THIRD EDITION

CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER

AMITAV ACHARYA

This page intentionally left blank

Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia

Third Edition

In this third edition of *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, Amitav Acharya offers a comprehensive and critical account of the evolution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) norms and the viability of the ASEAN way of conflict management. Building on the framework from the first edition, which inspired the establishment of the ASEAN Political-Security community, this new edition has been extensively updated and revised based on new primary sources that are not publicly available.

Updates for this edition include:

- Expanded and updated coverage of the South China Sea Conflict and how it affects regional order and tests ASEAN unity
- Analysis of new developments in the US role in the region, including ASEAN's place and role in the US pivot/rebalancing strategy and the evolution of the East Asian Community, the newest summit-level multilateral group
- Extensive analysis of the ASEAN Political-Security community
- An examination of US–China relations and China–ASEAN relations
- Coverage of ASEAN's institutional development and the controversy over reform of the ASEAN Secretariat
- An updated outlook on ASEAN's future as a security community and the issue of ASEAN Centrality in the regional security architecture.

The new edition will continue to appeal to students and scholars of Asian security, international relations theory and Southeast Asian studies, as well as policymakers and the media.

Amitav Acharya is Professor of International Relations and the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC. He has been elected to be the 54th President (2014–15) of the International Studies Association (ISA).

This page intentionally left blank

Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia

ASEAN and the problem
of regional order

Third Edition

Amitav Acharya

Contents

Tables and figures

Tables

Figures

Series editor's preface to the first edition

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has enjoyed a mixed institutional experience since its advent in August 1967. The past three decades and more have seen the Association manage intra-mural tensions with some success and also act as a diplomatic community speaking with a single voice during the course of the Cambodian conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has assumed a diplomatic centrality within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) but has also faced evident difficulties in sustaining collective consensus as a result of the impact of regional economic crisis and an enlargement of membership to coincide with geographic Southeast Asia, exempting East Timor. Professor Amitav Acharya has drawn on this mixed institutional experience to address the subject of constructing a security community. At issue in this volume is what kind of model does ASEAN provide for confronting the problem of regional order identified in the subtitle? Professor Acharya has taken as his intellectual point of reference the concept of 'Constructivism', whereby cooperation among states is understood as a social process that can have a positive, and even transforming, effect on their relations through internalising regulatory norms. Indeed, he is a member of the academic school that maintains that norms can have a life of their own and are capable of influencing the behaviour of states so that they come to share a common habit of peaceful conduct.

Professor Acharya is exceptionally well qualified to address this subject and its regional context. He has acquired a wealth of regional field experience and also has established a prodigious record of scholarship combining theoretical perspectives with empirical data. In this volume, he examines and assesses the merits of 'the ASEAN Way' and whether or not the nascent security community is in the ascendant. He sets ASEAN's institutional experience within a structured framework of enquiry, which serves not only as a basis for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the Association but also as a vehicle for the wider comparative analysis of regional organisations. In the process, he takes the study of ASEAN beyond an account of its historical record. The attendant intellectual appeal extends beyond specialists in Southeast Asian security to the wider community of students of regional and international security.

Michael Leifer

Preface to the second edition

The second edition of *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* takes into account nearly a decade of further evolution of ASEAN, which marked its fortieth anniversary in August 2007. The major new addition is Chapter 7, tracing and analysing the 'ASEAN Security Community' initiative. This and other chapters update ASEAN's response to both conventional and emerging security challenges since the Asian economic crisis in 1997, including interstate tensions and transnational security issues such as terrorism, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the Indian Ocean Tsunami, environmental degradation, and the challenge of domestic political change. Chapter 6, dealing with ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific security, has been updated to cover the latest developments relating to the ARF, the emergence of East Asian regionalism (and the East Asian Community idea), and more generally ASEAN's response to the rise of China and its multilateral engagement of China, Japan and India. Modest changes to the conceptual chapter (Chapter 1) have been made to offer some theoretical clarifications.

In terms of source material, I have been able to draw on declassified British records of ASEAN's formative period that were not available when the first edition's draft was completed. These documents, used to revise Chapter 2 on the evolution of ASEAN norms and the emergence of the ASEAN Way, offer interesting new information and insights into differing national perspectives on ASEAN's principles and processes that had to be reconciled to develop and sustain ASEAN. (They do, however, generally confirm my original observations regarding the uniqueness of ASEAN and the strengths and limits of its approach to regional cooperation.) I have also drawn on official documents of the ARF that are not normally available to academics and on both official and non-official sources in Bahasa Indonesia, especially in analysing the ASEAN Security Community idea.

In preparing a new edition, I have been inspired primarily by the response to the first edition from students from around the world who have used this book as a text (to an extent not anticipated by the author) or as a guide and tool for their own research. I am heartened by the scholarly interest and debate the book has generated. It has also turned out to be useful and relevant to policymakers although it was not intended as such, certainly not as a work of policy advocacy. Especially heartening has been the response to the book in China (where a Chinese translation was published in 2004 translated by Professor Wong Zhengyi of Beijing University and published by Shanghai People's Press) and from the wider intellectual community of scholars of international relations theory who are not necessarily interested in Southeast Asian affairs.

