



THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT

A reader

Edited by Cas Mudde

“Cas Mudde offers an expert guidance to the current debates about the populist radical right. With its clear framework and comprehensive selection of key readings this book is essential reading for students and those new to the field.”

Tjitske Akkerman, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

“Cas Mudde has assembled the most important work on the populist radical right. Research that has collectively defined the research agenda. The manner in which Mudde presents them encapsulates not only the essential work that has already been done, but (perhaps most critically) it sets the stage for future research.”

Andrej Zaslove, Radboud University, the Netherlands



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The Populist Radical Right

The populist radical right is one of the most studied political phenomena in the social sciences, counting hundreds of books and thousands of articles. This is the first reader to bring together the most seminal articles and book chapters on the contemporary populist radical right in western democracies. It has a broad regional and topical focus and includes work that has made an original theoretical contribution to the field, which makes it less time-specific. The reader is organized in six thematic sections:

- (1) ideology and issues;
- (2) parties, organizations, and subcultures;
- (3) leaders, members, and voters;
- (4) causes;
- (5) consequences; and
- (6) responses.

Each section features a short introduction by the editor, which introduces and ties together the selected pieces and provides discussion questions and suggestions for further readings. The reader is ended with a conclusion in which the editor reflects on the future of the populist radical right in light of (more) recent political developments – most notably the Greek economic crisis and the refugee crisis – and suggest avenues for future research.

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A reader

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The Populist Radical Right

A reader

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**For all students of the populist radical right, past, present,
and future.**

We are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants. We see more, and things that are more distant, than they did, not because our sight is superior or because we are taller than they, but because they raise us up, and by their great stature add to ours.

—John of Salisbury (1159)

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Preface

The idea for a reader on the populist radical right came to me first more than fifteen years ago. I had been working on the topic since the early 1990s and had noticed the sharp increase in scholarship. Whereas much of the studies on the populist radical right had been descriptive and in German when I started in the late 1980s, a body of more analytical and comparative work had developed in English created by and catering to an ever-growing community of scholars and students. And while readers on related topics were quite common, most notably on fascism, there was no equivalent on the populist radical right. Fifteen years later the situation has not changed much. There are even more courses on and scholars of the populist radical right, and much more scholarship, but still no reader.

This reader aims to provide the perfect introduction into the main scholarly debates on populist radical right parties in Europe and beyond. It is first and foremost catering to scholars teaching courses on the contemporary populist radical right – which are taught at universities across Europe and North America, from Bath in the United Kingdom to Ottawa in Canada and from Boston in the United States to Mainz in Germany. In addition, it is meant as a fundamental resource for the hundreds of graduate students and scholars working on populist radical right topics across the world. Finally, the reader hopes to offer an essential introduction to the topic for the many practitioners that have a professional interest in the populist radical right, from activists in anti-racist organizations like Hope not Hate in the United Kingdom to analysts in intelligence agencies like the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (BVS) in Germany.

The process of making this reader went through several iterations in which feedback from no less than fourteen reviewers was received and integrated as well as possible. While some reviewers suggested diametrically opposed changes – from more historical fascism to no historical cases whatsoever – the collective feedback has significantly improved the selection of articles as well as the overall reader. I would like to express my sincere thanks to all fourteen reviewers. I also want to thank all the authors who have granted permission to have their seminal works included in this reader. Finally, I want to thank all my friends at Routledge, including the editors of the Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, editor extraordinaire Craig Fowle, and senior editorial assistant of Politics & International Relations Emma Chappell.

Making this reader was a great opportunity for me to re-establish contacts with old colleagues, re-read the classics, and re-think my own influences. I can still remember the excitement when, as an undergraduate, I came across the first special issue on the ‘extreme right’ in *West European Politics* in 1988 and reading Klaus von Beyme’s foundational introductory article. Equally influential was Piero Ignazi’s seminal article in the *European Journal of Political Research* special issue of 1992, which came out just a few months before I started my

PhD. Finally, the defining books by Hans-Georg Betz (1994) and Herbert Kitschelt (1995) proved to me, and the initially skeptical discipline, that the populist radical right could, and should, be studied within mainstream social science. I thank all these great scholars for their inspiration and hope they will continue to inspire many others.

Athens, March 2016

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Introduction to the populist radical right

Cas Mudde

The populist radical right is one of the most studied political phenomena of the postwar western world. Hundreds of scholarly articles and books have been devoted to it, most notably to contemporary populist radical right parties in (Western) Europe. These works are trying to meet the ‘insatiable demand’ (Bale 2012) for information on the contemporary populist radical right. And this demand is not limited to the scholarly community; rarely a day goes by without at least one media outlet reporting on the populist radical right. The Great Recession has raised the public and scholarly demand even further, given that received wisdom holds that economic crises lead to the rise of the populist radical right (see Mudde 2016).

While there are many readers on the historical far right, i.e. fascism and National Socialism (e.g. Gregor 2000; Griffin 1998, 1995), no academic reader exists on the contemporary populist radical right. Most collective research is published in edited volumes, which have at least three weaknesses: (1) they often present single-country chapters, which date rapidly because of the volatile nature of most populist radical right parties; (2) they have a limited focus in terms of topics and regions; and (3) they tend to be light on theoretical insights, which normally are only covered in the introductory or concluding chapter. This reader aims to bring together classic articles on the contemporary populist radical right party family. It has a broad regional and topical focus and includes mostly work that has made an original theoretical contribution to the field, which makes it less time-specific.

The main aim of this introduction is threefold: (1) to provide a short overview of the academic study of populist radical right parties in the postwar era; (2) to outline the conceptual framework that I have been using in most of my more recent work – but which is not followed by the vast majority of authors included in this reader; and (3) to present an up-to-date history of the contemporary populist radical right in Europe, with a particular focus on the twenty-first century. Obviously, my own work has been strongly influenced by the writings included in this reader and will reflect many of their key insights. In particular, I am a product of the second wave of scholarship (see below), standing on the shoulders of giants like Hans-Georg Betz, Roger Eatwell, Piero Ignazi, and Herbert Kitschelt, whose seminal texts are included in this volume.

The study of the populist radical right

Populist radical right parties are the most studied party family in political science. Hardly a month goes by without a new article or book on a populist radical right party or the populist radical right party family. No less than ten articles were published (primarily) on the populist radical right in the first two months of 2016 alone! In the same period, no articles were published on the three major party families of European politics – the Christian democrats,




Figure 1 Articles on four party families over time.

social democrats, and liberals – while two articles were published on ‘radical left’ parties, a party family that was recently brought back from the dead by the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) in Greece and We Can (Podemos) in Spain.

This disproportionate focus is nothing new. Ever since the rise of populist radical right parties started in the mid-1980s, the party family has inspired an ever-growing coterie industry of scholars that tries to satisfy the never-ending desire for information that exists among various publics. One of the consequences of this ballooning of scholarship is that, at least since the early 1990s, there have been more academic studies of populist radical right parties than of all other party families *combined* (see Figure 1). In fact, in certain years (e.g. 2010) there were almost *seven times* as many articles on populist radical right parties than on all other party families together.

While the increase in studies of populist radical right parties reflects, at least to some extent, the rise in the electoral success of the party family, the emphasis remains highly disproportional. Even in the early twenty-first century the populist radical right is at best the fourth-largest party family in Europe, in terms of electoral support – behind the three party families mentioned before – and possibly only the fifth-most relevant in terms of political relevance, given that the Greens still have more coalition potential in most (West) European countries (e.g. Müller-Rommel & Poguntke 2002; Rihoux & Rüdiger 2006).

But the study of the populist radical right does not only stand out in terms of its disproportionate volume. What is unique is that virtually all of its scholars are more or less open opponents of the parties they study – in fact, I know of no openly sympathetic scholar of the populist radical right. While (younger) scholars are increasingly hiding behind alleged positivist neutrality, particularly within quantitative studies, even they mostly set up the populist radical right as a problem for, if not an open threat to, the liberal democratic system. This is in sharp contrast to studies of other party families, which have all been dominated by open supporters of the party families they studied – in fact, many of the scholars were active participants within the parties/party families they studied.

Three waves of scholarship

Just as Klaus von Beyme (1988) famously distinguished between three chronologically and ideologically different waves of right-wing extremism in postwar Europe, we can differentiate

between three academically distinct waves of scholarship of populist radical right parties since 1945. The three waves do not just follow each other chronologically, but also reflect different types of scholarship in terms of the questions they ask and terms they use. Obviously, the distinction is imprecise and functions mostly as a heuristic tool to structure the voluminous scholarship. None of the three waves is homogenous and heated debates about definitions and interpretations have always dominated the field.

The first wave lasted roughly from 1945 till 1980, was mostly historical and descriptive, and focused primarily on the historical continuity between the pre-war and post-war periods. The majority of the (few) scholars were historians, experts on historical fascism, who studied the postwar populist radical right under the headings of ‘extreme right’ and ‘neo-fascism.’ The bulk of this, still rather limited, scholarship was published in other languages than English, most notably German and French. Among the few English language studies was Kurt P. Tauber’s seminal, two-volume *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945* (1967), which discussed roughly twenty years of postwar German extreme right politics in no less than 1600 pages! Only a few studies described the ‘re-emergence of fascism’ across Europe, and even beyond, including countries like Argentina and South Africa (Eisenberg 1967; del Boca & Giovana 1969).

The second wave of scholarship lasted roughly from 1980 to 2000, although it only really took off with the start of the third wave of the ‘extreme right’ in Europe in the mid-1980s. This wave saw an infusion of social science literature, in particular various forms of modernization theory (e.g. Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995), and was, directly or indirectly, influenced by American studies of the ‘radical right’ of the previous decades (e.g. Bell 1964; Lipset & Raab 1970). In line with the influential ‘normal pathology’ thesis (Scheuch & Klingemann 1967), scholars tried to understand why ‘radical right’ parties could be successful in modern western democracies. Focusing on a small subset of parties in Western Europe – the usual suspects like the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the French National Front (FN), and the German Republicans (REP) – scholars almost exclusively studied the demand-side of populist radical right politics, treating the populist radical right party as the dependent variable.

The third wave of scholarship took off at the turn of the century, as scholars started to focus more on the supply-side of populist radical right politics, including the parties themselves (e.g. Art 2011). Scholars no longer only tried to explain their electoral successes (and, to a much lesser extent, failures), but started to investigate their effects as well (e.g. Williams 2006). Consequently, the populist radical right party was now studied as both a dependent and an independent variable. The field also became part of mainstream social science, and particularly political science, which led to further integration of mainstream theories and methods into the study of the populist radical right. Under a broad plethora of terms, though mostly including some combination of ‘right’ and ‘populism,’ scholarship of populist radical right parties now trumped that of all other party families together. It also influenced scholarship on related phenomena, from ‘niche’ parties (e.g. Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2010) to the ‘radical left’ (e.g. March 2011; March & Mudde 2005).

A conceptual framework

Although I have so far mainly spoken about the ‘populist radical right,’ the topic of this reader is termed ‘extreme right,’ ‘radical right,’ or ‘right-wing populist’ in most academic and media accounts. This terminological quagmire is in part a consequence of the fact that, unlike other party families (such as Greens and socialists), populist radical right parties do not self-identify as populist or even (radical) right. Many reject the left–right distinction as

obsolete, arguing that they are instead ‘neither left, nor right.’ While there are widely different definitions out there, most authors define the essence of what I call the ‘populist radical right’ in very similar ways.

The populist radical right shares a core ideology that combines (at least) three features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007). Individual actors might have additional core ideological features, such as anti-Semitism or welfare chauvinism, but *all* members of the populist radical right (party) family share at least these three features. Obviously, different groups express their ideology differently, defining their ‘own people’ in various ways and targeting different ‘enemies’ on the basis of a broad variety of motivations and prejudices (ibid.: Chapter 3). But all populist radical right actors share at least these three features as (part of) their ideological core.

Nativism entails a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. It is an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native (or ‘alien’) elements, whether persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state. Nativism is directed at enemies both within and outside and has a long history throughout the western world – dating back at least to the Native America Party, better known as American Party or Know Nothing movement, in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century (e.g. Bennett 1990; Higham 1983).

In Europe the nativism of the populist radical right has mainly targeted ‘immigrants’ (including guest workers and refugees) in the West and ‘indigenous minorities’ (e.g. Hungarians or Roma) in the East. The basis of the nativist distinction can be multifold – including ethnic, racial, and religious prejudices, which are often combined in one form or another. For example, Islamophobia, the prime nativist sentiment of the contemporary populist radical right, combines ethnic, religious, and sometimes even racial stereotypes. At the same time, populist radical right parties will use both socio-economic and socio-cultural motivations to ‘justify’ their nativism.

Authoritarianism refers to the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. It is an ideological feature shared by most right-wing ideologies (e.g. conservatism) as well as by many religions (e.g. Roman Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity). In terms of concrete policies authoritarianism translates into strict law and order policies, with call for more police with greater competencies as well as less political involvement in the judiciary. It also means that social problems like drugs and prostitution are, first and foremost, seen as security issues and not, for example, health or economic issues. Hence, authoritarians call for higher sentences and fewer rights for criminals, but also for more discipline in families and schools.

The final feature of the ideological trilogy is populism, which is defined in many different, and often highly problematic, ways. It is here defined as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people (Mudde 2004: 543). Populist radical right politicians claim to be the *vox populi* (voice of the people), accusing established parties and politicians of being a ‘political class’ that feigns opposition to distract the people from the fact that they are essentially all the same and working together. The FN expresses this latter sentiment by referring to the two major parties in France, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and Socialist Party (PS), as ‘UMPS.’

The three different ideological features are often interconnected in the propaganda of the parties. All populist radical right parties devote disproportionate attention to crimes by ‘aliens,’ be it Roma in the East or immigrants in the West. The Dutch Party for Freedom

(PVV) even campaigned with a slogan linking nativism and authoritarianism directly: ‘more safety, less immigration.’ Similarly, populism and nativism are often connected, as mainstream political parties are accused of ignoring ‘immigrant crime’ and suppressing any critique with ‘political correctness’ as well as of favoring ‘immigrants’ at the expense of the native people. This does not mean that populism and nativism are identical, as some scholars seem to believe. Whereas the nativist distinction is between (good) ‘natives’ and (evil) ‘aliens,’ the populist division between the (good) ‘people’ and the (evil) ‘elite’ is *within* the native group!

Importantly, it is the combination of *all* three features that makes an ideology (and party) populist radical right. Unlike the extreme right of the 1930s, the populist radical right is democratic, in that it accepts popular sovereignty and majority rule. It also tends to accept the rules of parliamentary democracy; in most cases it prefers a stronger executive and a few parties even support a toothless legislature. Tensions exist between the populist radical right and liberal democracy, in particular arising from the constitutional protection of minorities (ethnic, political, religious). The populist radical right is in essence monist, seeing the people as ethnically and morally homogeneous, and considering pluralism as undermining the (homogeneous) ‘will of the people’ and protecting ‘special interests’ (i.e. minority rights).

Finally, the populist radical right is not ‘right’ in the classic socio-economic understanding of the state versus the market. In theory, economics is at best a secondary issue for the populist radical right. In practice, most populist radical right parties support a hybrid socio-economic agenda, which combines calls for fewer rules and lower taxes with economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism, i.e. protection of the national economy and support for welfare provisions for ‘natives’ (only). It is, however, ‘right’ in its acceptance of inequality, as a ‘natural’ phenomenon, which should not be ‘legislated away’ by the state (Bobbio 1996).

The populist radical right today

In contemporary Europe the populist radical right mobilizes primarily in the form of political parties, which contest elections to gain seats in parliament and influence, either directly or indirectly, government policies. Street politics is traditionally more associated with the extreme right, notably neo-Nazi and other far right (skinhead) groups, but this has started to change in recent years. In fact, the refugee crisis has seen an upsurge in both extreme right and radical right street politics.

Given that no party self-defines as populist radical right, classification is up to scholars, and they tend to disagree almost as much as they agree. While there are many parties that virtually all scholars agree upon, at least in recent years, debate exists on many others. These debates are mainly related to the different definitions used, but are also the result of a continuing lack of detailed academic studies of several key parties in, mostly smaller, European countries. In fact, systematic analyses of the ideology of populist radical right parties, and political parties more generally, remain remarkably rare in political science.

It would lead too far to discuss all categorizations in detail here (see Mudde 2007: 32ff.). The most important parties that are excluded from this analysis, but that some other authors include, are List Dedecker in Belgium, Progress Party (FPd) in Denmark, Finns Party (PS) in Finland, Alternative for Germany (AfD) and German National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany, Golden Dawn (XA) and Independent Greeks (ANEL) in Greece, Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) in Hungary, Forza Italia (FI) and National Alliance (AN) in Italy, National Alliance (NA) in Latvia, List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands, Progress Party (FrP) in Norway, Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, New Democracy (ND) in

Sweden, Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey, and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. All these parties share some but not all of the three core features that define the populist radical right party family.

