The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation

Edited by
John McGarry
and Brendan O'Leary

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

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The problem of ethnic conflict regulation has become increasingly prominent in Europe since 1989 and the dissolution of communist power; the bloodshed inside the former Yugoslavia and ex-USSR being the most dramatic manifestation of this development. Other ethnic conflicts have continued unabated in South Africa and Northern Ireland as well as in Canada and Malaysia.

This edited collection begins with a substantial introduction which classifies and judges the morality, feasibility and consequences of all the major methods of ethnic conflict regulation. There follows a comprehensive set of case studies from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania which cover examples of relatively benign and amicable relations between ethnic communities, as well as ones where domination is enforced. They include examples of the normatively desirable, such as federalism, and the morally appalling such as genocide.

John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary have put together an extremely timely book of great relevance to current events. Many of the contributors are leading authorities on their respective case studies. This book should become the standard work on ethnic conflict regulation and will be essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students in this field.

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Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts

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Acknowledgements

Chapter 1

Introduction

The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict

John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary

INTRODUCTION

This book began life when ethnic conflict and its regulation were not universally fashionable subjects. Its concerns now have an almost outrageous timeliness. Ethnic conflict is a persistent feature of modernity but the last few years have brought seismic changes in the relations between several ethnic communities around the world. The disintegrations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have burst asunder the borders of these former communist empires. The conventional wisdom had been that the international (for which read the interstate) system had stabilised the borders of the world's states, so that secessions and the redrawing of territorial frontiers through conquest or partitions were phenomena of previous ages (see Mayall 1990). The aftermath of the Second World War and the decolonisation of Europe's empires had, it was said, carved states' borders in stone. Events like the forging of the states of Israel and Bangladesh through war and insurrection, Indonesia's conquests of East Timor and West Irian and India's invasion of Goa were merely exceptions which proved the rule. Today, however, we know the stability of state borders after 1945 (or 1960) owed more to the geo-politics of the cold war than to the triumph of particular norms of 'international order'. It remains to be seen whether the 'new international order' proclaimed over the rubble of the cities of Kuwait and Baghdad presages a new stabilisation of the world's territorial frontiers. Perhaps Saddam Hussein's adventurism was merely the first and least successful of a new round of state- and nation-building projects that will owe more to

conquest than consent. At least some Serbians appear to have made this calculation.

The renewed instability of state frontiers is merely one symptom of the global political power of ethnic consciousness and conflict. The last two decades have seen the final collapse of white settler regimes in Africa (in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe). As we go to press the South African system of apartheid, the last bastion of European settler domination in Africa, is on the verge of extinction. However, during the period of apartheid's rise and fall new systems of ethnic domination have been established around the world, in Fiji by native Melanesians, by Morocco in the western Sahara, by Israelis in what was Palestine; and there have been several attempts to establish such regimes that have led to protracted 'civil' wars, notably in Uganda and Sudan. In the post-colonial era, partly because of the fear (or pretext?) that open, multi-party democracies would degenerate into ethnic contests for state power, much of Africa has been under one-party dictatorships or military rule. In the next decade the re-experimentation with democracy under way in large parts of Africa will provide a decisive test of the success of the nation-building efforts of African generals and dictators. Some parts of the world appear to be trapped in deadlock ethnic wars, where no faction is sufficiently powerful completely to control or crush its opponent(s): for instance Burma/Myanmar (Smith 1991), Chad, Peru and the Sudan. In happier zones ethnic communities have been able to negotiate agreed changes to their political systems, notably in Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. Yet other sites of ethnic conflict live in a twilight world between deadlocked war and permanent negotiation: Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. The Balkans may join them, again. As we went to press, Canada, Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa were the subjects and objects of inter-ethnic negotiations about their political futures. The Indian government and its discontented ethnic subjects have been involved in analogous talks almost from the moment of Indian independence.

The chapters which follow provide a series of case studies from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania; and from what used to be called the first, second and third worlds. The contributors were asked to focus briefly on the causes of ethnic conflict, but to concentrate on the methods used to manage,

control or terminate ethnic conflict in their area of specialist knowledge. The case studies cover examples of relatively benign and amicable relations between ethnic communities, as well as ones where domination is enforced. They cover examples of the normatively desirable as well as the morally appalling. They are not restricted to conflicts which have immediate implications for all of us, like the conflicts in the former Soviet Union, but include examination of places like Fiji and Northern Ireland which add to our theoretical understanding of bi-ethnic conflicts, and a study of Burundi, the locus of two internationally ignored genocides.

Notwithstanding the global comprehensiveness of our sample, readers will immediately think of numerous additional cases which might have been included. However, given the ubiquity of ethnic conflict an exhaustive collection of case studies would have extended to several volumes. In mitigation we plead that this introductory chapter contains some modest discussion of cases not covered by our contributors.

