

The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy



Edited by Aaron Garrett

THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

The eighteenth century is one of the most important periods in the history of Western philosophy, witnessing the philosophical, scientific, religious, and social and political change of the Enlightenment on a massive scale. In spite of this, there are few overviews of the philosophy of the period as a whole.

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The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy provides students of philosophy and those from related disciplines with an outstanding and accessible guide to this fascinating period in the history of philosophy.

Aaron Garrett is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, USA. He has published books on Spinoza and Berkeley, articles on many topics in early modern philosophy, and is the co-editor (with James A. Harris) of the *Oxford History of Scottish Enlightenment Philosophy*. He is currently working on two books on moral philosophy in the early modern period: *The View from the Devil's Mountain: Seventeenth-Century Moral Philosophy* and *The Reasonableness of Morality*.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Throughout the volume the first time a non-English-language title of an eighteenth-century work is given in the main body of the text, it is given in its original language and then translated. Exceptions are made for a few self-evident and extremely familiar titles, Kant's *Critiques* and a few of his other well-known works, and Rousseau's *Social Contract*.

I have tried whenever possible to cite texts by the initial publication date of the work cited, or the initial date a public lecture was given, in order to give readers a sense of when the particular work of philosophy under discussion first appeared to offer the reader a stream of more useful information than the date of a contemporary edition or translation. This might sound like an easy goal, but in the eighteenth century there were a number of impediments, many of which reflect interesting features of the period and of its pivotal intellectuals.

First, many texts went unpublished. Important works by Cudworth, Leibniz, Turgot, Condorcet, Bentham, Diderot, Rousseau, etc., did not make it to the press when they were initially written, for reasons ranging from a lack of motivation on the author's part – once Locke had died Leibniz felt little need to publish the *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (*New Essays on Human Understanding*), since their main purpose was to draw Locke into debate, and so they went unpublished until 1765. Many authors feared censorship and persecution. Others found informal circulation sufficient. I have taken first publication to mean first public presentation, so for example the date for Turgot's *Tableau* has been given as 1750, since that is when he first publicly presented the work (even though it did not come out as a book until much later). The same rule has been applied for lectures when the date is clear (which is not always the case). Furthermore some works, like Rousseau's *Confessions*, appeared in part in 1782 but only in 1798 in full. I have tried whenever possible to give the date of the first complete edition.

Second, the initial publication is not always authoritative. Some texts, for example Smith's *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Hume's *Essays* and *Enquiries*, Newton's *Principia*, and perhaps most famously Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, went through numerous important editions. Other texts have a superior second edition. So the dates given are by no means a statement of the authoritativeness of said editions.

When it is apparent that an author is discussing a particular edition of one of these works – for example the second, 1690 edition of Locke's *Essay*, or the 1713 second and 1726 third editions of Newton's *Principia* – I have reflected this in the text. For example when Locke on personal identity is discussed in Ainslie and Ware, the date of the second edition where it first appeared – 1690 – is specified, together with the original date, in the main body of the text. The same for the dates of the

three editions of Newton's *Principia*, or cases where an author is just citing the A edition or B edition of Kant's first *Critique*.

The long and the short of it is that the in-text citation should be understood as a piece of information about when a text first appeared. The full information about where to locate a passage, which edition was consulted, etc., the translation cited is given in the bibliography. No doubt some will find this jarring, but hopefully most will find it helpful to give the reader a rough sense of the chronology.

Leibniz has posed a particularly serious problem to this practice, since many of his works are cited that were not published until the nineteenth or twentieth century. This does not mean the works did not have influence, due to the common practice of informal circulation. For example, as Manfred Kuehn notes in his article (Chapter 6) on "Reason and Understanding," the *Nouveaux essais* had impact far before their 1765 publication (p. 171). When a work by Leibniz does not have a seventeenth- or eighteenth-century publication date, I have opted to refer to the particular works in the text and provide a reference to a translation and in addition to whatever form of citation is appropriate. I have given 1720 for *Monadology*, the first publication of the German translation. And I have broken the rule by giving 1686 for the *Discourse on Metaphysics*. An exception has also been made for Berkeley's *Philosophical Commentaries* (1707–8).

I have tried to make references across the articles as consistent as possible when there is a standard edition, critical edition, or translation. I have also tried to refer in ways so that the citations will be easy to find across editions. Where appropriate the details of individual volumes are cited in the bibliographies. The standard editions referred to throughout the volume are as follows, *except when otherwise noted in the bibliographies of the individual pieces*.

Bentham

J. H. Burns, J. R. Dinwiddy, F. Rosen, and P. Schofield (eds.) *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham*. London: Athlone Press, 1968–81; and Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, in progress.

Berkeley

A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.) *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*. 9 v. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1948–57.

This is cited in the bibliographies as "Luce and Jessop (eds.) *Works*," or cited in full if the author needs to cite something from it that does not have a publication date. Then it is cited by date as would any other work cited from a bibliographical list, i.e. "Luce and Jessop (1948–57)."

Descartes

C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds.) *Oeuvres de Descartes*. Rev. ed. 11 v. Paris: J. Vrin; CNRS, 1964–76.

Cited by AT, volume number and page number.

Encyclopédie

D. Diderot and J. D'Alembert (eds.) *Encyclopédie des arts et des métiers*. 35 v. Paris: Breton, David, Briasson & Durand, 1751–72. Reprint, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann & Holzboog, 1966.

Citations are consistent with the edition of the *Encyclopédie* at the webpage of the French government and University of Chicago collaborative ARTFL Project (American and French Research on the Treasury of the French Language) <<http://encyclopedia.uchicago.edu>>.

Hume

References to *A Treatise* and the *Enquiries* are given to *both* the current Oxford editions and to the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition. This is the practice of *Hume Studies* and reflects the continued wide circulation of the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (which is cited as SBN).

Both editions are jointly cited in the individual-article bibliographies in order to avoid confusion in citation and repetition. So in the individual bibliographies:

Hume, D. (1739–40) *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978/2007.

Refers to *both*:

D. Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40). D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton (eds.). 2 v. In *The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

And:

D. Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch (eds.). Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Again:

Hume, D. (1748) *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975/2000.

Refers to *both*:

D. Hume. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748 [1772, 1777]). T. L. Beauchamp (ed.). In *The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. (Based on the 1777 edition.)

And:

D. Hume. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. In L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch (eds.) *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Finally:

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Refers to *both*:

D. Hume. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751 [1772, 1777]). T. L. Beauchamp (ed.). In *The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008. (Based on the 1777 edition.)

ABBREVIATIONS

And:

D. Hume. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. In L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch (eds.) *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

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Dutens: L. Dutens (ed.) *Opera omnia, nunc primum collecta, in classes distributa, praefationibus et indicibus exornata*. 6 v. Geneva: De Tournes, 1768.

Cited by Dutens, volume and page.

Grua: G. Grua (ed.) *Leibniz: Textes inédits*. 2 v. Paris, 1948.

Locke

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Reid

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INTRODUCTION: THE ECLECTICISM OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

Aaron Garrett

There are long-standing questions about metaphysics, morals, knowledge, politics, and art that Aristotle and Plato asked and that we contemporary philosophers ask as well. But the extension and intension of these questions, not to mention of the answers offered to them, vary dramatically according to the historical particulars, the setting – whether *agora*, Platonic Academy, London coffee house, Parisian scholastic disputation hall, or a twenty-first-century American Philosophical Association panel – and above all in connection with the situated concerns and beliefs of those asking and answering. Think, for example, of the impact of concerns over transubstantiation and the Communion on philosophical accounts of substance and belief. Or think about the very special issues connected with probability and certitude that arise in connection with the natural sciences (see Dario Perinetti, Chapter 11 in this volume). Or think of the impact that setting to prove the existence of a Christian god with particular attributes had on how metaphysical questions were taken up by a wide range of philosophers (see Maria Rosa Antognazza, Chapter 5). A main difficulty for the historian of philosophy is doing justice to what past philosophers considered to be philosophically interesting and relevant issues – many of which are remote from what philosophers today consider to be philosophically interesting or relevant – while at the same time exploring those aspects of eighteenth-century philosophy that contemporary philosophers do consider compelling.

And the difficulty is not just that changing extra-philosophical interests informed the ways in which past philosophers treated long-standing questions. Nor is it that perennial questions were discussed in very particular contexts – for example what Matthew L. Jones (Chapter 8, p. 204) describes as the “struggle over the authority of mathematics in physics and metaphysics” was focused, in the eighteenth century, on issues concerning space. It is also that philosophy itself included some of what we today view as natural theology, natural science, and nascent inquiries into what we now call the social sciences. And it included other areas that we today think are barely philosophical, or not philosophical at all.

The extension of philosophy is a general problem for historians but a particularly pressing issue for a volume on eighteenth-century philosophy. Eighteenth-century philosophers discussed an extraordinary breadth of topics, and many of the topics we would have liked them to spend their time on are not what they actually focus on. For example we would like it if many of the eighteenth-century British moral philosophers that we consider the most important had spent a great deal of time discussing what we consider to be crucial issues in normative moral theory and metaethics, but maddeningly they don't. Instead of getting into the justification of the authority of conscience, Butler spends a great deal of time exploring what he sees as the experiential details of our moral psychology. Hume spent a great deal more time working out the details of the *History of England* and the particulars of the passion of pride than he did explaining what is going on with the missing shade of blue, why he thought he had a fundamental objection to his own theory of personal identity, and how the analogy between secondary qualities and moral properties was supposed to work. These have left fascinating puzzles, but the prioritization is also important and interesting. And it holds, not just of Butler and Hume, but of countless other philosophers.

James A. Harris's essay "Liberty, Necessity, and Moral Responsibility" (Chapter 13) makes a helpful suggestion on the reasons for some of the difference of focus between us, today, and many philosophers of the eighteenth century. Harris remarks that "conceptual analysis is one preferred *modus operandi* of a philosophy which takes itself to be a discipline concerned first and foremost with the *a priori*, and which is content to leave empirical questions to others. Eighteenth-century philosophy is, for the most part, enthusiastic, even dogmatic, in its insistence on the importance of testing its theories at the bar of experience" (p. 320). It seems that nearly anything and everything that was testable, and perhaps confirmable, at the bar of experience was the fodder for philosophy, including the nature of the bar of experience itself (see in particular Perinetti's Chapter 11 and Lorne Falkenstein's Chapters 14 and 15 for some of the issues connected with this). This holds of Locke, Condillac, Hume, and Kant but also of Leibniz, Wolff, Montesquieu, Smith, etc., and in almost every area of philosophy imaginable. What qualified as the bar of experience ranged from scientific experiment, to thought experiment, to first-person phenomenological introspection, to travel reports, to fiction and art. There was similarly wide variance in how one scrutinized, tested, and confirmed everything from the principle of plenitude, to the relational character of space, to the non-relational character of space, to the possibility that we have a moral sense, to the epigenetic character of matter. The central place of experience in tandem with the massive growth of all sorts of empirical knowledge in the eighteenth century – of the life sciences, of physics and chemistry, of the human sciences, of the peoples around the world (this is an era of massive explosion of colonialism), of literature and the reading public – goes a long way to explaining the breadth and diversity of eighteenth-century philosophy. It also hints towards why there was so much philosophical investigation of perception and powers, so much comparative political and social philosophy, so many moral theories that stress the first-person experience of moral judgment and moral sentiment, and relatively less metaphysics and philosophy of mind (in our sense).

In what follows I will discuss another way of thinking about the extraordinary diversity of eighteenth-century philosophy that overlaps with this emphasis on

experience. When thinking about a philosopher like Denis Diderot we might colloquially say that he was “eclectic”: he had extremely diverse interests that did not necessarily fit together into one overarching scheme or system. Diderot himself wrote an article on “eclecticism” in the *Encyclopédie*, the massive reference work he co-edited with the mathematician Jean Le Rond D’Alembert, that is viewed as the central work of the French Enlightenment. In this article he characterized some of the main features we associate with the eighteenth century, and with the high Enlightenment, and identified them with the Eclectic “school.” I will use eclecticism as a way to discuss some of what was philosophically distinctive in the transition from the mid-seventeenth century to the later seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

A reader might ask why eclecticism and not Enlightenment? The movement of experience to the center of philosophy was a focal feature of the Enlightenment in its valorization of Locke and in many of its central accomplishments such as the *Encyclopédie*, Montesquieu’s *Spirit of the Laws*, Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, and Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. And many of the articles in this volume explore issues at the heart of the Enlightenment(s), particularly those by Fania Oz-Salzberger (Chapter 1), Silvia Sebastiani (24), Neil McArthur (26), Margaret Schabas (30) and Alix Cohen (31). I have avoided describing the contents of this volume as the “Philosophy of the Enlightenment” or the “Philosophy of the Enlightenments” for a few reasons. Foremost is that Enlightenment was more of a retrospective category than one used by the authors we consider to be representative of the Enlightenment during the time we call the Enlightenment (or Enlightenments). “Enlightenment” or “Lumières” or “Aufklärung” or “Illuminismo” was normally used to describe practices or achievements, not one historical movement; and the meaning of these practices or achievements was highly contested (see Oz-Salzberger, Chapter 1; Hunter 2001; Schmidt 2003). The contested character of the Enlightenment persists to the present day. There are still fundamental disagreements as to whether there was a shared Enlightenment in Europe (going back to Spinoza or Bacon or the Renaissance or beginning in the 1730s), or whether there were only different national Enlightenments, or whether there were different “Enlightenments” internal to different national philosophical cultures (see Hunter 2001), or if there was no one current uniting “the” Enlightenment(s) at all. In addition, and consequently, although we can fairly easily list central figures of the Enlightenment such as Diderot, Voltaire, Hume, Smith, Vico, Lessing, Kant, and projects like the *Encyclopédie*, the inclusive and exclusive borders are fuzzy and often arbitrary (Rousseau, Spinoza, Shaftesbury, Vico, and Herder each belong in some definitions and not in others). And the beginning and end of the Enlightenment are nebulous.

Consequently geographical and temporal limits are more efficacious for describing the contents of the volume than “Enlightenment,” although there’s a great deal of enlightenment. Great Britain, France, and Germany are the main areas of focus with brief forays into Italy (see Perinetti, Avi Lifschitz [Chapter 27], and Cohen), and a few brief excursions into the American colonies, and even Mexico (see the conclusion to Sebastiani’s Chapter 14). Most of the chapters begin with philosophers of the late seventeenth century – Locke, Leibniz, Bayle, *et al.* – and end with philosophers writing roughly at the time of the French Revolution: Kant, Wollstonecraft, Condorcet. The mid- and later seventeenth century saw a series of events, from the Peace of Westphalia to the Glorious Revolution to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes,

which had an enormous impact on European intellectual culture. These events make the last decade or so of the seventeenth century the logical place to begin a discussion of the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Similarly the French Revolution and the responses to it across Europe also signaled a kind of end. “Eighteenth century” is taken in this volume to extend roughly from the Glorious Revolution to the aftermath of the French Revolution, although the particular beginnings and end points are left up to the individual authors. For example, James E. Crimmins’s chapter on “Utility and Religion” (Chapter 20) concludes with some remarks about Mill, deep into the nineteenth century, but also wholly appropriate given the topic of the chapter. Ian Hunter (Chapter 23) begins with Grotius, and Lisa Shapiro’s (Chapter 17) and Falkenstein’s chapters with Descartes – again appropriate to the subjects under discussion (natural law and perception, respectively).

As I mentioned, I will begin by discussing eclecticism. Diderot, one of the central figures of eighteenth-century philosophy, thought that eclecticism described an important mindset that began in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century and was becoming a force in the eighteenth century. I will consider eclecticism initially via a consideration of skepticism, which Diderot also wrote an article on, and then by way of considering the waning of the schools in the eighteenth century (which I will suggest is one way of thinking about the rise in the diversity of the objects of philosophy). Eclecticism overlaps with what we associate with the high Enlightenment (which Oz-Salzberger identifies as really coming into focus in the mid-1730s) – the centrality of experience, the individual authority of reason, toleration – but it identifies these themes in terms of a prevalent way that early moderns characterized themselves: philosophical schools. I will then use this theme to introduce a few works published in the last two decades of the seventeenth century and the first decade of the eighteenth century that reflect this eclecticism. Not all figures of interest in this volume are eclectics in the way I will describe, and eclecticism is only a partial characterization – an issue I will discuss at the end of the following section. I will then turn to the plan of the volume and the contents of the individual chapters. If you wish to get directly to the contents of the volume feel free to move on to II!

I

Diderot concluded his *Encyclopédie* article “Pyrrhonienne ou sceptique philosophie” with a brief history of modern skepticism. According to Diderot, after having flourished in Greece, Pyrrhonism made little headway in Rome and “fell asleep”¹ until the birth of Francisco Sanchez in the mid-sixteenth century. Sanchez’s *That Nothing Is Known* (*Quod nihil scitur*) revived the classical Pyrrhonist techniques in order to undermine Aristotle-inspired scholastic arguments and to argue instead for fideism and submission to church doctrine. Diderot traced the lineage through Montaigne, François de La Mothe Le Vayer, and Pierre Daniel Huet to Pierre Bayle. The last of the modern skeptics discussed by Diderot – Bayle – died in 1706. “Pyrrhonienne ou sceptique philosophie” was published in 1765 and Brucker’s *Historia critica philosophiae* (which Diderot drew on extensively for the article) appeared in 1742–44. Brucker and Diderot both presented the history of skepticism as the

history of a school primarily by detailing main figures and pivotal doctrines. This sort of history of the schools was a common early modern way of doing the history of philosophy (Haakonssen 2006) an approach that went back to antiquity and persisted into the later eighteenth century (and was incorporated into different styles of history well beyond).

The historian of skepticism Richard Popkin argued in a brief, provocative essay that – with the notable exception of David Hume – by the eighteenth century, skepticism had been almost entirely dislodged from the central place it had held for philosophers of the prior century (Popkin 1963). Thirty years later Popkin qualified this claim acknowledging that “skepticism may not have been as deeply and fundamentally troubling as it was for Hume, but in modified form it underlay much of the basic philosophical discussion of the period” (Popkin 1992: 297). Skepticism had moved from being a school that generated potent criticisms of all manners of dogmatism to an ubiquitous register of argumentative techniques distilled from Sextus Empiricus, a source of epistemic modesty, and also one word on a list of pejorative terms used to characterize one’s philosophical and theological opponents (another, “materialism,” is discussed in Charles T. Wolfe’s Chapter 3).

Diderot’s history, second hand as it is, underscores this change. Huet’s *Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de l’esprit humain* (*Philosophical Treatise on the Weakness of the Human Mind*) was an important skeptical work published in the 1720s. It was translated into English and went through a number of editions. One could add (among others) Johann Georg Hamann in Germany and Anthony Collins in England as philosophers with very strong skeptical bents. In seventeenth-century usage the term “skeptical” had a very wide extension and included everything from questioning dogmas in scientific investigations (for example Robert Boyle’s *The Sceptical Chymist* [1661]) to materialism, atheism, and Deism (Berkeley’s use), to Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism, to the generation of paradoxes, to whatever critics didn’t like and could criticize in order to make themselves appear more orthodox. Positive use of the term seems to have been far rarer in the eighteenth century and full-blooded Pyrrhonists were scarce. And if what we mean by skepticism is the latter then neither Collins nor Hamann was a skeptic. Collins seemed to have been non-skeptically committed to materialism and Hamann was *sui generis*.