The chief intellectual concern of the second edition, like that of the first, is to use and advance the security community concept as an analytic tool, rather than as a descriptive

category for ASEAN (the question whether ASEAN has or has not become a true security community). Through this book, I seek to make a contribution to the theoretical study of security communities as well as to the literature on Southeast Asian studies. It reflects my longstanding interest in combining disciplinary and area studies perspectives which, if properly done, can be complementary, rather than mutually exclusionary.

Amitav Acharya
Bristol, UK
August 2008

Preface to the third edition

Asia is the most economically dynamic and strategically significant part of the world today, and the story of ASEAN is an important part of the political and strategic rise and reordering of Asia. Since its first publication in 2001, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* has been widely used by scholars and policymakers around the world to study Asia's evolving security architecture amidst momentous changes such as the rise of China and India and the renewed strategic attention given to the region by the United States. It was among the first contributions to renew scholarly interest in the idea of security communities in the post-cold war era. As such it became a key text of the emergent field of comparative regionalism. The book's impact can be seen by the fact that the initial articulation of the ASEAN Political Security Community idea was inspired by its first edition.

International interest in ASEAN, from both the academic and policy-making communities continues to grow, especially with the dramatic expansion of ASEAN's external relations to include all the major powers of the current international system. ASEAN is now an integral part of courses on comparative regionalism taught in universities around the world.

My purpose in bringing out a third edition of the volume is to serve the interest not only of those who have followed the story of ASEAN in the past decades, but also of newcomers to the subject and more generally of those analysing the role of Asia in the twenty-first-century world order.

The third edition expands the book's coverage of key developments that pose new and serious tests for ASEAN's role in regional order, including the escalation of the South China Sea conflict and the US 'pivot' or 'rebalancing' strategy, in which ASEAN figures centrally. Other important developments concern the evolution of the East Asian Community, and ASEAN's institutional development. The conclusion updates the outlook on ASEAN's future as a security community and the core issue of 'ASEAN centrality' in the regional security architecture of Asia.

<div align="right">
Amitav Acharya
Washington, DC
3 September 2013
</div>

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

ACMR	Air Combat Manoeuvring Range
ACWC	ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children
ADMM	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
ADMM Plus	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AIJV	ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSC	ASEAN Political Security Community
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARF-SOM	ARF Senior Officials Meeting
ASCC	ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASC	ASEAN Security Community
ASCU	ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies
ASEAN-PMC	ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences
ASEAN-SOM	ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting
ASEM	Asia Europe Meeting
ASP	ASEAN Surveillance Process
ASTSU	ASEAN Surveillance Technical Support Unit
BIMP-EAGA	Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area
CBM	Confidence-building Measures
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CLMV	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
COC	Code of Conduct (in the South China Sea)
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CPR	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSBMs	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

CSCA	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
DOC	Declaration on Code of Conduct (ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea)
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EAS	East Asia Summit
EASI	East Asia Strategic Initiative
EC	European Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EHD	Environment, Human Rights and Democracy
EEPSEA	Economy and Environment Programme for Southeast Asia
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EU	European Union
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
FUNCINPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICK	International Conference on Kampuchea
ICM	International Control Mechanism
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMC	Informal Meeting on Cambodia
IMET	International Military Exchange and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMT-GT	Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle
ISDS	Institute of Strategic and Development Studies
ISG	Inter-sessional Group
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
JLP	Joint Logistics Plan
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
MAPHILINDO	Malaysia–Philippines–Indonesia
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIMA	Maritime Institute of Malaysia
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NETs	Natural Economic Territories
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation

NPCSD	North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PD	Preventive Diplomacy
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conferences
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIJORI	Singapore–Johor–Riau
SLD	Shangri-la Dialogue
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOM	Senior Officials Meeting
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TPP	Trans Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USA	United States of America
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
ZoPFF/C	Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation

