

THE POLITICS OF **MARITIME POWER**

A SURVEY



Editor **ANDREW T H TAN**

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Introduction

This reference volume, *The Politics of Maritime Power: A Survey*, examines the modern-day use of maritime power for achieving a range of political objectives. While crucial major maritime battles were fought during the Second World War in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the post-war period there was a naval standoff between a vast US navy and an ambitious and growing Soviet navy. The USA established a strong world-wide presence owing to its ability to deploy warships, aircraft carriers and heavy land forces globally. It has used its navy for diplomacy, e.g. for maintaining far-flung alliances; for deterrent purposes, for example in the vicinity of the Taiwan Straits during the tensions arising from Chinese missile tests in 1995–96; for expeditionary war-fighting operations, e.g. its crucial support roles in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and both Gulf Wars; and for humanitarian relief, e.g. assistance following tsunamis and earthquakes in Indonesia. Increasingly, in the context of the emergence of global terrorism epitomized by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the USA, maritime power has also been increasingly employed in counter-terrorism, e.g. in joint patrols, counter-terrorism exercises and in intercepting ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

Despite the end of the Cold War, a number of developments have raised the importance of maritime power. Globalization, for instance, has resulted in the growth of international trade as well as just-in-time manufacturing techniques. The emergence of this global interlinked economy that is highly dependent on sea-borne trade, sea-lanes of communications and strategic waterways has placed greater burdens on maritime forces in policing both coastal and the high seas. The increasing reliance on long and vulnerable sea-lanes of communications for resources and markets has also led to much greater importance being attached to sea power by emerging economic powerhouses such as China and India.

The post-Cold War era has also seen a more complex and amorphous threat environment, including complex emergency situations in far-flung parts of the globe which necessitate naval rescue or intervention capabilities, and active pre-emption against security and terrorist threats in various trouble spots.

In addition, continuing and growing rivalries between great as well as regional powers in the more multi-polar post-Cold War environment, as well as historical conflicts over maritime territory, made more acute in an era of competition for maritime resources and 370-km (200-nautical mile) Exclusive Economic Zones, have resulted in ever-growing interest in acquiring and enhancing maritime power. The growing list of countries acquiring, or enhancing, aircraft carrier and amphibious landing capabilities, for instance, is indicative of this trend. The attractiveness of maritime power is that, unlike land and air power, it has a range of uses that make it a flexible and effective instrument of the state. With its

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mobility, reach, visibility, and ability to deploy a range of capabilities, it can be used for a range of purposes, such as deterrence, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention and war-fighting, without the need for in-theatre basing facilities, so long as logistical support vessels are available. An expeditionary force could also stay within range of any land-based objective without violating any international law or the sovereignty of any state, so long as it stayed in international waters. Finally, maritime power is also a visible manifestation of the power of the state, with every great power today aspiring to maintain a great navy as a symbol of its status.

The caveat that needs to be introduced here is that maritime power is not just for the great powers. Even small countries maintain maritime capabilities for a number of reasons. New Zealand's small fleet of two modern frigates, without anti-ship missile capabilities, as well as its new amphibious ship, is significant in the context of the micro island states of the South Pacific, and provides New Zealand with the capability to perform a variety of functions in its local regional context. The new amphibious ship is also a useful, cost-effective political instrument in enabling New Zealand to rebuild its diplomatic and security ties with the Western alliance, whilst at the same time serving as a visible political symbol of New Zealand's continued relevance in the Asia-Pacific region as well as further afield. Singapore's small but sophisticated navy has four small but useful landing platform docks which it has used for rescue purposes following tsunamis in Indonesia and for patrolling the Iraqi coast as part of its contribution to the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003. Such maritime capabilities enable it to 'punch above its weight' and afford political visibility.

The Politics of Maritime Power is thus an exploration of the contemporary facets of maritime power, particularly as a *political* instrument of the state, in the post-Second World War era.

Given the many books on naval history, this reference volume will concentrate on the contemporary post-1945 context. The volume is divided into parts: essays explore various aspects of modern maritime power, written by maritime experts; a glossary contains entries on various aspects of maritime power; a series of maps show major maritime zones; statistics inform on the naval capabilities of the major maritime powers; and a detailed bibliography provides suggestions for further research.

