

The Routledge Handbook of Archaeology and Globalization

Edited by Tamar Hodos

The Routledge Handbook of Archaeology and Globalization

This unique collection applies globalization concepts to the discipline of archaeology, using a wide range of global case studies from a group of international specialists. The volume spans from as early as 10,000 cal. BP to the modern era, analysing the relationship between material culture, cultural change, and the complex connectivities between communities and groups. In considering social practices shared between different historic groups, and also the expression of their respective identities, the papers in this volume illustrate the potential of globalization thinking to bridge the local and global in material culture analysis.

The Routledge Handbook of Archaeology and Globalization is the first such volume to take a world archaeology approach, on a multi-period basis, in order to bring together the scope of evidence for the significance of material culture in the processes of globalization. This work thus also provides a means to understand how material culture studies can be utilized to assess the impact of global engagement in our contemporary world. As such, it will appeal to archaeologists and historians as well as social science researchers interested in the origins of globalization.

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Edited by Tamar Hodos

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GIDEON SHELACH, MIRIAM STARK, AND MIGUEL JOHN VERSLUYS

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Part I

Introduction



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Globalization

Some basics. An introduction to *The Routledge Handbook of Archaeology and Globalization*

Tamar Hodos

Globalization is one of the most potent theoretical frameworks of the moment, for it provides a means by which we can make sense of our socio-cultural connectivities, and the networks through which those connections are developed and maintained. The impact of works such as Thomas Friedman's *The World is Flat: a brief history of the twenty-first century* (2005), Naomi Klein's *The Shock Doctrine: the rise of disaster capitalism* (2007) and Pankaj Ghemawat's *World 3.0: global prosperity and how to achieve it* (2011) illustrate the timely and relevant nature of globalization thinking.

Similar complex connectivities and networks also existed in the past, but rarely has scholarship assessed their impulse and nature through the lens of globalization explicitly. This is surprising given the evidence for the development of shared social practices between different groups, the expression of their respective identities, and the connective networks that facilitated such developments – all of which are considered key factors in today's sense of globalization. The present volume addresses this, for it is the first collection of the explicit application of globalization theory to a wide-ranging series of world archaeology case studies.

What is globalization?

Globalization is more than just another way to describe connectivity, trade, migration, internationalism, or diffusion. It has also become more than the idea of complex connectivity, as per Tomlinson's succinct definition in 1999. As case studies in this volume demonstrate, not all examples of complex connectivities in the past are necessarily examples of globalization.

Nevertheless, there is considerable disagreement about not only how to define globalization but also when it begins in world history. Many regard globalization as a post-sixteenth-century phenomenon and feel that our use of the term must encompass the world in scale (e.g. Giddens 1990; Wallerstein 1991; Robbie Robertson 2003, this volume). Other contemporary critics argue against any concept of truly worldwide engagement and suggest instead that the term and its ideas serve as a synonym for Westernization (e.g. discussions in Tomlinson 1999; Appadurai 2001b; Ghemawat 2011). For others still, it implies homogenization, standardization, and uniformity, obscuring or downplaying variation and difference (e.g. Giddens 1990; Steger 2003; Beck 2004;

Ritzer 2004). Close study of the processes that underpin the sense of global connectivity demonstrate that none is wholly accurate. Such analysis demonstrates that the idea of ‘global’ refers to a particular scale, often substitutes for ‘international’, and that it is not restricted, or even necessarily related, to Westernization (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Tomlinson 1999: 89–97; Appadurai 2001a, 2001b; Ghemawat 2011; Nederveen Pieterse 2015).

There is often no consensus on the definition of globalization, although many characterize it. It is widely agreed that one of globalization’s most defining features is increasing connectivity. Specifically, it is of a type that encompasses a wide-scale flow of ideas and knowledge alongside the sharing of cultural customs, civil society, practices and the environment. This may manifest itself through closer economic integration via increased movement of goods and services, capital and labour, and it may be shaped by politics (Steiglitz 2006: 5). Many debate its features, however, such as whether it is informed by technological changes, involves the reconfiguration of states, goes together with regionalization, or includes the sense of time–space compression (Nederveen Pieterse 2015: 7–25). Usually it is described and discussed within its experiential sphere, so that we hear of different kinds of globalization, such as financial, commercial, economic, or political. Most will agree, however, that globalization is uneven and asymmetric in pace, scope, and impact. There are clear ebbs and flows of various connectivities that work in tandem economically, socially, materially, and politically. Some understand these developments as a process (e.g. Robbie Robertson and Jan Nederveen Pieterse), as a system (e.g. Jonathan Friedman and Immanuel Wallerstein), or as a discourse (e.g. Manfred Steger).

Roland Robertson defines globalization as the process by which the world increasingly becomes seen as one place and the ways in which we are made conscious of that process (Robertson 1992: 8). This should not be taken to imply that there is a unified world society or culture, however (Featherstone 1995: 114). For this reason, Jan Nederveen Pieterse defines globalization as ‘a process of hybridization that gives rise to a global *mélange*’ (2015: 67), and he argues that globalization can be understood as an open-ended synthesis of a number of disciplinary approaches to such developments, in which there are as many globalization modes as there are agents, dynamics, and impulses (Nederveen Pieterse 2015: 68).

Since there are many circumstances in which this synthesis takes place, we should really speak of processes, and globalizations. In other words, globalization itself may be defined as *processes of increasing connectivities that unfold and manifest as social awareness of those connectivities*. It is more than just complex connectivity. That it is about the processes themselves makes globalization an active concept rather than a descriptive one. The idea suggests a world-scale, which is why some argue that it can therefore only be a phenomenon that begins with the period in which we have had the means of global circumnavigation. More often the term is used to signal wider changes within a conceptual or experiential world. Most commonly, this involves increasing integration and cooperation, with evolving, facilitating commonalities. There is often also the sense that the world is shrinking because distance communication and movement are both faster and wider reaching. Of course, the world itself is not diminishing, but it seems to become more accessible physically, socially, and/or temporally to those who operate within the sphere of experience. Studies have already demonstrated, however, that neither rapid communication, mobility over distance, nor technological advancements are necessary to convey a sense of one-placeness. For the past, the feeling of one-placeness is achieved more effectively by shared practices (e.g. Hodos 2015: 249–50; Pitts and Versluys 2015).

An important corollary to the increasing senses of similarity and accessibility is the awareness, and even development, of more pronounced differences and inequalities with those not so closely integrated into the experiential sphere (or not involved at all). This corollary indicates that there

are two primary aspects of globalization processes. One is the development of shared practices and values that contribute to the sense of one-placeness; these often derive from a variety of increasing connectivities. The other is an increasing awareness of and sensitivity to differences, especially cultural ones. Growing awareness of cultural difference is a function of globalization, not just a feature of it. It manifests itself often as a resurgence of local identities in explicit contrast to the increasingly shared practices of the globally connected level. That these local expressions of identity are also commonly linked to widely divergent levels of wealth, health, and political power often only serves to heighten such contrasts and the degree of social investment in maintaining cultural difference. Thus, with globalization there is a balance between shared practices that bind and diversities that distinguish participants. Indeed, cultural convergence cannot exist without cultural differentialism, since we cannot converge unless we start from divergence. The two are not only in tension with one another, but also interdependent. Together, they are part of the paradox of globalization. However, many discussions of globalization, both in the popular press and academia, pay lip service only to the former and neglect the latter.

Hybridization

One reason for this partial perspective is because there are often different notions of ‘culture’ under discussion. One accepts culture as essentially bounded, and assumes that culture derives from a localized, contextualized learning process (*habitus*). In this lies the notion of a cultural group. The other is the idea of a translocal learning process that involves an outward-looking sense of place. In both contexts, the notion of hybridization plays an important role (Nederveen Pieterse 2015: 87–90).

Hybridization has been defined as ‘the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices’ (Rowe and Schelling 1991: 231). The idea of hybridity was adopted by the social sciences from the natural sciences to characterize cultural blendings that reconfigure and develop into new practices. Its active form, hybridization, plays a role in globalizing processes as ‘the making of global culture as a global *mélange*’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2015: 86). Hybridization has often been criticized, however, for being based upon a sense of purity of the contributing parties and that it implies passive developments without agency (for an overview, see van Dommelen 2006). What is lacking in many of these critiques, however, is the historical depth that makes up cultures and the features by which we identify, categorize, and distinguish them (there are also questions about our notions of hybridity and past people’s actions: did what we regard as hybrid appear as such to their agents? See Pappa 2013; Silliman 2015). Silliman notes that with hybridity, we have been overly concerned about origins and the short-term mixing of cultural elements; he argues that hybridity and hybridization are best used with regard to practices anchored in social memory and multiscalar explorations of culture change and continuity (Silliman 2015).

While hybridity may be based upon differences between the categories that go into the mixture, the process of hybridization reveals those differences to be relative. We are just as bounded by similarity as we are distinguished by difference. The two cannot be separated from one another. Furthermore, hybridity transcends binary categories. Indeed, as Nederveen Pieterse notes (2015: 125), boundaries are historical and social constructions that serve as cognitive barriers whose validity depends on epistemic orders, which are ultimately arbitrary, or at least contingent. As such, hybridity critiques essentialism. Thus, hybridization, as the active voice of hybridity, refers to a wide range of practices that involve both accident and agency. It references social and cultural strategy, rather than merely observing objects combining different technological or cultural traditions

(Silliman 2015: 288). Hybridization, therefore, is a factor in the reorganization of social spaces and practices, and it applies as much to dominant socio-cultural groups as to the less dominant (e.g. colonized; subaltern). For this reason, globalization processes can be described partly as hybridization processes, and result in something much more complex than simply homogenization.

Variability

This complex result exists because of variability: there are variations in practices that we see within any particular group. Yet despite the variability, collectively members may still identify themselves, and be identified by us, as belonging to the same group. Difficulty arises when a practice falls outside of the normal range we expect to see within the boundaries of the defined group. As a result, we spend considerable effort in explaining such phenomena in contrast to our definition of the group.

Our need to accommodate variability better when defining groups becomes significant when we assess the nature of past complex connectivities through material culture, the building block of archaeology. Awareness of others is not the same as feeling connected to them. Often literary sources are too politically administrative or positional (biased; oppositional) to indicate any such perception, and for more distant eras we rarely have personal documents that reveal individuality. Yet feeling connected surely was a feature during certain periods, especially those that included substantial mobility of individuals and groups. The challenge is how to interpret the nature of past connectivities from material culture.

This is because the convergences we experience and characterize in specifically globalization connectivities are not identically replicated practices. Instead, they are shared practices. They are based on a thread of common understanding that transcends a culture's own values, beliefs, and practices. This enables different groups to operate together at the level of the global for mutual benefit. This is not, however, a simple moving towards uniformity. If it were, we would all be the same by now. The synchronization we associate with globalizing processes is incomplete, ambivalent, and subject to agency. It also downplays counter-currents and ignores the fact that much of what is being synchronized is of mixed origins to begin with. Even the idea of a global *mélange*, which characterizes this complexity better as the blending of diverse elements in a specific context of use/application by involved parties, cannot fully acknowledge the unevenness, asymmetry, and inequality that happens in global relations.

Glocalization

As those globally common practices reverberate through a cultural group – in the form of new shapes, styles, or goods – social practices within that group evolve to build upon the initial thread that facilitated global-level understanding in the first place. Often, such evolutions are adapted in a way that speaks directly and explicitly to that group, which increases their appeal locally. This is the idea of glocalization, or the local adaptation of those widely shared practices and values, which appears in the convergence most popularly associated with globalization (Roland Robertson 1995).

This global-outlook-as-adapted-to-local-conditions has its origins in business micro-marketing, in which goods and services have been tailored and advertised to differentiated markets. As a process, however, it can be driven just as much by the consuming market, which chooses to use goods and practices that accord with local traditions. Conceptually, glocalization emphasizes the local responses to global engagement, and focuses on the ways in which broadly shared ideas, goods, and practices are modified and adapted locally to accord with local practice, customs, habits,

and beliefs. The variability of such responses is immense, and these should not be regarded somehow as lesser or misinformed performances of global practice. Instead, they need to be regarded on their own cultural terms. Globalization is thus an integral aspect of globalizing processes.

Globalization

A companion to this is the notion of globalization (Ritzer 2004). This is a more imperialistic, homogenizing perspective, as it derives directly from the ambitions of organizations, nations, and corporations to grow (hence *globalization*) their power, influence and, in the case of businesses, profits in geographic areas. It is more focused on the expansion of producers and entities to find new locales, and thus new markets and consumers. It therefore emphasizes geographical extent and consumer opportunities, striving for homogeneity, rather than cultural impact and the variations in practice emphasized in globalization. Conceptually, globalization is part of the dominating aspect that we often associate with -izations, such as when globalization is considered proxy for Westernization (or Romanization, Sinicization, Islamicization, etc.). Thus, it, too, is an integral aspect of globalizing processes.

Globalization as a concept balances these competing processes of influence and response. It creates a framework in which the inter-relations of culture, power, and economics, and the diversity of actions and responses within those inter-relations, can be habilitated. These brief explanations here provide a context to the present volume, for while all of these might intrinsically be modern ideas, there is strong evidence of such practices and developments at various times in the past in regions around the world.

Globalization and the past

The widening cooperation and deepening inequality we see in today's globalization processes can be found together throughout history. But even in the past, such processes occurred unevenly temporally, unequally geographically, and unfairly socially. Not all examples of complex connectivities can be regarded necessarily as globalization. We should not expect globalization experiences in the past to be part of an evolutionary continuum. The trend towards human integration and cooperation is a dialectical process, but also one that unfolds inconsistently. Furthermore, the past is an incomplete record with biased, partial remains that give only clues to the nature of complex social interactions between individuals and groups.

Despite debates about the start date of globalization, many nevertheless acknowledge that the ideas that underpin today's globalizations are applicable to the past on different scales (including Robbie Robertson in this volume). For this reason, scholarship of the past is increasingly using globalization thinking to better interpret past connections between individuals and groups (e.g. Clark 1997; Tomlinson 1999; Hopkins 2002; O'Rourke and Williamson 2002; McNeil 2008). They draw particularly on contemporary analyses of the processes through which the world is regarded as a coherently bounded place, and the ways in which we are made conscious of this sense of one-placeness (Roland Robertson 1992; Waters 1995: 1–25; Tomlinson 1999: 1–31).

What is particularly appealing about globalization is that it rehabilitates competing, sometimes oppositional perspectives on the nature of connectivity. For instance, in the 1980s, post-colonialism emerged as a major paradigm of critical analysis. It sought explicitly to deconstruct the narratives of the colonizers, and to articulate the voices of the colonized and so-called 'others'. It impacted within archaeological discourse during the 1990s (Liebmann 2008), evidenced in the dismantling of interpretative frameworks such as Romanization and Hellenization

(see the discussion between Versluys (2014) and Hodos (2014)). Hybridization became popular as a means of interpreting cultural changes during these eras, instead. However, post-colonialism has been criticized for homogenizing experiences, not acknowledging sufficiently the role of history in cultural change, and, at times, disregarding the impact of the colonists to such an extent that they are written out of the narrative altogether (for discussions, see Liebmann 2008: 10–13). Globalization thinking rehabilitates these competing perspectives. It enables us to consider the commonalities that gave rise to the -izations in the first place alongside the diverse expressions of those shared practices. It also allows us to recognize the tension between shared practices and the rejection of them, which can happen in the resurgence of local identities in contrast to the merging of practices at the global level. Globalization enables us to consider the interconnections between all these different levels of interaction in a united perspective.

To date, such studies in the field of archaeology have been patchy in terms of application. Many focus on a single cultural group or period/era (e.g. Hingley 2005; De Angelis 2013; Pitts and Versluys 2015) or a more eclectic collection of case studies (LaBianca and Scham 2006; Jennings 2011). Some regard only the evidence for long-distance contact (Harris 2007), with little consideration of the nuances of shared practices or the paradoxical resurgence of expressions of distinctive local identities (De Angelis 2013). These, in particular, use globalization simply as proxy for the similarities of practice across a particular scale. They do not consider additional aspects that make the connections and reactions complex.

In contrast, the present volume is the first to assess the shared practices, the localized differences, and the networks that underpin them. Thus, it brings together the scope of evidence for connectivities in the past. Furthermore, it takes a world archaeology approach on a multi-period basis. In some respects, therefore, the present volume on globalization is truly global.

Of course, as with the very critiques of ‘globalization’, this volume does not cover every place in every period in human history. It cannot. No volume could. But, significantly, for many of the places, periods, and social groups discussed, this volume represents the first time that their social developments have been considered through the lens of globalization and the processes that underpin it. The chapters here are not synthetic narratives of the kind usually associated with the handbook/companion model. Instead, each has been specially commissioned to provide a focused case study. Thus, one aim in the selection has been to expand the scope of application beyond the few well-known, theoretically informed archaeological examples (e.g. Jennings 2011; Pitts and Versluys 2015; Boivin *et al.* 2012). To further encourage consideration of less obvious periods and places, we also shy away from widely discussed historical examples, such as slavery in the Americas (e.g. Falola 2013), opium and trade in the nineteenth century (e.g. Schoonover 2005), or the importance of global capital markets in supporting economic growth in the modern world (e.g. Weiss 2002). Nevertheless, within the sections, which are geographically oriented, we have also sought a temporal scope from prehistory to today. The volume spans from as early as 10,000 cal. BP to the modern era; its contemporary contributions consider global trade in commodities and technologies primarily from a material culture perspective (globalization of the heritage industry, which is also touched upon in this volume, is well-discussed elsewhere: e.g. Labadi and Long 2010; Meskell 2015). Collectively, these illustrate a tremendous range of connectivities that people have experienced, and a variety of evidence for those relationships, not all of which necessarily can be considered globalization. Therefore, what is and what is not globalization are also reflected upon.

