

The Peace In Between

Post-war violence and peacebuilding

Edited by Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal



Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding



The Peace In Between

This volume examines the causes and purposes of 'post-conflict' violence.

The end of a war is generally expected to be followed by an end to collective violence, as the term 'post-conflict' that came into general usage in the 1990s signifies. In reality, however, various forms of deadly violence continue and sometimes even increase after the big guns have been silenced and a peace agreement signed. Explanations for this and other kinds of violence fall roughly into two broad categories – those that stress the legacies of the war and those that focus on the conditions of the peace. There are significant gaps in the literature, most importantly arising from the common premise that there is one, predominant type of post-war situation. This 'post-war state' is often endowed with certain generic features that predispose it towards violence, such as a weak state, criminal elements generated by the war-time economy, demobilized but not demilitarized or reintegrated ex-combatants, impunity and rapid liberalization.

The premise of this volume differs. It argues that features which constrain or encourage violence stack up in ways to create distinct and different types of post-war environments. Critical factors that shape the post-war environment in this respect lie in the war-to-peace transition itself, above all the outcome of the war in terms of military and political power and its relationship to social hierarchies of power, normative understandings of the post-war order and the international context.

This book will be of much interest to students of war and conflict studies, peacebuilding and IR/Security Studies in general.

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Bergen and London, April 2011
Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal

Abbreviations

AFDL	<i>Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo</i>
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AI	Amnesty International
AMF	Afghan Military Force
AMS	Association of Muslim Scholars (<i>Hayat al-Ulama al-Muslimin</i>)
ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginnings Program
ANPPCAN	African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect
APODETI	Timorese Popular Democratic Association, East Timor (<i>Associação Popular Democrática Timorense</i>)
APREDE	Association for Crime Prevention
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ARBiH	Bosniak Army
ASDT	<i>Associação Social Democrática de Timor</i>
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BLDP	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
CAVR	Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
CEH	Commission for Historic Clarification (<i>Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico</i>)
CFF	Cambodian Freedom Fighters
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIVPOL	Civilian police
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
CNRM	<i>Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere</i>
CNRT	<i>Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense</i>
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPD-RDTL	<i>Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor Leste</i>
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CUC	Committee for Peasant Unity
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration

DIAG	Disarmament of illegal armed groups
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPG	Guerrilla Army of the Poor
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
Ex-FAR	Former Armed Forces of Rwanda (<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i>)
FALINTIL	<i>Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste</i>
FAR	Rebel Armed Forces (<i>Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes</i>)
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDD	Forces for the Defence of Democracy
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (<i>Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda</i>)
FECLETI	<i>Frente Clandestina Estudantil de Timor-Leste</i>
F-FDTL	<i>Força de Defesa de Timor-Leste</i>
FNL	Forces for National Liberation
FRETILIN	<i>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente</i>
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
GEMAP	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
GNI	Gross national income
HDI	Human Development Index
HDK	<i>Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq</i>
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HVO	Bosnian-Croat Army
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IEBL	Inter-Entity Boundary Line
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
INA	Iraqi National Alliance
INC	Iraqi National Congress
INE	National Institute of Statistics
IPTF	International Police Task Force
ISCI	Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISF	International stabilization force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JAM	<i>Jaish al-Mahdi</i>
JEMB	Joint Electoral Management Board
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
LEP	<i>Liga dos Estudantes Patriotas</i>
LF	Lebanese Forces