The first essay, entitled 'Towards a New Understanding of Maritime Power', by Bruce B. Stubbs and Scott C. Truver, attempts to define modern maritime power, including its many components and uses, as well as its contemporary evolution. The second essay, written by Norman Friedman, describes the evolution of maritime strategy, including its contemporary use and significance. The third essay, also written by Norman Friedman, examines military transformation in the naval context under the title of 'Navies and Technology'.

The fourth essay, on the historical use and continued relevance of naval diplomacy, is written by Peter T. Haydon. It underlines how navies have proven to be useful as a political instrument of the state. This is followed by Sam J. Tangredi's essay on 'Navies and Expeditionary Warfare', which examines the

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very contemporary concept of expeditionary warfare that is itself a development from amphibious warfare. The sixth essay, on the maintenance of good order in peacetime, including countering threats such as maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking in drugs, smuggling people and illegal fishing, as well as peacetime roles of confidence-building and naval peacekeeping, is written by Sam Bateman. This is followed by an essay by Daniel Moran which describes the maritime governance system. The essay section concludes with an important examination of the future of maritime power by Sam J. Tangredi.

The A–Z Glossary of Maritime Power section is written by Daniel Moran, Eric Grove, Harsh V. Pant, Jon Rob-Webb, Joshua Ho and Andrew T H Tan. Its many entries cover the following: major maritime laws, conventions and agreements; maritime organizations; major categories of weapons systems; major events, incidents and campaigns; major maritime and territorial disputes; major maritime powers, major naval contractors; and key contemporary maritime personalities.

It is the collective aim of the contributors to this volume that it should be used for training, reference and education. It will be especially useful to those pursuing naval studies, security studies, and to students of political science; naval professionals; those in the security industry; those working in the maritime industry; policymakers and analysts; and those wishing to further their understanding of the continuing and growing state interest in acquiring and using maritime power.

Andrew T H Tan
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Singapore
April 2007

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Acknowledgements

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Acknowledgements specific to the A–Z Glossary of Maritime Power are listed separately at the start of that section.

This volume is dedicated to naval personnel everywhere, without whom the maritime sphere could not have been used for so very many purposes, for the betterment of mankind.

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Policy, and the 1992 US Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century. With Dr Scott Truver he co-authored *America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding US Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century* (2000). After 9/11, the Commandant of the Coast Guard asked him to join his special task force on homeland security. Additionally, the Heritage Foundation asked him to join its homeland security task force. He has written articles frequently for the US Naval Institute's journal, *Proceedings*, as well as *Armed Forces Journal International*, *Sea Power*, *Government Executive*, and *Joint Forces Quarterly*, along with papers for the Heritage Foundation. He received the Naval Institute's first place prize for the 2004 Coast Guard Essay Contest. He holds a Master of Arts with distinction from the US Naval War College, a Master of Business Administration from the University of Washington, and Bachelor of Science degree from the US Coast Guard Academy.

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Abbreviations

AA	anti-aircraft
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
b/d	barrels per day
c.	circa
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
Cent.	Central
Chair.	chairman/chairwoman
DC	District of Columbia
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Dr	Doctor
Ed	Editor
Edn	Edition
Gen.	General
GPS	global positioning system
ha	hectare(s)
in	inch(es)
Is	Island/s
m.	million
MBA	master of business administration
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
mm	millimetre(s)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Neth.	Netherlands
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLA	People's Liberation Army (with ref. to China)
RAF	Royal Air Force
Ref.	reference
Rep.	Republic
S.	South
St	Saint
Switz.	Switzerland
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USN	United States Navy
WMD	weapon(s) of mass destruction

Note: in the text, 9/11 refers to 11 September 2001, the date of the al-Qa'ida attacks on New York and Washington, DC, USA.

Essays

Towards a New Understanding of Maritime Power

BRUCE B. STUBBS AND SCOTT C. TRUVER

‘The military aspect of sea power,’ Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy Sergei Gorshkov wrote in March 1978, ‘is of but *transitory importance*.’

It might seem odd to dredge up a quote by a deceased admiral who, during the height of the Cold War, commanded a navy that in early 2007 no longer exists. But, in light of the threats, challenges, and opportunities confronting all coastal and maritime states in the early years of the 21st century, his perspicacity was remarkable.