The evolution of ASEAN-Ten

A chronology

8 August 1967 (Bangkok)	Birth of ASEAN. ASEAN founders from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok.
27 November 1971 (Kuala Lumpur)	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration.
23–24 February 1976 (Bali)	First ASEAN Summit.
24 February 1976 (Bali)	Declaration of ASEAN Concord; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat.
4–5 August 1977 (Kuala Lumpur)	Second ASEAN Summit.
7 January 1984 (Jakarta)	Admission of Brunei Darussalam.
14–15 December 1987 (Manila)	Third ASEAN Summit.
21–22 July 1992 (Manila)	Applications for Observer status from Laos and Vietnam approved; Instruments of Accession of Laos and Vietnam to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia were accepted.
23–24 July 1993 (Singapore)	Laos and Vietnam at the 26th AMM as Observers; Cambodia at the 26th AMM as a Guest.
22–23 July 1994 (Bangkok)	Laos and Vietnam attended the 27th AMM as Observers; Cambodia and Burma attended as Guests.
17 October 1994	Vietnam applied for membership in ASEAN.
25 October 1994	Cambodia applied for Observer status.
24 January 1995	Cambodia acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
12 July 1995	Burma applied for Observer status.
27 July 1995	Burma acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
28 July 1995 (Bandar Seri Begawan)	At the 28th AMM, Vietnam was admitted into ASEAN as the seventh member; Cambodia became an Observer; Laos announced its wish to join ASEAN in two years' time; Burma attended as a Guest.
14–15 December 1995 (Bangkok)	The Fifth ASEAN Summit; the first meeting of the seven ASEAN Leaders and their counterparts from Cambodia, Laos, and Burma; Signing of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone by the Leaders of the ten Southeast Asian countries.

15 March 1996	Laos applied for membership.
23 March 1996	Cambodia applied for membership.
12–13 July 1996	Burma became an Observer.
12 August 1996	Burma applied for membership.
30 November 1996 (Jakarta)	The First Informal ASEAN Summit; ASEAN Heads of Government declare commitment to simultaneous admission of CLM (Cambodia, Laos and Burma) countries to ASEAN; informal meeting between the ASEAN Heads of Government and the Heads of Government of the CLM countries.
31 May 1997 (Kuala Lumpur)	Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur reaches unanimous decision to admit the CLM countries in July 1997.
10 July 1997 (Kuala Lumpur)	ASEAN Foreign Ministers 'delay the admission of Cambodia into ASEAN until a later date . . .' following the 'coup' in that country, but agreed that the admission of Laos and Burma 'will proceed as scheduled'.
23 July 1997 (Subang Jaya, Malaysia)	Laos and Burma admitted into ASEAN, one day before the start of the 30th AMM.
15 December 1997 (Kuala Lumpur)	The Second ASEAN Informal Meeting, leaders of the nine ASEAN members agree to 'consultations . . . so as to enable Cambodia to join ASEAN as soon as possible, preferably before the next ASEAN Summit' [in Hanoi in mid-December 1998].
16 December 1998 (Hanoi)	Sixth ASEAN Summit decides to admit the Kingdom of Cambodia.
30 April 1999 (Hanoi)	Cambodia admitted as the tenth ASEAN member.

Source: www.aseansec.org.id (accessed 31 July 2000).

Southeast Asia/ASEAN

Cartography by Gary Haley, PCS Mapping & DTP.

ASEAN 2010: Basic indicators

Country	Total land area (sq km)	Total population (thousand)	Gross Domestic Product at current prices		Product per capita	
			(US$ mn)	(PPP$ mn)	(US$)	(PPP$)
Brunei Darussalam	5,765	415	12,402	19,406	29,915	46,811
Cambodia	181,035	15,269	11,168	28,985	731	1,898
Indonesia	1,860,360	234,181	708,032	1,030,998	3,023	4,403
Lao PDR	236,800	6,230	6,508	16,105	1,045	2,585
Malaysia	330,252	28,909	238,849	415,157	8,262	14,361
Myanmar	676,577	60,163	43,025	76,601	715	1,273
Philippines	300,000	94,013	189,326	351,686	2,014	3,741
Singapore	710	5,077	223,015	291,934	43,929	57,505
Thailand	513,120	67,312	318,709	585,698	4,735	8,701
Viet Nam	331,051	86,930	107,650	291,260	1,238	3,351
ASEAN	4,435,670	598,498	1,858,683	3,107,829	3,106	5,193
CLMV	1,425,463	168,592	168,351	412,951	999	2,449
ASEAN6	3,010,207	429,907	1,690,332	2,694,878	3,932	6,269

Note: PPP stands for purchasing power parity
Source: ASEAN Secretariat

This page intentionally left blank

Introduction

Security communities and ASEAN
from a theoretical perspective

Identifying the conditions under which states avoid the recurrence of war and establish a durable peace is one of the most difficult challenges for practitioners and theorists of international relations. While there is abundant literature on the causes of war,[1] what leads states to self-consciously abandon war as a means of policy towards other states has been a far more problematic issue and one that has received considerably less attention. Thus, it is hardly surprising that one of the most promising concepts developed to explore 'the conditions and processes of long-range or permanent peace', that of 'security community', developed by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s, went more or less ignored by a discipline traditionally dominated by the realist paradigm which accepts competition possibly leading to war as an inevitable and permanent condition of international relations.[2]