The volume begins with four introductory chapters that establish different perspectives on globalization theory and its application to the past. Jennings provides a clear methodology for recognizing globalization processes in action. Knappett explores how networks provide the tools for analysing connectivities across space and time, arguing for the social nature of these

connections, beyond material and spatial ones. Feinman emphasizes the macro-scalar aspect of globalization. For Robertson, globalization remains a matter of scale that, for him, must encompass the world, and thus is an inherently modern phenomenon. Nevertheless, he acknowledges similar patterns of connectivities on smaller, local, and regional scales and recognizes that they epitomize human society. He appreciates that the theories that underpin today's thinking about globalization can be a useful tool for understanding similarly complex connectivities in the past. Thus, even within these four framework papers, the diversity of definitions and conceptualizations of globalization is illustrated.

Contributing authors were asked to engage directly with globalization theory, as raised through the following four chapters, in their reconsiderations of developments in their respective periods, places, and cultural groups. For many, this has been an exercise in original analysis and interpretation, since globalization theory within archaeology has not been widely applied to date. For this reason, authors have also often reflected back to consider how globalization thinking offers new perspectives on understanding the complex connectivities of their case studies that may be masked by alternative theoretical approaches. Collectively, therefore, this volume presents the discipline with an alternative paradigm with which to reassess the complexities and impacts of cultural connectivities in the past. To avoid any sense of a master narrative that locates a particular time period or continent as the epicentre of globalization, the sections themselves have been ordered alphabetically; cross-references to other contributions within the volume link the regions directly.

This volume has two additional aims, which address archaeology but also serve a broader purpose. The first is to illustrate the potential of globalization theory to bridge the local and global in material culture analysis. In other words, the volume highlights what globalization can do for archaeology. There are many examples from various archaeological periods in which the presence of 'exotics', 'trade wares', 'prestige items', and 'social valuables', new technologies and so on are highlighted in analyses of local settings. Such settings are often individual sites (villages or cities) or at best regional trade networks. The chapters in the present collection offer a broader reflection on the places of origin of those exotics, and the consideration of such objects as a factor in the analysis of social and cultural identities. The roles of objects and object agency in cultural change arising from connectivities come to the fore in this regard.

This, in turn, gets compared and contrasted with the role global engagement plays as a force of cultural change alongside its impact upon cultural resilience in spite of and in reaction to it. Such processes raise questions concerning how local communities responded to globalizing forces between the flexible local (cf. Ong 1999) and the friction viewed elsewhere (Tsing 2004).

The second aim is to highlight the distinction between modern and premodern globalizations as one of scale and, perhaps, intensity, rather than viewing the difference as one of kind. This is a point made by Jennings (2011), but case studies presented here illustrate this much more broadly. In other words, the volume demonstrates the significance and utility of the past to today's society and social theorists. Even though globalizing tendencies in the nation-state era are leading to more poignant forms of border crossings, cultural and natural borders were always being crossed. Diffusionist theory and World Systems Theory both make this point, but the former fails to ask 'how' and 'why' and the latter replies only through economic motifs. Globalization theory offers more room to introduce social and cultural elements into analysis of the material record of the past. This is because globalization is about processes rather than a way of being.

Therefore, other disciplines beyond archaeology can draw from the studies here. Evaluating, analysing and interpreting material evidence patterns from the past provide us with an opportunity to model the future in a unique way. Archaeology provides a long-term record of broader

social practices, and a trajectory of impact that arises from the complex connectivities we do, and do not, associate with globalization. This volume draws together case studies from world archaeology that reconsider the processes and networks that underpin ideas and processes of globalization, as seen in material culture. We need to identify these phases and shifting centres of globalization in the past to understand such processes in the long term, including going forward from today. As such, examples in the present volume serve as a model for contemporary globalization analyses that seek to map outcomes of our own, current connectivities in a variety of sectors in today's society, and societies. We need the past to understand the future; archaeology provides us with a means of shaping that future as we strive to anticipate the consequences of our own connectivities today for ourselves and our children.

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Distinguishing past globalizations

Justin Jennings

Introduction

Today's globalization is a 'very modern phenomenon' (O'Rourke and Williamson 2002: 47), developed over the past 500 years via an unparalleled surge in the distance, scale, and speed of interregional interactions. Yet people have always interacted across distances, and these interactions, with many peaks and valleys, have increased in intensity over the course of human history (Wenke and Olszewski 2006). With this in mind, there has been increasing interest over the last decade in relating our era of contemporary globalization to earlier periods of intense long-distance interaction and culture change (e.g. Steger 2003; LaBianca and Arnold Scham 2006; Morley 2007; Hodos 2010; Stearns 2010; De Angelis 2013). The scholars doing this research, many of whom are contributors to this volume, join me in recognizing that there are many features that make our current era unique, but nonetheless argue against the idea of modernity as a totalizing rupture with the past (Goody 2006). Globalization, we suggest, can be traced much further back in time.

Yet is globalization – a notoriously slippery word to define (Hochschild 2006: 40) – best seen as an unending process or one that has occurred multiple times in the past (Figure 1.2.1)? Many argue that there has been only one single trend towards increasing globalization in human history. The world, following this perspective, has been slowly globalizing in fits and starts over thousands of years (e.g. Frank 1993; Clark 1997; Nederveen Pieterse 2004; Chanda 2007; McNeil 2008). A second, perhaps smaller, group argues that globalization has occurred repeatedly in the past. These scholars – often drawing inspiration from world systems research (e.g. Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991, 1997; Kardulias 1999; Hall *et al.* 2011) – suggest a more cyclical process in history within which bursts of interregional interaction were followed by balkanization. My work, while falling within this second group (Jennings 2010, 2011, 2014), stresses that not all of these bursts of interaction should be considered as earlier globalizations.

To make a compelling argument for multiple globalizations, one must confront the difficult, and thus far largely neglected, problem of clearly distinguishing what was and what was *not* a period of prior globalization. In the brief space allotted, I would like to discuss the ways that archaeologists might identify earlier globalizations, and then provide two case studies of broad stylistic horizons – Chavín in the Andes and Hopewell in the North American mid-continent – that




Figure 1.2.1 Different conceptions of globalization in world history as (a) uniquely modern phenomenon, (b) long-term historical trend, and (c) repeated phenomenon

were precipitated by the flow of ideas, goods, and people across wide regions. The Chavín and Hopewell horizons were both transformative, but I will argue that only the Chavín horizon meets widely held criteria for a period of globalization.

Following John Tomlinson (1999: 2), I define globalization here as complex connectivity, a condition created by a dense network of intense interactions and interdependencies between disparate people brought together through the long-distance flow of goods, ideas, and individuals. Tomlinson, echoing other scholars, enumerates a number of cultural changes associated with

complex connectivity, and I argue that we can use the existence of these same changes during earlier periods of heightened long-distance interaction to determine if an earlier era achieved complex connectivity, and thus globalization (see Jennings 2011).

The cultural consequences of globalization

Identifying earlier periods of globalization, especially when dealing with regions before writing and recording systems were introduced, is problematic since strict quantitative approaches often flounder on the shoals of scattershot coverage and differential archaeological preservation. Tracking long-distance trade, for example, is a daunting task when much of this trade was in perishable materials, and many of the goods moved within informal channels (e.g. Hanks and Linduff 2009; Smith 2010). Ancient DNA, isotope analyses, and other new techniques can be used to reconstruct connections, but they still provide only a shadowy glimpse into the pace and volume of earlier human – as well as plant and animal – migrations (Lalueza-Fox *et al.* 2004; Knudson 2008; Schlumbaum *et al.* 2008). We can thus readily identify *if* people, flora, fauna, and objects were moving across the landscape in the past, yet it is virtually impossible to come up with the kinds of more precise data used to create commodity price indices, terms of trade, and the variety of other measures that economists and other scholars use to track patterns in globalization today (e.g. Chase-Dunn *et al.* 2000; Kurdle 2004; O'Rourke and Williamson 2002).

I argue that a more fruitful means of identifying earlier eras of globalization is by demonstrating a correlation between the increased flow of products and people *and* evidence for the array of cultural changes that are commonly associated with globalization. These culture changes, although perhaps more subjectively determined, are usually archaeologically visible and in aggregate provide a clearer sense than numbers of how surging interactions can impact the daily lives of far-flung groups. Drawing on the globalization of culture approach (Sklair 2006), one can identify eight closely related trends that occur in contemporary globalization. These overlapping trends, spurred by complex connectivity, create a global culture – all should be present for a period to be considered an era of globalization.

The first of the trends associated with globalization is *time-space compression*, an acceleration of long-distance economic, political, and social processes that shrinks one's experience of space and time (Harvey 1989). The world therefore feels smaller with time-space compression, and complex connectivity between groups means that changes in one place can have swift ramifications across a broad region. The internet, of course, springs to mind when we think of today's smaller world, as does the hardships felt as a result of the latest financial meltdown. Yet, the introduction of a new pack animal or the extension of a recording system has also led to significant time-space compression in earlier periods (e.g. Algaze 2008; Possehl 2007).

The second trend seen in globalization is *detrterritorialization*, the sense that a place seems only tenuously connected to its local, geographically-fixed, context (Appadurai 1990; Giddens 1990). Linked to the idea of time-space compression, detrterritorialization occurs as a result of foreign influences on a plethora of local practices. Cities like Mumbai or São Paulo therefore become more cosmopolitan and one result is that some residents can have more in common with people living thousands of kilometres away than they do with both their immediate ancestors and those living just outside of the city. Ancient detrterritorialization is perhaps most easily seen in the high percentage and wide range of imported styles found in the material assemblages of sites during certain periods in the Mediterranean (see Parts VII and IX, this volume).

The third trend, *standardization*, occurs as people navigate ways to bridge geographic and cultural boundaries. A common way of envisioning the world is needed in order to facilitate long-distance interactions and to make the actions of all parties in a transaction comprehensible

(Anderson 1991; Wilk 1995). Universal standards of measurements, like Greenwich Mean Time or the metric system, are the most obvious examples of standardization in modern globalization, but there are also myriad ways in which people begin to share a broad set of ideas about how the world works through television, movies, and other media. Standardization can be seen in the ancient world through the spread of pidgin languages and the adoption of ideologically charged motifs into local assemblages (e.g. Pauketat 2004; Heggarty 2008).

Unevenness is the fourth trend in globalization. Interregional interaction networks are not geographically ubiquitous, and there can be considerable power differentials between regions (Wallerstein 1979; Wolf 1982; Harvey 1989). Today's rising powers like China manage to dominate many exchange relationships, while other places like Haiti remain isolated. Bollywood enjoys global influence; the Iranian film industry does not. Unevenness also occurs in the ancient world, where cities like Teotihuacan enjoyed much wider influence than other sites of its era and there was considerable patchiness in the spread of stylistic horizons (Cowgill 1997; Rothman 2001a).

Homogenization, the fifth trend, is perhaps the most discussed hallmark of global culture (Thompson 1995; Tomlinson 1999). As flows of ideas, objects, and people increase, a degree of cultural homogenization occurs as individuals come to rely on a similar suite of practices and products. Homogenization can be seen in the spread of brands like McDonalds, as well as in global changes in attitudes towards violence, beauty, and sickness. Homogenization breaks down cultural barriers but it is important to underline that such flows between cultures always involve, 'interpretation, translation, mutation, adaptation, and "indigenization" as the receiving culture brings its own cultural resources to bear, in dialectical fashion, upon "cultural imports"' (Tomlinson 1999: 84). Homogenization can be seen in the ancient world when previously distinct groups begin to build their homes or distribute food in the same manner (e.g. Alt 2001; Nissen 1988).

The sixth trend in globalization, *cultural heterogeneity*, occurs because cultural variation actually increases during these periods, despite some homogenization. Contemporary globalization is not the same as Westernization, but rather is a blend of foreign elements from throughout the network that are then indigenized into local settings (Friedman 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 2002). The particular blending of outside influences is therefore unique from one place to the next and constantly shifting as new ideas and products are introduced while others lose favour. Yoga gets reinterpreted in California studios, and hamburgers do not look quite the same in Japan. Cultural heterogeneity can be perhaps best seen in the ancient world in the differences in ceramic assemblages across stylistic horizons. One group may mix motifs from two foreign styles on local cups, while another retains traditional forms while changing the colours of slips (e.g. Clark and Pye 2006; Yépez Álvarez and Jennings 2012).

Re-embedding of local culture, the seventh trend seen in globalization, is caused by those who react to global flows of ideas, objects, and people by attempting to reassert local traditions. These traditions, sometimes invented if not recast, are often presented as a counterweight to ground communities that are in the throes of rapid culture change (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Green 2002). The Académie française strives to maintain the purity of the French language in the face of neologisms, and there has been a surge in youth engagement programmes among Canadian First Peoples as elders seek to pass on traditional knowledge to the next generation. The re-embedding of local culture is the most tricky of these trends to document archaeologically, since it can often be difficult to tell if outside influences were rare or absent in a location because they were rejected by a group or because these influences were minimal. Yet, re-embedding in the past was likely occurring when we can see increasing rates of interaction paired with reassertions of previous funerary traditions, settlement organization, and other practices (e.g. Nassaney 2001; Rothman 2001b; Bélisle and Coverly 2010).

The final trend is *vulnerability*. Complex connectivity leads to interdependence because of the numerous, deeply embedded connections between various groups. Events – the Russian annexation of Crimea or flooding in the Philippines – have widespread reverberations across the network, and heighten awareness of globalization’s risks (Beck 1992; Eriksen 2007). Despite issues of chronological control, vulnerability can be best demonstrated in the past through the collapse of interaction networks in the ancient world. When important centres like Rome or Knossos falter, a more globalized exchange system will tend to break apart into smaller, more manageable, ones (Knappett *et al.* 2011; Sommer 2013).

Non-local connections are commonplace throughout history, and these connections are often associated with some of the same kinds of cultural changes that are seen with contemporary globalization because these flows also bridge geographic, historical, and societal divides (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1989; Gordon 1992; Wolf 1982; Gupta and Ferguson 2002). Yet I argue that not all periods of surging long-distance interaction should be seen as globalization eras – in many cases the particular nodes and links in the interregional exchange network did not come together to achieve complex connectivity – since the eight trends seen in modern globalization cannot be documented in some cases. For instance, the Chavín horizon is an example of an era of globalization; the Hopewell horizon is not.

Chavín and the Early Horizon

Beginning in the 1920s, Julio C. Tello advanced an argument for an Andean mother culture that diffused out of the site of Chavín de Huántar to encompass a region of the Andes stretching from Ecuador to Argentina (1948). Tello’s argument regarding the timing, extent, and nature of Chavín’s influence proved incorrect, but scholars nonetheless now recognize that Chavín de Huántar was an important ritual and urban centre in the interregional interaction network that created the Early Horizon Period (800–500 BC) (Burger 1992, 2008; Rick 2008; Rick *et al.* 2010) (Figure 1.2.2). Long-distance exchange surged during this period, and there was a wide sharing of technology, foodstuffs, and iconography. All eight of our cultural trends also occurred during the Early Horizon – Chavín is therefore an example of ancient globalization.

Chavín de Huántar, located in the sierra of northern Peru, was home at the end of the first millennium BCE to a few hundred people clustered around a small temple complex (Burger 1992; Kembel 2008). The site would grow tenfold between 800 and 500 BCE, and the temple radically expanded during this time to include sunken patios, platforms, and underground galleries (Rick 2008). The meteoric growth of Chavín can be correlated with the expansion of temple centres in both the sierra and on the coast of Peru, where residents seemed to have shared an underlying cosmology (Figure 1.2.3). Chavín de Huántar was a particularly cosmopolitan place during this period of intensifying interaction, attracting visitors from hundreds of kilometres away to participate in feasts, watch processions, and leave offerings (Druc 2004; Druc *et al.* 2001; Rick 2008).

The leaders of Chavín de Huántar, like those in other Early Horizon centres, sought to institutionalize the period’s growing differences in wealth, privilege, and power (Burger 1992; Kembel and Rick 2004; Rick 2005). They did so by arguing that they were different – somehow closer to the gods – through performances, iconography, and, most importantly for our purposes, long-distance connections. Chavín’s leaders helped to radically expand the use of llamas for long-distance exchange (Burger 1992); and new trade connections resulted in an unprecedented increase in the flow of obsidian, cinnabar, marine shells, and other goods to Chavín, as well as to other centres (Contreras 2011). Chavín’s previous connections had been with




Figure 1.2.2 Chavín-related sites mentioned in the text — the inset map shows where the area is located within Peru

other northern highland groups and, to a much lesser extent, those living on the northern coast (Contreras 2010). These links intensified after 800 BCE, and the spread of Chavín influence pushed considerably southward.

The site of Campanayuc Rumi, for example, was located in the sierra of southern Peru near the three major obsidian sources that were used at Chavín de Huántar. The site's architecture, ritual practices, and material assemblages changed radically after 800 BCE, reflecting a deep emulation of Chavín practices (Matsumoto 2012; Matsumoto and Cavero 2010). Another southern centre near a cinnabar source, Atalla, boasts ceramics almost stylistically identical to those found at Chavín during the Early Horizon (Burger and Matos Mendieta 2002). In the Paracas Peninsula on the south coast — an area long coveted for its supply of bird guano — there was a radical shift towards Chavín-inspired iconography and the introduction of new weaving




Figure 1.2.3 Illustration of the Raimondi Stone from Chavín de Huantár — the stone, depicting Chavín’s supreme deity, displays some the artistic conventions used during the Early Horizon. One convention is that the art is organized so that certain attributes are made more legible by inverting the stone as is done here (source: Toribio Polo 1900: 83)

technologies (Garcia 2010; Splitstoser *et al.* 2010). Colonization from Chavín de Huántar seems unlikely in these or in other known cases, but the increased interaction during the Early Horizon was leading to profound culture change in places that were sometimes more than a thousand kilometres apart.

Chavín iconography, in particular, was being championed by rising elites (Burger 1993). They had the most to benefit from the ideology’s core message of social distinction, and as time went on they developed a self-reinforcing elite culture that criss-crossed a large swathe of Peru. Yet, importantly, there were many groups who ‘appear to have consciously avoided being drawn into the sphere of interaction associated with Chavín’ (Burger 2008: 699). Life in the Nepeña Valley of the north coast, for example, changed dramatically in the Early Horizon – maize was introduced, there were ‘significant shifts in feasting equipment,’ and social distinctions widened (Chicoine 2011: 436). These changes were driven at least in part through the period’s increasing interregional interactions, but many of those living at Huambacho and other ritually

important centres in Nepeña chose to produce a material culture that was often conspicuously different from that being developed at Chavín de Huántar (Chicoine 2006, 2011).

