

# Turkey's Rise as an Emerging Power

Edited by  
Paul Kubicek, Emel Parlar Dal  
and H. Tarik Oğuzlu

# Turkey's Rise as an Emerging Power

Turkey is emerging as an important actor in world politics, exerting growing influence both in its immediate region and beyond. This book aims to understand and explain this phenomenon, utilizing a variety of perspectives from international relations theory. One prominent issue is how Turkey, long embedded in the West via NATO and other European organizations, is growing more confident and is asserting more independent foreign policy positions. This is particularly marked in the Middle East, where some suggest Turkey is pursuing a “neo-Ottomanist” agenda. At times, this competes with and creates tensions with the West. However, a rising Turkey can also be a constructive phenomenon and complement the West. This book examines geopolitical, economic, and cultural dimensions of Turkey's rise, pointing to both Turkish success and the limits of Turkish power and influence. It includes consideration of Turkey's relations with NATO, the European Union, the Middle East, and BRIC countries.

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# Decoding Turkey's Rise: An Introduction

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**ABSTRACT** *Acknowledging Turkey as a rising power, and having commonalities in both objectives and outcomes with the other rising Southern powers, this study is a modest attempt to decode Turkey's rise with/within the West discursively and empirically and at multiple levels: systemic, regional and agent-based domestic. It aims to contribute to the debate over rising powers by developing new conceptualizations and challenging or reinterpreting the existing theoretical approaches in order to define Turkey's current power status vis-à-vis both other rising powers and the major Western powers. Turkey's recent rise, which has also been characterized by the country's high economic growth, must be nuanced from that of the Global South countries in some principal aspects. Unlike other rising powers, the Western factor weighs more heavily in Turkey's recent rise. This issue's novel contribution to the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy is its attempt to understand Turkey's current rise, as well as its limitations in the context of its decades-long institutionalized and strategic relations with the West.*

## Introduction

The important systemic and regional changes occurring that we have witnessed in the last decade have also coincided with the rise of the geopolitical and geo-economic power of the emerging market countries, especially the larger ones that were grouped as the BRICs. In recent years in international relations literature considerable attention has been given to rising powers, their role and power capabilities in the eroding international system, as well as their increasing activism in global affairs. Rising power literature has seen important progress since 2010 and has become a cottage industry. Many academic articles,<sup>1</sup> policy reports<sup>2</sup> and special issues<sup>3</sup> dealing with various aspects of rising powers, particularly on the Global South, are now devoted to the ongoing debate over the essential characteristics of rising powers. These debates also focus on commonalities and main distinctions among

rising powers, as well as on the way they are involved in the shaping of the regional order in their respective regions. Despite the increasing scholarly interest in these rising regional powers in the South, however, few attempts have been made to understand the main systemic, regional and domestic reasons behind the current rise of Turkey, another rising power in its region, and to conceptualize as well as to theorize about its rising under its own particular conditions.

To this end, this special issue is a modest attempt to decode Turkey's rise with/within the West discursively and empirically and at multiple levels: systemic, regional and agent-based domestic levels. This issue aims to contribute to this debate by developing new conceptualizations and challenging or reinterpreting the existing theoretical approaches in order to define Turkey's current power status vis-à-vis both other rising powers and the major Western powers. This issue's novel contribution to the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy is its attempt to understand Turkey's current rise in the context of its decades-long institutionalized and strategic relations with the West and to offer a more diversified conceptual viewpoint and rich empirical evidence in order to make sense of Turkey's recent role, place and position in the changing international system. On this basis, this collection of articles from distinguished contributors seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy, both from conceptual/theoretical and empirical perspectives.