The concept of security community describes groups of states which have developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the group. In international relations theory, especially for the purpose of this book, the concept has twofold significance. First, it raises the possibility that through interactions and socialisation, states can manage anarchy and even escape the security dilemma, conditions which realist and neo-realist, and neo-liberal, perspectives take as permanent features of international relations. Second, the concept offers a theoretical and analytic framework for studying the impact of international (including regional) institutions in promoting peaceful change in international relations. This framework not only challenges the assumptions of realism and neo-realism, but also goes beyond the intellectual parameters established by the neo-realist–neo-liberal divide, which have formed a major part of the theoretical debate in international relations in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The theory of 'security communities' was among the first major attempts in the period after the Second World War to raise the possibility of non-violent change in international relations. It challenged the dominance of realism with its attendant focus on the security dilemma. The concept of 'security dilemma', proposed by John Hertz in 1950, described how the imperative of self-help guiding the behaviour of states under conditions of anarchy could fuel arms races and conflict.[3] It conceptualised international relations as a 'vicious circle of security and power accumulation' as states are 'driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others'.[4] The idea of security community, by contrast, was integral to a perspective that saw international relations as a process of social learning and identity formation, driven by transactions, interactions and socialisation.[5] It recognised the possibility of change being a fundamentally peaceful process with its sources lying in the 'perceptions and identifications' among actors.[6] Such processes could explain why states may develop greater mutual interdependence and responsiveness, develop 'we feelings', and ultimately come to abandon the use of force to settle problems among

them.[7] International relations could thus be reconceptualised as a 'world society of political communities, consisting of social groups, a process of political communication, machinery for enforcement, and popular habits of compliance'.[8]

While theoretically challenging, the concept of security community remained on the sidelines of international relations theory. The work of Deutsch and his associates on security community formed an integral part of regional integration theory which dominated the study of regional and international cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s.[9] Along with Ernst Haas's neo-functionalist approach,[10] Deutsch's work (called 'transactionalism') provided conceptual tools for 'investigations into peaceful transnational problemsolving'.[11] But interest in regional integration theory declined sharply with the faltering state of the European Community. The theory was considered 'obsolescent' when EC members failed to respond collectively to the Middle East oil crisis and the American technological challenge in the 1970s.[12] Moreover, as a Euro-centric theory, the liberal-pluralist explanation of regional integration proved to be inapplicable in the Third World context.

The major reason for the lack of interest in security communities, however, had to do with the orthodoxy of a discipline. As Adler and Barnett have put it, international relations scholars have been generally uncomfortable with the language of community – 'the idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interests, diffuse reciprocity and trust, strikes fear and incredulity in their hearts'.[13] This was especially evident when integration theory was superseded by theories of complex interdependence and international regimes. The latter proved especially influential in the study of international organisation from the late 1970s.[14] Although it retained some of the insights and concerns of regional integration, especially their 'curiosities about international collaboration via transnational processes within settings of interdependence',[15] the study of international organisations came to be dominated by the rationalistic predispositions of neo-liberal institutionalism. Missing from the picture was the integration theorists' emphasis on the sociological nature of state interactions, especially Deutsch's focus on the development of collective perceptions and identifications, which could lead to a fundamental transformation of the security dilemma. Under Keohane's intellectual leadership, neo-liberal institutionalism[16] accepted the realist premise concerning anarchy as a given of the international system and accepted that cooperation among states, while possible, would arise only in response to states pursuing their short-term self-interest.

The so-called debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals in the 1980s and early 1990s established a relatively narrow parameter for explaining change in international relations. Neo-realism,[17] to a much greater extent than classical realism, is sceptical of the prospects for peaceful change. International institutions, a key agent of peaceful change, are viewed by neo-realists as creatures of Great Power self-interest with only a marginal effect in regulating the behaviour of states. For neo-realists, change occurs as a consequence of shifts, often violent, in the balance or distribution of power. Neo-liberalism accepts that change can occur peacefully through the working of international institutions. Institutions facilitate cooperation by providing information, reducing transaction costs, helping to settle distributional conflicts, and, most importantly, reducing the likelihood of cheating. But while disagreeing with neo-realism that institutions matter only on the margins of international relations, neo-liberal institutionalism would still grant them a limited role. It accepts the basic neo-realist premise that institutions reflect and are conditioned by the distribution of power in the international system.[18] Moreover, institutions are created by self-interested states, and at most constrain state choices and strategies. They do not fundamentally alter state interests and

identities (as self-interested egoists). Like neo-realism, neo-liberalism takes state interests as a given. Interests remain exogenous to the process of interstate interactions taking place in a given institutionalised setting. Such interactions do not fundamentally transform the condition of anarchy.[19]

Through the neo-realist–neo-liberal debate, the literature on security communities remained practically stagnant. As Buzan notes, the concept had been 'lying around since the late 1950s', with those who used it doing so 'without looking too far beyond the basic definitions'.[20] It was not until the end of the Cold War that international relations scholars, cognisant that 'states are not as war-prone as believed, and that many security arrangements once assumed to derive from balancing behaviour in fact depart significantly from realist imagery', gave the concept a new lease of life.[21] Not surprisingly therefore, an initial body of work on security communities, done at the regional level, focused on differentiating security communities from other types of security arrangements, such as alliances (defence communities), security regimes and collective security arrangements.[22] Another body of work, at the wider international level, was especially important in identifying and conceptualising different types and stages of security communities and establishing the conditions required for their development.[23] A major impetus for this renewed interest in security communities was the constructivist revolt against neo-realism and neo-liberalism.[24] Constructivism came to be the main theoretical framework for the study of security communities.[25] Its influence in shaping the new discourse on security communities is in three areas.

