

*Korean
Attitudes
Toward the
United
States*

CHANGING
DYNAMICS

DAVID I. STEINBERG, Editor

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Foreword by Robert L. Gallucci

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Foreword

Robert L. Gallucci

The Republic of Korea remains of vital interest to the United States. Although overshadowed through much of 2002 and 2003 by the nuclear crisis with North Korea, its policies and peoples are intimately intertwined with the North and are of enduring importance to the United States because of growing strategic, economic, cultural, and institutional ties between our two states. The relationship is both strategic and symbolic and reflects the growing interchange between us.

The fifty-year alliance between the Republic and the United States has, in the early period of the new century, been buffeted by internal gales in both states and from North Korea. This has been reflected in growing anti-American sentiment in South Korea, which, not so long ago, Americans would have thought virtually inconceivable. These concerns have influenced the 2002 Korean presidential election and are likely to play an even greater role in relations between the two states if this phenomenon is not better understood.

For this reason, the Asian Studies Program of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service planned and brought together a major conference on this subject—the first such meeting devoted specifically to this issue—although it inevitably is raised, peripherally but significantly, at virtually every international gathering. The premise behind this meeting and this volume is that the issue in all its complexity must be directly addressed and understood if effective policy decisions are to be made to continue the close relationship that has existed in the half-century of the alliance and that is in the interests of both states. Although there have been the inevitable tensions, and more will no doubt occur, a more comprehensive understanding of the problem should enable policy makers on both sides to mitigate the worst aspects of the problem.

The School of Foreign Service has been pleased to have the support, moral and financial, of a variety of individuals and institutions that have offered assistance to the meeting and its deliberations. I would like to thank ambassadors Donald Gregg, Richard Walker, and Yang Sung Chul for giving talks at the meeting. Ambassador William Gleysteen had agreed to attend, but his untimely death prevented us from partaking of his wisdom. Those others who played important roles in the conference include

Young-Dal Chang of the Korean National Assembly, Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute, Sung Min Jang of Duke University, Mitch Kaneda of Georgetown, Don Oberdorfer of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, Bonnie Oh of Georgetown University, John Oh of Catholic University, Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University, and Stephen Rounds of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

We would like to thank our donors, who generously supported the meeting and participated in it. The Pacific Century Institute, specifically Spenser Kim, has been most kind in this as well as other meetings at Georgetown, and his presence added to the event. The Korea Society supported the gathering, and its President Ambassador Donald Gregg was actively involved; contributions were also received from the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Mr. Mark Gaston, and the Asian Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service.

We believe that this conference and volume will contribute to explication of the issues connected with this trend and reflect Georgetown's interest in participating in the policy dialogue on critical foreign policy issues.

Introduction

Anti-American Sentiment in the Korean Context

David I. Steinberg

Setting the Stage

The year 2003 was a significant milestone in Korean-American relations. It memorialized both the centennial of Korean immigration into the United States and the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean-American security treaty.¹ It was, apparently, a time for celebration and was so treated in innumerable conferences, seminars, and speeches reaffirming the strong, officially proclaimed ties between the two nations. But all the talismans were not so positive. Growing concerns over the behavior of North Korea the previous year had all but erased the progress in North–South Korean relations that had been so apparent in the 2000 summit in Pyongyang between President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Chairman Kim Jong Il of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).² Many in Korea attributed this to American policies toward North Korea as well as to North Korea’s surreptitious breakage of North–South, DPRK–U.S., and International Atomic Energy Agency agreements and the North’s secret nuclear program. There were growing rifts between the United States and the South over the most appropriate and feasible policies to be pursued toward the North as well as internal debates on these issues within both South Korea and the United States.

The history of the alliance is now shrouded in myth and in the euphoria over its longevity. The shared blood and agony of the Korean War and the close friendships built over the years between the (generally older) citizens of the two nations, as well as official pronouncements by both governments, have partly masked the constant tensions, were inherent even at its inception, and are inevitable in this long relationship. There is thus a tendency to ignore or submerge those problems in the face of a common enemy, and this was especially so during the period of the Cold War. But “anti-Americanism is growing at a startling rate in South Korea, potentially escalating into a serious problem that could jeopardize the future of the U.S.–Korean alliance.”³

In 2002, President Roh Moo Hyun was elected in South Korea on the hitherto absent political platform of greater equality of that American relationship, one coming under growing skepticism among younger voters, who are more nationalistic in an environment where such attitudes have been pervasive and increasing in intensity. Complaints that Korea had given up critical elements of its sovereignty in the alliance, as is true in any such relationship, were increasingly articulated at official and unofficial Korean levels. Tensions over a grievous accident that brought tragic deaths to two middle school Korean girls who were run over by a U.S. military vehicle surfaced with massive, generally peaceful demonstrations against the United States when the two soldiers involved were found innocent in a U.S. court martial just prior to the voting and again in June 2003 on the anniversary of the girls' deaths. The causes, immediate and historic, of anti-American sentiment have, since the summer of 2002, been the subject of diverse and intense policy reviews and media explorations by both Koreans and Americans. These sentiments have caused a negative reaction to U.S. troop deployment in Korea in some, generally conservative, American policy circles. But President Roh has expressed his belief that the problem is not serious, saying that he has confidence in his own ability, courage, and morality to handle the situation and that he would not succumb to popular pressures on this issue (as he has not done in the case of Japanese relations).⁴ On the other hand, Mr. Kwon Young-ghil, president of the Democratic Labor Party and a previous presidential candidate on the left, attributes such sentiments to three factors: the U.S. support of military dictatorships, perceived U.S. obstructionism to national unification, and U.S. infringements on national sovereignty and independence.⁵

However, in spite of its immediate presence and increasing strength, anti-American sentiment in Korea is nothing new. Although it may have reached a new level of intensity and visibility, it has been evident for long periods, sometimes forced underground under authoritarian Korean governments that viewed their relationship with the United States as essential for their security against a potentially belligerent North and also, and importantly, as a protective mantle invoking a degree of political legitimacy to regimes that came to power through unconstitutional means or stayed there through questionable tactics. Such was the early, positive U.S. political influence, which has since quite obviously waned. The National Security Law pervasively allowed the state to control public expressions that seemed to threaten any administration and its orthodoxy, including views that questioned the appropriateness of the alliance. Thus, to publish on the issue in Korea before political liberalization in 1987 was both difficult and dangerous. The democratization of Korea since that time provided the freedom to express these concepts, and incidents since then have exacerbated the problem.

To this writer as well as to many other observers, the causes of such anti-American sentiment are complex, involving historical, social, psychological, economic, political, and cultural elements too often ignored for a variety of reasons. To many in successive South Korean governments, to raise the issue for serious discussion and debate was likely in their view to intensify the problem, which might have both negative security and political ramifications for their administrations.⁶ To Americans be-

fore 2002, the issue had not reached crisis levels negatively affecting the global and regional security interests of the United States; thus these tensions either went unrecognized or were ignored as being of lower priority than other international crises. As long as Korea was ruled with an iron fist, public sentiment could, it was believed, be disregarded. Many on both sides of the alliance considered that unfortunate incidents exacerbating the problem were like cold sores—ugly and bothersome but soon to subside and thus of evanescent concern. Korean anti-American issues seemed, on a worldwide scale of violence and vituperation, of marginal intensity.

The existence, growth, and intensity of anti-American sentiment, however, had been of concern to this observer and others for quite some time.⁷ To draw out the causes and effects, he began in May 2002 to organize and seek support for the conference that has led to the publication of this volume.

The following hypotheses prompted the call for a conference:

- The Korean-American relationship is important to furthering the national interests of both the Republic of Korea and the United States, even though these interests are overlapping rather than completely congruent and may further diverge over time. The relationship is also important for the regional stability of Northeast Asia.
- Measured discussion and analyses of the issues would help both states and their peoples better to cope with the problems associated with the relationship and diminish its intensity. Conversely, avoidance of the issues, like ignoring a cancer, would allow expansion of the problem.
- Overt expressions and concerns about anti-American sentiment, however defined, may peak and diminish at any given time and over any particular incident. But according to a multitude of opinion polls, the strength emotion has perceptibly increased and encompasses broader elements of the Korean populace, with (since the conference) an apparent political impact in Korea.

During the period from January 30 to February 1, 2003, a distinguished group of scholars and officials met at Georgetown University to discuss these issues. Their revised papers, often expanded and edited, together with some other commissioned papers, form this volume. Its purpose is to elucidate the complexities, present influence, and potential of anti-American sentiment, so that the Korean-American alliance can contribute to improved relations between these two states and to progress in regional East Asian affairs.

The alliance between South Korea and the United States is in effect both a pillar and a facade of the bilateral relationship. Official U.S. and Korean statements consider the alliance strong and firm—the basis of the superstructure of other multiple relationships. But others, especially Koreans, consider it a facade, hiding tensions, antagonisms, a variety of emotions that are both positive and negative and that vary by a complex miscellany of experiences, backgrounds, demographics, regions, and many other factors.