Acknowledging Turkey as a rising power, and having commonalities in both objectives and outcomes with the other rising Southern powers, this study provides a useful lens through which to understand the diverse aspects of Turkey's rise and the alternative conceptual definitions used in assessing its contemporary power in the changing international system. Despite the existence of a series of common traits among all the rising powers, as claimed by certain analysts, there also exist some difficulties in treating all these countries as a singular bloc. However, Turkey's recent rise, which has also been characterized by the country's high economic growth, must be nuanced from that of the Global South countries in some principal aspects. Unlike other rising powers, the Western factor weights more heavily in Turkey's recent rise. Nevertheless, the West, being intrinsic to Turkey's national identity since the foundation of the republic, has created some counter impacts on the country's modernization and development process. Although Turkey's unbalanced Western-oriented foreign policy long prevented it from boosting its relations with the Middle East, the Western-rooted ideals and liberal economic model have undeniably become a catalyst for Turkey's gradual rise. Turkey's alignment with the Western bloc since the Cold War years and its strong institutional ties with the West have put it in a different category than that of the BRICs.

Against this background, the question is how to profile and interpret Turkey's rise with the West. Is it possible to consider Turkey a typical rising power that is uniquely positioned between the "West" and the "rest"? Is it more appropriate to separately categorize Turkey as a "Western-allied rising power" or a "rising power tied to the West"? What are the enabling systemic, regional and domestic factors to Turkey's recent rise as a distributive and value-claiming negotiator vis-

à-vis its major Western allies? Under which alternative conceptual categories can Turkey's power be explained and the influence of its power be measured? With these questions in mind, the principal objective of this collection of articles is to provide an insight into "Turkey as a rising power concept" and thus to contribute to the debate over the challenge posed by the rising powers to the contemporary international system and the struggle of these powers for influence with the established major powers in the global governance institutions. This special issue brings together eight articles all of which seek to combine analysis from the perspective of Turkey's rise regionally and internationally in the changing global order with "new" explanatory concepts or variables. The use of different conceptual tools and categories through which Turkey's current rising power can be explored in both discourse and practice helps create ground for further debates on the dynamics, limitations, structural and domestic conditions, as well as actors in Turkish foreign policy.

In this introduction, the focus is particularly on three sets of issues that combine the individual papers under a single analytical framework:

- (1) Profiling Turkey as a rising power and the facilitating factors in play.
- (2) Categorizing Turkey as "rising": alternative conceptual lenses and theoretical approaches.
- (3) Making sense of Turkey's rise with/within the West.

Under these three topics first a brief summary of the main findings and arguments of the contributions are presented. Second, some insights and remarks regarding the dynamics and limitations of Turkey's rise are provided and followed by some suggestions on how further research can contribute to defining Turkey's unique role and place in the international system as a "different" rising power in comparison with that of other rising powers.

### **Profiling Turkey as a Rising Power and the Facilitating Factors at Play**

Whether Turkey appears as a rising power in the changing international order, with it having similar objectives and foreign policy practices with those of the other rising powers in the Global South, or whether its rise should be located within the Western-centered neoliberal world order, can be better understood with a special focus on the enabling systemic, regional and domestic factors behind its rise. Acknowledging that Turkey's rise is geographically multidirectional and politically multidimensional and multifactorial, thus going beyond the traditional classifications made for the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), this section will first place a particular emphasis on the relationship between Turkey and the decline of the West and the rise of the rest debate, second on the objective-external indications of Turkey's rising power status and third on the subjective-internal indications of Turkey's rise: strong agency, visionary foreign policy and new geopolitical discourse.

*Turkey Facing the Decline of the West and the Rise of the Rest*

There is a growing body of literature dealing with debates over the gradual decline of the West in recent years and the resulting changes in the global order. Most of these accounts focus on how the USA can maintain its influence vis-à-vis the rise of new powers in the evolving international order.<sup>4</sup> Although the relative decline of the USA has generally been acknowledged in many political circles, this debate still remains contested in both academic literature and the US public discourse. First, the exceptionalist and exemptionalist attitudes of the US foreign policy-makers, as well as its prevailing predominant position in global institutions, do not facilitate the US adaptation to changing geopolitical conditions.<sup>5</sup> Second, for some scholars, since the power transition will take a long time, the USA still remains unrivaled militarily and economically.<sup>6</sup> Scholars acknowledging the relative decline of the West underline the importance of the “socialization hypothesis,” which considers rising powers as responsible stakeholders if they are given more responsibility and voice in international decision-making structures. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that there was little concern for rising powers in Western capitals until the last five years. For instance, up until the election of Obama in 2008 the USA lacked a clearly defined strategy on managing the rise of new powers (apart from China). Supporting the socialization thesis and multilateralism in foreign policy, the Obama administration established a linkage between seeking greater representation in global affairs and taking greater responsibilities in facing global problems.<sup>7</sup>