Acknowledging naval imperatives in defence of world socialism, Gorshkov none the less emphasized *non-military aspects*—particularly merchant fleets for sustaining economic growth, ocean science to understand the nature of the World Ocean, and the technological means to harness the ocean’s wealth—as equally critical elements of the sea power of the state but which are of timeless importance.

Nearly three decades on, while the military aspect of sea power has certainly not withered away, the *non-military aspects* of how states and the international community seek to maintain the peace, good order, and security of the maritime commons have assumed significant—if not pre-eminent—importance. Indeed, beginning in the late 1960s, running throughout the 1970s, and culminating in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its coming into force on 16 November 1994 (albeit still without US ratification in early 2007), a growing consensus has focused on the constabulary requirements and capabilities of coastal states for maritime—not specifically naval—power. In 1978, other than the navies of the two superpowers and a handful of near-first-rank naval states, most navies of the world were in reality coast guards, charged with ensuring maritime security and safety close by their shores, countering illegal migration and sea-borne contraband, protecting marine environments and resources, and safeguarding lives and property at peril on the seas. Even as territorial seas expanded to 12 nautical miles and patrimonial seas evolved into expansive 200-mile (370-km) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), the needs to guard the coast and control nearby ocean space remained fundamental concerns. In early 2007, many if not most navies of the world were coast guards in all but name, while other specialized maritime law-enforcement/constabulary forces figured prominently in national strategies, plans, and operations.

During this period, many coastal states have come to embrace, if implicitly, a new definition of sea power, one that comprises much more than naval power

alone. In the USA, the Coast Guard has been in the van for a similar expansion of national perspective—at least since the mid-1990s when the service confronted the block obsolescence of much of its “deepwater” assets and a proliferation of threats and challenges to US interests, citizens, and friends in waters close by America as well as far overseas. ‘America’s future will remain tied inextricably to the seas,’ a Coast Guard publication explained in early 2000.¹ ‘The seas link the nation with world commerce and trade, and allow us to project military power far from our shores to protect important US interests and friends. But the seas also serve as highways for a bewildering variety of transnational threats and challenges that honor no national frontier.’

While the reliance on naval power to achieve national military objectives is still fundamental to most seafaring nations, today it is but one manifestation of a broader concept of sea power—as is the unique aspect provided by the Coast Guard. Sea power for America is, at a minimum, a combination of the Coast Guard’s maritime power contribution, the commercial power contribution provided by the US-flag merchant marine, and the Navy’s naval power contribution. America still needs naval power for assured access and to command the seas, project power, and shape events on the land. But it also needs the Coast Guard’s maritime power to use the seas safely, fully, securely, and wisely—and to support US maritime security, safety, and stewardship. And while the US-flag merchant marine carries no more than 4% of America’s seaborne trade, it remains critically important for humanitarian, crisis-response, and military requirements.²

With the issuance of the joint Coast Guard/Navy National Fleet Policy Statement in September 1998 and its expansion in 2002 and 2006, the US Coast Guard and Navy have worked ever more closely to ensure that the nation’s full-spectrum capabilities for a new concept of maritime power can indeed be brought to bear. In this, however, there are significant strategy and policy, force structure and mix, research and development, acquisition, roles, missions, and tasks issues that must be addressed in the years ahead. Much remains to be done, but much hangs in the balance.

TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPT OF MARITIME POWER

The early 20th Century definition of the sea power of the state was based on Alfred Thayer Mahan’s notion that sea power rested upon the means needed to defeat organized military threats originating in nation states. In his seminal works, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (1890) and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire* (1892), Mahan argued that naval power was the key element in sea power and was the crucial element for success in international politics. The nation that controlled the seas—not just the ‘blue-ocean’ expanses but the littorals as well—and could protect commerce vital for the economy held the decisive factor in modern warfare. Mahan’s ideas stimulated the thinking of strategists and helped to justify naval expansion programmes throughout the world, at least for the next half-century if not longer.

Sea power thus became and remained synonymous with naval power.

But such a primary focus on navies and naval power no longer suffices in the first decade of the 21st century. Naval power is simply the ability to use military means at sea; it is an element or a subset of sea power, but it is not the same—much as homeland security and homeland defence are subsets of a state's overall national security posture. The growing realization in the USA of these fundamental differences—particularly as articulated in the September 2005 US *National Strategy for Maritime Security*—has generated calls for enhanced co-operation among the US Navy, Coast Guard, and other governmental agencies at the federal, state, and local levels; private organizations in the USA; and foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations to 'operationalize' an expanded concept that embraces state, regional, and global efforts to safeguard the good order of the maritime commons.

