

# THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY

The crest of the University of Cambridge is centered in the background of the middle section. It features a shield with four lions, surrounded by a wreath and a ribbon with the motto 'HILARY 1584'.

VOLUME VI  
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A  
GLOBAL WORLD, 1400–1800 CE  
PART 2  
PATTERNS OF CHANGE

EDITED BY  
JERRY H. BENTLEY  
SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM  
MERRY E. WIESNER-HANKS



## THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY

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### VOLUME VI

The era from 1400 to 1800 saw intense biological, commercial, and cultural exchanges, and the creation of global connections on an unprecedented scale. Divided into two books, Volume vi of *The Cambridge World History* series considers these critical transformations. The first book examines the material and political foundations of the era, including global considerations of the environment, disease, technology, and cities, along with regional studies of empires in the eastern and western hemispheres, crossroads areas such as the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and the Caribbean, and sites of competition and conflict, including Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean. The second book focuses on patterns of change, examining the expansion of Christianity and Islam, migrations, warfare, and other topics on a global scale, and offering insightful detailed analyses of the Columbian Exchange, slavery, silver, trade, entrepreneurs, Asian religions, legal encounters, plantation economies, early industrialism, and the writing of history.

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THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY

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VOLUME VI

The Construction of a Global World,  
1400–1800 CE

Part 2: Patterns of Change

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*In honor and memory of Jerry Bentley (1949–2012)*



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## Preface

The Cambridge Histories have long presented authoritative multi-volume overviews of historical topics, with chapters written by specialists. The first of these, the *Cambridge Modern History*, planned by Lord Acton and appearing after his death from 1902 to 1912, had fourteen volumes and served as the model for those that followed, which included the seven-volume *Cambridge Medieval History* (1911–1936), the twelve-volume *Cambridge Ancient History* (1924–1939), the thirteen-volume *Cambridge History of China* (1978–2009), and more specialized multi-volume works on countries, religions, regions, events, themes, and genres. These works are designed, as the *Cambridge History of China* puts it, to be the “largest and most comprehensive” history in the English language of their topic, and, as the *Cambridge History of Political Thought* asserts, to cover “every major theme.”

The *Cambridge World History* both follows and breaks with the model set by its august predecessors. Presenting the “largest and most comprehensive” history of the world would take at least 300 volumes – and a hundred years – as would covering “every major theme.” Instead the series provides an overview of the dynamic field of world history in seven volumes over nine books. It covers all of human history, not simply that since the development of written records, in an expanded time frame that represents the newest thinking in world history. This broad time frame blurs the line between archaeology and history, and presents both as complementary approaches to the human past. The volume editors include archaeologists as well as historians, and have positions at universities in the United States, Britain, France, Australia, and Israel. The essays similarly draw on a broad author pool of historians, art historians, anthropologists, classicists, archaeologists, economists, sociologists, and area studies specialists, who come from universities in Australia, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore, and the United States. They include very senior scholars whose works have helped to form the field, and also mid-career and younger scholars whose research will continue to shape it in the future. Some of the authors are closely associated with the rise of world history as a distinct research and teaching field, while others describe what they do primarily as global history, transnational history, international history, or comparative history. (Several of the essays in Volume 1 trace the development of these overlapping, entangled, and at times competing fields.) Many authors are simply specialists on their topic who the editors thought could best explain this to a broader audience or reach beyond their comfort zones into territory that was new.

Reflecting the increasing awareness that world history can be examined through many different approaches and at varying geographic and chronological scales, each volume

offers several types of essay, including regional, topical, and comparative ones, along with case studies that provide depth to go with the breadth of vision that is the distinguishing characteristic of world history. Volume I (*Introducing World History* [to 10,000 BCE]) introduces key frames of analysis that shape the making of world history across time periods, with essays on overarching approaches, methods, and themes. It then includes a group of essays on the Paleolithic, covering the 95 percent of human history up to 10,000 BCE. From that point on, each volume covers a shorter time period than its predecessor, with slightly overlapping chronologies volume to volume to reflect the complex periodization of a truly global history. The editors chose the overlapping chronologies, and stayed away from traditional period titles (e.g. “classical” or “early modern”) intentionally to challenge standard periodization to some degree. The overlapping chronologies also allow each volume to highlight geographic disjunctures and imbalances, and the ways in which various areas influenced one another. Each of the volumes centers on a key theme or cluster of themes that the editors view as central to the period covered in the volume and also as essential to an understanding of world history as a whole.

Volume II (*A World with Agriculture, 12,000 BCE–500 CE*) begins with the Neolithic, but continues into later periods to explore the origins of agriculture and agricultural communities in various regions of the world, as well as to discuss issues associated with pastoralism and hunter-fisher-gatherer economies. It traces common developments in the more complex social structures and cultural forms that agriculture enabled, and then presents a series of regional overviews accompanied by detailed case studies from many different parts of the world.

Volume III (*Early Cities in Comparative Perspective, 4000 BCE–1200 CE*) focuses on early cities as motors of change in human society. Through case studies of cities and comparative chapters that address common issues, it traces the creation and transmission of administrative and information technologies, the performance of rituals, the distribution of power, and the relationship of cities with their hinterlands. It has a broad and flexible chronology to capture the development of cities in various regions of the world and the transformation of some cities into imperial capitals.

Volume IV (*A World with States, Empires, and Networks, 1200 BCE–900 CE*) continues the analysis of processes associated with the creation of larger-scale political entities and networks of exchange, including those generally featured in accounts of the rise of “classical civilizations,” but with an expanded time frame that allows the inclusion of more areas of the world. It analyzes common social, economic, cultural, political, and technological developments, and includes chapters on slavery, religion, science, art, and gender. It then presents a series of regional overviews, each accompanied by a case study or two examining one smaller geographic area or topic within that region in greater depth.

Volume V (*Expanding Webs of Exchange and Conquest, 500 CE–1500 CE*) highlights the growing networks of trade and cross-cultural interaction that were a hallmark of the millennium covered in the volume, including the expansion of text-based religions and the transmission of science, philosophy, and technology. It explores social structures, cultural institutions, and significant themes such as the environment, warfare, education, the family, and courtly cultures on both a global and Eurasian scale, and continues the examination of state formation begun in Volume IV with chapters on polities and empires in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas.

The first five volumes each appear in a single book, but the last two are double volumes covering the periods conventionally known as the early modern and modern, an organization signaling the increasing complexity of an ever more globalized world in the last half millennium, as well as the expanding base of source materials and existing historical analyses for these more recent eras. Volume vi (*The Construction of a Global World, 1400–1800 CE*) traces the increasing biological, commercial, and cultural exchanges of the period, and explores regional and trans-regional political, cultural, and intellectual developments. The first book within this volume, “Foundations,” focuses on global matrices that allowed this increasingly interdependent world to be created, including the environment, technology, and disease; crossroads and macro-regions such as the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia in which connections were especially intense; and large-scale political formations, particularly maritime and land-based empires such as Russia, the Islamic Empires, and the Iberian Empires that stretched across continents and seas. The second book within this volume, “Patterns of Change,” examines global and regional migrations and encounters, and the economic, social, cultural, and institutional structures that both shaped and were shaped by these, including trade networks, law, commodity flows, production processes, and religious systems.

Volume vii (*Production, Destruction, and Connection, 1750–Present*) examines the uneven transition to a world with fossil fuels and an exploding human population that has grown ever more interactive through processes of globalization. The first book within this double volume, “Structures, Spaces, and Boundary Making,” discusses the material situations within which our crowded world has developed, including the environment, agriculture, technology, energy, and disease; the political movements that have shaped it, such as nationalism, imperialism, decolonization, and communism; and some of its key regions. The second book, “Shared Transformations?,” explores topics that have been considered in earlier volumes, including the family, urbanization, migration, religion, and science, along with some that only emerge as global phenomena in this era, such as sports, music, and the automobile, as well as specific moments of transition, including the Cold War and 1989.