In fact, Turkey's rise differs from that of other powers in the Global South in some principal points. First, Turkey has long been and still is an important ally of the USA in the Middle East. Since the Cold War Turkey has established a security-based strategic alliance with the USA and it has profited from its special relationship. Until the Iraq War of 2003, Turkey showed little desire in changing the US-led liberal international order, although in some cases Turkey's interests and priorities clearly confronted those of the USA. Second, Turkey's attachment to the West cannot only be restricted to its long-lasting strategic alliance with the USA. Here, the European Union (EU) also appears as an important economics, trade and political partner. Turkey's candidacy since 1999 has added an additional institutional impetus to its existing relations with Europe. Turkey is clearly distinguished from other rising powers as it is an institutional partner in many Western international organizations such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the EU and the OECD. This last point also constitutes an important limit to Turkey's challenging of the Western-led international order.

However, Turkey's rise as a regional power cannot be completely explained by the relative decline of the West in recent years. The continuing power shifts and increasing regionalization of world politics notwithstanding, Turkey's rise can be seen as part of a global trend resulting from foreign policy actions of states with similar systemic and structural repositioning in key regions. Regarding Turkey's rise in recent years, the following two arguments can be made. First, Turkey will no longer be an easy partner for both major powers and middle-sized or small powers. Second,

unless Turkey's increasing engagement with the East, or most particularly with the Middle East, detaches Turkey from its traditional Western allies, it is likely that Turkey's activism in its neighboring regions will provide benefits to the West rather than costs. However, some Western observers also express their skepticism concerning Turkey's rise in connection with the debate over the axis shift which serves, in their eyes, as an accelerating factor that is leading to Turkey's distancing from the West. Observers and analysts agree on the argument that Turkey's rising power status in the eroding international system has given it an upper hand almost in every area of politics, thus increasing its negotiation and bargaining power vis-à-vis the established powers.

*Objective-External Indications of Turkey's Rising Power Status*

In the last couple of years, in parallel to the debates on rising Southern powers, other discussions about regional order, regional powers and regional power shifts have been going on.<sup>8</sup> Having initially started as an analytical concept launched by investment bankers, in June 2009 the BRICs organized their first presidential meeting<sup>9</sup> and thus took the first steps for further institutionalization. Since then, many observers have started to claim that regions will gain more importance in the future global order<sup>10</sup> and that a "multiregional system of international relations" is actually in the making.<sup>11</sup> In fact, despite their different conceptualizations in some policy debates and analysis, the ongoing discussions on the rising powers and the rise of regional powers are not separable from each other in the sense that in both debates the countries seen as either rising or regional are the same: China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Some analysts even include Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, and in some cases Israel, to this classification.<sup>12</sup> In the mainstream literature on regional powers a general lack of analytical instruments to determine the characteristics of regional powers as well as an inability to compare them and to distinguish them from major and middle powers exists. While we are analyzing rising powers, it is of vital importance to adopt a regional perspective so as to understand the importance and increasing visibility of some regions and of regional governance structures. The current debate about what constitutes a regional power, and which countries are currently classified as regional powers, also closely relates to Turkey in the sense that it has generally been neglected in the flourishing literature on regional actors while some other regional actors, that have less material and power capabilities in their respective regions, are considered regional powers.