LNP	Liberian National Police
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MIF	Multinational Intervention Force
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission to Guatemala
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NAC	Norwegian Afghanistan Committee
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (<i>Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del</i>)
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NSD	National Security Directorate
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OHR	Office of the High Representative
ORPA	Organization of People in Arms
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAC	Paramilitary patrol groups (<i>patrullas de auto-defensa civil</i>)
PCE	Spanish Communist Party (<i>Partido Comunista de España</i>)
PDH	Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (<i>Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos</i>)
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo (<i>Partia Demokratike e Kosovës</i>)
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PfP	Programme for peace
PGT	Guatemala Workers' Party
PKK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
PNC	National Civil Police
PNT	<i>Partido Nacionalista Timorense</i>
PNTL	<i>Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste</i>
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PRPK	People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea
PST	<i>Partido Socialista Timor</i>
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RDC	Research and Documentation Centre
REMHI	<i>Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica</i>
RENETIL	<i>Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes Timor-Leste</i>
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPG	Rocket propelled grenade
RS	<i>Republika Srpska</i>
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SBiH	Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina

SDA	Bosniak Party for Democratic Action
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SLA	South Lebanese Army
SOC	State of Cambodia
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security sector reform
STL	Special Tribunal for Lebanon
UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army (<i>Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës</i>)
UDT	<i>União Democrática Timorense</i>
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, also known as the United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIC	United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIEST	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPOL	United Nations police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
URNG	Guatemalan National Guerrilla Unity

1 The peace in between¹

Astri Suhrke

Framing the issues

The end of a war is generally expected to be followed by an end to collective violence, as the term ‘post-conflict’ that came into general usage in the 1990s signifies. In reality, however, various forms of deadly violence continue and sometimes even increase after the big guns have been silenced and a peace agreement signed. Why is this so? What form does such violence take? What purposes – and whose purposes – does it serve? The present book is framed around these questions as they relate to contemporary, internal wars.

The idea that wars affect the level of violence in post-war societies goes back centuries, long before the more recent interest in ‘post-conflict’ societies. The phenomenon of post-war violence has been explored by philosophers (Erasmus), statesmen (Sir Thomas More) and sociologists (Emile Durkheim), and was methodically examined by social scientists in the early twentieth century. But while the idea has ‘a rich history’, as Archer and Gartner (1976) note in their seminal work in criminology, systematic studies are rare. The Archer and Gartner study is the most comprehensive and methodologically rigorous comparative analysis in recent years. Analysing the aftermath of international wars in the period 1900–76, they found that, as a rule, post-war societies are considerably more violent than they were before the war. In some cases, the homicide rate doubled; in Italy, the murder rate in a five-year period after the Second World War increased 133 per cent compared to a similar period before the war (p. 948). A similar study looking at homicide rates after internal wars came to a similar result (Collier and Hoeffler 2004)

In light of this, it is unsurprising that the aftermath of the civil wars in Central America in the late twentieth century was marked by extraordinarily high levels of violent crime. In El Salvador, homicides peaked four years after the war at an amazing rate of around 150 per 100,000 inhabitants, which was about five times higher than the pre-war rate and the highest in all of Central America (Call 2007: 41; Savenije and van der Borgh 2004: 156). In Guatemala, violence increased to the point where 40 per cent of the population of Guatemala City in 2006–7 expected to be a victim of violent crime within the following six months (Torres 2008: 1).

This is not the only kind of post-war violence reported. Ethnically-directed violence erupted in Kosovo after the 1999 NATO intervention dismantled Serb rule. The same happened in northern Afghanistan after the US-led military intervention in 2001. In Liberia, ex-combatants forcibly seized rubber plantations. In East Timor, factions of the police and the army battled each other and triggered a major conflagration in 2006, seven years after the violent secession from Indonesia. In Rwanda, the post-genocide government methodically hunted down the *genocidaires* as well as tens of thousands of civilians who had fled across the border to Zaire. The list goes on. Are there some commonalities to these disparate events that reflect their proximity to war?

The literature

‘Violence and war’, Christopher Cramer reminds us, ‘have been common experiences of [societal] transition since the very early origins and spread of capitalism’ (Cramer 2006: 288), and civil war is often a key element in such transitions. War-to-peace transitions may be particularly vulnerable to social violence for reasons that are generally seen to fall into two categories: legacies of the war and conditions of the peace.