In most cases the debate is over the question of whether nativism (most often anti-immigrant sentiments) is ideological or opportunistic, i.e. used only strategically in election campaigns. I exclude the following parties because nativism is not a *core* feature of their party ideology: AfD, AN, ANEL, FI, Fidesz, FP, FrP, LPF, NA, ND, PiS, PS, and UKIP. NA and PS are rather more problematic cases, however, as both parties have strong institutionalized radical right factions within their party and parliamentary factions, but their leadership, program, and government policies are not radical right. UKIP seems increasingly pushed into a radical right direction, and might move there after the Brexit referendum, which has significantly reduced the saliency of its main issue, i.e. exit from the EU. The AfD, on the other hand, moved to the populist radical right in 2015, when the more radical Frauke Petry succeeded the more conservative Eurosceptic Bernd Lucke as party leader.¹

A new phenomenon is the electoral relevance of more or less openly extreme right parties. Concretely, both NPD and XA are excluded because they are extreme right parties, even if at least the NPD tries to hide this in its official party materials. Similarly, the People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), which won seats in the 2016 national elections in Slovakia, is excluded on the basis of its extreme right character. The British National Party (BNP) and Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) are not excluded, however, even though they are borderline cases, i.e. mostly populist radical right 'front-stage' but with features of a extreme right 'back-stage'.² For example, racism and historical revisionism are prevalent within the BNP, which has recently imploded, while anti-Semitism and historical revisionism are endemic within Jobbik, which is also closely linked to a (non-armed) paramilitary unit, the now banned Hungarian Guard.

Table 1 lists the electoral results of the most important populist radical right parties in Europe. I have included only the main party in each country, focusing on national elections in the past twenty-five years and the two most recent European elections. It is important to note that, while the twenty-first century has seen the highest results for populist radical right parties in the postwar era, large parts of Europe remain immune to them. Consequently, Table 1 includes only fifteen countries, less than half of all European democracies. In the other countries either no populist radical right party contests national elections (e.g. Iceland and Ireland) or no party comes close to representation in the national or European parliament (e.g. Portugal and Spain). It is particularly striking that most of the largest and most powerful European countries do not have a strong populist radical right party: Germany, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom.

Even among the countries with more or less successful populist radical right parties the diversity is remarkable. The highest results in national elections range from 5.6 to 29.4 percent of the vote, while the most recent results vary between 1.0 and 29.4 percent. The *average* high result of these successful parties is 15.0 percent, while their average in most recent elections is 10.8 percent. Only six of the fifteen parties gained their highest result in the most recent election, which warns against seeing the development of populist radical right success as one continuous upward trend. In fact, the peaks of some parties were almost two decades ago and while some have since recovered (e.g. FN and FPÖ), others have not (e.g. PRM).

Populist radical right parties perform, on average, not very differently in European elections (Minkenberg & Perrineau 2007), where the average of the fourteen most successful parties was 9.9 percent in 2014 – the average of all populist radical right parties was just under

Table 1 Electoral results of main populist radical right parties in Europe in national elections (1980–2015) and European elections (2009 and 2014)

Country	Party	National elections		European elections	
		Highest result	Last result	2014 result	Change 2009
Austria	Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)	26.9	20.5	19.7	+7.0
Belgium	Flemish Interest (VB)	12.0	3.7	4.1	–5.8
Bulgaria	National Union Attack (Attack)	9.4	4.5	3.0	–9.0
Czech Republic	Dawn – National Coalition (Dawn)	6.9	6.9	3.1	+3.1
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	21.1	21.1	26.6	+11.8
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE)	8.1	8.1	4.0	+4.0
France	National Front (FN)	15.3	13.6	25.0	+18.7
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	5.6	1.0	2.7	–4.5
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	20.5	20.5	14.7	–0.1
Italy	Northern League (LN)	10.1	4.1	6.2	–4.0
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15.5	10.1	13.2	–3.8
Romania	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	19.5	1.5	2.7	–6.0
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	11.6	4.6	3.6	–2.0
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	12.9	12.9	9.7	+6.4
Switzerland*	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	29.4	29.4	—	—
Average of 15**		15.0	10.8	9.9	+1.1

* Switzerland is not a member of the European Union and the SVP does therefore not contest the European elections.

** In the case of the European Elections it is the average of 14, as Switzerland is not an EU member state.

7 percent (see Mudde 2016). Again, the diversity is striking, with results ranging from 2.7 to 26.6 percent and changes between the 2009 and 2014 elections between –9.0 and +18.7 percent. The massive gap in gains and losses again emphasizes the different trajectories of populist radical right parties in Europe. While the overall trend is up, particularly on average, there are several parties that are well beyond their peak.

A similar story can be told about government participation. The first populist radical right party to enter a (coalition) government in Western Europe was the LN in Italy in 1994. The phenomenon was more common in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, largely a symptom of the still fragile and volatile party politics of the transition period. In the first decade of the twenty-first century several parties entered coalitions in the West, while they became less common in the East. Although the trend remains up, there are currently only three governments with populist radical right participation – the four-party coalition government in Slovakia, in which a significantly moderated SNS is a junior partner; the liberal minority government in Denmark, which depends on the support of the DF (and other right-wing parties); and the uniquely constructed Swiss government, which includes the SVP, even though that party also functions as the main opposition party in Switzerland.³

Until 2015 the populist radical right was almost exclusively a party phenomenon with street politics the domain of small, sometimes violent, extreme right groups. While extreme right activists and groups remain primarily involved in street politics, they are no longer alone. In recent years various radical right non-party organizations have emerged that are exclusively focused on extra-parliamentary politics. The best-known groups are the English Defence

Table 2 Participation in government by populist radical right parties, 1980–2014

<i>Country</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Period(s)</i>	<i>Coalition partner(s)</i>
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	2000–2002	ÖVP
		2002–2005	ÖVP
		2005–2006	ÖVP
Bulgaria ¹	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	2013–2014	BSP & DPS
Croatia	National Union Attack (Attack)	1990–2000	
Denmark ¹	Croatia Democratic Union (HDZ)	2001–2005	V & KF
		2005–2007	V & KF
		2007–2011	V & KF
Estonia	Danish People's Party (DF)	1992–1995	Isamaa
Greece	Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP)	2011–2012	ND & PASOK
		1994	AN & FI
Italy	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	2001–2006	AN & FI & MDC
		2008–2011	PdL & MpA
		2010–2012	CDA & VVD
Netherlands ¹	Party for Freedom (PVV)	2005–2006	PIS & Samoorona
Poland	League of Polish Families (LPR)	1994–1996	PDSR & PSM
Romania	Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR)	1995	PDSR & PSM
Slovakia	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	1994–1998	HZDS & ZRS
		2006–2010	HZDS & Smer
		2016–	Smer & Most-Híd & Siet'
Switzerland ²	Slovak National Party (SNS)	2000–	SPS & FDP & CVP

¹ Minority governments in which the populist radical right party functions as the official support party.

² Swiss governments are longstanding, voluntary governments based on a 'magic formula' rather than the outcome of the parliamentary elections.

League (EDL) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA), which both have inspired similar groups across Europe and even beyond (e.g. Busher 2016; Vorländer et al. 2016). While these groups have been able to mobilize several thousand people at some times, their significance is strongly exaggerated by the media. Most EDL and PEGIDA demonstrations have been complete failures with small groups of activists being protected from the much larger numbers of anti-racist demonstrators by a mass police force.

The refugee crisis has changed populist radical right street politics in both qualitative and quantitative terms. First of all, there are more anti-immigration demonstrations, which attract more people in more countries. Second, the type of groups and people involved in these demonstrations is much more diverse, ranging from members of mainstream parties to activists from neo-Nazi groups. Most striking is the rise of anti-immigration demonstrations in East Central Europe, a region that had been confronted with little mass immigration or mass protest before. While much anti-immigration politics has so far remained either loosely organized or organized by existing far right groups, some new populist radical right groups have emerged, such as the Bloc Against Islam in the Czech Republic. I will discuss the possible ramifications of these ongoing developments in more detail in the concluding chapter.

Outline of the book

This introductory chapter has aimed to provide a short background to the populist radical right in Europe and to its academic study. It has mainly presented my own approach, and

definition, which is similar, but certainly not identical, to most of the authors included in this volume. Almost every author uses a somewhat different term, definition, and classification, which sometimes has consequences for the assessment of causes and consequences. Hence, it is important to compare not just the insights of different authors, but also the terms and classifications that they employ. For example, it is possible that two authors come to very different conclusions on the electoral success or political impact of the populist radical right, because one uses a very broad definition, which includes many governing parties, and the other a very narrow one, which excludes most of them.

The reader includes thirty-two previously published articles and book chapters organized in six thematic sections: (1) ideology and issues; (2) parties, organizations, and subcultures; (3) leaders, members, and voters; (4) causes; (5) consequences; and (6) responses. Each section features a short introduction by the editor, which introduces and ties together the selected pieces and provides discussion questions and suggestions for further readings. The reader is ended with a conclusion in which I will reflect on the future of the populist radical right in light of (more) recent political developments – most notably the Greek economic crisis and the refugee crisis – and suggest avenues for future research.

Notes

- 1 As the AfD contested both the 2013 German and 2014 European elections as a non-populist radical right party, i.e. before the split, it is excluded from Table 1.
- 2 The distinction between ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ was initially developed by the American sociologist Erving Goffman and applied to far right parties by the Dutch anthropologist Jaap van Donselaar (1991).
- 3 Obviously, the count is quite different if a broader interpretation of the ‘radical right’ is used. Several colleagues would, for example, also include the current governments in Finland (PS), Latvia (NA), and Norway (FrP). And, in light of the refugee crisis (see conclusion), many journalists have started to count Hungary (Fidesz) and Poland (PiS) as well.

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Part I

Ideology and issues

All scholars define the populist radical right as essentially an ideology and link it to specific political issues. There is significant debate about what exactly defines the core features of (what I call) the populist radical right ideology, and what the best term to denote it is. However, whether explicitly or implicitly, virtually everyone makes a connection to historical fascism of the early twentieth century (in its German or Italian form). **Roger Griffin** discusses the similarities and differences between historical fascism and the contemporary populist radical right, arguing that the latter is, in part, a consequence (and proof) of the post-fascist era.

Elisabeth Carter identifies the core features of (what she calls) ‘right-wing extremism’ and outlines the dividing lines between the ‘extreme right’ and the ‘mainstream right.’ In line with many other authors (see several chapters in Part IV), she argues that there are different types of ‘right-wing extremism’ and that there is a relationship between the type of ideology and electoral success. **Hans-Georg Betz and Carol Johnson** focus on the essence of the contemporary populist radical right ideology, and its complex relationship to liberal democracy, while **Sarah L. De Lange** questions the so-called ‘new winning formula’ (of Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann, see Part IV), which has informed much research into the radical right, particularly among US(-trained) scholars.

Populist radical right politics is related to a specific set of issues, which have remained relatively stable. Immigration has always been at the core of the populist radical right program, but the type of immigrant has changed in time. At least since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Muslims have become the prime target of radical right parties. **José Zúquete** looks into the phenomenon of ‘Islamophobia’ and how the new focus on Islam and Muslims has changed the populist radical right and its relationship with the political mainstream.

Finally, **Sofia Vasilopoulou** discusses another core issue of populist radical right politics: European integration. She shows that, as the European Union (EU) has changed, the position of the populist radical right parties has changed. Today, different populist radical right parties hold different positions on European integration in general and the EU in particular.

Revision questions

Griffin

- What are the key differences between historical fascism and the contemporary populist radical right?
- What does Griffin mean with the term ‘ethnocratic liberalism’?

- What are the two main strategies to keep fascism alive in the post-fascist era? Where do these two strategies come together?
- What ideological purpose does Revisionism, and in particular Holocaust Denial, serve for fascists in the post-fascist era?

Carter

- What are the two anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements that define right-wing extremism?
- What are the two features that constitute the dividing line between the extreme right and the mainstream right?
- What are the three bases of division for Carter's typology of right-wing extremism? Which five types does she distinguish?
- What is the relationship between party ideology and electoral success?

Betz and Johnson

- What did Jean-Marie Le Pen mean when he said that he wants to 'return the word to the people' who live under 'a totalitarian yoke with a democratic mask'?
- What does the populist radical right mean with 'true' or 'real' democracy? What is the essence of this form of democracy?
- What is 'the ethnocratic alternative'?

De Lange

- What are the two main dimensions of West European party politics?
- What is 'the new winning formula' according to Kitschelt and McGann? What is De Lange's main critique of that formula?

Zúquete

- What are the key consequences of the populist radical right's new focus on Islam and Muslims?
- What do the terms 'Eurabia' and 'Dhimmitude' mean?
- How has the issue of Islam led to the mainstreaming of the populist radical right in Europe?

Vasilopoulou

- Why do populist radical right parties have 'increased incentives' to oppose the European Union?
- What are the four aspects of European integration?
- What are the populist radical right's three 'patterns of opposition' to European integration? Why do different parties have different patterns of opposition?

Discussion points

- 1 Are we today in an 'interregnum' or an 'endgame,' according to Griffin? Do you agree with his position?

- 2 Is Carter's (full) typology of 'right-wing extremism' still relevant today? Does her established relationship between party ideology and electoral success still hold true in the twenty-first century?
- 3 What constitutes a bigger threat to contemporary liberal democracy, the 'post-fascist' New Right or the 'ethnocratic' radical right?
- 4 Does the European populist radical right have a distinct economic program?
- 5 Zúquete argues that Islamophobia is 'indistinctive' and 'moralistic' and should therefore not be used in academic debates. Do you agree?
- 6 Has there been a shift in the populist radical right's opposition to European integration during the Great Recession?
- 7 Are populist radical right parties 'anti-European'?

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1 Interregnum or endgame?

The radical right in the 'post-fascist' era

Roger Griffin

A charred corpse lying unrecognizable in an underground bunker in Berlin, a body hanging all too recognizably upside down from the gantry of a petrol station in Milan: if single images can be worth pages of historical analysis then the fates of Hitler and Mussolini in April 1945 certainly point to a dramatic watershed in the history of the radical right. The *Duce's* prophecies that his regime inaugurated a 'century of the Right, a Fascist century', and the *Führer's* claims to have founded a thousand-year Reich had proved catastrophic misreadings of unfolding political realities. The increasingly geriatric personal dictatorships of Franco and Salazar soon seemed grotesque anachronisms. In 1994 the oldest and most successful neo-fascist movement, the Movimento Sociale Italiano, became a 'right-wing party', declaring at its first congress held in Fiuggi that the collapse of actually existing socialism five years earlier had meant the end of an era characterized by the struggle between anti-fascism and fascism, and that parliamentary democracy now remained 'the only solution without negative side effects to the problem of competition between political forces for the conquest of consensus'.¹ In the run up to the congress in December 1993 the MSI's leader, Gianfranco Fini, had asserted that 'Fascism was now irreversibly consigned to history and its judgement. . . . Like all Italians we are not neo-Fascists, but post-Fascists'.² Symbolically at least, Fiuggi was the Bad Godesberg of the European radical right. Liberal democracy had triumphed.

With its Faustian urge to probe beneath the surface of human phenomena to find 'what holds together the world at its inmost level',³ political science clearly cannot be content with such punchy story-lines and cinematographic *dénouements*. However, once it is asked to recount how things 'actually have been' for the radical right since 1945 a number of factors come into play which make it hazardous to offer any sort of script at all, even if only in the form of a rough treatment. For one thing, even if the scope of the question is restricted to Europe, the failure of the radical right to achieve hegemony has a different story in every country.⁴ Moreover, the conceptual problems involved compound those raised by the sheer quantity of empirical material. Apart from the increasingly contested nature of the fundamental term 'the right',⁵ the concept 'radical right' can be defined and delimited in several conflicting ways,⁶ and in each case subsumes a number of distinct forms of organization and ideological rationale. Moreover, the specific connotations of the term in different languages (when it is possible to translate it literally) and its significance, both historical and contemporary, vary significantly from country to country and from one part of the world to another (e.g., in German 'radical right' is regarded as still within the bounds of legitimate political debate, while 'extreme right' is not). In some Anglo-Saxon usages it embraces thousands of individual groups, movements, and parties the world over, ranging from the vast and well-established to the ephemeral and minute.⁷ In addition, the subliminal political values, not to mention the historical assumptions and shadowy teleological imaginings, of the social

scientist who attempts to sketch the 'big picture' cannot fail to influence the way it is composed, which empirical features are highlighted, and what inferences for the future are drawn from it.