Indeed it is notable that Bacon, Newton, and Locke – the British philosophers whom Voltaire celebrated in his widely read *Lettres philosophiques* or *English Letters* (1734) as the epitome of what was invigorating in English thought and whose arguments could be seen as influences on similar currents in the French Enlightenment – were not particularly invested in advocating for, or refuting, skepticism. Locke seemed to hold that skepticism was the consequence of undisciplined thought ranging beyond its appropriate tether. There are powerful skeptical currents in Locke, for example the denial of our ultimate access to substance or to the constituents of matter and the stress on the probable character of empirical science. But the plain historical method, which dictated the conduct of the understanding in matters philosophical, pushed external-world skepticism or skepticism of reason out of the main business of philosophy and to the fringes of sober thought. Even Voltaire himself was not a Pyrrhonist, although he drew on and identified with Montaigne and other currents of Renaissance skepticism and delighted in uprooting dogmatisms – religious,

metaphysical, philosophical, and other – and using skeptical (and just plain obnoxious) argumentative techniques. Voltaire advocated for empirical science and Newtonianism with no skeptical criticism, as evinced in the *Lettres philosophiques*. And perhaps the best-known phrase from Voltaire is Candide’s “we must cultivate our garden” – perhaps the central Epicurean (not skeptical) teaching.

It would even be wrong to call David Hume, whom Popkin identifies as the most likely candidate, a Pyrrhonist *simpliciter*. Two years after the appearance of the third book of *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40), Hume published four essays known, today, collectively as the “essays on happiness.” Each essay outlined happiness from the perspective of a major ancient school: “The Platonist,” “The Epicurean,” “The Stoic,” and “The Sceptic.” The essays were perhaps originally intended for future volumes of *A Treatise*, which were not pursued after the first three volumes received a tepid response. In a footnote appended to the first of the *Essays* on “The Epicurean,” Hume remarked:

The intention of this and the three following essays is not so much to explain accurately the sentiments of the ancient sects of philosophy, as to deliver the sentiments of sects, that naturally form themselves in the world, and entertain different ideas of human life and of happiness. I have given each of them the name of the philosophical sect, to which it bears the greatest affinity.

(Hume 1742a: 1.15.1n)

In “The Sceptic,” by far the longest of the essays, Hume associated skepticism with each person valuing what they value as a consequence of their particular passions. Happiness, the passions, and taste are each relative to one’s particular temper. This had the overt skeptical consequence that judgments of beauty and morality are also relative to the perceiver. Hume identified two different sources of skepticism. The first source of skepticism drew on this variability and specificity of our passions and judgments of taste. There is no fact of the matter about judgments of taste or moral matters; truth or falsehood varies according to the various apprehensions of mankind, and so skepticism cannot be allayed. The second source of skepticism was due to the fact that there “seems to be always a real, though often an unknown standard, in the nature of things” (Hume 1742b: 1.18.13). We may agree that there is a standard but accessing and agreeing upon what that standard is a rather different matter. This further generated skepticism.

Hume’s argument in “The Sceptic” was itself highly skeptical. According to Hume, one’s attitude towards skepticism, the means by which one responds to skepticism, and one’s relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the solutions proffered, are all a consequence of one’s philosophical temper. But tempers vary. This echoes the skeptical problem concerning taste. There are two stopgaps though. First, pushing, pursuing, and embracing skepticism is a different matter from recognizing it. Hume of course pushed and pursued skepticism in *Treatise* 1.4, and there is little doubt that he identified most with “The Sceptic” of his four sketches. But that a particular philosopher – David Hume born at Edinburgh in 1711 – had a skeptical temper and that this temper involved a tendency to push arguments to their extreme ends is distinct from whether skepticism is the only viable philosophy.

And the second kind of skepticism is less of a problem in the science of human nature than in metaphysics and mind. Why? Each of the four philosophical types described by Hume failed to see that their philosophical beliefs reflected a particular temper as well as an overly dogmatic reduction of principles to those suited to their temper. Hume had previously argued, in *Treatise* 1.4.3, that Aristotelians and the ancients unwarrantedly universalized their tempers and their unreflective naive beliefs into a general metaphysical account of the world that they believed held of all of the schools. And the dogmatisms of the schools led to the conflicts between them.

In a note, Hume remarked that it held of skepticism as well:

The Sceptic, perhaps, carries the matter too far, when he limits all philosophical topics and reflections to these two. There seem to be others, whose truth is undeniable, and whose natural tendency is to tranquillize and soften all the passions.

(Hume 1742b: 1.18.51n)

What sorts of principles are undeniable? In the second book of *A Treatise*, “Of the Passions,” Hume suggested a comparison between his proposed moral revolution and Copernicus’s astronomical revolution:²

Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus. The antients, tho’ sensible of that maxim, that nature does nothing in vain, contriv’d such intricate systems of the heavens, as seem’d inconsistent with true philosophy, and gave place at last to something more simple and natural. To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs, that none of these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth.

(Hume 1739–40: 2.1.3.7; SBN 282)

Hume is of course offering *Treatise* Book 2 as a Copernican account of the passions and *Treatise* 3 as Copernican moral philosophy. Consequently, although in the essays on happiness Hume’s diagnosis is that the doctrines of each school arise from the temper of individuals who take it as a fact of the matter about the world and a fixed standpoint from which to criticize the other schools, the overall conclusion is not skeptical. The schools are all truly analyzed within a general account of the desire for happiness and accessible general principles of the passions (assumedly consistent with *Treatise* Book 2), which are not as susceptible to the second kind of skepticism as are metaphysical principles.

Assuming that Popkin is correct and that there is a nosedive in the number of eighteenth-century philosophers who considered themselves to be skeptics from the numbers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even if Hume was a less than paradigmatic example, what was afoot? It may have had to do with the fact that associations between skepticism and irreligion became more pronounced and more dangerous. But skepticism was not the only school that flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, nor the only school whose lessons were absorbed. There

were also Epicureans like Pierre Gassendi and William Charleton (Osler 1991, 1994; Wilson 2008; Lolordo 2006), Stoics like Justus Lipsius (Kraye 1988; Osler 1991; Sellars 2007, 2012; Brooke 2012), Platonists like Whichcote, Cudworth, More, and Masham (Hutton 1990; Darwall 1995; Gill 2006), as well as bevvies of Aristotelians and scholastics of many stripes (Ariew 1999). The philosophers who advocated these positions thrived, built systems, cultivated acolytes, and argued with one another.³ There were certainly Stoics in the eighteenth century, Hutcheson, for example. But even he was highly syncretic. Hutcheson's benevolent God was not much like the Stoic God.

Although individual school arguments, doctrines, and even self-identification persisted well into the eighteenth century one might conclude that it was not just the skeptical school that faded, but school thinking more broadly (for a parallel argument concerning Epicureanism see the Introduction to Leddy and Lifschitz 2009). Lessons from all the schools were more or less integrated into philosophical positions with much less worry about the systematic positions of the schools from whence they came. Furthermore, the very fact that cogent arguments have been made for identifying modern philosophy with Stoicism in political philosophy, with Epicureanism in natural science, psychology, etc., and of course with skepticism in metaphysics and the theory of knowledge, highlights the eclecticism of the seventeenth century taken as a whole.

Indeed the revival of the schools as a framework within which to present philosophical arguments that drew on a background of interconnected and long-standing philosophical positions was always syncretic and eclectic to a degree. Even the philosophers who identified themselves exclusively with individual schools normally attempted to reconcile ancient philosophical doctrines with Christianity. Gassendi, Lipsius, Sanchez, and the Cambridge Platonists – some of the most important figures and movements in the early modern revivals of Epicureanism, Stoicism, Skepticism, and Platonism – all criticized and rejected (like Hutcheson) important doctrines of those ancient schools with which they identified, in order to accommodate the bulk of the ancient school doctrines to their respective Christian beliefs. The converse was true as well, that core philosophical beliefs reflected, or were themselves, Christian beliefs. For example, Jonathan Edwards's criticisms of materialism and mechanism (see Jasper Reid's Chapter 4) and Malebranche's occasionalism harmonized Augustineanism (where God was thoroughly present in nature as immediate cause; see P. J. E. Kail, Chapter 7) with other philosophical commitments (Lockean and Cartesian, respectively). Similarly, later, Joseph Butler stressed human self-deceit in a way that reflected Augustinean anthropology, in concord with Stoical and Aristotelian doctrines.

Consequently there was a sense in which early modern philosophy was eclectic even when philosophers presented themselves as the advocates of particular schools (indeed Lipsius is viewed as both a founding figure of neo-Stoicism and of eclecticism). What I wish to suggest is that eclecticism, not as a combining of doctrines, but rather as a distinctive philosophical attitude became the philosophical norm in the period on which this volume is focused.

Diderot also wrote an article on "Eclecticism" for the *Encyclopédie* far longer than the article on "Skepticism." The article begins with a kind of credo of the Eclectic:

The eclectic is a philosopher who, trampling underfoot prejudice, tradition, antiquity, general agreement, authority—in a word, everything that controls

the minds of the common herd—dares to think for himself [*ose penser de lui-même*], returns to the clearest general principles, examines them, discusses them, admits nothing that is not based on the testimony of his experience and his reason; and from all the philosophies he has analyzed without respect and bias he makes for himself a particular and domestic one which belongs to him. ... There is no leader of a sect who has not been more or less eclectic. ... The Eclectics are among the philosophers who are the kings on the face of the earth, the only ones who have remained in the state of nature, where everything belonged to everyone.

(Diderot and D'Alembert 1751–72: V, 270)⁴

The basic elements of Diderot's definition of eclecticism are derived from Brucker, which in turn draws on Christian Thomasius's characterization of eclecticism.⁵ But Diderot states the creed with particular and distinctive zeal. He equates a refusal to submit to the herd or authority qua the herd or authority with eclecticism and portrays the eclectic as a true democrat and individualist who refuses to submit to the yoke of any sect, and creates a philosophy that responds to his own particular needs and beliefs. Like Skepticism, Eclecticism was the common enemy of the entrenched schools and was committed to not taking the validity of any doctrine or cluster of doctrines on authority. But where the Skeptic was committed to overthrowing any and all doctrines (ibid.: XIII, 608), the Eclectic happily accepted doctrines piecemeal insofar as they were each true, right, and relevant (see Thomasius 1688: ch. 1, §92).⁶ This was perhaps an even more destructive challenge to the schools, in that it questioned the unity of their doctrines as schools and was harder to dismiss out of hand than skeptical challenges.

Brucker, Thomasius, and Diderot stressed the close connection between eclecticism (I will use the small "e" to signal the attitude as opposed to the school) and the spirit of reasoned inquiry, insofar as to be an eclectic was to buck all orthodoxies and in particular those that damped free, thoughtful inquiry, where what one only cares about is truth relying on one's own intellect. Diderot's *ose penser de lui – même* is very close to Kant's more famous maxim *sapere aude*. Brucker's and Diderot's lists of modern Eclectics included Bruno, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, Thomasius, and Wolff – i.e. the core of modern philosophy informed by (and creating) the new natural philosophy. Many of the philosophers on the list came into conflict with authorities as well. They were also eclectic in the more standard sense. Even Wolff, Thomasius's opponent who was a Leibnizian with systematizing scholastic tendencies, mixed Leibnizian arguments and doctrines with empirical psychology in a way that would not have been embraced by Leibniz (see Manfred Kuehn, Chapters 6 and 35, and Stephen Gaukroger, Chapters 16 and 28). Descartes drew on Epicurean, Stoic, Scotist, Platonist, etc., arguments and doctrines in different parts of his theory. But for Descartes, what dictated the adoption of a particular doctrine was not that it was held by a particular school, or that it expressed the school's particular integrated worldview, but rather that the doctrine conformed to his method and to his reason. And although Descartes was not an empiricist, he, like Bacon, was pivotal in the movement towards philosophy engaging with more and more of the world of experience and experiment. Cartesian physiology, for example, brought modern

philosophy to the medical schools. The eclecticism and the focus on experience moved in tandem.

This is *not* to suggest that Descartes or Bacon viewed themselves as Eclectics, or would have been pleased by Diderot's retrospective baptism of them as Eclectics. I am rather suggesting that Diderot, following Brucker and Thomasius, was recognizing a shared philosophical commitment in Bacon, Descartes, and others towards method and a general orientation towards knowledge which broke up prevailing assumptions, in particular school assumptions, about how different areas of inquiry and human endeavor were unified and what areas were of primary interest. Bacon's *Of the Advancement of Learning*, Descartes's *Discourse on Method*, Locke's *Essay*, and numerous other works presented minimalist methods that were independent of particular doctrinal commitments and that individual inquirers could use to understand the world and to reject doctrinal commitments. Thomasius boiled down the method to two common principles shared by figures as different as Aristotle and Descartes but stripped of any associated metaphysical doctrines (Thomasius 1688: chs. 7–8). Method is to proceed from what is known to what is unknown and to use proximate conclusions in order to connect to remote conclusions (Haaparanta 2009: 123).

To return to the bar of experience, Thomasius saw this methodological minimalism and anti-dogmatism as of a piece with Eclecticism and the continual recourse to experience. All of the figures on the list of modern Eclectics made continuing and in some cases continuous use of the bar of experience, whether as test or confirmation. The centrality of the bar of experience was closely connected in all with the exercise of individual reason. And perhaps no one better exemplified the stress all together on the “testimony of experience,” the use of individual reason, and not taking authority at face value, than Diderot himself. His discussion of Molyneux's question (see Falkenstein, Part I, Chapter 14, on the question itself) in the *Lettre sur les aveugles* (*Letter on the Blind*) (1749) is a perfect example of this. Not content with an a priori discussion of the question, he analyzed recent surgical experiments as well as provided a kind of speculative anthropology of the world of the blind to try to better think through the problem. The *Lettre* landed Diderot in prison at Vincennes, where another famously eclectic thinker – Jean-Jacques Rousseau – claimed to have visited him every day during his confinement (see Ryan Hanley, Chapter 34).

This is not to suggest that the eclectic recourse to experience did not involve a great deal of speculation. As is suggested in Charles T. Wolfe's chapter on “Materialism” (Chapter 3), many of the putatively experiential concepts that philosophers such as Diderot used – for example “epigenesis” – were at least as speculative as those that they criticized. And no one would accuse the author of *Rêve de D'Alembert* (*D'Alembert's Dream*) (written in 1769) of unspeculative empiricism. Perhaps the diversity of what Diderot took to be relevant experience expresses the Eclectic spirit most adroitly. He created a current of philosophy even less amenable to a school than the philosophy of Descartes, Leibniz, and others (who most certainly had their schools).

With this emphasis on the bar of experience came also perhaps the most distinctive feature of eighteenth-century philosophy: its obsession with all things human (Garrett 2006). Bacon embraced Terence's maxim “Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto” (“I am human, I regard nothing human as alien to me”; Bacon 1623: 4.2, 323), as did many others. In the works of Locke, Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks*, Bayle's

Dictionnaire, and in other pivotal works of the late seventeenth century this obsession becomes more and more pronounced, as seen in Locke's fascination with travel narratives, in Shaftesbury's exploration of taste, and in Bayle's stress on human fallibility and human limit as crucial to the understanding of our world (as well as in his endless fascination with nearly everything human).

In Diderot, Rousseau, Hume, and Kant (who as Manfred Kuehn points out was just as fascinated with anthropology as all of these other figures were), it sometimes feels not just that nothing human is wholly alien but also that what is human and alien is even more fascinating than what is human and familiar. Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* (*Persian Letters*) (1721), in particular, explored the back and forth between familiar and alien in a way that was enormously influential throughout the century. And the obsession with the human and alien was also sometimes, perhaps often, an obsession with line-drawing. The phrase "admits nothing that is not based on the testimony of his experience and his reason" hopefully puts into the mind of the twentieth-century reader that how "who gets to be a 'he'" is decided is crucial to whether or not the eclectic attitude is as emancipatory as Diderot suggests (see Garrett 2006 and the chapters by Cohen, Sebastiani, Jacqueline Taylor [Chapter 18], and Susanne Sreedhar [Chapter 25]). Similarly philosophers were fascinated with race and with animals, both of which involved line-drawing (see particularly the chapters by Sebastiani, Cohen, and Justin E. H. Smith [Chapter 29]). If Eclecticism focused on experience, the diversity of human experience and the approaches were as eclectic as could be.

As mentioned before, philosophers still called one another skeptics, Stoics, Epicurean, as well as Cartesians, Hobbists, and many other names associated with doctrinal schools. But by the mid-eighteenth century "schools" seemed to function mainly as eclectic, mixable doctrines in the manner Diderot described. This process is adroitly illustrated by a letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short written in 1819.⁷ Jefferson claims himself to be an Epicurean but then imagines "translating Epictetus (for he has never been tolerably translated into English) of adding the genuine doctrines of Epicurus from the Syntagma of Gassendi, and an Abstract from the Evangelists of whatever has the stamp of the eloquence and fine imagination of Jesus" (Jefferson 1819). Jefferson was an idiosyncratic intellectual even by late eighteenth-century standards, but he also exemplifies this eclectic mix and match (Epicureans, Stoics, and Jesus) combined with scientific inquiry and, of course, a deep investment in tolerationism and democracy.⁸ By the end of the eighteenth century, to attempt to be a Platonist (or Neoplatonist) *simpliciter* – as Lord Monboddo or Thomas Taylor attempted to be – seemed more than a bit old-fashioned.

An answer to why this happened can only be conjectured. There were transformative political events at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century (the Glorious Revolution, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the 1707 union between Scotland and England, the growth of the slave trade and colonial empires, etc.) that had a decisive impact on the philosophers discussed in this volume. There were huge technological changes (the explosion of printed literature and greater access to it), the rise of informal networks (clubs, salons, coffee houses, etc.) that transformed and oriented philosopher's intellectual engagements (see Oz-Salzberger). There were rapid changes in many areas of knowledge, and

many discoveries of new areas of knowledge, that drew philosophers to engage with these diverse areas, to test their own philosophical views by them, and to try to create new ways of making sense of them. Newton's *Principia* (1687), Buffon's *Histoire naturelle* (*Natural History*) (1749–68), and Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des lois* (1748) were three monumental works in a sea of experiential innovation. And some of the most important engagements were in areas without a Newton, Buffon, or Montesquieu – witness Lifschitz's chapter on the extraordinarily fruitfulness of discussions of language in the eighteenth century.

Whatever cause one points to, the combination of the eclectic attitude identified by Diderot with the central figures of the new science and methodology of the prior century and the growing diversity of objects and areas changed philosophical inquiry and also allowed for a great deal of critique. Diderot's philosophical immersion in the life sciences led him to criticize Cartesian mechanistic explanations (see Wolfe and Smith). Berkeley's and Condillac's careful engagements with first-hand perceptual experience, and experiment (including thought experiment) led them to extend and challenge prevalent views on perception (see Falkenstein, Parts I and II, and Shapiro). Adam Smith's (and Hume's) interest in commerce helped them to think about politics and authority quite differently than Hobbes (see Schabas). Rousseau used natural history in a critical way in *Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (*Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men*) (1755) (see Hanley, Sebastiani, and McArthur). Mary Wollstonecraft's and Olympe de Gouges's first-hand experience of the changes at the end of the period under consideration helped them to make criticisms of Rousseau (see Sreedhar and Taylor). "Newtonianism" was everywhere in the eighteenth century, but it often meant not a great deal more than a commitment to the non-dogmatic testing of theories, guided by experience, and to a minimum of hypotheses and presuppositions. And, although it viewed itself as highly empirical, it often involved a great deal of speculation, even on the part of those who were Newtonians in a more precise sense, as well as debate as to how to understand the so-called simple hypotheses. For the former witness Clarke's espousal of divine voluntarism in connection with the principle of sufficient reason against Leibniz or his discussion of space (following Newton) as a divine *sensorium* (Leibniz and Clarke 1717) (see Jones, Chapter 8). For the latter see Eric Schliesser's discussion (Chapter 2) of Newton's none too evident rules for philosophizing.