One approach emphasizes socio-cultural factors. Wars create social disorganization and a general legitimization of violence stemming from wartime reversal of customary prohibitions on killings. The violent consequences in peacetime are sometimes ascribed to a ‘culture of violence’. Societies can develop the collective equivalent of post-traumatic stress disorder, leading to a loss of basic trust in the order of things and sowing the seeds of new violence such as domestic violence, rape, kidnapping, gang violence and organized crime (USIP 2001). Both gang violence and peasant lynching in Guatemala have been related to the trauma of large-scale atrocities inflicted by the state’s ‘security forces’ during the war, or a ‘democratization’ of such terror (Godoy 2002; Prophette *et al.* 2003). While fairly common in one form or another, ‘culture of violence’ explanations are also criticized on empirical and normative grounds (Steenkamp 2005).

An institutional approach situates problems of post-war violence in a different context. Continued or renewed violence is attributed to faltering institutions, above all a weak state, which fails to constrain unruly agents left over from the war (such as warlords, ex-combatants that are not reintegrated, or mafia groups empowered by the war economy) and creates widespread impunity for crimes. In this perspective, peasant lynching in Guatemala does not reflect ‘a culture of violence’ but expresses the community’s need to establish justice given the failure of the state to do so (Fernández García 2004). Institutional approaches have informed much of the policy-oriented literature on ‘peacebuilding’ which emphasizes institution-building in public administration and the security sector (Cousens and Kumar 2001; Milliken and Krause 2003; Rotberg 2004; Junne and Verkoren 2005; Call 2007; Nilsson 2008; Toft 2009). Until such institutions are in place, an international presence is necessary to stabilize

the peace, especially in the form of security guarantees (Walter 2002). This literature has significantly influenced needs assessments and policy development in the UN peacebuilding regime that has developed since the early 1990s. An increasingly standardized understanding of peacebuilding emphasizes security sector reform (SSR), the rule of law, good governance, rapid economic reconstruction and timely humanitarian assistance; the implication is that failure in these areas may lead to renewed violence (UN 2009).

In a political economy perspective, the problem is more fundamental. The starting point here lies in the understanding of war itself. Rather than a fight over political goals that can be settled by a compromise or outright military victory, war, and the violence it entails, serves a variety of economic, political and social functions. The political economy of violence literature emphasizes violence as a tool of accumulation and domination rather than as a means of political transformation (Duffield 1998; Berdal and Malone 2000; Keen 2000). This applies not only to entrepreneurs in the wartime economy but more broadly to a range of military and political actors. The prototype within this logic is the so-called warlord – a self-appointed military leader with armed followers and a more or less willing constituency – for whom the war is not only a source of enrichment but also a basis of political power (Giustozzi 2003). In addition, some analysts argue that violence meets a number of immediate psychological and security needs of the belligerents, particularly otherwise disempowered youths (Keen 2002; Utas 2003). The implications for peace are clear: if the violence of war serves a multiplicity of social, economic and political functions, we cannot expect it to disappear once a peace agreement is signed. When these functions are tied to distinct social and economic structures, they produce vested interests in the means of violence as a source of power and determinant of social relations. For example, warlordism and ‘warlord politics’ appear in this light as inherently violent structures that are inimical to state-building in a framework of accountability (Reno 1998), or at least rather resistant to conversion to suit a non-violent peace (Goodhand and Cramer 2002).