Chronological uncertainties at Chavín de Huántar, as well as at other centres, make it difficult to pin down the exact scale of the site's impact on Early Horizon interactions (Burger 2008; Kembel 2008; Rick 2008; Rick *et al.* 2010). Yet at the very least, Chavín was a *primus inter pares* among centres engaged in a wide ranging exchange of ideas, products, and individuals (Kembel and Rick 2004). The eight cultural trends that occur during periods of globalization can be found during the Early Horizon. Time-space compression, for example, can be seen in the increased emphasis on long-range llama caravanning. Geographic boundaries were eroded by these caravans – this is most easily seen in the spike in both the distance and volume of the obsidian trade (Burger and Glascock 2009) – and deterritorialization occurred in some places as people adopted a Chavín-inspired way of life that departed significantly from earlier practices.

The other globalization trends that were identified earlier in this chapter also appear to have been present in Early Horizon Peru. We see homogenization in terms of the spread of Chavín motifs and underlying cosmology, but there is also considerable cultural heterogeneity in how these motifs were incorporated into the ceramics and friezes of different sites. Standardization is evidenced by the 'specific religious experiences generated by similar ceremonies' at widely separated locales (Matsumoto 2012: 757); unevenness can be seen in those places in between where the lives of hunter-gatherers and small-scale horticulturalists changed little, even as long-distance caravans moved through their territory. Re-embedding of local cultures is manifest in Nepeña and other well-connected valleys like Cajamarca, where people chose to maintain local traditions seemingly to voice their opposition to introduced Chavín ideas. Vulnerability can be seen in the end of the Early Horizon, as Chavín de Huántar and other centres went into a precipitous decline at around the same time when violence increased, long-distance trade plummeted, and the Chavín horizon was replaced by 'a plethora of distinctive local styles' (Burger 1992: 228).

The Hopewell Interaction Sphere

In 1964, Joseph Caldwell and Stuart Struever coined the term 'Hopewell Interaction Sphere' in independent publications to draw attention to the circulation of ideas, raw materials, and, to a much lesser extent, artefacts that linked together groups living in a wide region of eastern North America during the Middle Woodland Period (150 BCE– 450 CE). These long-distance links, when combined with limited migrations (Bolnick and Smith 2007), are still widely seen as constitutive – creating an identifiable, if very loosely defined, Hopewell tradition that was reaffirmed through rituals and other activities that took place in and around burial mounds and geometric earthworks (Carr and Case 2006; Charles and Buikstra 2006; Abrams 2009). The specific mechanisms that connected people with each other, unclear during Struever's day, are only now coming into sharper focus (Carr 2006a), allowing us for the first time to evaluate if Hopewell can be classified as an era of globalization.

Families during the Middle Woodland Period lived in many small, dispersed farmsteads that depended on hunting, gathering, and horticulture for subsistence (Pacheco and Dancy 2006; Yerkes 2006; Pacheco 2010). They periodically came together into larger groups at ritually charged locations where individuals buried their dead, made offerings, and built monumental earthworks (Figure 1.2.4). Some of these locations were of only local importance, but other sites seem to have repeatedly drawn people together from across broader regions (Bernardini 2004; Carr 2006b). The largest of these gatherings may have involved world renewal rituals that assembled community leaders from hundreds of kilometres away (Carr *et al.* 2006; Byers 2011).




Figure 1.2.4 The mounds and causeways of the Newark Earthworks in Ohio, one of the more famous examples of Hopewell monumentalism (source: Squier and Davis 1848, plate XXV)

The people that came to these ritual centres stayed for a few days, building temporary housing, and, based on the debris left behind in these contexts, spending much of their time feasting and manufacturing offerings from exotic materials (Burks and Pederson 2006; Abrahms 2009). The burial mounds were revisited to commemorate the dead, but many of the earthworks were one-offs, where ‘the act of creating something was the critical event’ (Bernardini 2004: 350–51).

Hopewell mounds sometimes contained a bewildering range of material that seems to have been used to signal local, regional, and interregional connections (Seaman 1979, 1995). Some of the far away items like Yellowstone obsidian may have been obtained in a harrowing, once-in-a-lifetime journey across the continent, while other objects like bear’s teeth and pearls may have suggested familiarity with the dangerous or unknown (DeBoer 2004). The mounds also often contained a mixture of nominally pan-Hopewell artefacts – copper celts, earspools, figurines, panpipes, and platform pipes – that shared some features, but stylistic and compositional analysis suggest the existence of an array of related regional traditions with little long-distance exchange of these objects and often direct procurement of raw materials by each group (Bernadini and Carr 2006; Kellar and Carr 2006; Ruby and Shriner 2006; Ruhl 2006; Turff and Carr 2006).

These data suggest that the people that came into a ceremonial site usually assembled their own raw materials and then used them to create a collection of Hopewell material that was broadly similar across the mid-continent but varied significantly from one place to the next in style and function. Hopewell was thus a collection of loosely linked societies that shared ‘some very basic, shared philosophical-religious concepts’ (Carr 2006b: 619). Most of these concepts *predate* the Middle Woodland Period, with the Hopewell styles being a widely accepted means through which these concepts could be materialized. The upwelling of long-distance interaction at this time can be linked to the increase in the scale of mortuary mounds and earthworks that drew together much larger groups of people when compared to the previous Early Woodland Period.




Figure 1.2.5 Human effigy excavated from one of the altar deposits in Mound 25 of the Hopewell site. The figure may represent a shamanic leader (source: Moorehead 1922: 169)

The leaders that organized activities at ritual centres did so in different ways (Coon 2009), though building from a shared shamanic world-view that used altered states of consciousness to visit distant and supernatural realms (Brown 2006; Romain 2009). Many of the items found in the richest Hopewell burials may have belonged to elaborate costumes bedecked with symbols of the shaman's power (Figure 1.2.5). The exotica spoke of distant lands, the jingle and sparkle of metal and beads simulated flight, and the imagery emphasized the importance of human/animal transformations and the structure of the cosmos (DeBoer 2004).

Shamans made 'the extraordinary palpable' for the rest of society (DeBoer 2004: 101), and these individuals and their retinue may have occasionally travelled to both distant resource areas and other ritual centres in the pursuit of sacred knowledge (Carr 2006b). Particular centres likely grew in prestige based on the perceived powers of their shamanic leaders, and then these sites would decline in importance soon after their deaths. Two particularly influential leaders were buried at the eponymously named site of Hopewell in Ohio with 62 small copper celts that were likely brought by dozens of leaders from other ritual centres who travelled to the site to say goodbye (Bernardini and Carr 2006: 641–42). Trips like these would have been instrumental in diffusing the corpus of Hopewell imagery and practices. Shamans returned with new knowledge, and then they re-imagined this knowledge to meet local contexts.

The Hopewell phenomena connected groups together from across a wide region of North America. Some goods travelled more than 15,000 kilometres across geographic and linguistic barriers; people walked and rode canoes for days to build earthworks, dance, and feast with strangers (Bernardini 2004). With these interactions, we see the pale echoes of globalization in the tension between stylistic homogeneity and heterogeneity and the attempts to re-embed local traditions. Yet, there was no creation of a global culture. Instead, Hopewell might best be considered as composed of a series of discrete, often competing, interaction spheres that were largely local in their focus (Pacheco and Dancy 2006). The shamanic leaders at the heart of these spheres were often in contact with each other, but they tended to act independently. Each group sought their own exotica, and each took pains to make their particular variety of Hopewell palatable to constituents that were largely divorced from the mid-continent's more distant linkages.

There are few indications in Hopewell of the byproducts of complex connectivity. Little standardization can be seen; there is limited homogeneity, and even less deterritorialization, vulnerability, and time-space compression. Complex connectivity failed to occur largely because a fundamental aspect of Hopewell cosmology was about engaging with the faraway and the unknown. Leaders therefore often actively avoided, or even resisted, the globalizing tendencies of long-distance interaction. The journey to an obsidian source in the Rocky Mountains, for example, was just as important as the material itself, and therefore there was little incentive for developing down-the-line exchange mechanisms – the power of obsidian was based in large part on its scarcity. The arrival of foreigners added cachet to a funeral *because* they looked and acted so foreign. Since the barriers to communication between groups were integral to shamanic positions, there was an ongoing desire to accentuate differences even as the more influential centres were increasingly bridging these divides on a more regional scale (e.g. Seaman 1995; Fie 2006). The end of Hopewell, at least in part, can probably be linked to the limited homogeneity and standardization that occurred despite these barriers. Shamanic power declined as the wider world became more familiar.

Long-distance interaction and globalization

People, ideas, and products have flowed across vast areas throughout much of human history (McNeil 2008). These flows have all been globalizing in that they seem to lead inevitably

towards a similar suite of cultural changes as people negotiated their relationships with the outside world. Faint reminders of our contemporary interconnected world can thus be seen in the similarities of Venus figurines across Paleolithic Europe or in the first South Asian bead found in the settlements of West Africa. Yet treating the past as just an undifferentiated prologue to contemporary globalization risks obscuring the deeper rhythms of history (Marcus 1998). The level of long-distance interaction across regions has risen and fallen over the centuries (see Figure 1.2.1). Of the more intense periods of interaction, some – but significantly, far from all – meet the same cultural criteria used by scholars to distinguish our contemporary era of globalization (Sklair 2006; Ericksen 2007). I argue that only those periods that meet these criteria should be considered earlier globalizations (Jennings 2010, 2011).

As the budding sub-field of archaeological network analysis is demonstrating (Knappett 2013, this volume), all interaction networks were not the same. Differences in number, depth, and kind within the linkages connecting people mattered, and only in some cases were long-distance relationships profound enough to create the complex connectivity that leads to the formation of a global culture. Some of the specific linkages within the Hopewell and Chavín spheres can be accurately traced through material and stylistic analyses, but, at least for now, the existence of complex connectivity – and hence globalization – can be gauged most effectively through monitoring the ways in which people changed their behaviours during these periods as they became increasingly entangled with the Other (i.e. Hodder 2012; Dietler 2010).

The Hopewell and Chavín examples, like many of the other, more fully rendered case studies discussed in this volume, demonstrate the dual homogenizing/heterogenizing impulse common to interactions that transgress cultural and geographic boundaries. Yet in the case of Hopewell, the people that enjoyed the most cross-cultural linkages – the shamanic leaders of the various mounds – were dedicated to limiting these linkages in order to better maintain the mystique of their positions (Carr 2006b). Chavín de Huántar and other Early Horizon temple centres were in some ways similar to Hopewell complexes in that they were pilgrimage sites whose leaders suggested privileged access to the sacred and exotic. Yet, Chavín centres were more outward facing – exotica found its way into more homes, as did new ways of making textiles, forging metals, and eating meals (Burger 1992). The leaders of Chavín de Huántar either allowed, or perhaps more accurately were unable to curb, accelerating entanglements with a far-flung network of ideas, objects, and people. Hopewell leaders were able to effectively short-circuit the movement towards globalization by restricting access to exotic goods and knowledge. This was not the case with Chavín, and the incorporation of a wide group of people in Early Horizon interaction networks made globalization possible.

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Globalization, connectivities and networks

An archaeological perspective

Carl Knappett

Introduction: ‘-izations’

‘Globalization’, ironically, need not be worldwide. At least, this is a necessary convenience in its current definition, as it would be hard to establish definitively if and when every corner of the globe is connected. And this being the case, ‘global’ becomes a little less important in globalization’s definition than does the idea of ‘complex connectivity’ (Jennings 2011: 2, citing Tomlinson 1999: 2). With complex connectivity, interactions have to be intense, forming dense networks – and they have to be between different regions and have the capacity to trigger social change if they are to be reckoned as globalization (Jennings 2011: 2). Given this set of features, one can see how archaeologists and historians have found it justifiable to take the idea of globalization back into the past, as there are many scenarios that fit the bill, as long as the ‘global’ aspect does not have to be taken too literally (e.g. Morris 2005; LaBianca and Scham 2006; Hodos 2010 and this volume). So we can now read of ancient globalizations from Rome (Versluys 2014) to the Andes (Jennings 2011 and this volume), and this move certainly has a lot of promise for strengthening cross-cultural approaches, and breaking down ‘the great wall’ between ancient and modern civilizations (Jennings 2011: 3).

What then is the advantage of calling a process of complex connectivity ‘globalization’ if it doesn’t really have to be fully global? It is a move that says not everything *has* to be connected, but everything *could* be. And if everything under the sun is up for grabs, then there is no a priori starting point – no assumed ‘core’ from which one then traces zones of influence and hence peripheries. This is very liberating for cultural analysis, because it allows a move away from civilizational histories that emphasise boundaries and boundedness, no doubt under the influence of our modern nation-states (Flood 2009: 2). With the focus instead on the cultural entanglements created by constant mobility and connectivity, we create much more dynamic and emergent histories. This flattening effect in globalization thinking is basically achieved by putting all ‘cultures’ for analysis in ‘one single cultural container’ (Versluys 2014: 12). So for the Roman world, for example, which is Versluys’ focus, one does not start at Rome as the core and work out – one treats the entire world touched by Rome as a zone of intra-cultural, rather than inter-cultural, connectivity. The ‘globe’ is not the scale of this container, but perhaps Eurasia is – and so a centralizing term like Romanization is quite inaccurate in fact, and is currently resisted by

many Roman specialists. Still, a more decentring term like ‘Eurasianafricanization’ is unlikely to catch on. So perhaps Romanization 2.0, as Versluys calls it, simply has to recognize itself as a decentred phenomenon – just as we should not get too hung up on the global in globalization, likewise for the Roman in Romanization.

And one reason why Romanization continues to have some efficacy as a term is that it conveys very well the notion that the social changes effected by this dense, widespread complex connectivity *unfold over time*. So globalization thinking is highly useful in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Processes of ‘-ization’ develop over space and through time. The way in which globalization thus combines space and time, geography and history, is particularly powerful, although arguably this power has not been harnessed sufficiently. It seems that these two dimensions are more typically separated in scholarship – along the lines of the roots/routes dichotomy, in fact (Clifford 1997; Friedman 2002; Flood 2009). Let me try to explain how this happens, and why it is ultimately unnecessary, if entirely understandable.

First, let us think about the spatial connectivity component of globalization – which is typically grasped through the idea of the ‘network’. This is often used as a metaphor rather than as a specific model or means for analysis. It is very compatible with globalization thinking, because it allows that ‘flattening out’ mentioned above, and is sufficiently flexible to let us imagine many different kinds of entity connected up in lots of different ways, be it socially, economically or technologically. Scholars of the ancient world keen on globalization thinking have also recently argued that what studies of ancient globalization need are networks (Jennings this volume; Hodos 2014), though as yet there has been little explicit uptake of network analysis. Some scholars using globalization to think with have gone quite deeply into network thinking, without utilizing network modeling or analysis (e.g. Malkin 2011). Others have done a great deal to study interactions and connectivities inter-regionally and over the long term without finding any particular need to speak of globalization (Broodbank 2013). But I would argue that a number of archaeologists are already quite a way along the path towards this merging of globalization and network concerns, even if not yet expressed like this. Barbara Mills and colleagues (2013), Søren Sindbæk (2013), Anna Collar (2013), Fiona Coward (2013) and Shawn Graham (2014), among others (see contributions in Knappett 2013, 2014a), have been studying inter-regional interaction using network analysis to achieve many of the same effects as those desired by those advocating globalization ideas. Arguably, network analysis does everything that globalization thinking does. But globalization is inherently macro-scale, and so is more specific than ‘network’, which can apply to a range of scales, from neural networks to entire ecosystems.

Another sense that ‘globalization’ conveys inherently that ‘network’ does not is emergence. So this takes us to our second point: the emergent quality of globalization; how it unfolds over time. ‘Networkization’ might do the job, but nobody uses this of course – and so to many observers ‘network’ seems quite static, especially if they are imagining railway networks, or the network visualizations that are so commonplace. Thus, network methods are commonly conceived as too static for getting to grips with change, and so scholars have sought other registers that they believe capture change more aptly. One of these is ‘meshwork’, proposed by Tim Ingold in direct challenge to network, and specifically for its capacity to convey movement, flow, and emergence (Ingold 2007, 2012). We also have ‘entanglement’, which came to prominence in part through globalization debates, especially following Thomas (1991), and then in archaeology (e.g. Dietler 1998, 2010; Silliman 2005; Martindale 2009). However, it is in the hands of Ian Hodder (2012) that the idea of entanglement has come to show its worth in explaining temporal emergence over the long term. Hodder, too, shows a reluctance towards networks, though somewhat more ambivalently than Ingold, for what he calls their inability to convey the ‘stickiness’ of thing–thing relations.

Network tools

Actually, these are misconceptions, because networks are invariably dynamic and emergent, even if these properties are not transparent in the term itself. While I find entanglement and network perspectives quite compatible, and one need not have to choose one over the other, we should perhaps guard against the division of temporal and spatial dimensions of globalization, to the point where they end up with different approaches or methodologies. I argue here that networks can provide what globalization theory needs – providing the *tools* for analysing not only connectivities across space, but also their emergent properties through time. While globalization applied to ancient societies does the important heuristic work of encouraging us to think about mobility and connectivity, networks take us a step further, allowing us to both model and analyse data (Östborn and Gerding 2014). The single ‘container’ idea of globalization (Versluys 2014) is easily managed with networks, flattening out the hierarchical assumptions left over from core–periphery thinking. Network analysis can be multi-scalar, and so work across levels from local to global, another key facet of globalization thinking. Contrary to some common criticisms (e.g. Walsh 2014), networks can certainly capture emergence and change (e.g. Padgett and Powell 2012). More specifically, a series of network properties can be modelled and measured, such as centrality, tie strength and clique formation. These have been the focus of a great deal of research, in both social network analysis (SNA), and complexity science (e.g. Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Newman *et al.* 2006). What the formal study of such properties allows is a richer cross-cultural analysis – a move that has been slow in coming in globalization debates – which would then mean we could actually start comparing different ancient globalizations, such as Romanization and Mediterraneanization, rather than just stating that they are all the result of complex connectivity and dense networks.