Taken together, the volumes contain about 200 essays, which means the *Cambridge World History* is comprehensive, but certainly not exhaustive. Each volume editor has made difficult choices about what to include and what to leave out, a problem for all world histories since those of Herodotus and Sima Qian more than two millennia ago. Each volume is arranged in the way that the volume editor or editors have decided is most appropriate for the period, so that organizational schema differ slightly from volume to volume. Given the overlapping chronologies, certain topics are covered in several different volumes because they are important for understanding the historical processes at the heart of each of these, and because we as editors decided that viewing key developments from multiple perspectives is particularly appropriate for world history. As with other *Cambridge Histories*, the essays are relatively lightly footnoted, and include a short list of further readings, the first step for readers who want to delve deeper into the field. In contrast to other *Cambridge Histories*, all volumes are being published at the same time, for the leisurely pace of the print world that allowed publication over several decades does not fit with twenty-first-century digital demands.

In other ways as well, the *Cambridge World History* reflects the time in which it has been conceptualized and produced, just as the *Cambridge Modern History* did. Lord Acton envisioned his work, and Cambridge University Press described it, as “a history of the world,” although in only a handful of chapters out of several hundred were the principal actors individuals, groups, or polities outside of Europe and North America. This is not surprising, although the identical self-description of the *New Cambridge Modern History* (1957–1979), with a similar balance of topics, might be a bit more so. The fact that in 1957 – and even in 1979 – Europe would be understood as “the world” and as the source of all that was modern highlights the power and longevity of the perspective we have since come to call “Eurocentric.” (In other languages, there are perspectives on world history that are similarly centered on the regions in which they have been produced.) The continued focus on Europe in the mid-twentieth century also highlights the youth of the fields of world and global history, in which the conferences, professional societies, journals, and other markers of an up-and-coming field have primarily emerged since the 1980s, and some only within the last decade. The *Journal of World History*, for example, was first published in 1990, the *Journal of Global History* in 2005, and *New Global Studies* in 2007.

World and global history have developed in an era of intense self-reflection in all academic disciplines, when no term can be used unselfconsciously and every category must be complicated. Worries about inclusion and exclusion, about diversity and multivocality are standard practice in sub-fields of history and related disciplines that have grown up in this atmosphere. Thus as we editors sought topics that would give us a balance between the traditional focus in world history on large-scale political and economic processes carried out by governments and commercial elites and newer concerns with cultural forms, representation, and meaning, we also sought to include topics that have been important in different national historiographies. We also attempted to find authors who would provide geographic balance along with a balance between older and younger voices. Although the author pool is decidedly broader geographically – and more balanced in terms of gender – than it was in either of the *Cambridge Modern Histories*, it is not as global as we had hoped. Contemporary world and global history is overwhelmingly Anglophone, and, given the scholarly diaspora, disproportionately institutionally situated in the United States and the United Kingdom. Along with other disparities in our contemporary world, this disproportion is, of course, the result of the developments traced in this series, though the authors might disagree about which volume holds the key to its origins, or whether one should spend much time searching for origins at all.

My hopes for the series are not as sweeping as Lord Acton’s were for his, but fit with those of Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, the editors of the two-volume *Cambridge Economic History of India* (1982). In the preface to their work, they comment: “We only dare to hope that our collaborative effort will stimulate discussion and help create new knowledge which may replace before many years the information and analysis offered in this volume.” In a field as vibrant as world and global history, I have no doubts that such new transformative knowledge will emerge quickly, but hope this series will provide an entrée to the field, and a useful overview of its state in the early twenty-first century.

MERRY E. WIESNER-HANKS

PART ONE

★

MIGRATIONS AND  
ENCOUNTERS





# Global migrations

DIRK HOERDER

In the tri-continental African-Asian-European World, three unrelated macro-regional and political developments at mid-fifteenth century were to have major impacts on migration and power relations globally: First, in China, the transoceanic outreach epitomized by Admiral Zheng He's ambassadorial voyages between 1403 and 1433 to the "Western" or Indian Ocean and as far as East Africa's thriving port cities were ended by decree of the Imperial Court. Second, the Crown in Portugal, in contrast, decided to expand outreach by providing state support for merchants venturing southward along Africa's Atlantic coasts. Third, in the Eastern Mediterranean and West Central Asia, the hinge region of trade between China, the Indian Ocean societies and the Mediterranean's city-states, the emerging Ottoman Empire inserted itself between Arab and Venetian merchants. When, in the 1490s, Iberian mariners in search of a westward passage to "the Indies" and its imagined riches hit an unexpected barrier that came to be called the "Americas," a fourth major change resulted, this one demographic: the near-genocide of the population and resettlement. This, for the Europeans, "new world," was a known and lived space to resident peoples; *new* were the in-migrating Iberians' religion and quest for material gain.

The migratory consequences of these developments were many and included six major ones: first, the emergence of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia; second, new patterns of trade and mobility between Iberian and Atlantic Europe and Asia's many regions; third, the importation of bound Africans to Iberia; fourth, a new type of bondage, chattel slavery, with its forced mass migrations in the emerging European-ruled global plantation belt; fifth, population collapse in the Americas brought about by the European intruders' germs, warfare, and exploitation, which emptied the double continent for mass arrival of indentured and free Europeans and enslaved Africans; sixth, the Iberian and Dutch circum-African outreach, which involved few migrants but established a new regime that combined

mercantile expertise with armed state power and in which private investments and profits were subsidized by public-funded soldiery and administrators. This globalization replaced protocols of unarmed trade that had kept transaction costs low; the new, armed trade induced or enforced labor, refugee, and other migrations across the world.

Wherever voyagers, migrants, refugees, and bound or free laborers arrived, they encountered functioning societies with knowledge of the region's ecology and with societal-political structures. The newcomers from Europe, "explorers" in their self-deceiving master narratives, came with different knowledge acquired in their own socialization. They coveted the riches of "the Indies" and the labor of "the negroes" – both constructs of white ideologues. When they encountered resident societies, they could opt for co-existence, intermingling, or violence. Each group's "funds of knowledge" could be supplementary, contradictory, or parallel to others. Those with more guns and with a more aggressive religious, racial, and mercantile ideology imposed direct rule or indirect hegemony. Unarmed trader cultures and regional merchants became middle "men" or, more correctly, mediating family economies, who, because they were bi- or multi-lingual, could translate exchanges between local producers and visitors, whether long-distance merchants or self-imposing colonizers without knowledge of languages and exchange practices. In-migrating men with long-distance connections often associated with or married local women of rank to access their networks and social capital. Such partnership-families connected the local and the distant. Wealthy Europeans' demand for spices, silver or gold, porcelain or silk, and for plantation-produced sugar stimulated production and the demand for labor, and thus also stimulated labor and expert migrations. Information feedback about the options (seemingly) available in newly connected distant regions induced men and women of the poorer classes, who could hardly feed themselves and their children, to depart. So-called "free migrants" left unsatisfactory "homes" under severe economic constraints and societies that did not permit sustainable lives. Establishing themselves elsewhere involved acculturation, a coming to terms with different agricultural and commercial frames – climatic, geographic, spatial, societal, spiritual. Migrants' cultural *métissage* and non-migrating people's adjustment to the capabilities and impositions of newcomers are a core element of world history's dynamics.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jerry H. Bentley, *Old World Encounters. Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times* (New York: Oxford, 1993); Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

We will approach migrations by first summarizing in broad strokes the continuities and changes by macro-region across the globe from the earlier centuries to about 1500 and in some cases beyond. Next the penetration of heavily armed mobile Europeans into the societies of the Caribbean and South America, West Africa, the Indian Ocean's littorals and Southeast Asian islands will be analyzed in terms of displacement of and dominance over resident settled or mobile peoples. Motivations were economic: demand for northern furs, Southeast Asian spices, Chinese luxury goods, and – in the emerging plantation complex – mass-produced consumables including sugar, tea, and coffee. Since the European, powerful newcomers lacked knowledge of the languages, cultures, and customs of the economically or politically annexed territories and peoples, they required intermediaries – a further category of migrants. The mobility of intrusive investors and supportive state personnel ("colonial administrators") resulted in vast, mostly forced, migrations of men and women as laborers to produce for the Europeans' demand. The imposed production and labor regimes, in turn, led to depletion of resources and to involuntary departure of original resident peoples deprived of their means to gain their livelihood. In a further section we will discuss the migration of those Europeans who also had difficulty in gaining their livelihood – the ideology of European superiority and whiteness discourses veil the poverty endemic in many regions of Europe, forcing rural and urban underclasses to depart. But once arriving in the Americas, southern Africa, or Australia, supported by powerful colonizer states, migrants established themselves as settlers over resident peoples and imposed "settler regimes." In conclusion we will offer a comprehensive perspective on migrants and migrations in this period. For a long time historians have paid attention mainly to the long-distance migrations of white men or white women, but we will return to the full complexity of migrations of women and men in almost all societies of the world.