Anti-American sentiment in Korea has its own historical roots, which are well known to the Korean people, but it is also a part of, and related to, a worldwide trend that has resulted from both the growth of American military, economic, and even cultural power and the diminishing of other alternative international hegemonic influences.⁸ This introductory chapter considers that issue and follows it with a consideration of definitions of the term *anti-American sentiment* or *anti-Americanism*. It then considers the role of the press in this process, the efforts by the United States to enhance democracy in Korea, categorization of this phenomenon, anti-Korean reactions in the United States, and the organization of the conference and the volume itself.

Anti-American Sentiment as a Worldwide Concern

By 1988 a growing body of literature began to appear devoted to the worldwide phenomenon of anti-American sentiment, however defined. This was demonstrated by volumes that explored this issue regionally. There had been strong anti-American movements among the left and intellectuals in Europe for decades.⁹ One author has noted that over two centuries, anti-American sentiment, originating in Europe but spreading worldwide, has passed through “five major layers or strata, each of which has influenced those that succeeded it.” These are as follows: the new world as physically degenerating; the United States as intellectually inferior; the United States as a mixed (not pure and thus superior) racist society; the United States as a materialistic and spiritually empty society; and America as the site of catastrophe (*katestrophenhaft*; from Heidegger).¹⁰ Perhaps it was the fall of the Shah in Iran and the holding of the U.S. hostages in Teheran at the close of the Carter presidency that prompted more global consideration of the issue. Perhaps it was globalization itself, which many feel is a surrogate for U.S. influence. The problems have been exacerbated by the unipolar nature of U.S. power and the fall of the Soviet Union. In some sense, the military and economic strength of a democratic United States together with the rise of other, new democracies, of whatever stripe, around the world have prompted the need for such states to listen to their own people, who may be more nationalistic and less inclined to follow blindly the policies of their administration, thus making the issues that the United States must address more complex. Governmental fiat is no longer sufficient to satisfy various populations. By coincidence, the political liberalization of Korea in 1987, to which the United States contributed, gave intellectual stimulus to dialogue about that problem within Korea and, indeed, to the spread of this phenomenon.

From the early nineteenth century, beginning with de Touqueville, observers have noted that Americans were concerned with foreign views of their society. They wanted to be admired, and, as we say today, even loved.¹¹ This characteristic of U.S. society, which continues to this day, is in marked contrast to the attitudes of other major “imperial” powers, which have been satisfied with being feared. But democracy tempers imperialism, even as it did (rather unsuccessfully) in later-nineteenth-century England. The irony is that as some in the United States proclaim a virtual imperial role as policy, the United States has fostered, with relative degrees of success, democ-

racies and democratic deepening in many parts of the world; these two policies are often in direct conflict. Further, after the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has become more aware of the growth of anti-American sentiment and at the same time less tolerant of its vigorous expression.

Thornton, in his worldwide 1988 study, raises several issues, two of which are germane to the Korea question. The first is that attitudes toward the United States often result from the ways in which individuals see their own countries; the second is whether all foreign criticism of the United States is to be counted as anti-Americanism. The latter is summarily dismissed, both in that study and below. The need to define anti-American sentiment is thus apparent.

Definitions

In an attempt to allow the participants to explore the full range of issues, the conference organizers did not attempt to define anti-American sentiments, anti-Americanism, or any other aspects of this phenomenon in advance. However, reflecting on the conference itself and on the somewhat meager literature on the subject as it relates to Korea, a variety of definitions have become apparent. Yet it must be noted that criticism of an American administration or person and/or his or her actions or policies does not itself constitute anti-Americanism, and that anyone may hold conflicting views on the United States at the same time; for example, extolling the American educational system and wishing to participate in it while deploring U.S. policies, arrogance, or cultural intrusions. Such differences need not be seen as cognitive dissonance but rather as parallel or supplementary positions that are not necessarily contradictory.

In the broadest context, "Anti-Americanism can be defined as any hostile action or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States."¹² The authors distinguish four types of anti-Americanism: issue-oriented, ideological, instrumental (mobilizing domestic support by using the United States as a scapegoat), and revolutionary (seeking to overthrow a pro-U.S. government). Woo-Cummings, quoting Paul Hollander (Chapter 5), notes "Anti-Americanism is a *predisposition to hostility* toward the United States and American society, a relentless critical impulse toward American social, economic, and political institutions, traditions, and values. . . ." Ceaser believes that "Anti-Americanism rests on the singular idea that something associated with the United States, something at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world."¹³ Donald Clark suggests that "The anti-Americanism at issue here is systematic hostility toward Americans and their institutions in Korea, criticism that goes beyond understanding to attack the motives and ideas of Americans, and attacks by Koreans on other 'pro-American' Koreans in a manner reminiscent of attacks on former Japanese collaborators after the Second World War."¹⁴ Hyun Syng-il draws a distinction between anti-American sentiment and criticism of America: ". . . anti-Americanism is a form of criticism combined with hatred toward the United States."¹⁵

John Oh defines it as “significant manifestations of anger and hostility toward the United States and its policies, practices, institutions, and citizens—either military or civilian.”¹⁶ Stephen Linton goes further:

It is more of a “background anti-Americanism” that inclines Koreans to see what is valuable in their way of life under constant pressure from a dominant American-led western culture. This sense of “cultural victimization” predisposes Koreans to sympathize with whoever opposes America in a dispute. Because this form of anti-American sentiment has clear racial undertones, by its very nature it is more difficult to address through policy initiatives than any other form of anti-Americanism.¹⁷

It seems evident that the key concepts are systemic and undifferentiated, but individual issues or incidents—or, more broadly, ideological or cultural factors—can seriously affect alliances and attitudes that help shape political reality, especially in democracies, which ironically seem more vulnerable to these tendencies or at least their expression. Various contributors to this volume define the terms with different emphases.

Yet anti-Americanism has sometimes served an internal political purpose. “The Chun regime did little to discourage anti-American expressions so long as they served to deflect and dissipate some anti-regime fervor.”¹⁸ It effectively used the press to support its positions, with some of which the United States strongly disagreed.

Meredith Woo-Cumings in her chapter takes a different approach, essentially arguing that the most apt analogy for anti-American sentiment conceptually is that of European anti-Semitism, which vilified a whole people and their culture. If that analogy were to be applied to Korea, she argues, then anti-Americanism does not exist there. She forces us to consider a relative degree of anti-American sentiment and thus perhaps to eschew attaching the *ism* to the term, thus giving it this all-encompassing meaning. But, as Jean Paul Sartre reminded us in *Anti-Semite and Jew*, if anti-Semitism did not exist, we would have to invent it to deal with the “other.” Perhaps Koreans have a need to define themselves by what they are not, and the United States is an obvious, tempting target.

On the Press

I read the newspapers with lively interest. It is seldom that they are absolutely, point-blank wrong. That is the popular belief, but those who are in the know can usually discern an embryo truth, a little grit of fact, like the core of a pearl, round which have been deposited the delicate layers of ornament.

—Evelyn Waugh, *Scoop* (1938)

There is a widespread belief, certainly in American circles but also among Koreans, that the Korean media have played an important contributory role in exacerbating

anti-American sentiment in Korea. Efforts were made, unsuccessfully, to have papers on this subject for this volume, but to exclude the subject is to ignore an important component of the problem. Although no Korean government has strategically used the press or the media to foment such responses, tactically it has used public information and disinformation to pursue its own ends, in some cases falsely or inappropriately aligning the United States with its official position on an issue, which because it was unpopular with a significant segment of the Korean populace, thus resulted in increasing anti-American sentiment. Kwangju is a prime example of this issue.¹⁹

Lee's study carefully documents daily press stories that manipulated the press to identify the United States with Korean state suppression of the Kwangju revolt. Mass media were "somewhere near the center of the conflict, at times as mediators and observers, but more times as participants—in most cases, as agents of the ruling regime which attempted to manage the entire gamut of public communication with an extremely intense desire for legitimation."²⁰ Ironically, the democracy that resulted from the June 1987 reforms that the United States had wanted and to which it had contributed in the spring of 1987 resulted in the growth of anti-American sentiments because of the new freedom to express such views: "The rapid expansion of anti-American sentiments after the collapse of the authoritarian regime in June 1987 was, in a sense, a natural phenomenon, resulting from the incorporation of anti-American articulations by the establishment media under the increasing hegemonic pressures from the oppositional forces."²¹

To understand the role of the media, which have become increasingly independent of the state but are still subject to its formal and informal influences,²² the history of the press and attempts to control it are important. Each government since independence has had a Ministry of Information (at times a Ministry of Information and Culture) that has supported newspapers that conveyed its position to internal and external audiences, controlled television networks, and attempted to influence directly and indirectly how its actions were presented to the people. In the most rigorous period of command, under the Yushin period of Park Chung Hee's regime (1972–79), Korean CIA officers sat in editorial offices and stringently controlled what could be printed. President Chun Doo Hwan, following his coup of December 12, 1979, purged the media of hundreds of reporters and writers and consolidated the news agencies to ensure greater government control. Even under the liberal government of President Kim Dae Jung, the state went after the opposition newspapers with tax audits, fines, and convictions designed to stifle criticism of his government.²³ This simply hurt the credibility of his administration. President Roh, soon after his inauguration, instituted procedures that limited reporters' contacts with ministerial officials, thus insulating the press from the informal contacts that breed news stories. Even after liberalization, other legal means were sought to control the press.

