


# Deterrence in the 21st Century

Editor

MAX G. MANWARING



## Deterrence in the 21st Century

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*Editor*

MAX G. MANWARING

*(Professor of Military Strategy,  
US Army War College)*



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# Editor's Preface

MAX G. MANWARING

This special edition of *Small Wars & Insurgencies* stems from a symposium conducted in December 1999 by the Center for Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The symposium addressed 'Deterrence in the 21st Century,' and provided a practitioner's overview of deterrence policy and strategy, and the contemporary challenges they face. Although this volume is based on the symposium, it is not a comprehensive record of the proceedings. Rather, it is organized as an anthology of the 'best of the best' presentations – revised in the light of the discussions that took place at the symposium – and complemented by two chapters that fill important gaps in the limited dialogue. The primary conclusions of the symposium, and the driving concepts behind this compendium, are that it is imperative to reopen and broaden the deterrence debate, and to – hopefully – provide an impetus for policy change.

Since the ending of the Cold War, strategic concerns have played little part in the debate as to what to do with the billions of dollars allocated to national and global security. The general result, in the United States, has been the *ad hoc* and piecemeal crisis management of security affairs. That approach, in turn, has lead to *ad hoc*, piecemeal, and less-than-desirable results – and high personnel, monetary, and political costs. It must be remembered that, if one wants to optimize efficiency or effectiveness, one must precede reform, structure, and budget considerations with clear policy direction – and a strategy and organizational structure that defines how to achieve it.

Panelists, discussants, and participants sketched the problems and threats of the post-Cold War strategic environment, and argued that deterring the complex and diverse threats in that environment requires a new policy and strategy. The intent was to establish that contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with broad, integrated, and long-term culturally-oriented approaches. These approaches would confront better the myriad state and non-state, nuclear and non-nuclear, conventional and non-conventional, military and non-military, and asymmetric threats that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

Separately and collectively, the contributors to this anthology focus on that challenge. At the same time, they do essentially what 'Mr X' did in his 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct'.<sup>1</sup> They examine the threat situation in the contemporary global security arena. They analyze specific problems of deterrence and strategy. They outline cogent



issues. They implicitly and explicitly come to grips with the lessons that should have been learned over the past several years. They establish the beginning underpinnings of a deterrence theory of engagement to manage the contemporary environment and associated threats. And, lastly, they take the discussion of deterrence out of the “TOP SECRET” realm and begin to publicly educate decision-makers, policy-makers, opinion-makers, and the citizenry regarding the realistic requirements for contemporary national and global security.

As a consequence, decision-makers, policy-makers, opinion-makers, and their staffs should be able to develop a national security blueprint to confront more effectively the diverse threats of the 21st century. That is to say, leaders with this kind of information should be able to do what was done after the publication of ‘Sources of Soviet Conduct.’ Over a period of time, debate, symposia and conferences, and gaming elaborated and refined the conceptual, organizational, and operational elements that were proposed by Mr X (George F. Kennan) and promulgated in NSC-68, and that laid the foundations for the US Cold War policy of ‘containment’.

This anthology, then, commends itself to the reader to provoke thought about what governments and international organizations ought to do when faced with the ‘new world disorder’. In these terms, it suggests what citizens in the global community ought to demand of their governments and that community. Thus, we commend this volume to you – the reader – with the hope that you will make effective use of the insights of the contributors.

For the most part, the contributors are not scholars. The individual contributors are, as former US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, has observed, ‘Knowledgeable and experienced, and have proven track records in the only arena that counts – actually dealing with the problems they discuss.’<sup>2</sup> Thus, we wish to thank the contributors whose knowledge, experience, analytical powers, wisdom, and many hours of work made this book possible. We also wish to respectfully dedicate this volume to General John R. Galvin, US Army (Ret.). This anthology is part of a continuing effort to revitalize strategic thinking as it pertains to ‘uncomfortable’ contemporary conflicts. It evolved from General Galvin’s call for a new paradigm to fight the most prevalent and most likely forms of conflict in the world today.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, neither this compendium nor the individual studies in it should be construed as reflecting the official positions of the US government, the Department of Defense, or the Department of State. Contributors, alone are responsible for any errors of fact or judgment.

#### NOTES

1. X (George F. Kennan), ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947) pp. 566–82.
2. Interviews.
3. General John R. Galvin, ‘Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm’, *Parameters* (Dec. 1986) pp. 2–8.

# Introduction

WILLIAM J. CROWE JR

When the Chinese say, 'May you live in interesting times', I think they had in mind a period such as we are experiencing right now. I wrote in my book, *The Line of Fire*, that I sometimes regretted that my military professional life was shaped by a single global factor: the challenge of the Soviet Union, which was constantly in the forefront of our minds as our one formidable military adversary. Those times certainly were not uninteresting, but the current global situation is even more intellectually diverse and challenging. My post-military life has deepened and widened the already broad world perspective I had acquired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a unified area commander, as a naval officer in other military assignments, and as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). This was followed by 3½ years as US ambassador to the Court of Saint James's, London.

As Max Manwaring and the various contributors to this timely deterrence collection suggest, our world is truly in flux. It is moving so rapidly that perspectives, goals, and strategies that seemed appropriate a few years after the end of the Cold War are continuously being rethought and reshaped.