### Macro-regional migrations: continuities and changes

Migration and cultural exchange, as constituent processes of societies, are not defined by fixed continents or bounded states. Micro-, meso-, and macro-regions that provide economic and cultural options for life prospects set parameters. They are defined by natural and human-made characteristics: plains, littorals, and mountain valleys, contiguous or connectable by camel or horse, by navigable rivers or seas, or by challenging mountain passes or

desert-crossing routes. Groups of people, often known by ethno-cultural labeling, developed the knowledge to overcome distances and to use natural resources. By the fifteenth century, all continents had become interconnected spaces. The Indian Ocean's mariners had decoded the monsoon patterns a millennium-and-a-half before this; northern Arab and sub-Saharan black peoples connected along the Nile River valley and across the Sahara. In the sub-Arctic, Norse men and women had migrated in an hemispheric arc westward as far as Vinland and eastward via the Volga River to Byzantium, and had built states in Normandy, Sicily, and Palestine. From mid-thirteenth to mid-fourteenth century, the Mongols, highly mobile horse-borne peoples, expanded by aggression and destruction, then established rule over a trans-steppe realm. Their *pax mongolica* protected the transcontinental "Silk Road" trading. The tri-continental Mediterranean core of the West, after about 1000 CE, was supplemented by connectivity in Europe's land-centered western, central, and eastern sections. In the Americas, the centralized empires of the Aztec and Inca emerged in the central highlands of Mesoamerica and the southwestern Andean slopes in the 1400s. Trade routes radiated northward into the Plains and crossed the Eastern Woodlands.

### *Asia*

Of the "four Asias" – China, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Japan (with Siberia, the fifth, better viewed in connection with the Russian Empire) – the realm of the Ming and Qing dynasties, like all polities, expanded and contracted. From its early Yellow River core, peasant families and urban people had migrated by the millions southward to the fertile Yangtzi Delta and reached what is now Guangdong province in the thirteenth century, while absorbing resident peoples and adapting their techniques for cultivation of specific terrains. The in-migrant Mongol Yuan rulers (1271–1368) were succeeded by the Ming (1368–1644), who came from among the core Chinese ethno-cultural group, the Han; the Ming were in turn replaced by in-migrant Manchu Qing (1644–1912). The empire expanded as far as western Sichuan where resident peoples and mobile armies of Islamic faith from the south stopped further advance. Intensive cultural exchange ensued. Migrating monks from South Asia induced widespread religious change: Buddhism came to co-exist with the indigenous Daoist beliefs and Confucianism. Though continuously incorporating culturally different peoples by annexation and in-migration, the state attempted to exclude northern mobile intruders. The "Great Wall's" construction and maintenance required internal mass migration of workers and soldier-peasant families. The capital,

Hangzhou, housed some two million people of many cultures and multiple migration trajectories around 1400. Zheng He's fleets, thirty times the size of Columbus's and carrying up to 28,000 men, exchanged Chinese, Arab, and African products. A conservative court bureaucracy, hostile to innovation and "foreign" imports, ended the outreach to focus on the multiple and mobile land-based populations which produced whatever society needed. In defiance of such restrictions, however, entrepreneurs of southern Fujian province continued their relations with peninsular and insular Southeast Asian societies; artisans and laborers followed, and a permanently settled diaspora emerged. Men and local women formed families, and mixed children grew up; other men, "long-term sojourners," returned to fulfill Confucian precepts mandating that sons care for the spirits of ancestors.<sup>2</sup>

In Southeast Asia, a productive and integrated macro-region, highly skilled seafaring groups connected island peoples with those of the Malay Peninsula. By the fifteenth century, the Straits' port cities accommodated South and East Asian, Persian, and Arab merchants, along with Indonesian island traders. Arab migrants introduced Islam; Javanese trade missions reached China's Imperial Court; refugees from war-ravaged regions founded new urban agglomerations. After the late-thirteenth-century demise of the Srivijaya Empire, non-state-based mobile entrepreneurs recruited themselves from among migrants, fugitives, outlaws, and escaped slaves of Japanese, Chinese, and African background and became "pirates" or "buccaneers."<sup>3</sup> To the mid-sixteenth century they rendered port-city-based trade and migration unsafe. Depending on the strength of a particular polity or on investment strategies of specific merchants, whether Gujarati or Fujianese, the regions' migratory and cultural exchanges assumed a distinctive character in particular periods.<sup>4</sup>

Japan's rulers, by 1400, had sent soldiers and migrants to annex Hokkaido with its peoples in the north and the northernmost Ryūkyū Islands to the

<sup>2</sup> Ping-to Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953* (Cambridge University Press, 1959); Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).

<sup>3</sup> The term buccaneer, derived from the Arawak word for a wooden frame to smoke meat, originated in the early seventeenth-century Caribbean where highly mobile crews of French, Dutch, English, and probably other men attacked Spanish galleons for private gain (and smoked meat on such frames). The English Crown came to license such crews since piracy was a cheaper way of attacking its rival Spain than outfitting and dispatching the Royal Navy.

<sup>4</sup> Maria A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and About 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 13–26, 89–115.

south. They also encouraged internal migrations by urbanization. Although in the early seventeenth century they did invade and annex the southern Ryūkyū Islands, in general and in contrast to the Southeast Asian societies, Japanese development and migrations remained land-based and extended no further than to neighboring islands and peninsulas.

South Asia, internally highly diverse by regions, rule, and cultures, experienced in-migration and cultural métissage from invaders and others crossing the Pamir Mountains. Merchants from Gujarat, the southwestern Malabar and the southeastern Coromandel coasts connected to Arabian, East African, and Southeast Asian ports and peoples. Monsoon-driven long sojourns resulted in community formation. Internally, South Asia's societies were both mobile and immobile. Earlier, armed Islamic migrants had penetrated the Indus Valley; in the early sixteenth century the Mughal rulers (Timurid Mongols) arrived from the north and established a state that lasted until the nineteenth century; itinerant Muslim Sufi Orders proselytized; elites and common urbanites lived a fusion of Indic, Persian, and Turkish cultures. Southward-migrating peasant and warrior families from northwestern Vijayanagara established Telugu-speakers among native southern Tamil-speakers; westward migrations from upper Burma established Ahoms in the Brahmaputra Valley. However, Hinduism's prescriptions for purity in everyday food challenged mobility since travel necessitated impure eating practices. In addition, separation (*purdah*) of women into distinct quarters in a family's dwelling restricted their mobility. On the other hand, widespread if regionally specific views of social relations made inhabitants of one (village) community relatives and, in consequence, at marriage women had to migrate to neighboring communities – a short-distance migration which involved adjustment. On the whole, the mobility of common people distant from the littorals was often short-distance; urban cultural fusion hardly touched them, but in-migration, expansion, and religious conversion did.<sup>5</sup>

### *Africa*

Trade and migration connected South Asia's western with Africa's eastern societies; Madagascar had been settled from both Indonesia and Africa. The several Africas – Egyptian-Nilotic, Mediterranean, the eastern, central, and

<sup>5</sup> Jagadish N. Sarkar, *Studies in Economic Life in Mughal India* (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1975); Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge University Press, 1985).

western sub-Saharan regions, the southern segment – evidenced high levels of mobility. The Mediterranean littoral had been settled from the east by Arab-speaking peoples; in the Nile River valley northern Egyptian and southern (dark) Nubian peoples interacted; agricultural Bantu-speakers of many language variants moved southward and came in contact with the Khoisan. East African trading societies with sedentary urbanites and mobile merchants, using Swahili as *lingua franca*, reached their height in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The savannah's westbound migrating groups brought Islam, and elites of Muslim faith interacted with pastoralists and agriculturalists of animist persuasion. Complex, competing states had emerged before 1400. Each change of rule and societal structures changed opportunities and constraints and induced or forced families and groups to migrate. Muslims' *hajj* to Mecca, extending over years and funded by trading activities along the routes, resembled temporary migrations. Swahili and Hausa speakers established commercial diasporas. In size and sophistication, cities from the East African Coast to the Niger River compared with European ones. Along its Atlantic Coast, from Senegal to Nigeria (modern terms), numerous peoples speaking hundreds of languages moved and mingled; the Kru emerged as a coastal seafaring people.