The first is the social construction of security communities. For constructivists, just as power politics (which is viewed by realists as a given of international politics) is but socially constructed, cooperation among states is also to be understood as a social process that may redefine the interests of the actors in matters of war and peace. The habit of war avoidance found in security communities results from interactions, socialisation, norm setting and identity building, rather than from forces outside these processes (such as the international distribution of power).

Second, constructivist scholarship has injected into the Deutschian literature on security communities a clear focus on the transformative impact of norms on state behaviour. To be sure, all theories of international organisation, including neo-liberal institutionalism, recognise the importance of norms. But constructivism allows for a much deeper impact of norms in shaping international relations. Norms not only 'regulate' state behaviour as in neo-liberal institutionalism, but also redefine state interests and constitute state identities, including the development of collective identities. By focusing on the constitutive effects of norms, constructivism has thus restored some of the original insights of integration theory regarding the impact of socialisation in creating collective interests and identities. As described in the next chapter, norms play a crucial role in the socialisation process leading to peaceful conduct among states, which form the core of security communities.

Third, constructivism allows us to look beyond the impact of material forces in shaping international politics. Neo-realism and most liberal theories take state interests to be shaped by material forces and concerns, such as power and wealth; perceptual, ideational and cultural factors derive from a material base. According to constructivists, while material forces remain important, intersubjective factors, including ideas, culture and identities, play a determining, rather than secondary, role in foreign policy interactions. Thus, constructivism provides important insights into the role of socialisation and identity building (the emergence of 'we feeling') that Deutsch identified as a crucial feature of security communities.

Constructivism remains a somewhat linear perspective, predisposed against the study of crisis points in cooperation which would explain the decline of institutions. In this book, an

attempt will be made to examine ASEAN's record in managing regional order by focusing on both its accomplishments and its failures, using a framework that incorporates, but goes beyond, the linear constructivist logic. Overall, however, this book makes a case for adopting a sociological approach to the study of complexities of regionalism, focusing on the role of norms, socialisation and identity as central explanatory tools in the making and unmaking of security communities.

Why ASEAN?

ASEAN provides an important and rich area of investigation into the study of security communities. Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has lived through a major shift in the regional strategic environment of Southeast Asia. In the 1960s, the outlook for regional security and stability in Southeast Asia was particularly grim. The region was portrayed variously as a 'region of revolt', the 'Balkans of the East', or a 'region of dominoes'. The weak socio-political cohesion of the region's new nation-states, the legitimacy problems of several of the region's postcolonial governments, interstate territorial disputes, intra-regional ideological polarisation and intervention by external powers were marked features of the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. These conflicts posed a threat not only to the survival of some of the region's new states, but also to the prospects for regional order as a whole. Cold War Southeast Asia was polarised as a result of efforts by the revolutionary communist governments in Indochina to export their revolution to the neighbouring states. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 rekindled intra-regional tensions and set the stage for renewed Great Power intervention and rivalry in the region. While the Sabah dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia and the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore *Konfrontasi* (meaning confrontation) were the defining features of its regional security environment in the early postcolonial period, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the ASEAN–Indochina polarisation marked the high point of the second Cold War in Southeast Asia.

Against this background, events leading to the establishment of ASEAN in August 1967 did not inspire much hope for the advancement of Southeast Asian regionalism. A year before ASEAN was formed, Kenneth T. Young, US ambassador to Thailand during 1961–63, had written rather pessimistically:

> It is doubtful that political regionalism or area-wide defense will emerge to play a part in encouraging regional equilibrium or regional institutions for political collaboration or collective defense. Centrifugal and divisive tendencies are too strong. Leaders will be more interested in relations with outside countries than among themselves, and more inclined to participate in Pan-Asian or international conferences and organizations than in exclusively Southeast Asian formations. They know that real power and needed resources, which the Southeast Asian countries do not possess, will continue to come from outside the region. Even the common fear of Communist China and the threat of Chinese minorities will not develop any sense of solidarity or serve to coordinate the divergent policies of neutrality and alignment. One political dilemma in Southeast Asia is that these new governments are trying desperately to become viable nation-states in an area where the individual state may, despite internal nationalism and good leadership, be turning obsolescent for the security and development of the area, and where at the same time a sense of regional community and purpose is lacking to complement and reinforce the nation-state.[26]

Indeed, the very survival of ASEAN was placed in doubt as interstate disputes (such as that between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah) escalated.[27] Functional cooperation, including trade liberalisation, was also slow to emerge. ASEAN's declaratory blueprint for regional order in the 1970s, such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), was marred by serious contestations.

