendly territory. There would be a shift of emphasis, however, in favor of such capabilities as more and denser underground communications, prefabricated elements for small-sized field fortifications, multisensor mines, and short-range combat drones.

Finally in Chapter 8, one of the United States' early thinkers on alternative approaches to conventional defense, Steven Canby offers a critique of the primarily European proposals for a nonprovocative defense from the vantagepoint of an American force designer. He also offers his own alternative model for European defense. Canby argues that for forty years NATO has deployed its forces mostly as a cordon defense. Only recently has this begun to change and operational reserves were formed. While Canby believes that NATO's cordon deterred Soviet aggression, he contends that had deterrence failed, defense also would have failed. To remedy the situation, he recommends a defense oriented to light infantry forward, and tank reserves rearward with technology and tactics fully integrated.

In Part III, Chapter 9, Hans Günter Brauch addresses NATO's emerging force structure and strategy readjustments, the Bundeswehr's implementation of the new multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations for manpower, force structure, deployment and procurement planning for 1984 and beyond, the constitutional and political self-restraint for the future role of German forces in international military conflicts and the continued relevance of nonoffensive or confidence-building defense concepts. Brauch suggests that the following tasks for NOD and CBD concepts are worthy of consideration in the post Cold-War environment:

- NOD concepts should become a *topic for future seminars on military doctrine* of the now expanded Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
- For CSCE member states, NOD principles should become the guiding princi-

ples for steering (1) the weapons process; (2) force structure planning; and (3) arms control policy.

- NOD principles also should become the guidelines for permitted arms exports into crises areas. Only those weapon systems that strengthen the defense but do not foster the capability for offensive operations should be permitted for export.

In the final chapter, Robert Kennedy examines European security, NATO, and the future of a new international cooperative system in light of the extraordinary events of the last several years. He contends that we are entering an age of epochal international systemic change. The end of the Cold War, the impending complete withdrawal of the forces of the former Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, and, perhaps more significantly, the Second Russian Revolution has set in motion sweeping changes of historic proportions. However, according to Kennedy, we have not reached the end of history. The world has not seen the end of conflict. Perhaps the greatest danger we now confront is not being able to perceive the dangers that lie ahead. Kennedy concludes that NATO, CSCE, EC, and the WEU can and should play complementary roles in meeting Europe's future security needs. He further concludes that if NATO is to prove useful in dealing with future, not past, crises and potential threats to western security interests, it will have to be structured to deal with future, not past, problems. He suggests the need for changes in the modalities within NATO, a broadening and a deepening of the Alliance, and the development of a significant capability to deal with out-of-area issues both at the political level and, if need be, at the military level.

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Mosbach, Germany and Atlanta, Georgia

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SURVEYS OF FORCE POSTURE ALTERNATIVES



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Debate on Alternative Conventional Military Force Structure Designs for the Defense of Central Europe in the Federal Republic of Germany

Hans Günter Brauch

INTRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS OF ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE

Alternative defense is a military concept¹ that has been described by many terms, such as territorial, nonoffensive, defensive, nonprovocative, nonaggressive, confidence-building, structural inability to attack, and defensive or mutual defensive superiority. These and many other terms describe a military concept that differs fundamentally from the force structures of Guderian, Fuller, and De Gaulle in World War II and those of both NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries that have been optimized for counter-offensive or offensive operations.² In this chapter we use “nonoffensive defense” (NOD) as the generic term for this alternative school of thinking.

Björn Möller, editor of the *NOD Newsletter*, defined “nonoffensive defense” in this way: “The armed forces should be seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense, yet incapable of offense.”³ The term “nonprovocative defense” has been defined as “A military posture in which the strategic and operational concepts, the deployment, organization, armaments, communications and command, logistics and training of the armed forces are such, that they are in their totality unambiguously capable of an adequate conventional defence, but as unambiguously incapable of a border crossing attack, be it an invasion or a destructive strike at the opponents territory.”⁴ According to Boserup and Neild, “defensive defense” is: “. . . to ease the military confrontation in Europe by restructuring conventional forces so as to minimize the capability to attack while maintaining intact their capabilities to defend. If that can be done, it will provide unambiguous evidence of peaceful intentions; it will be mutually reassuring; and it will enhance military stability.”⁵ Lutz Unterseher introduced the concept of “confidence-building defense” as a reaction to NATO’s former nuclear posture and its then conventional force structure oriented at punishment rather than denial. As a defensive philosophy, it would rely on these measures:

1. Removal of nuclear assets from NATO’s territory; separation of nuclear from conventional forces; and adoption of “no first use” (only if the demands on

the American nuclear umbrella are greatly reduced is there a chance for some form of extended deterrence to survive).