Various types of bondage were common in Africa. Rights-in-persons practices bound poorer relatives or debtors to wealthier men. Women, knowledgeable agriculturalists, were particularly valued as a rural labor force. In contrast, male war captives were traded over long distances as far as the Mediterranean Arab world. Thus categories of bondage were fluid, ranging from rights-in-persons and short-distance moves to long-distance trade – some 10,000 men were force-migrated northward annually by the fourteenth century. Free, regionally specific migrations included iron- and gold-working craftsmen and women in West Africa and Zimbabwe, service personnel in urban centers, and students and scholars heading for Timbuktu, which from 1400 to 1600 was the most important Islamic center of learning. Portuguese, arriving from the mid-1430s, established fortified trading posts along the Guinea coast to acquire gold, cloth, slaves, and other valuables. Around 1500 some 10 percent of Lisbon's population was of African origin. Initially such slaves remained persons and could intermarry with Iberians. Migrants carried beliefs: Christian missionaries moved south, others adopted veneration of Black Madonnas originating in West African fertility cults or the Egyptian worship of Isis. As everywhere, the designation of peoples as, for example, Fulbe, Wolof, or Bantu, hid the constant reconstitution of groups through migration,

expulsion, flight, and incorporation of male strangers through community-sanctioned marriage with local women.<sup>6</sup>

### *The Mediterranean World*

In the Mediterranean world, Africa's Arab northern littoral connected via the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and via the Black Sea and Persia to the trans-Asian Silk Road. Through the economic power of Genoa and Venice but also Amalfi and Greek-founded Neapolis, the European littoral attracted as well as shipped migrants. Their trading colonies, like Kaffa, became nodes of migration and exchange. Seaborne connections to Asia were mediated by Arab, Gujarati, and Turkish merchants. As a center of trade and culture, Alexandria housed Egyptian citizens of standing, in-migrant rural Egyptians, Arabs from many origins, Ottoman administrators and soldiers, Gujarati and Istanbul merchants, Jewish traders and intellectuals, and, among Christians, Sicilian Normans, traders from Pisa, Palermo, Naples, Livorno, Genoa, and Venice, as well as residents of Frankish and English origin. The "Frankish" crusaders' eastbound warrior migrations had been replaced by pilgrim tourism with package tours organized from Venice. Like the *hajj*, such traveling, though not migration *strictu sensu*, involved cultural interaction and could last for years. Regardless of their faith, pilgrims returned with new experiences and with new images of the Eastern Mediterranean cultures.

In this West Asian Levant-Anatolia-Byzantium/Constantinople/Istanbul contact zone, in-migrating Turkic-speaking pastoralists and warriors had transformed their mobile societies into the settled and powerful Ottoman Empire from about 1280. Arriving from Central Asia, the founding migrants adopted Islam and adapted Byzantine Christian institutions. By 1400, the empire was expanding into Southeastern Europe's wooded "Balkans" and into Egypt. The Ottomans had to struggle with state-building Mongol warrior-migrants and confront or cohabit with Venetian and Genoese colonizer-migrants. The empire's leadership designed non-ethnic structures,

<sup>6</sup> Toyin Falola and Okpeh Ochayi Okpeh, Jr. (eds.), *Population Movements, Conflicts and Displacement in Nigeria* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2008); J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa*, 2 vols. (1st edn., 1974; London: Longman, 1987); George E. Brooks, *Landlords and Strangers. Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000–1630* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chaps. 5.3 and 6; Bartolomé Bennassar and Pierre Chaunu (eds.), *L'ouverture du Monde, xive–xvie Siècles* (Paris: Colin, 1977), 76–84.



developing a culturally pluralist polity of multi-religious and many-cultured peoples through free and, on occasion, involuntary migrations.<sup>7</sup>

To the east, the Venice/Genoa–Trebizond–Samarkand–China route, the trans-Caucasian routes to Russia and Poland–Lithuania, and the cross-Pamir passes to Mughal India, intersected in Safavid Persia (1502–1736), which was powerful economically, culturally, and militarily. Most of its soldiery came from Turkish-speaking groups. Georgians were deported and resettled, and urban Armenians, at immense population loss, were resettled in New Julfa (1605), close to the capital Isfahan. Entrusted with Persia’s trans-European silk trade, Armenian migrant families settled in Venice and other centers of commerce. Urban expansion – accommodation for in-migrants, infra-structures, mosques and palaces – required sizable in-migration of specialized craftsmen, often from other societies. The Safavid court recruited artisans and artists in the luxury trades; scholars, calligraphers, and painters were invited or transported to the capital from recently annexed cities. A new porcelain industry – to reduce imports from China – required skilled workers, while silk and carpet production for export to Europe led to a concentration of silk producing and weaving families. European visitors came, and Christian monks and artillery technicians settled. Migrations were fundamental to innovation of local arts, to military expansion, and to long-distance trade.<sup>8</sup>

In the western Mediterranean, the African-Arab and Kabyl littoral was dotted with highly developed cities experiencing frequent population recombination, providing a home to Jewish communities and to Muslim urban craftsmen who often produced for Ottoman (formerly Byzantine) and European markets. These cities were the terminal of caravan traders and attracted migrants from the sub-Saharan savannah like Mande leatherworking craft families. Each increase or decline in demand, each change of rule and establishment of a new court, each new trading connection to Europe initiated in-migration of skilled artisan families or forced underemployed ones to seek their livelihood elsewhere. From the Christian–Frankish conquest of Muslim Iberia refugee communities emerged, who – though impoverished – came with skills and long-distance networks. The expulsion of Muslims after the annexation of Granada in 1492 and the expulsion of all Jews from Spain and Portugal in 1492 and 1498 brought masses of refugees to the

<sup>7</sup> Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 2009).

<sup>8</sup> Francis Richard, *Le Siècle d’Ispahan* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), pp. 31–59.

vibrant Maghreb and Egyptian cities. The Ottoman Empire actively recruited Jewish refugees to utilize their human and social capital. In Iberia the economic damage caused by Christian fundamentalist persecutions was partly offset by shifting seafaring and economic activities to the Atlantic ports. This is epitomized by the migration of an underemployed Genoese Mediterranean mariner seeking work in the expanding Atlantic seafaring. His name was Columbus. Tiny Portugal, unable to feed its population, combined stateside resources with mercantile profit strategies: Its vessels traded along the West African coast from the 1430s; merchant migrants established fortified trading centers; the Crown forced families of Jewish faith to colonize São Tomé by establishing plantations and trans-shipment centers for the slave trade.<sup>9</sup>

### *Europe and Russia*

By the 1400s, the intra-European balance of political and economic power had shifted from the Mediterranean to the northwestern seafaring states. By 1492 the Atlantic was being crossed (though Arab sources indicate earlier crossings from Africa) and the Atlantic economies emerged with their intensive Atlantic settlement and worldwide colonizing migrations. Research and public memory have overemphasized these developments, while under-emphasizing the high level of medieval Europe's internal migrations and cultural exchanges. From medieval mobilities the Renaissance and Early Modern periods emerged, but in these centuries the directions and, to some degree, the character of migrations changed.<sup>10</sup>

In Eastern Europe, including the regions of Russia, Poland-Lithuania, and Hungary, several distinct long-distance migrations had subsided by the end of the fifteenth century: the Norse expansion, colony-building, and immersion into local populations; the eastward migrations of German-language peasants into neighboring, more thinly settled lands with Slavic-speakers; the expulsion of German- and Yiddish-speaking Jews, who created the Ashkenazi community's culture. In East Central Europe, the enserfed peasantry belonged to the nobility; thus sovereigns had little revenue and could not encourage craft and mercantile activities because the nobility prevented the emergence of an urban bourgeoisie. To address both problems, rulers

<sup>9</sup> Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chaps. 5–7.