For example, in early 2006 the US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, stated: 'I believe sea power, as a notion, has become far too narrowly defined . . . For far too long it's been centered in my view on one of two things—programs and blue water. Building big things and putting them to sea . . . I really believe that's all too often been our focus,' he noted, 'and it's a focus that wrongly keeps us tied to a Cold War mentality.'³ Admiral Mullen argued that true sea power is a much broader and expansive concept than naval power, principally because the nature and scope of the threats have changed, if not the venues in which most of these threats and challenges could be encountered. This expanded definition of sea power must now include all elements of a country's relationships with the sea, harkening to Admiral Gorshkov's understanding and the Coast Guard's perspective.

'Accordingly, in today's and tomorrow's world,' then-Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thomas H. Collins remarked in the fall of 2003:

'I would suggest true sea power must be a broader and more expansive concept than naval power alone. Sea power in the 21st century is the ability of a nation to use the seas safely, securely, fully, and wisely to achieve national objectives. In this new security environment, we need new thinking, new partnerships and a new construct to provide the sea power we all want to ensure the safety and freedom of the seas for all, and the security for each of our nations. I suggest that today we need to think about a broad complement to 21st century naval power—*maritime power*.

21st century maritime power speaks to a nation's needs beyond the purely military capabilities needed for warfighting. It includes for each of us the use of the seas—to preserve marine resources, to ensure the safe transit and passage of cargoes and people on its waters, to protect its maritime borders from intrusion, to uphold its maritime sovereignty, to rescue the distressed who ply the oceans in ships, and to prevent misuse of the oceans. These are timeless interests, which are more relevant than ever, that collectively can be described as a nation's maritime security and safety interests.'⁴

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 forced the USA and its allies and partners to rethink their approach to naval, sea, and eventually maritime power in the

broader context of homeland security and homeland defence. Prior to 9/11, US borders were relatively unencumbered, international commerce moved freely, and the USA relied on its armed forces and the open expanse of the oceans surrounding North America to maintain its homeland security. But terrorists were able to use this free flow of people, money, and products to strike at the very heartland of America, just as they have in so many other countries.

COMPLEX, AMBIGUOUS AND LETHAL DANGERS

Today's maritime threat environment is ever more challenging than during the Cold War, when two superpower fleets challenged each other for control of the seas as the means to project military—not just naval—power throughout the world; and it certainly would have bewildered Mahan. Today's adversaries are proving harder to find than 'blue-ocean' aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces, despite the information and ISR—intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance—revolutions promising unprecedented levels of maritime domain awareness. Adversaries and their weapons of mass disruption/destruction might travel under the cover of legal commerce crucial to global economic vitality. Under a cloak of legal activity, they can cross international borders anywhere along thousands of miles of maritime borders. The USA confronts the challenge of protecting some 95,000 miles (153,000 km) of coastlines, more than 360 ports, and a territorial sea/EEZ that comprises more than 3.4m. sq. miles (9m. sq. km) of ocean space. Sorting the legal from the illegal in such a maritime domain nearby US territory—much less in the farther-abroad—is a highly complex and difficult problem that has no easy or inexpensive solution.

In addition to being diverse, unpredictable, asymmetric, and transnational, these threats and challenges—smuggling of drugs, arms, and people; terrorist mining of strategic ports and waterways; vessel-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-explosive weapons; piracy; over-exploitation of economic rights; organized crime; environmental attacks and trade disruption; political and religious extremism; mass migration flows; global health threats (e.g. the spread of infectious diseases such as SARS and avian flu); over-exploited fisheries and the destruction of marine habitats; and more—have few military contexts and are conveyed in ways that are not effectively countered by traditional military forces.

Little wonder, then, that US national security and military strategies put in place since September 2001 envision a 'Long War' of global dimensions against ambiguous yet dangerous adversaries—stateless terrorists and 'rogue' states that sponsor them; failing states that undermine regional stability; and a variety of violent extremists, insurgents, pirates, criminals, and paramilitary forces intent on doing the USA and its friends harm.