This last point has largely been the subject of interrogation and criticism in Şaban Kardaş's article in this issue, entitled "Turkey: A Regional Power Facing a Changing International System," where he first tries to locate Turkey in the international system through both role-based and structural positioning categorizations. He then defines the concept of a regional power, its behaviors and the regional-level theorizing in the new configuration of world politics. For Kardaş, regional powers as pivotal actors in their respective regions have the ability and capacity to influence other actors inside and outside the region in determining of their foreign policies. Thus,

the author posits that regional powers are located in the global power distribution at somewhere between large and small powers. Considering Turkey as a regional power that is increasing its visibility in recent years and challenging the existing international order at the same time, Kardaş poses the question of how to position Turkey and conceptualize it as a regional actor. To this end, and with a special focus on the regional powers literature, he begins by drawing an analytical framework based on three assumptions: (1) the current international system is characterized by an eroding unipolar order; (2) regions are becoming the relevant unit and level of analysis to conduct research on world politics; and (3) regional powers started to play significant roles in world politics, especially in economic and political governance, as well as in security management.

Here what strikes the author is that although in the current regional power literature Turkey has hardly been considered under the category of regional powers, the same conceptualization is frequently used in academic debates and articles on Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP)). Conceptualizing Turkey as a regional power within different regional systems in its neighborhood, Kardaş criticizes Barry Buzan's and Ole Waever's work on the Regional Security Complex theory where Turkey is attributed the role of insulator rather than that of a regional power belonging to the Middle Eastern security complex. Kardaş argues that a regional power can be identified in three dimensions: capability-based, relational and perceptual. First, in terms of material capabilities and soft power, Turkey can easily be distinguished from the other states in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Second, Turkey's increasing level of influence on regional, economic, diplomatic and security interactions is also an important indicator of its regional power status. Third, the current Turkish leaders have strong perceptions and national role conceptions in that their country should play a leading role in its region. The author concludes that Turkey's activism is in fact a continuum of a global trend that has appeared in the last years and it has to be more analytically and empirically analyzed both at the regional and global levels in future studies.

*Subjective-Internal Indications of Turkey's Rise: Strong Agency, Visionary Foreign Policy and a New Geopolitical Discourse*

Compared to the rise of other regional powers in the South, a strong agency factor seems to have played a greater role in Turkey's rise in the international scene. Turkey's decade-long new foreign policy has clearly reflected the way Turkish foreign policy-makers see their country in the world in the light of their self-perceptions and national role conceptions. In conformity with a visionary foreign policy informed by an idealistic approach, current Turkish decision-makers have sought a greater role and place for their country both in its region and in the world. The recent rise of Turkey economically and diplomatically has also given an upper hand to Turkish leaders in strongly expressing their aspirations about not just the nature of the new world order and a more equitable United Nation (UN) decision-



making system, but also about what Turkey's role could and/or should be as power and influence are transformed.

However, this discursive policy of Turkish leaders has not still been totally reflected in concrete policy actions. Similar to the leaders of the BRICs, Turkish leaders are obviously seeking to revise the Western-dominated global order. However, this demand for change in the international order must be distinguished from that of most of the BRICs in terms of both aspirations and influence. As an influential member of the Western security system since 1952, an integral part of the EU's commercial framework since the 1990s and an EU candidate country since 1999, Turkey's attempt to reframe the international system in the favor of newly emerging or rising powers was not really built on either balancing, bandwagoning or coalition building strategies, rather it was designed to propose more international justice-based alternative approaches to the existing global order which needs to be reconstructed so as to face newly emerging systemic challenges in the world and forge dialogue and cooperation among states. Here, as also seen in Emel Parlar Dal's article in this volume, despite its criticism about the unbalanced decision-making mechanisms of the UN, Turkey does not seem to actively and regularly challenge the global norms of the international system and the collaboration mechanisms. Favoring an inter-civilizational dialogue between the West and the East, the Turkish ruling elite attributes a differentiated role conception to their country as a pivotal regional power strategically, and at the same time geopolitically positioning it in both Western system and Middle Eastern one. In this regard, Turkey does not seem to be prioritizing the strategy of emphasizing difference at the global level. Rather, Turkey is emphasizing interaction and interdependence among states to promote a sense of global and regional responsibility.