Scientific endeavours, as conventionally understood, are built upon theories and hypotheses, evidence and experiments. The development of a science is often measured by the scale of precision in prediction and postdiction of which it is capable, and by the degree of development of quantified indicators of the phenomena being examined or explained. It cannot be said that the study of ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict management have yet wholly met the aspirations of positivist ideals of social science,[1] and we cannot hope to make good such deficiencies in this introduction. Instead we shall attempt a humbler task, that of classification, the necessary precursor of scientific theory and empirical verification and falsification.

As well as being classificatory, this chapter is both positive and normative. We develop a taxonomy of eight modes of ethnic conflict resolution which maps the empirical forms of macro-political ethnic conflict regulation. Our long-term positivist ambition is to establish whether there are 'laws of motion' which govern the forms of ethnic conflict regulation we are interested in explaining: regularities which enable the 'postdiction' (if not the prediction) of the circumstances under which particular strategies for managing ethnic conflict will be attempted, and successfully implemented. But we also have normative concerns:

to evaluate the merits of the different forms of ethnic conflict regulation, and to establish whether multi-ethnic states can be stabilised in ways which are compatible with liberal democratic values and institutions.

A TAXONOMY OF THE MACRO-POLITICAL FORMS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION

Here we confine ourselves to presenting our taxonomy of the macro-political[2] forms of ethnic conflict regulation, and briefly showing its relevance for the case studies elaborated by our contributors, leaving its further development to future research (McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming). The term 'regulation' is inclusive: it covers both conflict termination and conflict management. Eight distinct macro-methods of ethnic conflict regulation can be distinguished, to wit:

(i) *methods for eliminating differences*
    (a) genocide
    (b) forced mass-population transfers
    (c) partition and/or secession (self-determination)
    (d) integration and/or assimilation
(ii) *methods for managing differences*
    (a) hegemonic control
    (b) arbitration (third-party intervention)
    (c) cantonisation and/or federalisation
    (d) consociationalism or power-sharing.

This is a taxonomy, and not a typology: the classification of entities by logical types. Typologies are heuristics used to codify existing knowledge. Good social science typologies are simple; constructed through the use of logical antonyms rather than empirical observations; and provide a fruitful basis for further theoretical development and empirical investigation. Taxonomy by contrast is the classification of organisms, and originated with the Swedish scientist Linnaeus. Taxonomists aim to place all organisms in a hierarchical classification scheme, in which, to put it very crudely, 'likes' are classified with 'likes'. Taxonomies, unlike typologies, are empirical rather than ideal-typical, *a posteriori* rather than *a priori* categories. Our list of eight modes of ethnic conflict resolution is taxonomic because it was arrived

at simply through researching cases of ethnic conflict termina-
tion and regulation, and putting together 'likes with likes'.[3]

However, our taxonomy does not suggest Linnaeus-like dis-
creteness or exhaustiveness. Often the eight modes are found in
combination and targeted at the same ethnic group(s), or,
alternatively, different strategies are aimed at different ethnic
groups within the same state. Thus the Nazis practised genocide,
mass-population transfers and hegemonic control of Jews. Stalin
practised genocide, mass-population transfers and hegemonic
control of multiple ethnic groups (see Chapter 3). Yugoslavia
under Tito practised elements of control, arbitration and con-
sociation (see Chapter 8). Oliver Cromwell offered Irish Cath-
olics a choice between genocide and forced mass-population
transfer. They could go 'To Hell or Connaught!' The USA
practised genocide on native Americans, integration of immi-
grant Europeans and control of black Americans in the deep
South. Contemporary Israel practises consociationalism amongst
Jews of different ethnic origin but control over Palestinians; it
practised mass-population transfers in the past and may do so
again. Belgium has practised consociationalism to regulate div-
isions between its 'spiritual families' and federalism to resolve
tensions between its linguistic communities (Chapter 12).

However, it is beneficial to divide our taxonomy through a
logical distinction, which creates a typological contrast: some
modes of ethnic conflict regulation seek to eliminate or terminate
ethnic differences, whereas others seek to manage the conse-
quences of ethnic differences. Thus genocide, mass-population
transfers, partition/secession and integration/assimilation are
all political strategies which seek to eliminate ethnic differences,
at least within a given state. By contrast the strategies which seek
to manage the consequences of ethnic differences are those of
control, arbitration, federalism/cantonisation and consociatio-
nalism.[4]

It is possible, and desirable, to rank the eight methods in the
taxonomy normatively, even if it is not possible to construct a
simple or lexicographic moral hierarchy. It is not, in our opinion,
possible or desirable to say that either difference-eliminating or
difference-managing methods are inherently superior. Of the
eliminating-differences strategies there are moral justifications
for partition/secession (e.g. Barry 1991c; Beran 1987; Buchanan
1991) and arguments for integration (assimilation) which

have been advanced by generations of liberals and socialists. However, there is no obvious moral hierarchy which enables people to claim that integration is better than partition (or vice versa), unless there is widespread consent for one option rather than the other, where widespread consent refers to substantial majorities within all the relevant ethnic communities. The merits of partition/secession as against integration/assimilation must be decided by political argument and pragmatic considerations, such as feasibility and estimates about long-run efficacy. There is nothing morally weighty to be said in favour of genocide or forced mass-population transfers, the other difference-eliminating strategies, although 'ethical' arguments have usually accompanied the implementation of these gruesome projects.