With the democratization of Korean society since 1987, government officials realized they could no longer use illegal, extralegal, and irrational methods to silence the press, and they seized on libel law, which is still listed in the Criminal Code as

well as in the Civil Code, to punish members of the press. During the past six years, the Korean press has continuously been challenged by complaints of criminal defamation and civil libel suits filed by public officials. Korean law concerning political libel and the Korean courts have favored public official plaintiffs.²⁴

The role of the press cannot be separated either from pressures to conform to state policies, orthodoxy, or from Korean nationalism.²⁵ Following President Kim Dae Jung's trip to Pyongyang in June 2000, in August of that year a large group of South Korean publishers also went to Pyongyang, where they promised that they would not publish articles that were critical of the North and that might harm or destroy the "Sunshine Policy" of the South Korean government. The Kim Dae Jung administration was singularly silent on human rights abuses in North Korea, although he himself had suffered from such abuses under South Korean regimes.

When Korea seems confronted with disputes with other states, there is an understandable but intense response to support the orthodox Korean position, and in some cases to manipulate information to that purpose. There is no definitive general study on this phenomenon, but in a speech prepared for this conference, Stephen Rounds²⁶ explored press reporting on the sale of new fighter aircraft to the South Korean government, maintaining that these and other inaccurately reported stories contribute to anti-American sentiment.

The point is that the problem [press bias] is cumulative: the one-sided press reporting forms and drives a vicious circle, in which reporters who are persuaded of U.S. ill will or arrogance fight back by slanting their stories. These stories are read by others, who come to believe that they, too, should contribute to "the national interest" by creating or passing on one-sided reporting. Thus, a significant part of Korean anti-Americanism has probably been caused by the fact that Koreans carry with them a whole inaccurate history of the details of our relationship because so much of the coverage of day-to-day events has been inaccurate. The accumulated misperceptions it has communicated form a heavy burden on the relationship.

The dilemma for any Korean administration, if a close relationship with the United States is deemed a priority, is how to encourage accurate, balanced reporting on the inevitable disputes that will arise in the future without engaging in press control or censorship.

Professor Auh Taik Sup²⁷ distinguished between two tiers of anti-American sentiment: those sentiments (diffused, emotional, passive) that concern hegemony, ego-centrism, materialism, and so forth, and those that reflect an ideologically oriented and cognitive reaction to the United States, its ideals, politics, and dominance. His findings were that both were ambivalent, polarized, and evolutionary, having progressed from prevalence in smaller groups to a broader public. The Korean media can set the agenda, give primary focus to an issue, and frame the material, thus strongly influencing public opinion. In using the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) case as an example, he concludes that the media coverage was episodic using a single (negative) frame, and a "falsifiable consensus emerges when debate is cur-

tailed, making it extremely difficult even to describe the situation in a different way,” and that “its problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment—the spiral of silence resides not only in the minds of the general public but in the news media and the working journalists.” Thus, there is a belief that the SOFA is not only unfair to Korea but is harsher than similar U.S. agreements with Germany and Japan.

The role of other media should not be ignored. According to a January 2001 survey, 74 percent of the population got its news from television, 13 percent from newspapers, and 8 percent from the Internet. However, the credibility of these media was newspapers, 17 percent; television, 75 percent; radio, 5 percent; and Internet, only 3 percent.²⁸

The role of the U.S. media in portraying anti-American sentiments should also not be ignored. The American media have certainly played up Korean discontent with U.S. policies and graphically portrayed it by reporting on demonstrations and through “investigative journalism,” such as the television program *Sixty Minutes*. The U.S. media, supported by administration officials from John Foster Dulles in the 1950s to President George W. Bush, have had a “binary” approach to foreign policy—“If you are not for us you are against us”—thus exacerbating the differences that are inevitable in any bilateral relationship where national interests are concerned.

Democracy, Human Rights, and the United States

If there is one area in which, according to popular American impressions, the United States should be given credit by Koreans, it is that of encouraging democracy and human rights. Americans perceive this as part of their core values and have institutionalized this approach with a bureau devoted to it within the Department of State. Yet from a Korean vantage point, that is not how many Koreans feel. College students, an obviously volatile group, believe that the United States has had a negative effect on human rights (41.9 percent compared to 22.5 percent), and an even more intensely negative effect on democratization (60.2 percent believed it to be negative while only 10.1 percent thought it positive).²⁹ Clearly the perception has been that the United States has been more supportive of dictatorships than of democracy because U.S. objectives in Korea have been, in priority order: security, an economic “level playing field,” and finally democracy. This disparity of views on such a primordial value as democracy is one core element of tensions in the relationship.

Korean writers have downplayed the important role of the United States in effectively denying to the Korean government the potential use of its own military, through imposition of martial law or garrison decree, during the massive public demonstrations in the spring of 1987, resulting in the June 29 political liberalization. At the same time, although U.S. influence has been important for both democratization and improvement in human rights, this has not been because of official policies but rather informal and unofficial U.S. influence on the society as a whole.³⁰

Categorization of Crises and Events

It may be helpful to consider those specific incidents that have materially contributed to the rise of anti-American sentiment. Some of these were events that stirred the official community and have led to a sense of distrust of the United States, thus providing a milieu in which anti-American sentiment could build more broadly, and some have been those affecting the public. Of course, the boundaries in any such delineation are often indistinct.

State concerns about the reliability of the United States as an ally began with the armistice itself, which President Syngman Rhee opposed. The coup of 1961 led to an intense period of mutual mistrust between the United States and General Park Chung Hee, since Park overthrew a popularly elected government supported by the United States. It was a rift that was never completely overcome although the United States perceived that it needed Park for security considerations. The Guam (or Nixon) Doctrine of 1969 precluding the United States from fighting further land wars in Asia, further exacerbated the feeling that the United States could not be trusted or relied upon in an emergency. This resulted in the buildup of Korea's armament industries (and a nuclear capacity that the United States effectively vetoed in 1974) so as to avoid too great a dependence on the United States. Trade disputes involving manufactured goods after that time were continuous as the United States tried to open a highly protected Korean domestic market and the United States accused Korea of dumping goods into the United States.³¹ Subsequently, the requirements to open Korean rice and beef markets have created a continuing storm of anti-American demonstrations in the rural sector, which, although small, is quite vocal and has a disproportionate influence (as in Japan) in the legislature. The Kwangju rebellion created both state and popular distrust of the United States, but with different interpretations of U.S. culpability, while the bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States leading to the Agreed Framework of 1994 created palpable unease in official Korean circles at the highest levels. The financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality was interpreted by the state and the people as surrogate requirements of the United States, which was seen as intent on buying up Korean businesses and industries at bargain prices, thus creating an explosion of popular nationalism.³² Some of these incidents may be attributed to a generalized antforeign sentiment rather than focusing directly on the United States. For example, in a survey conducted in July 1997, just when the Asian financial crisis hit Thailand but had not yet affected Korea, a large number of Koreans did not want any foreigners to own Korean land or businesses, and an even larger number did not want them to own larger parcels of land or larger businesses—just the conditions the IMF imposed on Korea a half-year later.³³

To these more structural problems have been added issues connected with military incidents involving U.S. personnel. They have included environmental waste issues, a controversial U.S. military firing range, and personal assaults, culminating in the tragic deaths of the two Korean middle-school girls in June 2002 and the subsequent

stir to revise the SOFA and the effect on the December 2002 Korean presidential election. The revelation of the Nogun-ri Korean War massacre of South Korean civilians by U.S. troops created a major controversy, even though it was the Associated Press, through detailed investigative journalism, that uncovered the story, which then was picked up by the Korean press. In many of these incidents, two cultural-legal Korean-American differences continue to contribute to anti-American sentiment. The first is the issue of an apology—required in Korean customary usage in a moral sense but which, in official U.S. circles, seems to carry the stigma of guilt and responsibility, including financial liability, and is thus eschewed by lawyers. The second is that someone should be responsible for tragedies and thus take the blame, even if it is only symbolic. This is not American practice, and thus the acquittal of the two U.S. soldiers in 2002 was seen as unfair and inappropriate from a Korean standpoint.