Another subjective-internal indication of Turkey's recent rise is the change observed in the geopolitical discourse of the current Turkish foreign policy elite, who are now claiming positions of more importance and a more influential role in world affairs. As mentioned in Murat Yeşiltaş's article in this volume, there has been a remarkable change in Turkey's geopolitical vision and discourse in the last decade under the AKP rule. In "The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign Policy," Murat Yeşiltaş examines the discursive assumptions of two competing geopolitical visions in Turkish geopolitical culture by problematizing the centrality of geopolitical-laden language in foreign policy. More importantly, he explains how different political actors "construct" Turkey's geopolitics and represent it as having an exceptional geographical position in the international system, and how these geopolitical representations serve to enable, restrict and rationalize a different set of role choices for Turkey in the international order in each of the different geopolitical visions. He compares two geopolitical visions and examines how these two competing visions have framed Turkey's power status and geographical position in the international system. In the first vision, according to Yeşiltaş, over the years two geopolitical metaphors have dominated the discourse in the orthodox geopolitical vision of Turkish foreign policy: protectionism and exceptionalism. While the former discourse helped to establish defensive foreign policy practices, the latter ended up



bolstering geopolitical exceptionalism, a political discourse particularly shaped by the territorial and civilizational anxiety of Turkey in the regional and global geopolitical orders. The combinations of these two discourses have paved the way for a defensive geopolitical vision within Turkish geopolitical culture.

The second vision is the “new geopolitics,” which became a hegemonic discourse in Turkey’s post-2002 foreign policy as result of changes in the domestic political structure, in the country’s ideological core and in the systemic structure of international order. By underscoring the conceptual and discursive rupture in the new geopolitical vision of Turkey, Yeşiltaş claims that the new geopolitical vision in the AKP period should be analyzed in terms of the difference in which the new political elites’ discourse vis-à-vis the nation-state, borders, liberalism, civilizations and transnationalism have redefined Turkey’s rising power status as more assertive in the sense that it is now seeking a new subjectivity within the western-led liberal international order.

In his article, Yeşiltaş also points out that Turkey can be seen as a revisionist state that seeks to restructure the international political, economic and cultural order by redefining its state identity, civilizational perspective and its own role in the international order. Therefore, Turkey’s new geopolitical vision is one of the most important indicators to understand how Turkey locates itself as a rising power in the international system. To Yeşiltaş, the new political elites, including Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, have dramatically reshaped the old geopolitical vision that was informed by a nation-state-based discourse. To put the matter bluntly, while the civilizational discourse was central in foreign policy in the early 1990s to overcome Turkey’s identity crisis against Europe by underlining Turkey’s belonging to Europe not only geographically but also culturally, the same discursive space was constructed as the solution for Turkey’s identity crisis by underlying Turkey’s civilizational difference in the AKP period. As a consequence, Yeşiltaş’s article shows the way in which Turkey’s geopolitical framing of its rising power status has indicated important ruptures from the old foreign policy geopolitical imagination.

### **Categorizing Turkey as “Rising”: Alternative Conceptual Lenses and Theoretical Approaches**

A time of transformation in the international system inevitably calls for alternative concepts and new categories through which that transformation can be assessed. Understanding a novel global context necessitates the introduction of new concepts and tools. Based on this, this special issue of *Turkish Studies* aims to inject some fresh ideas into the academic analysis of Turkish foreign policy and of the country’s current rise internationally as well as regionally. In their contribution to this issue, Cerem I. Cenk Özek and Tarık Oğuzlu intend to use the literature on both international order and rising powers in order to interpret the slow-down in EU–Turkish relations since the start of accession negotiations in 2005 until today using an international-level systemic analysis. Applying some core Western concepts that have already proven their conceptual and analytical worth in both EU foreign policy studies and international relations literature can clearly be seen in two other

articles of the issue, namely Emel Parlar Dal's article on Turkey's normative power in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region and Pinar Akpınar's article on Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy. Similarly, in an effort to introduce theories related to the BRICs to the analysis of Turkish foreign policy in his article entitled "Turkey and the BRICs: Can Turkey Join the BRICs?", Gökhan Bacık advances an alternative approach to understand the new directions in Turkey's pursuit of a greater role in world politics.