Perhaps with huge amounts of changing and expanding areas of inquiry to philosophize about and a rapidly changing context, a measure of eclecticism was a reasonable response. And it is important to note that many of the divisions between what is and what is not philosophy, that we take for granted – i.e. between philosophy and different areas of empirical inquiry and theology – were in the process of developing or had not yet taken shape. This could vary regionally. Sidgwick notes that in 1772 at Cambridge John Jebb listed the four branches of philosophy as "Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Apparent Astronomy and Optics" (Sidgwick 1876), which would not have been held as *the* four branches of philosophy in Paris (although they might have been viewed as belonging broadly to philosophy).

But it was not just the changing context that led to this eclecticism. It was also spurred on by the syncretic and eclectic visions of a few important philosophers and

their exemplary philosophical works. The many writings of Locke, Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (*Historical and Critical Dictionary*) (1697), and Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711) (many of the central chapters of which had been appearing as individual essays over the first decade of the eighteenth century) acted as catalysts for these aspects of eighteenth-century philosophy and were exemplary of the attitude identified by Diderot (although none of them are listed in the article).⁹

As noted previously, Voltaire identified Locke as the core of what was exemplary in English letters and felt that his works united epistemic modesty, epistemic toleration – i.e. a willingness to think through unorthodox positions – empiricism, religious toleration, and tacit criticisms of state brutality. Locke provided various elegant statements of the idea that one's own natural light or “candle of the Lord,” not external authority (in Diderot's phrase “*ose penser de lui-même*”), was the ultimate justification of the validity of a philosophical position or argument. In Locke's own thinking this was closely connected with a theology that stressed the personal link between God and humanity. But whatever the origin of this standpoint, Locke was “one very important model indeed of conversation, discussion, friendship, and civility in the ‘early Enlightenment’” (Marshall 2006: 519). Locke is, unsurprisingly, discussed extensively in this volume despite the fact that his influential writings belong mostly to the late seventeenth century.

Pierre Bayle was a mainstay of the discussion circles in which Locke took part during his exile in Holland (discussions which appear to have radicalized him both philosophically and religiously) and appeared to have been friendly with him (Marshall 2006: 491). Bayle united most of the same themes, but with less interest in constructing a positive philosophy and a far sharper and more playful wit. (Prior to Locke's *Epistle on Toleration* [1689] he wrote perhaps the most powerful argument for toleration in early modern philosophy, the *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ “Contrains-les d’entrer”* [*Philosophical Commentary on the Words of Jesus Christ “Compel Them to Come In”*] [1686], following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.)

The *Dictionnaire*, which Locke recommended as a work to be read by educated gentlemen (Marshall 2006: 519) and which spurred Hume's *Treatise*, was a precursor to Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*. But one of the most extraordinary aspects of Bayle's mammoth *Dictionnaire* is how non-sectarian it was in exhibiting a wealth of philosophy and of philosophical argument. In other words it disseminated not just skeptical arguments, but arguments of many, many sorts. Although Bayle criticized every stripe of philosopher ancient and modern in the footnotes, it seemed not so much a triumph of skepticism over competing schools as the embodiment in a philosophical work of not taking arguments as authoritative just on the presumed intellectual standing of those who promulgated them and instead evaluating them for oneself. Bayle was given the role of “last great modern skeptic” in Popkin's history and in Diderot's (and Brucker's) historical sketch. And he certainly was a skeptic in many ways. But he was also the very spirit of eclecticism as described by Diderot.

One of the hallmarks of the work was the disproportion between the brief articles outlining basic doctrinal and biographical facts and the expansive footnotes, which

often engaged, not just with the article at hand, but with other articles and other footnotes in intellectual debate. Like Locke, Bayle provided structures for “civil” debate in two senses: debate that was civilized and debate that allowed a civil space where those whose allegiances pulled them to different and opposed spheres could fruitfully disagree. This can be seen in the *Dictionnaire* and also his *Nouvelles de la république des lettres* (*News from the Republic of Letters*), one of the first journals devoted to book reviews (with many written by Bayle himself while he was editor from 1684 to 1687). *Nouvelles de la république des lettres* created the semblance of a vigorous, intellectual community of reasoned debate, as well as wit and mockery, which played no small part in building a real community.

Shaftesbury was tutored by Locke, who perhaps wrote his great work on liberal education *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693) – which argued for allowing children to come to reason for themselves with as little external coercion as possible – with the tutoring of the young lord in mind. Although Bayle and Shaftesbury were from very different backgrounds – the former a Huguenot French exile in Rotterdam and the latter from the apex of the British gentry – they met a number of times and kept up a friendly correspondence after Shaftesbury returned to England from Holland in 1699.¹⁰ The attitude on offer in Bayle’s *Dictionnaire* can also be seen in Shaftesbury’s *Sensus communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour* (1709) and his defense of satire and raillery as closely connected to free thought and toleration.

Satire and raillery were associated with Epicureans like Lucian, as well as skeptics and cynics. In *Sensus communis* Shaftesbury was effectively signaling their importance to a thriving and liberal society. In a 1706 letter to Pierre Coste (the translator of Locke and Newton into French), Shaftesbury described his own intellectual development in terms of a move from Stoicism to Epicureanism and back (Shaftesbury 1900: 355–66). In the frontispiece to the *Characteristicks*, Shaftesbury stands in a toga leaning on Xenophon and Plato but wearing not sandals but modern shoes (Garrett 2012: 232–33). The effect is that Shaftesbury is portrayed as being fully schooled in the Schools, but also drawing on them selectively for modern purposes. The *Characteristicks* is a playful, self-referential, and self-reflective work. In a way complementary to Bayle’s *Dictionnaire*, which offers the macrocosm of the many ideas circulating in the republic of letters from the ancient world onward, the *Characteristicks* offers a portrait of Lord Shaftesbury in many guises and disguises. These drew on ancient philosophical currents to illuminate a cluster of issues crucial to the modern world – religious toleration, the nature of virtue in a commercial society, the importance of mockery and criticism to a thriving society, republicanism, and the centrality of art and literature to life, among others.

John Toland said of Shaftesbury “perhaps no modern ever turn’d the Antients more into sap and blood, as they say, than he. Their Doctrines he understood as well as themselves, and their Virtues he practis’d better” (Toland 1721: vii). This description captures both the importance of the ancients for Shaftesbury, and also that Shaftesbury was drawing on them as a modern for the moderns. A few years earlier the “querelles des Anciens et Modernes” (quarrel between the ancients and moderns) had brought some of the best-known French dramatists, writers, and poets into conflict about whether ancient or modern poetry and drama was superior. The *Querelle*

played out in philosophical doctrines and debates in a rather more complicated way since the return to the schools was a crucial component of the new sciences and because, as noted before, even the most ardent admirers of the schools normally sought to harmonize them with contemporary Christian confessions. Such notables as Henry More, Pierre Gassendi, and Leibniz embody the complexity of these engagements.

Shaftesbury seemed to have identified himself primarily as a Stoic, although he was also very much a Platonist, an Epicurean, and a skeptic. I would like to suggest that Shaftesbury and Bayle were instrumental in a different aspect of eclecticism as well that is not captured in Diderot's discussion of a continuous tradition. Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and many of the other great philosophers of the seventeenth century viewed themselves as modern in opposition to scholasticism and to other viewpoints they held to have been superseded. Bayle and Shaftesbury, like many other eighteenth-century philosophers – Hume's "Essays on Happiness" are also paradigmatic in this regard – appreciated and engaged eclectically with the ancient schools and in Shaftesbury's case ancient virtue in particular. The revival of the schools, from the Renaissance onward, involved a stress on the continuity with *sapientia antiquissima* ("most ancient wisdom" as the most Renaissance of eighteenth-century philosophers Giambattista Vico styled it). In the *Dictionnaire* and the *Characteristicks* the ancients criticized the moderns and vice versa. But we are moderns, so the ancients needed to be appropriated for the moderns, but critically and without being appropriated in whole cloth. A toga could, and should, be eclectically donned with heeled shoes not ancient sandals. Ulrich Schneider has suggested that in Thomasius and in the German context more generally there was also a close connection between eclecticism and an awareness that philosophers can choose from a wide variety of historical positions (Schneider 1997: 87; 1998).

Bayle and Shaftesbury for all their brilliance seem very different, though, from the many eighteenth-century philosophers who were strongly driven by systematic considerations and are recognized as central both by their peers and by us. I have in mind luminaries such as Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume,¹¹ and Kant. I would like to conclude this discussion by suggesting that the tension between the eclectic attitude described above – the stress on individual reason and the testimony of the senses, anti-dogmatism, toleration, and a reduction of method and philosophy to a few simple principles – and the desire for a systematic way of making sense of the complexity and the diversity of mind and world seen in the methodological unity of Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and the other methodologists taken as exemplary by the eighteenth century was no small part of their greatness. (But lack of systematicity should be more often recognized as no small part of Bayle's, Shaftesbury's, and Diderot's greatness as well.)

To return again to Hume's "Essays on Happiness," Hume wished to explain the diversity of temper and individual moral and aesthetic judgments as well as how these differences of taste and judgment might be unified in an explanation that does not do disservice to this diversity. Unifying diversity was one of the most exciting promises of the human sciences in Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des lois*, in Condillac's psychology, Smith's political economy, and elsewhere. Hume's self-described "Copernicanism" of the passions (an earlier and distinct variety from Kant's far

better-known Copernican turn) was exhibited in the claim that all humans seek happiness and that all humans have similar associative psychologies and similar passions but in different mixtures and degrees. The schools make a mistake in maintaining their systems dogmatically and the difficulties of their positions can be seen in their inability to explain those elements of human nature that are made sense of by the other schools. Adam Smith similarly concluded the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) with a discussion of the “Systems of Philosophy” where he argued that the disagreements among the philosophical schools could be dissolved if one recognized that the schools turned particular tendencies and preferences into absolute principles (morality is *solely* benevolence or *solely* utility) and real properties of the natural world (see Remy Debes, Chapter 21, and Taylor). Once we recognize that there are shared psychological features that explain the many forms that morality takes we will be able to recognize that different sorts of explanations are appropriate to different arenas (propriety and justice for example). They might even have different standards of certitude and probability, as suggested in the essay by Perinetti.

The tension between eclecticism and system is perhaps most pronounced in the “Antinomies of Pure Reason” of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (see Kuehn in Chapter 35 of this volume). Some of the most profound metaphysical questions could not be resolved but instead could only be displayed in their “dazzling but false plausability” as ideas that “cannot be made to agree with appearances” (Kant 1781/1787: A408/B435). To maintain that the world necessarily has a beginning in time, or does not have a beginning in time, was to engage in dogmatism. The only resolution to the conflict between dogmas, and the conflict between dogmatism and skepticism, was to methodologically limit the tendency to either, and to explain the tendencies through a core account of experience (much like Hume’s and Smith’s psychology).

But to draw on Hunter, Sebastiani, Sreedhar, and many others in this volume, unity is often the retrospective judgment of the philosophical victors. On the ground, things were diverse, contested, and complex. Hume, Smith, and Kant are of course today philosophical eminences. There were other systems and there are other ways to tell the story of the conflicts between philosophical orientations and what philosophical problems were most pressing. And even the systems of the great philosophical eminences are more diverse, and foreign at many points, than we like to recognize.

II

The volume as a whole attempts to do some justice to the eclecticism described in the previous section and to the actual interests of these philosophers on the ground. There are many references to Leibniz, Kant, Hume, Condillac, and Rousseau. But there are also references to Thomasius, von Haller, Erasmus Darwin, Olympe de Gouges, and Antonio Genovesi. There are discussions of causation and utility, but also of Trembley’s polyp and political economy.

Furthermore this volume is intended to be eclectic not only in its structure, and its coverage, but also in its approaches to the history of philosophy, from reconstruction of philosophical argument, to highly contextual history of philosophy, to other

approaches associated with the disciplines of the varied contributors. All of these approaches are very much alive in the contemporary republic of letters. It seems appropriate to offer diverse approaches to try to understand a historical period when there was great breadth in what was considered philosophy. It is hoped that this will help cast light on the eclectic expanse of eighteenth-century philosophy as a practice, as an academic discipline, as identifiable intellectual currents, concepts, and problems, and as many different texts and authors. In this volume “philosophy” is taken to include pivotal topics for philosophers writing today – such as causation, personal identity, and moral realism – as well as topics that are today somewhat less discussed or even wholly forgotten but which were important areas of research in the eighteenth century – such as pneumatology and the soul. Kant’s discussion of right is both treated as an outgrowth of his moral philosophy and as emerging from a history of natural law going back to Grotius.

As a consequence, although many of the chapters provide broad coverage of their topics, the editorial focus has been less on coverage and more on saying something distinctive and original. There are notable lacunae. But this *Companion* should give the reader a sense of the engagements and concerns of philosophers in this period.

That said there are a few emphases and distinctive features of this volume. As noted in the previous section, the eighteenth century was perhaps the greatest period of ferment of things human, of moral, political, and social philosophy – “moral” in the sense of Rousseau’s distinction between *l’homme moral* and *l’homme physique* in the *Discourse on Inequality* and in the sense the *encyclopédistes* specified in many of their articles (*Moral*). Even areas apparently remote from human beings and human nature return to them. Justin Smith’s chapter on “Natural History and the Speculative Sciences of Origins” (Chapter 29) discusses, among other things, the numerous ways in which philosophers made sense of the natural world by comparing themselves to it and situating themselves within it. The fascination with the diversity and centrality of human beings, and the belief that the best way to understand them was through experience, unites an enormous amount of philosophy throughout the century from Locke’s *Essay* and Shaftesbury’s *Characteristicks* to Rousseau, Kant, Wollstonecraft, and Condillac. It is the century where moral, anthropological, social, aesthetic, and political kinds of experience all come to the fore at once.

Oz-Salzberger’s chapter, already discussed above, makes this point very strongly by showing the dazzling array of interconnected works, networks, and projects associated with the Enlightenment(s). It is followed by Schliesser’s chapter on Newtonianism, Reid’s on immaterialism, and Wolfe’s on materialism, all of which discuss movements, or perhaps more accurately tropes, of the eighteenth century. All draw on a cast of characters many of whom today are unfamiliar. Newtonianism was on many lips, but as Schliesser shows, it did not follow that those talking about it understood, much the less agreed on, what Newton meant. Nor was what Newton meant in key passages as evident as one might hope. Schliesser’s chapter also reflects, as do many of the other chapters in the volume, on how easily philosophers moved back and forth between metaphysical and methodological issues, and their consequences, and natural science. In Reid’s Chapter 4, we see that “immaterialism” in distinction from the later “idealism,” was primarily a British movement, although drawing extensively on Malebranche’s occasionalism and earlier currents we often associate with the late

Renaissance. Immaterialism though is not just a matter of abiding influences; it arose independently in the arguments of thinkers who did not know each other's work. Reid explores how Berkeley, Collier, Jonathan Edwards, and many others less known today argued against matter and traversed the intricate ontological and perceptual questions involved. Materialism was, in contradistinction, primarily a French phenomenon, although again it prospered in Germany, Britain, and further afield at different points. Not surprisingly, materialism in the eighteenth century was closely connected with the rise of the life sciences, although it also took succor and shape from everything from Epicureanism to Leibniz. It was also, unlike immaterialism, often a clandestine and anonymous affair – the danger of immaterialism was mainly ridicule, the danger of materialism, when deemed atheism, could be far more severe.

Maria Rosa Antognazza's Chapter 5 on "Reason, Revelation, and Arguments for the Deity," which discusses the changing relation between human reason and revelation in eighteenth-century philosophy, opens the second section of the volume: "Metaphysics and Understanding." Antognazza describes how latitudinarian attempts to find common ground between reason and revelation in a few common principles were followed by the rise of Deist criticisms of revelation in France, England, and Germany. In the century which began with Samuel Clarke's deductive proof of the attributes and the existence of God against skeptics of revelation such as Spinoza, the concurrent (Spinoza-influenced) Baylean currents of skepticism about the limits of reason gave rise to Hume's potent criticisms in the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*¹² (published posthumously in 1779) and then to a striking rational variant on the Pietist stress on moral practice as central to religion in the moral turn in Kant's notion of practical reason. Manfred Kuehn's Chapter 6 focuses on "Reason and Understanding" and tells a centrally German story (although there are many non-Germans discussed in the chapter as well). He charts a change throughout the eighteenth century from a Leibnizian optimism about reason to a deeper and deeper awareness of the limits of reason. In Kant in particular, reason became identified with the understanding and the limits on the faculty of understanding expressed by Locke became even more restrictive. But surprisingly there was a return in Fichte to an even stronger optimism than Leibniz. The cunning of reason indeed! Perinetti's "Ways to Certainty" shows how a closely connected issue – are there different kinds of certitude – led eighteenth-century philosophers to consider whether there was one notion of certitude or whether different degrees of certitude and probability were appropriate to the different regions of inquiry. This involved a shift in the eighteenth century to the adoption of what Perinetti refers to as the "equal certainty thesis," which was closely connected with the rise of the sciences of man (Chapter 11, p. 277).

Central metaphysical topics are discussed in Donald Ainslie and Owen Ware's "Consciousness and Personal Identity" (Chapter 10), P. J. E. Kail's "Causation" (7), Matthew Jones's "Space, Evidence, and the Authority of Mathematics" (8), and Yitzhak Melamed's "What Is Time?" (9). All provide sophisticated analyses of central metaphysical concepts in their pan-European context. Kail gives a genealogy of the Malebranchean, Leibnizian, and Newtonian/Lockean background of discussions of causation in the eighteenth century and pays particular attention to the fundamental role that Malebranche's occasionalism played in Hume's far more familiar analysis. Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Berkeley, Newton, and others all figure in Kail's discussion of

cause and the issues concerning regularity and necessity that were closely connected with understanding it. Ainslie and Ware begin with Locke's creation of the problem of personal identity and chart its surprising permutations in France, Scotland, and German. From Hume's bundle theory as well as his puzzling over whether his own theory worked, they move to the rise of the human sciences and the "project of understanding the social worlds that we create for ourselves" in Rousseau (Chapter 10, p. 255), and finally to Kant's unifying project of bringing the social self back together with self as mind. Their chapter makes visceral the point that the borders between metaphysics, mind, morals, and social and political philosophy were highly fluid or unrecognized by many eighteenth-century philosophers. Jones looks at the "philosophical struggles to grasp the nature of space, the continuum, and the symbolic fecundity of analytic mathematics, whose new objects greatly challenged dominant eighteenth-century understandings of mathematics" (Chapter 8, p. 204). The legitimacy of mathematics as a discipline and as a paragon of certainty was both advocated for and contested by philosophers and physicists. The question of how to understand what mathematics was and how to understand the sort of evidence it gave was crucial for many intellectuals throughout the century. Melamed asks the very eighteenth-century question of "whether time can be reduced to, grounded by, or explained through other more basic elements" (Chapter 9, p. 232) and shows just how puzzling it was for many thinkers to explain and ground that which Augustine had noted seemed inexplicable. No decisive solution was offered, and the framework for trying to explain it seems rather strange to us. But excellent philosophy resulted nonetheless.