<sup>10</sup> Michael Borgolte, "Migrationen als transkulturelle Verflechtungen im mittelalterlichen Europa. Ein neuer Pflug für alte Forschungsfelder," *Historische Zeitschrift* 289 (2009): 261–85, and Borgolte, *Europa Entdeckte Seine Vielfalt: 1050 – 1250* (Stuttgart: Ulmer, 2002).

attracted refugee and voluntary migrants, including expelled German-language urban Jews as well as urban Christians, by granting them privileges. “Inserted” middle classes, different by language and culture from the surrounding rural people and nobles, emerged and remained distinct until, in the nineteenth century, newly nationalist ideologues began to question their loyalty and cultural practices.<sup>11</sup>

From the mid-fourteenth to the late seventeenth century several population catastrophes caused massive migrations in Europe. At first, dispersed survivors had to migrate and re-establish settlements viable for economic production, (re-)marriage, and reproduction. Later, when populations began to expand again, regions laid waste could be resettled. The first of these catastrophes was the “Black Death,” which emptied vast territories in the late 1340s. Second, the totalitarian hold of Catholicism led to the persecution of individuals in the various inquisitions and of whole groups suspected of independent thought and heresy: In southern France, the Cathars (also known as the Albigensians) and Waldensians, emerging since mid-twelfth century, were annihilated by “crusades” and with them the culture of the *langue d’oc*. In the Baltic northeast, a “crusade” against the Old Prussians and other Baltic peoples, labeled “Saracens of the north,” emptied the lands. The aggressors, the military order of the Teutonic Knights, originally composed of men of many cultures who had been expelled from the “Holy Land” when it was reconquered by Muslim forces, had migrated northward in stages. Third, after the Reformation of 1517, century-long religious wars led to the expulsion of Catholics, Protestants, Mennonites, and others depending on who was temporarily victorious, creating a refugee generation and destruction that culminated in the Thirty Years’ War, 1618–48. This mass flight and, later, resettlement migrations also involved the eighty-year liberation struggle of the Protestant Netherlands against Catholic Spanish–Habsburg rule. A fourth macro-regional migration-inducing struggle was the Habsburg–Ottoman contest in the Balkans. Muslim Ottoman advances liberated peasant families from (most) Christian feudal obligations; in reaction, to counter this rural awareness of a liberating aspect of Muslim rule, Europe’s socio-religious and political elites waged a war of propaganda depicting “the Turks” as bloodthirsty infidels. From among in-migrating Muslims, the modern Bosnian Muslims are the last

<sup>11</sup> Inge Blank, “A Vast Migratory Experience: Eastern Europe in the Pre- and Post-Emancipation Era (1780–1914),” in Dirk Hoerder *et al.*, *Roots of the Transplanted*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1, pp. 201–51.

survivors. After the Habsburgs' reconquest of Hungary, re-Catholicization sent Protestants fleeing.

Across Europe, rural–urban migration brought the growth of cities and denser commercial networks, which encouraged producer migrations to satisfy increasing demand. The Atlantic ports experienced large population increases, as did inland nodes of exchange such as Frankfurt/Main or Krakow. Out-migration from rural regions to urban destinations and war-devastated lands resulted from population growth beyond the contemporary capacity to feed people.

In the land-locked Russian territories, east–west plains and north–south rivers structured mobility. Multidirectional medieval connections transformed into early modern patterns. Via the rivers a Scandinavian–Byzantine route had carried migrant Normans who had established themselves as a ruling Kievan group, over Russian, Finnish, Baltic, and Turkoman peoples. Byzantine Greek and Jewish merchants as well as Eastern Christian missionaries traded in Kiev. This fusion generated the Slavic version of Orthodox Christianity. Russian nobles intermarried with the Byzantine ruling house and later with West European dynasties. Warfare and competition notwithstanding, the nobility – like the merchants – were a trans-European mobile group. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, rule of the both highly mobile and state-building Mongols changed culture. The multiethnic Mongol Empire began to incorporate steppe peoples and foreign elites. Some were recruited and assigned specific military, administrative, or commercial functions. The next phase of expansion by migration, transcontinental exploration of the north and of southern Siberia, began a century later than the Iberians' transatlantic outreach.<sup>12</sup>

### *The Americas*

The peoples of the Americas, north, central, and south, followed a variety of life-ways. In North America they were nomadic in the Arctic and plains, settled and agricultural in the northeast, settled and fishing in the northwest, and pueblo-living in the southwest. Those of the central isthmus and along the Andean Pacific slopes lived in complex states and empires and had developed macro-regional and transcontinental trading and migratory networks long before European–American contact – earlier contacts with Asia and Africa, suggested by some controversial sources, had left no lasting

<sup>12</sup> Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chap. 5.2, 11, 12, 13.

impact. In the central mesa, southward-migrating agriculturally and scholarly skilled Toltecs joined with Mixtecs, Zapotecs, and others to coalesce into Aztec culture. The imperial Inca and Aztec societies used mobile bound labor of force-migrated war captives and criminals. They raided neighboring peoples to fill labor reservoirs and, it seems, to capture high-ranking persons for sacrificial rites. According to the Spanish – who destroyed all written sources of the conquered peoples to become the masters of historical memory – enslaved people were traded from Nicaragua and Yucatán to Honduras and Guatemala and the Incas uprooted transport workers (*tamemes*) for long-distance trade.<sup>13</sup> In the north, across the Sonoran Desert, from the pueblo regions to California, along the Mississippi, and into the northern woodlands, trading routes were traveled by peoples from many regions, and ceremonial and luxury items influenced distant peoples' cultures. Whole groups migrated and resettled, some as far as from the Arctic Circle to the south central mesas.

Thus, during the fifteenth century, migrations, cultural exchange and fusion connected cultures in the two transcontinental hemispheres. Early modern migrations continued, adapted, changed, and expanded pre-1400 patterns. Road and postal systems were part of the Inca realm, and of Western Europe, and criss-crossed the lands from the Eastern Mediterranean to Japan. Handbooks by an Arab postal expert, an Italian mercantile clerk, a Jewish-Iberian cartographer, and Chinese observers dispersed such knowledge. In China, in addition to roads and rivers, canal systems permitted mobility. Some rulers, including Chinese and Inca, built state granaries to prevent famines and resulting refugee migrations. Migrants traveled established and known routes, even if new to them. During rest stops – encampments, caravanserais, hostels – they interacted with residents of different customs and languages. In-migrating agricultural families learned from and merged with resident peoples. Where, by social convention, migrants were predominantly male and service personnel along the route were female, sexual contacts – consensual, paid, or violent – resulted in children who usually grew up in the mother's culture. Where fathers settled, ethnogenesis, the emergence of a culturally new group, might ensue.

<sup>13</sup> Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *The Population of Latin America: a History*, trans. W. A. R. Richardson (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974); William L. Sherman, *Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth-Century Central America* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), pp. 15–19.

## Connecting and changing global mobilities: the coming of armed Europeans

By 1500 Portugal's outreach along the West African coast and Spain's to the Caribbean, as well as European penetration into the Indian Ocean, changed global economic relations; migrations also changed, although this was often delayed. On the one hand, the newcomers' impact was limited, restricted to armed trading forts along the coasts and distinct quarters in port cities. North America was hardly touched, other than a few assumed summer settlements of Basque fishing crews on Newfoundland and, after 1600, of the fur traders at Tadoussac on the Saint Lawrence excepted. On the other hand, in the Americas, the Iberians' unwitting import of Eurasian germs against which resident peoples lacked immunity brought population collapse in the Caribbean and in Central America. Extreme exploitation of the Arawak, Taino, and other peoples' labor resulted in further mass deaths. In Africa, the deportation of c.12 million enslaved men and women, in a ratio of 2 to 1, resulted in population depletion exacerbated by loss of lives during the raids and by the fact that those enslaved were in the most fertile years of their lives.

In addition to population depletions in the Americas and Africa, four economic developments were to have major long-range consequences for migration. First, European territorial states' combination of state power and revenues – tax-paid soldiery, armies, and later administrations – with merchants' investment and profit strategies and non-territorial long-distance connections changed the protocols of unarmed trade that had framed exchanges, kept transaction costs low, and kept the state and mercantile, the public and private spheres separate. The newly armed state-commercial complex imposed itself across the globe and left only some sectors to traditionally unarmed, macro-regionally active merchant communities, such as those of Fujian Chinese, Jews, Parsees (Indian Zoroastrians), Armenian Christians, and Muslim Hausa. Second, increased demand, whether for furs from the northern regions of the globe or for porcelain from China, induced numerous migrations of producers to meet demand, as well as of transport workers along the routes from production point to wholesale market and consumer. Third, in tropical and subtropical regions, where European investors annexed territories for plantation regime mass production but did not offer wages to attract free labor migrants, forced labor regimes were imposed through several different methods. These included the immobilization and exploitation of resident peoples, the Dutch model in Southeast Asia, and the transoceanic sale of enslaved Africans, the model of the Portuguese and other

powers in the Atlantic and plantation belt extractive economy. In the case of Americans, called Indians or Indios, forced labor was imposed by the Spanish through the systems of *repartimiento* and *encomienda*, which involved inter-regional forced migrations for work in mines or immobilization for agricultural and service labor. The British and French dynastic states would adopt these practices – migration of colonizer personnel across the globe and forced mobilization or immobilization of colonized labor forces. Fourth, a century or more later, Europe's rural populations without sufficient means of subsistence emigrated, either involuntarily when states exported some of their subjects, or voluntarily through self-paid voyages or systems of indenture in which a third party paid for the passage. Thus colonies of agricultural settlement developed parallel to colonies of exploitation and extraction of minerals and mass-produced food items, especially sugar.