If we can start using some network measures to assess some of the details of ancient mobilities and connectivities, then we can move away from a position where the latter are little more than ciphers enabling the assertion of globalization as a spatio-temporal process. But what network measures would be most appropriate for studying ancient globalizations? If our first reaction (as archaeologists) is to think of the long-distance, inter-regional nature of globalized connectivities, then we may all too easily view ancient ‘-izations’ as spatial phenomena – maps of the Roman empire, for example, coming to mind. We should try to resist such knee-jerk cartographic thinking – even though much archaeological evidence is material and spatial rather than directly social (see Knappett 2014b), we should still try to remember that ancient networks were fundamentally social, economic, political or religious too. So when we consider these inter-regional mobilities, we really need to have the social nature of the connections very much in mind too. And what are long-distance social connections typically like? What should we expect of inter-regional connectivities in the past? Well, there are a few different ways we might think about them – and we can break them down into frequency, strength, content and directionality.

First, with what frequency were connectivities maintained across distance? We might imagine connections over long distances to have been typically infrequent, at least relative to the contemporary world. Although we should be wary of simplistic assumptions about levels of mobility in the past, there were nonetheless certain infrastructural limitations at different times. So, in the Mediterranean, travel across maritime space would presumably have been relatively restricted before the invention of the sail. Second, we should consider the strength of connection too – which is different to frequency. A strong tie may be infrequent, and vice versa. We might typically expect strong ties to be local ones, and weak ones to be over distance. This is not to say, however, that such weak ties are unimportant – indeed, for certain purposes they may be very powerful, as argued by Granovetter (1973) in a classic paper on the ‘strength of weak ties’ in facilitating network navigability. This idea has also been connected with the

notion of ‘small world’ networks (Watts and Strogatz 1998), whereby only a few random connections are needed to create global network navigability across an otherwise clustered set of local connections. If we then think of globalized entities as ‘small worlds’ (Malkin 2011; see also Tartaron 2013), then we should probably expect the long-distance links to be weak. But in certain cases, ancient globalizations seem to generate quite strong inter-regional connectivities (e.g. Collar 2013). And there are some network studies suggesting that the ties holding global networks together need not be weak (see White and Houseman 2003). Moreover, we should take ourselves back to Jennings’ comments concerning the definition of globalization: intense interactions forming dense networks (Jennings 2011: 2).

This question over the relative strength of long-distance ties brings up a third important area, which is the *content* of ties. As long ago as 1973, Granovetter warned against an excessive focus on tie strength at the expense of tie *content*. That is to say, we should ask what was actually moving or circulating through these ties – what kinds of matter, energy or information? Asking about tie content raises the issue of what motivates social mobility and connectivity in the first place. It is very easy in network analysis to take a particular network structure for granted, and then analyse the functions that take place on that network. But network structure evolves for some purpose, probably but not necessarily correlated with its current functionality, and so we need to pay attention to what an ancient network, or ancient globalization, is *for*. In other words, *why* connect across distances? It seems like an obvious consideration, but it is curiously easy to overlook. It is important to ask because network connections are not without cost – and so we must assess what the benefit would be in establishing and maintain a link. If we do observe many long-distance links of some strength in a given network, then we must ask what purpose they serve for whichever protagonists were investing in them. One means for assessing tie content, in archaeological contexts at least, could be to focus less on artefactual proxies, and more on the actual practices or praxeologies that appear to be shared through inter-regional connections (see contributions in Kiriati and Knappett 2016).

The fourth feature of network connectivities to consider here is *directionality*. Does a given node have links both coming in and going out? Are the flows of matter, energy and information unidirectional or multidirectional? This relates to the content and purpose of connections of course, and it may be that the directionality in a network could reveal aspects of its function. Do all nodes in a network have an equal interest in and contribution to the network function as a whole? Or are some nodes conspicuously more involved than others?

By highlighting frequency, strength, content and directionality as features of network connections, we give ourselves some scope to assess and compare ancient globalizations. Of course, comparison is quite possible without formal network measures, as Jennings has shown, helped by Sklair’s identification of eight ‘trends’ in globalizations (Sklair 2006). Jennings also very helpfully highlights in this volume that not all instances in the past of long-distance connectivity quite qualify as globalization, as he argues is the case for the Hopewell interaction sphere. A further advantage of using these variables to assess networks is that none of them restricts us to searching for ancient globalizations at a particular scale. Bevan (2011) in his review of Jennings’ book quite justifiably raises the matter, noting that Jennings’ case studies tend to span about 1,000 km. Is there a typical ancient scale for globalization? Or can we use this same umbrella term to compare phenomena at scales ranging from the Roman empire to Cahokia, for instance? How does it help to call both of these ‘globalizations’? Well, scale is not the main concern – as long as the distances are in some sense ‘inter-regional’ (and this must also be relative, based on technologies, and difficulty of travel), then we can still compare them in terms of the frequency, strength, content and directionality of their ties and anticipate finding quite some variability in their scale, duration and purpose.

Minoanization as globalization?

What I would like to do at this point is take an example from the ancient Mediterranean that, as far as I know, has yet to be seriously considered as an ancient globalization. It concerns the phenomenon often referred to as ‘Minoanization’, artfully defined by Broodbank (2004: 46) as:

a modern term of sometimes deceptive convenience for a heterogeneous range of ancient material culture traits and practices that indicate the adoption in places beyond Crete, through whatever means, of ways of doing things that originated directly or indirectly within that island.

I say ‘artfully’, because with the term ‘through whatever means’ he delicately sidesteps the polarized debate between those who believe in a Minoan colonization of the Aegean, and those who favour a more bottom-up process of acculturation. Regardless of these different views, what one can say is that most specialists do look at this phenomenon in terms both of *inter-cultural* interactions – because the Minoan, Cycladic, Helladic and Anatolian cultures do look quite different, and have deep, distinct ‘civilizational histories’ – and with a definite sense of a directionality emanating from Crete, even if its exact character is debated. The term itself makes these assumptions hard to avoid. We could try to abandon using ‘Minoanization’ altogether, though I feel this would run into the same problems as trying to abandon ‘Romanization’ (see Versluys 2014). Another option would be to change the terminology so it would better reflect the total container within which interactions were occurring – and so perhaps ‘Aegeanization’ would be more apt (though this does overlook interactions with Egypt, for example). This is perhaps as likely to catch on as ‘Eurasianization’ is as a replacement for Romanization. A third option would be simply to retain the term Minoanization while remaining vigilant as to the assumptions it brings with it.

More important than the term we use is what we do in terms of analysis – and so what we should try here is to make the entire Aegean ‘the container’ for analysis, in order not to take Crete as our starting point or ‘core’. So we should simply take the Greek mainland, the Cyclades, the Dodecanese, coastal Asia Minor, the northeast Aegean and Crete, and see what kinds of connections we can detect between these different places, in terms of their frequency, strength, content and directionality. Moreover, we mentioned above that networks can quite readily incorporate the temporal dimension too, and fortunately so can the evidence from this region – we can, for example compare the before, during, and after of Minoanization, to see how this candidate for ancient globalization emerged and developed.

Phase 1: Middle Bronze Age, c.1950–1750 BCE (MM I–II)

This is essentially a phase of contact between all of the regions mentioned above, though seemingly at quite low levels (Figure 1.3.1). The evidence for the first use of the sail in this area is really only iconographic, but what we do have points to a date around 2000 BCE (Tartaron 2013: 53) – which means that this innovation could have been in part responsible for this phase of contact.

Cretan pottery is found at various sites in the Aegean, such as on the Cycladic islands of Kea (Abell 2014), Melos (Hood 2007) and Thera (Nikolakopoulou forthcoming), on Aegina in the Saronic Gulf (Gauss and Smetana 2007), at mainland Greek sites like Lerna (Zerner 1993), in the east Aegean on the Dodecanesian island of Rhodes (Marketou 2009), on the Anatolian coast at Miletus (Niemeier 2005), and even up into the northeast Aegean on the island of Samothrace




Figure 1.3.1 Map of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean

(Girella and Pavúk 2016). There also exists some evidence for Cycladic imports on Crete, in small quantities; and some links between the mainland and the Cyclades (Nikolakopoulou 2007), though nothing this early suggesting contact between the east Aegean and the Cyclades. In all cases the quantities are certainly modest, suggesting a low-level, infrequent mode of connectivity. Moreover, one would have to say that the connections are weak, as there is little to no sign of any effects on local traditions. The content of these exchanges seems to be largely economic, as we are dealing with storage amphoras and jars for the most part, though some indications from Aegina and Miletus could indicate closer ties. And in terms of directionality, the evidence suggests that Crete is more active in stimulating these connections. We have to guard against biases in the evidence, with Cretan pottery perhaps being more fully studied and more easily recognized; and we should not overlook the signs of other cross-cutting connections. Nonetheless, this is the period when the Cretan palaces of Knossos, Phaistos and Malia are in competition, and creating demand for bronze objects, with neither copper nor tin available on the island. So one might well imagine that metals are really a driver here, as in the east Mediterranean generally at this time (Broodbank 2013: 376).

Overall, the network ties in this phase are diffuse, and there is no sign of social changes occurring because of them. It is therefore difficult to argue that this phase is one of ‘globalization’. On the other hand, the weak ties holding together far-flung clusters of communities gives this the character of a ‘small world’ network – which would be resilient over the long term (Knappett *et al.* 2011).

Phase 2: Middle to Late Bronze Age, c.1750–1450 BCE (MM III–LM I)

Later in the Middle Bronze Age, equivalent to the Cretan phase Middle Minoan IIIA, or c.1750 BCE, something changes quite drastically in inter-regional connectivity. Lasting through the first phases of the Late Bronze Age, it corresponds to what I have elsewhere described as a shift from networks of exchange to networks of affiliation (Knappett and Nikolakopoulou 2005). We can now observe that network ties *are* having pronounced social effects. At the site of Akrotiri on the island of Thera, for example, various artefacts and practices better known from Minoan Crete find themselves adopted – from new kinds of architectural features and arrangements of space, to new weaving techniques, to new ways of making pottery on the wheel. Some of the uptake is quite faithful to Cretan prototypes, though there is also a lot of what some scholars might call ‘hybridization’, though this is a less effective term than others like ‘translation’. I use it here since Girella and Pavúk call this the ‘hybrid phase’ in the northeast Aegean too – where the previously very limited contact now seems much more thoroughgoing, at least at Samothrace, and to some extent also on the islands of Lemnos, Lesbos and Chios. Elsewhere we see much the same picture – on other Cycladic islands (Kea and Melos), in the Dodecanese (Rhodes and Kos) and in coastal Anatolia (e.g. Miletus and Iasos). Although the evidence for connectivity does tend to be largely dominated by Cretan imports, there are now also many more signs of cross-cutting connections, for example between the Cyclades and the east Aegean (with both Koan and Milesian imports on Thera: Knappett and Nikolakopoulou 2008; Knappett and Hilditch 2016). Material does also make its way to Crete from these areas, though largely confined to Knossos presently, where Cycladic and east Aegean imports (from Rhodes, Kos, and Miletus) have been identified (Knappett 2006).

So we can quite confidently say that in this phase the strength of ties is much greater than before, and so presumably was their frequency – with the depth of learning for some of the adopted technologies, like wall plaster, weaving, and the potter’s wheel, contacts were surely

more intense. As for directionality, there still seems to be a certain dominance of Cretan links, with the quest for metals as strong, if not stronger, than before, though the geopolitical situation on Crete had changed considerably, with Knossos now probably the single major palatial power. That said, there are certainly ample connections that are not Cretan, and although we tend not to imagine that the other areas of the Aegean had much impact on Minoan culture, there is the curious case of figurative wall paintings, which do not occur any earlier on Crete than they do in the Cyclades; and which given the rich pre-existing tradition in the Cyclades, could have originated there. We ought also to take into account the signs of mainland connectivity in LM IB: even when Crete is still supposedly dominant regionally, a number of sites seem to be receiving imports of Marine Style, a quintessential Cretan style, from the Greek mainland. So we should be careful about assuming too much directionality from Crete.

One of our four criteria that we have not yet discussed for this phase is tie *content*. I would argue that we are no longer just seeing economic exchange, but something more textured. We see pronounced mobility of many different kinds of artefacts and techniques, and some look as if they must be tied up with ritual. Miletus especially has a sanctuary area with pronounced Minoan influence, with altar platforms, plaster offering tables, and rhyta (Niemeier 2005; Raymond *et al.* 2016). The Xeste 3 frescoes at Akrotiri show what must surely be a ritual scene arranged around a lustral basin, a typically Minoan architectural feature with probable cult functions (Doulas 1992). We might also bring up the clear Minoan content in the riches of the Shaft Graves at Mycenae (Dickinson 1984). Indeed Joseph Maran has recently commented on the ‘wide array of Minoan religious paraphernalia’ in the Shaft Graves, and a ‘turn towards elements of Minoan religion at the very beginning of the Mycenaean period’ (Maran 2011: 289). Could it be that the Minoanization of this phase is in large part a religious phenomenon? That is not to say it was not also economic – as Kowalzig argues for the Mediterranean in the later, Archaic period, religion and maritime economic activity were tightly entangled (Kowalzig in prep). Religion would be one binding force that could stimulate multiple communities across a network to make the necessary investments in inter-regional ties to keep them strong. This then makes for intense interactions forming a dense network – or, in other words, the minimum definition of *globalization*. Minoanization may not span a particularly wide area, mostly confined to the Aegean, but its characteristics in this phase have all the hallmarks of globalization. If we were to explore further, using Sklair’s (2006) eight trends, then we would find that many of these also seem to apply quite well – such as standardization and unevenness, for example.

Phase 3: Late Bronze Age, c.1450–1200 BCE (LM II–III)

If we take the orthodox position that Minoanization spreads out from a Minoan core, then we have to imagine that Minoanization comes to a very abrupt end with the wave of destructions on Crete in LM IB that bring Minoan civilization to an end. However, the continuity of connectivity across the Aegean suggests that the network was not as centred on Crete as is often believed. We have already mentioned the imports of Marine Style from the Greek mainland occurring earlier, in the LM IB phase. Now we see the Greek mainland, from LM II onwards, really just picking up the same networks. Indeed, archaeologists working at Miletus have recently argued that this first Mycenaeanizing phase (Miletus V, LH IIIA) has much in common with the preceding Minoanizing phase (Raymond *et al.* 2016). It is not until the second Mycenaeanizing phase (Miletus VI, LH IIIB) that the situation changes radically, with much greater evidence for pervasive mainland influence. Indeed, the excavator of Bronze Age Miletus, Wolf-Dietrich Niemeier, believes that it signifies an actual presence of Mycenaean mainlanders, not least because of the Mycenaean burial customs (Niemeier 2005: 16). Mountjoy

(1998), however, sees acculturation rather than immigration, though both authors agree that this ‘Lower Interface’ area sees a great deal more evidence for Mycenaeanization than do areas of coastal Anatolia further north, the so-called ‘Upper Interface’ (see also Girella and Pavúk 2016). Returning south, Rhodes and Kos also see a lot of Mycenaean influence, with many Mycenaean-style chamber tombs on Rhodes (Niemeier 2005: 14), and all of the main features of Mycenaean identity present on Kos, with significant evidence for Mycenaean cultic objects and funerary rites (Vitale 2016). In the Cyclades, too, we see major changes in the material culture, with Minoan connections replaced largely by mainland Mycenaean ones. The east and west shrines at Phylakopi on Melos have clear connections with the Argolid, and Earle has used this and other evidence to suggest that cult practices were integral to Mycenaeanization in the Cyclades, much as they were with Minoanization too (Earle 2016).

Indeed, there is an argument to be made that Mycenaeanization has very similar network properties to Minoanization in these same areas of the Aegean where the latter was present – i.e. the Cyclades, the Dodecanese, and the ‘Lower Interface’ of coastal Anatolia. That is to say, possessing the same levels of tie strength and frequency, and similar content, according to the argument that religion was key to both. Of course, the directionality has changed, from Crete to the Greek mainland, but interestingly the network is robust to this change. But Mycenaeanization has another important feature that we have not yet addressed – its much wider reach. We have to now include parts of northern Greece (Kiriati and Andreou 2016); the eastern Mediterranean, notably Cyprus (van Wijngaarden 2002); as well as the central Mediterranean, especially southern Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia (Blake 2008). Mycenaean pottery is found both imported and locally imitated (depending on the period) in quite some quantities. However, we might suggest that these more far-flung connections are different to those we have described above: perhaps less frequent, less strong, with different directionalities (e.g. Crete more tied to the central Mediterranean than was the Argolid – see Kiriati and Andreou 2016), and probably different tie content too – arguably more economic than religious. In this respect, these wider network links are perhaps more like those of phase 1 for the Aegean, as described above.

What are we then to make of this ‘Mycenaeanization’ phase? Certainly, if we are to dub Minoanization an example of an early globalization, then Mycenaeanization, at least in the Aegean area, also qualifies. But should we also extend this to the wider east and central Mediterranean areas? Whereas in the Aegean I think one can certainly describe a dense network of intense interactions in this phase 3, it is debatable whether that description applies to the wider region. The wider space has more the character, arguably, of a ‘small world’, bound together by the strength of weak ties – and an economic rather than a religious phenomenon.