Thomas Ahnert's "Soul and Mind" (Chapter 12) appropriately opens the third section of the volume: "Mind, Soul, and Perception." Ahnert examines questions of mind in connection with the status of the soul in Britain, France, and the "German lands" (p. 311) – and in particular whether the mind or soul was material or immaterial. As part of the discussion he also considers the rise and fall of a characteristically eighteenth-century discipline: pneumatology, or the discipline that considered the human soul and all other spirit beings. Ahnert describes the shift from looking at humans as souls with affinities to angelic and demonic souls to a more familiar naturalistic view. His chapter is a paradigmatic example of drawing us into what are today rather unremembered areas of philosophy to illuminate areas far more familiar. Like those of Reid, Wolfe, and Kuehn, Ahnert's chapter shows both that there was a great deal of movement of knowledge across national boundaries in the eighteenth century, and that there were also distinctively national intellectual movements and interests (although examples like the materialism of Priestley, the immaterialist formulations of Maupertuis, or Locke's centrality to discussions of reason and the understanding make this a generalization not a rule). James Harris also discusses the different national contexts for thinking about agency, such as the British concern with characterizing the experience of agency, derived from Locke, and the impact of the French fascination with materialism. But surprisingly, given its centrality for Kant, "much moral and political philosophy" was "written in the eighteenth century without the question of liberty and necessity being broached at all" (Chapter 13, p. 335). Harris is tacitly raising an issue of historiography. Do the ways in which we represent the history of philosophy in the wake of a highly original philosopher – in this case Kant – accord with the history on the ground?

Lorne Falkenstein's two chapters cover one of the central philosophical topics throughout the eighteenth century, the nature of perception. I am tempted to say that these two chapters are the best brief treatment of the history of eighteenth-century perception written. In particular, Falkenstein shows how the bar of experience was used by Berkeley, Condillac, Reid, Porterfield, and numerous others in a wide variety of perceptual experiments and inspections of perceptual experience to challenge philosophical orthodoxies on the perception of distance, and to make surprising claims about the nature of the visual field.

Stephen Gaukroger's and Lisa Shapiro's chapters move us to fulcrums between discussions of perception and the moral and social. Gaukroger's "Sensibility" (Chapter 16) explores a central eighteenth-century concept that is no longer central for us, but was then often posited as opposed to reason. In supplement to Kuehn's and Antognazza's chapters, Gaukroger shows a different context for understanding reason in the eighteenth century through the way in which medical, anthropological, moral, and other sorts of experience bore on the development of the sensibility which "lies at the basis of our relation to the physical world" and came to have "physiological, moral, and aesthetic dimensions" (p. 382). Lisa Shapiro's chapter "Pleasure, Pain and Sense Perception," treats a similar fulcrum between discussions of perception and of moral philosophy. Shapiro explains the surprising history starting from Descartes and Locke of how perceptions of pain and pleasure moved from being as rich in content as other perceptual states to "simple contentless motivational states" (Chapter 17, p. 400). Her discussion ends appropriately with Bentham and how getting rid of content in pain and pleasure (while still preserving some qualitative distinctions between pleasures) was crucial for aggregative utilitarianism. Along with Falkenstein's second chapter these two show the centrality of Condillac in mid-eighteenth-century philosophy.

The fourth section of the volume treats "Morals and Aesthetics." Having four out of the five chapters in this section on moral philosophy is appropriate insofar as, as Debes puts it, "[t]he eighteenth century was the grandest stage moral philosophy has ever seen" (Chapter 21, p. 500). The first three of these chapters treat types of moral philosophy that originated in the eighteenth century and have had proponents ever since: moral sentimentalism, Kantian moral philosophy, and utilitarianism. Jacqueline Taylor's chapter begins the section with a discussion of the first of these areas and one of the major philosophical eclectic "schools" of the century – moral sense and moral sentimentalism. The chapter gives us a detailed account of philosophical sentimentalism that also suggests that sentimentalism was of broad appeal not solely to philosophers but to novelists, *philosophes*, *et alii*. Notably Taylor shows how the sentiment/reason dichotomy was not simple and the "feminizing of sympathy and sentiment" (Chapter 18, p. 439) in figures like Rousseau became an important point of criticism for Wollstonecraft and others (as does Sreedhar).

Taylor's chapter is followed by Eric Entrican Wilson's "Kant's Moral Philosophy" (Chapter 19), which is the only chapter devoted to one aspect of one philosopher. A chapter devoted to an aspect of Kant's philosophy is not special pleading, since Kant's moral philosophy does not fit easily into any category, although both Debes and Hunter find different ways of situating aspects of Kant's moral philosophy. Wilson gives us a systematic presentation that stresses the doctrine of virtue and its

affinities with the works of other eighteenth-century philosophers despite its novelty. The chapter contrasts well with Hunter's account of Kant that contextualizes his moral philosophy against a background which faded due to Kant's influence.

Crimmins's Chapter 20, on "Utility and Religion," explains with reference to many philosophers far less known today how Bentham's secular utilitarianism arose in distinction from the predominantly religious utilitarianism. Although utilitarianism came to be thought of as British, Bentham had very close connections to major figures of the French Enlightenment. It was a far more international creation than is sometimes recognized, fusing British providentialism, French scientism, and Beccaria's concern for the particulars of punishment and the prevention of crime.

Unlike the other three chapters, Remy Debes's "Moral Rationalism and Moral Realism" (Chapter 21) treats a theme, and so has some overlap in the authors treated in the other three chapters on moral philosophy. There are discussions of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, Kant, and Bentham. But here reason again comes to the fore in a different guise, in that of the puzzles over the connection between reason and morals and the problem of the reality of moral rules, properties, qualities, the object of the moral sense, *et alii*. Debes concludes with a striking claim that Kant pushed rationalism to the limit and so disengaged rationalism from the moral realism which had been its common partner from earlier eighteenth-century realism up through Reid.

Rachel Zuckert's "Aesthetics" (Chapter 22) fittingly ends the section. The discussion of aesthetics in the eighteenth century was, like the discussion of morals, particularly rich and moved fairly easily across linguistic and national boundaries. Many of the themes discussed in other chapters – pleasure, perception, affect, and above all sensibility – are united in aesthetic perception and experience. The aesthetic sense and aesthetic perception were both analogous to, and in some cases guiding of moral perception and discussions of moral pleasure (see Debes and Taylor as well). Similarly many of the questions asked about art and beauty – such as what is its social, political, and moral role – draw on and draw together other discussions in the volume.

Ian Hunter's "The Law of Nature and Nations," which is the first chapter in the fifth section – "Politics and Society" – provides a fitting bridge from the moral to the social and political insofar as it treats a central way of conceptualizing morality and politics in the early modern period: in terms of natural law. Hunter concentrates on early modern Germany and beginning with Grotius and Pufendorf moves with extraordinary depth and insight through Thomasius and many others to Kant. Hunter argues that natural law, which has been either taken retrospectively as a wholly unified and unifying discourse about morals, or split into rationalism and voluntarism, "did not delineate a common intellectual object ... The key elements of this topos – the character of human nature, the manner in which natural law is embedded in it, and the form of the natural reason through which this law is known – all varied, often radically" (Chapter 23, p. 561). Hunter's challenge helps us to rethink the place of Kant in moral philosophy through showing us a great deal of surprising and unknown context.

Silvia Sebastiani also discusses the disunity of thinking about human nature and nations but from the side of the empirical engagement with anthropological, historical, and other descriptive accounts of human life. With Montesquieu at the center she describes the mainly French and Scottish orbits around the question of what

made for national character, what made for differences of race (which was often closely connected with sex), and the obsession with reconciling “uniformity and diversity, regularity and singularity” (Chapter 24, p. 593). As Hunter argues in the case of natural law, the putative achievement of Enlightenment universalism was far more contested at the bar of diverse experience with regard to human nature. The uniformity of the philosophical stories based on concepts less amenable to the bar of experience is strongly challenged in the later chapters of this volume.

Susanne Sreedhar’s “Constitutions and Social Contracts” (Chapter 25) and Neil McArthur’s “Civil Society” (Chapter 26) consider what are taken to be two of the greatest achievements of eighteenth-century political philosophy and are closely connected to the Enlightenment – the rise of liberal contractualism and of the connected concept of civil society. In addition to British and European philosophers, McArthur and Sreedhar both move us to the New World with Thomas Paine among others (Reid had moved us there before as a locale sympathetic to immaterialism with Jonathan Edwards and Berkeley’s correspondent Samuel Johnson). Sreedhar argues strikingly that despite our tendency to project a kind of liberal democratic triumphalism onto the eighteenth century, many of the debates were framed in terms of enlightened absolutism and, as also argued by Sebastiani, many of the results were somewhat less liberal or inclusively contractarian than they might first appear. Sreedhar ends by making the aforementioned important point that the vaunted development of “universal” rights doctrines of figures like Rousseau went hand in hand with the exclusion of women or at times their uneasy inclusion – a point adroitly argued by Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges. And even Wollstonecraft and de Gouges were not as expansive as we might hope. McArthur shows that civil society, a concept associated above all with two nineteenth-century thinkers – de Tocqueville and Hegel – was developed by eighteenth-century philosophers in connection with theories of social progress (see Sebastiani, Lifschitz, and Schabas as well) and struggles between political factions. It also led radicals writing during the French Revolution and directly after, like Godwin and Paine, to argue for a kind of rationalist anarchism as the logical conclusion of civil society.

Concluding this section Lifschitz draws on an extraordinarily wide range of philosophy to show the unsurprising centrality of language to the eighteenth century and to the Enlightenment. As Lifschitz notes, “Due to the Enlightenment’s distinctive preoccupation with the emergence of civil society, the question of the cognitive and social roles of language was usually recast as a hypothetical narrative of the evolution of language and the human mind. The origin of language became a pressing philosophical question, since it was widely believed that linguistic signs had enabled human beings to forge both their material culture and their intellectual endeavors” (Chapter 27, p. 663) and therefore came to the center as a necessary condition of human cognition. Language and certitude are both paradigmatic examples of the eclectic interweaving of diverse experience in the reflection on experience.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the volume is the five chapters in Part VI treating aspects of “Philosophy in Relation to the Arts and Sciences.” These are intended to show how intellectual currents we consider today to be outside of philosophy, or which indeed were outside of philosophy in the eighteenth century, are connected to the discussions in the chapters preceding them.

Two of these chapters deal with what we now consider to be natural science: Stephen Gaukroger's "Philosophy and the Physical Sciences" (Chapter 28) and Justin Smith's "Natural History and the Speculative Sciences of Origins" (Chapter 29). Smith begins his chapter with a suggestion that in the eighteenth century the physical sciences tended to try to discover unities, and natural history to taxonomize divergences and differences. Each had its central figure motivating this: Newton and Buffon, respectively. Gaukroger's overarching narrative is one where two branches of physical science – mechanics and matter theory – move apart and the Kantian ideal of subsuming the latter under the former becomes impossible. In chemistry what appeared to be amenable to mechanist explanations became more and more problematic and chemistry began to offer explanations of phenomena that had gone unchallenged as models of mechanistic explanation. Electricity scientists like Benjamin Franklin tried to provide explanations of "charge" using various analogies, from democratic politics to the economic discharging of debt. Smith defines eighteenth-century natural history as whatever Buffon was interested in, and since his interests were extraordinarily diverse the field is extraordinarily diverse as well: Smith surveys taxonomy, comparative anatomy, generation theory, cosmogony and geogony, adaption theory, and accounts of human and racial diversity (see Sebastiani and Schabas as well). These are just some of many areas treated by philosophers as of serious philosophical interest. As with electricity and chemistry, a central question was whether natural history was amenable to proper philosophical explanation (a question closely connected to the issues dealt with by Perinetti).

Margaret Schabas and Alix Cohen treat the study of *l'homme moral* as opposed to Justin Smith's discussion of *l'homme physique* (although the divide was rarely as clear and neat in practice as Rousseau drew it). The eighteenth century, and particularly the second half, is a period of the rise and massive growth of the human sciences, which as Schabas notes (Chapter 30) are more properly called the sciences of man or moral sciences. Her chapter concentrates on the most prolific of the sciences, political economy, which was an object of fascination for many, many eighteenth-century philosophers and connected areas as disparate (for us) as physical geography, natural history, philosophical reflections on wealth and morality, and discussions of probability and chance. Cohen's Chapter 31, on "Philosophy and History," centers on philosophical reflections on the nature of history, which drew some of the greatest eighteenth-century philosophers, notably Kant and Rousseau. The figures and topics considered overlap with McArthur and Sebastiani – all discuss aspects of the stadial theories ubiquitous in the eighteenth century (as does Schabas) – but the chapter is much more focused on the way in which philosophers speculated on the nature of history. Was history teleological; if so, how and toward what?

The eighteenth century was also the period of the rise and the development of the novel. Where Zuckert analyzes philosophical discussions of the beautiful in general, C. Allen Speight's Chapter 32, on "Philosophy and Literature," provides a particular discussion of how eighteenth-century philosophers made sense of literature (a later term) and belles-lettres. In trying to make sense of the extraordinary changes in art happening in this period Speight focuses on one art form. Philosophers thought about what was happening in the novel, in poetry, and in drama, and there was philosophical speculation in the works of Sterne, Swift, and others.

Diderot and Lessing wrote both philosophy of literature and highly philosophical literature.

The volume concludes with synoptic pieces on three of the central figures of the period – Kant, Rousseau, and Hume. These are perhaps the three greatest philosophical eminences in their respective languages and philosophical cultures, and the three wholly eighteenth-century figures mentioned most commonly throughout the volume (although Berkeley, Diderot, and Condillac come close). Although the volume is primarily organized around concepts and movements, something valuable can also be learned by examining the intellectual lives and philosophical projects of particular philosophers.

Each was, perhaps unsurprisingly, diverse in his interests. As Erin Frykholm (Chapter 33) points out, Hume wrote on a wide range of subjects and is a central figure in chapters that discuss not just causation and morals but also political economy, aesthetics, race, and many other topics. He also, of course, wrote *The History of England*. Rousseau wrote an opera, a novel, and uncategorizable philosophical memoirs in addition to more straightforward philosophy, although even the most straightforward philosophical works are particularly difficult to categorize. Finally the interests of Kant, who is characterized as the most philosophically sober of the three, were extremely wide-ranging as well; Kuehn highlights his fascination with anthropology.

III

The discussion of the contents of the volume hopefully has given some evidence for the eclecticism of the eighteenth century and the fascination of many eighteenth-century philosophers with the variety of experience. But the real test of the bar of experience will be reading the chapters themselves!

Notes

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- 1 Diderot follows Brucker here and elsewhere (all the figures listed by Diderot are from Brucker) with the exception of the addition of Montaigne (whom Brucker classifies as an eclectic), and the subtraction of Hieronymus Hirnhaym.
 - 2 Hume's skepticism is a highly contested issue and I neither wish to suggest that I've solved it nor that the analysis of the passions is not itself susceptible to skeptical criticisms.
 - 3 I do not mean to suggest that there were modern schools in the same sense that there had been ancient ones, i.e. the Platonic Academy that endured for nearly a millennium. There were philosophers who identified with particular ancient schools, built systems, were identified as being exponents of the schools, had followers who propagated their doctrines, etc.
 - 4 Quoted in Donini 1988: 19, trans. A. A. Long. The attribution to Brucker was made in Proust 1995: 590.
 - 5 The modern revival of eclecticism, as an explicit position against schools or sects, goes back to Lipsius's praise (and perhaps avowal) of eclecticism and Vossius's (and earlier) discussion of "the elective sect" which directly follows his discussion of Pyrrhonism in the posthumous *De philosophorum sectis liber* (*Of the Sects of Philosophers*) (Vossius 1657: 2.21; Schneider 1997: 85). Situating eclecticism in the map of the history of the schools or sects, Vossius made eclecticism into an historical tradition (drawing on Diogenes he identified its origins with Potamen of Alexandria; Vossius 1657: 2.21.2). It was above all associated with

Thomasius, who viewed philosophy in terms of schools or “sects” (Thomasius 1688: ch. 1, §89) while at the same time suggesting that the submission to authority which was the price of school membership was anti-philosophical (Eskildsen 2008). True philosophical practice was intrinsically eclectic and tolerationist.

Once eclecticism was situated by historians of the schools as a possible position, Thomasius (and other philosophers, particularly Buddeus) argued for an eclectic philosophy which, as suggested above, tied together a number of themes which would be associated with Enlightenment(s) (see Hunter 2001): religious tolerationism, the undermining of superstition (see particularly Thomasius’s attacks on the presuppositions of witchcraft trials in Thomasius 1701), the criticism of judicial torture and more generally state brutality in conjunction with a stress on the individual cultivation of reason as against authority and the herd. The word sect was also used in religious contexts. For Thomasius, as well as many others, the bigoted ferocity of the religious sects had been the cause of a great deal of unproductive bloodshed during and after the Reformation. There was also a parallel stress on the presentation of public argument and of philosophical argument in the vernacular in order to make it accessible to all members of the community which was connected to the centrality of translation for the high Enlightenment (see Oz-Salzberger 1995 and her Chapter 1 in this volume).

- 6 Diderot distinguished eclecticism from mere syncretism (again in line with Thomasius 1688: ch. 1, §§88–89) the attempt to reconcile different apparently conflicting doctrines without thinking them through (Diderot and D’Alembert 1751–72: XV, 748) or without any attention to their truth value.
- 7 Thanks to James Schmidt for the reference.
- 8 Jefferson also represents how tolerationism, an eclectic attitude, and democratic fervor could coexist with racism.
- 9 Leibniz responded to Locke and Bayle respectively in the *Nouveaux essais* (*New Essays*) and the *Essais de théodicée* (*Theodicy*) (and Locke and Bayle responded to one another as well). Shaftesbury was one of the most widely read of all philosophers in the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century, translated into French by Diderot and into German by Lessing, criticized by Berkeley, admired by Hume, and so on.
- 10 Shaftesbury initially hid his identity from Bayle. See Shaftesbury’s son’s sketch of his life (Shaftesbury 1900: xxii–xxiii).
- 11 Although a majority of philosophers today view *A Treatise* as his greatest and most systematic work, it was relatively underdiscussed in the eighteenth century in comparison with Hume’s *Essays* and *History of England* – except by Reid, Beattie, and a few other notable critics.
- 12 Although as Antognazza notes Hume’s *Dialogues* were not particularly persuasive to many of his contemporaries.

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Part I

CONTEXT AND MOVEMENTS

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1

ENLIGHTENMENT, NATIONAL ENLIGHTENMENTS, AND TRANSLATION

Fania Oz-Salzberger

Preface

The Enlightenment has probably inspired more discussions and disagreements on its contents, purpose, and legacy than any other chapter in intellectual history. It was never launched as “a movement,” but many of its participants self-consciously reflected on the unique features of their era while gradually developing its recurring topics and distinctive terminology. A keen sense of a shared intellectual adventure ran across the Enlightenment’s numerous networks, beneath differentials of geography, politics, and faith.