*Turkey as a Realpolitik Actor in Reference to its Relations with the EU*

In their contribution to this special issue, Cenker Özek and Oğuzlu explain the slow-down of EU–Turkish relations since the start of the accession negotiations in 2005 until today with international-level systemic analysis. This article differs from the institutional explanations that explain EU–Turkish relations either with the utility-based logic of consequentialism or the norms-based logic of appropriateness. It also makes a novel contribution to the literature by focusing on the changes in the international distribution of power over the last two decades and by showing how both the EU's and Turkey's responses to these changes have influenced their relative powers as well as the negotiation process.

The article explains the changes in international order by focusing on two inter-related processes. The first process is about the rise of new powers, which poses challenges to the US-led unipolar order of the post-Cold War era, and the second one concerns the rift within the liberal US–EU alliance, which has proven salient despite the relative betterment with the Obama administration. The analysis of these processes show that the international order in which both the EU and Turkey relate to each other has changed substantially over the last two decades, which, in turn, has had an influence on the EU–Turkey relations.

US international playing field has become more multi-vocal over the last two decades as both the so-called BRICs and other middle powers are challenging the US-led unipolar order of the post-Cold War period. From Brazil, Russia, India and China to South Korea, Turkey, South Africa and Indonesia, various states put into effect a series of similar policies that ensure their increased visibility, power and prestige at the international level. These policies are diverse such as the emphasis put on multilateralism and good neighborhood policies as well as the importance given to development assistance and more active involvement in international organizations. Though these policies sound just too similar to the ones the USA has been promoting for decades on the basis of the liberal premise, they are likely to have substantially different implications for the international system when their foundations lay in preservation of state sovereignty rather than its gradual loosening due to increased co-operations and connections at the international level.

According to Cenker Özek and Oğuzlu, the interesting point about the growing importance of state sovereignty despite ever more liberalization and globalization at the international level is the US role in this process, which has influenced the US–EU rift as well. The US unilateral intervention in Iraq in 2003 relied on

interest-driven power politics, which diverged from the EU's promotion of peaceful and rule-based cooperation. Scholars compare the US military power with the EU's civilian power since 2003 until today. The rift between the USA and the EU, in turn, challenges the liberal vision of the international order that rests on the notions of shared sovereignty, collective security, shared economic gains and individual rights.

Cenker Özek and Oğuzlu argue that the sovereignty hawk rising powers on the one hand and the US unilateral policies on the other hand, affect the EU's appeal as a political system negatively. This situation has a direct bearing on the EU–Turkey relations as well. Back in 1999, when Turkey was accorded the candidate country status in Helsinki summit, the EU was seen as *the* political model for, then, the foreseeable future. As of 2013, the numbers of political models are increasing in parallel to the rise of new powers, while the USA does not seem particularly interested in imagining liberal alternatives to the modern nation-state system. Hence, the EU has become a lone alternative to this system, which makes it gradually less appealing for Turkey as well.

The authors underline Turkey's relative rise in the international system at the time of the EU's relative decline. Scholars point out Turkey's more active involvement in international organizations and regional issues as well as its growing investment in development assistance as indicators of Turkey's growing power and visibility in the international system. Cenker Özek and Oğuzlu argue that Turkey's growing power on the one hand and the increasing availability of alternative alliance systems than the EU at a time of its relative decline on the other hand have drifted Turkey away from the EU since 2005 until today. This last point also confirms how the relative decline in EU–Turkey relations was affected by Turkey's increasing realpolitik considerations in its quest for new alliances. As the authors contend, especially over the last two years, the Turkish government has been signaling that its membership to the EU is not *sine qua non* for Turkey. This changing attitude of the Turkish government differs from its prior commitment to the EU membership in the future. This situation, in turn, is likely to explain Turkey's loosening attitude toward the democratic reform process since 2007 onwards.