2. Creation of an inherently stable conventional deterrent, by tactically and organizationally emancipating it from nuclear weapons (which would no longer be counted upon as "trouble shooters") giving it the capability to restrict the battle zone; making it virtually safe from being overrun, bypassed, or "outmaneuvered," technically and tactically; and keeping it from presenting valuable targets to enemy fire, thus abolishing opportunities for the opponent making it structurally incapable of (and doctrinally not charged with) invading or bombarding the other side's territory, thereby removing the reason for preemption.

3. "Decoupling" from the arms race and consequently maintaining and improving the internal stability of the societies by doing away with the traditional concept of balance ("answering in kind") and by specializing on defense in a cost-effective manner.⁶

Since the 1950s, this alternative school to the traditional military and strategic thinking in NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been a specific reaction to nuclear deterrence and conventional defense concepts, and (in the case of Germany) also to the division of Germany. This school was influenced by Carl von Clausewitz, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Bogislav von Bonin, Guy Brossollet, and Emmil Spannocchi.⁷ From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, the alternative school was primarily a German debate stimulated by the writings of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and Horst Afheldt. Subsequently the debate spread to the Netherlands (Egbert Boeker, *INSTEAD*); to the United Kingdom (Alternative Defence Commission, Common Security Project, *Just Defence*); the United States (Randall Forsberg and Paul Walker); and since 1984, via the Conventional Weapons Working Group of Pugwash, to Eastern Europe—especially to Hungary and to the Soviet Union, where it was taken up and promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev as part of the new thinking and has thus become part of the international dialogue.⁸ Since the 1970s, independently of Afheldt and the German debate, Stephen Canby, Ed Corcoran, and Robert Kennedy have initiated a similar debate in the United States (see Chapter 2). However, until the early 1980s, these two independent debates did not influence each other.

Most of the proposals were developed prior to unification by West German authors and a few independent thinkers in the GDR, such as Walter Romberg⁹ who focused on the former central front between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, running down the divided Germany. They were conceived of as tools to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons; to drop NATO's nuclear first-use option; to avoid an inadvertent nuclear attack by removing incentives for preemptive attacks; to enhance strategic and especially crisis stability; to exploit the terrain by increasing defense efficiency; to further detente and conventional disarmament; and to eliminate or drastically curtail the arms race by favoring the defense over the offense. However, the context in which these proposals were originally developed in Germany has disappeared since the winter of 1989. The question remains: Have the concepts themselves become obsolete as well.

This chapter first examines the old strategic context in central Europe, reviews the five stages of the German NOD debate, and identifies the major pure, add-on, and integrative and comprehensive proposals. It discusses the new international

and domestic political context resulting from German unification and the potential implications for force restructuring.

NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORWARD DEFENSE?

During the 1980s, "conventionalization" and "alternative defense" were the catchwords of a debate on the military aspects of security policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. Geographic, strategic, historical, political, and economic reasons contributed to an intensive debate among government officials (the official debate), government advisers in research institutes close to or advising the Federal government (the semiofficial debate), retired officers, social scientists, and independent security experts (unofficial debate), and by peace researchers, peace activists, and the peace movement (the peace debate).¹⁰

The *geographic* reasons were self-evident: the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany would be the first battlefield in Europe if deterrence should fail and the East-West conflict escalate to the military level with the employment of both conventional and nuclear weapons. The *strategic* reasons were a reflection of the differing interpretations of NATO's doctrine of "flexible response" and of deterrence in general in Europe and the United States, most particularly in West Germany. Since the 1950s, NATO has been confronted with a "seemingly irreconcilable conflict of interests." Given the potential destruction of any war on their territory during the East-West conflict, Europeans, and particularly Germans, "have tended to advocate a strategy of absolute deterrence through the immediate threat of all-out nuclear war, and have looked with unease and suspicion at any development that appears to distract from this ultimate threat, or that threatens to 'decouple' Europe from the American strategic nuclear guarantee."¹¹