Controversy begins with the very contours of the Enlightenment – its chronology, geography, and subject matter. Since the present volume is about philosophy, it would not be superfluous to remind oneself that the topic of this chapter only partially overlaps with the book’s. Enlightenment may have emerged from philosophy, included philosophers, and engendered philosophy, but it does not belong exclusively to the history of philosophy. Its most effective figures were not necessarily the greatest eighteenth-century philosophers, and its *philosophes*, *Aufklärer*, or men and women of letters, are closer to what a later age would dub “public intellectuals.” Moreover, not every eighteenth-century work of art, literature, or theory should automatically be placed within (or against) the Enlightenment (see Vierhaus 1995). Our field is narrower than that, but it is nevertheless huge.

The Enlightenment conjoined ideas, public aspirations, and social change in a novel way. Simply put, never before did so many writers openly promote the expansion of readership. Never before did so many writers set out to critique received wisdoms, augment human knowledge, ameliorate individual lives, and enhance the collective well-being of mankind by means of Reason and in the name of civil liberty. The light-spreading metaphor that accompanied many open declarations of this set of intentions drew from the previous century’s “natural light of

Reason,” but its future-orientation, critical daring, and social-political reforming ambitions were new.

Moreover, the Enlightenment – we shall dwell on both critiques and justifications for this use of the definite article – was novel in its cosmopolitan, cross-cultural, and cross-linguistic modes of conversation. Human interactions, correspondences, quotations, and above all translations were crucial for its development, self-understanding, and argumentative nature. As Silvia Sebastiani shows in Chapter 24 of this volume, the “unresolved tension between uniformity and diversity, regularity and singularity” is “constitutive of the Enlightenment itself.” The present chapter suggests that Enlightenment localities and the quest for universality, modified through processes of reception and translation, enabled the transformation of both European (or the partially synonymous “modern,” and eventually “Western”) and national forms of awareness.

Terminology developed alongside the theoretical and practical agendas. Pierre Bayle used the term “siècle éclairé” as early as 1684, and his contemporary Bernard de Fontenelle habitually referred to “les lumières.” These became standard idioms by the early eighteenth century (Roger 1968: 167ff.). In Britain, “our enlightened age” cropped up in the mid-eighteenth century, parallel to the growing awareness of its crucial difference from previous “enlightened ages” in its multiplicity of participants, critical spirit, public commitment, and distinctly modern discourse of liberty. British writers did not use the noun “Enlightenment” itself until well into the nineteenth century (Porter 2001: 5), but the vocabulary of “improvement,” “progress,” and “refinement,” in the “arts and sciences” as well as in politics and economy, was firmly linked to “our enlightened age” (for a representative periodical survey see Anon. 1769, *Critical Memoires*).

The German term *Aufklärung* gained prominence in 1783 in the form of a question, “Was ist *Aufklärung*?” It was broached by the theologian J. F. Zöllner, discussed by the members of the Wednesday Society of Berlin literati, and became the 1784 prize essay topic in the journal *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (Schmidt 1996, 2003; Oz-Salzberger 2003a). Immanuel Kant’s entry provided one of the best-known definitions of the Enlightenment, as “mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity,” namely “the inability to make use of one’s own understanding without the guidance of another” (Kant 1784: Ak VIII, 35; Schmidt 1996: 58). The German Enlightenment was emblematic of the era’s intellectual and terminological self-searching: the term *Aufklärung* gained public visibility as part of the polemic quest for its definition.

Twentieth-century scholars have hotly debated the Enlightenment’s contents and impacts, and their critiques and defenses often had sharp political edges. Major controversies focused on the Enlightenment’s emphasis on the primacy of reason, its universalist aspirations, its intellectual hubris, and its (often retrospectively demarcated) blind spots and deliberate biases. The exclusion or demeaning of women, the lower classes, Jews, non-Europeans, colonial subjects, and other “others” has been a staple of recent critiques. In particular, the Enlightenment’s rationalizing gaze was seen as oppressive by Frankfurt School neo-Marxists (Horkheimer and Adorno), deceitfully power-seeking and colonizing by postmodernists (Foucault, Said), and – by contrast – as a genuinely humane and laudably liberal-minded legacy (Gay, Berlin; Bronner 2004).

Other scholarly debates, less openly political but no less heated, pertain to the relative importance of the Enlightenment's major players and ideas. Its "center" and "peripheries" have been disputed, alongside its "moderation" and "radicalism" and its "secularism" and "religiosity." The very coherence and unison of the term "Enlightenment" is also under scrutiny: Does it denote an era, a process, or perhaps a "project"? Can one speak of *the* Enlightenment? Were there multiple Enlightenments? How did its different national, regional, cultural, and linguistic branches correspond and interact?

This chapter does not attempt to run the full gamut of Enlightenment thought, much of which is bound to overlap with other sections of the present volume. Instead, it offers a concise account of the Enlightenment's time frame, personalities, and main themes. Since none of these items enjoys a consensus among scholars, the chapter also scans several recent and current debates on the Enlightenment's importance, inner divisions, and present-day relevancies.

Such controversies encourage a fine-tuned attention to the Enlightenment authors' own voices, and in this chapter several examples will be offered of the ways in which Enlightenment thinkers understood their own individual and collective aspirations. Finally, reflecting new research into the Enlightenment's geographical and linguistic multivocality, the main trajectories of Enlightenment texts are discussed, along with the problems and profits involved in the transfer of ideas across linguistic and cultural barriers.

Historical and geographical contours

As a specific chapter in intellectual, social, and cultural history, the Enlightenment inhabits most of the eighteenth century, although some of its thinkers and texts hark back to the seventeenth century, and others spill over to the nineteenth.

Geographically, Enlightenment texts and ideas spread through metropolitan centers in western and central Europe: Paris, most famously, alongside Vienna, Milan, Naples, Edinburgh, and Berlin. This is by no means a conclusive list. Other cities, towns, universities, and country mansions played important roles in fostering Enlightenment thought, debate, and publication. Circulation grew thinner in eastern Europe, where writers linked to Enlightenment ideas were sparser, and readership more circumscribed. In North America, most notably in Philadelphia, authors and printers belonged to Enlightenment networks with strong European connections. As to the non-European world, while parts of it fascinated European thinkers, who made various intellectual uses of them – from Charles de Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* (*Persian Letters*) (1721) to August Ludwig Schlözer's *Neujahrs-Geschenk aus Jamaica in West Indien für ein Kind in Europa* (*New Year's Gift from Jamaica in the West Indies for a Child in Europe*) (1780) – its "exotic" societies were still considered inspirations rather than interlocutors. A serious and complex reception of Enlightenment ideas in the colonial and post-colonial world, let alone dialogical reciprocity, was a matter for future generations.

Geography and chronology often determine each other: the Dutch Enlightenment began in the seventeenth century, while the East European Jewish *haskala* was largely a nineteenth-century offshoot of the German-Jewish Enlightenment. Like other

historical eras, the Enlightenment's accepted time frame depends on the importance we attach to individual figures and cultural clusters within its broad range.

Many historians use the French Revolution as the Enlightenment's convenient end-terminus, often also seen as its apogee or demise. Regardless of the undecided question whether the Revolution was derivative or deviant from mainstream Enlightenment thought, contemporaries and posterity have seen it as a decisive turn in cultural as well as political history. Nicolas de Condorcet in France, Immanuel Kant in Germany, and Dugald Stewart in Scotland can be seen as the Enlightenment's last generation. These three thinkers also provided, in different ways, intellectual closures for the era. Condorcet died in a Revolutionary prison shortly after writing his optimistic *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (*Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*) (1795) in 1793/94. Kant not only offered deep reflection upon the term *Aufklärung* but also navigated its legacy into deeper philosophical waters and abandoned some of its cherished creeds. Stewart summed and transmitted Scottish moral philosophy and political economy to nineteenth-century audiences. His social-intellectual milieu, though spared the violence suffered by Continental contemporaries, experienced a similar major transformation of tenor and turf, shifting from cafes, salons, broad-ranging journals, and self-taught dilettantism into university lecture halls and academic specialization.

Charting the beginning of the Enlightenment is a more complex task. In the French context it was inspired by René Descartes, and more directly pioneered by Bayle. Its two great English mentors were John Locke and Isaac Newton. German thinkers looked back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Dutch Republic provides even earlier crucial predecessors: Enlightenment political thought hails from Hugo Grotius, while studies emphasizing the Enlightenment's radical streak allot great significance to Baruch de Spinoza and other members of his generation.

Each of these thinkers may be considered a precursor of the Enlightenment, but some of them can also be seen as members of an "early Enlightenment." Periodization varies according to intellectual and national/linguistic contexts: the Dutch Enlightenment may well have begun in mid-seventeenth century, but eastern-European upshots only took hold in the second half of the eighteenth century (van Bunge 2003; Venturi 1989).

Similarly, topical aspects dictate variegated starting points: the epistemological shift leading to the Enlightenment's conceptualizing of knowledge may have begun with Descartes's philosophy in the first half of the seventeenth century or with Locke's work in the second half. Political ideas of civil liberty came into full swing with Locke and with the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, while German concepts of the well-governed state hail to Leibniz and Christian Wolff in the early eighteenth century. Theories of religious toleration hark back to Spinoza, Bayle, Locke, and Thomasius, and a wave of novel inquiries into aesthetics was set in motion by the mid-eighteenth century, ignited by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten.

If we are to identify a specific "moment" in which the Enlightenment blossomed into a self-conscious movement of ideas, network of thinkers, and public sphere of readers, the years 1733–35 may serve as a convenient pointer. In 1733 Voltaire brought out his *Lettres philosophiques sur les Anglais* (also known as *Lettres anglaises*), a

widely circulated panegyric of England's political liberty, economic success, and scientific accomplishment. Then 1734 saw the publication of Montesquieu's *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* (*Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans*), and in the same year Benjamin Franklin issued the American version of the Constitution of the Freemasons (first published in London in 1723). The young David Hume traveled to France for the first time and began working on his path-breaking *Treatise of Human Nature* in the mid-1730s. Conjoining and at times interlocking, these biographical moments and intellectual accomplishments add up to a crucial turning point in the history of ideas.

During the same pivotal years, scientific work throughout western and central Europe was characterized by post-Newtonian ambition to expose the principles underlying the physical world and by a post-Baconian sense of communal interaction and networking. The Enlightenment powerfully linked technology to science: Britain reached a threshold of the Industrial Revolution with John Kay's 1733 invention of the flying-shuttle loom. In Stockholm, Carl Linnaeus published his great *Systema naturae* (1735), sorting "the three kingdoms of nature, according to classes, orders, genera and species." In Marburg, already famous for his long list of publications promoting rationalism Christian Wolff published his *Psychologia rationalis* in 1734. French scientist René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur launched the science of entomology with the first of his six-volume *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des insectes* (*Memoirs Relating to the History of Insects*).

By symbolic coincidence, Réaumur's countrywoman Gabrielle Émilie, Marquise du Châtelet, a major transmitter of scientific ideas, began her translation of Bernard de Mandeville's influential political treatise, *The Fable of the Bees* (originally published in 1723). "I feel the full weight of the prejudice," she wrote in her translator's preface, "that excludes us [women] so universally from the sciences ... [I]f I were king ... I would allow women to share in all the rights of humanity, and most of all in those of the mind" (Du Châtelet 1735: 48–49). A co-author of Voltaire's *Éléments de la philosophie de Newton* (*Elements of the Philosophy of Newton*) (1738), Du Châtelet's translation and commentary on Newton's *Principia* was published posthumously in 1759. A pioneering mediator of English science on the Continent, she was also able to appreciate the egalitarian potential of Locke's theory of knowledge. But her male contemporaries, Voltaire included, indeed left Du Châtelet "excluded from the sciences." Like other women of letters, who were at best recognized as mediators and hostesses to true intellectual grandeur, she remained in the shadows for a long time to come.

In 1734, British orientalist George Sale published his English translation of the Koran. Further south, Italian freethinking had already developed to a degree that induced Pope Clement XII to ban Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Notwithstanding this and similar efforts, the dissemination of rational and utility-prone reasoning persisted and grew. A very different Pope, English poet Alexander Pope, distilled the intellectual quest of his era in the *Essay on Man* (1734): "Know then thyself, presume not God to scan. / The proper study of Mankind is Man ... Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd; / the glory, jest and riddle of the world." Our handful of pointers, chosen for their significance and long-term effects, is far from exhaustive. But it should suffice to explain why, by the mid-1730s, well-

informed European readers of periodicals and new books would not have failed to notice that something serious and exciting was afoot in the world of ideas.

Definitions and self-perusals

The self-understanding of an “age” or a “movement” is not always encapsulated in headlines or definitions. Many eighteenth-century observers nevertheless sensed their era’s intellectual uniqueness. Henry Grove, an Anglican minister from Taunton, provided a fine early display of its terminology and trends, albeit in a reproachfully ironic vein: “I am sensible that in our enlightened age,” Grove wrote “... we are become a Nation of Politicians; every three half-penny author, or Coffee-house orator, is fit to be of the Privy Council ... Should a stranger come to many of our Coffee-houses, and observe with what a solemn air and magisterial tone the company criticize the Publick Administration, what could he imagine but that every board was filled with Statesmen, impatient to display their fine talents in the service of the publick, and retrieve dying Liberty?” (Grove 1747: 355–56). This passage can read as a checklist of key Enlightenment innovations: the very concepts of “publick” and “coffee house,” the unprecedented oral and written propagation of ideas, the burgeoning authors in a mushrooming periodical and book industry, and the numerous self-styled politicians and statesmen, daring to “criticize,” and resuscitating or redefining “Liberty.” Like the biblical Balaam – an allusion doubtless familiar to Grove – his words now read as a blessing where he intended to curse.

Philosophical definitions were less colorful, but stronger in historical contextualization. For Kant, as we have seen, Enlightenment (rather than *the* Enlightenment) was a human cognitive process. It involved education and mental maturing. This approach was shared by Moses Mendelssohn, whose response to the 1784 Prize Essay question considered Enlightenment as a process by which man is educated in the use of reason (Mendelssohn 1784; Schmidt, 1996: 1–44).

Kant’s definition hinges on self-emancipation by way of autonomous thinking – Kant’s *sapere aude*, “dare to know!” – that places the onus of intellectual and moral responsibility on every human being. This definition is, in a sense, timeless. But in another sense it was firmly anchored in the particular stage of human history in which Kant himself resided. As Michel Foucault explained, “[Kant’s] analysis of Enlightenment, defining this history as humanity’s passage to its adult status, situates contemporary reality with respect to the overall movement and its basic directions. But at the same time, it shows how, at this very moment, each individual is responsible in a certain way for that overall process” (Foucault 1978: n.p.). Both Kant and Mendelssohn recognized a gradual mental liberation, accomplished by relatively few individuals in their time, yet boding well for the future of mankind. But Kant, more adamantly, did not see his age as “an enlightened age” but as “an age of enlightenment,” in which most individuals, yet immature, would benefit most from the benign tutelage of such enlightened rulers as Frederick the Great (Kant 1784: Ak VIII, 40; Schmidt 1996: 62).

Other thinkers, particularly the French, proffered a less gradualist approach. They celebrated their own age as having already achieved unprecedented intellectual

progress. “Never has a century been called ‘the century of lights’ more often than ours,” wrote Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (Mably 1776: 98). Twenty years later, Antoine-Nicholas, Marquis de Condorcet, summed up the accomplishments of his era in his famous *Esquisse*:

The progress of philosophy and the sciences have extended and favoured those of letters, and these in their turn have served to render the study of the sciences more easy, and philosophy itself more popular. They have lent mutual assistance to each other, in spite of the efforts of ignorance and folly to disunite and render them inimical. ... [E]rudition has assisted in destroying [hurtful prejudices], because the sciences and philosophy have enlightened it with a more legitimate criticism. It already knew the method of weighing authorities, and comparing them with each other, but it has at length submitted them to the tribunal of reason; it had rejected the prodigies, absurd tales, and facts contrary to probability ...

(Condorcet 1796)

Tragically, this passage was penned shortly before Condorcet’s death in a Jacobin prison, during the most murderous phase of the French Revolution, which some observers took to be the Enlightenment gone mad. Condorcet’s view of his times is all the more touching since it conveys almost the full gamut of keywords typical of late Enlightenment’s self-understanding: progress, philosophy made popular, the rise of sciences and letters, criticism, “the tribunal of reason,” and the combating of ignorance and prejudice.

Such ironies permeate the history of the Enlightenment: the cruel death of a moral optimist, the marginalization of an erudite female scholar, and the adoration of a warring absolutist monarch by a great philosopher who is his humble subject. These tensions – some apparent to eighteenth-century observers, others surfacing only in retrospect – all arise from the unprecedented standards that the “century of lights,” the “age of refinement,” and the “tribunal of reason” demanded of civilized humankind. From the eighteenth century to our own day, scholarly debates have been exploring and expanding these dissonances, thus demonstrating their ongoing relevance. Whether the Enlightenment was an era, a movement, a project, or a process – it was beyond doubt an enormous and fruitful tension field.

(The) Enlightenment/s: current scholarly perspectives

Some recent debates on the Enlightenment take issue with grammar: the definite article is disputed, and so is the singular noun. A case may be made for defining “Enlightenment” separately from “the Enlightenment” (Schmidt 2003). The former term is a mental quest, and possibly a social process. Linked with Kant’s imperative “Dare to know,” it can be an essentially individual drive for personal enhancement as well as a collective yearning for public betterment. For Ernst Cassirer, the Enlightenment amounted to its philosophy, robustly ensconced within Cassirer’s own philosophy of symbolic forms and generative knowledge (Cassirer 1932).

“Enlightenment,” Dorinda Outram suggests, “was a desire for human affairs to be guided by rationality rather than by faith, superstition, or revelation; a belief in the power of human reason to change society and liberate the individual from the restraints of custom or arbitrary authority; all backed up by a world view increasingly validated by science rather than by religion or tradition” (Outram 1995: 3).

But “the Enlightenment,” insofar as it encompassed a network of social and cultural interactions, was more than a desire, a belief or a worldview: it was an increasingly self-conscious “climate.” Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer understood it as a “project,” criticizing its inherent grain of smug rationalism and its later takeover by inhumane technocracy (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947). Peter Gay, with approbation matching the Frankfurt School’s opprobrium, called it “the party of humanity” and “the science of freedom” (Gay 1966–69). However, the Enlightenment was not merely a group of thinkers, debaters, or projectors, nor was it only a set of ideologies. Its practical outcomes were numerous. Beccaria’s *Dei delitti e delle pene* (*On Crimes and Punishments*) (1764), Antoine Baumé’s *Chymie expérimentale et raisonnée* (*Experimental and Reasoned Chemistry*) (1773), and James Bonner’s *The Bee Master’s Companion and Assistant* (1789), are three examples of numerous texts written with the expressed goal of improving human lives in modern context. To be sure, practical manuals had been published prior to the eighteenth century; but the Enlightenment terminology had now reached a level of dissemination that allowed a humble “Bee Master,” though “not having the advantage of a grammatical education,” to elaborate proudly on the contribution of his craft to the growth of “rural oeconomy” (Bonner 1789: vi, ix). Agriculture, practical sciences, and law were among the fields of endeavor deeply affected by the Enlightenment’s quest for organizing and deploying the accumulated knowledge of generations, alongside a new thirst for both intellectual and technical innovation and a new-found trust in Reason. And while ground-level improvers like Bonner resonated echoes of the new discourse of progress, high-level practical reformers such as Beccaria were intimately linked with the mainstream philosophy of their time.