### *Turkey as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor*

In her contribution to this special issue, Emel Parlar Dal borrows Nathalie Tocci's analytical framework on “normative foreign policy actors,” a framework which draws upon three conceptual tools: normative goals, normative means and normative results or impact. Aside from the use of these three conceptual tools, the author also looks at the conditioning factors affecting Turkey's choice of a normative stance in its policies vis-à-vis four Arab countries that are reforming in the post-Arab Spring era. Parlar Dal poses the question of to what extent “the normative” in Turkish foreign policy has been valid starting from the republican period until now, and in what way it would help Turkey appear as a distinct leading country in the MENA region. In her article, the main concern is to understand to what extent, under which conditions and in which concrete cases Turkey can act as a normative

foreign policy actor in the changing MENA region. For this purpose, the author rigorously follows Tocci's analytical framework and tries to decode Turkey's normative foreign policy behaviors in the MENA region in terms of both its effectiveness and limitations.

It is also interesting to see in Parlar Dal's article how the author links the questioning of Turkey's normative power to the general theme of this special issue on Turkey's rise in relation to the West with a special focus on objective-external and subjective-internal indications of this rise and from new conceptual lenses. Before applying her four selected Arab case studies to Tocci's triad, Emel Parlar Dal first looks at mainstream literature on the normative power concept in EU foreign policy, which was first used by Ian Manners to define the EU's difference in the international system, and second, at Tocci's three-dimensional categorization of normative foreign policy. Against this backdrop, the author then assesses the normative connotations embedded in Turkish foreign policy in two distinct periods: from the republican era until the start of the AKP period in 2002 and the AKP era (2002–13).

In her article, the author points out that Turkish foreign policy has long lacked important normative underpinnings on principles such as human rights, democracy, freedom and the rule of law. However, as stated by Parlar Dal, Turkey has generally pursued a peaceful and status quo-oriented diplomacy by remaining strongly and explicitly attached to universal norms promoted by major international organizations. In this regard, the author argues that traditional Turkish foreign policy has been based on a varying blend of status quo, *realpolitik* and normative approaches. Parlar Dal also argues that there is a strong correlation between Turkey's rising power status on the international scene and the increasing importance of "the normative" in its foreign policy. For her, the most important feature of Turkey's present-day normative foreign policy approach is its duality, which means that it tends both to spread EU norms—most of which are also seen as universal—as well as its own norms to the third countries. In the AKP era, according to the author, there can be seen a greater willingness to add a normative impetus to Turkish policy rhetoric and practice. Turkey's increasing hard- and soft-power capabilities as a result of its increasing credibility in both its region and international affairs has given it an upper hand in its normative foreign policy orientation.

In the empirical part of her article, where she applies Tocci's conceptual triad to the analysis of the four Arab case studies, the author contends that at the beginning of the Arab revolts Turkish foreign policy was generally status quo-oriented rather than normative. As the revolts progressed, Turkish foreign policy has taken on different forms, generally varying from status quo and *realpolitik* forms to normative foreign policy types, depending on the case. Another important point regarding Turkey's current normative approach to foreign policy is that Turkey was not giving greater importance to some universal norms—such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law—in both discourse and practice as much as it did before the unfolding of the Arab upheavals. In the final analysis, Parlar Dal concludes that Turkey's normative foreign policy vis-à-vis the MENA region has already

started to produce some “normative” effects, albeit limited, and Turkey as a normative foreign policy actor would certainly accelerate democratization both at home and in its region. However, for the author it is still too early to consider Turkey a complete “normative power” actor.

*Turkey as a Humanitarian Actor*

Similar to Emel Parlar Dal's borrowing of the concept of “the normative” from EU foreign policy literature, in her contribution to this issue Pinar Akpınar uses another “Western-originated” concept, “humanitarian,” as an analytical tool. Acknowledging “humanitarian diplomacy” as a newly emerged discursive and practical foreign policy instrument in the AKP government's foreign policy agenda, Pinar Akpınar contends that the Turkish model of humanitarian diplomacy as an idealized form of diplomacy with rich rhetoric has some limitations in practice. As discussed by the author the power-interest dimension of this new type of diplomacy makes it difficult for Turkey to completely act in a humanitarian way while engaging in peace building activities. This argument has been proven in Turkey's Somalia initiative where Turkey's humanitarian engagement with this country has also reflected Turkey's interests and its desire to be regionally recognized as a legitimate actor. In other words, it was a tool to legitimize Turkey's efforts in building a new regional and global order. Akpınar indicates that as a new player in such volatile and dangerous post-conflict zones as Somalia, Turkey's peace building activities have covered various fields, including infrastructure, education, medical relief, religious aid and security. The author argues that although Turkey's initiative in Somalia is limited compared to the major actors engaged in this country, the Turkish style of humanitarian diplomacy has brought novelty into the current peace building activities that are affecting the existing balances in the country.