Colonizer expansion by migration and power imposition was not that of a highly developed core to less developed regions, as Euro-centric historical lore has asserted. Capitalist developments in Asian and Eastern Mediterranean economies – and resulting producer migrations – had occurred independently, especially if these economies were connected within systems of trans-Asian and trans-Saharan exchange. When Europe's state-commerce complexes came to rule the seas as well as some territories, the worlds of the Indian Ocean and the Asian seas lost some of their inter-regional cohesion but not their vitality.<sup>14</sup> The age of "discovery and exploration," as this era has long been termed in Western-centered scholarship, was actually an era of the imposition of – increasingly imperial – power on less well-armed people: Columbus's annihilation of Caribbean peoples; Vasco da Gama's atrocities against East African and South Asian ports; the violence of Cortes and Pizarro; or (in the nineteenth century) the British opium wars to force the sale of the drug on China. In the present, such acts of violence are increasingly part of public memory and of school texts in formerly colonized societies. Thus, the migrations of aggressive but numerically few men, who emphasized their Christianity and, increasingly, constructed their whiteness as a mark of superiority, still structure interstate and racial memory in modern times. Twenty-first-century migrants arriving in former colonizer societies carry such knowledge.

<sup>14</sup> Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Alan K. Smith, *Creating a World Economy. Merchant Capital, Colonialism, and World Trade 1400–1825* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991); Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630* (Cambridge University Press, 1984).

## Intermediaries and mobilizing and immobilizing labor regimes

Three major types of production with mostly forced and involuntary migrations emerged from the state-commercial-investor imposition mediated through migrant colonizer personnel: the global belt of plantation-regime production; globally dispersed but micro-regional mining; and the belt of fur harvesting in the far north.

### *Intermediaries*

In terms of capabilities, colonizer migrants arrived at their destinations without knowledge of conditions, cultures, and languages. Thus, in Asia, mobile Gujarati, Malabar, and Coromandel Coast merchants, as well as the southern and diasporic Chinese merchants, traders, and artisans in Southeast Asia, acted as intermediaries or continued to trade on their own. Along the West African coast, male warrior states emerged, which raided inland societies to supply the European entrepôts with slaves; to trade imported goods, navigationally skilled mobile Kru boatsmen connected the large European vessels across shallow waters with coastal populations. To distribute goods inland, some Europeans moved deep into African societies and formed unions with resident women who had the cultural capability to trade. Local peoples, the Hausa in particular, also acted as medium- and long-distance traders thus increasing their own traditional mobility.

Intermediaries or “go-betweens” were central to most cultural exchanges following upon migration. Men – whether Europeans in colonial settings or Chinese in the Southeast Asian trading regions – formed temporary or “secondary” families or unions with women of the receiving culture. In other cases the mere exchange of physical items, plants and animals in the Columbian Exchange between Europe and the Americas, mediated between societies and environments on different continents. All intermediaries inhabited a “middle ground” (Richard White) and, in the case of the Americas with Brazil as an example, Alida Metcalf has distinguished three types: men and women who mediate between societies (“physical go-betweens”), who, however, also carried diseases; the “transactional intermediaries,” translators, negotiators, and cultural brokers whose role we have discussed; and, third, influential “representational” go-betweens who represent Europe to “the locals” or “the exotic” to Europeans (or to the Chinese Court – to use another example) whose powerful imagery created clichés and shaped discourses. Adding West African societies to the analysis, a fourth type appears,



“landlord–stranger reciprocity,” in which resident groups or the powerful men in these permit valued strangers to marry local women, a privilege that integrates them into the community. In such cases the mixed children may form a third group or be integrated into the culture of their mothers. This process was widespread in many regions of the globe.<sup>15</sup>

In the global fur belt from Scandinavia eastward through Siberia to (Russian) Alaska and westward via Labrador and the James Bay region to the Rockies, investor companies in Moscow, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Paris, and London sent men into locally resident communities. Scots came to North America through the Hudson’s Bay Company, for example, and French-Canadians through the Northwest Company. Unfamiliar with the terrain, cultures, and hunting possibilities, they formed unions with resident women according to the “customs of the country” and thus pooled resources and long-distance connections with local expertise: language, networks, and connections to hunters. The peaceful, commercial in-migration changed material culture and gender relations: pelt preparation with an iron knife instead of brittle bones simplified women’s work, but producing for markets in addition to family needs increased their workload. From these unions, a French- and English-language Métis population emerged; the change from hunting for local demand to harvesting furs for distant markets created inter-tribal rivalries and resulted in dislocations as well as out-migration of whole groups from depleted regions further inland. Already mobile groups thus had to increase the parameters of their migrations.<sup>16</sup>

Intermediaries derived a benefit from their activities; those men and women forced to work for Europeans usually did not. Often their standard of living was reduced to subsistence and bare survival. Many died from overwork or undernourishment.

### *Labor regimes*

The colonizers’ labor regimes have usually been associated with forced migrations, slavery in particular. Their impact on migration took a variety of forms, however: immobilizing resident men and women as workers, forcing them to move themselves over shorter or larger distances, or transporting them to distant “extractive economies,” plantations or mines. At first,

<sup>15</sup> Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006); George E. Brooks, *Landlords and Strangers. Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000–1630* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

<sup>16</sup> Susan Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001).

the Portuguese warrior merchants achieved control over shipping in the Indian Ocean and blocked trade through Arab and Ottoman ports (and thus through Venice and Genoa) in favor of the circum-African route and Lisbon. From the 1590s, the Dutch colonizer migrants imposed plantation production on the “South Sea spice islands” by immobilizing local populations, forcing them into short-distance, intra-island migrations, or transporting them between islands for enslaved plantation labor (“factories in the fields”). Subsequently, the mass production for European investors secured by European states enforced mass migrations on West and Central African populations – Wolof, Mandinka, Yoruba, Songhai, and Hausa among others – as well as on some in East Africa. From about 1500 to the end of the trade in the 1870s, over 3.8 million slaves were force-migrated to the British, French, Dutch, and Danish Caribbean, 3.6 million to Brazil, 1.6 million into Spanish America, and 0.4 million to British North America: a total of 125,000 from 1450 to 1600, 1.3 million in the next century, 6 million 1701–1810, and another 1.9 million from the legal end of the trade to the 1870s. At the height of the trade 60,000 men and women were kidnapped each year. Some were force-migrated repeatedly: Those destined for the (still colonial) United States were “broken in” in the Caribbean and, later, when the US coastal regions’ soils were exhausted, slaves were moved to the new production region along the Mississippi. In Brazil, slaves were moved from the declining northeast to the new, southern São Paulo plantations or inland to mining operations. Slavery was abolished as late as 1863/65 in the United States and in the 1880s in Brazil and Cuba (serfdom in Czarist Russia ended in 1861). After emancipation, racist exclusion from most economic sectors meant that continent-wide African-Americans’ out-migration from plantation regions was slow. Since slaves served terms for life, they had to develop distinct cultures to survive and to socialize their children, even though under extreme constraints. This has best been studied for Brazil to where the voyage from Africa was comparatively short and where men and women from specific African cultures lived in proximity. They re-established religious and social institutions and, given their large numbers, negotiated room of their own from the Portuguese. A population of free Africans, manumitted or self-purchased, added to the vibrant cultures.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969). Curtin’s figures have been revised only slightly in subsequent decades. Kátia M. de Queiros Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil, 1550–1880* (1986; 4th edn., New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1994).