But ASEAN survived. What is more, by the early 1990s its members could claim their grouping to be one of the most successful experiments in regional cooperation in the developing world. At the heart of this claim was ASEAN's role in moderating intra-regional conflicts and significantly reducing the likelihood of war. The original ASEAN members, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, had not fought a war against each other since 1967 when they founded the grouping.[28] In addition, ASEAN could claim an ability to manage regional order by virtue of its leadership role in steering the peace process that culminated in the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991. Buoyed by the international recognition ASEAN received for its role, some of its leaders questioned the utility of Western models of regional cooperation (based on legalistic and formalistic institutions) *vis-à-vis* the ASEAN model, or the 'ASEAN Way', which emphasised informality and organisational minimalism. Such was ASEAN's credibility in the wake of the settlement of the Cambodia conflict that the countries of the Asia Pacific region accepted its nominal leadership and institutional model as the basis for creating a regional multilateral security dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN itself aspired to a role in regulating the behaviour of major powers and in creating a stable post-Cold War regional order in the Asia Pacific.

By the late 1990s, however, ASEAN's image had suffered a major setback. To be sure, ASEAN was never short of critics.[29] But many of them seized on the Asian economic crisis to highlight the shortcomings of the organisation.[30] They pointed to the persistence of intra-ASEAN disputes and ASEAN's failure to develop concrete institutional mechanisms and procedures for conflict resolution. They also cited the continuing differences and disagreements among its members over how to deal with non-members and external powers (such as the differences over ZOPFAN in the 1970s and over Vietnam in the 1980s). ASEAN's tendency to deal with intra-mural conflicts by 'sweeping them under the carpet', rather than resolving them, and its slow pace and modest record in developing economic cooperation, could be cited as further testimony to the limitations of the ASEAN Way. Moreover, in the late 1990s, ASEAN was criticised for not dealing effectively with human rights issues, or transnational problems such as the forest fires in Indonesia that had caused severe air pollution in neighbouring states. In the wake of the Asian economic crisis in 1997, ASEAN's critics also highlighted its inability to provide a united front in dealing with the challenges of globalisation. Intra-ASEAN differences over longstanding norms such as non-interference, evident in the wake of the expansion of its membership to include all ten countries of Southeast Asia, aggravated perceptions of ASEAN's weaknesses. Finally, the ASEAN-led ARF was seen as little more than a talk-shop, much like ASEAN itself. The ASEAN Way of soft institutionalism and dialogue process seemed ineffective in laying the foundations of an Asia-Pacific regional order.

Since then, ASEAN has tried to reform itself. As it crossed 40 years of its existence, ASEAN has undertaken a number of new initiatives, including a vision to build an ASEAN community with three pillars by 2020. An ASEAN security community (partly inspired by the Deutschian academic concept around which this book is written) is one of them. And an ASEAN charter, a constitutional framework for ASEAN that gives the grouping a legal personality, was adopted in 2007. In the wider region, ASEAN has not only continued its

effort to bring China (and more recently India) into its normative framework for regional order, it has also helped develop a new process of East Asian regionalism.

The shifting perceptions of, and debates about, ASEAN through its four decades of existence invite several questions. How did ASEAN survive its shaky beginnings? How does one explain ASEAN's role in regional order in Southeast Asia? What explains its decline in the late 1990s compared with the 1980s and early 1990s? Is the 'ASEAN Way', often credited with ASEAN's effectiveness in the past, a myth or a reality? Do the new initiatives of the past few years such as the ASEAN community-building project and the ASEAN Charter mean a rejuvenation of ASEAN? Answering this question causes profound disagreements among scholars and analysts.

This book argues that the concept of security community, originally developed by Deutsch and his associates and recently resurrected and modified by constructivist scholarship, provides the most useful framework for addressing the above questions. This perspective views ASEAN regionalism as a process of interaction and socialisation and focuses on the norms which underpin this process. It also examines identity formation in ASEAN, explored by looking at the claims made by ASEAN elites about regionally specific ways of problem solving and cooperation. The book does not assume, *a priori*, that ASEAN has already become a security community in Deutsch's terms – or perhaps become a fully-fledged security community. Rather, the purpose of this exercise is to use the idea of security community as a framework within which to examine the evolution and nature of ASEAN's political and security role and identify the constraints it faces in developing a viable regional security community.

Such a perspective on ASEAN's role in regional order is scarcely found in the available literature. Despite its abundance, the literature on ASEAN has been and remains overwhelmingly atheoretical, and thus does not lend itself to any neat classification into realist, liberal, constructivist or other categories.[31] But it can safely be concluded that the available literature on ASEAN rarely deals with the question of norms and identity in explaining the evolution and role of ASEAN.