Alongside the abstract ideal of “Enlightenment” and the mankind-improving thrust of “the Enlightenment,” scholars have emphasized the multiplicity of “Enlightenments” – national and regional, as well as moderate and radical, irreligious and religious, “high” and “low.” A chief target of this differentiating effort is to show that Voltaire’s Paris, the home base of the *Encyclopédie*, the metropolitan hub producing many of the canonical texts of the era, was by no means the only (or even the most significant) Enlightenment center. With Paris partially dethroned, some of the older emphases on the Enlightenment’s alleged uniformity, hyper-rationalism, anti-clericalism, and elitism were cast in doubt. New centers and voices were highlighted. Today, the plurality of Enlightenments has reached a stage in which – arguably – the time has come to seek commonalities once again, and construct new and better generalizations.

The attention to multifarious “national Enlightenments” has proven a fruitful scholarly strategy since the early 1980s. It signaled a broadening of horizons from francocentric definitions of the Enlightenment and from Anglo-French accounts of its emergence (Porter and Teich 1982). This approach did not invent, but it certainly put in new context, scholarship on national and regional Enlightenment thinkers and

centers, from Spain to Sweden and from Hungary to Ireland. While many of these studies are dedicated to particular authors or to specific circles, several European Enlightenments currently stand out in their geocultural specificities. The German Enlightenment, already familiar to English readers through the works of Cassirer (1932), has since been examined from numerous angles. The Scottish Enlightenment drew particular attention due to its outstanding cast of thinkers, and served as a particular test case for the “national Enlightenment” approach. The Italian Enlightenment was made accessible to international readers through translations of the path-breaking works of Franco Venturi. The Dutch Enlightenment gained a surer footing in recent studies (Jacob and Mijnhart 1992). Significantly, Spinoza and other Dutch thinkers figure strongly on the broader canvas of “the radical Enlightenment,” painted most prominently in the works of Jonathan Israel (2001, 2006). The *Haskalah*, or the Jewish Enlightenment, is a unique case that transcends the “national” contours both geographically and thematically (Sorkin 1996, 2008; Feiner and Naor 2003).

The national context approach is both useful and problematic. Its centrifugal flow may easily obscure the common denominators of the Enlightenment. It runs the risk of underplaying interactions, making false assumptions about the coherence and self-sufficiency of “national” intellectual bearings, and simplifying the layered cultural identities of individual authors. More subtly, this approach could retrospectively impose nation-state boundaries, largely non-existent in the eighteenth century, at the expense of local specificities, urban settings, and cross-border trajectories. Eighteenth-century Europe was not a world of nation states, let alone “national cultures.” Ideas and texts transcended linguistic and political borders in many different ways (Vierhaus 1995). What we have doubtless gained from “national Enlightenments” studies are the new treasuries of local details, local texts and personalities, that might be woven into a new general tapestry, far richer and more nuanced than the old (Robertson 2007).

Another set of “Enlightenments” has undermined the previous vision of one, universal, rationalist and secular Enlightenment transmitted from English deists to French non-believers. The former picture was proffered by Carl Becker’s secularized “heavenly city” (Becker 1932), and challenged by Peter Gay’s essentially pagan and French-led Enlightenment (Gay 1966–69, v. 1), both of which were distinctly anti-clerical. Recent discussions of religious Enlightenments have moved atheists to a minority position. There was a moderate Presbyterian Enlightenment in Scotland, a Latitudinarian Enlightenment in England, a radical Enlightenment of Spinozists and Freemasons, a conservative Enlightenment that was largely Socinian, a Jesuit Enlightenment, and a Jewish Enlightenment. Such “religious” Enlightenments were laden with political and cultural subtexts that were often tangential to those of Paris-based atheism, sharing some of its rationalist premises and debating its godless, materialistic worldview (Haakonssen 1996a, 1996b; Sorkin 2008).

“Radical” Enlightenments have been sought at the crossroads of deism, atheism, and Spinozist pantheism, and often associated with the radical politics of Freemasons, republicans, social progressivists, and revolutionaries. Margret L. Jacob’s pioneering study of some of these groups (Jacob 1981), broached a field of study that has recently been thoroughly, and controversially, tilled by Jonathan Israel’s

extensive work. Israel suggests a shift in the received canon, moving weight away from the “moderate” Locke, Voltaire, and Hume toward Spinoza, Bayle, and Denis Diderot, whose “radicalism” speaks better to our own age and concerns (Israel 2001, 2006).

The social history of the Enlightenment has opened another set of new vistas. Jürgen Habermas, no social historian himself, has provided a powerful analytic tool in his concept of the “public sphere,” a space of intellectual and political interaction poised between eighteenth-century officialdoms and private premises. The public sphere, displayed by Habermas as an eighteenth-century innovation leading to communicative modernity, allowed immensely fertile exchanges in *salons* and cafes, printing presses, and letter correspondences, running the gamut from public-minded conversation to new literary genres (Habermas 1962; Goodman 1992). Further studies have taken closer looks at the social milieus in which Enlightenment discourse flourished, depicting a wide and multicentral map of European encounters and cross-fertilizations (Munck 2000).

The tension field between the private and the public spheres inhabits numerous recent studies on women and gender relations in the Enlightenment. Before shifting into university lecture halls in the early nineteenth century, a great deal of European learning and future-looking discussions took place in spaces accessible to women, at least to privileged women. Paradoxically, some women could therefore avail themselves of higher learning more easily during the eighteenth century than in most of the following century. But they were easily excluded too: Kant’s idea of a “public use of reason,” while perfectly compatible with what most readers would associate with a private sphere, notoriously kept “all of the fair sex” within the confines of the “unenlightened” (Kant 1784: Ak VIII, 35).

Recent scholarship has perused the Enlightenment debates about women (Tomaselli 1985) and traced women who took an active part in the Enlightenment (Landes 1988; Hesse 2001). The most recent studies paint an even broader canvas of lettered eighteenth-century women (Goodman 2009; O’Brien 2009). Feminist scholarship has reprioritized Enlightenment figures, bringing to the fore female thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges (Hesse 2001) (see Sreedhar, Chapter 25 of this volume), female intellectual mediators such as Anne Dacier and Du Châtelet, and female networkers like the Paris and Berlin *salonnières* (Goodman 2009; Hertz 1988).

Thinkers and works

Any selection of Enlightenment figures and texts is by definition partial, doubtless unjust, and it unavoidably betrays the author’s own canonical preferences. In this and the following sections one map of the main players and texts is offered. Contemporaneous as well as latter-day assessments of importance are taken on board. The different vantage points of individuals, groups, milieus, and institutions are considered. Attention is given both to theoretical and practical fruit of Enlightenment discourse. Finally, the trajectories of ideas across linguistic, cultural, and political boundaries are explored. The reader would do well to note that every scholarly approach mentioned in the previous section, and every single historian in the field, would produce a rather different map of the Enlightenment.

No Enlightenment metropolis was more central than Paris, no single Enlightenment figure fired the imagination of contemporary and subsequent readership more than François-Marie Arouet, known as Voltaire, and no single Enlightenment project was more emblematic than the *Encyclopédie* co-edited by Jean Le Rond D'Alembert and Denis Diderot. Although recent scholarship has expanded our historical grasp with re-evaluations and rediscoveries of numerous other places, persons, and institutes, major and minor, exposed the riches of several national and regional Enlightenments, and shown intellectual networks far transcending the best-known figures, the traditional leading lights still provide the best preliminary orientation in a vast and variegated field.

Voltaire was the pen name chosen by François-Marie Arouet, who was born and died in Paris and whose style, wit, widely circulated writings, and celebrated political battles made him the penultimate *philosophe* of the French Enlightenment. Educated at the Jesuit college Louis-le-Grand, Voltaire turned against the “Latin and the Stupidities” of orthodox Catholicism and the outrages of French monarchy. His earliest political satire earned him a prison term before he was twenty, and his first theater play, *Œdipe*, was penned in the Bastille. A term in exile followed, and Voltaire traveled to England, where he sojourned between 1726 and 1729. Deeply inspired by Locke’s philosophy and by the science of Newton, whose funeral he attended, Voltaire paid close attention to the parliamentary politics and intellectual open-mindedness that made Britain an ascending European power. His *English Letters* (1734) aroused government suspicion that drove him out of Paris once again, and some years spent in the chateau of his friend Du Châtelet provided an opportunity for both of them to study, translate, and convey Newton’s physics to a broad European audience. In 1746 Voltaire became a member of the Académie Française. Between 1749 and 1753 he was the guest of his then-admirer, Frederick II of Prussia, whose own Enlightenment aspirations and military triumphs earned him the sobriquet Frederick the Great. After falling out with his crowned benefactor Voltaire returned to Paris, presiding over an expanding circle of *philosophes*. In 1759 he bought Ferney, a mansion near Geneva where he spent most of his late years. Ferney soon became a magnet for many aspiring European literati, and Voltaire the uncrowned king of a new breed of modern intellectuals.

Voltaire’s writings spanned several genres – drama, history, literary criticism, philosophy, and political essay – all in lively conversational style and light-handed verve that a later age would defile as dilettantism. His numerous plays included *Zaïre* (1732) and *Mahomet* (1736), and his best-known prose work is *Candide* (1759), a scathing satire on facile Leibnizian optimism and other modes of social and literary pomp. Voltaire wrote histories of the Swedish, Russian, and French monarchies, as well as an *Essay on the Manners of Nations* (or “Universal History”) (*Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations*) (1756). His philosophical and political credos came together in his *Dictionnaire philosophique* (*Philosophical Dictionary*) (1764), which targeted church dogmas, religious sectarianism, and other sanctified errors.

This published output reached many corners of Europe in French or in translation, but it constituted only part of Voltaire’s fame. It was buttressed, in a way deeply characteristic of the Enlightenment, by his voluminous correspondence (over 20,000 extant letters), a vast array of personal contacts, and a measure of media coverage

and visibility – by eighteenth-century standards – that made Voltaire the ultimate networker of his time. Voltaire represented specific ideas and fought publicly for corresponding causes. He savaged all manner of “superstition” and “prejudice,” especially those inherent in Christian dogmas; he attacked and ridiculed the bigotry, mutual intolerance, and violence of most of the organized Christian churches. His battle cry, *Écrasez l’infâme*, heralded the modern politically engaged intellectual.

Yet Voltaire was no radical. His call for a dispersion of knowledge and the rationality did not amount to cognitive, let alone political, egalitarianism. In the article on “Taste” in his *Philosophical Dictionary* he wrote, “Taste is like philosophy. It belongs to a very small number of privileged souls ... It is unknown in bourgeois families, where one is constantly occupied with the care of one’s fortune.” As Robert Darnton has commented, Voltaire “thought that the Enlightenment should begin with the *grands*; once it had captured society’s commanding heights, it could concern itself with the masses” (Darnton 1985: 84).

Voltaire was a charismatic mediator of both Newton and Locke, whose multiple significances for eighteenth-century European thought transcended the philosophical essences of their works. Heralded by Voltaire, Du Châtelet, Alexis Clairaut, and Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis as a hero of towering intellect, Newton’s reputation promised (even more than his writings delivered) an exclusively rational understanding of the world of nature as well as society and man. The *Principia* raised hopes of mathematicizing all fields of inquiry, and the *Opticks* demonstrated the benefits of experimentation (Porter 2001: 130f.; Guerlac: 1981).

The *Encyclopédie* was a project of cross-European, even pan-European, significance (Darnton 1987), although its status as reflecting mainstream Enlightenment convictions is still being debated (Israel 2006). D’Alembert is recognized as its scientific leader, while Diderot charged it with a radical and critical spirit. The participation of Montesquieu, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, Étienne de Condillac, Rousseau, François Quesnay, and Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach, added up to a multiauthorial project that pushed against several types of stumbling blocks in order to present to the reading public an unprecedented ambition in solid print: the ultimate assembling of knowledge and know-how, indeed the daring aspiration to include *all* extant knowledge and know-how and the contextualizing and charting of every science, grandly published and successfully circulated. Reflecting the personalities of its chief editors, the *Encyclopédie* conjoined two aspects of Enlightenment intellectualism: the statics of eternal keepsake with the dynamics of perpetual critique.

While each of the major French contributors to the *Encyclopédie* also performed individually, the *Encyclopédie*, and other joint enterprises such as journals, salons, and correspondences, exemplify the often subtle – and retrospectively ungraspable – nature of the Enlightenment’s intellectual sociability (Goodman 1994). To be sure, individual *philosophes* accomplished particular intellectual feats: Montesquieu’s *De l’esprit des lois* (*Spirit of the Laws*) (1748) offered a comprehensive system of geopolitical differential and development; Helvétius, La Mettrie, and d’Holbach brought materialism to bear on radical politics; and Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the franco-phone Enlightenment’s loosest cannon, moving along his own tangential itinerary with his radical philosophy of education and his unique route in republican thought.

These thinkers' theories of history and political economy criss-crossed their other intellectual divides. But the individual thinkers cannot be assessed within the history of philosophy without a preliminary sense of their group bearings, their informal but highly productive gatherings and institutions, and their love of conversation, wit, debate, and retort. The significance of such an ambience can easily be lost on modern academic philosophers.

The Scottish Enlightenment is a case in point. Its thinkers – many of whom are treated elsewhere in this volume – are interesting not only for their multifarious contributions to eighteenth-century thought, but also as a cluster of learned men who were exceptionally close, socially interlinked, politically conversant, nationally self-conscious, and intellectually dialogic. This self-conscious group of philosophers and historians included David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Home (Lord Kames), Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, John Millar, and several others; the spiritual father of most of them – with the possible and notable exception of Hume – was Francis Hutcheson and their last offspring (still within the Enlightenment) was Dugald Stewart. Far from monolithic, the Scottish Enlightenment was often syncretic – though almost always cordially dialogical – about such matters as the meaning of modernity, human nature, faith and rationality, civic virtue, and political economy (Phillipson 1981; Hont and Ignatieff 1983; Robertson 2000).

Despite recent controversy about the relative importance of the Scottish Enlightenment, the group is widely seen in current scholarship as a revolutionary turn in modern theories of cognition, understanding, sentiment, and moral sense, juxtaposing epistemology with political and economic philosophy. Scottish thinkers faced the practical consequences of the abandonment of sovereignty and the fusion of currency in 1707, as well as the rise of modern commerce and manufacture. Intellectual onus moved on from Church to lay scholarship in a particularly modern vein. It opened up a vast European horizon, in terms of both reception and transmittal of innovative approaches and ideas (Robertson 2000).

Between 1739, the publication date of the first two books of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, and the 1790s, a generation of thinkers set out to create a new understanding of modernity based on good laws, peaceful commerce, and social refinement. Inspired by its unique crossroads between English civility and Gaelic tradition, and drawing on its long-standing contacts with the European Continent, Scotland created a distinct voice within the European Enlightenment. Grotius and Pufendorf, Montesquieu and Rousseau, and travel literature and ethnography informed the Scottish view of history as moving along stages from primitive tribalism to refined modernity. Sharing Newtonian rationalist optimism, Scottish thinkers focused on aspects of economic modernity, offering a new interplay among individual interests, market forces, and forms of government. The Scottish contribution to European Enlightenment discourse is most visible in investigations into sentiment and "common sense," and in the innovative philosophy of political economy associated mainly with Hume and Smith. They were preceded by Francis Hutcheson, whose theory of human virtue and benevolence stipulated a realm of "moral sense," which underlies men's ethical judgments. By way of partial disagreement, Hume's "Science of Man" pledged "experience and observation" alone. His *Essays, Moral and Political* (1741–42 with later additions), *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*

(1748), and *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) based morality on human psychology, particularly on sentiments, drawing on man's love of pleasure and aversion to pain (see Taylor, Chapter 18 in this volume). Hume's *History of Great Britain* (1754–62) set an agenda for tracing the rise of modernity in general. His political theory advocated trust in modern monarchies, when able to safeguard the rule of law, civil liberty, and freedom of trade. Hume's essays "Of Superstition and Religion" and "Of Miracles," and the posthumously published *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779), offered a powerful philosophical basis for both skepticism and atheism (Forbes 1975).

Thomas Reid was the most important voice of the "Common Sense" school that also included James Beattie, George Campbell, and Dugald Stewart. Opposing Hume's empiricism, these thinkers identified principles of cognition common to all mankind and exempt of rational proof. Reid's inquiries into sensation, language, and free will are of interest to philosophers today.

An important group of thinkers turned to the history of mankind or of social groupings. Among them were Kames, Robertson, Ferguson, and John Millar. They attempted to create categories for understanding the material, social, and economic progress and "division of ranks." Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) has recently aroused renewed interest as a republican-minded exploration of man's primeval communal nature, posing a perpetual challenge to civilized, commercial modern society. Individual volition and civic voluntarism were thus counterpoised against the mechanisms of unintended consequences – transfigured into Smith's "invisible hand" – that Hume, Smith, and their disciples found so attractive as an explanatory factor in human progress (Oz-Salzberger 2003b).

Smith's engagement with the Scottish subject matter resulted in two important works: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) analyzed the independence of men's moral judgments, and *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) established the modern science of political economy. Following Hume and differing from Ferguson, Smith stipulated a market-based society based on modern manufacture and trade, vouchsafed by strong laws and civil refinement.

Hume famously voiced his own sense of his group's uniqueness: "At a time when we have lost our Princes, our Parliaments, our independent Government, even the Presence of our chief nobility ... , speak a very corrupt Dialect of the Tongue which we make use of," wrote David Hume in 1757, "is it not strange ... that, in these circumstances, we shou'd really be the People most distinguish'd for Literature in Europe?" (quoted in Mossner 2001: 370). The Scottish universities and informal social milieus such as the Select Society and the Poker Club furnished thinkers with a (mostly friendly) hub of debate, inspiring literary output to an extent seldom matched in early modern intellectual history. Scotland's fame – in particular that of Hume, Robertson, Ferguson, and Smith – reached English readers as well as Continental ones. Called "a hotbed of genius" in Tobias Smollett's *Humphry Clinker*, and "a strong ray of philosophic light" in Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, this was one of the most intimate circles of high-minded Enlightenment creativity. The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers thus enjoyed a particularly close-knit version of the famed eighteenth-century sociability.

The Scottish Enlightenment's impact on future generations of philosophers was profound and lasting. Hume, Smith, and Ferguson, among others, reached toward the Enlightenment thought emanating from France. In turn, their works influenced French, German, and Italian theory (Waszek 1988; Oz-Salzberger 1995; Robertson 2007). Voltaire lauded his Scottish contemporaries. Ferguson was influential among German Enlightenment philosophers and Romanticists, culminating in Georg W. F. Hegel. Smith made his impact on Continental political economy throughout the nineteenth century. Since his initial stamp on Kant, Hume's impact on modern philosophy has been constant. Significantly, since the 1970s, interest in the Scottish Enlightenment has grown among political thinkers and social commentators, fascinated by parallels between its early modern tension fields and our late modern concerns.