Indeed, the US *National Strategy for Maritime Security* makes this clear: 'Unlike traditional military scenarios in which adversaries and theaters of action are clearly defined, these nonmilitary, transnational threats often demand more than purely military undertakings to be defeated.' Moreover, the national strategy

states: 'Security of the maritime domain can be accomplished only by seamlessly employing all instruments of national power in a fully coordinated manner in concert with other nation-states consistent with international law.'

For the next 20 years if not longer, then, maritime security operations will primarily be against non-military, asymmetric threats that seek out weaknesses and gaps in security postures. Some of these, such as piracy and slave trade, are not new; others are without precedent. Although a conventional war threat from nation states cannot be disregarded, the more likely challenges to US and allied maritime interests will originate from non-state sources. Traditional military forces cannot effectively counter these threats as they commingle with and strive to become indistinguishable from legitimate commerce and recreational maritime traffic. Constabulary, law-enforcement, and police powers, not war-fighting capabilities, are most salient here.

That said, we also know that we must plan for conflict with a more conventional military 'peer competitor' that might emerge in the future—almost universally recognized as the People's Republic of China. Although the USA does not *anticipate* a war with China, the *possibility* of crisis or conflict is certainly a salient consideration in strategies, policies, force structures and mixes, and acquiring specific capabilities to counter Beijing's influence on US national interests through the use of its Navy. If the USA focuses solely or even principally on the GWOT—Global War on Terror—then it risks losing critical capabilities for what used to be called 'major theatre war'. Naval power will be vital for mission success, as Admiral Mullen noted during his change of command in July 2005: 'The Navy is first and foremost a fighting, sea-going service—always has been. The weapons and technology change. The ships, aircraft, and submarines certainly improve over time, but the job remains the same: to take the fight to the enemy so that he cannot take it to us.'⁵ That said, the real, close-in maritime threats and challenges are with us, today, and require a new approach, as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) remarked a month later:

'Without mastery of the sea—without sea power—we cannot protect trade, we cannot help those in peril, we cannot provide relief from natural disaster, and we cannot intercede when whole societies are torn asunder by slavery, weapons of mass destruction, drugs, and piracy. Without sea power we cannot hope—the world cannot hope—to achieve what President Bush has called 'a balance of power that favors freedom.'⁶

Thus, true 'sea power' for the USA and its allies, coalition partners, and friends must be a broader and more expansive concept than naval power alone. Admiral Gorshkov had it right: the sea power of the state in the early 21st century comprises the full-spectrum ability of a nation to use the seas safely, securely, fully, and wisely to achieve national objectives and sustain good order throughout the maritime commons. This new maritime security environment demands new thinking, new partnerships, and a new construct to provide the power at sea to ensure the security, safety and freedom of the seas for all. In short, we need to think about a broader complement to 21st-century naval power—maritime power.

Maritime *vice* Sea *vice* Naval Power

Such a concept of 21st-century maritime power speaks to a nation's needs beyond the purely military capabilities for war-fighting. It includes the use of the seas—to preserve marine resources, to ensure the safe transit and passage of cargoes and people on its waters, to protect maritime borders from intrusion, to uphold its maritime sovereignty, to rescue those in peril on the sea, and to prevent misuse of the oceans. These are timeless interests, but which are more relevant than ever and collectively can be described as a state's maritime security and safety interests intermingled with homeland defence and homeland security needs.

Diverse public agencies and non-governmental organizations are intimately involved in maritime security and wielding the maritime power of the state. In this new security environment for the USA, for example, the effective integration of and collaboration among the Departments of Defense (DoD), State (DoS), and Homeland Security (DHS), among others; the close involvement of the national intelligence community; other US inter-agency and governmental partners; civilian law-enforcement authorities; and private-sector maritime stakeholders and partners are crucial for maritime security. The maritime security programmes and initiatives of these agencies must be integrated and aligned into a comprehensive, cohesive national effort of scaleable, layered security. This includes full alignment and co-ordination with the private sector and other countries' public and private institutions.


Thus, success in securing the maritime domain will not come by navies acting alone, but through a layered security system that integrates the full maritime capabilities and interests of governments and commercial interests throughout the world. (See Figure 1.) The need for a strong integrated effort is reinforced by the fact that most of the maritime domain is under no nation's sovereignty. The 2005 *National Strategy for Maritime Security* emphasizes the importance of the inter-agency approach: 'Security of the maritime domain can be accomplished only by seamlessly employing all instruments of national power in a fully coordinated manner in concert with other nation-states consistent with international law.'