The latest polling available (May–June 2003) indicates that “South Korean dislike of the United States was deeper than [that of] any other U.S. ally”: 58 percent said they were disappointed that Iraq did not put up more resistance to the United States, and only 24 percent support the U.S. war on terrorism.³⁴

“Anti-Koreanism” in the United States

As a result of Korean protests against the United States in 2002 and the very visible burning of American flags and vigils around the U.S. Embassy, and in spite of large pro-American counter rallies, there has grown up in some circles in the United States a counter, anti-Korean sentiment.³⁵ If there is little “anti-Americanism” in Korea, then there certainly is no “anti-Koreanism” in the United States, although anti-Korean sentiment is apparent. Although these incidents were seen by Koreans as peripheral to the message being conveyed of concern and generally not of a violent nature, these events had important repercussions in the United States. Beginning with the second Bush administration and the insistence of President Kim Dae Jung on coming to Washington in March 2001, before the Bush team was really ready to receive him and against the administration’s advice, trouble began. The resulting summit was disastrous, and since then differences in approaches to North Korea have led to a mistrust of the South Korean position on peninsular relations in Washington, especially in the Defense Department, which ironically has been the traditional bastion of pro-Korean sentiment and the alliance. Anti-Korean attitudes reside essentially in that department. Since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the United States is far less tolerant of anti-American demonstrations of any sort.

The United States wants to be loved and respected, and the result has been a number of newspaper articles by well-known conservative commentators that if the South Koreans are against our presence, we should withdraw all our forces from Korea. A slanted segment of the widely popular television program *Sixty Minutes* featured anti-American demonstrations without analysis and probably affected a large element of the American public, who always thought of Korea (if they did at all) as a loyal and essentially subservient ally. Although anti-American sentiment would be applauded

by a small segment of the Korean public, no government and the majority of the Korean people have never wanted the precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.³⁶ That would create a sense of abandonment and intensify the vulnerability Koreans have historically felt over their position in East Asia.

Organization of This Volume

This volume is organized into the following sections: global, regional, and comparative perspectives; anti-American sentiments as structural phenomena; alliance perspectives; civil society perspectives; and economic and legal dimensions. It thus proceeds from the general to the regional and then to specifically Korean issues.

Global, Regional, and Comparative Perspectives

John Ikenberry reviews the anti-American phenomenon in a global perspective. The U.S. order was built on force and consent, and thus legitimacy, but the United States has shifted away from legitimacy and more toward force. He notes the disparity in power between the United States and other nations, but considers that there was little in the U.S. environment to discipline its exercise of power. He points out that the United States was experiencing a “legitimacy deficit and anti-Americanism in East Asia,” western Europe, and other areas, noting the need to distinguish between foreign anger and disapproval of U.S. policies and the United States itself. Majorities around the world, even in some democracies, do not like American ideas and values, but the United States does not appear to be willing to play by international rules. U.S. unilateralism seems out of control, and the United States is viewed as “undisciplined” and as a “rogue state.” Ikenberry notes three types of U.S. power: (1) system-structural power (capitalism, democracy—manifest in the basic logic of globalization); (2) political-institutional-hegemonic power—people see the presence of the U.S. military and economic power as intrusive; and (3) unilateralism and neoimperialism. Ikenberry believes that the new strategy “attaches little value to international stability.” This situation is not irreversible, as the United States could become a benign hegemon and work with multilateral institutions. “The United States must rediscover those elements that help reconcile American power with stable and legitimate international order. . . . There are aspects in the American experience—institutions and strategies—that can help the United States legitimate its power and reduce the instabilities that are manifest as anti-Americanism.”

Kent Calder focuses on the Japanese Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco in 1951. The interrelated politicomilitary and economic commitments between the United States and its Pacific allies gave the United States a security role in exchange for opening its markets to the newly developing economies, especially Japan. With the rise of Japan and improved relations with China and the end of the Cold War, disaffection with the political aspects of the relationship (SOFA, etc.) became apparent. Quoting the Pew Memorial Trust survey, Calder notes that the United States had the least favorable

rating in Korea among other Asian states: Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Most Koreans were against the war of terrorism; they believe that the United States considers others least and is little concerned with the threat of nuclear weapons. "Korean attitudes toward the United States, in sum, seem to be substantially more critical than those of Asians generally, resembling most closely those of Islamic nations like Indonesia. . . . Korea's differences at the popular level with the United States, it can be argued, are the psychological residue of the San Francisco System." It was designed to "enrich and stabilize Japan, [Korea's] longtime nemesis. Not surprisingly, that systematic orientation stirs resentment in Korea." Important as well has been the rise of competitive party politics in Korea and the growth of civil society—most importantly the increase in protest activism from the early 1980s until the early 1990s—more than twice as rapid as in Japan. Also, the increasing autonomy of local government in Korea has no parallel in East Asia. Pressures for revision of the San Francisco system are likely to continue. "Nationalism and democratization are eroding the San Francisco System." To keep the alliances, do we need to eliminate the bases? Korea resembles the Philippines more than Japan. The civil society movement is important in both the Philippines and Korea, where it has exploded, and far more than in Japan.

Brad Glosserman reviews anti-Americanism in Japan. He considers it as taking three forms: left, right, and "opportunistic." Marxist thought was ideologically important since before World War II. Right-wing anti-Americanism obviously predates World War II and was sharpened by U.S. attempts to delink the present from Japan's imperial past. The Japanese charge that Japan's economic troubles were caused by the United States. But the roots go back to the opening of Japan; there is an often overlooked but critical tension between modernism and traditional Japanese norms. This has been glossed over. Placing the blame for World War II on a small number of people allowed the Japanese to disclaim responsibility. The right wing has argued that the United States forced Japan to go to war. The perception of U.S. influence in Japanese policy making is important; *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure, usually American) can be used by Japanese for their own ends. There are specific triggers of anti-Americanism, such as the Okinawa rape case and the sinking of the Ehime Maru. Important in Japanese perceptions have been the shocks resulting from the U.S. failure to consult with the Japanese on critical policy issues. "There is speculation that such tactics have been deliberately used to 'manage' the relationship; if so, it has been a terribly short-sighted approach." There is increased impatience in Japan with the way the alliance has been managed. Special problems are associated with the overwhelming presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa, which disproportionately bears the burden within Japan for the U.S. presence. Okinawa has been the poorest prefecture of Japan, discriminated against by other Japanese, yet in part it is dependent on the U.S. forces for its economic well-being. It may be significant that anti-American sentiment in the Philippines seems to have diminished with the removal of the U.S. bases from that region.

Yoichi Funabashi discusses the new dynamics of anti-Americanism in Japan, which, before World War II, was the most anti-American country in the world. However,

after its defeat, it became the most pro-American country. Japan became a “good loser” while the United States was the “good winner,” supplying food during the occupation in time of need, preserving the symbol (not the power) of the old order by retaining the emperor, and supporting the “stake-holding” peoples (such as women, labor, and farmers) by ensuring their rights. The Peace Treaty of 1951 provided an element of trust toward the United States, as it was fair and generous, but the show trials of war criminals created anti-American sentiment among some groups. One source of anti-Americanism in Japan was the resort by the United States to “hard power” rather than “soft power.” The rise of economic nationalism has been directed toward the United States, the idea of a “Japan that can say no” is focused on the United States, and antiglobalization translates into anti-U.S. sentiment, although sometimes Japanese business failures are incorrectly blamed on the United States. The most serious problem between the two states is alliance management, as other states feel powerless in the face of U.S. strength. The United States plays a masculine role in the alliance while Japan plays a feminine role. The problem with the economic and alliance system is that the winner takes all, with indifference to the loser. In a sense, Japan is a model of the good loser. One way to improve relations is to increase educational exchanges, as U.S. higher education is the most advanced worldwide and is admired; the Fulbright program, for example, has sent some 7,000 Japanese to the United States and some 3,000 Americans to Japan.

In the course of the discussion, Funabashi draws attention to the differences in support for U.S. troops in Japan and Korea. U.S. forces in Japan are better housed, can often bring their families, and have better facilities; thus the level of frustration among the military seems lower and relations with local communities are generally better (except perhaps in Okinawa).

Meredith Woo-Cumings considers the issue of anti-American sentiment in the broad historical context of European anti-Semitism and concludes that the term *anti-Americanism* is inappropriate as applied to Korea. She considers the cultures too far apart to result in the “loathing” with which anti-Americanism is associated in Europe, where it has become endemic to the intellectual establishment in a number of countries. She notes that the statistical rise of anti-American sentiment coincided with the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994 and policies of the Bush administration, both of which gave rise to South Korean insecurity and rising apprehension that the U.S. unilateral approach to foreign policy and the use of force could jeopardize the Korean people of both the North and the South. She charges the U.S. Treasury with insisting on the breakup of “Korea Inc.” in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and related economic issues that negatively affected perceptions of the United States in Korea. Woo-Cumings quotes George Santayana that rejection is a form of self-assertion, and that anti-American sentiment is the obverse in the Korean case of pride in Korea’s obvious accomplishments.