The German Enlightenment makes less of a group portrait. The deceptively simple question, "Was ist *Aufklärung*?" was the core of the late German Enlightenment, evoking a debate on human cognition, moral preferences, and the nature of historical process. Kant coined the *Aufklärung*'s memorable motto, "*Sapere aude!* Have the courage to use your own understanding!" and also gave its famous definition as "mankind's exit from his self-incurred immaturity" (Kant 1784). But Kant's answer is more complex than these quotable phrases suggest, and it neither represents nor winds up the *Aufklärung* debate (Nisbet 1982; Schmidt 1996).

As in other cultures, the fundamental issues of the *Aufklärung* preceded the term. For Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, the French notion of "*éclairer*" meant intellectual clarification, the use of reason to discover truth. The founding generation of the German Enlightenment, including the jurist Christian Thomasius and the philosopher Christian Wolff, combined the quest for truth with the imperative of moral and social improvement. The early German Enlightenment proposed several differing concepts of rational and moral clarification. It reworked Cartesian and Newtonian rationalism, involving the systematic expansion of human knowledge to all "clear and distinct" truths; this was a chief premise of Wolff's metaphysics. In parallel, natural jurisprudence, adapted by Thomasius from the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, was mobilized by German scholars to launch a legal and political reform of state administration, taken as a functional mechanism for promoting the happiness of its citizens; this was the core of a new discipline of *cameralism*, a science of public administration (Hochstrasser 2000; Bödeker and Herrmann 1987).

The individualized quest for divinity was evident in August Hermann Francke's Pietist ideal of spiritual "rebirth" and lifelong striving for inner perfection; the Pietist movement inspired educational innovation, a new philosophy of sentiment, and a literary culture of *Innerlichkeit* ("soul-searching") that affected German literary works from Klopstock to Goethe. During the second half of the eighteenth century an English ideal of practical and moral improvement through "polite" reading and socializing, expounded by periodicals and novels, the English models of which were emulated by German and Swiss "moral weeklies" and "bourgeois dramas." A generation of "popular philosophers" reworked and disseminated various combinations of both the rationalist and public-minded and the individualist and sociability-oriented tenets listed here (Beiser 1987; Oz-Salzberger 2003a).

These variants enriched the German Enlightenment with disparate notions of the origin of knowledge, acceptable authority, and ideals of order. They proposed varying balances of reason and faith, and displayed acute differences of emotional tenor. Yet the *Aufklärung* also retained common structures. Most crucial was its matrix of perfectibility – a process of self-conscious expansion of human rationality and morality that in both Wolffian and Pietist thinking led toward individual and social perfection. Also implied was modern historical self-awareness, culminating in Lessing's stadial conception of history and in Kant's celebration of "the century of Frederick."

The circles and institutes of the German Enlightenment reflect various blends of these components. In Protestant Germany, Pietist-inspired individuality was a crucial ingredient, while the Catholic Enlightenment emphasized social and legal reform by the state. The University of Halle fruitfully (but uneasily) combined philosophy, natural jurisprudence, and Pietism. Scholars in Göttingen developed a modern science of politics drawing on history rather than theology; Wolffian and (later) Kantian philosophy flourished in learned journals and tracts, alongside the "eclectic" and "popular" philosophies of practical reformers. The literary circles, clubs, and reading societies came increasingly under the influence of British books and ideas, but often adapted British concerns with social realities to intense soul-searching, and British notions of "improvement" to a German preoccupation with "destination." In several courts, "enlightened" rulers and ministers benefited from cameralist theory and combined humane reform measures with administrative consolidation, boasting an *aufgeklärt* ("enlightened") reason of state (Vierhaus 1979, 1995; Bödeker and Herrmann 1987).

Authors like Christoph Martin Wieland used the term "*Aufklärung*" extensively to denote the spread of knowledge and self-thinking as a rational and universal concept of progress. For pedagogues like Johann Bernhard Basedow and Joachim Heinrich Campe, *Aufklärung* was the gradual moral edification of the people. *Aufklärung* as practical improvement and social refinement appeared in the efforts of several reformist writers to enlighten women (Campe), Jews (Christian Wilhelm Dohm), and, not least, the uncouth German *Bürger* themselves (Christian Garve). Mendelssohn expanded this pedagogic and social horizon by linking *Aufklärung* with two other German neologisms, "Kultur" and "Bildung" (education, in the sense of profound inner improvement). He used these terms to ponder the links between individual and national enlightenment, reflecting the individualist and state-oriented traditions of *Aufklärung*. Significantly, while all these thinkers regarded *Aufklärung* as a vehicle of happiness, Kant's idea of *Aufklärung* eliminated the criterion of happiness by equating *Aufklärung* solely with intellectual self-liberation.

Other thinkers considered the *Aufklärung* principle of reason in relation to religious faith. Views of reason as superseding biblical revelation proved objectionable, not just to orthodox Christians, but also to the philosophical critics of *Aufklärung* who regarded faith, feeling, and intuition as human faculties valuable in their own right. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi launched a political critique of *Aufklärung* drawing on republican ideas of human autonomy, while Johann Georg Hamann mocked the rationalist servility and "cold, unfruitful moonlight" he found in contemporary *Aufklärer*, chiefly in Kant. Johann Gottfried Herder invoked the uniqueness of moments, personalities, and nations to attack the narrowness of *Aufklärung* rationalism and the shallowness of its universalism. Yet Herder shared the *Aufklärung* ideal

of humanity, and Hamann and Jacobi offered a broader understanding of the use of reason. There is an important distinction to make here: Hamann's critical irony, Herder's ethnohistorical insights, and Jacobi's call for political liberty place all three well within the contours of the European Enlightenment, even as they reproached *Aufklärung* in its predominant German form (see Berlin 1977 and Norton 2007).

The Enlightenment in Italy has been well served by several modern scholars, although further work on its European connections is still ahead. One great account stands out as a thoughtful general picture of the Enlightenment using solid organizing principles. Franco Venturi's series of studies, *Settecento riformatore*, showed how the Italian vantage point, which to all non-Italian readers was a fresh and stimulating device in itself, could provide a good spectrum of Europe's Enlightenment, seen as a cosmopolitan enterprise, not as a flat universalist Paris-based monopoly, nor as a collection of parochial discourses and local debates (Venturi 1972). John Robertson has studied the Neapolitan and Scottish Enlightenments as case models for a multifaceted, dialogical yet non-insular view of the European Enlightenment (Robertson 2007).

Enlightenment audiences, as well as individuals interconnected with the networks of French, German, Scottish, and Italian circles, operated in several other European lands, including Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. While these groups have been fruitfully discussed in terms of their respective "national Enlightenment" (Porter and Teich 1982) or its social-intellectual interconnectivity to other Enlightenment centers (Munck 2000), and while newer accounts have expanded our horizons on the geographies and genealogies of the Enlightenments (Kontler 2006; Hesse 2006; Withers 2007; Edelstein 2010), the present chapter now turns to an inspection of translation as a chief, at times exclusive, agent in the various trajectories of Enlightenment texts and ideas.

Trajectories and translations

While most accounts of intellectual transfers understandably rely on published or unpublished texts – books, journals, diaries, and letter exchanges – it would be well to note that a vast and almost uncharted territory is the oral interaction between Europeans traveling across cultural and linguistic borders. Scattered testimonies suggest that direct encounters were of enormous importance for the diffusion of the Enlightenment. The importance of travelers, envoys official and unofficial, guests and their hosts, accidental and planned encounters, to intercultural and interlinguistic dissemination of Enlightenment texts and ideas is yet to be measured. Both French and German enthusiasm about English books, for example, were partially inspired by French *philosophes* and German publishers visiting London during the early eighteenth century. In Anglophile Göttingen, anatomy professor Albrecht von Haller and his students were busy inventing sequels to Richardson's *Clarissa* while dissecting a corpse. Moscow University lecturers trained in Glasgow came back to teach the ideas of Adam Smith a decade before the *Wealth of Nations* was published in English, and almost a century before it was finally translated into Russian. In Milanese cafes, Spanish theaters, Paris salons, and Swiss reading societies, languages intersected, translations were improvised and concepts compared. A

great part of these novel encounters took place in the lively realm of a rising, dynamic, and communicating middle class. However, we are becoming more aware that this emergence of the public sphere (Habermas 1962) leaves a great deal unrecorded and undocumented. A meager few of such human exchanges have been preserved in correspondences and travel reports, but much of the oral aspect of intercultural translation is, by its nature, lost to posterity (Oz-Salzberger 2006; Munck 2000).

The Enlightenment translation market was different from all predecessors in its appeal to a new and broad readership, comprised of women and men, aristocratic and bourgeois, readers of high erudition and those of basic literacy. This expansion of audiences brought to the fore novels and theater plays, poetry, geography, ethnography, and travel books, as well as philosophy of the Enlightenment vein, history, art theory, and popular science. The popularity of translated philosophical works can be attributed to the rise of the popular and witty style of the *philosophes*, but also to the relative accessibility of the more demanding works of Hume and Kant, written in their mother tongues. An early landmark of the vernacular turn was the decision of the editors of Spinoza's complete works, published posthumously, to issue Dutch translations alongside the Latin originals. French and German versions soon followed. By the mid-eighteenth century certain philosophical works, such as Locke's *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693, with five German translations during the eighteenth century) and Hume's *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, did well in translations, while others flopped. British political philosophy, notably Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), fared better in French than in German. Similarly, Scottish moral philosophy, aesthetic theory, and historiography were far more successful in German translation than Scottish discussions of politics. Political economy became popular during the last phase of the Enlightenment, with James Steuart's *Oeconomy* becoming a veritable bestseller in German translation (Price and Price 1934; Korshin 1976; Tribe 1988; Kuehn 1987; Oz-Salzberger 1995).

Among philosophical writers Voltaire led the way throughout Europe, often followed by Diderot and Rousseau. Of particular popularity were Voltaire's *Zaïre* and *Candide*. The relative importance of translations from French, however, cannot be compared to those from English. *Zaïre* may have reached new readership when it was translated into Hungarian in 1784, but the thrust of Voltaire's European diffusion was made in the original French. Similarly, Voltaire's historical writings were less in need of translation than Hume's *History of England*, which became available to German readers from 1762, through two separate translations in Berlin and in Leipzig (Price and Price 1934).

But a more interesting question is not who were the most translated authors, but who were the authors most effective in translation. Effectiveness can be measured by several standards. Quantitative measures include size of editions, number of reissues and reprints, volume of sales, and surveys of quotations, paraphrases, imitations, tributes, and plagiarisms (Price and Price 1934; Korshin 1976; Kiesel and Münch 1977). Qualitative research assesses effect through stature and further impact of the receiving-end readers and users. Of particular importance are testimonies delivered by contemporary writers, which add up to a general picture of cultural inspiration.

Personal accounts of impact may be programmatic and groundbreaking, such as Voltaire's *English Letters* (Voltaire 1734) or isolated but no less groundbreaking, such as Kant's single statement that "the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber" (Kant 1783: 2). Seen in this light, it was the British authors, from Shakespeare to Smith, from Newton to Hume, and from Addison to Burke, who made the greatest impact on Enlightenment theory and art through the medium of translation.

The eighteenth century in general, and Enlightenment-related works in particular, marked a shift in the history of textual transmission and translation. For the first time, a large group of vernacular cultures was conducting a cosmopolitan conversation without the auspices of a "universal language," as Latin had previously been. Despite the ongoing prominence of French, the interlinguistic and intercultural dynamics went through a sea change. From a community of Latin-reading scholars and educated laymen perusing and producing a circumscribed set of texts, the eighteenth century saw an expansion of a broad readership consuming numerous genres in over a dozen vernacular languages, dominated, but not hegemonized, by the French (Oz-Salzberger 2006).

While Europe's vernaculars had been serving as literary, and even scientific and philosophical, languages as early as the fifteenth century, the Latin superstructure gave way during the seventeenth century. As early as 1681, the number of German-language books listed in the catalogue of the Leipzig Easter book fair exceeded the number of Latin books by about 10 per cent. By the second half of the eighteenth century, translations from Latin and Greek were a fraction of the number of books rendered from modern languages. After 1750, scientific texts were no longer translated into Latin for international readership (Kiesel and Münch 1977). As Latin lost its grip on philosophical as well as literary writing, modern European languages became the major transmitters of texts and ideas, thus encouraging as well as reflecting the rise of national self-awareness (Febvre and Martin 1997). Spinoza, Pufendorf, and Newton made their impact on Enlightenment thought mostly by means of translation from Latin. Bayle and Locke mostly wrote in their native tongues, and they were read and discussed in the same, or in translations into other modern languages. Eighteenth-century philosophers writing in their own languages were able to reach new audiences and benefit contemporary thinkers often through translation: Wolff, Hume, Rousseau, and Beccaria are cases in point.

Thus, interestingly, the receding of Latin and the rise of modern literary vernaculars served two countercurrents: modern cosmopolitanism, buttressed by the intensifying market for translations; and emerging European nationalism, carving new differentials along linguistic boundaries.

French remained a leading vernacular throughout the eighteenth century; other languages fluctuated in their relative importance, English gaining Continental recognition around 1750, becoming for the first time in its history a major origin language in Europe's literary traffic. German went through a comparable transformation, also becoming a major host language for new translations and, by the end of the century, an origin language of great importance in both literature and philosophy. Italian lost some of its earlier prominence on both ends of the translating route. Available statistics of English, French, and German publishing suggest that translations of books

and other texts rose to unprecedented levels in terms of numbers, diversity, speed of publication, and geographical diffusion. The status of translators underwent subtler changes, while translation itself, the theory and the practice, became a focus of public debate. Translators and publishers were members of a new social stratum of literati, belonging to a growing species of cultural mediators. “Translators,” wrote Emilie Du Châtelet, “are the entrepreneurs [négociants] of the Republic of Letters” (Du Châtelet 1735: 46). Translation, the tool of a new Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, eventually became the medium (and target) of new linguistic self-awareness and cultural nationalism.

The history of eighteenth-century translation is primarily a tale of two languages: French, Europe’s almost-unrivaled lingua franca, and English, a newcomer to the cosmopolitan scene that rose to challenge French in essential areas of cultural creativity. The interplay between French and English was complex and subtle: the French Enlightenment owed its early flowering to Voltaire’s and Montesquieu’s discovery of English politics, literature, science, and philosophy. The French language became a vehicle for transmitting these authors, as well as Pope, Swift, Defoe, Fielding, Richardson, Shaftesbury, and Hume, into other major European languages. After 1750, however, British influence began to vie with the French, and in some respects overcame it. From the perspective of the late German Enlightenment, for example, French was no longer the magnanimous mediator of English style and ideas, but their vanquished adversary.

Nevertheless, almost every important Enlightenment opus not originally written in French was translated into it. Voltaire’s role as pioneering intermediary between English and French cultures was coupled by Diderot’s keen interest in English literature and in cultural aspects of translation. Shakespeare, Richardson, and Hume were initially read on the Continent in French translation more than in any other language, including the original English. Translations into French from Italian were significantly fewer, but included the Abbé Morellet’s highly effective translation of Beccaria’s *Dei delitti e delle pene*.

New translations of the classics reached new audiences, not versed in Latin, and served Enlightenment authors for quotation and discussion. Even an excellent Latinist like the Scots philosopher Adam Ferguson preferred to quote, when possible, from a good contemporary translation such as Elizabeth Carter’s rendering of Epictetus, rather than use the original.

Translation from French into other languages marks the crossroads where Enlightenment texts reached readers beyond Europe’s francophone elites. The profusion of translations from French, beginning in the early Enlightenment with Bayle and especially François Fénelon, peaked with the writings of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Among the most popular were Montesquieu’s *Persian Letters* and Voltaire’s *Candide* and *Zaïre*. Scholarly works, such as Montesquieu’s *De l’esprit des lois*, were less frequently translated. No full translation was made of the *Encyclopédie*, widely circulated in Europe in the original French (Darnton 1979).

From the 1750s, a tide German of translations from the English marked a British-German cultural exchange that openly and defiantly circumnavigated France. To be sure, the surviving database of the Leipzig book fair proves that translations from French never lost their lead (Kiesel and Münch 1977: 197). However, in the fields of

philosophy and art theory as well as belles-lettres, English works gained a qualitative advantage. The last decades of the eighteenth century were characterized by prompt, eagerly awaited, and intensely discussed German publications of translated English poetry, drama, and novels, as well as a broad range of theoretical texts in moral philosophy, aesthetics, and political economy, notably those of the Scottish Enlightenment. Although the average period between original publication and German translation is estimated, for such authors as Ferguson, Millar, and Blair, at about nine and a half years, these peak-period translations were often complete within a year of the first English editions. Some works by Hume, and Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, were translated two or three times in the late eighteenth century (Price and Price 1934; Korshin 1976; Oz-Salzberger 1995).

Other trajectories of translation and reception criss-crossed the European Enlightenment. English-language translations remained predominantly from the French. Only in the nineteenth century did German thought balance its debt to its English and Scottish mentors. In Italy, where Latin maintained its grasp as the language of science and theory longer than elsewhere, interest in French culture rose dramatically at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and translations in Enlightenment context gathered pace during the second half of the century. Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Rousseau made important contributions to Italian intellectual history both in the original French and in Italian translations. British sources were important to two important groups of the Italian Enlightenment: in Milan, the journal *Il Caffé* was based on the example of the *Spectator*, and its contributors, Pietro and Alessandro Verri and Cesare Beccaria, quoted extensively from English and Scottish works. Of particular importance were Hume's philosophical and historical writings. In Naples, political economists often read Scottish works in French translations, and a highly significant process of reception ensued (Robertson 2007).

The eighteenth century thus witnessed the first rise of a vast multilingual translation hub. While travel literature, fiction, and poetry are not directly part of the present discussion, their impact on philosophical thinking was often significant. Alexander Pope, Joseph Fielding, Samuel Richardson, and Edward Young were translated from English into French, German, and several other languages. By the end of the century Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller began to acquire their European reputations in similar ways. Classical, medieval, and Renaissance authors, including Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare, inspired the Enlightenment through new translations. It was largely through successful translations that Cervantes inspired literary circles in Copenhagen, Pope's works traveled to St. Petersburg, Robertson made his mark on German historiography, and Voltaire found new readers in Hungary. Modern European languages obtained a new wealth of literary, scientific, and philosophical idiom through translation. Toward the end of the century, national cultures were consciously being constructed, enriched, and even challenged to originality, by means of translations. The theater, moving from a nomad to a city-based existence and taking on "national" aspirations, was a great consumer of translations. Other Enlightenment institutions – journals, reading societies, and clandestine clubs – enabled translated books to mobilize new social and intellectual energies (Munck 2000; Korshin 1976).

An important by-product of Enlightenment translation was the increasing awareness of the relevant theoretical problems (for a broader discussion in context, see Avi Lifschitz's Chapter 27, "Language"). Several Enlightenment thinkers produced theories of translation: Descartes's rationalist view of language posited a basic structural similarity among all languages, allowing for smooth intertranslatability. Other theorists derived all extant languages from one "primeval tongue," typically Hebrew (Beauzée 1765). Locke's philosophy of language acquisition suggested to some of his disciples that cultural diversity is irreducible to common principles of syntax and interchangeable vocabularies. Conversely, Condillac's "naturalist" approach to language aimed to retain its universal substructures (Condillac 1746). However, more nuanced philosophies of language and representation became predominant by the mid-eighteenth century, alongside more particularistic approaches to cultural-linguistic uniqueness. D'Alembert noted that languages "cannot all be used to express the same idea," and pointed out "the diversity of their genius" (D'Alembert 1751: 198). The differences between languages – ancient and modern, European and extra-European, but even within Europe's boundaries – were increasingly acknowledged. The debate between faithfulness and beauty of translated texts coincided with the Enlightenment's demand for accessibility and popular diffusion. A growing list of self-reflective translators, some of whom were prominent Enlightenment authors in their own right – Pope and D'Alembert, the Abbé Prévost, and Christian Garve – sharpened the Enlightenment's sensitivities to cultural and linguistic nuance, ancient and modern, European and non-European, and, most poignantly, to the Enlightenment's own inner variegation.