Americans, in looking beyond deterrence, have "emphasized the need to deter conflict at all possible levels through the provision of a wide range of capabilities and options" and, if deterrence should fail, "to facilitate the termination of any conflict short of allout nuclear war," e.g., if a nuclear war should occur and if a conventional war should escalate to the nuclear level, to limit it and to prevent an allout nuclear war or a spillover into the continental U.S. As Americans called for flexibility and for as many steps as possible in the nuclear escalation ladder, many Europeans suspected that any increase in flexibility would lead to a strategic nightmare: the containment and limitation of any conflict to Europe. This dispute has lasted for three decades. It influenced the transatlantic multilateral force (MLF) debate in the 1960s, the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) controversy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the short-range nuclear forces (SNF) dispute in the late 1980s, as well as the debate on "conventionalization" (AirLand Battle and Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA)) in the early 1980s.¹² Whereas the MLF debate took place primarily among governments and a few experts, the INF controversy led to a broad public debate that made the West German government far more sensitive to domestic concerns during the SNF dispute. As a consequence of the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe, of German unification, and of the agreed Soviet troop withdrawals, the political, geographical, and strategic contexts have changed fundamentally.

FIVE STAGES OF THE DEBATE ON ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE

Since its establishment in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was confronted with five fundamental debates on foreign and security policy:¹³

- In the early 1950s: on rearmament and integration into NATO and the European Community institutions vs. national unification between the Adenauer government and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).¹⁴
- In the late 1950s: on deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear disengagement in Europe between the Adenauer government and the SPD and the first antinuclear movement.¹⁵
- In the early 1960s: on the primacy of a transatlantic (U.S.) vs. a pro-European (France) orientation within the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parties.
- In the early 1970s: on Brandt's Ostpolitik, the recognition of the borders, joining the Nonproliferation Treaty and on the participation in the CSCE between the Brandt government and the CDU/CSU opposition.¹⁶
- In the early 1980s: on the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles and on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.¹⁷

With respect to the debate on military force structures and NOD concepts, five stages may also be distinguished (see Table 1-1).

- In 1954–1955 (as the Bundeswehr was being established) among the military experts within and outside of the government.
- In the 1970s when Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and Horst Afheldt published their studies on the implications and contradictions of nuclear deterrence (within the scientific community).
- In the early 1980s on the background of the public INF controversy, a search for political alternatives to nuclear deterrence stimulated the development and proliferation of NOD concepts within the scientific community and the peace movement.
- In the mid-1980s, NOD concepts for the first time had an impact on political parties, most particularly on the SPD after it lost power in 1982 and to a limited extent on the Greens.
- In the early 1990s, the first historical opportunity to include NOD concepts in the review process of military force structures and military doctrines.

Only in the context of the fourth major debate did military force posture alternatives and NOD concepts come to play a significant role. Only then were NOD proposals intensively discussed and adopted in party resolutions and into the program of the SPD.

Stage 1: Establishment of the Bundeswehr; von Bonin, an Early Dissenter (1954–1955)

The unconditional surrender of 1945, the division of Germany, and the super-power confrontation during the cold war did not provoke a fundamental reassess-

Table 1-1 Five Stages of the Debate on Force Posture Alternatives in the Federal Republic of Germany