Conclusions

This brief look at the before, during and after of Minoanization, by comparing the frequency, strength, content and directionality of connectivities, shows both how useful globalization can be as an organizing principle, and how underdeveloped some of our thinking is about connectivities. Even just taking some parameters of networks is a useful start, without even venturing into more formal network analysis. One especially interesting question has surfaced through this exercise – what would motivate multiple communities to all invest in connections, thereby distributing the otherwise prohibitive costs of long-distance strong ties? With the material discussed here, it seems one of the most convincing answers is ‘religion’. Even though it is conceivable that in the case of Minoanization this religion is promoted from a centre (Knossos), its acceptance by other communities (if only in part) would suggest that it brought considerable benefit. Furthermore, we might note that if Minoan religion was polytheistic (see Gulizio and

Nakassis 2014), then it could have been adopted accretively rather than in an exclusionary fashion. If we think briefly about what happens later, it is only in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Bronze Age political systems that the entire Mediterranean basin becomes quite tightly connected for the first time, in a process of Mediterraneanization (Morris 2005). Broodbank (2013) has this happening as early as the tenth/ninth centuries, whereas Malkin pins it as an Archaic phenomenon. Either way, if we could assess it in terms of the parameters outlined above, we would get further towards interpreting it comparatively. This would be an interesting exercise, as Malkin calls it a ‘small world’, which by strict definitions should be composed of weak rather than strong ties over distance, whereas we have seen that a basic definition of globalization requires strong connections forming dense networks. Given the latter requirement, then it would indeed be interesting if it were religion that again helped to distribute the network cost of having long-distance strong ties, as inferred by Kowalzig for the Archaic period (Kowalzig in prep).

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Economic aspects of globalization in the past material world

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Introduction

Questions and deliberations concerning globalization are more than a hot topic of extended cross-disciplinary focus in academia; they also are central to long-simmering debates regarding policies and their implications that today often enter the public arena. For example, a quick perusal of broadly accessible media outlets from late 2013 and early 2014 reflects a suite of still unresolved but vibrant civic ponderings: ‘When did globalization start?’ (*The Economist* 2013), ‘The dark side of globalization: why Seattle’s 1999 protesters were right’ (Smith 2014), and ‘Have we reached the end of globalization?’ (CNN 2014). Yet can such issues really be evaluated judiciously without defining the critical elements of globalization, and then dissecting and assessing its historical scope? Given the broad temporal and spatial elements implied by the concept ‘globalization’, is it not most likely that the outcomes and effects of this multifaceted process would be highly variable across time and space? But through a diachronic and comparative examination of human connections over time, might we see some commonalities and learn relevant lessons?

This chapter aims to provide a multidisciplinary basis that contextualizes contemporary globalization by situating these modern processes in a deeper temporal context. The objective is not so much a broad-brush review of planetary history (McNeil 2008) but a discussion of the various ways that archaeologists, anthropologists, historians, and associated scholars have conceptualized macroscale networks and relations, and why an appreciation of this longer-term history can help us understand, evaluate, and provide comparative perspectives on these more contemporary developments. The remainder of this chapter proceeds first to define globalization in a manner that does not arbitrarily segregate the present from the past. Underpinned by its definition, the importance of the historical vantage on globalization becomes clear, and scholarly frames and debates concerning macroscale relations and processes are reviewed. The final section outlines questions, directions, and variables that could in part frame an explicitly cross-disciplinary agenda for unravelling the roots of globalization in the past material world and provide a firmer context in which to probe, measure, and assess the significance of recent changes in large-scale events and processes and their synergies with local and regional practices.

Globalization: definition and conceptual implications

Globalization is a challenging concept to define, one that can be fashioned in a multitude of ways (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann 2006). At its essence, it is the broadening, strengthening, and intensifying of global interconnectedness, a meaning that requires immediate refinement and elaboration (Faulconbridge and Beaverstock 2009: 331). Any specific perspective on globalization clearly refers to a process or, more precisely, a set of linked processes. The concept also involves, by definition, a clear engagement with (and sensitivity to) the temporal and the spatial, more precisely the ramifications and implications of compression in the relationship between time and space (Kearney 1995).

For the sake of clarity and explicitness, I adopt Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann's (2006: 5) broad definition of globalization as 'a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities'. Yet also essential is Kearney's (1995: 548) recognition that 'globalization refers to . . . processes that take place within nations but also transcend them, such that attention limited to local processes, identities, and units of analysis yields incomplete understanding of the local'. These perspectives underpin an analytical frame that has important implications for how globalization is conceived and researched; they also define challenges for the study of deep history (through archaeology and associated fields) while drawing a connection between them (see also Chase-Dunn 2000; Hall *et al.* 2011).

For those whose prime focus is truly restricted to relatively recent networks and connections that span the entire globe, there are rapidly expanding volumes of evidence that the roots of the component links (as well as the modes and mechanisms of connection) extend deep into the past. Such historical links and complexities have contributed to the total absence of consensus regarding when and how the present pan-planetary network became systemically connected (e.g. Wallerstein 1974; Pomeranz 2000; Goldstone 2002; O'Rourke and Williamson 2002). Although there is no question that new transport and communication technologies have greatly compressed the relationship between space and time in recent decades (Wallerstein 2000), our understanding of contemporary globalization cannot be enhanced by arbitrarily walling it off from the past (e.g. Sherratt 1995: 5; Sluyter 2010). Globalization is not a process that has a clearly delineated beginning and end (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann 2006: 3). Even today, there are peoples around the world who are barely or weakly tied in to global networks. We wonder how does this process begin, spread, intensify, end, and/or how is it resisted? And yet, history is awash with just such processes and their diverse, but still informative, outcomes (e.g. Carlson 2012).

The focus on such historical questions and debates opens key cross-disciplinary agendas that require vantages into the deeper past that only can be provided by historians, archaeologists, and other scholars who investigate these temporally distant realms. Yet at the same time, a concern with globalization (broadly defined) entails that researchers in the social and historical sciences engage with scale and spatial variation, concepts that too often have not been deftly handled by prior paradigmatic frames in these fields (e.g. Fletcher 1995; Blanton and Peregrine 1997; Bodley 2003).

From this perspective, and in accord with Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1976: 346) and many of those who have built upon his seminal works, global or world systems need not be strictly planetary or inclusive of the whole Earth. A limited focus on narrow time domains cannot answer questions concerning the roots of globalization or offer sufficient comparative context regarding how contemporary globalization differs from earlier macroscale networks. To provide such context, it is important to acknowledge that globalized 'worlds' may encompass

spatial domains smaller than the entire planet (e.g. Hodos 2010; Jennings 2011: 2–3). They are ‘inter-societal networks in which the interactions (e.g. trade, warfare, intermarriage, and flows of information) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes which occur in these local structures’ (Hall and Chase-Dunn 1996: 12–13; see also Chase-Dunn and Hall 1993: 854–56). To set an agenda that endeavours to examine and compare these macroscale worlds, we must first look back conceptually in order to chart ways to move forward.

Archaeological approaches to scale

Historically, a keen sensitivity to scale has not been an integral aspect of archaeological practice. During the early academic history of the discipline, culture history approaches dominated theoretically, regional-scale field procedures were mostly geared to find suitable sites to excavate, and concepts like the ‘type site’ held sway. In regard to spatial scale, archaeologists often excavated small sections of large sites and then extrapolated not merely to the site as a whole but frequently to characterizations of the entire culture or society (e.g. Haury 1982). Given the limited state of knowledge regarding the deep past in most regions at that time, perhaps there were few alternative ways for archaeological interpretation to proceed. Although the importance of broader-scale contacts through migration and diffusion were recognized (often depicted as arrows penetrating the orbs that represented cultural traditions), these modes of conveyance rarely were firmly underpinned by evidence, deeply dissected, or analysed in behavioural terms. The notion of self-contained, isolated communities retained appeal (Lesser 1961).

The advent and broadening application of settlement pattern approaches in archaeology during the mid-twentieth century (Parsons 1972; Kowalewski 2008) ushered in more regional-scale awareness in the discipline, which at mid-century coincided with the growing influence of developmentalist thought across the social sciences (Wallerstein 1976). The latter frame provided the foundation for early processual archaeology, with its focus on societies and regions (and their components) as the primary units of investigation and analysis (e.g. Binford 1965). This mid-century theoretical shift brought much more in-depth consideration to regional and intra-societal variation in the past, so that it became interpretively less valid to extrapolate blithely from a small sector of a single site or a handful of artefacts to an entire culture, region, or society. Yet at the same time, macroscale processes and phenomena generally were diminished in interpretive importance as societies and regions were envisioned as tightly bounded, and change was presumed to have had almost entirely local triggers (e.g. Sanderson 1991: 187; Webster 1994: 419). The assumption that societal change results principally from endogenous factors was shared broadly by theoretical frames as diverse as cultural ecology, neofunctionalism, and cultural materialism, among others.

By the last decades of the twentieth century, the increasing prominence of regional archaeological settlement pattern surveys in many regions (e.g. the Mediterranean: Renfrew 2003; the Americas and beyond: Sabloff and Ashmore 2001) in conjunction with the greater attention given to macroscale history (e.g. Braudel 1972; Wallerstein 1974; Wolf 1982) broadened the attention and awareness to supraregional processes in archaeological analysis and interpretation (e.g. Peregrine and Feinman 1996; Kardulias 1999; Kowalewski 2004; Balkansky 2006). For the most part, these efforts are explicitly multiscale in focus, and so they do not privilege the ‘macro’ at the expense of the ‘nano’. They do, however, endeavour to probe and understand the interplays and relations between the different levels of human interactivity from the domestic to the macroregional.

Many of the first explicit attempts to grapple systematically with macroscale phenomena in the deep past aimed to broaden the narrow confines of Wallerstein’s (1974) proposed frame,

which he outlined to probe the emergence of European capitalism. Modifications were proposed concerning the initial presumption that precious goods did not have systemic significance, the rigid notion that macroscale networks must have definable cores and peripheries, the assumption that broad-scale processes do not have significant impacts in worlds composed of smaller-scale polities, and the Eurocentric focus and timing of the original analysis (e.g. Schneider 1977; Kohl 1978; Blanton and Feinman 1984; Abu-Lughod 1989; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1993).

The subsequent debates and expansions of Wallerstein's seminal conceptual frame not only established a basis for comparative perspectives on macroscale relations, but provoked fruitful challenges to long-standing suppositions that all ancient or 'primitive' economies were qualitatively different from modern ones (e.g. Smith 2004; Feinman and Garraty 2010). Just as these once-fashionable categorical divisions are eroding with the accumulation of evidence, so too are the notions that draw artificial thresholds between the ever-narrowing sections of present and what came before (Blanton and Fargher 2008). While changes and differences over time are evident, and specific questions may always be examined from narrow temporal foci, broad issues concerning changes in human networks and socioeconomic connectivity are most effectively and comparatively addressed and contextualized from broad historical frames (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).

An explicit multiscale vantage also provides prospective avenues to address the so-called 'micro-macro problem' (e.g. Schelling 1978; Hedström and Swedberg 1996), which to date remains largely unresolved in the context of archaeological theorizing that often experiences swings and debates between unfettered description and narrative at one pole and efforts to explain only commonalities (in lieu of diversity and variation) at the other. The ways out of this long-standing predicament require explicitly multiscale approaches that probe and account for human agency at smaller scales and then integrate and project those considerations into the empirical analysis at broader scales. At a more case-specific level, recent multiscale approaches to broad time-space analyses, freed from the presumed structures and conceptual rigidities of earlier frames, have made major contributions to our understanding of key episodes of historical variation and change (e.g. pre-Hispanic US Southwest: Mills *et al.* 2013; prehistoric Aegean: Parkinson and Galaty 2009; Postclassic Mesoamerica: Smith and Berdan 2003).

The empirical case for a globalizing perspective on the past

There is no consensus concerning the chronological domain appropriate for the examination of globalization (Robinson 2007). For some investigators, reasonable time-depth is no more than decades, coincident with perceived rapid recent advances in the technology of money transfer and communication (e.g. Sklair 1999). Other scholarly constituencies traditionally draw the threshold to around AD 1450–1500, timed with the shift in planetary wealth and power toward the West (e.g. Wallerstein 1974). A third suite of scholars with a greater appreciation of historical processes expands their analytical vantages by millennia, back to the advent of urbanization and early states (e.g. Frank and Gills 1992). For them, significant macroscale processes need be associated with the emergence of hierarchies and inequalities. All of these investigators share a view of non-urban societies as spatially localized, relatively static, and tightly bounded, with few significant linkages that extend beyond those limits. Whether in specific reference to Wallerstein's (1984) 'minisystems' or the bounded cultural units at the focus of cultural historical and traditional neoevolutionary approaches in anthropology, it is frequently further assumed that the societal limits of these entities were culturally, economically, and politically coterminous.

A fourth perspective adopts even longer-term temporal vantage (e.g. Chase-Dunn and Hall 1993, 1997; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Galaty 2011; Hall *et al.* 2011), recognizing that

the boundaries of human groupings were often more fluid and contested than often presumed (Wolf 1982; Lightfoot and Martinez 1995; Terrell *et al.* 1997; Burch 2005; Smith 2005, 2007), and that significant macroscale connections need not necessarily imply either hierarchical differentiation or economic inequality manifest through strict spatial demarcations between cores and peripheries (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1993, 1997; Galaty 2011: 10–11). In fact, key units in macroscale networks, past and present, may be smaller and less spatially delimited than nations or physiographic regions (Leach 1954; Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Burch 2005). Empirically, the notion of small-scale, closed, human networks also is challenged by recent genetic and linguistic findings, which illustrate that significant interaction and regular movement across continental scales is fundamental to the human career (Tishkoff and Kidd 2004; Pagel *et al.* 2013). Contemporary expressions of human diversity rely much more heavily on descriptors, such as ‘clines’ and ‘networks’, rather than ‘races’, ‘isolates’, and ‘impermeable barriers’.

Long-distance trade connections that crossed cultural boundaries are well documented back to the Upper Paleolithic (Bar-Yosef 2002), with potential effects on human survival, well-being, and the mitigation of risks. Over human history a diverse range of non-local materials, beyond bulk items and staple goods, have been critical for the reproduction of social and power relations (e.g. Schneider 1977; Smith and Berdan 2003) in many different contexts. Ebbs and flows in long-distance economic networks have critically and repeatedly underpinned the emergence, resilience, and collapse of extant power structures as well as urban and market networks (e.g. Curtain 1984; Chadhuri 1985; Abu-Lughod 1989; Smith and Berdan 2003). The transformative impact of trade and exchange on sociopolitical relations, economic actions, and individual values and needs may be intense, and across history, participation in interregional networks has promoted major technological and structural transitions in society (Adams 1974: 244).

Even in preindustrial contexts, the suite of widely exchanged exotic goods was not restricted to rare preciosities that were narrowly confined to those of the highest status. In certain settings, bulk luxury goods (salt, cotton cloth, obsidian, and cacao in Mesoamerica: Blanton and Fargher 2012; salt in Mesoamerica: Kepecs 2003: 130) often were broadly distributed across status lines, even though costly. Such valued exotics, traded in quantity frequently, have served key roles in household reproduction, through rites including, but not limited to, feasts, weddings, and mortuary rituals (e.g. sugar in the European Industrial period: Mintz 1985; basic ornaments, certain pottery vessels, marine shells in Early Historic India: Smith 1999).

Although careers of research remain to be done to document to what degree and how broad-scale processes are refracted through local and regional structures and institutions in different global contexts, the increasing observations of cross-cultural synchronicities in the rises and falls of polities over space are a significant step. Such macroscale cycling has been noted in networks of middle-scale societies in the prehistoric US (Anderson 1994; Neitzel 1999) as well as for polities and networks at grander scales (East and West Asia: Chase-Dunn *et al.* 2000; Bronze Age Europe: Kristiansen 1998; ancient Mediterranean: Sherratt 1993; Postclassic Mesoamerica: Smith and Berdan 2003; Afroeurasia: Turchin and Hall 2003; Roman to Early Modern Europe: Turchin and Nefedov 2009). Of course, the specific regional and local consequences of these synchronous oscillations are expectedly neither uniform nor simple (e.g. Kowalewski 2000; Parkinson and Galaty 2007) and certainly can result in cultural divergences and/or the diffusion or transference of ideas and innovations (Hodos 2010). In different contexts, inter-societal interaction can result in both ‘spread effects’, the transference of information and wealth, as well as ‘backwash effects’, which leads to increasing differentiation and the precipitation of further underdevelopment (Myrdal 1971; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 38–39). Furthermore, the flows of people, material, and information need not be unidirectional (Stein 2002). In all instances, documentation of spatial coincidences is only one key step, and the causal connections must be affirmed.

From a wide range of empirical and conceptual perspectives, it has become evident that human connectivity across broad spatial domains has a deep history and that these links seem often to have systemic properties, in the sense that their local and regional consequences can be significant, and that local and regional processes can ramify (in various ways) across broader scales (Hall *et al.* 2011: 264–65). Furthermore, while the modes, logistics, and intensities of these broad-scale linkages were unquestionably highly variable over time and space, it has repeatedly proven unsuccessful to draw hard-and-fast thresholds qualitatively demarcating precise dates when new logics and interconnections emerged. Even long-held notions regarding widespread price convergences and other economic properties in comparatively recent European market systems have been shown to extend deeper into the past with more time–space parallels than previously assumed (Keller and Shiue 2007; Rönnbäck 2009; Bateman 2011). Stark dichotomies drawn in regard to markets, economic behaviours, and more between current Western peoples and all others, which have framed academic debates for centuries, no longer rest on solid empirical ground (e.g. Lie 1997; McCloskey 1997; Goody 2006; Feinman and Garraty 2010). A slew of potential insights regarding the history of globalization are still to be gained from analytical frames that realize chronological depth, comparative contexts, and interdisciplinary dialogues.

Agendas to assess shifting human networks and globalization over time

Although the foundations of a systematic, and behaviourally focused, macroscale framework were introduced to archaeological practice through Wallerstein's conceptual scheme, a generation of scholarship has greatly expanded the approach and hence widened its applicability (e.g. Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). The historical investigation of globalizing processes must be explicitly multiscale, interweaving streams of change through the actions of different agents residing at dispersed locales. Furthermore, contemporary approaches should be less rigid regarding the nature of participating entities and agents, while accepting that meaningful transfers can include much more than staple goods and occur through diverse modes of intercultural transaction. In part, these theoretical expansions require the integration of more bottom-up conceptualization with the predominant top-down vantages adopted by most explicit world-systems approaches (Kowalewski 1996: 33).