Although navy-to-navy confrontations on the high seas or in the littorals cannot be ignored, the 21st-century national security environment places much greater emphasis on maritime security and constabulary/law-enforcement operations for 'good order and discipline' at sea than on long-range weapons exchanges or amphibious assaults. Responding to the broad maritime threat environment can best be accomplished by national law-enforcement authorities acting within their domestic authorities and, where appropriate, in concert with other governments and within international frameworks.

Allies and Partners Understand

And, the USA is not alone in this understanding of the need to refocus a nation's endeavours to maritime power *vice* sea or naval power. In the March 2006 issue of the United States Naval Institute (USNI) *Proceedings*, for example, leaders of world navies expressed concern about the non-military, maritime threats

Figure 1. Application of Maritime Power



confronting the global community at sea or close by their coastlines and the means to deal with them effectively. Vice-Admiral J. W. Kelder of the Royal Netherlands Navy noted: ‘Maritime security threats—piracy, drug-trafficking, illegal immigrants, weapons smuggling, and weapons of mass destruction—as well as potential conflict areas, are diverse and unpredictable.’⁷

Rear-Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth of the Royal Norwegian Navy wrote that these threats share another trait: ‘Illegal activities such as piracy, smuggling, and terrorism know no borders and are rarely connected to a specific state. Neither are natural disasters or environmental hazards.’ Admiral Sebastian Zaragoza Soto of the Spanish Navy explained: ‘This task is more political than naval. Fighting crime at sea goes beyond the ‘just military’ approach.’ The German Navy’s Vice-Admiral Lutz Feldt added: ‘Maritime security, however, is an issue that touches on the tasks and responsibilities of more than a navy.’

Leaders of world navies recognize well this need for broad collaboration and co-operation in maritime affairs. For example, Vice-Admiral Russell E. Shalders of the Royal Australian Navy called it the ‘whole of government approach to maritime security’, which ‘is perhaps the biggest opportunity and challenge proffered by the concept. While navies are generally already in the business of sharing information and capacity, the involvement of other government and commercial agencies has latent potential. In Australia, the establishment of a Joint Offshore Protection Command, a collaborative Defense-Customs organization led by a navy admiral and established within the Australian Customs Service, is an example of one nation’s solution to inter-agency co-ordination.’

Vice-Admiral Feldt agreed: ‘The growing awareness in political circles that comprehensive security and safety can be ensured only in an inter-governmental approach to adequately meet future challenges and risks is cause for optimism. This will also offer maritime options to be brought into effect more frequently in the future and enable them to be integrated into a comprehensive security concept.’

Facilitated by New Regimes

And, new regimes for maritime security and jurisdictional reach and authorities are key concerns for naval and maritime leaders. In that regard, in early 2007 Vice-Admiral Vivien Crea, Vice-Commandant of the US Coast Guard, explained:

‘We are carefully designing and building a maritime regime which through regulation, international engagement, collaboration with private industry and federal, state, and local partners seeks to push our borders off shore, identify and mitigate threats before they reach our nation’s ports and waterways. We also have refined processes, improved maritime domain awareness and information sharing, and developed stronger partnerships at federal, state, and local agency levels and also with industry and private organizations at home and overseas.’⁸

Similarly (as reported in the March 2006 USNI *Proceedings*), Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz of the Chilean Navy noted: ‘When analysing the needed operational capabilities, it is of significant importance to review the judicial implications—both global and regional—to advance the establishment of a framework that allows facing new threats in the different maritime spaces.’ Rear-Admiral Nils Wang of the Royal Danish Navy underscored the need for and also the difficulties in assuring sufficient jurisdictional authority because, ‘... realizing that no one has sovereignty on the high seas—creating common protocols and perhaps even common rules of engagement, which could ultimately allow use of force to counter threats in international waters, could prove another challenge.’

Maritime security can be achieved only by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into a comprehensive, integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats. Maritime security—and the exercise of maritime power to achieve it—demands a close partnership between governments and the private sector to put in place a rigorous maritime security *regime* for prevention. In the March 2006 *Proceedings*, Admiral Yener Karahanoglu of the Turkish Naval Forces noted this vital requirement:

‘The post-9/11 period saw the “safety first” maxim in the maritime domain change into the “security first” maxim, with chain reactions in many fields including economic, legal, operational, and technological. This change is reflected in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and its activities over the past few years, including the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and the revision of the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention.’