According to the author, what makes Turkey's peace building initiative in Somalia different from that of the big players is its activism in the field despite the security problems. In addition to that, Turkey engages directly in Somalia without using any intermediary agents to deliver aid to beneficiaries. Turkish civil society's hands-on experience in the field, as well as its religious ties with this country, also creates advantages for Turkey's peace building activities. However, the use of multiple channels by different Muslim charity organizations can create incoherency in Turkey's existing religious discourse regarding Somalia, which may lead to criticism regarding Turkey's initiative in this country.

For Akpınar, there are also other limitations in Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy. The indifference of the international community to the crisis in Somalia, combined with criticism from some major actors of Turkey's activism in this country, has obliged Turkish leaders to calculate the costs and benefits of pursuing a pragmatic and sustained policy in Somalia. In the final analysis, the author concludes that there is not a contradiction between having economic interests in Somalia and pursuing humanitarian diplomacy. For her, coexistence between interests and humanitarian diplomacy is always possible as long as it leads to a win-win situation.

*Turkey as a BRICs Member: Similarities and Differences*

As a result of the recently growing importance of the BRICs in world affairs, there is also a remarkable interest in the BRICs, their power capabilities and their demands for the revision of the international order in Turkey. With a growing positive perception of the BRICs over the last decade the potential of a new alternative alliance with these rising powers in the South has become a subject in Turkish foreign policy. As stated in Gökhan Bacık's article in this special issue, "Turkey and the BRICs: Can Turkey Join the BRICs?", although Turkey does not have an official and consistent foreign policy agenda toward the BRICs, the idea of Turkey joining this group of rising countries has been positively welcomed in many Turkish conservative political and intellectual circles that are skeptical of eventual integration in the EU. While it can be argued that debates over whether Turkey's future should be with the rising Southern powers in the BRICs risk oversimplification, Turkey does not actively articulate a policy preference toward the BRICs. Despite their demand for a reform of the global order Turkish leaders do not promote a specific agenda containing well-defined principles for an alternative and more equitable international system. However, Turkey's increasing self-confidence in foreign policy associated with its considerable rise in its material capabilities in recent years has prevented it from standing on the sidelines in global affairs. For instance, the tripartite nuclear swap treaty signed between Iran, Turkey and Brazil in 2010 has indeed become a good indicator of Turkey's new "limited alignment" and hedging strategy with great powers and of its selective engagement policy in external actions.

In his article, Bacık first analyzes the nature, evolution and vision of the BRICs. According to the author, the BRICs have not yet become an international political or economic organization as they still lack a legal and institutional executive organ. In Bacık's view, the BRICs have emerged as an alliance against the Western-led liberal international system but do not possess a common ideology or political agenda. The author argues that the BRICs challenge the global capitalist system as they consider this system and the US hegemony as unjust and unequal. In his contribution, Bacık also asks what makes the BRICs different from the other revisionist states. The author's answer to this question is quite clear: Although the BRICs are far from being a real international organization, this group of states has a large role in global politics and constitutes a large part of the globe in terms of population, geography and economy.

In his contribution, Bacık also points out the difficulties in analyzing non-institutional dynamics, such as BRICs-like formations, in international relations theory. Bacık also states that the lack of analytical tools to identify and to compare regional powers oblige researchers to make hard-power comparisons with geography, population and economy rather than soft-power comparisons. The author says that as the BRICs do not have any institutionally harmonized soft-power initiatives, a soft-power-based analysis seems impossible. The differences among the BRIC states also get the attention of Bacık. There are large difference among these states