Certainly the global picture has altered dramatically in an extremely short time, and continues to change rapidly. In essence we are witnessing firsthand one of the great watersheds of history. We are actually experiencing it and reading about it in our newspapers and seeing it on our television sets. We saw the edifice of communism shatter, the Soviet Empire crumble, and now throughout much of the world, people are throwing off their shackles and moving – in a very halting and uncertain way – toward pluralism and free markets.

As Americans we applaud these developments. At the same time, we are aware that our future is not necessarily secure and assured. I submit that we are in for a protracted period of uncertainty and struggle. The current transitions are bringing new pockets of poverty and new pockets of wealth, with a widening divergence between the two. New governments have in several cases fashioned important improvements through economic liberalization and greater individual freedom, but the international community will still suffer a great deal of confusion, trauma, frustration,

and disillusionment before the new world order sorts itself out. And, although each nation and each people must be responsible for their own actions, the United States – as the free world leader and as the remaining superpower – will undoubtedly be deeply involved in the global revolution.

We live in an international community with no prominent adversary. Third World threats, although real, are more ephemeral, individually less dangerous in the short term (although not so cumulatively), and not especially predictable. Without the consuming confrontation between two armed camps, not every crisis or every challenge requires American reaction or intervention. Washington's primary international problem now is to determine when our interests are genuinely at risk and what their relative priorities are – in other words, to be selective as to our involvement. Unfortunately, this is a perplexing task, and our republican system of government has difficulty in coping with ambiguous, 'low-intensity' political-military conflicts.

Such challenges abound. In many parts of the world traditional enmities grounded in ethnic feuds and national rivalries are thriving, and such rivalries have the capacity to blossom into wider challenges. The doomsday anxieties that so deeply marked the collective psyche of the Cold War generation are not totally a thing of the past. The possibility of several countries employing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction on their neighbors is made more likely by proliferation. Witness the 1998 decisions of both India and Pakistan to set off nuclear devices. In a sense, the United States is being expected to act as an international policeman and conciliator for regional wars, to control rogue states, and to settle low-intensity conflicts. That is the burden of our role as the world's only superpower. Winston Churchill once commented: 'With great power comes great responsibility.'

This anthology argues that facing the diverse threats in the 'new world disorder' requires new attitudes and new approaches. I agree. Contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with more relevant strategy. For example, new policies are needed to deal with the myriad state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

The naïveté of arguing that the United States is the only superpower in the post-Cold War world – and has nothing to fear from any other political actor – is too simplistic and, on occasion, dangerous. The reality of such irresponsibility is that there are state and non-state actors that have the potential to threaten US interests and global well-being. Thus, it is incumbent on individual powers and the international community to understand and cope with the threats imposed by contemporary chaos.

The intent of General Michael Carns and Professor Colin Gray in [Part One](#) of this work is to reexamine the broad concept of deterrence as it

applies to the ‘Russian Bear, Asian Dragons, and 1,000 Snakes’. In turn, it argues the need for a new and broader deterrence policy that can and will respond to the diverse ‘non-military’ threats looming on the not-too-distant horizon. In that context, [Part Two](#) analyzes a series of troubling issues - from ‘Some Possible Surprises in Our Nuclear Future,’ to questions of deterrence and defense in a biological and chemical environment, in addition to terrorism and information warfare – that make the case for a host of changes.

Finally, in [Part Three](#), Dr Max Manwaring and Ambassador Edwin Corr provide some strategic level ideas regarding possible new deterrence policies and political-military responses.

These writings will, hopefully, encourage the process of rethinking both problems and reactions. The editor and contributors to this anthology should be commended for this impressive effort. It should be required reading for scholars, policy-makers, diplomats, soldiers, and other leaders who must plan for, fight, or otherwise attempt to manage conflict in the new global security environment.



## Part One

### Setting the Stage for a Discussion of Deterrence



# **Reopening the Deterrence Debate: Thinking about a Peaceful and Prosperous Tomorrow**

MICHAEL P. C. CARNS

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the global security system and the verities that shaped US purposes, policies, and priorities have undergone fundamental changes. Cold War concepts of security and deterrence are no longer completely relevant. We are in a new global security environment that involves the integration of free markets, technologies, and countries to a degree never before witnessed. The growling, nuclear-armed Soviet bear was relatively easy to understand and deal with. What is not easy to understand and respond to are the many 'smaller' threats – and opportunities – that stem from global integration. Yet, as the country that benefits most from global integration, the US has a pressing national interest in maintaining and enhancing the new order.

## **The New Strategic Environment**

When what mattered most were military bases, preserving access to sea lines of communication, chokepoints, and raw materials – and denying those assets to the Soviet Union and its surrogates – the US could generally ignore internal conditions in other countries. But, since the US is now also interested in the need for non-hostile dispositions toward the country, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the capacity of other countries to buy American-made products, the continued development of democratic and free market institutions, and human rights – as well as cooperation on shared problems such as illegal drugs, the environment, and the victims of natural and man-made disasters – then the US must concern itself with the causes and consequences of regional and national instability.

The 'unstable peace' and chaos of the post-Cold War era are caused by myriad instabilities. The causes include increasing poverty, human starvation, widespread disease, and lack of political and socio-economic justice. The consequences are seen in such forms as social violence, criminal anarchy, refugee flows, illegal drug trafficking and organized