Of the managing-differences strategies one should be morally unacceptable to liberals, namely hegemonic control (see below). The rest (arbitration, cantonisation/federalism and consociationalism) are compatible with democratic norms, although there are many liberal critics of the democratic quality of consociational practices (e.g. Barry 1991a, b; Lustick 1979; Glazer 1987). Advocacy of the merits of the remaining strategies, namely federalism/ cantonisation, consociation and arbitration, must, however, be tempered by empirical judgements about their feasibility and long-term efficacy.

(i) Eliminating differences

(a) Genocide

The first two extreme and terminal 'solutions' to ethnic conflict are the most abhorrent: genocide and forced mass-population transfers. They often go together. Genocide literally means the killing of a *genos* (a race or kind). There is some controversy as to how the concept should be used, either legally or by social scientists (e.g. Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kuper 1981). We think the concept should be confined to cases where the victims share (real or alleged) ascriptive traits, while Harff's useful term *politicide* should be employed for the systematic mass killing of people who may or may not share ascriptive traits (Harff 1992).

Genocide, then, is the systematic mass-killing of an ethnic collectivity (however defined), or the indirect destruction of such

a community through the deliberate termination of the conditions which permit its biological and social reproduction. On this definition appalling genocides were perpetrated by the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s, and within the Communist bloc in Eurasia. The European colonisers in the Americas, and Russians and Turks in the Tsarist and Ottoman empires also perpetrated genocides by this definition. The option of genocide remains available to political actors in the modern world. Despite the infamy won by Hitler and Stalin it is wishful thinking to assume that genocide has become unthinkable.[5] Since 1945 there have been genocides perpetrated in the Soviet Union (of the Chechens, the Ingushi, the Karachai, the Balkars, the Meskhetians and the Crimean Tartars[6]); in Burundi (of Hutu, see Chapter 7); in Iraq (of the Kurds); in Paraguay (of the Ache Indians); in Indonesia (of the Chinese[7] and the indigenous population of East Timor); in Nigeria (of Ibo residents in the north); in Equatorial Guinea (of the Bubi); in Uganda (of the Karamojong, the Acholi, the Lango, Nilotic tribes and the Bagandans); in Pakistan (of the Bengalis in what became Bangladesh); in Burma (of Muslims in border regions); and in Iran (of Kurds and Baha'is). We therefore still live in a world in which genocide is practised; indeed, in absolute terms the twentieth century has been more genocidal than its predecessors. Only confident optimists believe genocide has become outmoded because of the triumph of universal norms in what some sociologists are pleased to call 'late modernity'.

Genocides are usually one-sided – indeed some would say this is one of their defining features (Jonassohn 1992: 19) – and they are intended to terminate ethnic conflict. In the construction of many empires it can be said that genocides 'worked': they secured the relevant territories for imperial rulers. European Jews were the victims of the most atrocious genocide in the Second World War, and the Armenians suffered grievously in the First World War, and in both cases the perpetrators resolved on final solutions, believing it would stabilise their empires. Yet genocides often fail to achieve their objectives and always create explosive and historically entrenched bitterness and fear amongst the descendants of victims. Serb–Croat relations in what was Yugoslavia are inflamed by memories of war-time genocide during the Second World War (Chapter 8). If Russians and indigenous groups in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

are to co-exist peacefully lots of skeletons have to remain buried (Chapter 3). The state of Israel's 'siege mentality' owes its existence to a reaction against the Nazi genocide of Jews.[8] Moreover, one of the consequences in a community which has undergone genocide is a very high birth-rate, which often shifts a political conflict downstream to the next generation.

It is possible to identify circumstances under which genocide is likely to be contemplated. *State genocide* is more likely to occur when:

- an empire is being constructed and maintained (e.g. genocide was used as a deliberate policy of land acquisition and mass terrorisation by European settler-states in the 'new world', Africa and Australasia);
- an ethnic community lacks geo-political resources, such as its own state or a powerful diaspora (like Armenians, European Jews and Gypsies);
- a subordinate ethnic community is left vulnerable within a disintegrating system of control, whether organised by an empire or a party dictatorship, (like Armenians and Bosnian Muslims);
- a given ethnic community (Jews, Ibos, Armenians, overseas Chinese) possesses economic superiority and cultural identifiability in conditions of industrialisation, but lacks military and political power (Gellner 1983: 105);
- the relevant state is not democratic.[9]

Frontier genocide, which by contrast may not be directly implemented by state officials, is likely to occur when settlers, possessed of technologically superior resources, displace natives from their access to land. It is a concomitant of colonisation and conquest.