At the risk of oversimplification, one could discern, however, a body of writings on ASEAN that could be described as 'realist', in the sense that it calls into question ASEAN's capacity to shape regional order.[32] For the realist, ASEAN's survival and role have been dependent on, and shaped by, a wider regional balance of power system underpinned by the US military presence. Underlying this view is the quintessential realist assumption that the smaller and weaker states of the international system, whether acting individually or through multilateral institutions, lack the capacity to play a managerial role in ensuring international order and must therefore depend on the resources and leadership of the Great Powers.[33]

Another body of literature on ASEAN may be termed 'institutionalist', in the sense that it takes a generally more optimistic view (although the degree of optimism varies considerably) of ASEAN's capacity for managing intra-mural conflicts and creating the basis for a stable regional order.[34] From a theoretical standpoint, this type of work embraces a broad range of perspectives, including liberal institutionalist (including integrationist) and neo-liberal institutionalist (including regime theory) perspectives. Generally, however, liberal institutionalist perspectives have not been very relevant in explaining ASEAN's successes or failures, especially in the political and security arena. ASEAN was not a major empirical focus of regional integration theory (which had already become 'obsolescent' by the time ASEAN came into the international limelight).[35] Moreover, most liberal theories of cooperation assume background conditions, such as a shared

liberal-democratic domestic environment (republican liberalism) and a relatively high degree of mutual economic interdependence (commercial liberalism), for regionalism to succeed. Neither of these conditions, to be discussed in Chapter 1, has been a marked feature of ASEAN.

Neo-liberal perspectives, including regime theory, do not share the belief of integrationist models regarding the sovereignty-eroding potential of institutions. In the case of ASEAN, a small body of literature has investigated its emergence and function as a regional security and economic 'regime' that allows each member to preserve its sovereignty and pursue its own 'national' interest.[36] Thus, Don Emmerson characterised ASEAN as a 'security regime', the latter defined as formal or informal arrangements among states 'to maintain their sovereignty in conditions of peace among themselves and with outside states'.[37] Some of the work on ASEAN economic cooperation also represents this type of approach. Such work views the role of ASEAN as that of a policy-coordinating body, a forum for trade liberalisation, information sharing, and a platform for collective bargaining over such functional issues as access to foreign markets or securing better prices for the primary commodity exports of members. Regional order is enhanced by growing interdependence fostered through trade, investment and other economic linkages.[38] But ASEAN remains primarily a vehicle through which its members pursue their national interests, the content of which remains unchanged (ASEAN as a regime can constrain the aggressive pursuit of national self-interests but not transform them). Regionalism remains largely an exercise in utility maximisation without any sovereignty-eroding or collective identity-shaping impact.

Neither the realist nor the vast majority of institutionalist writings have spent much time in discussing questions central to this book: such as, what are the key norms of ASEAN? To what extent have they been upheld in practice? What effect have they had on the national interests and identities of the ASEAN members? Some available literature on ASEAN displays a constructivist flavour by investigating the elements of the ASEAN Way, and exploring the possibility of identity change.[39] This study is intended to analyse systematically the role of ASEAN's norms in the management of regional order and their effect on the development of collective interests and identities. Proceeding from a constructivist perspective, it examines ASEAN as a security community and, in doing so, hopes to provide a better and more complete understanding of ASEAN than already available.

The conceptual framework of this study goes beyond the neo-realist–neo-liberal divide. It argues that the successes and failures of international and regional institutions are not predetermined for them by forces exogenous to their social practices. This includes the distribution of power emphasised by the realist school. Nor can ASEAN be understood through the neo-liberal prism. While regime theory's view of ASEAN as an informal security arrangement is helpful in understanding ASEAN's role, the accompanying neo-liberal belief that institutions work by 'constraining' state preferences through provision of sanction mechanisms to prevent cheating is not applicable to regional groupings in the Third World. ASEAN, for example, has made no effort to develop such sanctioning mechanisms. Instead, ASEAN has worked by focusing, in a more positive manner, on the task of defining and redefining Southeast Asia's regional identity and developing norms of collective action. As most observers of ASEAN would agree, the organisation's approach to regionalism has been geared to inducing cooperative behaviour from its members through socialisation, rather than 'constraining' uncooperative behaviour through sanctions. A neo-liberal approach predisposes us from examining such constructs as the ASEAN Way and to investigate whether it has led to the emergence of new interests and identities which reflect shared understandings and expectations about regional peace and stability.

In other words, the main reasons for ASEAN's successes and failures can be found by looking at the nature and *quality* of its socialisation process and the norms that underpin it. This perspective is constructivist in orientation. It assumes that state interests and identities derive from their social practices and are not simply exogenous to them.[40] Institutions provide crucial settings within which states develop their social practices and make them understood, accepted and shared by others in the group.[41] ASEAN is not moulded exclusively by material conditions such as the balance of power or material considerations such as expected gains from economic interdependence. Its frameworks of interaction and socialisation have themselves become a crucial factor affecting the interests and identities of its members. The idea of security community, sociologically understood, enables us to analyse ASEAN as a regional institution which both regulates and constitutes the interests and policies of its members on matters of war, peace and cooperation. ASEAN's role in regional order can be studied and evaluated by looking at the extent to which its norms and socialisation processes, and identity-building initiatives, have shaped the attitudes and behaviour of its members about conflict and order in the region, and the extent to which they have led to the development of common understandings, expectations and practices about peaceful conduct.