Fortunately, three factors operate to bring the remit of this article just within the bounds of the manageable. First, it is written as one of a series of articles primarily concerned with general patterns of development discernible over the twentieth century within some of the major modern political ideologies, rather than with specific political formations and the events they helped shape. Secondly, the right-left dichotomy is a product of the French Revolution, and the term 'radical right' acquires its most precise connotations in the context of ideologically elaborated rejections of parliamentary liberalism of the type which first arose in late nineteenth-century Europe. Considerations of traditionalist forces operating outside Europeanized societies in a non-parliamentary context, such as Islamic fundamentalism, or of ideologically vacuous dictatorships, whether military or personal, thus need not detain us. Thirdly, one of the most significant events in the recent history of the radical right arguably concerns not the object of research but the lens through which it is seen. After several decades in which even the most rudimentary agreement over the definition of fascism was lacking, a significant pocket of consensus has emerged about its basic definitional contours. This conjuncture of factors enables an area of empirical data which poses irreducible definitional and taxonomic problems to be cut down to size, at least for heuristic purposes, by considering within a relatively uncontentious conceptual framework those aspects of the post-war radical right which can be seen as outlets or conduits for the same ideological energies which fed interwar fascism. Having cleared some of the terrain it will then be possible to suggest in a more speculative spirit that the most significant development that has taken place since the war in the radical right has occurred outside the parameters of fascism: the spread of 'ethno-cratic liberalism'. The anti-liberal currents of ideology it feeds may prove even more insidious than modernized forms of the interwar fascist right in their liberticide effects because they are so easily absorbed into the bloodstream of liberalism itself.

There is now a growing consensus that fascism is best seen as a revolutionary form of populist nationalism which emerged in the interwar period at a time when a systemic crisis seemed to many within the Europeanized world to be affecting not only national life, but civilization as a whole.⁸ A necessary precondition for the rise of fascism was a cultural climate saturated with apocalyptic forebodings and hopes for imminent or eventual renewal captured in such works as Spengler's *Decline of the West* and H.G. Wells's *The Shape of Things to Come*. It articulated, fomented, and channelled inchoate but extraordinarily widespread longings for a new type of political system, a new élite, a new type of human being, a new relationship between the individual and society, for a more planned economy, for a revolutionary change in the values of modern life, for a new experience of time itself.⁹ The mobilizing myth which can be treated ideal-typically as the definitional core of fascism (the 'fascist minimum') is that through the intervention of a heroic élite the whole national community is capable of resurrecting itself Phoenix-like from the ashes of the decadent old order ('palingenetic ultra-nationalism'). It is this myth which informs the obsessive preoccupation with national/ethnic decadence and regeneration in a post-liberal new order which is now widely acknowledged to be the hallmark of all fascism.¹⁰

After 1945 not only was ultra-nationalism widely identified with war, destruction, genocide, and calculated inhumanity on a horrendous scale, but liberal democracy underwent no serious systemic crises, and was if anything strengthened and legitimated for the bulk of its citizens (in the myth of the 'Free World') by the emergence of the Soviet Empire, which also had the effect of comprehensively denying political space to liberal and right-wing agitation

on its own territory. Within a few years of the Axis defeat it had become clear to all of fascism's more astute activists that the age of mass armed parties led by charismatic leaders was dead, and that in order to survive at all as an ideology in the absence of a pervasive palinogenetic climate it had to be extensively overhauled. The basic problem was to adapt a revolutionary form of populist nationalism posited on the imminent collapse of Western liberalism and the palpable risk of a Communist takeover, to a Western world now divided between a dynamically expanding capitalist and an apparently impregnable Communist state system, neither of whose populations were susceptible to mass mobilization by the rhetoric of extreme nationalism, racism, and war.

It would be misleading to suggest that all fascists recognized the extent to which their vision had been discredited by events, and have accepted the need for drastic change in their ideology and tactics in the light of the new international situation. The psychotropic power of palinogenetic myth to transform despair into hope encouraged many who had believed in a fascist cause at the height of the war to enter a sustained state of denial. For decades pockets of purely nostalgic and mimetic fascism could be found in Europe, like muddy puddles in the bed of a dried-up lake. But the dramatic loss of the historical climate which produced fascism forced its more flexible activists, decimated by events and acutely marginalized within their political cultures,¹¹ to develop two basic strategies for keeping the dream of national rebirth alive, even if in a state of hibernation, in the bleak winter of liberal and (until 1989) communist hegemony in Europe. They can be summarized ideal-typically as 'internationalization' and 'metapoliticization'.

The internationalization of fascism

Even before the end of the Second World War some Nazis were making plans for the core values of the Third Reich to be perpetuated after its increasingly inexorable defeat. One of the more bizarre schemes may well have involved the setting up of a secret international order through the agency of the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS.¹² Though this particular project came to naught, it was an early symptom of the Europeanization of fascism which has become such a striking feature of the post-1945 fascist radical right. There had been several fascist schemes for a federal Europe before the war,¹³ especially emanating from Italy,¹⁴ and the realities of a Nazi conquest made the 'New European Order' a subject of considerable speculation and forward planning in some ministries of the Third Reich when victory seemed a foregone conclusion¹⁵—one Nazi initiative, Young Europe, was revived after the war as *Jeune Europe*. Nazi fellow travellers, such as Drieu la Rochelle in France and Szálasi, leader of the Hungarian Arrow Cross, also promoted visions of a Nazi dominated pan-fascist Europe. Once Germany had lost the war, a tempting explanation for the defeat without abandoning fascist principles was to accuse Mussolini and Hitler of being too narrowly nationalistic to realize the true historical purpose of fascism, namely to save European civilization as a whole from destruction at the hands of Bolshevism and Americanization.

Symptoms of the Euro-fascism which emerged in the aftermath of 1945 were the launching of periodicals dedicated to the cause such as *The European*, *Europa Nazione*, and *Nation Europa*, the publication of major texts by Oswald Mosley,¹⁶ Julius Evola,¹⁷ Maurice Bardèche,¹⁸ and Francis Yockey¹⁹ calling for a European Federation or Empire of fascist nations, and the creation of pan-European fascist organizations such as *The Nouvel Ordre Européen*, *The European Social Movement*, and *Faisceaux Nationaux et Européens*.²⁰ However, any notion that the radical right had found in Eurofascism an effective strategy for a coordinated assault

on the citadels of power is instantly dispelled when it is realized how many incompatible schemes emerged from it: pagan and Catholic, Nietzschean and occultist, pro-Nazi (and anti-Semitic), pro-Fascist, pro-British, pro-French, and pro-Hungarian. Some saw the new Europe as equally threatened by Russia and America, and hence saw Africa as a colonial hinterland supplying an autarkic Europe with raw materials (the idea of 'Eurafrica' was first formulated in the Salò Republic in the last years of the war). Others linked its destiny with the USA as part of an anti-communist alliance, or with Russia to form a continental bloc against decadent materialism and individualism ('national bolshevism').

The acute taxonomic difficulties posed by the post-war fascist radical right are brought out clearly when we consider that the Nazi variant of Eurofascism is simultaneously an example of another form that its internationalization has taken. Once stripped of its specifically German connotations of a 'Third Reich', Nazism became the ideology of the white supremacist struggle to save civilization from its alleged enemies (Jews, communists, the racially inferior, liberals, etc.), whether on a strictly European (*Nouvel Ordre Européen*, *Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa*) or a planetary (World Union of National Socialists, League for Pan-Nordic Friendship) scale.²¹ In both cases, as with Eurofascism in general, the national or ethnic dimension of the struggle for regeneration was not abandoned, but subsumed within a wider context, so that Swedish or American Nazis can feel that the struggle for the rebirth of their nation or homeland is but one theatre in an international race war. By the 1970s a new generation of Universal Nazis was thinking globally and acting locally, made up principally of marginalized 'working class' white racists targeted through propaganda directed at the educationally challenged, a racist variety of heavy metal 'punk' rock and ballads, and, in Europe at least, through networks of organized football hooliganism with a racist agenda. Extensive international links exist between them, not only in the form of ritual 'congresses' (e.g., the annual jamboree in the Belgian town of Dijksmuide, the Hitler or Hess birthday celebrations), but especially at the level of the distribution of propaganda, literature, and merchandizing. The White Noise CD business is a multinational industry in itself whose profits are channelled into financing political activities.²²

Universal Nazism has retained the original's fanatical belief in the genius of Adolf Hitler and in the innate right of Aryan peoples to take any measures necessary to protect and strengthen the national community, which in practice means fighting the threat posed by Jews, Communists, Blacks, and other alleged enemies of racial health, but the showdown between cultural health and degeneracy generated new variants of Nazism as it adapts to its new habitat. Thus US Nazis present the federal state as ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government), and the United Nations as an agency of enforced racial mixing in a culturally homogenized, genocidal New World Order. Specific groups blend in elements taken from the Ku Klux Klan, evangelist Christianity,²³ or Nordic mythology²⁴ in a spirit reminiscent of the 'German Faith Movement' which appeared under Hitler, though the fusion of the political with 'new religions' has its roots deep in the charter myths which inform the national identity of traditionally minded white Americans.

An even more original form of international fascism ideologically is Third Positionism, which, influenced by some currents of Italian neo-fascism, seeks a third way between capitalism and communism, and associates itself with Third World struggles against the global market and a USA-Israel dominated 'international community' (notably Gaddafi's Libya, the PLO, and Hussein's Iraq), 'Zionist' capitalism, and the cultural hegemony of the USA. The English Third Positionist group the National Revolutionary Faction, for example, promotes its own alternative economics ('distributionism'), and calls for the component parts of Britain (including Cornwall and the Isle of Man) to achieve semi-autonomy within a

united (but decidedly not in the EU sense of united) Europe. This combination of regionalist separatism (ethno-pluralism) with supranational federalism reflects a marked tendency in some areas of the modern European radical right to abandon the nation-state as the basic unit of homogeneous cultural energy and promote the idea of discrete ethnic groups or *ethnies* (a principle already familiar from the Nazi equation of nation with *Volk*). This produces the concept of the 'Europe of a hundred flags' to which the NRF subscribes.

Though it presents itself as a vanguard movement of 'political soldiers', the NRF is typical of Third Positionism for the considerable energy it expends on refining its ideological alternative to classic fascism and encouraging a healthy diet of reading among its followers. The books on sale via its magazine *The English Alternative* (formerly *The Crusader*) range in subject matter from Nazism, especially its anti-Semitism and racial politics, the Iron Guard and the Falange, to ecology and the ideas of English visionaries such as Hilaire Belloc and William Morris. Especially significant is its promotion of the socialistic, pro-Russian, and Europeanist brand of fascism evolved by Otto Strasser and (in attenuated form) by his brother Gregor before he became a Nazi leader. Indeed, Third Positionism is sometimes called Strasserism to distinguish it from neo-Nazism, which it rejects as excessively compromised by capitalism, demagoguery, and narrow chauvinism. The ENM is informally linked to Third Positionist groups all over the world, all with their own unique syntheses of ideas.²⁵

The metapoliticization of fascism

An even more important ideological development within the fascist radical right than its rejection of the nation as the sole or principal focus for revolutionary energies also results from the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. An outstanding feature of Fascism and Nazism which fascist organizers elsewhere attempted to emulate was that they were able to take over the state as a new type of force in modern politics which combined four components: an electoral party, a paramilitary army, a mass social movement, and an effervescent ideological discourse. The ideological discourse, which under the two regimes became the orthodoxy and hence the basis for the social re-engineering of values and behaviour, was provided by a profusion of texts by intellectuals, artists, and articulate activists (notably the leaders themselves) who felt an elective affinity with a movement which promised to put an end to the decadence in national life and inaugurate a process of renewal. Far from being fully cohesive bodies of doctrine, the ideologies of both movements were alliances (in the Fascist case a very loose one) of heterogeneous political, intellectual and cultural currents and ideas which converged on the image of the reborn nation.

A post-war political climate inclement towards all 'extremisms' precluded fascism from attracting anywhere in the world a mass following of sufficient size, momentum, and gravitational pull to bind these four components together under a charismatic leader in a way which had been only possible in the exceptional circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s. As a result overtly anti-systemic cadre movements of revolutionary paramilitaries and radical ideologues split off from ostensibly democratic political parties pursuing a fascist agenda, and it became possible for the ideological production of fascist discourse to operate relatively autonomously without any formal links with organized politics. The situation which emerged was reminiscent of the French or German radical right in the pre-1914 period where party politics, popular passions, extra-parliamentary activism, and ideological agitation were still not coordinated into cohesive unified populist movements. As a result of the fragmentation a panorama of the modern fascist right in Europe presents a spectacle of a small number of political parties with fascist associations existing alongside a much larger number of

organizations made up of militant activists dedicated solely to ideas, some of them with minute memberships (the 'groupuscular right').²⁶ The radical right planets of Europe's interwar political system have broken up into countless asteroids.

The combination of this situation with the universalization of Nazism is that a whole new sector of international cultural production has grown up since the war dedicated to keeping alive Nazism as an ideology, either through books glorifying the Nazi period (memoirs, biographies), or, more subtly, through academic journals, monographs, conference papers, and 'scientific' reports which are 'revisionist' in that they offer historical accounts of Nazism denying, relativizing or minimizing the atrocities and human catastrophes which directly resulted from its attempt to create a racial empire in the heart of Europe. The most notorious product of Revisionism is Holocaust Denial, which exists in various degrees of pornographic crudity and specious sophistication in its manipulation of historical realities.²⁷ Its success in re-editing history and making the facts about the Nazis' racial state at least contestable in the minds of post-war generations is crucial to a long-term strategy of elements within the international radical right for normalizing and rehabilitating Nazism to a point where its ideas no longer create repulsion among the general public, and where some anti-Nazi energy is actually deflected towards Jews themselves (who are accused by some 'vulgar' revisionists of 'inventing' the 'lie' of the Holocaust in order to be given a homeland at the expense of the Palestinians).

Some of the more sophisticated examples of revisionism²⁸ provide fascinating and disturbing case studies in the persuasive psychological power which form can exercise over content. By deliberately emulating a discourse and format of academic production (conferences and public lectures, journal articles and books incorporating footnotes, a strictly analytical linguistic register, the appeal to documentary evidence, the invocation of academic qualifications, etc.) which originally evolved as part of a liberal humanistic quest for truth, revisionists set out simultaneously to pervert the historical record and overcome psychological barriers which any humanist should have towards fascism. Revisionist and Holocaust denial literature is demonstrably part of the staple diet of 'Nazi-oid' fascists the world over and its most prolific producers nearly always have links to known Nazi activists. However, much of its insidious power derives from the fact that it exists as a free-floating discourse in its own right, and is not part of the ideological stance of any particular movement, party, or 'school' of fascism. In this sense revisionism is 'metapolitical'.

The pro-Nazi subtext of revisionism is at least apparent. By far the most sophisticated disguise assumed by the fascist radical right since the war is the (European) New Right. First elaborated as a response to calls for a more 'modern' fascist discourse which became increasingly frequent within the French radical right in the 1960s,²⁹ the Nouvelle Droite has been responsible for an extraordinary output of high quality ideological material associated with the 'think-tank' GRECE and the periodicals *Nouvelle École* and *Éléments*, most of which only the trained eye (peering through the lens of the 'new consensus') can detect as bearing the traces of a fascist legacy. The New Right's 'metapolitical' critique of liberal democracy has been taken up in several other countries, notably Italy (where it has been fused with a fascination with fantasy literature, especially Tolkien, and with esoteric elements derived from the total alternative 'Traditionalist' philosophy of history bequeathed by Julius Evola), Germany (where the influence of the Conservative Revolution is particularly strong), and Russia (where it has given rise to a new version of Eurasianism). There is even an English branch of the New Right which adds some Celtic and Anglo-Saxon perspectives to a view of the modern world as indebted to Evola as it is to GRECE.³⁰ The European New Right embraces a large number of academics and freelance autodidacts, journalists, writers, and intellectuals,

some of whom are associated with particular magazines, study groups, or parties, while others are essentially loners. Some are overtly fascist, as when one of their number calls for a regenerating explosion of mythic energy of the sort precipitated by Hitler,³¹ while others have evolved in such idiosyncratic directions away from any discernible revolutionary position that their fascist expectations of rebirth seem to have melted into a diffuse cultural pessimism about the present world order.³²

While it is impossible to generalize about its ideological contents, the recurrent features of New Right thought are: a 'right-wing Gramscianism' which recognizes that cultural hegemony must precede political hegemony; the extensive use of intellectuals associated with the 'Conservative Revolution', notably Nietzsche, Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger, and Carl Schmitt, as articulators of principles central to non-Nazi variants of German fascism which emerged under Weimar; the idea of Europe as a unique cultural homeland which can still be revitalized by renewing contact with its pre-Christian mythic roots; an extreme eclecticism stemming from the belief that the dichotomy of left and right can be transcended in a new alliance of intellectual energies opposed to the dominant system of liberal egalitarianism, capitalist materialism, and American consumerist individualism (summed up in the concept of a creeping 'McDonaldization' of the world, which also links in with an idiosyncratic concern with ecology); and the celebration of ethnic diversity and difference ('differentialism') to be defended against cultural imperialism and 'totalitarian' one-worldism ('mondialisme'), mass migration, and the liberal endorsement of a multi-racial society (presented as 'genocidal').