These conditions are facilitative, not necessary. An obvious necessary condition for genocide appears to be the presence of a racial, ethnic or religious ideology which sanctions a non-universalist conception of the human species, and makes mass-murder easier to accomplish. These belief-systems may be more important than technological capacities for managing mass-killings, as it is the discipline of the killers, rather than their instruments, which may best account for the scale of genocides. The Old Testament God of the Jews (and subsequently of the Christians and Muslims) could be used to sanction the extermi-

nation of peoples long before Nazi racism. Some have argued that ideological (as opposed to imperial) genocides are modern: beginning in the religious wars of the Middle Ages they have been carried further by the spread of nationalist and Marxist–Leninist doctrines. We do not agree. For us, the rise and fall of empires is primary in explaining the conditions which facilitate genocide, and genocide is not 'modern', although it occurs in modern times. Moreover, nationalism and racism should be carefully distinguished. Nationalism is not inherently genocidal, though racism may be. Genocides can be instrumental and 'pre-emptive' as well as being ideological: indigenous peoples were killed by European colonisers on the supposition that their circumstances were those of 'kill or be killed'. The same beliefs seem to have been important in motivating Tutsi genocides of Hutu in Burundi (Chapter 7).

(b) Forced mass-population transfers

Forced mass-population transfers occur where one (or more) ethnic community is physically transplanted from its homeland and compelled to live elsewhere. Some Serbians have coined a chilling expression for forced mass-population transfers, 'ethnic cleansing'. A population (or populations) can also be forcibly 'repatriated' and pushed back towards its alleged 'homeland', as occurred during the high tide of apartheid in South Africa. Forced mass-population transfers must be distinguished from agreed 'population exchanges', i.e. the transfers which accompany agreed secessions or partitions, such as those between Greece and Turkey after the end of the Second World War. The population transfers in Cyprus in 1974/5 were in no sense agreed, by comparison with the Greek–Turk exchanges of the 1920s. They were the result of frightened populations moving under the threat of military coercion. The populations which move after 'agreed exchanges' between states never consider such moves to be voluntary, but their fate must be distinguished from those unilaterally compelled to move.

Forced mass-population transfers may displace but they do not always terminate ethnic conflict. The ethnic turmoil in what was the Soviet Union is partly an outcome of forced mass-population transfers executed by Lenin and Stalin and their successors (Chapter 3). Violence in the contemporary Caucasus is, in part,

the result of similar policies pursued by both Tsarist and Ottoman emperors. Palestinians were expelled from Israel during the insurrectionary war which founded the state of Israel, and many Palestinians fear that the settlement of the West Bank by Israeli colonisers is merely the prelude to a further set of expulsions. In turn the creation of a Palestinian diaspora helped precipitate the destabilisation of Jordan, the Lebanon, and even Kuwait. Some presently fear that the Muslims of Bosnia may become the Palestinians of Europe: dispossessed, repressed people living in refugee camps, desperate to recover their former lands. In what soon may be described as the former state of Ethiopia forced resettlement policies exacerbated the civil war and famine-proneness of the country during the mid-1980s. In the last decade the states of Nigeria, Vietnam and Burma have expelled large numbers of residents on plainly ethnic criteria, and India has promised to expel Bengali immigrants (from Bangladesh) from the state of Assam, although this decision has not yet been implemented when going to press.

Forced mass-population transfers, like genocides, are often advocated as integral components of imperial consolidation strategies. They are usually implemented after or during wars and civil wars – consider Oliver Cromwell's 'transplantation' strategies in Ireland, Tsarist and Turkish policies in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, Stalin's movement of the Volga Germans, Cossacks and others, and Milosevic's 'Greater Serbia' project. Forced mass-population transfers are also likely to be advocated in response to the perceived threat of 'ethnic swamping', as seen in the Assamese demonstrations against illegal Bengali immigration, or in response to economic depressions, when the call for 'repatriation' of 'guest-workers' may be extended to include all those who are not 'sons and daughters of the soil'. 'Ethnic cleansing' by Serbian irregulars in Bosnia demonstrates that forced mass-population transfers can be narrowly instrumental: to establish 'facts' which might make future territorial adjustments 'impossible'.

There are no moral merits to forced mass-population transfers, especially as they facilitate genocidal assaults on vulnerable populations and/or encourage the likelihood that the victims will suffer from famine. Forced mass-population transfers violate minimalist conceptions of human rights and egalitarian political philosophies. Nevertheless where peoples believe that their

homelands have been stolen from them by settler-peoples it becomes thinkable if not justifiable to argue that historic retribution is in order.

(c) Partition and/or secession (self-determination)

Genocide and forced mass-population transfers are obnoxious from the perspective of modern liberalism or modern socialism. By contrast, partitioning territories to permit self-determination or secession can, in principle, respect the rights of ethnic communities. Partition, self-determination and secession are compatible with liberal democratic institutions (universal, periodic and competitive elections, alternations in power, and civic freedoms of expression, assembly and organisation), in that such states can, in principle, permit secessions and preserve democratic institutions. Partition resolves ethnic conflict, if it works, by breaking up multi-ethnic states, or by allowing divorce between those ethnic communities which do not wish to live together in the same state.