In a different perspective, some explanations for post-war violence focus on the nature of the peace settlement and the associated assistance and reforms to peacebuilding known as ‘the liberal peace’. Widely promoted as a model for post-war reconstruction since the end of the Cold War, ‘the liberal peace’ is based on market forces and political democracy operating within a neoliberal international economic system. Reforms of this kind are associated with systematic inequalities, marginalization and exclusion of weaker groups (Robinson 2003; Stewart 2001), which are potential sources of violence, particularly in the form of state repression and crime. In societies emerging from civil war, institutions and the national consensus are often weak and the negative consequences of liberalization and competition are likely to be especially marked (Paris 2004; Richmond 2005). National elites become increasingly oriented towards international sources of power available through international peacebuilding and less attuned to the demands of post-war development and social integration (Pearce 1999). Post-war democratization is a

similarly double-edged sword. While in the long run associated with non-violent conflict resolution, in times when rules of the new order are being defined in the aftermath of war the stakes are high and the democratization process has historically been punctured by violence (Tilly 2003). Early elections in post-war societies carry a particular risk of reinforcing divisions and courting violence according to some analysts, although others consider it overstated (Sisk 2009).

Varieties of post-war states

The premise of general studies such as those cited above is that post-war environments have significant common features. That may be so, but should not obscure regional variations in post-war environments that are particularly relevant to understanding forces of conflict and violence. Studies of post-war societies in Central America typically emphasize a constellation of factors: entrenched and highly unequal socio-economic hierarchies, weak or partisan institutions of state and justice, and the negative socio-economic effects of integration into a regional international economy dominated by the United States (Hume 2009; Zinecker 2006). Studies of conflict in the post-war Balkans, by contrast, emphasize the transformation of wartime economies into post-war compacts between organized crime and political elites to establish 'shadow economies' of exploitation (Pugh *et al.* 2004). In parts of Africa, similar alignments developed after Cold War patronage disappeared, and rebels and governments alike had to finance themselves by opportunistic and often violent exploitation of local natural resources in war as well as peacetime. Some scholars have noted a fluid line between war and peace in Africa more generally. While the purpose of violence is in both cases to accumulate resources and suppress the opposition, behaviour becomes similar as belligerents fraternize during war and fight each other afterwards (Keen 2000; Nordstrom 2004).

This literature takes us some way towards understanding the dynamic of post-war violence. Puzzles remain, however. In Central America, for instance, a striking but unexplored piece of data is the very low crime rate in post-war Nicaragua, which otherwise has many features in common with El Salvador and Guatemala. Some countries have not experienced high levels of post-war violence even though the war was enormously destructive and peace initially seemed fragile. 'There were good grounds for expecting a "violent peace" in Bosnia, the most diverse and delicately balanced of the former Yugoslav republics in terms of ethnicity', Berdal, Celador and Zupcevic write in chapter 4 of this volume. Yet, as they go on to show, apart from immediate 'aftershocks' of ethnically directed violence and incidents associated with minority refugee returns, Bosnia has had relatively little overt post-war violence. As for elections, the literature is inconclusive and the debate goes on. Violent elections have taken place in countries without a recent civil war (Kenya in 2007 and recent elections in Zimbabwe), while the 1994 elections in Mozambique immediately after the peace agreement proceeded calmly and served as an essential

transition mechanism from war to peace. Other war-torn countries (Iraq and Afghanistan) have had violent elections, however.

The variations are important. First, they point to a question that has so far been ignored. What is the most significant puzzle to be addressed – that societies which have descended into brutal civil war experience continuous and heavy violence afterwards, or that they experience only limited violence? Why would a brutal war in Bosnia and Liberia suggest a particularly violent peace? Put differently, what are the underlying assumptions here about ‘normal’ levels of violence in a society and particularly a post-war society? For social scientists, the question can only be addressed historically and empirically. In the absence of empirically-based, aggregate data analysis of post-war violence except for homicide (Archer and Gartner 1976; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), a case study approach that places individual country experiences in their historical context is a methodologically reasonable way to go. Second, the variations in post-war violence suggest that there is no such thing as one generic post-war environment, but rather many types. The singular term ‘the post-war state’ masks this kind of variation and inhibits a nuanced understanding.