It should be noted that from a French Enlightenment perspective, translation was not indispensable for the diffusion of Enlightenment texts and ideas. The bulk of French books received in non-francophone parts of Europe were read in the original. The *Encyclopédie* was admired and circulated, mostly untranslated, throughout the Continent. French titles in the Leipzig book fair catalogue often outnumbered translated works (Kiesel and Münch 1977: 196). Adam Smith read his French mentors in the original, members of the Enlightenment circle in Milan devoured Voltaire and Diderot in French, and Catherine the Great plagiarized Montesquieu in the same way. Could not the Enlightenment be conducted in French? Why was translation after all a crucial vehicle of intellectual broadcast?

The answer touches on the very nature of Enlightenment's social geography. The writers and the readers who constituted Enlightenment culture were no Latinists. Many of the works conveying Enlightenment ideas – popularized science and philosophy, national histories, travel literature, new belles-lettres – could only be written in vernaculars. Eighteenth-century writing was increasingly localized and individualized, stamped by indigenous landscape and idiom. Be it Scottish or Neapolitan, vernacular language conveyed local sensitivities and linguistic bent. National languages were thus becoming indispensable for philosophical content as well as readership. Not all Enlightenment readers knew French, and many of its writers could not write in it. Even scholars with a reasonable knowledge in other languages found translations easier to digest and to quote. Hume, for example reportedly read Beccaria in the Italian original, but also in Morellet's accessible French translation (Oz-Salzberger 2006).

Eighteenth-century intellectual history includes epoch-making translations, either of full texts or effective selections. Such were Voltaire's quotations from Locke in his *Lettres anglaises* (especially Voltaire 1734: letter 8, "Sur M. Locke"), and his and Du Châtelet's translation and dissemination of Newton's *Principia Mathematica*. The latter project brought Newton's ideas, via a network of retranslations, excerpts, and popularizations, to a vast French-reading public. In Germany, Johann Lorenz Schmidt's important rendering of Spinoza's *Ethics* in 1744 was a crucial act of intellectual transmission. Other significant encounters were based on translations already available: Kant's arousal from his "dogmatic slumbers" by a German translation of Hume, and Herder's discovery of Macpherson's pseudo-Gaelic opus *Ossian*.

Translation marks the lines where monolingual, Paris-centered Enlightenment and its francophone audiences across Europe reach their limits, and other territories of Enlightenment begin. The vast network of Europe's eighteenth-century translation industry is yet to be mapped. Only a few of its hubs and outposts have been thoroughly researched. Recent studies are beginning to trace the labyrinthine paths of Europe's Enlightenment cultures, stretching well beyond the metropolitan centers, renowned authors, and typical readers of "the" Enlightenment (Kontler 2001, 2006; Robertson 2000, 2007).

Europe's great centers of translation were Paris, London, and from about 1760 Leipzig and environs – the latter also a major hub of circulation through its book fair and its academic, literary, and journalistic connections. Important secondary centers of multilingual translation included Zurich, Amsterdam (along with other Dutch cities), and Hamburg. Other cities producing significant numbers of translations into the local language included Lisbon, Naples, Dublin, Edinburgh, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. Quantitative research in the German territories reveals publishers of translated works in numerous small towns as well as large cities, as research of the German lands makes clear (Fabian, in Korshin 1976).

Leipzig, the book market capital, hosted a large and multilingual industry of publication and translation. It was also a center of translation theory. Zurich was a multilingual nucleus of the Swiss network of cultural mediation. Apart from an important French-German intermediary, its publishers launched an important English-German route of influence. By the mid-century, the Zurich publishers were among the first to insist on the merit of direct translation between the origin and the host languages. Hamburg became another meeting point for French, English, and German, but its geographic and economic orientation gave it a unique advantage for becoming an Anglo-German intermediary. It was a major gateway for importation of English books, including texts for the Scottish Enlightenment, fresh from the printing press, into the Holy Roman Empire. In nearby Wolfenbüttel, Lessing translated and reviewed British books, and the University of Göttingen used its own Hanoverian link to become a major reception center for English novels and Scottish philosophy. The Dutch Republic, a hub of multilingual translation for over a century before the Enlightenment, was a pioneer of vernacular publishing (Kiesel and Münch 1977; Baker 1998).

Some of the Enlightenment's greatest authors were also highly effective translators, among them Voltaire, Pope, and Lessing. But beyond these well-known figures, some thousands of relatively obscure translators worked in dozens of cities and towns, performing the mass of Europe's growing translation industry. Some of them

worked anonymously. Among them were university professors, freelance lecturers and students, clerics, clerks, and minor government employees. Many of them were self-employed literati, often in dire economic circumstances.

Eighteenth-century publishers, reviewers, and readers were often aware of quality of translations, or the lack thereof. Inadequate translation is sometimes blamed for the obscurity of Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in its early German edition (1776–78). A brilliant second translation by the scholar and “popular philosopher” Christian Garve, complete with an enlightening preface (1794–96) is seen as a key factor in Smith's somewhat belated German success. In a different case, Garve's excellent German version of Ferguson's *Institutes of Moral Philosophy* overshadowed an unimpressive translation by C. F. Jünger of the same author's much more original and important *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Oz-Salzberger 1995),

Women translators increased their impact on Enlightenment. Aphra Behn and Anne Dacier made famous renderings of classical texts. Dacier, whose work inspired Pope's own translation of Homer, was derided for her gender by some of his critics. Elizabeth Carter provided a first complete English rendering of Epictetus (1749–52), important to republicans like Ferguson. Charlotte Brooke published the first collection of translated Gaelic poetry from Ireland (1789). The prolific Dutch writer Betje Wolff found time to translate twenty-three works from English, French, and German (Hermans, Salama-Carr, Ellis and Oakley-Brow, in Baker 1998; Oz-Salzberger 2006).

Some of the Enlightenment's significant intellectual transitions took place in contexts of misreceptions, pseudo-translations, and mistranslations. The most famous instance of pseudo-translation in the eighteenth century is James Macpherson's alleged English rendering of three collections ascribed to the third-century blind bard Oisín (Ossian), presumably drawn from Gaelic manuscripts and oral poems, and published to great acclaim in 1760–63. Despite the immediate skepticism of English critics, *Ossian* became famous and highly effective in several European cultures. The Ossianic corpus made an enormous contribution to the rise of sentimentalist primitivism and the new poetics of authenticity, later associated with German Romanticism (Gaskill 2004).

Of similar fascination is the effectiveness and creative potentialities of mistranslations, a term denoting translations whose style or contents were drastically remote from the original, be they the result of intentional manipulation, self-conscious translator's license, unintended shifts of meaning, misunderstanding of the original, or sheer ignorance. Most Enlightenment theorists and practitioners, particularly the French from Dacier to D'Alembert, approved of wide-ranging adaptation into the host language and to the tastes of the host culture. Interestingly, German admirers of original authenticity did much the same. Throughout the century great liberties were taken with translated works: Ducis changed the ending of *Othello* to make it fit for the French stage. Garve shifted Ferguson's active civic virtue into a spiritual perfectionism. Bertrand changed the chapter division, vocabulary and mood of Friedrich Nicolai's *Sebaldis Nothanker* to please French tastes, while German translator J. J. C. Bode removed all traces of irony from Sterne's *A Sentimental Journey*. Some of these changes were clearly intentional; others were far subtler, at times evidently unintended. Some terms were simply not available in host languages, and the implied ideas were therefore difficult to convey: Ebert was acutely aware of the lack of a German equivalent for “genius” or “genie”; Garve and Wieland struggled hard with

“public spirit.” Terms like “commerce” did not resonate and lost their context; “wit” and “esprit” failed to sparkle. “Reason,” “raison,” and “Vernunft” overlapped only in part (van der Zande 1998; Oz-Salzberger 1995; Kontler 2001).

In some cases, philosophical creativity could be credited, in part, to shifts of meaning that occurred during processes of translation and reception. Isaiah Berlin has suggested that German “anti-rationalism” could be read back, via ducts of misreception, to Hume’s epistemology (Berlin 1977). Others, including the present author, analyzed the unintended shifts that enabled Scottish philosophy to enrich the German Enlightenment even as its thinkers misread some of its texts, for example by informing Schiller’s philosophy of play and Hegel’s account of civil society (Kuehn 1987; Waszek 1988; Oz-Salzberger 1995).

Conclusion

Few intellectual movements in European history have been so self-conscious while in the making, and so controversial in latter-day assessments of their character, scope, and legacy, as the Enlightenment. This chapter has attempted to visit a two-tier tension field. First, the Enlightenment’s own debates, not only about “What is Enlightenment?” but also about human nature, the promises and trappings of modernity, the gamuts of history, the origins of wealth, the sources of virtue, and the scope and limits of Reason. Secondly, some stock was taken of post-Enlightenment scholarly arguments, often verging on the political, regarding the perennial conundrum “What was (the) Enlightenment?”

Recent research is throwing fresh light on some of the controversies, in particular those tossing an alleged “mainstream” or “high” European Enlightenment against its national, regional, religious, and cultural variants. It is becoming increasingly clear that disseminations of texts and ideas, far from being clear-cut trajectories of transferral, involved both crude and subtle shifts of meaning, conscious modifications, and unintended misreceptions. Some of these vicissitudes prove crucial for understanding both the Enlightenment’s cosmopolitan conversations and its unique localities.

Translations were prime movers in the transition of Europe’s “republic of letters” into a set of “democracies of letters,” in which numerous denizens enjoyed literacy, albeit a one-language literacy. Outgrowing the ideal of “universal language,” Enlightenment thought became increasingly sensitive to a linguistic and cultural differential, and ever more dependent on translation. French was a crucial but temporary mediator. Under its receding mantle, Europe’s world of learning and literature reached multilingual maturity. Intellectual internationalism grew and flourished alongside literary nationalism.

When Adam Ferguson visited Voltaire in Ferney, his host congratulated him for “civilizing the Russians,” through translations of his history and philosophy opuses. But numerous eighteenth-century translations did not follow Voltaire’s imperative. Rather than universally spreading the Voltairean idea of Reason, or the universalizing Scottish accounts of historical progress, translations increasingly encouraged the birth of modern national literatures and cultures. Two processes are especially striking: English and German came to predominate in the translation of imaginative literature (and to some degree art and literary theory) alongside the rise of

sentimentalist tastes and the waning of classicism. The parallel flowering of the Scottish and the German Enlightenments contributed to the same trend, without, however, dethroning French as the major source language. At the same time, and subtly interconnected with the first process, translation increasingly became a challenge to national originality rather than a mere viaduct of cultural influx.

The late Enlightenment opposition to French cultural domination was shared by German, Dutch, and Scandinavian mediators of texts. They were also the first to sense new linguistic siblinghoods. While French, as a source language, suggested a universalist paradigm, English and German works inspired readers all over Europe to new creativity in their mother tongues. Moreover, while “strong” national literatures (such as the English, French, and German), supported by late Enlightenment ethnography and anthropology, paid growing respect to the source languages and origin cultures, smaller or nascent national literatures were fiercely host-oriented, adapting translated texts to their home-turf needs.

Shifts of political loyalty were also reflected in Enlightenment communicative trends: Americans read French works that enhanced their sense of cultural autonomy and supported political radicalization. In his 1764 tract, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, James Otis translated and quoted passages from Rousseau’s *Du contrat social* (*The Social Contract*) buttressing anti-English political sentiments by a cultural circumnavigation of Britain. Revolutionary pamphleteers followed the same example, using Montesquieu and other French writers alongside Rousseau.

French thought also served nascent political rebellions elsewhere. In Spain, Mariano Luis de Urquijo’s rendering of Voltaire into Spanish was intended and understood as an assault against the Inquisition (Pym, in Baker 1998: 556). In Russia, Alexander Pushkin and some of the Decembrists read Voltaire, who left a lasting effect on their political irreverence. These facts suggest a possible critique of Jonathan Israel’s recent taxonomy of “moderate” versus “radical” Enlightenment corpuses. Taking “moderate” to mean conservative and outmoded, Israel argues that the Enlightenment’s “moderates,” Locke, Newton, Hume, Voltaire, Turgot, and Kant, heroes of the old textbooks, were too unprogressive and ineffective, in their day and later, to merit their hallowed pedestals “from the democratic, egalitarian, and anti-colonial perspective of the post-1945 western world” (Israel 2006: 865). But the histories of translation and reception tell a different story. Moderation could *translate* into radicalism – by means of either literary translation or intellectual impact – in the way that Voltaire’s non-revolutionary thought impacted the Russian Decembrists. To be sure, this was not a one-way current: republican activism could also *translate*, by contrast, into apolitical quietism or metaphysical striving, in the way Ferguson’s thought was received by a generation of German readers (Oz-Salzberger 1995).

The Enlightenment’s core concepts and shared priorities lent themselves to translation and to broad diffusion. The ideas of the primacy of Reason, freedom of thought, social progress, dispersal of knowledge, critical analysis, and universal human aspirations all proved highly translatable. But even as Europe’s cosmopolitan legacy stood its first test of multilingual modernity, formidable differentials loomed in the near horizon. The very capacity of Enlightenment texts and ideas to cross boundaries and enrich national cultures and tongues could eventually break the mold of cosmopolitanism and usher in the age of radicalizing politics, pointing in

two directions of late modernity: revolutionary egalitarianism and national(ist) cultures, literatures, and schools of thought. Neither of these nascent semi-heirs was geared to acknowledge their great debt to Enlightenment thought; indeed they either raged against it or tagged it obsolete. But present-day scholarship, especially the growing research tracing the vagaries of texts, concepts, and ideas across linguistic and cultural borders, may restore the Enlightenment's core importance, albeit on a far more complex and variegated pedestal. It was a fountainhead of modernity due to its fundamental belief in, and successful practice of, an ever-broadening dissemination of free critical thought and human improvement. Neither radicalism nor nationalism could live up to both of these tenets.

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Further reading

See, in particular, M. Baker (ed.) *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies* (London: Routledge, 1998), especially the articles by Theo Hermans, Myriam Salama-Carr, Roger Ellis and Liz Oakley-Brown, and Anthony Pym (on the Netherlands, France, England and Spain, respectively); D. Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); J. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); L. Kontler, "What Is the (Historians'")

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2

NEWTON AND NEWTONIANISM

Eric Schliesser

Introduction

Isaac Newton's *Principles of Natural Philosophy* (hereafter *Principia*) appeared in three different editions (1687, 1713, 1726). The *Principia* appeared in three parts using advanced geometry punctuated by propositions, scholia, and lemmas and included a large number of new, extremely challenging mathematical results.¹

Newton followed and emulated the high standards of rigor set by Christian Huygens's *Horologium oscillatorium sive de motu pendularium* (*On the Pendulum Clock*) (1673), expanding the range of phenomena and techniques covered. Crucially, Newton ensured that many of Galileo's and Huygens's results on motion and collision could be recovered by his approach. *Principia* included a number of predictions about a large number of terrestrial and celestial phenomena, many of which had not previously been noticed, and appealed to unusually exact empirical evidence in order to make far-reaching claims about the orbits of planets and their satellites, the shape of the earth, the tides, the orbits of comets, and resistance behavior. It settled the debate about the Copernican hypothesis – the most important outstanding cosmological question. Surprisingly Newton showed that the sun moves albeit “never ... far from” the common (immovable) center of gravity of the solar system, which is taken as “the center of the universe” (Newton 1687: 816–17).

But these results in natural philosophy and cosmology, as extraordinary as they are, are only the beginnings of the story of Newton's influence. The *Principia* also inaugurated a new vision of how science was done, one that was difficult to appreciate for his contemporaries and eighteenth-century readers; the authority, methodology, and nature of the claims of the *Principia* became one of the most contested areas of eighteenth-century philosophy. This chapter explores how Newton's achievement dramatically influenced debates over the way subsequent philosophers conceived of their activity which prepared the way for an institutional and methodological split between philosophy and science. The standard story goes that in the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke – who conferred with Newton, but who also did not always present Newton's best available arguments – a dividing line was drawn

between the natural sciences of cosmology and physics and metaphysical natural philosophy. As with many stories there is some truth in it, but the story is considerably more complex. These larger themes are illustrated by attention to a large number of highly detailed debates over the nature and importance of Newton's legacy. In discussing these debates I indicate where various authors draw on strands within Newton and where they reinterpret Newton. The reinterpretation was often highly creative, abetted by the fact that Newton presented his readers with evolving views such that even some of his closest followers could legitimately claim to present Newton's views even if the views presented were in direct conflict.

The awareness of Newton's achievement had ramifications as well, even for philosophers who were not invested in the details. For example Kant's two famous claims about Newton in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) – that he was not a genius, insofar as his discoveries and his method of discovery could be set out clearly and taught (unlike geniuses such as Homer and Wieland [!] who could not explain how they created art) (Kant 1790: §47; Ak V, 308–539) and that it is absurd to hope for a “Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass” (§75; Ak V, 400) tacitly assumed Newton's authority. In other words, that it was absurd to hope for a Newton of the blade of grass meant that if a Newton couldn't explain it, no explanation was forthcoming along the lines of the *Principia*. Throughout the century the “Newton of X” was one of the highest honorifics – Montesquieu and Adam Smith were called the Newtons of the human sciences for example. And throughout the century thinkers tried to position themselves in relation to Newton, from Anthony Collins's attempt in the first decade of the century to argue that his materialist account of mind was more consistent with Newtonian natural philosophy than the position espoused by Newton's friend and spokesperson Samuel Clarke (Collins 1707: 39) to the parallel disagreements between Joseph Priestley and Thomas Reid towards the end of the century (to be discussed below). “Newton” came to stand for a whole range of iconic tropes within discussions about natural philosophy and the larger cultural scene not to mention the many attempts at “moral” (that is, social) and medical science modeled on some image of Newtonian science.

Two disclaimers: First, although I will mention some of the ways Newton was appropriated I will not offer a taxonomy of the many different ways Newton and Newtonianism were understood throughout the eighteenth century. The main focus of the chapter is on the appropriation of Newton's works, as opposed to his authoritative specter. For example Newtonian mechanics became associated with a clockwork conception of nature in which God would frame the machine and then leave it to run on its own. This picture does more justice to Descartes's conception than Newton's. As Newton's early critics, Leibniz and Berkeley, recognized in the *Queries to the Opticks*, Newton seems to commit himself to the position that God would occasionally interfere and provide a “reformation” in keeping the planetary “system” on track – a position defended by Clarke in his correspondence with Leibniz (Newton 1718: 378). Another example is Voltaire's efforts of enlisting Newton's achievements in his program of political reform inspired by the political constitution of the English. Second, in this chapter I treat Newton as publicly available to informed eighteenth-century readers. In particular, this means that nearly all of