The hallmark of the New Right is its belief that the present world system is not only decadent, but that it will eventually give way to a new type of civilization based on healthy mythic forces (though the new millennium nowadays often seems indefinitely postponed). Contemporary history is thus an 'interregnum' for the spiritually awakened (a concept derived from the Conservative Revolution). New Rightists of an Evolian bent use the alternative image of the 'Kali Yuga' or Black Age which in the Hindu cyclic philosophy of history precedes the opening of a new golden age. Since the Axis powers did not take advantage of the unique opportunity offered by the interwar crisis to install a European empire based on Traditional values, those with an intuitive sense for these values have no option but to withdraw into 'apoliteia' (which does not preclude political activism and even terrorism) until the modern world finally collapses.

It is in the copious publications of Europe's metapolitical New Right that the remarkable vitality and originality of the contemporary fascist radical right as an ideological phenomenon is to be found, as well as the most sophisticated expression of its Europeanization.³³ Perhaps the ultimate form taken by fascism's metapoliticization, however, is the extensive use it is now making of the Web. Thanks to the Internet, schemes for the salvation of nations, ethnic groups, Europe, the West, or the White race from their present decadence cease to be located in a movement, party, ideologue, or visionary leader, or even in a particular country or ethnic community: the secular Jeremiads and Evangelia are everywhere and nowhere simultaneously in a suprahistorical electronic reality which has the most tenuous link with the material world. In 'cyberfascism', the zenith of metapoliticization coincides with the ultimate degree of internationalization. To follow up the links to kindred organizations provided on each radical right web-page will take the avid researcher on a virtual journey through literally thousands of sites located throughout the Europeanized world, all presenting different permutations of palingenetic ultra-nationalism. What results is the paradox that as fascism diversifies into an ever greater plethora of factions and sects, it is simultaneously undergoing an ever more intense process of ecumenization.³⁴

Democratic fascism, ethnocratic liberalism, and the prospects of the radical right

The sheer quantity of *groupuscules*, organizations, and publications which point to the tenacity of fascism in its various modulations might lead the unwary to assume that fascism is growing in strength and still poses a challenge to democracy. Fortunately in the present case, where variants of major ideologies are concerned there is often weakness in sheer numbers, since they point to an absent centre, the lack of dynamic movement which would turn them into mutually intelligible dialects of the same *lingua franca*. Fascist ecumenicalism does not run deep, and papers over radical differences in ideology which would nip in the bud any sort of fascist international (as they did when attempts to 'universalize' fascism formally were made in the much more propitious 1930s). Similarly, its metapolitics mask the fundamental impotence of visions which survive solely because their essential utopianism is never exposed by the acid test of attempted implementation. Creating a European Empire on differentialist lines, for example—leaving aside the preposterously surreal conditions required before such a fantasy could be enacted—would involve a process of enforced resettlement and ethnic cleansing which would soon leave the 'hundred flags' of the new Europe drenched in blood.

The most telling indicator of the structural impotence of the revolutionary radical right today is perhaps the emergence of electoral parties, which, despite euphemizing their fascist agenda for public consumption, have remained firmly marginalized everywhere in the world since 1945. The NSDAP or the PNF used paramilitary force to back up electoral campaigns and negotiations with the state, and made no secret of their contempt for liberalism. The modern parliamentary fascist party (e.g., the British National Party, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) is more like a toothless, emaciated, old nag than a powerful Trojan horse capable of carrying revolutionaries into the citadel of power. The extent to which 'real fascism' is a dead letter is exemplified by the consequence of Fini's decision to move the MSI towards the centre from the right to take advantage of the Italian state crisis of the early 1990s. The price for becoming a legitimate player in the political game was to renounce the official commitment to a post-liberal new order, which meant taking Genesis out of the Bible just as much as it did for the hard left when Clause 4 was removed from the Labour Party Constitution. In both cases a small rump of intransigents were left (Scargill's Real Labour Party and Rauti's MSI Fiamma Tricolore) to keep the flame of ideological purity burning as a practically invisible point of light in the political spectrum. Despite occasional bouts of media panic about the possibility of massive swings to the right triggered by neo-Nazi violence against asylum seekers or the BNP's winning of a seat in a local election, the structural conditions are simply lacking for any fascist party to 'take off' as a mass force in national politics anywhere in the world as long as the globalization of capitalism continues apace.

Fascists cannot afford to concede this without ceasing to be fascists. Just as communists when confronted by the appearance of fascism in the 1920s had to classify it as another counter-revolutionary form of capitalism in order to 'save' their teleology, so fascists have to believe they are living on the threshold of a new age or in a protracted interregnum (or the 'Kali Yuga'), in order to retain their commitment to the cause intact. They are temperamentally incapable of coming to terms with one of the most psychologically disturbing cosmological implications of liberal modernity: the idea of history as an intrinsically meaningless, neutral medium in which—at least as long as our species survives—an infinite chain of events will continually unfold generated by the largely random interaction of the lives of billions of human beings, events which disclose patterns and trends but no intrinsic purpose or continuous story. In that sense the withering away of fascism in the West marks the victory,

not of the 'Open' over the 'Closed Society', but of open-ended, amorphous, plotless time over aesthetic shapes and mythic dramas projected onto events as a palliative to the 'Terror of History'—a term coined by Mircea Eliade, who before becoming a world expert on palinogenetic cosmologies, himself succumbed to the need to believe in the myth of politico-cultural rebirth from decadence.³⁵

It would be academically irresponsible, however, to give this brief account what is, in a liberal perspective, a happy ending. As many reading this will have been already waiting impatiently for me to point out, another type of radical right has crept up on European society, one which is potentially of considerable virulence, not in its ability to destroy liberalism from without, but to contaminate it from within. Sometimes called 'radical right populism', or simply 'the radical right',³⁶ its paradoxical qualities perhaps emerge more clearly in the term 'ethnocratic liberalism'.³⁷ It is a type of party politics which is not technically a form of fascism, even a disguised form of it, for it lacks the core palinogenetic vision of a 'new order' totally replacing the liberal system. Rather it enthusiastically embraces the liberal system, but considers only one ethnic group full members of civil society. As the case of apartheid South Africa illustrates only too clearly, a state based on ethnocratic liberalism is forced by its own logic to create institutions, including a terror apparatus, to impose a deeply illiberal regime on all those who do not qualify on racial grounds for being treated as human beings. This contaminated, restrictive form of liberalism poses considerable taxonomic problems because, while it aims to retain liberal institutions and procedures and remain economically and diplomatically part of the international liberal democratic community, its axiomatic denial of the universality of human rights predisposes it to behave against ethnic outgroups as violently as a fascist regime.

The fact that ethnocratic liberalism is a hybrid of ideological extremism and democratic constitutionalism, of radical right and centre (making the term 'radical right populism' misleading), and is a paradox rather than an oxymoron, also makes it more dangerous. It is perfectly attuned to a post-war world hostile to unadulterated fascism, one where the clerks³⁸ now enthusiastically help 'man' the ideological Maginot Line which has been constructed to stop an openly revolutionary brand of illiberalism ever again achieving credibility. It speaks a language of 'rights'—rights of ethnic peoples, rights to a culture—which addresses deep-seated and understandable fears about the erosion of identity and tradition by the globalizing (but only partially homogenizing) forces of high modernity. It is a discourse which has grown in sophistication thanks to the theorists of communitarianism,³⁹ ethnopluralism, and differentialism, and in legitimacy in the context of justified concerns over cultural globalization. The ground for its widespread acceptance as a familiar and genuine (if unwelcome) member of the liberal ideological family rather than the offspring of a highly fecund anti-liberal cuckoo, has been well prepared by liberalism's long history of contamination by prejudices which have denied entire groups access to the rights it upholds as 'sacred': women, the poor, children, the handicapped, the nomad, the allophone, the aboriginal, the 'primitive'. If the battle cry of liberalism in theory is Rousseau's 'All [human beings] are born equal and everywhere they live in chains' then its slogan in practice has been Orwell's 'All men are equal but some are more equal than others' (a phrase which is often conveniently identified with the authoritarian 'other' rather than 'our' own brand of totalitarianism).

The Front National, the FPÖ, the Lega Nord, the Vlaamsblok, the Republikaner, the Centrupartei, the Scandinavian Progress parties, and scores of openly xenophobic parties which have emerged in the countries of the former Soviet Empire⁴⁰ vary considerably in their programmes and aspirations, and most can sincerely claim to have nothing to do with historic fascism in the conventional sense of the word. Yet in a world inoculated against

openly revolutionary varieties of palingenetic ultranationalism, their axiomatic rejection of multi-culturalism, their longing for 'purity', their nostalgia for a mythical world of racial homogeneity and clearly demarcated boundaries of cultural differentiation, their celebration of the ties of blood and history over reason and a common humanity, their rejection of *ius soli* for *ius sanguinis*, their solvent-like abuse of history represent a reformist version of the same basic myth. It is one which poses a more serious threat to liberal democracy than fascism because it is able to disguise itself, rather like a stick insect posing as a twig to catch its prey. It was arguably because Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party blended with ethnocratic liberalism that he made such an impact on Russian politics in 1993, even if events since have shown that it is the militarist/imperialist perversion of liberalism familiar from nineteenth-century Europe which still retains hegemony. It was his exploitation of ethnocratic liberalism, not fascism, which enabled Milošević to carry out ethnic cleansing for years under the gaze of an international community mesmerized by the (procedurally speaking) democratic consensus on which he based his actions. The total number of victims of the calculated atrocities against non-Serbs which resulted far outweighs that of all the outrages committed by post-war fascists put together, suggesting that ethnocratic liberalism has replaced fascism as the form of radical right best adapted to the realities of the modern world.

The Third Reich's citizenship laws distinguished between Germans and non-Germans, but at least the Nazis had never made a secret of their contempt for what one of their number dismissed in 1925 as 'the Jewish-liberal-democratic-Marxist-humanitarian mentality'. He went on: 'as long as there is even a single minute tendril which connects our programme with this root then it is doomed to be poisoned and hence to wither away to a miserable death'.⁴¹ Ethnocratic liberals have genetically modified the radical right so that it thrives in the very soil which once would have been poisonous to it. What are their long term prospects for success, in the face of the 'ecological' purists within liberalism constantly seeking to cleanse it of toxic additives? As I write, Tudjman's ethnocratic liberal party has recently been ousted by centre-left forces in Croatia.⁴² Fukuyamians might read this as a sign that history is still on course for achieving the undisputed hegemony of liberal capitalism which will give birth to the bottomless *ennui* of the 'last man'. A host of less sanguine social scientists such as Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman would suggest instead a Manichean view which sees contemporary history as a permanent battle ground between forces tending to realize liberalism's project of a global humanity and those seeking to thwart and corrupt it. We will continue to live in interesting times.

I must side with the Manicheans. The modern world is not an interregnum, but it is an endgame, one being continually played out, like the eternal recurrence of world snooker competitions and European cup football on British TV, superimposing a cyclic pattern on rectilinear history. 'It is only our concept of time which causes us to use the phrase The Last Judgment: actually it is a court in permanent session.'⁴³ Now that millennium hysteria has died down, it might become easier to see that the last act being constantly performed in our age has nothing to do with a particular date or a technological glitch, or even a final reckoning between liberalism and the conveniently alien ideological 'other' provided by fascism, communism, or fundamentalism. Instead it is between genuinely liberal versions of democracy open to global humanitarian and ecological perspectives on the one hand, and radical right versions on the other which exploit the profound ambiguity of the concept 'demos'. Nor is it necessary for openly radical right political formations such as the Front National or the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia to triumph for liberalism to be corroded by the ethnocentrism which they represent. Given the evidence of contemporary Europe's continuing implication in forces which, according to some reliable

humanitarian monitoring agencies, are generating mounting structural poverty and ecological depredation in the 'South', it is possible to see 'actually existing' liberal Europe not just as a socio-economic fortress, but as an ethno-cultural one as well, protected by ramparts being continually reinforced. It is a concentration of ethnocentric power which, though liberal in its domestic politics, continues to operate prevalently as a radical right wing force in terms of its total impact on the global community.

The effect of propaganda put out by ethnocentric ideologues and parties can only reinforce this tendency, no matter how marginalized they are from actual government, making it even more impossible for politicians to present populations with policies which would involve a substantial transfer of wealth and resources (back) from the North to the South or address the structural reasons for mounting immigratory pressures, for fear of the mass dissent it would arouse. The next few decades should decide whether a healthy liberalism can prevail or whether, in the midst of a deteriorating environment and escalating demographic explosion which the new millennium inherits from the old, its contamination takes a permanent hold. Meanwhile, one of the messages transmitted by the protesters against the WTO in Seattle in the autumn of 1999 for those who habitually treat the radical right as 'out there' is that it might also be already in our midst. If the radical right is based on a malfunction of human empathy, on an affective aridity, then it might be legitimate to appropriate lines written in a very different context by T. S. Eliot, someone who managed to make the transition from fellow traveller of radical right cosmologies to a pundit of 'high' liberal humanist culture:

The desert is not remote in southern tropics,
The desert is not only round the corner.
The desert is squeezed into the tube-train next to you,
The desert is in the heart of your brother.⁴⁴

Notes and references

- 1 *Pensiamo l'Italia: il domani c'è già. Valori, idee e progetti per l'Alleanza Nazionale. Tesi Politiche approvate dal congresso di Fiuggi* (Rome: On Line System, 1995), p. 11. For more on the AN's ambiguous embrace of democracy, see R. Griffin, 'The post-fascism of the Alleanza Nazionale: a case-study in ideological morphology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1/2 (1996), pp. 107–146
- 2 Quoted in C. De Cesare, *Il Fascista del Duemila* (Milan: Kaos Edizioni, 1995), p. 106. For a more sceptical view of the sincerity of the MSI conversion to democracy, see Piero Ignazi, *Postfascisti?* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994).
- 3 A phrase from Faust's monologue in the first scene of Goethe's *Urfaust*.
- 4 See especially the impressive country-by-country survey in S. U. Larsen and B. Hagtvet (Eds.), *Modern Europe after Fascism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
- 5 One of the best surveys of the conceptual complexities posed by the term 'right' is still R. Eatwell (Ed.), *The Nature of the Right* (London: Pinter, 1989).
- 6 See, for example, the debate over the comparative value of the terms 'fascism' and 'radical right', in D. Prowe, "'Classic" fascism and the new radical right in Western Europe: comparisons and contrasts', *Contemporary European History*, 3/3 (November 1994), pp. 289–313. For another perspective on the word-field associated with the radical right, see Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Chapter 1.
- 7 C. O'Maoláin, *The Radical Right: A World Directory* (London: Longman, 1987).
- 8 For a fuller account, see the 'General introduction' to R. Griffin, *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London: Arnold, 1998). The latest (unwitting) convert to the consensus is A. J. Gregor, as shown in his latest book on generic fascism, *Phoenix* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), in which he refers to it as a 'tortured, enraged, and passionate demand for national renewal' (p. 162). For independent corroboration of the existence of this necessarily partial