Stage Years	Phase of East-West Conflict	NATO Strategic Context	FRG Political Context	Official, Semioffic., Traditional	Proponents of NOD Force Structure Proposals
1954–	Cold war	Massive Retaliation	Rearmament NATO, EEC	Heusenberga Kielmannsegg	von Bonin (1954)
1967	Limited Detente	Flexible Response MLF	Atlantic vs European orientation		von Bonin (1967)
1971–	Detente	Flexible Response	NPT Treaty Moscow Tr.	Defense White Papers	v. Weizsäcker (1970) Afheldt u.a. (1973) ^c
1978	<i>Ostpolitik</i>		Warsaw Tr. CSCE (1975)	1970–1979 ^b	Afheldt (1976)
1979–	Limited Detente,	Flexible Response	INF Dec.	Stratmann Nerlich	Uhle-Wettler (1980) J. Löser (1981)
1984	Second cold war	INF modern. FOFA/ALB	NOD Hearing (1983–1984)	K. Kaiser ESECS (1983) ^d	H. Afheldt (1983) v. Weizsäcker (1984) Hannig (1984) SAS (1984) Nolte/Nolte (1984) v. Müller (1984)
1984–	Limited	Flexible	SPD-Essen	Defense	v. Bülow/Funk/
1989	Detente	Response INF Treaty SNF Debate	Party Cong.	White Papers 1983 & 1985 ^e	v. Müller (1988) SAS (1989) Gerber (1989)
1990–	Detente end of post- war period	Flexible Response Forward Defense Reassessm.	German unification	Official Statements Stoltenberg Eppelmann ^f	Afheldt (1991) SAS—Unterseher (1991)

^aSee Brill, op. cit. 1976 and op. cit., 1987.

^bBundesminister der Verteidigung, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970, 1971/72, 1973/74, 1975/76, 1979* (Bonn: BMVg, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1979).

^c*Eine Andere Verteidigung? Alternativen zur atomaren Abschreckung. Aus der Arbeit der Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler* (München: Hanser, 1973).

^dPeter K. Stratmann, *NATO-Strategie in der Krise?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1981); Uwe Nerlich, "Missile Defense: Strategic and Tactical," *Survival*, 27, no. 3 (May/June 1985): 119–136; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 5 (Summer 1982): 1157–1170; ESECS, *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe—Proposals for the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1983).

^eBundesminister der Verteidigung, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1983, 1985* (Bonn: BMVg, 1983, 1985).

^fSee speeches and press conferences of the West German defense minister Stoltenberg, and the East German minister on disarmament and defense, Eppelmann.

ment of military force structures. Only Colonel Bogislav von Bonin¹⁸ dissented from the mainstream represented by General Adolf Heusinger, Count Wolf von Baudissin, and Count Johann Adolf von Kielmannsegg in the Amt Blank (later to become the Federal Ministry of Defense).

Starting with reunification as the prevailing political objective, von Bonin designed a barrier zone along the demarcation line some 50 km wide that was to wear down and, if possible, to stop the armored thrusts of an invader. He believed that a small force of 150,000 to 200,000 soldiers could be built up within two

years at relatively low cost. Von Bonin's force structure proposal consisted of a system of small, well-camouflaged field fortifications, distributed in depth with only small armored elements for tactical counterattack, to be manned by old *Wehrmacht* cadres still fit for service. Most of their equipment was to consist of relatively simple, state-of-the-art weapons, e.g., about 8000 antitank guns complemented by recoilless rifles and numerous hand-laid mines. Once von Bonin made his nonprovocative concept explicit, he was removed from his position in 1953 and portrayed as a dissident.

According to the von Bonin plan, nonprovocation was to be made operational through tactics and force structure, both designed for static warfare, for denial of attrition. Large-size mechanized all-purpose forces were thought of only in the context of allied reserves, coming to chop off enemy spearheads that might eventually pierce the proposed covering army. He was convinced that the allies' help could be counted on and that the delaying effect of the barrier zone would be welcomed by them. This purely German nonprovocative front layer was to avoid providing the Soviets with any incentive for a potential build-up of invasion forces in East Germany. No foreign mobile forces with offensive capabilities and armed with nuclear weapons that might create a climate of instability and confrontation and minimize the opportunity for German unification were to be stationed in central Europe. He proposed a virtual disappearance of military targets through camouflage and dispersion.¹⁹

Von Bonin's proposal was rejected both by military experts within the Amt Blank: by Heusinger, head of the military department of the Amt Blank, by the reformers, von Baudissin and von Kielmannsegg, and by the CDU/CSU, as well as by the defense experts of the SPD, Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt. Von Bonin's concept was supported by several retired generals, and his ideas were well received by some news media, most notably by the news magazine *Der Spiegel*, which published a long essay on "The Battle of Kursk—a Model for the Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany,"²⁰ in November 1966.