Slaves from Asia were imported to Spanish America via Spanish Manila in a first, brief transpacific migration system, lasting from the 1570s to the 1590s, and free Chinese, extending their practices of diaspora-formation, came as well. Lima, Peru, and Mexico City had Asian-origin populations.

Mining led to various types of migration patterns in different parts of the world. Demand for labor in Peru's silver mines, especially those of Potosí, increased from the 1550s. The new city, temporarily the largest in the Americas, had 120,000–160,000 inhabitants in the seventeenth century. From 1574, the *mita* system of labor allocation forced resident people in a belt extending 1400 km in length and 400 km in width to migrate to the mines. In the months-long journey, *mitayos* had to bring families, food, and other supplies. The *mita de plaza* obliged adult males to work locally or in nearby towns. All *mita* service was disruptive, the Potosí *mita* deadly. The labor reservoirs' total population declined from 81,000 to 10,600 within a few decades. In the Malay Peninsula, in contrast, mine laborers were Chinese credit-ticket migrants who, having worked off the cost of passage, were free. They worked for Chinese investors and Chinese markets and, from the late sixteenth century, for European ore traders. Most came from specific locations in the Fujian region of southern China for a period of several months or years and, with their earnings, supported their families in their villages of origin. In Europe, mine labor was free, but mine workers moved over great distances from exhausted veins to new strikes.<sup>18</sup>

### European settler migrations and the expulsion of resident peoples

White settlers, often families, migrated to European colonizer acquisitions as agriculturalists, extending beyond coastal enclaves to ever larger territories: from the later sixteenth century in Spanish America; from the early seventeenth century in North America and increasingly in Portuguese America; as well as in South Africa, which was founded as a half-way provision station between Europe and Southeast Asia. (Such peasant migrations had taken place earlier in sub-Saharan Africa and in China in far larger numbers, but had not involved backing by state power and conquest.) Regions north of the Black Sea and in the Balkans, acquired when the Romanov and Habsburg

<sup>18</sup> *Cambridge History of Latin America* (ed.) Leslie Bethell, 9 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1984–2008): Charles Gibson, "Indian Societies Under Spanish Rule," vol. II, chap. II, and Peter Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," vol. II, chap. 4.

empires pushed back Ottoman rule, attracted peasant migrants. Wherever such settlers arrived, they – or the armies of their states of origin – dislodged resident peoples. In formerly Ottoman regions, for example, agricultural producers of Islamic faith were forced to flee, and the oft-used phrase, “the peopling of the Americas,” actually refers to a re-peopling: “First” Peoples were expelled by arriving “Second” Peoples and vast refugee migrations often ensued. The “Second Peoples,” seemingly homogeneous as colonizers, were internally differentiated. They consisted of investors and colonizer personnel, self-funded “free” migrants, larger numbers of men and women migrating under indentures, and deportees.

Despite the traditional emphasis on European “settlement” resulting from an ideology of white superiority, before the 1830s more Africans than Europeans came to the Americas. But since the procreation of Africans was hindered through often deadly labor and prohibition of family formation, white immigrants procreated faster. They imposed their superiority by force and rule and, with the exception of the Caribbean societies and Brazil, achieved superiority in numbers.

It also needs to be reinserted into historical memory that up to about 1800, one-half to two-thirds of the migrants from Europe came under indentures, i.e. were temporarily not free. Depending on the laws of their country of origin reflected in their contracts, they had to work for three to seven years to pay off the cost of their passage – longer than the Chinese in Southeast Asia whose credit-ticket system, under which employers advanced the cost of travel, required several months to three years to work of the debt. Since they redeemed their freedom such “indentured servants” were also called redemptioners.

A further aspect of European migrations involved involuntary exile. The “exile from Erin,” the migration of millions of Irish displaced by British colonization and the resulting famine, has been well studied. Another case is that of European men and “non-white” women forming consensual unions and families. The men and their families could not return. In South Africa, for example, settlement offered income through the provisioning of ships on the Europe-to-Asia or from-Asia-to-Europe routes with fresh food. Dutch men returning from the Southeast Asian colonies with non-white wives and mixed children had to settle there since racist legislation prevented their return to the Netherlands. “Dutch” settlement in South Africa thus involved migrants from the Netherlands and migrants from Dutch-ruled Southeast Asia. A different case is Australia, first settled by deported men and some women, considered criminal under contemporary English law – often for no

more than the theft of food – and by men deported for political dissent from other parts of the empire such as Canada. Settlement of Australia began after the American War of Independence when the British Empire could no longer deport its “criminals” to North America. In South Africa such settlers displaced or enslaved the Khoi, in Australia the Aborigines. Thus state policies shape migration, and the migrants, in turn, with the help of the state displace resident peoples thus creating further mobilities.

In the British Empire, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were called the “white” colonies – migration and racialization were closely entwined. Racialization has also been part of the historiography of agricultural settlement migration. The focus by historians socialized in Western Europe/North America on the thirteen British colonies that became the United States minimizes the number of Africans in the Americas, as only a relatively small share of the people taken in slavery from Africa ended up in North America. In addition, historians’ emphasis on the East Coast British colonies overlooks the fact that the European settlement of North America began with the Spanish. In 1565 the Spanish established St. Augustine in Florida. Spanish settlers came to New Mexico in 1598 – nearly twenty years before English settlers came to Jamestown in Virginia – where earlier in-migrating pueblo peoples had lived for five centuries. The focus on English colonies also ignores the fact that from the later sixteenth century a few Russian colonies emerged along the Pacific Coast and that French immigrants settled the St. Lawrence and Mississippi valleys from 1604. Also, the thirteen colonies were not simply British: In addition to English, Scots, Irish, and Welsh, French-, German-, and Spanish-language migrants came, as did Walloons, Dutch, Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, and Finns. In Spanish Florida, men and women from Minorca, Livorno, and Greece made their homes. Religious refugees included Pietists, Moravians, Huguenots, Mennonites, and Old Order Amish from many parts of Europe. Lutheran Palatines fled devastations of war and overcrowded crafts, Catholics the discrimination in Protestant states. Scholarly simplifications that reduce North America to one *Anglo*-America or – similarly – talk of “*the Chinese*” in Southeast Asian cities and mines, reduce diversity to one imagined group, constructed as superior and dominant if white, as inferior intermediaries if “yellow.”

### The few and the many: a comprehensive perspective on migrations

This chapter provides a bird’s eye view emphasizing major developments in this era: the migrations of armed Europeans, the forced migrations especially

out of Africa, and the transatlantic settler family migrations to farmlands, which they emptied of the resident peoples. The “settlers” were, in fact, refugee-generating migrants who resettled lands. The bird’s eye view thus shortchanges the myriads of moves in all societies of the globe. It also generalizes resident peoples, often highly mobile, into one essentialized and inferior cultural or genetic group. People, regardless of color of skin, moved to feed themselves, escape from the violence of war, avoid elite-imposed tax and labor burdens, or depart from constraining ecologies. They moved with an expectation of improving their living conditions, and studying their migrations emphasizes the breadth of human agency while providing a perspective different from heroic pioneer stories and the lore of intercontinental mass migrations of whites.

In all rural regions across the globe where plots provided subsistence for one single family, only two of all children reaching adulthood could remain on the land. The others had to migrate, whether to less densely settled tillable land or to wage labor in towns and cities. The putting-out system of manufacturing – cloth-weaving, lace-making, small-scale smithery of household utensils – could feed additional mouths, until the centralization of production ended such local income-generation. Rural life and farming families in the Yangzi Valley, in the upper Rhine–Black Forest region, or in Malay society could be sheltering, but such a life was also restraining. Towns and cities permitted increased options and ways of earning a subsistence when land became scarce. Thus rural–urban migrations provided escape from undernourishment or a chance to select between options. Historians cannot trace the multitude of individual migrations, but demographic data on urban growth and decline, on mortality rates, and on the share of in-migrants in a central place’s expansion – though incomplete – reflect such human agency. While societal traditions and practices – spiritual-religious prescripts, social stratification, ecological constraints or opportunities – limited migration, perceived options elsewhere provided room for agency to implement different life-courses and to pursue plans and projects. Cities attracted – and in periods of economic contraction pushed out – especially adolescent men and women seeking to become independent from parental families. This was the case in London or Cordoba, Isfahan or Samarkand, Timbuktu or Alexandria, Beijing or Kyoto, Tenochtitlán or Cuzco. Some cities, such as those in the Islamic realm where ritual washings were prescribed, provided a healthier environment than did rural areas. Europe’s cities, in contrast, were demographic black holes given the death rates caused by unsanitary conditions. Only constant in-migration could keep a (Christian) city from declining in size, while other (Muslim) ones grew.