Just as earlier archaeological initiatives to theorize at macro- and multiple scales were sustained and fostered by new methods and procedures, including systematic archaeological settlement pattern fieldwork, computerized technologies to handle big data, and new field mapping technologies (such as global positioning devices and laser transits), future investigations of globalization can build productively on new sourcing technologies that hold the potential to characterize quantitatively the long-distance movements of materials (Golitzko *et al.* 2012), as well as theoretical advances in the analysis of social networks (Mills *et al.* 2013) and new aerial technologies that bring new macroscale vantages to environmental contexts that are less open to pedestrian coverage (Chase *et al.* 2012). Archaeologists must continue to expand their diachronic settlement pattern analyses into ancient margins and frontiers (e.g. highland Oaxaca: Feinman and Nicholas 1999; Albania: Schon and Galaty 2006), while adapting these regional-scale procedures to areas not previously investigated (e.g. preindustrial Cambodia: Evans *et al.* 2007; Qin Dynasty, China: Feinman *et al.* 2010). Collectively, such efforts expand the corpus of potentially comparative settings as well as the tools and evidential pieces to employ in historical explorations of human connectivities, yet, at the same time, the broadening and refinement of the intellectual enterprise also is in order.

Geographers long have compared the use of formal and nodal approaches to define spatial units (Haggett 1966: 241–53). The former are defined by similarities or homogeneity in certain specified characteristics, while the latter reflect patterns of interaction. Based on conceptual as well as empirical grounds, archaeologists are now in a position to elevate consideration of the latter through the examination of actual flows of material and even people (e.g. Tiwanaku: Knudson *et al.* 2004; Spanish Florida: Stojanowski 2005). The formal/nodal distinction has never been an either/or proposition; juxtaposing these perspectives, however, not only provides a bottom-up vantage but lends itself to multiscale analyses in which individual participation in nested groupings from households to residential clusters, neighbourhoods, and communities (all less encompassing than nations or societies) can be assessed quantitatively. Furthermore, the ability to measure actual flows and patterns of interaction permits the decoupling of future archaeological analyses from a tenet, long held since the days that culture area thought predominated (Wissler 1927), that the homogeneity of cultural characteristics adequately defines meaningful societal units.

The ability to chart network links and flows permits the examination of boundary variables (Blanton *et al.* 1993: 18; Blanton and Peregrine 1997: 6) that are critical to multiscale historical investigation, but rarely are ascertained empirically. Archaeologists are gaining the capacities to assess how and where the flows of material goods fall off, and how these volumes and patterns of flow shift across time (Brughmans 2013). Such examinations are crucial not only for defining the nature of units in macroscale networks, but also for evaluating the relative permeability at the margins of such aggregates. The relative openness and stability of political boundaries has been linked to the scale and complexity of polities (Oaxaca: Kowalewski *et al.* 1983) and the nature of the interactions between rival competitors (Aztec empire: Berdan 2003), but the control of flows across boundaries also can be a critical element that affects how power is funded and how political affiliations are organized (e.g. Levi 1988; Blanton and Fargher 2008: 254).

At the same time, the disentanglement of macroscale analysis from presuppositions regarding the existence and placement of cores, peripheries, and frontiers does not nullify that the processes of globalization generally are, and frequently have been, interwoven with inequalities of wealth, disparities in accumulation, imbalances of power, disparate demographic densities, and assessments of how these elements of macroscale networks shift over time (Kentor 2001). Rather than through assumption, these dimensions can now, at least for some regions, be measured, allowing shifting patterns of connectivity to be defined empirically. To look forward, such analyses can and should be employed to supplement ongoing smaller-scale studies that focus down on the outcomes of globalization, phenomena such as diaspora, inter-ethnic interaction, and transnationalism, to provide greater spatial context as well as comparative depth (e.g. networks: Collar 2013; world-systems analysis: Galaty 2011; trade systems: Oka and Kusimba 2008).

Pulsations in macroscale flows frequently have important local impacts, but such oscillations are not entirely unique to contemporary timescales (Chase-Dunn and Jorgenson 2003: 8). Just as the careful investigation of globalization demands consideration of multiple analytical scales, so too will it profit from wider and flexible temporal vantages. When examined from different chronological foci, some trends that at first appear linear, even inevitable, may reveal less regular patterns of change (e.g. Feinman 1998: 97–104).

Reframing globalization: a multiscale, deep time, and networked approach

As noted at the start, the intellectual bounds of globalization research are defined in a multitude of ways. Many prefer only a narrow and purely planetary scope, with only opportunities for relatively brief (at least for an archaeologist) cross-temporal comparisons. Others focus mainly

at local scales, charting the effects of perceived external forces. In this chapter, I have advocated for a multiscale and deep time perspective on the long history of human connections and how those connections have synergistically reverberated at household, local, and regional scales. Furthermore, I have suggested that after a generation of scholarship, it is past time to look beyond Wallerstein's (1974, 1980) initial world-systems constructs and to recognize that the current toolbox of world-systems approaches, freed of many of the initial conceptual rigidities, has much to offer the investigation of the history of global connectivities. At the same time, sharpened techniques, especially network analyses and an array of technologies that allow flows to be measured, along with new streams of research that directly probe the complex relations between interaction and identity, provide new ways to amplify that paradigmatic toolkit and the questions that we endeavour to probe with it.

Such an agenda is undoubtedly ambitious. To tackle it requires not only the breaching of long-held barriers and building communication bridges between an array of academic disciplines, but also the crashing of generally more impermeable intellectual divides that have been impediments to holistic considerations of the present with the past, the recent West from the global rest, and so-called primitive versus modern economic systems. It requires the interweaving of institutions and structures with a consideration of agents (both subaltern and elite), and the examination of the material from alternative lenses of economic practice, power, and identity. Although the intellectual path that I prefer is clearly steep, the principal alternatives doom us to approaches that isolate the analysis of the contemporary era (from the rest of history) because of its presumed uniqueness. Yet, as McNeil (2008: 9) has recognized:

All ages are unique; each moment and every person is unique. So is each atom and sub-atomic particle for that matter. But continuities and commonalities also prevail, and recognizing them is what historians and scientists focus on when trying to understand the ever-changing world.

When addressing the broad public concerns as well as serious academic queries regarding recent globalization, its historical roots, and web of effects, will we not ultimately build a much stronger foundation if we adopt perspectives grounded in rich contexts, deep histories, and broad comparisons rather than paeans to the perceived exceptionality of our times?

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Globalization thinking and the past

Robbie Robertson

Introduction

Because so much of how we read the past is conditioned by ideas and descriptions that grew out of that past, globalization thinking potentially provides us with fresh opportunities to re-examine history through new lenses and discover detail and trends previously obscured. However, globalization has itself succumbed to similar tendencies. Indeed, part of the difficulty in understanding globalization lies in the way the term has been captured by vested interests (for example free marketers and anti-capitalists) with their own take on globalization as a form of economic practice that promises or threatens world integration. Additionally, the term is used as shorthand for defining features of contemporary society, such as the speeding up of spatial and temporal processes of change, the onset of cultural homogenization, interdependency, or the withering of the nation-state. Notions of archaic, proto and modern globalization are also confusing, with the former being both precursors of modernity and indicators of globalization's universality. Together, they suggest continuity. Yet for others, ownership is something that can neither be traced back in time nor shared. Globalization is simply Westernization and it brought to the world the shock of modernity (see Latouche 1996; Bauman 1998; Scholte 2005; Hopkins 2002).

There are elements of truth in all these understandings, but by themselves they do little to explain globalization or contextualize it, especially within the contours of social development, which is usually the elephant in the room whenever globalization is discussed. Let us begin with a very simple definition: globalization is a form of connectivity. The form, of course, is very important. We are not talking about just any type of connectivity but connectivity that envelops the world. The distinction is important. The Romans were particularly adept at drawing diverse peoples into their Mediterranean-based empire, yet their domain remained a mostly disconnected microcosm or set of microcosms of a much larger entity. It never had the potential to envelop the global world, despite pursuing strategies similar to many later used by states and organizations to globalize their own activities, and despite sharing features associated with expanding networks and growing interconnectivity.

It is in those similarities where confusion often lies. Many writers acknowledge that the notion of globalization as integration is a chimera, that complex connectivity resources anchored localities with new freedoms, experiences and networks, although not equally or simultaneously

(Ghemawat 2011: 16; Tomlinson 1999: 97, 276). The result is not homogeneity but diverse complex and reflexive interactions. Thus it was in the past also. As Bryan Miller and Ursula Brosseder's contribution in this volume on the Xiongnu acknowledges, growing connectivity with China did not so much expand the Chinese world as feed changes that were driven and maintained locally by the Xiongnu. Parallels exist also during the more recent period of imperialism. Local Pacific island elites often encouraged Britain's imperial expansion as a way of gaining access to new resources to maintain dominance within their own societies and over neighbours or rivals. Local agency should never be forgotten. Connectivity had similar diverse impacts on past Mediterranean, West, South, East and Southeast Asian societies; it is one reason why historian Ian Morris's social development cores continually shift over time (Morris 2010: 31). In this sense, the globalization framework has great value for historians and archaeologists as a way of moving beyond the superficialities of imagined homogeneous and hegemonic cultures and civilizations. Globalization as connectivity always presents us with diverse complex and reflexive interactions, even when applied to past subglobal contexts that lack the technological drivers common today.

Keeping the definition of globalization simple has an immediate advantage; it enables us to humanize the process. Globalization is a consequence of human actions, in particular of survival and wellbeing strategies (Sanderson 1995: 11–13). Before looking at those strategies, it is worth exploring briefly the social contexts in which they played out. Humans live within groups and cooperate for mutual advantage. More complex, populous societies increase opportunities for cooperation between individuals (Wright 2000: 1, 264); they broaden circles of cooperation (Ghemawat 2011: xi). While this undoubtedly creates its own dilemmas, especially when cooperation extends beyond people we are familiar with, it also creates empowering opportunities for new specializations and imitating activities that are seen as bestowing status and wellbeing on individuals or groups (Ridley 1996: 37–50). Such change is never achieved easily and, without the necessary resources, might never occur at all. Connectivity, then, is the price humans pay to access resources that satisfy their desire for status and wellbeing (see also Snooks 1997: 125–29). Its consequences are always unpredictable. Hence Felipe Fernández-Armesto's description of history as random mutations with enduring impacts (such as evolution: Fernández-Armesto 2009: 312).

In Pankaj Ghemawat's World 0.0 of hunter-gatherers, resource access was severely limited. Without technology or institutional frameworks, connectivity could rarely be sustained over substantial distances or at least generate the transformative characteristics associated with globalization. This limitation diminished with the emergence of an agricultural World 1.0 that made possible population increases and urbanization. It gradually transformed human lives (Ghemawat 2011: 5–9). Morris describes this as an outcome of caging, forcing people to organize and innovate to survive, and to incorporate rather than destroy erstwhile enemies (Morris 2014: 78–80). By becoming part of something bigger, societies grew in sophistication. They learned from each other to reduce their own fragility. They specialized to raise productivity. They developed new military technologies to better enable survival and prosperity. And, despite the risks, increasingly they traded with neighbours to obtain what they could not produce themselves. All this, as *The Economist* recently noted, 'starts to sound rather like "globalisation", even if it [is] more limited in geographical area than what most people think of the term today' (*The Economist* 2013). But like hunters and gatherers, agriculturalists possessed no innate global consciousness. People still lived very local, parochial lives and feared the outsider, usually for good reason. Success not only attracted imitators but also conquerors and raiders keen on loot to reward their followers and sustain their own ways of life. Across the steppes of Eurasia no shortage of such candidates existed.

Consequently, how people handled connectivity and managed relations with other communities mattered more than ever, since the stakes were always increasingly higher. Furthermore, in progressively stratified societies, leadership also assumed a qualitative importance that often outweighed the capacity of societies to provide it. Climate change, agriculture and population growth transformed human landscapes, sometimes with disastrous consequences. Desiccation begat warlords who used military campaigns to plunder and create vast tribute empires that for centuries became Eurasia's default political organization (Darwin 2008: 491; Griffith 2001; Morris 2010), spawning new forms of connectivity and insecurity. Connectivity, then, has always been a feature of human communities and a central motor for change, not always for the better. Only during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did connectivity begin to assume global proportions and envelop the world. However, this did not change the imperial and exclusionary character of much subsequent connectivity, despite the growing ascendancy of commerce and technology as growth engines; nor its unsustainability. Any connectivity process that increases human interactions ultimately makes the wellbeing of one community dependent on the wellbeing of others. Exclusion denies that opportunity. It shrinks the markets required to stimulate innovation, and disempowers the people who would constitute those markets. In short, it brings forward the culminating point of success.

If the path to globalization has been far from singular, then its consequences have also been similarly varied. Free trade as a principle for global connectivity might seem a natural outcome, yet it has enjoyed limited acceptance, in part because its short-term consequences constantly trump its long-term promises. Today, smaller countries and technological leaders benefit most from free trade, while larger, less-trade-dependent countries employ protectionist strategies to minimize its impact (Bernstein 2009: 375). Globalization has not removed that dynamic. Nor has it undermined the principal logic behind trade that it thrives on difference. To assert, as some writers do, that 'globalization is nothing more nor less than the intercontinental convergence of commodity and factor prices' (de Vries 2010: 714) is to define globalization solely by one outcome. Integration as a definition of globalization produces similar difficulties.

Globalization describes the ultimately world-encompassing outcomes of human connectivity that on smaller local and regional scales has epitomized human societies for millennia. Ever since humans globalized themselves during the last 100,000 years, opportunities to directly or indirectly reconnect and exchange plants, animals, minerals, writing, ideas, and manufactures have steadily increased with growing technological and governance capacities, urbanization, education, and, especially, wealth. Such opportunities have been affected by the strategies employed for human survival and wellbeing, namely migration, conquest, commerce, and technology. In each strategy, or mix of strategies, mimicry is often the basis for human decision-making. We copy what we believe will bring material success, and we employ the mix of strategies available to us to achieve that goal (Snooks 1997: 45). But only the technological strategy has – to date – enabled societies to generate linear economic growth, not just the short-term windfall profits that were usually the motivation for conquest and commercial strategies. Since this technological difference has become apparent only in the last 200 years, many regard globalization as a contemporary affair. This also is a misreading of history. Technological change grew out of globalization, in particular the social changes it wrought and, as Yuval Harari argues, the ignorance of the world it made manifest (Harari 2014: 249–52). The outcomes these changes generated have never been even in application, nor inevitable, let alone just. Connectivity produces constantly changing gradients of winners and losers; globalization does not change that consequence. Both have always been deeply subversive of the status quo and vested interests, in part because commerce and technology-driven strategies require a wider ownership of resources for success. This has never been achieved easily.

For much of human history the impact of connectivity remained overwhelmingly local or, at most, regional. It is from those expanding regional connections that we derive our contemporary misunderstanding of societies as culturally defined, hermetically sealed, homogenous civilizations (Cannadine 2014: 246). We acknowledge expanding Afro-Eurasian civilizations centred on the Tigris and Euphrates, Nile, Indus, and Yangzi and Huang He rivers, even though none – with the exception of the more distant Chinese – were disconnected from each other in their early manifestations. Too often, though, connectivity is regarded as heralding civilizational identities and conflict (Cannadine 2014: 250). Indeed, Morris sees regional expansion and connections as producing a similar outcome to globalization: ‘Mediterraneanization drove up Roman social development’, just as Sinicization drove East Asian development and premodern globalization drove Western social development (Morris 2013: 252). As noted earlier, we should be wary of viewing interconnectivity as the harbinger of monolithic cultural groupings. Rather, we should acknowledge that engagement produced many features familiar to globalization today: lost diversity, new forms of difference, environmental degradation, expanding political, economic and social units, and, especially, the gradual development of synergies with ever wider impacts (Robertson 2003: 7). Hence the resulting domains are instantly recognizable in terms of their multiple networks and institutional feel. Take, for example, commercial Classical Athens and other Mediterranean and West Asian cities (Keane 2009: 101–28), where decentralized authority produced features we recognize within our own democracies because they derive from strategic similarity. Or fifteenth-century English: an Indo-European language, developed from the patois of Germanic immigrants, fused with Latin and French, using Phoenician letters and Indian numbers, and printed in books produced by moveable type invented in China. It is both a salutary reminder that no human group ever creates by itself more than a small part of its heritage (Holton 1998: 27–28) and that globalization always involves diverse complex and reflexive interactions, not homogeneity.

Thus archaeologists like Tamar Hodos and Justin Jennings (this volume) claim that such similarities justify the use of the term globalization to describe past processes of interconnectivity and their consequences. This in itself is unproblematic as long as differences between regional or interregional connectivity and global connectivity are acknowledged. In most instances, early communities had neither the capacity nor the knowledge to go far beyond their immediate zones of interaction. Yet these direct and indirect engagement zones did increase, although not progressively. It would take until the end of the fifteenth century CE before the Americas began to be humanly connected with Afro-Eurasia, both the home and migration site for the bulk of humanity, and the impact of global connectivity began to be felt on a scale hitherto unimaginable. Certainly, there were many earlier examples of long-distance exchanges with regard to foods, goods, scholarship, religion and disease, but until the sixteenth century their impact tended to be more regional or transregional than global and – with the exception of microbial transfer – bore few of the global consequences that the Columbian Exchange had on the availability of food. Scale is important, as is the extraterritorial character of exchange. Harari argues that Western Europe’s discovery of the Americas eventually created a global vision that could not have been generated by pursuing Eurasian transregional linkages alone (Harari 2014: 288).

It is no coincidence that this dramatic transformation in human food resources preceded the equally dramatic late eighteenth-century transformation in human technological capabilities we call the Industrial Revolution, but which might equally be termed an energy revolution. It and subsequent revolutions were unintended consequences of the globalization of human connectivity; the societies that benefited most were those most able to transform themselves – knowingly or otherwise – and ride the wave of change. There was nothing inevitable, cultural,

or civilizational about these transformations, however. If anything, they reinforce the idea of complex and reflexive interactions.