- and contested consensus, see Stanley Payne's review article, 'Historical fascism and the radical right', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35/1 (2000), pp. 109–111.
- 9 See R. Griffin, 'Party time: Nazism as a temporal revolution', *History Today*, 49/4 (April 1999).
 - 10 See particularly R. Griffin, *Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
 - 11 The only real exception to this generalization is the explosion of radical right groups both extra-systemic (some fascist) and others ostensibly democratic (ethnocratic), which took place in Russia in the 1990s. Though safely marginalized by the system, the sheer variety of them and the dramatic, though predictably short-lived, rise to international prominence of Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party underline the dependency on conditions of acute systemic crisis for radically palingenetic and ethnocratic forms of the right to achieve a popular resonance. Even in post-unification Germany and pre-democracy South Africa the radical right, though violent, remained safely marginalized, because in both cases populist palingenetic hopes for the rebirth of the country were projected onto liberal democracy/capitalism and channelled within the parliamentary system.
 - 12 Kevin Coogan, *Dreamer of the Day* (New York: Autonomedia, York, 1999), pp. 317–324.
 - 13 'Europe for the Europeans: the fascist vision of the new Europe', Humanities Research Centre Occasional Paper, No. 1 (Oxford Brookes University, Oxford OX3 0BP), 1994, available at <<http://www.brookes.ac.uk/schools/humanities/staff/europ.txt>>.
 - 14 M. A. Ledeen, *Universal Fascism* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972).
 - 15 R. E. Herzstein, *When Nazi Dreams Come True* (London: Abacus, 1982).
 - 16 Oswald Mosley, *The Alternative* (Wiltshire: Mosley Publications, 1947).
 - 17 E.g., 'Sui presupposti spiritual e strutturali dell'unità europea', in *Europa Nazione*, 1/1 (January 1951). For a collection of Evola's highly influential essays on the European empire, see Part One of J. Evola, *Saggi di Dottrina Politica* (Genoa: Dioscuri, 1989).
 - 18 Maurice Bardèche, *Qu'est-ce que le fascisme?* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1961).
 - 19 Francis Yockey, *Imperium* (n.p.: Truth Seeker Press, 1962). See Coogan, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, which locates the book in its context of the fascist international and projects for a new Europe.
 - 20 See Coogan, *ibid.*, Chapters 30–36.
 - 21 See Coogan, *ibid.*, Chapters 45–48. A highly influential expression of the ideology of Universal Nazism is *The Turner Diaries*, written (under a pseudonym) by William Pierce, leader of the neo-Nazi National Alliance; for a sample, see Griffin, *Fascism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10, pp. 372–374.
 - 22 See N. Lowles and Steve Silver (Eds.), *White Noise* (London: Searchlight, 1998).
 - 23 The most famous example is the 'Christian Identity' movement, which makes extensive use of the Internet. The characteristic blend of Christianity with a Universal Nazi ethos can also be sampled at the website of 'Kingdom Identity Ministries' at <<http://www.kingidentity.com>>.
 - 24 See Jeffrey Kaplan, *Radical Religion in America* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
 - 25 For a flavour of Third Positionist ideology and its sophisticated use of the Internet see the NRF's website at <www.nationalbolshevik.com/nrf/nrfindex.html>. Another Third Positionist *groupuscule* is Groupe Union Défense, whose ideology is discussed in R. Griffin, 'GUD reactions: the patterns of prejudice of a neo-fascist *groupuscule*', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 33/2 (April 1999). The tendency to extreme eclecticism so typical of fascist ideology is explored in R. Eatwell, 'Towards a new model of generic fascism', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4/2 (1992).
 - 26 See Griffin, 'GUD reactions', *op. cit.*, Ref. 25.
 - 27 See Deborah Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust* (New York: Free Press, 1993).
 - 28 E.g., Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg* (Berlin: Proylaen Verlag, 1987); David Irving, *Hitler's War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), the text at the centre of the libel case which Irving brought against Professor Lipstadt and lost so ignominiously in April 2000.
 - 29 See Pierre-André Taguieff, *Sur la Nouvelle Droite*, (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1994); R Griffin, 'Between metapolitics and *apoliteia*: the New Right's strategy for conserving the fascist vision in the "inter-regnum"', *Modern and Contemporary France* 8/1 (February 2000), R. Griffin, 'Plus ça change! The fascist pedigree of the Nouvelle Droite', in Edward Arnold (Ed.), *The Development of the Radical Right in France, 1890–1995* (London: Routledge, 2000).
 - 30 See the website of *The Scorpion* at <<http://www.stormloader.com/thescorpion>>.
 - 31 Horacio Cagni, 'Assenza di Dio e vitalismo tragico nel fascismo', *Trasgressioni*, 20 (January–August 1995).
 - 32 This would appear to be true of two intellectuals who in the past have worked tirelessly to establish the New Right as the major current of radical right thought in their respective countries, Alain de

Benoist (France) and Marco Tarchi (Italy), even if they are still associated with publications which betray the persistence of a belief in the 'interregnum' and its eventual dissolution in a new age.

- 33 An outstanding example of the richness and diversity of New Right cultural production was provided by Italy in the 1970s and 1980s: see especially M. Revelli, 'La nuova destra', in F. Ferraresi (Ed.), *La destra radicale* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1984); and P. Bologna and E. Mana (Eds.), *Nuova destra e cultura reazionaria negli anni ottanta* (Notiziario dell'Istituto storico della Resistenza in Cuneo, no. 23, 1983).
- 34 See Coogan, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, for an impressively researched exploration of just one 'story' in the internationalization of post-war fascism, its extraordinary ideological diversity and earnestness, and the bizarre fantasy world which some fascists still inhabit while they wait for the 'interregnum' to close.
- 35 On Eliade's time as an ideologue of the Iron Guard, see Coogan, *ibid.*, pp. 318–326.
- 36 E.g., Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1994); Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
- 37 For more on this concept, see R. Griffin, 'Last rights?', in S. Ramet (Ed.), *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe* (Pennsylvania, PA: Penn State Press, 1999).
- 38 An allusion to Julien Benda's classic study of the European intelligentsia's betrayal of the humanist tradition in the interwar period, *La Trahison des Clercs*, published in 1927.
- 39 For an excellent essay which underlines the anti-liberal thrust of communitarian notions of culture, see Z. Bauman's introduction to the reprint of his *Culture as Practice* (London: Sage, 1999), pp. xxxiii–xlv.
- 40 See Ramet, *op. cit.*, Ref. 37.
- 41 See Griffin, *Fascism, op. cit.*, Ref. 10, pp. 118–119.
- 42 Since writing, an impressive wave of international and national protest was unleashed by Jörg Haider's success in manoeuvring the (ethnocratic but not fascist) Austrian Freedom Party into power as part of a coalition government in February 2000.
- 43 Franz Kafka, 'Betrachtungen über sünde, leid, hoffnung und den wahren weg' (no. 40), in *Hochzeitsvor bereitungen auf dem Lande und andere Prosa aus dem Nachlass Betrachtungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1980), p. 33.
- 44 T. S. Eliot, *Choruses from 'The Rock', Selected Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), p. 109.

2 Party ideology

Elisabeth Carter

Parties of the extreme right are to some extent ‘masters of their own success’. That is, regardless of the political environment in which they operate and regardless of the institutional contexts within which they find themselves, their electoral success will depend, in part, on the ideology they espouse and the policies they put forward, and on the way in which they are organized and led. This chapter focuses on the first of these party-centric factors, and examines the extent to which the ideologies of the extreme right parties influence their fortunes at the polls. Rather than there being a uniform right-wing extremist ideology, the ideas and policies of the different parties vary quite considerably, with some of these being more popular with the electorate than others. Consequently, it is quite possible that the variation in the electoral success of the parties of the extreme right across Western Europe may be partly explained by the presence of different ideologies, with the more successful right-wing extremist parties embracing one type of ideology and the less successful ones adopting another.

The chapter begins by discussing the much-debated concept of right-wing extremism and by examining the different terminology used to describe the parties. Then it considers the existing studies of right-wing extremist party ideology, and investigates the ways in which these works have sought to illustrate the diversity that exists among the West European parties of the extreme right. As will become clear from this discussion, these existing studies suffer from a number of limitations and, in the light of this, the chapter puts forward an alternative typology of right-wing extremist parties. Five different types of right-wing extremist party are identified. On the one hand, this typology allows for the full diversity that exists within the right-wing extremist party family to be illustrated. On the other, it means that the link between the parties’ ideology and their electoral scores can be investigated. In this way it becomes possible to ascertain whether right-wing extremist party success is linked to a specific type of ideology, or whether, conversely, the nature of a party’s ideology matters little to its electoral success. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the importance of party ideology in an overall explanation of the disparity in the electoral fortunes of the West European parties of the extreme right.

The concept of right-wing extremism

In spite of the fact that right-wing extremism has been extensively analyzed by academics, journalists and other observers alike, it remains the case that an unequivocal definition of this concept is still lacking. Indeed, almost every scholar of right-wing extremism has pointed to the difficulties associated with defining the concept: Billig refers to the term ‘extreme right’ as ‘a particularly troubling one’ (1989: 146); Roberts speaks of the lack of ‘satisfactory operational indicators of extremism’ (1994: 466); and von Beyme argues that ‘formal definitions or derivations based on the history of ideas [have] largely failed to provide a

convincing concept for “right-wing extremism”’, while other frequently used criteria for labelling these parties have also been problematic (1988: 1–3).

The absence of an agreed-upon definition of right-wing extremism means that scholars continue to disagree over which attributes a party should possess if it is to be considered as being of the extreme right. As Hainsworth argues, ‘essentialist categorizations of the extreme right [are] fraught with problems’ and it is thus ‘not easy to provide neat, self-contained and irrefutable models of extreme rightism which might successfully accommodate or disqualify each concrete example or candidate deemed to belong to this party family’ (2000a: 4).

Surveying the different definitions of right-wing extremism that can be found in the academic literature, a consensus does nonetheless emerge that right-wing extremism refers to a particular form of *ideology* (Mudde, 1995a: 203–5). A few scholars have also pointed to a certain type of political style, behaviour, strategy or organization, or a certain electoral base as constituting facets of right-wing extremism (e.g. Herz, 1975: 30–1; Betz, 1994, 1998a; Taggart, 1995). These must be considered additional or secondary dimensions of the concept rather than defining features, however, since they are all informed first and foremost by the parties’ ideology. As Backes notes,

there are no organizational or strategic traits that would take into account the multiplicity of the phenomena that we generally call ‘right-wing extremism’, and that would act as a common denominator . . . The organizational structures of the parties of the extreme right are important for an exact description of this phenomenon, but they are totally inappropriate in reaching a definition of this concept.

(2001: 24, 29, this author’s translation)

A few authors have argued that right-wing extremism may be defined by reference to one single ideological feature. Husbands (1981), for example, points to ‘racial exclusionism’ as constituting the common ideological core of the West European extreme right, while more recently, Eatwell cites nationalism (in various forms) as being *the* defining feature of the parties of the extreme right in Western Europe (2000a: 412). The majority of scholars define right-wing extremism with reference to more than one ideological feature, however, although they fail to agree on which features these are. Indeed, following an extensive review of the literature, Mudde found no fewer than 58 different features were mentioned in the existing definitions of right-wing extremism. That said, he also found that certain features appeared more frequently than others in the existing definitions, and that five features were cited in over half the definitions. These are nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democratic sentiment and a call for a strong state (1995a: 206–7).

Just because these five features appear more frequently than others in the existing definitions of the concept of right-wing extremism does not mean that they can be considered as constituting the foundations of a generally accepted definition, however. It would, in fact, be misleading to consider them as such, because these five features do not all occupy the same place on the conceptual ladder of abstraction. More specifically, four of the five features – nationalism, xenophobia, racism and a call for a strong state – are all further down the ladder of abstraction than the fifth concept – anti-democratic sentiment. Put differently, nationalism, xenophobia, racism and a call for a strong state are all manifestations of the higher concept of anti-democratic sentiment.

The disparity in the level of abstraction of these five features is problematic because it means that possible (or even sufficient) features of right-wing extremism are mixed with its necessary features. Nationalism, xenophobia, racism and a call for a strong state are all

possible (and sometimes even sufficient) features of right-wing extremism, but they are not necessary ones. Anti-democratic sentiment, by contrast, is a necessary (though not a sufficient) feature of right-wing extremism. Cumbersome though it may be, this distinction between necessary and possible features of right-wing extremism is important because it underlines the fact that while a racist party, for example, is indeed a right-wing extremist party, not all right-wing extremist parties are racist. Thus, to argue that nationalism, xenophobia, racism or a call for a strong state are defining features of right-wing extremism is misleading. To maintain that anti-democratic sentiment is a defining feature of right-wing extremism is not problematic, however, because all right-wing extremist parties do indeed embrace anti-democratic sentiment, though it is important to note that not all parties that embrace anti-democratic sentiment are right-wing extremist.

To get closer to identifying the defining features of right-wing extremism – that is, features that are common to *all* right-wing extremist parties – and to make out which parties belong to an extreme right party family, it is therefore important to focus on necessary features of right-wing extremism rather than on possible ones. Possible features only become important later on, when the extreme right party family is subdivided in some way or another. To begin identifying the necessary features of right-wing extremism it is useful to go back to the concept of extremism, *tout court*, and for the most part, it is scholars from (or linked with) the German tradition who have engaged in such a task, not least because of the consequences a German party must face if it is deemed to be extremist (see below).

As Backes explains, the concept of extremism originates from an Aristotelian tradition, in which the just moral and politico-institutional sphere is set against the excessive exercise of power (2001: 21). It is thus concerned with negative constitutional notions and with the domination of one group over another, and hence involves both anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements. In the more modern era, and since the advent of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century in particular, extremism is most often conceptualized as the antithesis of liberal democracy. This means that on the one hand, it is characterized by its rejection of the ‘fundamental values (human rights), procedures and institutions (free, equal, direct and secret elections; party competition; pluralism; parliamentarism; a state based on the rule of law; separation of powers) of the democratic constitutional state’ (Backes and Moreau, cited in Roberts, 1994: 463), while on the other, it is distinguishable by what it embraces: absolutism and dogmatism (Backes, 2001: 22).

A definition of extremism as an ideology that incorporates anti-constitutional and anti-democratic features has also been adopted by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its interpretation of the Basic Law. As Saalfeld observes,

in addition to the principles of political pluralism, the Court has emphasised the rule of law, respect for human rights and civil liberties, free and universal democratic elections, a limitation of government powers through a system of checks and balances, the accountability of government, and independence of the judiciary as fundamental elements of liberal democracy. Furthermore, it has pointed out that liberal democracy is incompatible with the violent or arbitrary exercise of power. Parties whose principles violate one or more of these fundamental characteristics are considered extremist and can be banned by the Federal Constitutional Court.

(1993: 180–1)

Since anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements can be part of a left-wing ideology just as they can be part of a right-wing ideology, political extremism can be of the left or of

the right. Right-wing extremism is therefore a particular type of political extremism, and is distinguishable from left-wing extremism. The distinction between the two types of extremism can be made by reference to attitudes towards the principle of fundamental human equality, a principle that lies at the very core of liberal democracy. Whereas left-wing extremism accepts and supports this principle even though it interprets it 'with consequences that mean the principle of total equality destroys the freedoms guaranteed by the rules and institutions of the state of law' (Backes, 2001: 24, this author's translation), right-wing extremism strongly rejects it. Instead, right-wing extremism emphasizes the notion of inequality of individuals, and 'extreme right-wing models of political and social order are rooted in a belief in the necessity of *institutionalised* social and political inequality' (Saalfeld, 1993: 181 italics in original).

Such institutionalized social and political inequality may be based on a number of different criteria, but those overwhelmingly favoured by parties and movements of the extreme right have been nationality, race, ethnic group and/or religious denomination. This, to a great extent, helps explain why nationalism, xenophobia, racism and ethnocentrism appear in so many of the existing definitions of right-wing extremism. It remains the case, however, that although these features may help characterize and describe the extreme right, they do not help define it. They are mere manifestations of the principle of fundamental human inequality, which lies at the heart of right-wing extremism.

In the same way as it is misleading to consider nationalism, xenophobia, racism and a call for the strong state as defining features of right-wing extremism, so too is it inaccurate to view an adherence to the legacy of fascism as a defining feature of right-wing extremism. This is because the characteristics of fascism or neo-fascism (to use a term frequently assigned to the post-war extreme right, which drew on the legacy of historical fascism) are also merely manifestations of the higher concept of rightwing extremism.¹ These characteristics (over which there is significant debate but which include extreme nationalism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-pluralism, and the subordination of the individual to the will of the nation or state, to name but a few) are thus only possible features of right-wing extremism rather than necessary ones. While fascist or neo-fascist movements or parties should indeed be considered right-wing extremist, not all right-wing extremist movements or parties may be considered fascist or neo-fascist.

This point is accepted by the vast majority of scholars studying the contemporary extreme right. Billig is explicit on this matter, and argues that 'fascist regimes can be seen as the paradigmatic instances of extreme right-wing politics, but this should not be taken as implying that all extreme right-wing movements are necessarily fascist' (1989: 146). Similarly, Hainsworth maintains that although 'the label "neo-fascism" may be appropriate in some extreme right cases . . . it would be erroneous and reductionist to stereotype the post-war extreme right as parodies of earlier fascist movements' (1992a: 5). Thus, just as racist parties should be seen as a particular type of right-wing extremist party, as was argued above, so too should fascist or neo-fascist parties.

To be absolutely clear, therefore, right-wing extremism is defined by two anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements:

- 1 a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state (a feature that makes right-wing extremism extremist);
- 2 a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (a feature that makes right-wing extremism right wing).

Of the numerous features that appear in the existing definitions of right-wing extremism, most are mere manifestations of one or other of these two elements. Anti-partyism,

anti-pluralism, anti-parliamentarism, a call for a strong state, a demand for a strong leader, an emphasis on law and order, and a call for militarism are all manifestations of the rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state (i.e. they are all manifestations of extremism), while nationalism, xenophobia, racism, ethnocentrism and exclusionism are all manifestations of the principle of fundamental human inequality (i.e. they are all manifestations of right-wing extremism). These elements are possible features of right-wing extremism rather than necessary ones, and while they help describe and sub-categorize the extreme right, they do not define it.

The assertion that right-wing extremism may be defined by (1) a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state and (2) a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality does not mean that the concept is free from definitional problems, however. On the contrary, the concept remains a difficult one because, as Roberts explains, 'satisfactory operational indicators of extremism are [still] lacking' (1994: 466). The reason for this is that the concept of extremism refers, in the first instance, to what Roberts calls 'structural elements', rather than to the programme or policies of movements or parties. Indeed, he observes that 'the stipulative definition of "extremism" applying to groups opposed to the values, procedures, and institutions of the democratic constitutional state says nothing, in itself, about the programme and policies of organisations or movements that qualify as "extremist" ' (1994: 465).

Yet, to operationalize the concept of extremism, scholars have turned to the policies and programmes of the movements and parties, and have made the assumption that 'the content of policy statements of such extremist groups *in themselves* necessitate breaches of the democratic constitutional order' (Roberts, 1994: 465, *italics in original*). This assumption is, in some instances, not overly problematic. Policy statements that call for the expulsion of all non-whites, such as those put forward by the British NF in the early 1980s, for example, clearly result in a violation of the democratic constitutional order because they give rise to the breaching of the fundamental values of that order, including the principle of fundamental human equality. However, the presumption is more difficult with regard to many other policy statements, as it is less evident whether a violation of the democratic constitutional order will inevitably occur.