Ronald Meinardus reviews the German experience with anti-Americanism in a comparative analysis. Anti-American thought in Germany historically was rooted in a fearful reaction to modernity, with the United States considered by traditionalists

and conservatives alike as the heaven of modernity. After World War II, a great majority of West Germans were pro-American: although the country was defeated by the Americans militarily, many greeted the U.S. forces as liberators. Attitudes turned slightly more negative during the Vietnam War. Following that episode, the deployment of U.S. missiles on German soil became a controversial issue. For the first time, sizable portions of the population perceived a cleavage between U.S. and allied interests and “national” West German interests. Today, there are strains on Iraq policy. Still, in spite of differences on policies, 68 percent of Germans consider themselves to be basically pro-American. The Korean and German experiences have major differences. Although both nations were divided, the division was accepted as a fait accompli by a majority of West Germans; in Korea, the divide is considered an open wound. The United States invested heavily in both countries—both militarily and economically. More recently, demographic change in both states has occurred, with the younger population tending to ignore the benefits their parents derived from U.S. assistance and support. In South Korea, many youngsters accuse the United States of prompting division of their country. This has never been the case in West Germany, also for the simple reason that unification was not considered a realistic option. Korean nationalism, Meinardus argues, is stronger than German nationalism. This has an immediate impact on the intensity of negative attitudes toward the United States. U.S.-German relations have been structured through NATO; historically, this has alleviated political friction between the two states, as the governments in Bonn participated on an equal footing in most strategic decisions. On the other hand, there is no such multilateral structure in Northeast Asia. U.S.-ROK relations are more problematic because they are reduced to the bilateral sphere, and “structurally, bilateralism has opened the door to the accusation of unilateralism.” In reviewing Anti-American sentiments in both countries, one must take into account the evolution of democracy: today, fortunately, the Germans and the South Koreans are entitled to elect their governments freely. Thus, political leaders have to take their people’s attitudes into consideration as they devise their policies.

Structural and Strategic Phenomena

Bruce Cumings concentrates on “structural” aspects of anti-American sentiment, including the division of Korea, the foreign bases that are part of an “archipelago” of such bases around the world, the Combined Forces Command, the unexamined assumptions and history that are now being revisited and reinterpreted, and racism. In his view, there is a difference between “anti-Americanism” and “anti-American policies.” The question was asked whether Koreans were more critical of the United States now in contrast to the 1980s and previous periods, or whether they now are simply more able to express their opinions. The 1980s may have been the high point of virulent anti-American sentiment, but evidently the policies of the Bush administration have exacerbated this feeling. During the Clinton administration, anti-American sentiment (e.g., the 1997 Asian financial crisis) was against globalization, of which

the United States was the surrogate. The Koreans now see the United States, under the Bush administration, as standing against Korean integration, and in their view the United States has botched Korean policy. But what does anti-American sentiment mean? It is usually about policies, not people, and the demonstrations in Seoul concerning the trial of the soldiers who were acquitted in the deaths of the two Korean middle-school girls were well organized and peaceful, with older participants as well as young ones. Certain U.S. responses to these protests (e.g., Richard Allen) seem petulant, condescending, and surprised, as when calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Yet the troops were there to perpetuate the division of the peninsula and to constrain and restrain South Korea as well. The United States does not like the idea of the two Koreas being alone together. Racism, certainly evident in earlier dealings with Korea, is still evident, even if expressed in different forms, such as "All Koreans are. . . ." Important also has been the growth of civil society.

Victor Cha considers five structural trends in the forward presence of the United States and its impact on anti-American sentiment, suggesting that changes in the U.S. force composition stationed in Korea are inevitable. These five trends are as follows: (1) the forward presence of the United States has successfully deterred threats (yet noting that such forces need to be far more flexible); (2) the allies of the United States in the region are far stronger than they once were; (3) democratic and social changes have taken place, which will affect policies, especially since the population is also younger; (4) there have been important changes in U.S. military technology, with the development of U.S. capacity to conduct long-range and precision military strikes; and (5) there have been exogenous shocks and unintended consequences on the peninsula. These include the Sunshine Policy, the effect of the worsening perceptions of the U.S. presence, and the "failure" of the Sunshine Policy, which has led to the United States being used as a scapegoat for this failure. It is unfortunate that there is no serious dialogue on this, but simply buck-passing. There is thus a weakening of the foundations of the ROK–U.S. alliance. A broader vision of the alliance is needed, such as regional stability and facing the issue of quasicontainment of China or peace-keeping in the region. After unification, the geopolitical landscape will not be favorable to the United States, as Korea will seek accommodation with China and more tensions will develop between China and Japan. A demographically older Japan will be more uncomfortable with the U.S. relationship, and this will go against U.S. interests. This sequence of events may lead to regional nuclear proliferation, and the United States should try to shape the outcome differently. The ROK–Japan–U.S. alliance should go beyond the Cold War and stand for something positive—have a broader meaning (such as antiterrorism, etc.). There are four requirements for revision of the alliances and forces. These are (1) a flexible presence; (2) a rapidly deployable force; (3) a credible force; (4) and an unobtrusive force. U.S.–ROK relations are "a train wreck in slow motion"—there is no connection in policies. Korea is not anti-American, but it has a solidarity and heightened nationalism, and opinions there are different from those in the United States. The ROK people are not concerned about the North Korean nuclear issue. The two sides do not meet. The United States sees images in North

Korea and considers them real, while South Koreans see the images and believe them to be marginal and insignificant. Rethinking the alliance thus is necessary.

Chung-in Moon discusses the spectrum of attitudes toward the United States, noting that it is nothing new in Korean history. He discusses the changing attitudes toward the United States—*banmi* to *sungmi*—anti- and worship. There is a dualistic phenomenon: “Many South Koreans show a very strong pro-American attitude in person, but in public or in a group, they take an anti-American tone.” There are three dimensions to the issue: (1) left-wing ideology, especially in the 1980s; (2) attitudes that fluctuate along with events and changing circumstances (e.g., trade); and (3) rejection of American exceptionalism, justified “in the name of national security” (meaning that the United States need not obey Korean rules and norms). Anti-Americanism “has become more salient than before.” The factors prompting this are unilateralism and cultural insensitivity; emerging disjuncture between power and status; and rejection of or opposition to pro-American forces, “who monopolized material and positional values in (Korean) society”; lack of knowledge and understanding of the United States. There is a strong rejection of U.S. unilateralism, especially the Bush administration’s policies. Korea needs the status comparable to its economic power. There is a growing feeling within Korea against Korean societal elements that monopolize power through U.S. connections (such as U.S. education). At the same time, Koreans look for scapegoats, such as the United States. The United States has not played the role of “honest broker” in the North-South relationship. The current problems could have been avoided. There are no easy solutions; one cannot get rid of anti-American attitudes, they are part of the Korean psyche. But we can minimize them and maximize pro-U.S. or know-U.S. attitudes. There is a need for centers for American studies, which are lacking in Korea at the university level.³⁷

Alliance Perspectives

Chung Min Lee feels that South Korea was in a state of deep strategic denial about North Korea. North Korean key behavior has not changed since the start of the Sunshine Policy, and he deplores the payment of \$200 million to North Korea to facilitate it. The December 19 Korean presidential election was a cultural revolution with important implications for policies toward the United States and North Korea that Roh has to deal with. Roh has become a combination of Tony Blair and Perón. The Korean people, however, are looking for a new security architecture. The anti-Americanism is not a majority view but rather that of those in power, who see the United States, not North Korea, as responsible for the lack of unification. The Sunshine Policy has not yet produced behavioral change in North Korea. If such changes were to have taken place, they would have already happened. There has been a new, cumulative rise in Northeast Asia: China, a nuclear North Korea, and a resurgent Japan. There is also a new strategic awakening in East Asia of which the United States is not aware. There are three key choices for South Korea: (1) universal values; (2) autonomy or indepen-

dence; and (3) a unified Korea. But what kind of future do they envision? Some South Koreans believe that if the North has nuclear weapons, they will someday belong to the South and thus are not something to worry about. This is the time to make critical policy choices. There should be a 2 + 2 meeting (ROK–U.S.), including both defense officials and diplomats, and a more precise definition of issues should result. The ROK may choose to live with a nuclear North Korea and will sweep it under the carpet, as the North has tied its nuclear program to regime survival.