Von Bonin stated that the defense planners of NATO and of the Bundeswehr were still adhering to World War II concepts made obsolete by nuclear weapons. NATO's nuclear deterrence concept and the deployment of nuclear launchers on German territory would contradict its national interests. Strategy would require a removal of all provocative weapons systems and force structures and their replacement by a security system that would offer better protection and would not beg the opponent to preempt. He argued:

As long as American nuclear weapons are deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet leadership would be forced to destroy this forward based U.S. atomic base. It must be the preeminent goal of the Federal Republic to remove its territory from the target list of Soviet nuclear weapons. A major Soviet attack has become unthinkable. The American nuclear weapons would make any Soviet aggression against Western Europe an incalculable risk.²¹

Von Bonin called for the following elements of an alternative mission for the Bundeswehr and for NATO:

Withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from West German territory.
Change of the structure of the Bundeswehr by replacing its offensive character with a nonprovocative structure.

A reduction and restructuring of the Bundeswehr to permit the withdrawal of several Soviet divisions from East Germany.

The prevailing mission of the Bundeswehr should be the defense of the border against a Soviet surprise attack.

This border defense would require about 250,000 regulars, of which 160,000 would serve in the army.

The first layer of defense would consist of eight border defense divisions of 15,000 men each for a territory of 100 km in depth.

A combination of sufficient mobility with strong attrition would have to wear down an aggressor in a system of several defensive layers.

This would require the introduction of multiple rocket launchers and of more potent ammunition and fire power.

The area defense force made up of conscripts would have to supplement the border defense force by exploiting the knowledge of the terrain for the defense. These forces could be trained in six months.

The tasks of the navy would be limited to the defense of the north German coastline: 30,000 men would be sufficient for this task.

The air force would have to support the defensive battle of the army; 60,000 regulars for the air force and 12 air wings would be sufficient for this task.

The Federal Republic would require the support of NATO and of the United States. The restructured Bundeswehr could not prevent a massive Soviet attack. It would have to rely on the deterrence function of the U.S. strategic forces. However, it would be able to counter a more limited Soviet aggression and to stop it.²²

Helmut Schmidt, then chairman of the SPD faction in the *Bundestag*, agreed to a large extent with von Bonin's analysis; nevertheless, he disagreed with his proposals. By preferring negotiated arms control agreements to unilateral efforts at restructuring of forces, Schmidt avoided any discussion of a nonprovocative force structure in his two books: *Defense or Retaliation* (1961) and *Strategy of Balance* (1969).²³ As the first Social Democratic defense minister (1969–1972), Schmidt initiated many reforms. He created a defense planning staff and partly reorganized the *Bundeswehr*. However, he avoided any change in the direction of von Bonin's concepts.²⁴ Von Bonin's proposals did not provoke a fundamental security debate within the tiny security political elite in the political parties, in societal groups, nor at universities.

Stage 2: Critique of Nuclear Deterrence; von Weizsäcker and Afheldt (1970s)

The second debate was stimulated by a decision in 1957 by 18 renowned nuclear physicists, among them Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, not to cooperate in any nuclear project in the future. Since the late 1960s within the Federation of German Scientists (*Vereinigung deutscher Wissenschaftler*) and later within the framework of the Max Planck Institute for Research on the Living Conditions of the Scientific and Technical World, a small

group of talented scientists under the chairmanship of the physicist and philosopher, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, had analyzed the consequences of a limited nuclear war in central Europe on the economy, on stability, and on the environment.²⁵

The group contended that no credible defense existed for the Federal Republic if deterrence should fail. Therefore war prevention was the primary goal for any rational security policy. However, they believed that the deterrence system was confronted with increasing challenges of destabilization due to new weapons developments. No permanent technical stabilization of a policy of war prevention by deterrence could be assumed. Thus political steps would be needed to maintain stability between two competing superpowers.

The social democratic government of Chancellor Willy Brandt and his defense ministers Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber reacted with silence to this fundamental conceptual challenge, as did all parties in the parliament. However, the "Weizsäcker Study" influenced the political debate within the youth organizations of the SPD and the FDP—the Young Socialists and the Young Liberals²⁶—and the debate within the tiny peace research community.