Innovation and invention are never easy, and throughout human history few accidental discoveries are replicated independently. Instead, utility ensures rapid replication, but the most important ingredient is connectivity. Writing is a classic example, but so too is industrialization. As a result, many historians argue that the highly competitive and connected societies that emerged along the European subcontinent's Atlantic shores were more disposed to grasp opportunities when they arose than the larger continentally fixated Asian empires, or the sparsely populated, poorly connected African kingdoms (Ferguson 2011; Landes 1998). But this, too, is a misreading of the past and more particularly of the nature of globalization.

Such 'European' competitive advantage should not be understood as a Western triumph, a demonstration of Western superiority and civilization. To understand globalization we need to suspend the values and judgements inherent in preceding eras that still linger fitfully in the wake of humanity's great transformation. These include values and judgements derived from the sense of Western triumph that accompanied the early lead of a small number of European countries deemed to be historically and culturally linked: the Atlantic seaboard countries and, later, their settler colonies.

This interpretation of change transposes proximity for civilization and introduces an element of competition where none existed. Thus Western civilization triumphed over Eastern (and Islamic) civilizations, creating by the eighteenth century what is known as the Great Divergence. This is not to suggest that divergence did not occur, but rather to question the parameters used, much as Alexander Geurds questions the cultural divisions usually assigned to the Americas (this volume). It is better to discard cultural cluster notions across the continents in favour of diffused unity continuums. There was no Western triumph, although it is easy to understand why late nineteenth-century Europeans might have held such an assumption as they gazed over their global empires. Instead, the story is more prosaic.

Historians especially have been slow to disengage themselves from old perspectives. Many still privilege Western initiatives as the motor for global change over the past 500 years, not because they continue to hold the racial or cultural views of their forebears but because the notion of Westernization has become so ingrained in modern cultures. In former colonies students were taught that Europe was the sole cradle of modernity, that familiarity with the West was a precondition for understanding history, and that their histories would replicate a similar national focus (Sachsenmaier 2011: 15, 19–21). Hence any attempt by colonial subjects to acquire knowledge from Western power centres was and still is interpreted as Westernization rather than the age-old desire of humans to emulate success and strength. Hodos reminds us that the Hellenization of the Mediterranean is similarly misunderstood (Hodos 2010). Western Civilization has also been a popular subject in American academia until recently, and notions of a distinctive West in contemporary discourses on the rise of China and India constantly remind readers of its fading superiority.

Understanding change has been made more difficult also because historians have long shunned the big picture. In the nineteenth century, nation-states captured their attention and since that experiment delivered global tragedy in the early twentieth century, many have been drawn instead to the detail of diversity (gender and ethnic studies) or simply the detail itself (foods, technologies, ideas), believing, perhaps, that 'the secret of the forest is in the trees' (Nairn 1981: 332).

Universities, where many historical studies are generated, are themselves mostly creatures of their nation-states; few are global in staffing or curriculum. Additionally, the growth of discipline specificity has increasingly isolated academics from each other. This has left academia unprepared for the global turn; any locally based, nationally oriented individual trying to cope

with the multidisciplinary complexity of the world's many parts faces difficulties, lacking the necessary knowledge and insights into other languages, cultures, and regions (Sachsenmaier 2011: 238). Developing a global perspective and framework is never going to be easy (Gills and Thompson 2006: 4). Indeed, finding new ways of looking at the world – not recycling the old – is the grand contemporary challenge (Ghemawat 2011: 4).

Seeing the world for what it is, 'a sphere spinning in space' and all people as humankind (Held *et al.* 1999: 369), is a useful starting point. As Andre Gunder Frank once warned, if you look only under the European street light you won't see much beyond Europe (Frank 1998: 48). But the task is formidable when many of our descriptions or thinking of the world remain frozen in a time warp. We talk of the Middle East instead of West Asia, or of Europe as a continent in its own right, rather than a subcontinent of Eurasia, or, more correctly, Afro-Eurasia or Afro-Asia. Such confusion allows us also to present Europe as an integrated whole, which it has never been. Unfortunately, Niall Ferguson is not alone in arguing that 'The first version of the West – Western Civilization 1.0 – arose in the so-called Fertile Crescent . . . and reached twin peaks with Athenian democracy and the Roman Empire', which he calls the ancient West (Ferguson 2011: 17). Even Ian Morris's path-breaking study of Eurasia pursues this line, largely by ignoring South Asia and its linkages with both West and East Asia (Morris 2010, but less so in 2014). The culture of classical antiquity (let alone Mesopotamia) or its impact was never solely European. Rather, it was the product of large-scale interactions across Eurasia, with consequences experienced widely; Keane has argued that the Greeks would not have become Greeks without contact with people to the east and points out that Athens as democracy's birthplace was a nineteenth-century invention (Keane 2009: 101–55). Thus, the achievements of one community were quickly indigenized, and became the traditions of others, which might never have happened had Europe not been part of the Afro-Eurasian land mass (Langdon 1999: 204). Even Europe's Renaissance 'rediscovery' of its classical roots was the product of cross-fertilization between Islam and the West. It was also 'an accentuation of uninterrupted Western self modelling on ancient Greece and Rome' (Fernández-Armesto 2009: 122, 317) by elites who downplayed Europe's migrant roots (Darwin 2008: 31).

It has been commonplace to think of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment as uniquely European transitions that set it on the dynamic path to modernity. But aspects of these important transitions found independent expression elsewhere across Eurasia; especially in commercially expansive Song China, which experienced its own Renaissance several centuries earlier and first pushed Eastern social development ahead of the West (Morris 2010: 417–26). Anti-institutional stances similar to Protestantism also occurred within Islam (Fernández-Armesto 2009: 272). The European transitions did not always herald new ways of thinking about science or capitalism not already practiced across much of Asia or transform Europe's growth trajectory prior to the nineteenth century. Even the more recent Enlightenment thinking was something of a chimera, conceived of very differently among the educated elites who promoted it. In France, it justified enlightened despotism and submission to the 'general will'; in the US, freedom with slavery and Amerindian suppression; and in Eastern Europe, continuing serfdom. Only a century or more later did it intellectually morph into *the* cohesive Enlightenment movement we acknowledge (Himmelfarb 2004). What is often missing in analyses of these transitions is their alignment with periods of strategic commercial success. At different times some European states – like the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks, Indians, and Chinese before them – were able to profit from eastern Mediterranean trade or use the wealth generated from new Asian and American commerce to remake their societies. The result was always a great burst of intellectual creativity and social development, which enabled trade to demonstrate its viability as an alternative to conquest (Snooks 1997: 264–65).

It is odd that so many features used to justify Europe's uniqueness and dynamism should prove so lacking in coherence or direct application. Many historians make much of the contrast between Europe's geographically fragmented polities, which drove competition, military prowess, and state efficiency, and the monolithic conformist East Asian empires with unstable borders to defend (Ferguson 2011: 33–41). But fragmentation does not explain Europe's nineteenth-century transformation. Nor does it sit well with the idea of a singular Europe or Western model that empowered the world (Sachsenmaier 2011: 157). Spain and Portugal, the supposed forerunners of European modernity, remained feudal states, impoverished and bankrupted by their courts' ambitions and extravagances. Religious strife and civil war similarly tempered England as an economic success model until the late seventeenth century. Only small and industrious Holland – sometimes presented as the first modern state (Taylor 1996) – seemed to break the mould. Europe was never a single entity or, in and of itself, the harbinger of modernity. Its societies were as regressive, reactive, culturally introverted and insensitive as any (Darwin 2008: 200). It did not collectively own or control modernity; globalization was never a Western project.

So what happened to dramatically transform the world? Let us return to the notion of connectivity we started with. Ghemawat has argued that distance is important in shaping relationships and that connectivity does not equate with convergence (Ghemawat 2011: 315, 40). The closer we are to people the stronger the relationship and cross-fertilization possible. Clearly, connectivity and its impacts will always be stronger where distances are smaller. This explains partly why neighbouring regions appear to have much in common and widely separate regions do not. Throughout much of human history interconnectivity did not directly involve large distances. Even where it did, traders rarely travelled the full length of the exchange. Invariably, the result was a chain of small exchanges that in total was never global; in fact they rarely exceeded one-third of the world's land surface (Flynn and Giráldez 2006: 244). This is not to suggest that such exchanges were without great influence, particularly when after the first millennium they were focused on the Indian Ocean, itself connected with the world's largest, most successful economy (e.g. Niziolek and Respass this volume; Miksic and Goh this volume).

The historian who most reoriented our thinking on globalization and its role in making the modern world is Filipe Fernández-Armesto. He asks us to consider China as modernity's source; Europe was poor, backwards and prone to get-rich-quick schemes with little economic growth impact (Fernández-Armesto 2009). In addition, Europe was far from the centre of human economic activity, its markets were small and trade faced massive transaction costs. China, on the other hand, was huge. Its population was twice Europe's in 1400 and expanded more rapidly to over 300 million by 1800, partly because it was best positioned to benefit from trade growth and Eurasian wealth that followed the end of a climatically and plague-induced long recession in the fourteenth century and start of the Columbian Exchange (Frank 1998: 78–117). Linked to the rest of Eurasia through the Indian Ocean and Baghdad silk road, with over 50,000 km of canals and river networks, and 10 per cent of its population urbanized, China's sheer size and agricultural and craft productivity made it different. Moreover, many of the transformational initiatives that facilitated modernity originated in China: paper and printing, gunpowder, blast furnaces, coal exploitation, paper money, direction finding, shipbuilding technologies, and scientific empiricism. 'So in science, finance, commerce, communications, and war', Fernández-Armesto notes, 'the most pervasive of the great revolutions that made the modern world depended on Chinese technologies' (Fernández-Armesto 2009: 25).

Additionally, China bore all the hallmarks of a modern state: internal sovereignty; central government; unified administration, laws, currency, weights, and measures; bureaucrats appointed on merit; and good internal communications (Fernández-Armesto 2009: 212). In fact, as David Reynolds notes, it bore a striking resemblance to the modern United States. Indeed

twentieth-century USA was the new China: a large polity with a common currency, no internal tariffs, excellent communications, and whose sheer economic scale enabled market dominance (Reynolds 2002: 245–52). Being so large, both countries had little need for external trade and saw themselves as relatively complete or self-sufficient. External trade was not their growth engine. In other words, size and unity, rather than fractious fragmentation, could also be advantageous.

Modernity is a relative term; it can also hold contradictions. Just as modern America harboured slaves and Britain maintained a ruling elite, so China sheltered a costly imperial family and an increasingly self-serving Confucian bureaucratic class. Neither assisted the agrarian country to garner the necessary finances to maintain effective government and military strength, especially when threatened externally. On the other hand, unlike the European Atlantic seaboard countries, it did not need to launch aggressive foreign policies to enrich itself. Its northern and southern parts enabled a tremendously diverse and well-connected economy that had already expanded westward into provinces like Sichuan. Under the Qing dynasty, land cultivation doubled and agriculture commercialized. No wealthy urbanized country existed close to its borders to distract it from its own huge economy. In that sense, China was inward looking, much like the United States prior to World War II. And it survived, precisely because, unlike many other empires, it did not see its future in costly and often misjudged external interventions (Darwin 2008: 125).

Nonetheless, China's link with the vast Indian Ocean trading network conspired for a time to make that sea the world's richest economic zone. Trade has always been easier by sea, and the Indian Ocean's seasonal monsoons made it easy to cross. Muslim traders connected West Asia and East Africa with India and Southeast Asia, the latter already teaming with Chinese merchants and their diaspora. Demand for spices mostly drove this activity. Few spices found their way to Europe, and what did was so ridiculously expensive that demand for them could only ever have been the result of elite desires to display wealth ostentatiously (Fernández-Armesto 2009: 239, 17). Nonetheless, that demand, and the windfall profits enjoyed from supplying it, drove socially ambitious European adventurers and apocalyptically minded rulers to find ways jointly to link directly with the riches of the East, make their fortunes, and possibly change the course of history. In this they were only partially successful, but it was nonetheless what began to make some European states distinctive. In turning to the sea to end their marginality (Morris 2014: 178–83), they created new forms of connectivity that overturned old ways of understanding the world.

After 1498, Europeans did penetrate the Indian Ocean but for a long time they were unable to capture its trade and were confined to 'the archipelagos and fringes of mainland Asia' (Flynn and Giraldez 2006: 240). Even if they had, European markets were too small to accommodate it. De Vries argues that between the 1630s and 1800 the total volume of goods sent annually from Asia to Europe approximated 50,000 tons, the carrying capacity of a large container ship today (de Vries, 2010: 718). Even with regard to the spice trade, European intervention only altered its shape to a limited extent; 60 per cent of production still went to China. Lacking goods to exchange, Europeans survived by becoming Indian Ocean traders, such was the shortage of shipping to cope with the massive and growing Asian demand for goods. But it was a precarious existence. England and Holland formed large monopoly companies to reduce the risk inherent in long-distance trade, but these companies had still to operate in competitive markets to purchase and – outside of their national markets – sell their products. Although many of these eventually became mass consumption goods (tea, cotton textiles, silk, porcelain, and coffee) and laid the real foundation for enduring social development, companies could only survive by finding new sources of revenue to subsidize their trading operations, especially once such commodity production spread outside Asia. Hence the Dutch and English Asian trading companies, despite being revolutionary pioneers in mobilizing capital, increasingly sought political revenue

instead (effectively becoming colonial conquerors), and – in the British case – India–China trade monopolization as well. Being exclusive in nature, neither strategy proved sustainable. As de Vries notes, the impact of European demand on Asian trade was marginal; at best it had local or regional impact. Undoubtedly, its greatest impact lay in globalizing foods and products, but the result was not a single world economy (de Vries 2010: 722–27).

However, Europeans were additionally fortunate in being able to profit from the growing disparity in the value of silver within China compared with the rest of the world. The reason lay in the development of another regional economy that would eventually rival the Indian Ocean in wealth. Atlantic Ocean trade gave a few European nations – those located on the new trade routes and hence the beneficiaries of connectivity – the opportunity to leave behind their wretched poverty. At one time, their geographic location had doomed them to marginality. Now, the closeness of sea-oriented countries to the Americas bestowed new opportunities once they had discovered the continent. The Americas provided land on which to grow many of the products previously obtained only from Asia. Additionally, it provided fuel that enabled sugar to be turned into a mass consumption good. And importantly, it provided huge silver reserves that permitted countries like Spain to buy their way into Asia. Silver created the first global monetary system, inflating prices in the smaller European markets and shifting manufacturing to its northwest. After Spain established its base in Manila in 1571 to supply China with Bolivian and Mexican silver, silver linked the world (Flynn and Giráldez 2006: 244). But this trade soon paled in comparison with Atlantic trade. By the 1770s, the volume of goods crossing the Atlantic was four times greater than Europe's Asian trade, and growing at over twice the average rate (de Vries 2010: 717–18). By bringing the Americas into the European world, European resources were vastly increased, and the eclipse of 'long-hegemonic empires and economies in Asia made possible' (Fernández-Armesto 2009: 4), although not guaranteed. Not everyone agrees that the Americas made an immediate difference. Jonathan Healey posits northwest Europe's lead in social development during the seventeenth century, well before the Americas had been exploited and scientific developments had wide impact (Healey 2011). Morris reasserts geography's importance. Unlike the steppe-fronting Eurasian empires, the fractious west European states confronted each other. Hence their dependence on infantries and gun technology, which they eventually used against weakening Asian empires (Morris 2014: 176, 198–99).

Nonetheless, it is important not to assume that any rebalancing of world economic power necessarily led directly to contemporary globalization. None of the European players in either the Atlantic or Asian trade were fated to become global powers simply because of their roles in creating a new kind of empire that stretched across seas (Morris 2014: 203). Spain and Portugal, the original explorers of new knowledge, soon lost their early promise and never integrated their colonies into their economies or used their earned wealth to create sustainable growing economies (Darwin 2008: 65; Harari 2014: 288–91). The Dutch were too small politically and ultimately tied their fortunes to England. French empire building stumbled through fiscal crises, stagnation and revolution, and eventually enveloped Europe in a devastating tribute war. It has been argued that across Eurasia, natural and man-made resources struggled to sustain rising living standards (Flynn and Giráldez 2006: 243). Some European countries were undoubtedly advantaged by their ability to use the Americas to compensate for their own shortfalls, but there was nothing inevitable about their ability to transform that into a new kind of economy. Indeed, European expansion appeared to peter out during the eighteenth century, with most states mired in debt and conflict (Darwin 2008: 104).

There was only one country where, uniquely, labour costs were high and energy cheap. Britain was a beneficiary of early globalization. It was also fortunate that its geography partially distanced it from mainland European politics, and that by the late seventeenth century it had

concluded its own political and religious wars. The resulting power sharing created space for expanding commercial activity and social development. But internal growth alone did not drive change. What made the difference was England's connectivity with the world and its preparedness to globalize, to reshape itself for a global world. Like the Netherlands, its early woollen trade success provided the platform for eighteenth-century growth, when colonies additionally provided natural resources and extra demand for manufactures. Urbanization (particularly the rapid growth of London), manufacturing and international trade stimulated agricultural productivity, improved living standards, literacy and technical training, and maintained high wages. The country did not stagnate. Instead, high wages drove rising prosperity and the use of capital and energy to raise output without increasing costs. It helped that Britain possessed readily available cheap coal fuel to compensate for the loss of its timber resources. The conversion of fossil fuel into energy, initially for its rapidly growing urban population, laid the basis for the textile industry's industrialization. Britain was additionally blessed by cheap raw materials from India (and North America) and its growing ability to restrict Indian textile competition at home and in its colonies, and to use opium to reduce its Chinese trade deficit. Importantly, a mass consumer market already existed within Britain due to the country's connectivity to Asia and the Americas and its high wages, themselves a product of Britain's foreign trade boom. The sheer size of the global cotton industry helped ensure that Britain's technology became globally transformative (Allen 2011).