Between the years 1948 and 1991 only one new state, Bangladesh, was carved out of an existing state – if we exclude the very numerous cases of decolonisation of European and US-controlled territories in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, since the collapse of the communist empires of Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union secession has become a growth-industry, the in-vogue method of ethnic conflict-resolution. Iraq will be next if Iraqi Kurds are allowed to have their way. The secession of Quebec from Canada remains a possibility after Canadians overwhelmingly rejected a proposed constitutional settlement in a referendum in October 1992. There are secessionist or semi-secessionist[10] movements in Europe (e.g. amongst the Basque, Corsican, Northern Irish nationalist, Scottish, Slovak and Welsh peoples); in Africa (e.g. the Polisario movement in the Moroccan-controlled western Sahara, the Dinkas of the southern Sudan and a bewildering variety of communities in the Horn of Africa); in the new republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh wishes to secede from Azerbaijan, South Ossetia from Georgia, Crimea from the Ukraine, and the 'Dniester Republic' from Moravia); and in central and southern Asia (e.g. the Khalistan movement for a Sikh homeland, the Kashmiri independence movement, Tibetans

in Communist China, and the multiple ethnic secessionists of Burma).

The normative idea behind principled partitions and secessions is the principle of self-determination.[11] The key problem with the principle of self-determination as a means of eliminating ethnic conflict is that it begs four questions:

- Who are the people?
- What is the relevant territorial unit in which they should exercise self-determination?
- What constitutes a majority?
- Does secession produce a domino effect in which ethnic minorities within seceding territories seek self-determination for themselves?

In what were Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union these questions are hardly academic. As Lieven and McGarry and Schöpflin show here they have given rise to multiple civil wars. There are many other hard cases in seeking to apply the doctrine of self-determination. In Transylvania there are two major populations (Hungarians and Romanians) mixed together in the same region along with other smaller communities. In Northern Ireland each ethnic community claims that it is part of another nation, and wishes the putative boundaries of that nation to be the relevant jurisdiction for decision-making (Chapter 6).[12] In Quebec, native Canadians, who occupy a huge proportion of the province's land-mass, are unwilling to secede from Canada with the Francophone majority (Chapter 2). In the Punjab (Chapter 4) and Kashmir, Hindus vehemently oppose the very idea of secession. In Slovakia, the Hungarian minority fears that the secession of the Slovaks from Czechoslovakia will be detrimental to their interests.

The constitution of a majority for self-determination begs the question of a majority in what region? In moderately complex cases the principle of self-determination seems indeterminate. As Ivor Jennings remarked:

> On the surface [the principle of self-determination] seem[s] reasonable: let the people decide. It [i]s in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.
>
> (Jennings 1956: 56)

Exercising the principle of self-determination is only straightforward where there is no large or disgruntled ethnic minority within the relevant region affected by the proposed secession *and* when the seceding area includes the great majority of those who wish to leave. Unfortunately it is difficult to think of instances where these optimum conditions have applied. Norway's secession from Sweden was an exemplary case. So was the case of Swiss Jura. Here, in an 'internal secession', plebiscites were held commune by commune to produce a result that split the new canton into two, along religious lines (Protestants voted to stay with Berne canton). By contrast the partitions of Ireland and India left significant minorities behind in Northern Ireland and Kashmir. Even when secessions seem straightforward, and the seceding areas appear reasonably homogeneous, new conflicts can emerge fairly rapidly. The Ukraine is a possible future example. Most commentators have focused on the dangers posed by the sizeable Russian minority, but less attention has been paid to the deep historical, cultural and geographical divisions between Catholic westerners (who were annexed by Stalin) and the Orthodox (who have been linked to Russia for some three centuries). After the glow of national liberation fades, so might Ukrainian national unity.

There have been some ingenious proposals about how to construct a normative liberal theory of secession (e.g. Beran 1984; 1987), which can answer Jennings's question: 'Who decides who are the people?' Beran advances the argument that every (self-defined) area within a liberal democratic state should be given the right to secede, provided the same right is extended to every sub-area within the proposed secessionist territory. This argument answers the serious accusation that self-determination creates a dangerous domino effect by saying two different things:

- there is nothing wrong with allowing a state to fragment on the principle of self-determination; and
- the fact that the seceding units themselves should grant the right of self-determination within their boundaries should put a prudential check on the aspiration to seek self-determination in territorially problematic zones.

Adam and Moodley accept the thesis that people should be entitled to secede from democratic states. They think that it is important to reduce the fears of the Zulu-based Inkatha and

white extremists that a democratic South Africa will become a
vehicle of ANC/non-Zulu black power (Chapter 10). They think
that the inclusion of a secession clause in the new South African
constitution will create incentives to accommodate ethnic minor-
ities (for a contrary argument see Buchanan 1991: 159-61).