In 1976 in his major study, *Defense and Peace—Policy with Military Means*, Horst Afheldt presented a sharp critique of the contradictions of NATO's flexible response posture and military force structure. He also offered an alternative: the outline of an area defense force. This was the first radical and *purely military force structure alternative*.

In 1977, Afheldt set up a working group of retired military officers to work with him on military force structure alternatives that avoided the dilemmas of forward defense and flexible response. In the 1980s several of his collaborators, such as Jochen Löser and Norbert Hannig became proponents of pure force structure alternatives. Others, like Eckart Afheldt and Johannes Gerber, suggested adding NOD components to existing force structures, or dealt with specific aspects of NOD (add-on models).²⁷ Whereas all these models focused on the army, the SAS (Study Group on Alternative Security Policy) offered an *integrative* model for all three forces.

From 1978–1981, Alfred Mechtersheimer worked with Afheldt, and from 1983–1988, Albrecht von Müller was Afheldt's assistant and Lutz Unterseher acted as an outside adviser. All three were to play a major role in the alternative defense debate in the 1980s. Mechtersheimer later founded the Research Institute on Peace Policy.²⁸ Unterseher had already founded the SAS,²⁹ and von Müller played an active role in the Pugwash Workshop on Conventional Forces in Europe and as the coordinator of a research project under the guidance of Afheldt and Hans-Peter Dürr. In 1989 with Anders Boserup he founded the European Center for International Security (EUCIS).

Stage 3: INF and the Antinuclear Movement; Search for Alternatives and Proliferation of NOD Concepts (1980s)

During the INF debate in the early 1980s, several retired generals, active officers of the Bundeswehr, defense experts, members of parliament, and peace re-

searchers offered their own alternative concepts after the peace movement and the media had created a substantial demand.³⁰ For the first time, the military and academic debate turned into a political one.

Stage 4: NOD Proposals as a Topic of the Political Debate and Their Impact on Political Parties

At the height of the missile debate, the Armed Forces Committee held a series of public hearings on "alternative strategies," from October 24, 1983, to February 6, 1984, for which the political parties designated 26 experts.³¹ Not surprisingly, in its assessment, the CDU/CSU faction of the parliament supported NATO's existing military strategic concept, whereas the SPD called for a thorough reassessment of NATO's strategy of flexible response, rejected chemical warfare modernization plans, the forward deployment of nuclear artillery, and the AirLand Battle Doctrine of the U.S. Army. Instead the SPD called for the abandonment of nuclear artillery, a rearward deployment of nuclear battlefield systems, separation of the nuclear and conventional tasks of the air force, and a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons on either side. To raise the nuclear threshold, the SPD called for a strengthening of the conventional component through a better use of reservists, an improvement of the quality of conventional weapons, a strengthening of conventional forces with a visible defensive structure, an improvement of C³I systems, and an increase of cost efficiency as a result of standardization. The FDP proposed conventional improvements within the existing NATO strategy, whereas the Green Party supported nonviolent forms of defense, disengagement, and finally a dissolution of both military alliances.³² However, the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Defense Minister Wörner saw no need for a fundamental reassessment of NATO's defense posture.

Stage 5: German Unification; The Integration of the National People's Army into the Bundeswehr in 1991

As a consequence of the agreement between Kohl and Gorbachev at Zheleznovodsk on July 16, 1990,³³ within three to four years the armed forces of a united Germany will be reduced from an active strength of 578,000 (in July 1990: Bundeswehr 480,000 and NVA 98,000) to 370,000. In August 1990, the West German defense minister, Stoltenberg, announced an integration of some 50,000 soldiers from the NVA into the Bundeswehr, among them 25,000 to 30,000 officers and N.C.O.s and the rest conscripts.³⁴ For the first time, two armed forces trained in opposing military alliances and who attended military academies in the United States and in the Soviet Union will be united. This will require a reassessment of NATO strategy. With the reduction of the Bundeswehr and the creation of a territorial army outside of the integrated NATO commands, NOD concepts are likely to be seriously considered for the first time.³⁵ Undoubtedly a wide review of proposals will be considered.