Although the top political leaderships continue to emphasize the importance of sustaining the alliance even after Korean unification, neither Seoul nor Washington has paid enough attention to building a new strategic framework. In part, this absence stems from the persistence of the North Korean threat—albeit in more varied forms than before; but it would be a mistake to assume that the alliance can be sustained without paying greater attention to articulating a new and more credible strategic framework.

Kim Sung-han feels that South Koreans consider inter-Korean relations as between brothers (and thus closer), while they view South Korean–U.S. relations as between friends. Before the Pyongyang summit, there was competition between North Korea and the United States versus South Korea and the United States; now, South Korea and the United States are competing over North Korea. When President Clinton left office, 50 percent of South Koreans did not feel the North to be a threat, so the South Korean people could not understand President Bush's policy toward the North, and they see any preemptive strike against the North's nuclear facilities as leading to another Korean War. South Koreans believe that the United States wants North Korea to remain a "rogue state" so as to justify the U.S. missile defense system. The most recent origin of anti-Americanism arose after the June 2000 summit and was also exacerbated by the inequity of relations under the SOFA, the "axis of evil" remark, and so on. The United States believes that the ROK–U.S. alliance faces two major challenges: the North's attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and the South, and the South's growing anti-American sentiment and potential demands for troop withdrawal. South Korean people have romantic nationalistic feelings toward peninsular relations, and the United States should then be relegated to observer status.

James Feinerman considers the SOFA a cardinal point of contention and calls for its continuing revision. The SOFA covers U.S. forces at the ninety U.S. bases in Korea, and it is uncertain whether SOFA will continue in its present form. In perspective, the United States has coerced countries through security concerns into accepting U.S. concepts of common law and the U.S. legal order for U.S. military personnel overseas. There are strong congressional pressures within the United States to keep U.S. citizens under the U.S. legal system. Criminal jurisdiction is the highest-profile legal issue for U.S. military personnel, but others may be important, such as customs, labor, civil claims, environmental issues, sanitation, and so on. U.S. soldiers committing crimes on or off duty are not tried in Korean courts. Perhaps there is a need for more professional soldiers and not relying on a volunteer army.

Hahm Chaibong traces the historical roots of anti-American sentiment but first concentrates on those aspects of the relationship that bring the two nations closer together: education, religious influences, values, and economic systems. Hahm noted the festivities associated with the 2002 World Cup that gave Koreans a sense of pride in their national accomplishments, not only in sports. Strong nationalist sentiment was evident in the event and its aftermath. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in one of the rationales of the strong American connection to disappear—a midterm cause of the rise of anti-American sentiment. Revisionist arguments and ultranationalist sentiments were more widespread and could be disseminated along with the democratization movement in Korea in 1987. The long-term issues relate to the perceived threats to Korean-ness. “(In this sense), anti-Americanism . . . is an expression of a deep-seated sense of anxiety regarding Korean identity. It is a reaction to yet another chapter in their history where Koreans are forced to adapt to a new civilization.” Thus, anti-American sentiment is “part of an effort to articulate a sense of national and cultural identity on the part of Koreans, who have had to go through major civilizational shifts.”

Civil Society Perspectives

Katharine Moon considers the rise of civil society and the American military presence. She charges that anti-American sentiments were not new, that these were not Korean-made issues but were regional in character. *Anti-Americanism* is probably a misnomer—*America bashing* is probably a better term. This sentiment is both organized and unorganized, and in part based on a U.S.-Korean relationship that is fraught with violence, tensions, and frustrations. Why does this occur now and with such intensity? Democratization is one factor. Another is the dichotomy between the wealthy Koreans and the camp towns around the bases—both the U.S. and ROK governments have treated them with neglect. Decentralization has affected these towns, which now have more authority and can press their grievances; there are newly empowered citizenries around the bases. A late-1990s law required transparency in local autonomy and allowed claims if such transparency were not provided. If there is transparency within the Korean government, should there not be the same in the administration of American bases? There is a need to take local grievances seriously; they have been built up over time against the bases and against the local police. There are now attempts to get redress for past problems, exemplified in Korea in the “comfort women” movement, the Nogun-ri incident of U.S. troops killing Korean civilians in the Korean War, and Kwangju (as in the case of the black community in the United States and slavery). The growth of Korean civil society has been important, and through its growth and contacts, social capital has developed in the peripheral areas in conjunction with those in Seoul. The anti-American movement has brought these groups together for the first time. The legacy of authoritarianism lives on in the anti-American movement. The United States demands gratitude for past assistance, but this has no place in Korea.

Scott Snyder, in an oral presentation, considered that anti-American sentiment as a proxy for the discussion of the role of class and access in Korean society and the elites and elitism that have access to the United States through education and other benefits. The United States is seen as favoring elite interests by its association with the establishment. By some, Lee Hoi Chang was considered a puppet of such groups. Although the United States may see itself as promoting democracy, Koreans may see it differently. This problem is fostered by the Korean education system and overcompetition, where the top elite use their financial advantages to continue elite status via the U.S. education system. English is required, multinational corporations offer good jobs, and privileges divide Korean society. Is the Koreanness of those associated with the Americans questioned, and what are the implications of this? In the past (when economic opportunities were limited), U.S. bases were magnets for economic opportunity, but times have changed. To get a U.S. visa, one must demonstrate financial assets, and all this creates jealousies. The rich-poor gap has widened since 1997, and there is likely to be less mobility as the elite continues its domination.

Uichol Kim approaches the issue of anti-American sentiment through a psychological survey of middle school, university, and adult populations. His findings indicate that there is a negative view of the American people and society and their influence on Korea and the world. The current results challenge the commonly held assumptions that the younger generation will have a positive view of the United States and emulate its values and norms. In terms of attitude, junior high school students had the most negative view of the United States and its influence on Korea; university students were mixed; and older students were least negative. Most had had no contact with the United States, but those with more contact had a more balanced view. "It is likely that Korean respondents have developed anti-American sentiments largely from the media and through informal contacts." First, these sentiments are susceptible to change, since they are not based on accurate information or personal contacts. Second, since people are likely to process information to be consistent with their beliefs, anti-American sentiment will likely increase. Third, "the anti-American sentiment in South Korea is driven by neither ideology nor tradition. They reflect a growing confidence of the younger generation in themselves and their nation." Fourth, Koreans want to maintain a strong bilateral relationship. They are angry because they feel neglected, abused, and betrayed by the unilateral policies and decisions of the United States. For some, the anger has turned into hostility, since Koreans are accused of being irrational and ungrateful, as evidenced by the U.S. threat to withdraw its troops from South Korea. In order to reduce anti-American sentiment, Koreans must be listened to, since they and Americans often view reality differently, in terms of different cultural assumptions. With family reunions, the evil image of North Korea has partly been transformed, and the anti-Japanese movement is over. Koreans view the United States as a superpower and feel themselves to be victims, especially with the Bush administration's policies toward North and South Korea. They are motivated to be closer to the United States, but existing structural barriers (such as the sheer difficulty of obtaining a U.S.

visa), psychological barriers (such as the perceived injustice of the death of two young girls), and perceived U.S. unilateralism are fueling anti-American sentiments. The recommendation is to provide more accurate information to Koreans about the United States using existing media, and especially educational institutions. Allowing Koreans to travel and study in the United States (by providing nonvisa exemption status) and further strengthening the bilateral ties would be the most effective means for modifying Korea's anti-American sentiments.³⁸

William Watts's presentation is based on survey data on Korean attitudes toward the United States. Roh Moo Hyun, the newly elected president of the Republic of Korea, faces a major problem that he surely neither wants nor needs: a rising tide of anti-Americanism that has assumed proportions previously unseen on the Korean peninsula. There has been an enormous negative shift in views toward the United States. China is regarded as the most important country for Korea in the next ten years, replacing the United States. The United States is regarded as the principal beneficiary of the ROK-U.S. relationship. Security is most important to the Koreans. The problems with the United States involve hegemony, unilateralism, creating dependency status for Korea, the "axis of evil" remark of President Bush, and lack of attention to other countries. Although the United States is respected in some fields, such as science and technology, Koreans are against the war on terrorism and the missile shield, but they do not want the U.S. troops to withdraw at this time. U.S. opinion is generally favorable to South Korea, although if defending the South from a North Korean attack were to fall on the United States alone, the U.S. public would be against it, while those considered informed would strongly favor it.

William Drennan refers to the Kwangju incident of May 1980 as the "tipping point" in anti-American sentiment. He details the problems connected with negotiating with the Korean government of Chun Doo Hwan, and the important distinction between the "command" (under Koreans) and "operational control" (under Americans) of forces under the Combined Forces Command. He distinguishes between Kwangju the event and Kwangju the myth. "In the eyes of many Koreans today, the U.S. was the 'wire puller' behind Kwangju and therefore bears ultimate responsibility. Kwangju was not caused by U.S. manipulation. In one sense, it was not 'caused' at all; it 'happened.'" Unless and until Koreans recognize that "Kwangju was about Koreans killing Koreans . . . the United States will remain the scapegoat, the ROK-U.S. alliance will remain hobbled, and the ghosts of May 1980 will continue to haunt Korean society." Although the legal responsibility for Kwangju rested clearly with the Koreans, did the United States have a moral responsibility to protect the Kwangju citizenry from the Korean government?