This is particularly the case in the contemporary period as most movements and parties described as extremist by academics and other observers regularly underline their commitment to the existing democratic constitutional order and to its values. As Betz notes, 'if not out of conviction then out of expediency, they have tended to abandon much ideological baggage that might sound too extremist [as] parties that have transgressed the boundaries of the permissible and acceptable political discourse soon found themselves penalized in public opinion, at the polls, or in parliament' (1998a: 3).

Though well aware of the problem this presents to the operationalization of right-wing extremism, many scholars argue that the parties' expressions of commitment to the democratic constitutional order should not be taken at face value, however. As Hainsworth puts it, 'nominal commitment to democracy and constitutionalism should not simply be taken as evidence of its actual realization' (2000a: 8). Instead, scholars believe that beneath the homage to the rules of the game lie a discourse and a political culture that clearly undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system. In other words, scholars consider these parties examples of what Sartori (1976) terms 'anti-system' parties or what Kirchheimer refers to as parties that display an 'opposition of principle' (1966: 237).

Gardberg sums up the political culture of the extreme right as one that can be interpreted as a 'subversive stream that is anti-egalitarian and anti-pluralist and that opposes the

principle of democratic constitutional states' (1993: 32). Similarly, Voerman and Lucardie argue that 'even if extremists accept the formal constitution, they reject the dominant political culture and party system'. These authors go on to say that, in the case of many modern right-wing extremist parties, they 'seem to accept parliamentary democracy, but reject the prevailing "cosmopolitan" and liberal political culture' (1992: 35–6).

The lack of operational indicators of extremism means that it is very difficult to establish a dividing line between the extreme right and the mainstream right. In fact, Roberts argues that since 'there is an analytic continuity linking democratic parties and organisations to those classified as extremist . . . it is impossible to draw a firm boundary line and say that on one side of the line everything is democratic, on the other everything is "extreme"' (1994: 480). Von Beyme is not quite so categorical but nonetheless maintains that, as right-wing extremist parties have evolved and as more and more parties reject any adherence to the legacy of fascism, 'the dividing line between conservatives and right-wing extremists has become even more blurred' (1988: 2).

Two points can nevertheless be made about this dividing line. First, as the above discussion has shown, the dividing line should be conceived in terms of a party's acceptance or rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic order rather than in terms of its spatial location. In other words, a party does not qualify as being of the extreme right just because it is the party furthest to the right in its party system. Instead, it qualifies as being of the extreme right because it rejects or undermines the democratic constitutional order in which it operates. The examples of Iceland or Ireland illustrate this point: although one party in each party system is further to the right than all others, no party in either party system may be considered right-wing extremist because no right-wing party in either party system undermines or rejects the respective democratic constitutional order.

The second point to make about this dividing line is that it is country specific, since the values, procedures and institutions that make-up the democratic constitutional order of each country are specific to that country. Indeed, Roberts questions the universal validity of the concept of right-wing extremism and suggests instead that the concept has a '“relative” quality'. He argues that

since the basic rights and pattern of democratic institutions and procedures vary not insignificantly from democratic constitution to democratic constitution . . . surely a group which might be extremist in one country might not be so described in another. [Thus] for all the claims to be dealing with a concept of universal validity, 'extremism' is primarily a concept defined in relation to the particular version of the democratic constitutional order.

(1994: 467)

The relative nature of the concept is well illustrated if the Scandinavian parties of the extreme right – the Danish FRPd, Norwegian FRPn and Danish DF – are compared to their counterparts elsewhere in Western Europe. The ideology of these parties is somewhat less extreme than that of other right-wing extremist parties. As Ignazi observes, they have 'never made a frontal attack on democracy involving authoritarian solutions' in the way that other extreme right parties have (2003: 148). However, this does not mean that they are not extreme within their own party systems and political culture. Rather, as Ignazi goes on to argue, 'they certainly undermined the system's legitimacy, not just by displaying contempt towards the parties and the politicians, but also by considering the parties as useless,

backward, and even harmful' (2003: 148). Thus, 'although their anti-system profile is quite limited compared to that of their other European counterparts', they nonetheless 'qualify for inclusion in [the extreme right] political family' (Ignazi, 2003: 140).

The difficulty – if not impossibility – in establishing where the dividing line between the extreme right and the moderate right lies does not mean that parties of the extreme right cannot be identified and analysed. To be sure, borderline cases exist and scholars continue to disagree over whether these should be considered part of the extreme right party family or not. Yet 'there is a large number of political parties whose extreme right status is not debated' (Mudde, 2000: 16), and an extreme right party family, distinct from the mainstream right, is indeed discernible (Hainsworth, 2000a: 6; Mudde, 2000: 16–17).

Terminology

Before embarking on a detailed examination of the different ideologies of the parties of the extreme right, a few words must be said about terminology. As the above discussion has shown, the term 'extreme right' is clearly favoured in this book, but a number of other authors have preferred to assign other terminological labels to the parties in question. Indeed, a plethora of terms has been used in conjunction with these parties. As well as being termed extreme right, these parties have been labelled fascist, neo-fascist, Nazi, neo-Nazi, totalitarian, fundamentalist, radical right, new radical right, populist right, neo-populist right, new populist, far right and even simply rightist. And long though it is, this list is probably not exhaustive.

There is a growing consensus in the more recent literature that a number of these terms can be misleading and unhelpful. Perhaps the most unhelpful are 'totalitarian' and 'fundamentalist'. Von Beyme notes the unsuitability of applying the first to the modern parties of the extreme right when he observes 'it is difficult to argue that totalitarianism is possible without the access to power in a given society' (1988: 2). As for the term 'fundamentalist', it has been linked above all to religious movements, and has the unity of the state and the religious order as a central element. Therefore, as Backes explains, it is inappropriate to apply this term to non-religious movements such as the contemporary parties of the extreme right. The term is further unsuitable because it does not denote movements or parties that are specifically of the right (Backes, 2001: 18).

The terms 'fascist', 'neo-fascist', 'Nazi' and 'neo-Nazi' are not without their problems either. To return to a point made earlier, many authors agree that 'fascist' or 'neo-fascist' are no longer accurate labels for the contemporary parties of the extreme right, since many of these have abandoned all references to the legacy of fascism. Most authors instead argue that fascism or neo-fascism is a sub-phenomenon of the extreme right and that fascist or neo-fascist parties are therefore only a particular type of extreme right party (see Billig, 1989; Hainsworth, 1992a; Fennema, 1997; and Backes, 2001, among others). The same is even more true for Nazi or neo-Nazi parties: not only can these parties be considered a sub-type of the extreme right, but they have also been judged to be a sub-type of fascist parties (Billig, 1989).

More common in the recent literature is the use of the terms 'radical right' or 'new radical right'. Indeed, Herbert Kitschelt's influential analysis (1995) is entitled *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, while Hans-Georg Betz famously coined the term 'radical right-wing populist parties', though in more recent work he appears to have dropped the label 'populist' and refers to the parties simply as 'radical right-wing' (e.g. Betz, 2003). Peter Merkl (1997, 2003) has also used the term 'radical right', though he does seem to use it interchangeably with the term 'extreme right'.

A number of other authors take issue with the term 'radical' being used to refer to the contemporary parties of the extreme right, however. The main objection they have is that the term has been used to refer to a wide variety of movements, most of which have been quite distinct from the modern parties of the extreme right. As Backes explains, the term originated in eighteenth-century England but was soon used on the other side of the Atlantic to refer to advocates of Utilitarianism. It was then swiftly adopted by left-liberal and republican parties in France and Italy (2001: 17). In the twentieth century, however, the term was applied to rather different movements. In the United States it was used in the immediate post-World War II period to refer to extreme conservative movements that were 'characterized by strict moral traditionalism and an obsessive anticommunism' (Ignazi, 2003: 28). As Ignazi notes, therefore, its varied usage means that the term 'radical' has taken on 'ambiguous connotations'. Furthermore, the fact that it has been applied to movements that did not display anti-system tendencies means that it is 'too loose [to] be fruitfully applied to the analysis of extreme right parties' (2003: 28).

This last point finds resonance in the German usage of the term. Since 1974, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has labelled 'radical' those groups or parties that display a critique of the constitutional order without any anti-democratic behaviour or intention. By contrast, those that exhibit anti-democratic, anti-constitutional or anti-liberal values or intent are labelled 'extremist' and, as was noted above, such parties can be banned by the Federal Constitutional Court. As Roberts (1994) has argued, and as was discussed above, the lack of satisfactory operational indicators of extremism means that, in practice, making the distinction between radicalism and extremism is very difficult, and it remains the case that the contemporary German parties of the extreme right have not (yet) been officially defined as extremist, and have thus not (yet) been banned. However, if 'anti-system' is taken to mean behaviour or values that undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system, the parties in question are clearly parties that display anti-system tendencies, and as such they should not be labelled 'radical', as this term does not capture their anti-systemness. As Westle and Niedermayer note, this explains why, despite the fact that these parties have not been officially defined as extremist by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 'in the scientific literature [they] are predominantly judged as being clearly on the extreme right' (1992: 87).

The preference for the term 'extreme right' over 'radical right' that is apparent in the German or German-based literature has been mirrored elsewhere. As a result of the different connotations of the term 'radical' and the fact that it does not denote movements or parties that display an anti-systemness, it has been increasingly replaced in the literature by the term 'extreme right'.

Another term increasingly used in recent years to refer to the contemporary parties of the extreme right is 'populist', or its derivative 'neo-populist'. As was just observed, Hans-Georg Betz (1993a, 1993b, 1994) has shown a preference for this term over the label 'extreme right' and has referred to the modern parties as radical right-wing populist parties. French authors have also favoured this term, and have tended to refer to the contemporary parties as national-populist parties (see Taguieff, 1984, 1986, 1995; Winock, 1993; Perrineau, 1997, among others). Other authors have used the term 'populist' to refer to a specific type of right-wing extremist party. Taggart, for example, identifies as 'New Populist' those extreme right parties that fuse 'the anti-politics stance of the New Politics with the broad-based protest of the populist right' (1995: 35). Similarly, Kitschelt (1995) uses the term 'populist' to describe certain parties of the extreme right, notably the Austrian FPÖ and the Italian LN.

The term 'populism' is not unproblematic, however, especially when it is applied to the contemporary parties of the extreme right. While the term may be used meaningfully to describe or characterize certain parties of the extreme right, it is of little use to denote or identify a separate party family. This is because populism refers to a particular political style or form rather than to a specific political ideology (Taguieff, 1995; Mudde, 1996a: 231; Backes, 2001: 20). It therefore brings together parties that are ideologically quite distinct from each other, and within the populist group many parties that are not of the extreme right (and that do not espouse anti-democratic sentiments) sit alongside ones that are. The usefulness of the term is further limited when it is applied to the parties of the extreme right because, just as not all populist parties are of the extreme right (or even of the right), not all parties of the extreme right have adopted a political style that may be described as populist.

The term 'far right' is also problematic, even though it is used quite widely in both the academic literature and the media. Its limitation lies in the fact that it suggests that cases are selected according to their relative spatial location. However, as was discussed above, a party should be considered for inclusion in the extreme right party family according to its acceptance or rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional order, and according to its acceptance or rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality, rather than in terms of its spatial location. A party does not qualify as being of the extreme right just because it is the party furthest to the right in its party system. As for the term 'rightist', which is used frequently in the study by Kitschelt, for example, it is simply too imprecise to be used to describe the parties of the extreme right, as it fails to distinguish them from their mainstream counterparts.

In the light of these discussions, the term 'extreme right' is clearly favoured in this book. Not only does it overcome the problems associated with the alternative terms, but it also has the advantage of being squarely concerned with party ideology and of evoking notions of anti-democracy and anti-systemness, which lie at the very heart of the concept of right-wing extremism. Some of the other terms discussed above are used within the book, but they are not employed interchangeably with the term 'extreme right' as they have been in some of the other studies of right-wing extremism. Instead, they are used, where appropriate, to describe sub-groups of the wider extreme right party family only.

The study of right-wing extremist party ideology: existing typologies and their limitations

In view of the continuing debates over what constitutes right-wing extremism and over what terminology should be used to describe the parties, more and more studies have sought to turn attention away from conceptual definitions and instead have endeavoured to examine the actual object in question – that is, they have focused on the nature of the right-wing extremist parties themselves. The single-party case study is the most common approach to this kind of research, but in addition to such works, a handful of comparative analyses of the ideologies of the parties of the extreme right exists.

The main impetus behind most of these comparative studies of right-wing extremist ideology is the desire to illustrate the diversity that exists among these parties. In particular, the parties that have emerged and prospered during the 'third wave' of post-war right-wing extremist activity are, for the most part, distinct from those older parties that embrace some form of historical legacy, be it of a fascist or some other kind. The French FN and the Austrian FPÖ, for instance, are markedly different in nature from the British NF or the Italian MSI. Therefore, through their examination of the ideology of the parties, the existing

comparative studies have shown that the combination of the rise of newer parties and the continued survival of older parties has rendered the extreme right party family increasingly diverse in composition.

In addition to illustrating the variety that exists within the extreme right party family – something that is clearly of interest and importance in itself – these comparative studies also shed some light on which type or types of right-wing extremist ideology are most commonly associated with electoral success. Whereas the connection between ideology and electoral success is only implicit in some of these studies, in others it is wholly explicit. For example, Richard Stöss's analysis of West German right-wing extremism (1988), Christopher Husbands's overview of the extreme right in Western Europe at the beginning of the 1990s (1992a), and Hans-Georg Betz's broader study of West European radical right-wing populism (1993b, 1994) all stop short of offering a discussion of which type of party is the most successful in electoral terms. In contrast, in his influential article on the emergence of right-wing extremist parties, Piero Ignazi (1992) discusses which of his two types of party ('old' and 'new') is electorally most successful. In a similar fashion, Paul Taggart (1995) observes that the right-wing extremist parties that he terms 'New Populist' are those that have experienced the greatest success at the polls. The link between ideology and electoral success is even more explicit in Herbert Kitschelt's analysis (1995), as a core objective of this study is precisely to explain why right-wing extremist parties have performed well at the polls in some countries but not in others. Ideology is therefore examined as one of the factors that might account for the uneven electoral success of these parties.

Although these existing comparative studies provide valuable insights into the diversity that exists within the extreme right party family, and although some of these works also point to which types of right-wing extremist parties are more successful at the polls, these existing typologies nonetheless suffer from a number of shortcomings, which limit the extent to which they can be used as a basis from which to examine the link between the parties' ideology and their electoral success in close detail. In the light of this, a new, alternative typology of right-wing extremist parties will be constructed in this chapter, with which it will be possible to investigate fully the influence of ideology on the parties' electoral success. In the first instance, however, it is useful to examine the limitations of the existing typologies in some depth and to draw lessons from these so that the typology put forward later in the chapter may avoid some of the pitfalls most commonly associated with this type of study.

A first limitation of the existing typologies is that the majority of them do not examine all of the parties of the extreme right that are of concern to this book. With the notable exceptions of Ignazi's and Taggart's studies, the existing analyses include only certain members of the extreme right party family. Stöss's categorization remains limited to the West German extreme right; the study by Betz fails to include older parties such as the Italian MSI, the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) and the British NF; and the works by Husbands and Kitschelt omit some of the smaller and less successful West European right-wing extremist parties such as the Belgian Front National/Front voor de Natie (FN(b)) or the Spanish Falangistas.

A second reason for not wishing to use the existing categorizations as a basis from which to examine the influence of ideology on the electoral scores of the parties of the extreme right is that they are now all to varying degrees out of date. With the exception of Stöss's study, which has a historical focus and concentrates on the West German extreme right of the 1950s and 1960s, all of the typologies referred to above examine the extreme right in Western Europe in the 1980s and in the first few years of the 1990s. Therefore, because they were compiled when they were, they do not take into account more recent developments in the

West European extreme right, such as the split in the Danish FRPd in 1995 and the establishment of the rival DF, the transformation of the Italian MSI into the AN in the same year and the subsequent breakaway of Pino Rauti's Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Ms-Ft), or the formation of the Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB) as a result of Marguerite Bastien's defection from the Belgian FN(b) in 1997. Making use of these studies to examine the link between ideology and extreme right-wing party success would therefore result in the investigation being out of date.