However, the right of secession seems unlikely to be entren-
ched in many modern liberal democratic constitutions,[13] and
secession is likely to continue to have a bad press amongst
liberals and socialists. But with the collapse of the global cold
war, there is now much greater room for successful secession and
the alteration of borders artificially frozen by the strategic
interests of the superpowers – as the reunification of Germany
suggests. The cold war had elevated the stability of boundaries
into a necessity: rather than face nuclear confrontation each
superpower respected the boundaries of the other's client-states,
at least in Europe. 'Globalisation' and the increasing power of
supra-state organisations may also make some international
boundaries less inviolate.

Secession remains an option very likely to produce violence,
and problems (initially) as bad as the ones it is intended to solve.
Partitions can lead to population movements, often involuntary
ones, and populations on the move are highly vulnerable to
massacre, as happened during and after the partition of the
Indian subcontinent (Khoshla 1950). Whether implementing
secession is straightforward, on Beran's lines or not, the proposal
of any community to secede from any state is likely to encourage
key elites in the affected states to behave in chauvinistic and war-
like ways. Normally secessionist movements provoke elites
satisfied with the existing state into mobilising 'Unionist' move-
ments against traitors. It was ironic to watch American com-
mentators warning the Soviet Union during 1990-1 to allow its
republics the right to self-determination. As Gorbachev observed,
Lincoln's heirs have short memories.

What can be said of a general nature about the circumstances
under which secession/partitions are likely to be carried out?
Three external phenomena matter most and need to be studied
closely: the nature of the inter-state system (is it permissive or
restrictive?); the aftermath of wars (which often lead to territorial
transfers/partitions, often without any considerations of consent)
and the disintegration of empires (although this observation is
almost tautological).

People seek full self-determination, in the form of independent statehood, for a variety of reasons. The urge for self-government may be motivated by a reaction against ethnic discrimination and humiliation, by the pragmatic expectation that the new nation-state will have greater economic and political freedom, by the wish to have a state in which different public policies will be pursued, by the desire for power and prestige amongst nationalist elites, or to protect a given ethnic culture from extinction. Not much of a very general nature can be successfully sustained about the economic circumstances or motivations of full-scale ethnic secessionist movements (Connor 1973). One observer notes that secessions are demanded both by economically advanced groups (e.g. Basques, Catalans, Ibos, Lombards, Sikhs, Tamils) and by economically backward communities (East Bengalis, Karens, Kurds, Slovaks); and that the secessionist communities can be located in either backward or advanced regional economies (Horowitz 1985: 229ff).

Most importantly enthusiasm for the principle of self-determination flows from the democratisation of the world. Democratisation means that the people are to rule. The statist declares that the people are all those who are resident in a given state or political unit's boundaries (the civic nationalist); the nationalist that they are the nation (the ethnic nationalist). In a few happy cases – Iceland – these two answers approximately coincide. However, in most cases the two definitions of the people do not coincide. In the general case the definition and championing of the people are up for grabs, and the possibility of partition/secession enters into the fabric of any state where the ethnic and civic nationalisms may point to different definitions of the nation.

Once democratisation poses the issue of the definition of the people a clustered set of issues automatically follows: the most important of which are the definition of citizenship, the possession of the franchise, the state's boundaries and the organisational structure of the state. These issues create incentives for political entrepreneurs to make party-building efforts out of ethnic cleavages, whether at the foundation of the state or afterwards. Politicians in multi-ethnic states have multiple incentives to play the ethnic card: whether it be Randolph Churchill playing the Orange card in the UK in the 1880s or Jean-Marie Le Pen playing the Algerian card in France in the

1980s. It is not possible to immunise the democratic process to exclude potentially explosive civic and ethnic issues. They are always there for mobilisation by the oppressed or the opportunist or both. Those who lose out politically under existing state arrangements and policies, whoever they may be, may always choose to redefine the rules of the game by playing the ethnic card in the arena of party politics.

A final reason why ethnic questions are potentially explosive, and raise the possibility that some people(s) will be tempted to exercise self-determination through secession is simple. Ethnic questions raise relatively non-tradable issues. Nationality, language, territorial homelands and culture are not easily bargained over. They create zero-sum conflicts, and therefore provide ideal materials for political entrepreneurs interested in creating or dividing political constituencies.

Having suggested reasons why democratisation increases the likelihood that political actors will seek self-determination for their community and thereby destabilise existing multi-ethnic states we must make two qualifications. First, destabilisation is likely to be contained if the relevant state or region exists in a milieu of other liberal democratic states. Thus far, in the twentieth century, liberal democracies have never gone to war against one another. Second, there are some circumstances under which the destabilising effects of democratisation upon multi-ethnic states can be muted, and inhibit the impetus to consider secession. These factors include:

- internal territorial segregation which permits self-government ('good fences make good neighbours');
- demographic dominance (where the large group is sufficiently secure not to fear the minority (or minorities) and behaves in a generous way);
- demographic stability (where one or more groups are not outgrowing or 'outfalling' one another); and
- a history of pre-democratic co-operation amongst ethnic political elites which gives the post-authoritarian state a reasonable chance of promoting accommodation.