The late eighteenth century might be called a moment of historical mutation. Quite uniquely and unexpectedly, one country transformed itself sufficiently to enable linear economic growth. Henceforth, growth-inducing technology would drive trade, generate new wealth, give new relevance to scientific enquiry, and transform governance and popular consumption (Snooks 1996: 374–76, 415–26). In doing so, it completely altered the goals of all societies thereafter, although not conquering ambitions and the desire for windfall profits, which many leaders still saw as essential to offset the destabilization change generated. Ultimately, Britain failed to appreciate the importance of its achievements. Its growing empire did not sit well with a globalization process that increased human interactions and made one community's wellbeing increasingly dependent on the wellbeing of others. Immutable inequalities diminish the potential for markets to expand, stimulate technological innovation, and raise human capital.

Nonetheless, countries closest to Britain were among the first to appreciate the implications of its achievements for the balance of power and to respond accordingly, especially once technology costs fell and offset the value of cheap labour; hence the importance of economic distance and tendency to view industrialization as a European phenomenon. Yet the European and North American countries that transformed themselves did not do so because they were European or shared a common heritage with Britain. They did so because Britain was too great a model to ignore. Imitation, as we have seen, has a long human history, only this time its scale was global. Within a relatively short time, even distant countries like Japan did likewise, although others, destabilized by or captive to the interests of transforming nations, were simply unable to respond independently. However, once freed from such constraints, they too transformed themselves. As noted above, the result has not been homogeneity but complex and reflexive interactions. To call such responses 'Westernization' (like Mediterraneanization or Sinicization) not only denies agency to much of the world, but also bestows 'Western' origins on a process of interconnectivity that has always belonged to humanity globally. Industrialization was the unforeseen child of globalization.

If we persist in seeing the world as divided between East and West, we will continue to project that vision onto its history. The world is not so easily divided, not even when limited to Afro-Eurasia. There were always connections between its many parts; people, ideas,

trade goods, foods, and disease constantly moved and enriched or endangered communities and regions differently. Usually the products of connectivity were indigenized and transformed. Columbus's arrival in the Americas accelerated the process but did not create a world neatly divided between a passive East and dynamic West. Europe's geography and political fragmentation did create a difference, which proved an advantage most when driving new linkages to the world or sustaining military innovation and power projection, but a disadvantage when adventurism turned inwards. Europe's political fragmentation drove a fierce competitiveness not seen elsewhere on such a scale. In the end, the outcome was not a European transformation but a northwest European one. More specifically, it was a British one. Only Britain enjoyed the civic mindedness, high wages, cheap energy, global connections, and market size to make it possible.

This great transformation – which no one anticipated, let alone planned or knew how to manage – did not derive from civilization but from the world's growing connectivity, and its most obvious corollary was that all peoples could benefit in some way if they responded appropriately. One of its most important dynamic outcomes has been democracy. Amartya Sen calls it humanity's common heritage (Sen 2000: 38). Commercial and technology-based societies depend for success on wider resource ownership (economic democratization) and political franchises. But there exists also a second, equally dynamic, defining outcome of globalization. People still live very local and surprisingly parochial lives, but they do so today within a dynamic global frame that penetrates their consciousness as never before and variously subsumes all cultures (now both transformed and more fluid) within it, not equally and not evenly, but certainly never monolithically. This most marks globalization today from its precursors, especially in its tensions between the economic and political, although it might be argued that this tension existed also in Mediterraneanization or Sinicization.

Two hundred years after globalization precipitated the greatest change in human societies, we should no longer view modernity as Westernization. Yes, a few formerly marginalized European countries exploited and enhanced globalization processes but they did so because they needed to connect with a world with much to offer in order to enrich their own communities. Yet they – like the rest of the world – had also to learn that to sustain modernity they had to transform themselves and desist from promoting exclusionary strategies that produced only winners and losers. These lessons of globalization were rarely understood in the past; it might seem today that each generation has always to relearn them. After all, the health of humanity today is as dependent on Asian wellbeing as on American or European comfort, or, for that matter, African success. An interconnected world will always be greater than the sum of its parts.

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Part II

Africa



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2.1

Africa in and of the world

Archaeological perspectives on globalization in the *longue durée*

Paul J. Lane

Knowing where to begin with Africa, as a continent, an idea, a well-spring of identity, or as lived reality, can often present particular challenges, although maybe rather different ones, for both external observers and those who lay claim to it as their ancestral home (whether they now live there, or not). This is certainly true when attempting to link ‘Africa’ and ‘globalization’. Conventional wisdom, and probably the majority of popular opinion in the West, most likely would suggest that the continent has only relatively recently, say since 1945 or thereabouts, been touched by the forces of globalization, and that overall neither Africans nor their continent have been especially well served as a result (see essays, for instance, in Shizha and Diallo 2015). There might be some acknowledgement that European colonial powers still held sway, at least in name if nothing else, over the greater part of the continent in 1945 and in some areas had done so for several centuries. But prior to the end of Empire that the conclusion of World War II presaged, convention and popular opinion in the West, even in the second decade of the twenty-first century, are still quite likely to imagine that the tasks of the colonizing powers prior to the outbreak of war had been opening up the continent for commerce and, although perhaps out of political correctness no longer articulated as bluntly, holding savagery at bay.

This may well seem something of a caricature, an attempt to create a straw man that ignores all the changes in attitude and efforts made in these postcolonial times to recognize and celebrate ‘things African’. African music, from Highlife to Rai, Township Jazz to Kwassa Kwassa, has certainly attracted a global audience since the mid-twentieth century, especially as part of the created category of ‘world music’ (e.g. Collins and Richards 1989), as do contemporary hybrid fusions of African genres with Rap (Charry 2012), and the Afrobeat tradition inspired by the music of Fela Kuti (Olanyan 2004). Contemporary African dance, art, and literature are similarly increasingly popular and influential globally, although the reception, and to some extent the promotion, of both African art and dance are often hampered by a seeming attachment to the monikers ‘traditional’ and/or ‘authentic’ (for elaboration of this point, see, for example, Douglas *et al.* 2006; Poulter 2011). African political and cultural leaders have also sought to refashion Africa’s image, perhaps most obviously and overtly through the promotion of the idea of an African renaissance (Asante 2007) and the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), launched in 2001 (Chabal 2002). While the actions of the continent’s politicians have often done more harm than good to this positive presentation of Africa and the

accomplishments of its diverse populace, there was a brief moment when Western leaders of the G8 countries and the United Nations seemed ready to engage with the continent in a new way (Black 2012). At much the same time, the People's Republic of China was also reorienting its approach to supporting Africa by bringing this more in line with the restructuring of its internal economic policies initiated a few decades earlier (Anshan 2008).

Fifteen years on, however, most impartial observers would argue that both NEPAD and the policy shifts promised by Western governments, but not always delivered or consolidated, have been only partially successful – although there are different views on why this has been the case. Moreover, in the public sphere, Western imaginings of the continent remain dominated by the idea of Africa as a single entity, as exotic, often dangerous, still largely wild and untamed, a land of adventure – for the adventurous. But this view of Africa, as the Kenyan author Binyavanga Wainana (2005) famously satirized, is also mediated by images of poverty, vulnerability, 'tribal' warfare, corruption, and failed states – all problems that, depending on perspective and to some extent political leaning, either demand urgent attention on the part of the international community, or soak up tax revenues that could be 'better used' to alleviate the plight of the poor, the sick, and the elderly at home. Either way, for many, the billions of dollars redistributed in donor aid to African countries each year are testimony to failed globalization both in the post-World War II era and in earlier centuries. Otherwise, why would such aid still be needed?

At the other extreme, both in a temporal sense and more metaphorically, we could say that globalization began in Africa, as this is the continent where not only our own species but also our hominin ancestors first evolved (Foley 2013; Lahr 2013), and from which they spread to colonize the rest of the world (Fleagle *et al.* 2010; Stringer 2014). Archaeology courses and text books constantly remind us of these facts, even though certain aspects including the direction, timing and drivers of each exodus, and even whether all hominin species first evolved on the continent, can be hot topics of debate. An unspoken sub-text to many of these debates, though, is just what does it mean for a continent to lay claim to the origins of our species and modern human behaviour? The DNA ancestry of all of us confirms that as a species we originated there, but any suggestion that we are all globalized, hybrid Africans is far too destabilizing for most contemporary sensibilities (but see the T-shirt produced and sold by the Richard Dawkins Foundation). No, No, No! This heritage you are talking about, this is *our* heritage, not just Africa's but humanity's – and don't you forget it!

Between these opposing views of Africa and Africans as originators of, and failures at, globalization, lie multiple other, and more nuanced positions, several of which are explored by the contributors to this section with reference to elements of the continent's vast and complex archaeological and material cultural heritage. One theme, among others, that cuts across these papers is connectivity. As several of the authors point out (see also Mitchell 2005), archaeological research has done much to uncover evidence for extensive, long-standing and complex connections between different areas of the continent and other parts of the world that were in existence many centuries, and, in some cases, millennia ago. Yet, as Scott MacEachern notes, evidence for connectivity, even if on quite a large scale, does not necessarily imply globalization. Thus, as he elaborates, different communities across West Africa were intimately connected with trading partners in North Africa and through them with many parts of Europe throughout the medieval period. These ties almost certainly have much older roots, and it is well known that changes in one area, whether of a 'technical' nature, such as developments in ship-building technologies in later medieval Europe or the introduction of camels into North Africa – both of which impacted the scale of contact and its directionality – or in other domains, had consequences for actors at either end of the trade and production networks, and in other localities. We are all too familiar – from our own era of corporate globalization – with these kinds of

stories and the mixed legacy of misery, violence, and environmental catastrophe alongside fresh employment opportunities, business stimulus, and even improved labour laws they can leave in their wake. Yet, archaeology's analytical frames of reference and modes of practice do not lend themselves especially well, as yet, to exposing the winners and losers of ancient globalization. Far too often, as MacEachern's chapter makes abundantly clear, attention is directed toward documenting connections rather than understanding their consequences.

Connections may not simply be material; they can equally be manifest more intangibly – including ideologically, spiritually, or ethereally, as explored, respectively, in the contributions by Miguel John Versluys, Chapurukha Kusimba, and Julia Verne. The presence of late second millennium BCE obelisks in the Piazza del Popolo, Rome, and in the Place de la Concorde, Paris, or the widespread borrowing of other Egyptian motifs and architectural styles that became popular in Europe and North America especially after Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion in 1798 (MacDonald and Rice 2003), may seem the epitome of material global connections. But, as Miguel John Versluys discusses, Aegyptiaca have not only been circulating elsewhere on the African continent and throughout the world for far longer (the obelisk in the Piazza del Popolo was, in any case, originally brought to Rome around 10 BCE by Emperor Augustus), but have also worked to assemble and re-assemble more intangible essences of Egypt among their new hosts. Ideas of Egypt have circulated with these objects, creating and projecting particular values the West now lays claim to as its own. In terms of Western civilization, Africa, to use Versluys' term, 'got things going'; testimony yet again that certain globalization process may have begun in Africa.

The east coast of Africa, from Cape Guardafui (Somaliland) in the north to Delgado Bay (Mozambique) in the south, like large parts of West Africa, has been globally connected for centuries, and the inhabitants of this vast stretch of coast, as on the opposite side of the continent, have absorbed and transformed cultural influences from very different worlds, making them as much their own as anything foreign or borrowed. A central feature of the success of these connections from the late first millennium CE onwards, not just in terms of trade networks but also in more cultural terms, was the existence of a shared religion – Islam. Evidence for shared religious connections, as Chapurukha Kusimba explores in his chapter, may in fact provide a better indication – than the mere presence of exotic trade goods – of how and when people on opposite sides of the Indian Ocean and in the neighbouring Red Sea and Persian Gulf recognized that they were part of a larger world comprising many spatially distant but nonetheless connected communities of practice, and began to define themselves with reference to these absent worlds.

The interplay between absence and presence, and their mutual constitution of each other as part of an increasingly globalized world, is evident too in Julia Verne's discussion of one of the most preeminent symbols of modern globalization on the African continent today – the mobile phone. These small, increasingly discrete but all too frequently irritatingly intrusive objects have been, and remain, important actors in contemporary Africa. The rate of adoption of mobile technologies and the mobile phone as an essential to everyday life across the continent over the last quarter century has been phenomenal, bringing distant diaspora communities into ready contact with one another, and, through local initiatives and innovations, they have pioneered the movement of money around the continent without the involvement of the national or international banking systems. Processes of appropriation and adaptation, technological imperialism and resistance, information exchange and the hybridization of knowledge and personhood are all played out through, and expressed by, the use of mobile phones in contemporary Africa. Most critically of all, however, as one of Verne's informants notes, these small items easily forgotten, like monumental Aegyptiaca, 'allow you to know things'.

Finally, no discussion of globalization on the African continent would be complete without some consideration of empire and colonialism. These have been such a feature of the continent's

history, and not just since the European Age of Exploration, that it is impossible to not to link them to globalization, as Lydia Wilson Marshall notes. European colonialism during the nineteenth century, as she makes clear, did not initiate globalizing processes (and contrary to its own rhetoric, effectively made the continent darker than it had been before – see Brantlinger 1985), but it certainly initiated new processes, changed the direction of connections, created new arenas for resistance and revolt, and altered Africa's place in the world. Archaeological research on these encounters is more limited than in the Americas, but as the examples Marshall discusses illustrate quite clearly, there is always something new out of Africa. What particularly stands out is the value of studying African contexts for enhancing the understanding of the 'production of locality' (Richard 2013: 43) under very different forms of globalizing colonial encounters (and not just those imposed by Europeans). In this regard, the African continent is especially rich in contrasts, and archaeological study of these is an effective means of destabilizing more dominant interpretive models.

As European influence across Africa has waned, especially since the late twentieth century, so China's role in shaping Africa's futures has increased. The last few decades have witnessed, in particular, massive investment on the part of China in large-scale infrastructure projects on the continent and a related upsurge in the demand for diverse raw materials. The number of Chinese-owned small business has blossomed, and, as incomes have risen in China, so Africa has become an increasingly popular tourist destination for middle-income Chinese people. All of this has helped create jobs, and has contributed in part to the economic boom the continent has experienced since the turn of the twenty-first century, with overall GDP rising between 5 and 6 per cent a year (*The Economist* 2015). Yet it has also had less positive impacts, including on the continent's cultural heritage, as discussed by Paul Lane, Cornelia Kleinitz, and Yongliang Gao. Precisely what these impacts are, and where they have been most severe, is hard to gauge because of under-reporting and the secrecy that can surround many of the Chinese-funded projects. What is clear, however, is that the funding needed to assess potential impacts and for mitigation projects, including excavation, has rarely been made available, leaving local archaeological services to bear the brunt of the costs, both financially and in terms of the loss of knowledge arising from the destruction of sites and monuments. This new wave of globalization on the continent has also left new kinds of friction between local communities and the state in its wake, in which archaeologists have sometimes found themselves inconveniently entangled.

Friction (Tsing 2005), between people, things, places, memories, beliefs, practices, ideas, and systems of government, rather aptly sums up the many paradoxes of globalization. Globalization, despite its universalizing tendencies, is always variable and partial, dividing as frequently as it unites, rubbing things the same way and rubbing things up the wrong way. As the chapters here illustrate, the frictions of globalization have certainly created tensions and dissent in Africa, but then they have also created innovation and desire, and these opposing tendencies will continue to inform globalization across the continent.

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2.2

Exploring Aegyptiaca and their material agency throughout global history

Miguel John Versluys

Introduction: Aegyptiaca in Africa

When excavated at the beginning of the twentieth century, the largest tumulus in the city of Kerma in Nubia (dated to the period of 1700–1550 BCE) was discovered to contain a life-size seated statue of an Egyptian woman named Sennuwy, together with part of the statue of her husband Djefaihapy (Figure 2.2.1). This led the excavator, George Reisner, to believe that Djefaihapy was the Egyptian governor at Kerma and to interpret the site as a trading post run by Egyptians. Evidence found later and elsewhere proved him wrong. Kerma was the capital of a powerful and independent state that arose in competition with Egypt, and it turned out that Djefaihapy was the provincial governor of Asyut (in Middle Egypt) during the reign of the twelfth dynasty pharaoh Sesostri I (around 1971–1926 BCE). Both statues were thus re-used in the Kerma tomb when they were already antique, and had been brought to Nubia from a far-away tomb or temple in the Nile valley (Bard 2008: 199–205).

Situated at the lower Nile that meanders through north-east Africa, the mid-second millennium BCE kingdom of Kerma made extensive use of Aegyptiaca: *objects that can be characterized as distinctly Egyptian through their stylistics and the materials from which they were made*. Kerma is well known for its large and impressive royal tumuli, dating roughly between 1750 and 1500 BCE, the so-called *Kerma classique* period (Bonnet 2004). Many Egyptian statues dating from the period of the twelfth and thirteenth dynasties (c.1991–1663 BCE) have been found in those burial mounds, like those of Sennuwy and Djefaihapy, as well as in temples from that period. But also more mundane Kerma grave goods may consist of Egyptian artefacts that were robbed from earlier Egyptian graves in Lower Nubia (Valbelle 2004). Appropriating (ancient) Aegyptiaca apparently mattered a lot within Kerma at the time.

During later periods of the region's history, the importance of Aegyptiaca would also remain paramount. During the (early and mid-first century BCE) Kushite period, for instance, Nubian material culture often looks so distinctly Egyptian that scholars have talked about *Egyptianisation* to account for what was understood by many as the Egyptian face of Nubian civilisation (Edwards 2003 and Török 2011 provide an overview of the debate and illustrate different views). In that period, these kinds of 'Egyptianisms' were visible everywhere in north-east Africa. The famous pyramid field at Jebel Barkal (Napata) constitutes a remarkable example (Figure 2.2.2).



Figure 2.2.1 Statue of Lady Sennuwy, Egyptian, Middle Kingdom, Dynasty 12 (1971–1926 BCE), found in Nubia, Kerma, Tumulus K III, hall A. Made from granodiorite. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 14.720. Harvard University – Boston Museum of Fine Arts Expedition



Figure 2.2.2 The pyramid field at Jebel Barkal, Napata. Maurice Chédel via Wikimedia