A further, more fundamental reason for deciding not to use the studies mentioned above to examine the influence of ideology on the parties' electoral success is that some of these analyses display methodological and theoretical shortcomings. More specifically, a number of the existing typologies fail to satisfy the conditions of exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness around which typologies should be built (Sartori, 1984; Marradi, 1990). In Betz's study, for example, the fact that two parties are not assigned to either of the two types suggests that a third type of party is possible, and that the typology is therefore not exhaustive in nature. As the typology stands, the Austrian FPÖ and the Swiss Autopartei der Schweiz (APS) are not included in either the 'neo-liberal populist' or the 'national populist' type because they 'place equal emphasis on both a neo-liberal and an anti-immigrant program' (1993b: 684). While this may indeed be the case, in order for the typology to be exhaustive, a third category would have to be created to accommodate such parties. The inclusion of this third category would mean that every possible state of the property that is being used as a basis of division (in this case the emphasis placed on the neo-liberal elements of the programme as compared to that placed on the anti-immigration elements) is allocated to one of the typology's categories.

In some of the other studies, the condition of mutual exclusiveness is not met. In Taggart's categorization, for instance, the German Republikaner, the French FN and the Flemish VB may, arguably, be accommodated in either one of the two categories of parties. Indeed, Taggart himself argues that these three competitors are 'examples of parties that blur the distinction' between 'neo-fascist' and 'New Populist' parties (1995: 40). In contrast to Betz's analysis, this problem with Taggart's study would not be solved even if a third category were constructed. Instead, the difficulty lies with the basis of division used. The features Taggart highlights as important in distinguishing between 'neo-fascist' and 'New Populist' parties do not reflect a particular property of the parties that may be categorized into all its various states. As such, these features are not sufficiently stringent to allocate parties to one type and one type only and, as a result, the two categories in the typology are not mutually exclusive. Taggart is clearly aware of this since he argues that 'New Populism and neo-fascism are not *necessarily* contradictory' (1995: 40, *italics in original*). This does not stop the principle of mutual exclusiveness from being violated, however.

The distinction between the categories in Kitschelt's typology is also somewhat unclear. The Italian MSI and the German NPD are described as 'likely to express shades of fascist thinking that range from a workerist (and now welfare chauvinist) "social fascism" . . . to a "corporatist capitalism" ' (1995: 64). The apparent uncertainty over whether to locate these two parties in the 'welfare chauvinist' or in the 'fascist' category of parties suggests that, here too, the bases of division used to subdivide the extreme right party family are not stringent enough to ensure that all of the categories in this study are mutually exclusive.

Of all the existing typologies, Ignazi's arguably displays the most theoretical and methodological rigour. The bases of division that are used are such that the different categories are mutually exclusive and the typology is also exhaustive in nature. In addition, it is one of the most comprehensive of the existing comparative studies, since it includes the great majority of West European right-wing extremist parties. In spite of these attributes, however, in terms

of providing a base from which this chapter may investigate the link between the parties' ideology and their electoral success, Ignazi's typology remains far from ideal.

The main reason for this is that Ignazi is primarily interested in examining the different parties of the extreme right from a democracy/anti-democracy perspective. In other words, he is concerned above all with whether the parties accept or reject the existing democratic consensus, something that leads him to consider both the parties' ideological legacy and their attitudes towards the system. This is in no way a criticism of the typology – on the contrary, as has been observed already, the study is extremely sound and, for that reason, has become very influential – but it does mean that the different parties within each of Ignazi's two groups ('old' and 'new') continue to exhibit significant variation when features other than their attitudes towards democracy are taken into account. For instance, even though their views on democracy are relatively similar, the British NF and the Spanish Frente Nacional, two of the parties located within Ignazi's 'old' extreme right category, differ markedly in their attitude towards foreigners and people of other ethnicities. Whereas racism and xenophobia lie at the heart of the NF's ideology, these features do not play a part in the belief structure of the Frente Nacional.

The fact that significant differences continue to exist between parties of the same group implies that, in Ignazi's typology, the diversity present within the extreme right party family is not illustrated as fully as it could have been had more bases of division been employed. This, in turn, suggests that, if such a model were to be used to examine the link between the parties' ideology and their electoral success, the extent to which ideology might be able to explain the disparity in the electoral fortunes of the parties would possibly be limited. In other words, with a model such as this, the explanatory power of ideology in an overall account of the disparity in the electoral fortunes of the parties of the extreme right could potentially be curtailed. This is because it may well be the case that some parties have been more electorally successful than others due to characteristics not mentioned in Ignazi's typology. For example, it is quite possible that the most successful right-wing extremist parties are those that have an ideology in which xenophobia (a feature not included in Ignazi's typology) is central. Therefore, in spite of its strengths, Ignazi's typology will not be used as a model on which to base an examination of the link between the ideology of the parties of the extreme right and their electoral success. In addition to his model being rather dated by now, it does not contain sufficient bases of division with which to fully illustrate the diversity that exists within the right-wing extremist party family.

From this examination of the limitations of the existing typologies, it has become clear that if the relationship between the ideology of the parties of the extreme right and their levels of electoral success is to be properly investigated a new typology is necessary. This typology, however, must be sure to draw on the lessons learned from the existing studies. Namely, it must:

- include all right-wing extremist parties in Western Europe;
- be as up to date as possible;
- be constructed so that its types are jointly exhaustive;
- be constructed so that its types are mutually exclusive;
- attempt to reflect the full diversity of the extreme right party family.

In addition, and in contrast to some of the existing studies, the logic behind the construction of the typology will be fully explained. It will be apparent what bases of division are being employed, and why. It should therefore also be clear why certain parties are grouped together, while others are not.

An alternative typology of right-wing extremist parties

To fully illustrate the diversity present within the right-wing extremist party family, three bases of division have been chosen with which to construct this typology. These are:

- 1 the importance attached by the parties to the issue of immigration;
- 2 the nature of the parties' racist attitudes;
- 3 the parties' attitudes towards democracy, parliamentarism and pluralism.

These criteria have been selected because they relate to elements of right-wing extremist ideology most frequently mentioned in the existing literature. Indeed, in his review of the existing definitions of right-wing extremism, which was referred to above, Mudde found that at least half the studies he examined pointed to xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy and the strong state (1995a: 206) as being key features of right-wing extremism.² While the above discussion of the concept of right-wing extremism argued that these elements are only possible features rather than necessary ones, and emphasized that they are therefore not appropriate for defining right-wing extremism, it nonetheless suggested that these features are useful for describing and sub-categorizing the extreme right party family.

Clearly, the first basis of division proposed for this typology relates to xenophobia, and the second to racism. The third encompasses both the parties' attitudes towards democracy and their views on the state. These two final features are merged into one basis of division because the views right-wing extremist parties have on democracy and on how society should be organized are closely related to their position on the role of the state.

These three bases of division also allow the typology to distance itself from examining the impact that the legacy of fascism (or any other historical ideology) has had on the different parties of the extreme right. This is an advantage because evaluating the importance of fascism in the ideologies of right-wing extremist parties is fraught with difficulties. In some instances, parties have referred to past legacies even though these have not formed a central part of their ideologies. This was the case, for example, when Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian FPÖ, commented on the Third Reich's 'competent employment policies' (Knight, 1992: 285). In contrast, parties that do draw on such historical traditions in their ideologies have, as Ignazi observes, frequently toned down symbolic references to fascism so as to avoid stigmatization (1992: 10). Given this behaviour, it is extremely difficult to assess the extent to which the ideologies of the parties are actually informed by such legacies.

Each basis of division will now be considered in turn. The ideologies of the right-wing extremist parties will be explored in detail and, in the first instance, the parties will be categorized along each basis of division separately. Then the three bases of division will be combined to produce the final typology. Once the separate types of right-wing extremist party are identified, the electoral success of the parties of each type will be examined so that it will become possible to ascertain whether the electoral performance of the different parties is in any way linked to their ideology.

Importance attached to the issue of immigration

Attitudes towards the issue of immigration reflect the importance of xenophobia in the ideologies of the different right-wing extremist parties. Moreover, a party's xenophobia – its fear, hatred of and hostility towards foreigners – reveals its concern for 'internal homogenization', which Koch (1991) argues is one of the two forms of the nationalist political programme.³ As

Table 2.1 illustrates, right-wing extremist parties can be divided into two groups according to the importance they attach to the issue of immigration. For some parties this issue is a priority, and they can thus be described as radically xenophobic. In contrast, xenophobia does not feature in the ideology of other right-wing extremist parties.

Parties of the first group view combating immigration as their overriding concern. The French FN, for example, has demanded the immediate expulsion of all illegal immigrants and the strict control of political refugees ever since the late 1970s when Jean-Pierre Stirbois (who later became the FN's secretary general) famously called on immigrants from beyond the Mediterranean to 'go back to your huts' (Hainsworth, 2000b: 24). The issue has remained central in more recent years too. In both the 1993 and 1997 party programmes, immigration was addressed in the very first chapter (Marcus, 1995: 100; Front National, 1997a). The FN seeks to reduce the length of employment contracts for non-Europeans, rejects the automatic acquisition of French citizenship by children born in France to foreign parents, and calls for

Table 2.1 Importance attached to immigration in the ideologies of the different right-wing extremist parties of Western Europe

<i>Central to party's ideology</i>	<i>Not central to party's ideology</i>
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) Austria	Fremskridtspartiet (FRPd) before mid-1980s, Denmark
Vlaams Blok (VB) Belgium (Flanders)	Ethniko Komma (EK) Greece
Front National (FN(b)) Belgium (Wallonia)	Alleanza Nazionale (AN) Italy
Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB) Belgium (Wallonia)	Lega Nord (LN) before mid-1990s, Italy
British National Party (BNP) Britain	Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Ms-Ft) Italy
National Front (NF) Britain	Fremskrittspartiet (FRPn) before mid-1980s, Norway
Dansk Folkeparti (DF) Denmark	Falange Española Auténtica (FEA) Spain
Fremskridtspartiet (FRPd) since mid-1980s, Denmark	Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (FE de las JONS) Spain
Front National (FN) France	Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista – sector Diego Marquez (FE de las JONS sector DM) Spain
Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) France	Falange Española Independiente (FEI) Spain
Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) Germany	Lega dei Ticinesi (LdT) Switzerland
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) Germany	[Ethniki Politiki Enosis (EPEN) Greece]
Republikaner Germany	[Komma Proodeftikon (KP) Greece]
Lega Nord (LN) since mid-1990s, Italy	[Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) Italy]
Fedrelandspartiet (FLP) Norway	[Partido da Democracia Cristã (PDC) Portugal]
Fremskrittspartiet (FRPn) since mid-1980s, Norway	[Frente Nacional Spain]
Ny Demokrati (ND) Sweden	[Fuerza Nueva Spain]
Sverigedemokraterna (SDk) Sweden	
Freiheitspartei der Schweiz (FPS) Switzerland	
Schweizer Demokraten (SD) Switzerland	
[Agir Belgium (Wallonia)]	
[Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFNb) Belgium (Wallonia)]	
[Centrumdemocraten (CD) Netherlands]	
[Centrumpartij (CP) Netherlands]	
[Centrumpartij'86 (CP'86) Netherlands]	
[Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU) Netherlands]	
[Det Nya Partiet (DNP) Sweden]	

Note: Parties in square brackets no longer exist.

an end to dual citizenship (Marcus, 1995: 107). Furthermore, the majority of the FN's other policies – be they on the family, health, housing or law and order – all revolve around this political issue, with the notion of national and European preference lying at the heart of the party's programme (Hainsworth, 1992b: 49; Mayer, 1998: 16). As Marcus argues, immigration has thus become the FN's 'ideological aspic' (1995: 101).

The French Mouvement National Républicain (MNR), which split from the FN in 1998–99, has an attitude towards immigration that is very similar to that of the FN. In fact, the entire political programme of the MNR closely mirrors that of the pre-split FN, since Mégret, who now heads the MNR, drafted the majority of FN manifestos (Bastow, 2000).

With the election of Franz Schönhuber to the position of party chairman in 1985, and with the fall of the Berlin Wall, immigration also became the overriding concern for the German Republikaner. In its 1990 programme, the party called for the repatriation of the 4.5 million immigrants living in Germany and, like its French counterparts, it recommended that employment contracts for foreigners should not be granted indefinitely (Childs, 1995: 300). In addition, the party opposes the right of immigrants to permanent residence in Germany and objects to foreigners bringing their dependent families into the country (Backes, 1990: 10). It also recommends that the naturalization laws should be tightened and that dual nationality should be banned (Saalfeld, 1993: 191; Veen *et al.*, 1993: 16). Thus the issue of immigration informs the majority of the Republikaner's other policies, very much as it does the FN's (Backer, 2000: 100).

Immigration also occupies a central place in the ideologies of the German Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and NPD (Mudde, 1995a: 213). Both parties demand a significant reduction in the number of immigrants and asylum-seekers, and favour measures such as repatriation schemes in order to 'solve' the immigration problem (Saalfeld, 1993: 183).

The attitude of the Austrian FPÖ towards immigration is similar to that of both the French and the German right-wing extremist parties. Jörg Haider and his party did not hesitate to exploit the sentiments of anxiety felt within Austria after the arrival of many foreigners from the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 (Morrow, 2000: 51). The FPÖ argued that this surge in immigration was leading to higher levels of unemployment, and demanded an immediate stop to foreigners entering the country. In addition, the party called for the repatriation of all foreigners already in residence in Austria. Although the tightening of immigration and asylum legislation by the socialist interior minister in the early 1990s deprived the FPÖ of some of its ammunition (Knight, 1992: 296–7), the party continues to place the issue of immigration very high on its agenda. This was evident in the 1997 party programme, which 'clearly stated the central role of national identity and the necessity to defend it from foreign invasion' (Ignazi, 2003: 119).

Immigration has also become the most important policy area for the Danish and Norwegian right-wing extremist parties in more recent years. The issue was of little concern until the mid-1980s, but following an increase in the number of foreigners entering both countries, the two Progress Parties (the FRPd and the FRPn) began to address the question of immigration more and more (Andersen and Bjørklund, 2000: 205). They began to demand that the number of immigrants should be sharply reduced, that integration into society should be strongly encouraged, and that immigrants should be sent home if they committed serious crimes or if conditions in their home countries improved sufficiently (Svåsand, 1998: 84). The parties' continued emphasis on these policies has been such that today xenophobia and immigration are key elements for both Progress Parties (Widfeldt, 2000: 491). The issue is also central to the ideology of the Danish DF, which was formed in 1995 when the FRPd split. It is key in the ideology of the Norwegian Fedrelandspartiet (FLP) too.

Like its Danish and Norwegian counterparts, the Swedish Ny Demokrati (ND) has been greatly concerned with the issue of immigration. During the 1991 election campaign, the party stood on a platform that included measures to repatriate immigrants (Arter, 1992: 357). It was also very critical of the government's policies towards immigration and asylum-seekers, linking immigration to crime, and describing refugees as welfare scroungers (Widfeldt, 2000: 496). Sweden's Sverigedemokraterna (SDk) and Ian Wachtmeister's Det Nya Partiet (DNP), which he formed in 1998 after he left Ny Demokrati but which has since been dissolved, are two other parties with views on the issue of non-European immigration that are similar to those of the ND (AXT, 2001: 8–10; Widfeldt, 2000: 496).

As the Scandinavian Progress Parties began to concern themselves more and more with the issue of immigration from the mid-1980s onwards, so likewise immigration has become central in the ideology of the Italian LN since the mid-1990s. Ignazi argues that by 1996 the LN had become the 'only Italian party openly to address a xenophobic discourse' and that 'the opposition to multiculturalism and the practice of making foreigners the scapegoats are constant themes of party propaganda' (2003: 59).

The issue of immigration also features centrally in the ideology of the Belgian right-wing extremist parties. The VB perceives the 'massive' presence of foreigners as 'the most important cause of moral decay' and claims that immigration is 'destroying Flemish culture' (Swyngedouw, 1998: 65–6). Accordingly, since the mid-1980s, the anti-immigrant issue has become the central plank of the party's electoral platform, overshadowing even the nationalist issue (Swyngedouw, 1998: 67; Mudde, 1995b: 11). The party calls for a 'watertight' end to immigration and demands the immediate expulsion of all immigrants who are found to have no papers, who have committed criminal offences, or who have been unemployed for more than three months (Hossay, 1996: 343). Although their ideologies are significantly less well-developed than that of the VB, the Belgian FN(b) and its off-shoot, the FNB, have similarly virulent views on migrants and subscribe to many of the same policies as the VB, including the repatriation of immigrants (Fitzmaurice, 1992: 307; Swyngedouw, 1998: 59). The same is also true of the Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFNb), and of Agir, two very small Wallonian parties that had ceased to contest elections by the 1990s.

Immigration was also a key element in the ideologies of the now defunct Dutch Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU), Centrumpartij (CP), Centrumpartij'86 (CP'86) and CD. The CP saw immigration from countries with a non-European culture as the root of a whole host of social problems, from environmental concerns to unemployment. In response, the party called for the immediate cessation of immigration, and for the expulsion of illegal immigrants (Voerman and Lucardie, 1992: 40). The CP'86 also demanded the repatriation of all foreigners, starting with those not legally entitled to be in the Netherlands and those with criminal records (Mudde, 2000: 151). As for the CD, its obsession with the dangers of multiculturalism was such that, as Mudde and Van Holsteyn argue, 'the ideology of the CD is almost exclusively focused on the immigration issue' (2000: 150). Like those of the French FN and the German Republikaner, all the CD's other policies were informed by the party's attitude towards immigration (Lucardie, 1998: 118).