Brent Choi feels that the problem is not anti-Americanism, but "anti-baseism," exacerbated by a generational shift in Korea and concern over the Bush administration's policies toward North Korea and the treatment of Kim Dae Jung by President Bush at their summit in Washington. The wounds Korea suffered as a result of the 1997 financial crisis and declines in the stock market were overcome by the national pride illustrated at the World Cup. These may have been the largest demon-

strations in Korea since Sam Il (the March 1, 1919, independence movement). Korea (North and South) are viewed as a family, and have different concepts of law; in Korea, someone is always guilty and intent is not as important as in the West. The United States should understand that the generational shift in Korea is more important than the demonstrations. The Pyongyang summit humanized Kim Jong Il. We are witnessing the signification of Korea as the South moves further from the United States. Sensitivity toward Korea is critical and was exemplified by the head of the American Chamber of Commerce, whose language and manner stopped demonstrations against that institution.

Economic Dimensions

Dennis McNamara, in considering economic issues, analyzes the changes in identity issues of the company, the state, and the people (labor and consumers) through analysis of the automobile industry as foreign firms began to participate in it. "Borders give identities. Globalization undermines existing borders but also stimulates emergence of boundaries." He noted the importance of the auto industry in terms of employment and in the downstream industries; the Korean automotive industry as a 'full-set' industry, producing all elements of the machines. There has been strong state intervention, controlled labor, and encouraged consumption. There is strong consumer nationalism. "Transitions in Korean auto manufacturing provide a window on the reconstitution of social capital. . . . The study comes to a focus in solidarity and flexibility, testing the borders of closure to permit flexibility yet solidarity and identity." The chapter raises the issues of foreign (i.e., U.S.) investment in prestigious Korean firms and such actions in relation to identity, national sentiment, and antiforeign feeling without reaching a specific conclusion.

Notes

1. Signed in 1953 and ratified in 1954.
2. A cloud hung over that summit when it was revealed in 2003 that President Kim Dae Jung authorized a payment of some \$500 million to the North in relation to the summit.
3. Kim Seung-Hwan, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2002–3).
4. Personal interview, Seoul, June 2003.
5. Personal interview, Seoul, June 2003.
6. When I wrote an op-ed for a Korean paper on this subject in the mid-1990s, I had a personal telephone call from the foreign minister complaining about my raising such an issue.
7. See, for example, David I. Steinberg, *Stone Mirror: Reflections on Contemporary Korea* (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2002). Specifically see "On Rising Anti-American Sentiment" (pp. 251–56). This is a collection of selected op-ed columns that have appeared in the *Korea Times* since 1995 under the title "Stone Mirror." See the bibliography at the end of this chapter for a list of the more salient publications on this subject as they relate to Korea.
8. In East Asia, China traditionally had the "soft power," being the cultural attraction at the center of that world. It was aptly known as the Central Kingdom. The United States has in the past century played a similar role, and in part the ambivalence toward the United States is a

product of the clash of the soft power and hard power that the United States obviously has, and the growth of nationalism in Korea.

9. See Chapter 5.

10. James W. Ceaser, "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *Public Interest*, no. 152 (Summer 2003).

11. Thomas Thornton, "Preface," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988): 9–19.

12. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith, "Anti-Americanism in the Third World," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988): 35–45.

13. Ceaser, "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism."

14. Donald N. Clark, "Bitter Friendship: Understanding Anti-Americanism in South Korea," in Donald N. Clark, ed. *Korea Briefing 1991* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). On the growing trend of Koreans criticizing other Koreans for being too pro-American, see David I. Steinberg, "On *Mikguk Nemsae*," *US-Korea Tomorrow* 6, no. 2 (April 2003). In December 2002, "Never had so many people exhibited neutral sentiments or feared being ostracized by others for holding pro-American sentiments." Byung-Kook Kim, "An Anti-American Americanized Generation? The Paradox of Democratization, Globalization and Antiterrorism in Korea," paper presented at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the East Asia Institute, Harvard University, February 14–15, 2003.

15. Hyun Syng-il, "Anti-Americanism in Korean Student Movement," in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seong Hyong Lee, eds. *Forty Years of Korea-U.S. Relations, 1948–1988* (Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press, 1990).

16. John Kie-chang Oh, "Anti-Americanism and Anti-Authoritarian Politics in Korea," in Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., *Two Koreas in Transition: Implications for U.S. Policy* (Rockville, MD: In Depth Books, 1998).

17. Stephen W. Linton, "Impact of Anti-American Sentiments in the ROK on the U.S.-ROK Security Alliance." Conference on the 2002 Presidential Elections in the Republic of Korea: Implications and Impacts. Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, April 2003. It was apparent in the Korean response to the 1988 Olympics held in Seoul that a very large and vocal element of the audience cheered for any opponent to any American team.

18. John Kie-chang Oh, "Anti-Americanism and Anti-Authoritarian Politics in Korea," in Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., *Two Koreas in Transition: Implications for U.S. Policy* (Rockville, MD: In Depth Books, 1998).

19. The definitive study of control and misuse of the media in Kwangju is Jae-kyoung Lee, "Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Media and the Politics of Signification," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1993.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

22. See Kyu Ho Youn, *Press Law in South Korea* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1966).

23. The government claimed that these papers, specifically *Chosun Ilbo*, *Dong-A Ilbo*, and *Joongang Ilbo*, which together represent some 70 percent of newspaper circulation, were evading taxes and by law had to be audited at least every five years. Whether this was true is unclear to this writer, but as one sage American correspondent quipped, "You don't get into a fight with people who buy ink by the ton." These papers were critical of president Kim's "Sunshine Policy" toward North Korea—a policy that became the hallmark of his administration.

24. Taegy Son, "The Law of Political Libel and Freedom of the Press in the Republic of Korea and the United States," Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2002.

25. In one conference, I was asked by a Korean institution to write a paper on the role of the American press in improving relations on the Korean peninsula. I replied that this was a Korean, not an American, question, because from an American vantage point, there was no such

role of conforming to administration policies, while in Korea the practice has been for the media to support the state when the latter is in dispute with foreign nations.

26. Stephen Rounds, "The Korean Media and Anti-Americanism: A Case Study" [unpublished paper].

27. Auh Taik Sup, professor of mass communications, Korea University at a seminar in Seoul in 2002 on "An Overview of Korean Perceptions of the United States and U.S.-Korean Relations."

28. Personal interview, former director, KBS, Seoul, June 2003.

29. Gi-wook Shin, "South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective," *Asian Survey* 2936, no. 8 (1996).

30. For a study of the U.S. role, see David I. Steinberg, "U.S. Policy and Human Rights in the Republic of Korea: The Influence of Policy or the Policy of Influence," in the U.S. Institute of Peace study on U.S. influence on human rights worldwide (forthcoming 2004).

31. Such disputes are too numerous to chronicle, but include steel: selling Hanbo Steel, Daewoo Motor, and Hynex semiconductors. Other issues were forcing U.S. cigarettes into the Korean market at the time when the United States had declared them a health hazard at home, the pricing of imported pharmaceuticals that affected the Korean health system, and so on. Other issues involved zoning for housing the U.S. Embassy in downtown Seoul. See Yang Junsok, "Anti-Americanism in Korea?" *US-Korea Tomorrow*, April 2003.

32. See Chapter 5.

33. Doh C. Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

34. Kim Sung-han, "Realignment of U.S. Forces in Korea and Korean Attitudes Toward the United States," Korea-U.S. Opinion Leaders Forum, July 11-12, 2003, Washington, DC, Korea Economic Institute of America.

35. This was the subject of a talk by Dr. Curt Campbell, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, at the CSIS-Pacific Forum seminar on Korea, May 23, 2003.

36. According to Byung-Kook Kim's study "An Anti-American Americanized Generation?" the percentage of Koreans who want immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops has been constant for a dozen or so years at under 10 percent, while about 45 percent want staged withdrawals.

37. Don Oberdorfer notes that the Koreans and Americans do not talk against the U.S.-ROK alliance as such, but they do not seriously examine it either. Even President Carter did not do this in his advocacy of U.S. troop withdrawals. Some felt that Koreans wanted the United States to save them from dictatorships, which was not done because of the security priority. Although earlier Korean students were anti-American because of a radical ideology, this is not presently true. The seeds of disaffection are broadly shared, with no sense of threat from the North among the college students interviewed. Whatever the United States does, it does without the consent of Korea, and this strains the alliance to the breaking point. The United States must take account of Korean attitudes, for not to do so will affect Northeast Asia and mean the further rise of China.