(d) Integration and/or assimilation

A fourth method of macro-political ethnic conflict regulation is

built upon the idea of trying to eliminate differences within the state by seeking to integrate or assimilate the relevant ethnic communities into a new transcendent identity. Whereas civic integration has the more modest object of creating a common civic, national or patriotic identity,[14] ethnic assimilation aims to create a common ethnic identity through the merging of differences (the melting pot).

Integration/assimilation has been the official aspiration of civil rights leaders in the USA, the African National Congress in South Africa, unionist integrationists and the integrated education lobby in Northern Ireland (Chapter 6), and the democratic left in those European countries striving to cope with immigrant influxes. Though inconceivable a few years ago, integration/ assimilation has been embraced by pragmatists in South Africa's National Party who believe that the economic status quo can be secured and improved under liberal integration better than under apartheid (Chapter 10).

Usually people who advocate integration policies favour reducing the differences between ethnic communities, ensuring that the children of the (potentially rival) ethnic communities go to the same schools, socialising them in the same language and conventions, encouraging public and private housing policies which prevent ethnic segregation, and ensuring that the workplace is ethnically integrated through outlawing discrimination. Liberal integrationists promote bills of rights with equal rights for individuals, rather than communities. Assimilation policies go further. They favour the merging of ethnic identities, either into one already established identity (e.g. a French identity) or into a new one (e.g. a Soviet or Yugoslav identity). The ultimate proof of successful assimilation is large-scale intermarriage across the former ethnic boundaries which leads first to their blurring and then to their eradication. Integrationists and assimilationists also support 'catch-all' political parties, arguing against ethnic political parties, and aim to shun all policies which might show up differences between communities.[15]

This strategy of ethnic conflict management is driven by both high-minded and instrumental motives. Liberals and socialists, with the best of intentions, associate ethnic pluralism with sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-mindedness and chauvinist bigotry. They maintain that those opposed to integration either want or risk societal disintegration. Canadian integrationists

demanded a Charter of Rights after 1945 to prevent a repeat of the war-time internment of ethnic minorities (Japanese, Italians and Ukrainians). White liberals in the USA funded court cases promoting black integration. Other liberals in North America sincerely advocate the assimilation of aboriginal minorities as the best way to end the atrocious conditions on reservations (e.g. Gibson 1992). Likewise the European left generally espouses the integration of immigrants because it abhors racism and discrimination. However, sometimes integrationism is not so high-minded: in Northern Ireland those who advocate integration of all as either British or Irish citizens are often merely interested in scoring ethnic points; while in South Africa some of those who advocate integration are either interested in preserving their economic privileges (whites) or see it as a way of establishing majority control (blacks). Sometimes integrationism is not even accompanied by formal generosity – consider white Canadians or white Britons who rail against Sikhs being allowed to wear their turbans where others would not be permitted to do so.

The targets of integration/assimilation policies respond in various ways – partly as a function of their perceptions of the motives lying behind the policies. Integration/assimilation policies are often targeted at migrants in liberal democratic states. These policies are more overtly liberal than the form of quasi-control associated with *metic* or guest-worker policies. In Canada, immigrant communities have acquired a Canadian civic identity on top of their original ethnic identity. The United States has proved a 'melting pot' in which some ethnic assimilation has taken place, although it would be better to say that white Protestants have assimilated (Swedes, Norwegians and Germans), and that white Catholics (Irish, Italians and Poles) have gradually assimilated. After 1945, both Canada and the USA have had some success in integrating Asian immigrants. Similarly, 'New Australians' have emerged in the wake of post-war continental European migrations. But these cases of moderately successful integration/assimilation involved migrations to a 'new' country, where the migrants, in principle, were willing to adapt their cultures to their new host country and accept a new civic identity.

Qualitatively different integration/assimilationist projects are those aimed at uniting (moderately) different communities against a common foe. The Anglican ascendancy in eighteenth-

and nineteenth-century Ireland promoted pan-Protestant unity against an insurgent native/Catholic threat. The South African government has ensured that all whites (English, Greeks, Italians, European Jews) and not just Afrikaners have benefited from apartheid, to create pan-white unity against blacks. Israeli governments have sought to downplay Sephardic–Ashkenazi differences in the interest of presenting a united front against Palestinians. During the nineteenth century the dominant English minority in Quebec welcomed Irish and other English-speaking immigrants as allies against French-Canadians. Contemporary *Québécois*, troubled by the low birth-rate amongst Francophones, have recently turned to non-white but French-speaking immigrants (from Haiti, Senegal and former French colonies) to bolster their linguistic community.