Notes and references

1   For a comprehensive overview of the literature on the causes of war, see: Jack S. Levy, 'The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence', in Philip E. Tetlock *et al.* (eds), *Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War*, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

2   Karl Deutsch *et al*., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 3. This book, in the authors' own words, was conceived as a 'contribution to the study of possible ways in which men some day might abolish war'. Ibid. The term security community was coined earlier by Richard van Wagenen, who was a member of Deutsch's team that produced the book.

3   John Hertz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, vol. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157–80.

4   Ibid., p. 157.

5   Donald J. Puchala, 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations', in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene M. Wittkopf (eds), *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives* (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 189.

6   Ibid.

7   Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, 'The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis', in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p. 4, cited in Joseph S. Nye, 'Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement', *International Organization*, vol. 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1968), p. 863.

8   Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, 'The Future of International Warfare: Toward a Global Security Community', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 16, no. 4 (1995), p. 347.

9   Joseph S. Nye, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics*, vol. xl, no. 2 (January 1988), p. 239. Regional integration theory refers to a body of theoretical writings influential from the 1950s until the mid-1970s covering the origins, functions, and strengths and limitations of regional approaches to peace and cooperation. A selection of writings on regional integration theory includes: Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Regional Integration: Theory and Research* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Roger D. Hansen, 'Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts', *World Politics*, vol. 21 (January 1969), pp. 242–71; Ernst Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joys and Anguish of Pretheorising', in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), *Regional Politics and World Order* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1973), pp. 103–31; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations', in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds), *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives* (New York: Random House, 1984); Gordon

Mace, 'Regional Integration', *World Encyclopedia of Peace* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), pp. 323–25; Michael Hodges, 'Integration Theory', in Trevor Taylor (ed.), *Approaches and Theory in International Relations* (London: Longman, 1978); Charles A. Duffy and Werner J. Feld, 'Whither Regional Integration Theory?', in Gavin Boyd and Werner J. Feld (eds), *Comparative Regional Systems* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).

10 Transactionalism (Karl Deutsch) examined how increased communications and transactions among societies can redefine their perceptions and relationships and lead to the establishment of security communities in which the use of force becomes illegitimate as a means of problem solving. The other major school of regional integration theory was neo-functionalism (Ernst Haas and Joseph Nye) which held that cooperation in areas of 'low politics' would produce a 'spillover' effect into areas of 'high politics'. Neo-functionalism was a revised version of classical functionalist theory, which, as formulated by David Mittrany, held that the prospects for integration could be enhanced if actors focused their initial efforts on issues of 'low politics', i.e. functional and technical issues, before moving into issues of 'high politics', such as political and military affairs. But classical functionalism was not concerned with the role of institutions in promoting higher and more centralised forms of political authority. This was a gap filled by neo-functionalist theory, developed by Ernst Haas, who also took an expanded view (compared with the functionalist emphasis on technocrats) of the range of actors involved in the integration process, including elements of civil society (e.g. pressure groups).

11 Puchala, 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations', p. 198.

12 Regional integration theorists were accused by their critics of having overestimated the durability and broader applicability of the conditions that had led to the creation of the EC. Critics argued, for example, that European conditions after the Second World War were somewhat unique; the decline of European nationalism was temporary owing to the scale of devastation caused by the war. Integration theorists had wrongly assumed the end of ideology and the decline of nationalism in postwar Europe. This became further apparent when the EC, despite its evident success in turning age-old rivals France and Germany into members of a permanent security community, failed to come up with a collective response to external challenges, such as the Middle East oil crisis of 1973. That external events could cause states to go their separate ways and opt for national strategies over regional collective action was evident in several cases. For example, when faced with the US technology challenge, Britain, France and Germany ignored the possibility of collective response through the EC, instead adopting national responses. Similarly, Britain joined with the USA in response to the 1973 oil crisis, thereby ignoring and undermining the possibility of a collective response by the EC. All this served to undermine the game plan of the integration theorists, who found the relationship between regional integration and transregional interdependence to be too uncertain and 'turbulent' to justify the view of regional integration as an incremental or linear process.

13 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective', in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 3.

14 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

15 Puchala, 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations', p. 198

16 Robert Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 4 (December 1988); Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). For a critique, see: Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988).

17 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 176–93; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

18 'International institutions', write Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, 'are created in response to state interests . . . their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities'. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 47.

19 A vigorous account of the realist–institutionalist debate can be found in the article by John Mearsheimer in the Winter 1994/95 issue of *International Security* and replies to it in the journal's Summer 1995 issue. John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5–49. Among the institutionalist