The dramatic change noted by Admiral Karahanoglu resulted from a global effort led by the US Coast Guard to develop the ISPS Code. This framework requires ships subject to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and port facilities that serve such ships to enhance their physical and information security. The SOLAS amendments and ISPS Code were adopted by IMO in December 2002 and became effective for 148 countries in July 2004, an unprecedented accomplishment. A diplomat from the European Commission commented on the importance of these efforts: ‘In general the best solutions for [maritime] security are global solutions.’⁹

These global relationships, networks and partnerships are critical for the ultimate success of far-reaching US Navy and Coast Guard strategy, policy, programme, and operational innovations. Both services, for example, in early 2007 were crafting broad ‘maritime strategy’ documents, both of which understood the need for international collaboration and the establishment of maritime security regimes.

The US Navy and Coast Guard, in close partnership with the other branches of the US armed forces, civil agencies, state and local authorities, private organizations, and foreign governments and international organizations, figure significantly in any refocused concept of maritime power and the need for ‘regime change’ at sea. Although not quite embracing Gorshkov’s idea that the military aspects of sea power were of ‘transitory importance’, Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, US Coast Guard, and CNO Admiral Mullen in August 2006

Maritime Security Regime

A chartered collaborative framework where the nations working to address their maritime security interests contribute to collective engagement on the shared maritime security interests of regional neighbours and international partners through information sharing, exchange of a common operational picture, conduct of co-operative operations and the development and exercise of international and regional agreements.

The objective of establishing maritime security regimes:

- Develop co-operation and information sharing among partnering nations to work together to detect and monitor, deter or intercept transnational maritime threats to prevent harm to a nation’s safety, security, economy or environment.
- Forge a co-operative effort among regional partners that will deter law-breakers and adversaries, provide better mobile surveillance coverage, add to the warning time, allow seizing the initiative to influence events, and facilitate the capability to surprise and engage adversaries before they can cause harm.

Maritime Security interests include:

- *Protection against transnational crime*: Threats like illegal trafficking in narcotics, humans or illicit cargo weaken a nation's social fabric and the strength of its society.
- *Preservation of the safety of navigation*: Any serious interruption to the flow of maritime traffic can have widespread and far-reaching detrimental economic effects.
- *Protection of the marine environment*: Cumulative and episodic degradation of the marine environment has a devastating impact on the livelihood of coastal communities and sustainability that comes from the sea, and negatively impacts the nation's economy.
- *Protection of natural resources*: The illegal exploitation of fish, petroleum and other natural resources robs a nation of its economic security and threatens independence.
- *Protection against terrorism*: Terrorism is a global scourge with trans-border effects. The chain reaction of terrorist events in one nation may trigger negative impacts on the trade and economy within and beyond the region.

Common elements found in a regional maritime security regime:

- Regional and international cooperation under international and domestic laws, protocols and partnerships that is essential to coordinating all elements of regional capability.
- Increased situational awareness developed through information sharing and maintenance of a common operational picture that will facilitate identification of, and timely, effective response to maritime threats.
- Responsive decision making protocols that employ standard procedures to support safe and timely responses against emerging threats.

Source: US Coast Guard, 'Maritime Security Regime: Meeting National Interests Contributes to Meeting Shared International Maritime Security Interests' undated (c. October 2005) memorandum.

framed the thinking in the USA about a much-needed renaissance of national and international co-operation to ensure maritime and national security could be safeguarded and how national power at and from the sea can best be employed. 'The attacks of September 2001 infused our partnership with a greater sense of urgency, as well as the need to re-examine our collaboration,' they explained. 'Perhaps of most fundamental importance,

... the Navy and Coast Guard must build and maintain a global maritime security network with willing coalition partners and allies that gives all nations the domain awareness capable of generating actionable intelligence to successfully prosecute the GWOT. Today's security challenges will test our ability to gain awareness, understanding and the opportunity to seize

the initiative against our adversaries in the maritime battlespace. Whereas our adversaries in the past have been conventional forces susceptible to traditional means of combat, our current adversaries are elusive, widely distributed and employ irregular tactics to achieve their goals. A better understanding of what is occurring above, on, and below the water is a challenge that must be overcome to conduct persistent forward presence for proactive shaping, disrupting and attacking terror networks and to be ready to conduct conventional campaigns to defeat all threats to US interests.’¹⁰

Coupled with something that the Chief of Naval Operations has called the ‘1,000-ship Navy’ or the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative (GMPI), the National Fleet is a critical element—among many—of US maritime power in the 21st century.