The Swiss Schweizer Demokraten (SD) are also preoccupied by the immigration issue. As Gentile and Kriesi observe, even though the party has changed its name twice since it was first founded,⁴ its programme has remained fundamentally the same and continues to emphasize anti-immigrant concerns (1998: 126). More specifically, 'since the early 1970s, the Swiss Democrats have sought to reduce or at least restrict the number of foreign residents in Switzerland [and] have also been involved in the movement to limit the right of foreigners to be recognized as refugees, especially for non-European nationals' (1998: 131). Anti-foreigner

sentiment is similarly central in the ideology of the Swiss *Freiheitspartei der Schweiz* (FPS) (Husbands, 1992a: 281).

The British right-wing extremist parties are one last set of parties for which the fight against immigration is a priority. The NF's vehement xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment were illustrated in the party's most notorious policy – the compulsory repatriation of New Commonwealth immigrants (Thurlow, 1998: 262–3). The BNP's policies are similar, even though Nick Griffin, who assumed the party leadership in 1999, seems more guarded about the issue of forced repatriation (Eatwell, 2000b: 189).

All the parties just discussed are grouped together in Table 2.1. Since immigration is central to the ideologies of all these parties, and since they all perceive the fight against immigration to be a priority, all can be considered radically xenophobic.

In contrast to parties of the first group, the fight against immigration does not preoccupy the Italian MSI/AN and Movimento Sociale–Fiamma Tricolore (Ms–Ft), the Spanish Falangistas⁵ and Fuerza Nueva/Frente Nacional, or the Portuguese Partido da Democracia Cristã (PDC). These parties therefore form part of a separate, second group. Commenting on the ideology of the Italian MSI, Griffin observes that 'in marked contrast to [the British NF and the German Republikaner] and to . . . Le Pen's Front National, the MSI had in the late 1980s deliberately veered away from an overtly racist "anti-immigration" platform' (1996: 132). Furthermore, xenophobia remains insignificant in the ideology of the AN, the successor party to the MSI. As Ignazi notes, at the Fiuggi party congress of 1995, Fini, the party leader, 'clearly abandoned any tough standing regarding immigration' (1996a: 707).⁶

The lack of emphasis placed on the issue of immigration by the Spanish Falangistas and Fuerza Nueva/Frente Nacional can be explained, in part, by the fact that there was an absence of anti-immigrant rhetoric in the Franco era.⁷ Furthermore, 'the anti-Muslim sentiment that pervades the European neo-populist movement may be difficult to mobilize in a country that was once part of the Islamic empire' (Davis, 1998: 161). With non-nationals accounting for less than 2 percent of the Spanish population, it is also very difficult for the parties to blame these individuals for the high level of unemployment (Ellwood, 1995: 103; Casals, 2001: 330). As for Portugal, even though there are significantly more black or mixed-race people here than in Spain, 'the anti-immigrant hysteria which has revived the far Right in France, Austria and elsewhere, has passed Portugal by' (Gallagher, 1992: 244).

The fight against immigration is also not central in the ideology of the Swiss Lega dei Ticinesi (LdT), nor was it in that of the Italian LN until the mid-1990s. Although the LdT has campaigned for the defence of the cultural autonomy of the Ticino region and has criticized other cultures in the process, and although its attitude towards refugees is not very favourable (Mazzoleni, 1999: 80–1), the party has never developed an ideology in which the fight against immigration is central and in which all other themes revolve around this issue. Similarly, until the mid-1990s the LN used the issue of immigration in order to attract votes. However, Bossi's xenophobic slurs in this period must be viewed as provocative arguments only, designed to shock and earn him public attention, rather than as expressions of the party's true beliefs (Kitschelt, 1995: 162, 175; Gallagher, 1993: 620).

The ideology of the Greek parties of the extreme right is not centred on the issue of immigration either. The *Ethniko Komma* (EK), like its predecessors the *Ethniki Politiki Enosis* (EPEN) and the *Komma Proodeftikon* (KP), is concerned above all with 'restoring Greece's national strength' and promoting a return to 'Hellenization' in public life rather than fighting immigration (Dimitras, 1992: 265). As in Spain, the lack of emphasis on the issue of immigration by the Greek parties of the extreme right may, in part, be explained by the high ethnic homogeneity of the Greek population.

As was mentioned earlier, the issue of immigration hardly featured in the ideologies of the Scandinavian Progress Parties until the mid-1980s. Indeed, in the 1973 FRPn and FRPd pamphlets the issue was not even referred to (Andersen and Bjørklund, 2000: 204). Therefore the Progress Parties of the 1970s and early 1980s are categorized in the second group of parties in Table 2.1 rather than the first.

Racist attitudes

Racism, which may be defined as the belief that natural and hereditary differences exist between groups of people, is another frequently mentioned characteristic of right-wing extremism (Miles and Phizacklea, 1979). That said, it is not a defining element of right-wing extremism, and the contemporary parties of the extreme right exhibit different types of racist attitudes. The views of the parties on race can therefore be used as a second basis of division in the present typology. More specifically, right-wing extremist parties can be divided into three categories according to their attitudes on race. Parties of a first group embrace classical racism; those of a second group espouse new racism or culturism; and parties of a third group adhere to ideologies in which racism plays no part. These three categories are illustrated in Table 2.2.

The first group consists of parties that distinguish groups solely on the grounds of race (rather than culture) and that embrace overtly anti-Semitic beliefs. These parties, which stress the inequalities of races, can be described as adhering to classical racism (Barker, 1981). The British NF and BNP espouse classically racist beliefs. John Tyndall and Martin Webster, who assumed control of the NF in its heyday in the 1970s, both had their roots in the tradition of British neo-Nazism that originated in the pre-war Imperial Fascist League. They were concerned above all with the racial purity of Britain and warned against the degeneration of the British race brought about by ethnic cross-breeding (Thurlow, 1998: 265–6). They were also distinctively anti-Semitic. Despite some change in direction when Nick Griffin and Joe Pierce took control of the NF in 1983, this type of racism still characterizes the party's inner core, although publicly the repatriation of blacks on the grounds of non-assimilation is emphasized (Husbands, 1988a: 71–2). The BNP also adheres to classical racism. This similarity is partly explained by the fact that it was Tyndall who set up the BNP, two years after he resigned from the NF in 1980 (Eatwell, 1992: 178).

The German NPD has also traditionally adhered to notions of classical racism. Admittedly, the importance the party attaches to the white race has been toned down in recent years, with echoes of biological racism being eliminated from its public programme in favour of greater emphasis on the importance of the German *Volk* (Backes, 1990: 15). This moderation stems mainly from the party's fears of being outlawed by the Federal Constitutional Court for exhibiting anti-democratic behaviour. An examination of the NPD's internal literature shows clear continuities with the prewar German extreme right tradition that fed into National Socialism, and that undeniably included vehement white supremacism and aggressive anti-Semitism. The racist sentiments of the DVU are similar to, if not more extreme than, those of the NPD. The DVU also embraces strong nationalism and patriotism. In addition, it overtly glorifies the National Socialist past and challenges the responsibility of the Nazis as regards the Holocaust. Its anti-Semitism is particularly fervent (Roberts, 1994: 335; Backes and Mudde, 2000: 462).

The former Dutch NVU was another right-wing extremist party that embraced classical racism. As Voerman and Lucardie observe, 'Glimmerveen [the party leader] and his comrades could be considered racists in the narrow, classical sense. They believed in the

Table 2.2 Racist attitudes of the different right-wing extremist parties of Western Europe

<i>Adhere to classical racism</i>	<i>Adhere to culturism</i>	<i>Not racist</i>
British National Party (BNP) Britain	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) Austria	Fremskridtspartiet (FRPd) before mid-1980s, Denmark
National Front (NF) Britain	Vlaams Blok (VB) Belgium (Flanders)	Ethniko Komma (EK) Greece
Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) Germany	Front National (FN(b)) Belgium (Wallonia)	Alleanza Nazionale (AN) Italy
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) Germany	Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB) Belgium (Wallonia)	Lega Nord (LN) before mid-1990s, Italy
[Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFNb) Belgium (Wallonia)]	Dansk Folkeparti (DF) Denmark	Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Ms-Ft) Italy
[Centrumpartij'86 (CP'86) Netherlands]	Fremskridtspartiet (FRPd) since mid-1980s, Denmark	Fremskrittspartiet (FRPn) before mid-1980s, Norway
[Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU) Netherlands]	Front National (FN) France	Falange Española Auténtica (FEA) Spain
	Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) France	Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (FE de las JONS) Spain
	Republikaner Germany	Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional- Sindicalista – sector Diego Marquez (FE de las JONS sector DM) Spain
	Lega Nord (LN) since mid-1990s, Italy	Falange Española Independiente (FEI) Spain
	Fedrelandspartiet (FLP) Norway	Lega dei Ticinesi (LdT) Switzerland
	Fremskrittspartiet (FRPn) since mid-1980s, Norway	[Ethniki Politiki Enosis (EPEN) Greece]
	Ny Demokrati (ND) Sweden	[Komma Proodeftikon (KP) Greece]
	Sverigedemokraterna (SDk) Sweden	[Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) Italy]
	Freiheitspartei der Schweiz (FPS) Switzerland	[Partido da Democracia Cristã (PDC) Portugal]
	Schweizer Demokraten (SD) Switzerland	[Frente Nacional Spain]
	[Agir Belgium (Wallonia)]	[Fuerza Nueva Spain]
	[Centrumdemocraten (CD) Netherlands]	
	[Centrumpartij (CP) Netherlands]	
	[Det Nya Partiet (DNP) Sweden]	

Note: Parties in square brackets no longer exist.

superiority of the white race in general and the Germanic and Northwest European race in particular' (1992: 38–9).

The Dutch CP'86, which was outlawed in 1998, also adhered to classical racism. Although the party's manifestos and programmes contained few references to the superiority of the white race, as Mudde notes, 'closer reading shows that one race is "more equal" than others. The superiority of the white race is implicated in [a number of party] slogans' and the inferiority of other races was implicitly referred to in the party paper, which spoke of ' "jungle-people, "non-European underdeveloped nations" and [talked of] "degeneration" as a result of the mixing of races' (1995a: 211–12). In addition, the CP'86 displayed anti-Semitic tendencies (Voerman and Lucardie, 1992: 43).

The Belgian PFNb, which was dissolved in 1991, also embraced classical racism. In particular, the party engaged in fervent anti-Semitism and developed a revisionist ideology, the central tenet of which was the denial of the Holocaust (Husbands, 1992b: 133; Deslore, 1995: 253).

The parties that adhere to classical racism are grouped together in Table 2.2. As the table illustrates, however, contemporary right-wing extremist parties that embrace such attitudes are in the minority. Much more common are parties that may be termed *culturist*, or which espouse a 'new' racism. These parties believe that differences exist between groups of people but, in contrast to their counterparts who advocate classical racism, they argue that it is culture rather than race that marks these differences. Thus, they maintain that the indigenous people and the Western civilization are superior because of their culture rather than because they are part of the white race. They also stress that certain groups are incompatible because of differences in their culture rather than differences in race. Hence, *culturist* or new racist parties reject multiculturalism on the grounds that the mixing of cultures endangers the separate identity of each of the different groups (Barker, 1981: 23; Mudde, 1995a: 211). This contrasts with parties that adhere to classical racism, which view multiculturalism as leading to the 'degeneration' or 'pollution' of the white race.

The French FN is located within this second category of parties. Its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, is obsessed with the French nation's survival and with its identity, which, he argues, is threatened by increasing cosmopolitanism. He 'insists that a plurality of cultures and peoples must be preserved, but clearly not in France [and] he rejects the "Anglo-Saxon" and American models of integration – "multiculturalism" and the politics of the "melting-pot" – . . . as unrealistic and dangerous options' (Marcus, 1995: 106). These attitudes are reflected in the policies of the party. As Swyngedouw and Ivaldi contend, 'the key argument of the FN is that the culture and religion of the immigrants coming from North Africa or black African countries is irreconcilable with the European culture of which the French nation is part. There can only be adversarial coexistence between the two' (2001: 14). The party thus avoids 'blatantly racist formulations, stressing cultural differences between groups instead of their supposed inferiority' (Mayer, 1998: 17).

The MNR is similarly preoccupied with the preservation of France's identity, which it considers particularly threatened by Islam (Bastow, 2000: 7–9). The parallels with the FN's beliefs on multiculturalism and globalization are unsurprising, given that Mégret, the MNR's leader, was responsible for drafting many of the FN's policies before he left the FN to form the MNR. Indeed, he declared that the MNR had not abandoned 'one iota of the programme of the Front national' (Bastow, 2000: 7).

The German Republikaner display similar beliefs. As Backes makes clear, the party distances itself from the tradition of National Socialism and 'does not shroud its xenophobia in a biologically-based theory of race' (1990: 14). Instead, it rejects multiculturalism and argues that cultural diversity poses a threat to the national identity. Saalfeld explains that, for the Republikaner, 'foreigners and non-Germans are not officially classified as inferior, [but] they are seen as a threat to the cultural and ethnic identity of Germany' (1993: 191). Thus, like the FN, the Republikaner can be categorized as being *culturist*, rather than adhering to the tradition of classical racism.

The racism of the Belgian VB is also of the *culturist* variety. Although the party 'essentially maintains that peoples are not the same or equal . . . , the VB rarely allows itself to support a distinction on a purely biological (racial) basis' (Swyngedouw, 2000: 136). The party 'insists that it never speaks in terms of races and that, in its opinion, the Flemings are no better than other people' (Mudde, 1995b: 19). However, it does emphasize that different cultures are

incompatible, and talks of non-Europeans as being ‘incapable of assimilating into the Flemish community’ (Mudde, 2000: 99). Furthermore, the party’s paper ‘is not completely free from claiming the inferiority of other cultures’ (Mudde, 2000: 100).

The racism of the now-defunct Wallonian party Agir, which was formed in 1989 after a split in the PFNb, was similar. The founders of the party (Freson, Steuckers and Destordeur) made a point of distancing themselves from other extreme right groups by emphasizing a culturist belief structure rather than one based on biological racism (Ignazi, 2003: 128). In the same vein, the Wallonian FN(b) and FNB (the latter created after a split in the FN(b) in 1995) avoid any reference to biological racism, and instead emphasize their concern with the preservation of the nation’s identity, which they believe is being particularly undermined by the presence of foreigners.

The Austrian FPÖ may also be regarded as culturist. Morrow notes that the party makes ‘no explicit mention of traditional phrases such as *Volksgemeinschaft* (“the community of the *volk*”, a core component of Nazi racial ideology). Instead, [it] substituted a determination to protect more pastoral and domestic notions like *Heimat* (hearth and home)’ (2000: 54). The current party programme continues to reflect this preoccupation with *Heimat*, and as well as emphasizing Austria’s right to a cultural identity, the programme also rejects ‘multi-cultural experiments that bear social conflicts with them’ (FPÖ, 2002a).

The racism of the contemporary Scandinavian right-wing extremist parties is also of the culturist kind. Writing about the Danish DF and the Norwegian FRPn, Widfeldt explains that both parties may be classified as new racist because of their clear opposition to multiculturalism. The Danish party ‘objects to Denmark developing into a multi-ethnic society’, while its Norwegian counterpart argues that the ‘continued immigration of asylum-seekers . . . will lead to serious conflicts between ethnic groups in Norway’ (2000: 491). The same is true of the other, smaller Scandinavian right-wing extremist parties – the present-day Danish FRPd, the Swedish ND, DNP and SDK, and the Norwegian FLP. This latter party, for example, calls for an end to multiculturalism on the grounds that the mixing of peoples of different cultures leads to murder, rape and the establishment of gangs (AXT, 2000: 8).

In the same way the Swiss FPS and SD distance themselves from any reference to biological racism but do, however, embrace a culturism which is underpinned by an aversion to multiculturalism. The two parties’ involvement in initiatives against the antiracist law (which was finally passed in 1994) and in other similar public actions reflect their beliefs that the mixing of different cultures can only be detrimental to the preservation of the Swiss identity and culture.

The Dutch CP and CD – now both defunct – were similarly preoccupied with the threat posed by multiculturalism. In its internal papers the CD argued that ‘the inclusion of people of a different culture . . . causes substantial problems, for both the Dutch culture and the people from the other cultures’ (*CD-Actueel*, March 1990, quoted in Mudde, 2000: 134). One way in which the CD proposed to help ‘combat’ multiculturalism was by discouraging mixed marriages, and by making it easier for Dutch people married to foreigners to file for divorce (Mudde, 2000: 133).

The parties just discussed are grouped together in Table 2.2. All of these right-wing extremist parties can be described as culturist or new racist, as they all emphasize cultural rather than racial differences between groups. They also point to the incompatibility of these groups and, if they stress the superiority of one group over another, this is done on the grounds of culture rather than race.

As was the case with their attitude towards the issue of immigration, the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Greek right-wing extremist parties differ from their north European