38. Jae Sung-min commented that the United States emphasizes human rights, respect for property, and the rule of law, but the Korean people believe that the United States is moving away from these ideals. There is a clash of policies between the ROK. and the United States on North Korean issues, and now one must distinguish anti-U.S. sentiment from anti-Bush administration sentiment. The Bush administration is characterized as arrogant. There was no such anti-U.S. feeling during the Clinton administration, he claimed. In fact, Bush has empowered Kim Jong Il by calling him "evil." There is a Korean saying, "Even if she is ugly, dance with her."

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Part I

Global, Regional, and Comparative Perspectives

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1

Anti-Americanism in the Age of American Unipolarity

G. John Ikenberry

Introduction

The United States is increasingly unpopular around the world. The era of good feelings about America that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War is over. The momentary sympathy for the United States that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has also passed away. Recent public opinion data gathered from dozens of countries indicate that while many people around the world admire America—its ideals and open society—they have growing misgivings about its policies and role in the world. Anti-Americanism has also become part of presidential elections in various parts of the world. Schroeder in Germany, Lula in Brazil, and Roh in South Korea—all these recent election victors drew upon themes that involved opposition to the United States and its policies.¹

What accounts for this wave of anti-Americanism? Is it about American power or American policy? Is it a deep and inevitable outgrowth of the changing global power structure, in which the United States increasingly towers above everyone else? Or is this global anger and resentment at America a more focused reaction to current American foreign policy? How earthshaking is this recent upsurge in anti-Americanism? Is it a passing tempest in the American hegemonic teapot, or is it the prelude to a more basic fracturing of the American-led international order?

The driving forces of this global reaction to the United States are the everyday frustrations and worries that are produced by sharp power disparities between America and the rest of the world. Because of America's size, small shifts in its policy can have huge consequences for other states. At the same time, there is little in America's environment to discipline the exercise of Washington's power. If America sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold. It is hard for the world to ignore or work around the United States regardless of the issue—trade, finance, security, proliferation, or the environment. But while the world worries about what America does next—or neglects to do—the United States needs to worry very little about what the rest of the world does. In such a benign and unchallenged environ-

ment, American foreign policy tends to be driven by domestic politics or the current policy tastes of its leaders. The sad fact is that in a world of unipolar power, Americans need to know very little about what other governments or peoples think, but foreigners must worry about the vagaries of congressional campaigns and the idiosyncratic prejudices of senate committee chairmen.

This paper argues that recent shifts in the international power structure have altered general perceptions of the United States. The American system is increasingly experiencing a "legitimacy deficit"—and anti-Americanism in East Asia, western Europe, and elsewhere is a reflection of this development. The American-led international order has always rested on a combination of force and consent; but in the eyes of many people, the balance has shifted toward force. To some extent, this development is rooted in the changing distribution of global power, and any American president would confront this new reality. But while some of today's anti-Americanism is inevitable, its character and intensity are not. American policies and postures matter.

Three considerations are important in placing current anti-Americanism in perspective. First, it is important to distinguish between foreign anger and disapproval of American policy and America itself. The enormity of American power clearly worries people around the world, but American policy can either mitigate or exacerbate these worries. American policy today—whatever its merits or justifications—is tending to exacerbate these worries.

Second, reactions to the United States vary widely around the world. Public approval of the United States is high in some regions—such as eastern Europe—and low elsewhere. This is another way of saying that American power and foreign policy are not experienced in the same way in all places. The American imperium is variously a threat and an opportunity. The United States continues to offer its European and Asian partners both markets and security protection. There continue to be overwhelming reasons for governments in Asia and Europe to work with the United States—to engage it and attempt to alter the most untoward aspects of its policies—rather than resist or balance against it.

Third, the United States is not newly powerful. It has been at the apex of world power for most of the twentieth century. There is a historical record that demonstrates how the United States can provoke anger and resentment among foreigners but also friendship and esteem. At various historical moments, the United States has been able to wrap its unrivaled power in the clothing of shared values and cooperative security—thereby eliciting support and acquiescence from other peoples and governments. There are insights in this historical record that indicate how the United States might do the same again today.

Varieties of Anti-Americanism

The most striking aspect of today's anti-Americanism is its variability. Attitudes toward the United States vary widely across countries, but these attitudes also are focused on a variety of aspects of the United States—its political system, values, and

foreign policies. Untangling these complex attitudes is important in order to make sense of the magnitude and shifting character of anti-Americanism.

Recent public opinion polling by several different groups bears out this variability. In a Pew Foundation poll of forty-four countries, the findings show that there are majorities in most countries that have a favorable view of the United States: 61 percent of Germans, 63 percent of the French, and 75 percent of the British had such views—and, overall, majorities in thirty-five of the forty-four countries liked the United States. It is primarily in the Muslim world—Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey—that majorities dislike America.²

Majorities—or at least large minorities—in most western and Asian countries do not like the ideas and values that the United States spreads around the world. This finding is true even in western countries that share the same liberal democratic traditions. American political culture enshrines an antistatist individualism and laissez-faire market society, while European political traditions privilege communal liberalism and social democracy. These divergent traditions give play to more specific differences over a host of issues, such as environmental protection, regulatory policies, corporate rules, and social welfare. Others see the values disagreement hinging on religion. The United States is more prepared to embrace “traditional values”—religion, family, country—thus inclining it more toward older-style nationalism and to see the world in terms of good and evil. Europeans tend toward more “secular-rational” values. “In America,” the *Economist* reports, “even technical matters become moral questions. It is almost impossible to have a debate about gun registration without it becoming an argument about the right to self-defense. In Europe, even moral questions are sometimes treated as technical ones, as happened with the controversy over stem-cell research.”³ These differences have been around for a long time, but the loss of a common Soviet threat and the rise of new transnational issues give salience to value splits.

Some see a deeper philosophical divide between the United States and the outside world—including western Europe. Francis Fukuyama argues that the disagreement is over the locus of liberal democratic legitimacy. In his view, the United States tends to see the source of democratic legitimacy in the constitutional nation-state. This, in turn, places severe limits on the willingness of the United States to cede power to higher international or supranational authority. “To the extent that any international organization has legitimacy, it is because duly constituted democratic majorities have handed that legitimacy up to them in a negotiated, contractual process. Such legitimacy can be withdrawn at any time by the contracting parties. International law and organization have no existence independent of this type of voluntary agreement between sovereign nation-states.” In contrast, Fukuyama argues, Europeans tend to believe that democratic legitimacy flows more from the will of the international community. “This international community is not embodied concretely in a single, global democratic constitutional order. Yet it hands down legitimacy to existing international institutions, which are seen as partially embodying it.”⁴

These differences tend to reinforce the view that the United States is not just the

most powerful country in the world—but that it also sees itself as exceptional and therefore not fully willing to play by the rules that others must play by. Europe and other countries are committed to building an international order that binds individual nation-states to global rules and authority, while the United States clings to its sovereignty and the primacy of the nation-state. Europe and the rest of the world community seek a rule-based international order, and the Americans seek a world made safe for national polities. This split has potentially far-reaching implications for the myriad issues that the United States and the rest of the world struggle over—peacekeeping, the United Nations, the use of force, the World Trade Organization (WTO). These struggles are not just over divergent interests but also over philosophical principles.

America's rise as a unipolar power is a critical aspect of the recent wave of anti-Americanism. On the one hand, the Pew study did find that majorities in most countries said that a world with a rival superpower would be less safe than today's unipolar system—and this was even true for Russians.⁵ But there is growing nervousness and anger in many quarters about the way the United States exercises its power. When Europeans were asked if the United States should remain the only superpower or the European Union (EU) should become a military and economic superpower like the United States, 65 percent of European respondents want the European Union to rise to superpower status. But the vast majority of these Europeans—nine out of ten—indicated that they support this as a way for Europe to better cooperate with the United States, not to compete with it.⁶

America's position as a lone superpower that can project force around the world—seemingly without restraint—is an important aspect of today's disquiet. It is revealing that in the recent public opinion polls, Europeans were willing to agree to the use of force in Iraq by a clear majority if the United Nations sanctioned the war. If it were to be unilateral American intervention, opposition to the use of force dominated. The world worries about American power—about the way it is used to promote ideas and values and about its disassociation from the rules and norms of the international community.

Three Types of American Power

Is it possible to isolate more clearly the various sources of anti-Americanism? In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between three forms or levels of American power: system-structural, political-institutional, and policy-related power. Each is a distinct type of power that offers a complex array of threats and opportunities to governments and peoples around the world. Each can be seen as a type of domination with its own type of politics.

System-Structural Power

The most basic and diffuse form of power is system-structural. This is power as manifest in the global structures of American-led capitalism and democracy. In effect, the global spread of modern western systems of politics and economics is a process in