Towards the Nation’s Fleet

Although a 1995 Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) between the US Department of Defense and Department of Treasury (the Coast Guard’s bureaucratic ‘home’ since 1967 before being assigned to the new Department of Homeland Security in 2003) allocated major national defence missions to the Coast Guard in support of US regional commanders, both Coast Guard and the Navy leaders recognized that a more focused relationship needed to be defined. In September 1998, the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, and Coast Guard Commandant James M. Loy signed the first ‘National Fleet Policy Statement’, which pledged increased co-operation and collaboration—primarily in surface warship and cutter arenas—between the two services. Renewed and expanded in 2002 and 2006, the National Fleet Policy has become a focus of enthusiastic, out-of-the-box thinking by the Navy and Coast Guard leaders and planners, and has begun to shape the strategies, plans, and operations of both services to meet the maritime security challenges ahead.

The 1995 MoA proved to be useful, but only in defining the Coast Guard’s roles, missions, and functions in a supporting relationship with the Defense Department, primarily in crisis and conflict. It all but ignored the multi-faceted and broad-spectrum Coast Guard peacetime operations that directly and indirectly supported a much more expansive concept of national security, or the role of the Coast Guard as a supported agency in maritime homeland security, as articulated in *America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century*.

Focusing on Challenges

These concerns and issues had already shaped the thinking of Admiral Loy, who as Coast Guard Chief of Staff in the early fall of 1997 presented a briefing at a Tuft’s University conference during which he called for a ‘real revolution in thinking not only things’. He challenged the audience to ‘... launch another

revolution, a revolution of shared purpose, operational integration, and common effort'. Specifically addressing what he envisioned as 'The National Fleet', Loy identified four principal attributes:

'First, it is a fleet of surface combatants and major cutters that would be affordable, interoperable, complementary, and balanced with minimum overlaps in their capabilities. Second, it would comprise highly capable multimission Navy surface combatants optimized for the full spectrum of naval operations, including Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSC) and Major Theater War (MTW). Third, the Coast Guard's "frigate-sized" maritime security cutter—which is one element of the ongoing Deepwater Project—would be optimized first for peacetime and crisis-response Coast Guard missions. This cutter would also be able to work side-by-side with its Navy counterparts in many SSC situations and several MTW tasks, filling the requirement for a small, general-purpose, low-cost, shallow-draft warship. Fourth, this cutter could become an attractive alternative for foreign military sales. Such a cutter, if acquired by allied and friendly navies and coast-guards, could contribute greatly to meeting the Navy's international program objectives of generating enhanced interoperability and cooperation with allies and partners.'¹¹

Returning to Coast Guard headquarters, Loy energized his staff to draft a white paper that proposed, through the somewhat moribund Navy/Coast Guard 'NAV-GARD' organization, a more formal arrangement between the two services that would build on the unique, non-redundant capabilities of each and would help to compensate for the imminent 'train-wreck' in warship/cutter force structure—both operational obsolescence and in the numbers of cutters and ships—that had become painfully apparent. On 21 September 1998, Admirals Loy and Johnson signed the first formal 'National Fleet Policy Statement', calling for greater synergies between the two services. The prologue of the initial National Fleet Policy states:

'The Navy and Coast Guard commit to shared purpose and common effort focused on tailored operational integration of our multi-mission platforms, meeting the entire spectrum of America's twenty-first century maritime needs. While we will remain separate services, each with a proud heritage, we recognize the need to work more effectively together. We describe the process for closer cooperation as the "National Fleet", a concept that synchronizes planning, training and procurement to provide the highest level of maritime capabilities for the nation's investment.'

And, the specific policy direction—to maximize maritime as well as naval effectiveness—was clearly laid out:

'The Navy and Coast Guard will work together to build a National Fleet of multi-mission surface combatants and cutters to maximize our effectiveness