At propitious locations, traders or rulers developed nodes of exchange or planned cities to advance economic development and dynastic interests. St. Petersburg is one example, as is Edo, the city that later became Tokyo. Two decades after its founding in 1703, St. Petersburg counted 40,000 inhabitants, while Edo, a coastal village at mid-fifteenth century, had a population of over one million in the early eighteenth. Istanbul's growth required state-enforced as well as state-supported importation of peasant families to surrounding regions to assure food supplies. Such places of exchange required connections: The building of canals in China and of roads in the Inca's realm required mass migrations of earth workers and were utilized to stabilize food supplies between regions and thus reduce need-driven migrations.

Towns and cities – unless destroyed by warfare or expulsion – provide an image of growth and dynamic development, which attracted migrants. By contrast, rural areas have been viewed as culturally immobile – the old “from time immemorial” adage – or, economically, as regions of backwardness and stagnation. Social histories of villages tell a different story, however. In France, for example, few families can be traced for more than three generations in one place; in China young people departed from villages short of land to terrace nearby or distant hills and thus increase usable acreage. Such short-distance migration and terracing also occurred (in an earlier period) among the pueblo peoples in southwestern North America and on the steep Alpine slopes bordering the Mediterranean littoral. The long climatic cooling period from the 1550s to the early 1800s, sometimes labeled Little Ice Age, forced rural families to cope – by adapting grains, reducing food intake, expanding acreage – or to migrate.

Beyond the simplistic rural–urban dualism, variations between regional economies explain patterns of migration. Port cities, mines, and lumbering belts attract differently skilled people. Mining families would not select seafaring jobs in port cities. They might transit ports when being recruited from their region of birth and training, e.g. from the German-language area to sixteenth-century Venezuela or nineteenth-century Australia. Transportation nodes, like ports, are places of transit permitting cultural exchange or a stopover to earn the funds for the next leg of the migration. The construction of migrants as defined by ethnicity, created in the nineteenth century under the national identity paradigm but still in use today, does not reflect actual transcultural interaction often based on craft or religion. In the early eighteenth century in recently founded St. Petersburg, for example, one large building housed an Armenian priest, a German pastor, and artisans of German, English, and French background. In Lima, Peru, a ship arriving in

1544 brought the Corsican owner, the Greek captain, and a crew of Genoese, Corsican, Greek, and Slavic men – mariners’ skills rather than ethnicity counted. A city’s skilled artisans and merchants often were foreigners: In St. Petersburg, for example, silversmiths and tailors, came from Flemish towns, while traders included English and French.

Thus physical environment and natural conditions provide a frame for settled or mobile life-courses; elite-imposed exactions or development projects expel or attract people; and societal as well as spiritual norms have an impact on migration decisions. The position of women under Confucian, Christian, and some other religions’ prescripts reduced their options to migrate. Norms were not always followed, however. Among Christians, the dogma enjoining a passive acceptance of conditions in this world for a paradise in another could be questioned by a realization that better living conditions could be achieved in this world: Migration to a different place and space would not bring paradise, but it would bring more bread. Migrants left local and regional constraint structures in the frame of larger ideological, religious, political, and social-hierarchical discourses. They never left aggregate or generic entities, mere figures of speech – like “China,” “England,” or any other polity.

Since settler and urban artisanal or laboring migrants had to be able to provide for their subsistence immediately after arrival, they selected destinations where their human capital, skills or lack of them, would be usable without intermediate periods of adaptation (and lack of income). Their “intermediaries” or, better, “facilitators” were earlier migrants from their communities or broader culture of departure. Thus they connected economic regions rather than polities or followed craft routes rather than heading for famous cities. Since realization of human capital requires networks, i.e. social capital, they would head to where fellow craftsmen, sister domestics, kin or immediate family had settled before. Their migration decisions were translocal and trans-regional. Mercantilist states, whether China or the Ottoman Empire, Prussia or Persia, might offer stimulus funds to attract migrants. But their insertion occurred on the regional, local, craft, or agricultural level. Migrants looked for options, rather than for, as nineteenth-century US expansionist propaganda termed it, unlimited opportunities. They left constraining structures for option-providing ones. Such goals could require short-, medium-, or long-distance migrations, with the latter more costly than the former.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder with Donna Gabaccia, *What is Migration History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).



Migration both of agricultural families and of colonizer men was to some degree interrupted during the wars for independence in the Americas, 1776–1821, and the revolutionary–imperialist–antirevolutionary wars across Europe. The Enlightenment and revolutionary concepts of human beings and the rights of men – together with economic cost calculations – would come to influence and change forced labor regimes and migrations in the nineteenth century.<sup>20</sup>

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## Patterns of warfare, 1400–1800

JEREMY BLACK

War was important. It transformed societies, moulded states, destroyed communities and struck deep into the experience of families. War was also complex as a phenomenon and varied as a means of activity and experience. In trying to provide an overview, some historians prefer unitary arguments, tying seemingly disparate military events, settings, cultures and developments into a coherent theme or superstructure. Although such an approach provides coherence and clarity, thematic descriptions and accounts, notably the established ones, such as the 'Military Revolution', the 'gunpowder empires', or the advent of the 'fiscal-military state', raise many questions. Moreover, there were events and processes that can undermine storylines of technological determinism, Western global dominance and bureaucratic centralisation.

History, indeed, is a messy process, and an understanding of the diversity of conflicts around the globe offers important correctives to the well-established, but overly simple, narrative of modernisation, with its stress on the decline of cavalry and the rise, in contrast, of infantry, artillery and fortifications. Moreover, success and failure were the result of local conditions and demands, rather than reflections of the 'inherent' benefits of certain technologies or formations. These points underline both the more general difficulties in establishing the relative capability of protagonists, and the need for more fresh work in the subject. The latter is especially required for Southeast and Central Asia, for sub-Saharan Africa, and for Iran after 1750. In some cases, there are serious problems with the availability of evidence, but there are always opportunities for more work and for integrating this work into general accounts.

In the period 1400–1550, there were important struggles between the Ming Chinese and the Mongols, as well as the establishment of the Mughal, Safavid, Ottoman and Habsburg empires. In the eighteenth century, the Chinese greatly extended their power over non-Chinese peoples, while the

Mughal (Indian) and, even more, Safavid (Persian) dynasties collapsed, and the fate of North America was largely settled, as was the struggle between Britain and France in India. The claim that supply problems made achieving strategic objectives only rarely possible is not vindicated by the campaigning, much of which delivered results in terms of victories won and territory conquered. Russia became a great power, the Turks were pushed back in Europe, and, in the 1790s, French hegemony in Western Europe was restored, albeit temporarily. War led to the rise of a number of other powers in the eighteenth century, including Afghanistan under the Durrani, Burma under 'Alaung-hpaya, and Gurkha Nepal. The means available could deliver many of the results required.

Some of the consequences of this military activity have lasted to today. British success over France ensured that North America would have a political culture derived from Britain. A French-dominated transoceanic world would have looked to Catholicism, civil law, French culture and language, and to different notions of representative government and politics from those of Britain.

Alongside differences between particular types of conflict and specific contexts, there were fundamentals to warfare throughout the period and across the world. An overall matrix of military activity, in which scale, political development, social characteristics, and environmental constraints were linked and mutually interacting, produces transcontinental parallels.

First and most obviously, but so taken for granted that it was (and is) scarcely subject for mention, the conduct of warfare in all societies was very much the duty of men. The direct involvement of women as fighters was exceptional, although women were closely involved with conflict: their agricultural labour was crucial to the economic survival of societies at war, and they were war's victims, directly or indirectly, sustaining physical, mental, social and economic injuries. In particular, the rape and enslavement of women were habitual in raiding warfare.

Second, the relatively low level of applied technology, even in the most developed societies, ensured that the patterns of warfare worldwide remained subject to common environmental and physical constraints. The absence of any real understanding of the causes and vectors of infectious diseases in humans and animals, combined with low agricultural productivity and the limited nature of industrial activity, ensured that population and productivity figures were low everywhere, by modern standards. The potential pool of warriors was thus lower than what it would be in 1900, and the predominance of agriculture in the world economy meant that fighting men