Mutually agreed integration/assimilation projects have reasonable prospects of success. However, where ethnic communities seek more than civic equality or equal opportunity and insist on autonomy or self-government (or where no external threat can compel pan-community unity) integration/assimilation policies fall on stonier ground. Ethnic communities living in their ancestral territories, for example, are often less willing than individual migrants to shed their culture or accept some new overarching identity. In the USA and Canada native Americans resist assimilation and hold out for varying degrees of self-government (or what we call cantonisation below). They call themselves 'first nations' to stress the moral superiority of their claims to cultural protection.[16]

Assimilation in contested homelands, however high-minded, cannot work where it involves assimilation on one community's terms: if one community's language, culture, religion and national myths are given precedence then we are not talking of assimilation or integration but of annexation; in such cases people complain of *ethnocide*, the destruction of a people's culture as opposed to physical liquidation of its members. This complaint is the standard one raised by the indigenous peoples of the world. Some forms of integration and assimilation appear to require coercion: compulsory educational homogenisation and the imposition of standard cultural codes as preconditions of full industrial and welfare-state citizenship. Making peasants into French people in the nineteenth century, the schooling of black South Africans in Afrikaans, the 'Russification' practised by the

Tsars and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the periodic attempts at Anglicisation of French Canada in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the 'Romanisation' implemented by Ceaucescu in Transylvania, are policies cut from the same cloth. But even arguably more neutral strategies of integration/assimilation encounter significant resistance: as with Nehruvian secularism in India (Chapter 4), or Yugoslav (Chapter 8) and Soviet communism (Chapter 3). These efforts to establish transcending or pan-ethnic identities are often seen by minorities as disguised forms of cultural annexation, although the same policies may be rejected by the relevant dominant communities who see transcendent or pan-ethnic identities as detrimental to their (Hindu, Serbian or Russian) cultures.

Those who regard assimilation/integration strategies as benign forms of ethnic conflict regulation in contested homelands underestimate the difficulties involved. Optimistic observers of South Africa need to be counselled that it will be some time before representative Afrikaners and blacks embrace the ANC and the National Party respectively. The Hutu in Burundi, as Lemarchand suggests, are unlikely to abandon their distinct identity or their ethnic organisations just because such actions would fit the agenda of the Tutsi-dominated government (Chapter 7). In the foreseeable future, Northern Ireland Catholics, Basques and Croats are unlikely to be integrated or assimilated with their ethnic enemies. In fact, resistance to unwanted assimilation or integration projects is likely to be very high,[17] and can provoke ethnic revivals and secessionism in response, as has occurred in Burma, Ghana, Iraq, Sudan and Uganda (Horowitz 1985: 567-8). It is axiomatic that modern ethnic identities can only be significantly sustained through educational and neighbourhood segregation of some kind, because these conditions are necessary to preserve a cultural critical mass in the relevant communities. Some go further and claim that such communities require broadcasting media and control over access to land to sustain their identities. Such arguments explain why policies designed to compel people to be schooled together and to be neighbours are provocative, and possibly productive of violence. In short, unless assimilation/integration projects are targeted at people willing to acquire a new civic identity (like voluntary migrants) and to modify their ethnic identity, they produce rather than provoke conflict (Nordlinger 1972: 36-9).

For these reasons, amongst others, many liberal democracies which are managing large-scale immigrations, or multiple recently established ethnic communities, have realised that multi-cultural policies make greater sense than straightforward integration or assimilation strategies. They are abandoning the spirit of classical liberalism to manage immigrants. In England and France, at least in previous generations, liberals had a general bias towards integration/assimilation as macro-political forms of ethnic conflict resolution – at least within the metropolitan cores of their empires. However, this strategy seeks to resolve ethnic conflict by eliminating ethnic differences when the relevant problem is the desire of members of ethnic communities to maintain differences: which liberals committed to the right of individuals to choose their own conceptions of the good find it hard to argue against. This difficulty leads to a normative division of opinion between liberal integrationists (who are accused of intolerance) and liberal multi-culturalists (who are accused of surrendering liberalism to a form of relativism which tolerates illiberalism, e.g. in the form of Muslim schools). Liberal multi-culturalists are on their way to considering the merits of macro-political ways of resolving ethnic conflict which rely on managing differences rather than eliminating them (e.g. Kymlicka 1991).

Political engineers seeking to resolve ethnic conflict also frequently recommend the development of catch-all political parties to break down the salience of ethnic cleavages, i.e. they advocate electoral integration. For example, the absence of Great Britain's political parties in Northern Ireland before 1989 led one enthusiast for electoral integration to argue that the British party boycott was 'the fundamental reason' for continuing conflict in the region (Roberts 1990: 132). Those persuaded of the merits of engineering electoral integration include the military framers of Nigeria's second constitution, which forced political parties to develop some support in all regions of the state.

Such electoral integrationist projects may be well-intentioned ways of regulating ethnic conflict, but they are mostly based on wishful thinking. If there are parties which already mobilise across ethnic divisions then political stability is likely to be greater, and that is all to the good, but the belief that one can generate parties with such effects through heroic acts of will or engineering is fundamentally utopian, especially if the relevant