One main purpose of this book is to start sorting out these different types of post-war environment, or what we will call difference kinds of post-war peace. The variations, as we shall see, include some of the kinds of factors that determine whether peace agreements are implemented or collapse (Hampson 1996; Stedman *et al.* 2002; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). More specifically, we shall look at the nature of the war, the way it ended in terms of the political bargain and balance of power on the ground, the political-normative framework for the new post-war order, and the presence and absence of institutions for managing violence, including, importantly, international forces and agencies. Four main post-war ‘peaces’ can be identified, based on empirical cases that lend themselves to the construction of ‘ideal types’. The first, which we have called the *Victor’s Peace*, is based on an older historical case – the Spanish Civil War. Its counterpart, the *Loser’s Peace*, is also based on an older case, namely the post-bellum ex-Confederacy states in the United States. The two remaining types are derived from contemporary situations. The *Divided Peace* is constructed around the relatively short post-war situation in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban (2001–4/5), while post-war Liberia is the model for what we have called the *Pacified Peace*. The four types, their determinants and their susceptibility to post-war violence are discussed in later sections of this chapter.

The second main purpose of the book is to present in-depth analysis of different types or dynamics of violence in various post-war environments. Recognizing the importance of regional variations, we selected contemporary cases from different geographical areas – two from Europe, two from the Middle East, three from sub-Saharan Africa (West and Central), three from Asia and one from Latin America. Two much older cases were added to provide historical depth and invite reflections on the importance of changes in the global context for post-war environments. These ‘historical cases’ are the aftermath of the Spanish Civil war in the mid-twentieth century and of the American Civil War in the mid-nineteenth century. The

cases reflect the diversity of contemporary post-war environments and post-war violence. Some chapters have overall country reviews of levels and types of post-war violence; others focus on particular conflict dynamics. Individually these chapters provide insight into particular cases; collectively they offer material for identifying commonalities and variations in both the dynamics of post-war violence and the types of post-war situation where they occur.

But first, a note on concepts.

A note on concepts: violence, post-war violence and violence in the post-war state

The term ‘post-conflict’ that came into widespread use in the 1990s is somewhat awkward in an analysis that examines violence in the aftermath of war and similar kinds of armed conflict. Taken literally, ‘post-conflict violence’ is an oxymoron and we shall therefore use the term ‘post-war violence’.

Violence has many meanings (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2002). This book mainly discusses what Charles Tilly (2003) calls ‘collective violence’, that is, physical violence undertaken by a collectivity or involving some degree of coordination. This may include ‘ordinary’ crime such as robberies and murders, which are often associated with gangs, as well as violence by organized non-state groups such as ‘warlords’, associations of ex-combatants, ‘spontaneous’ mobs (that in reality are rarely spontaneous) and community structures (e.g. village lynchings of thieves). In addition, a whole range of extrajudicial violence is associated with the state and its agents or ex-agents, often so-called ‘security forces’. Threats of violence that operate as a deterrent are only one step removed from its overt use and are examined in some of the case studies.

At a certain level, violence short of war in countries that are formally at peace can create insecurity and impose costs, including violent death, that resemble war-time conditions. How, then, does a situation of ‘post-war violence’ differ from a state of ‘war’, or a state of ‘peace’? The boundary lines between war and peace are fluid, as both the qualitative and quantitative literature recognize (Keen 2000; Sambanis 2004). But if we accept that ‘war’ is distinguished by a certain level of violence, organization and collective purpose – the standard criteria used in widely referenced data sets on internal wars (Gleditsch *et al.* 2001) – then a situation of ‘post-war violence’ would conceptually speaking be located somewhere in between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ – the more precise location depending upon whether the ‘post’ or the ‘war’ part is the more prominent. It is a violent peace, bracketed by peace’ and war, a ‘peace in between’.

As for the question of when a post-war period ends, the answer is essentially a matter of judgement, although informed by qualitative and quantitative markers. In qualitative analysis, ‘post-war’ usually means a phase that is extraordinary in some sense, a transition from war to more ‘normal’ conditions. The time element embedded in the term *post* suggests that period cannot last too long, but how long is another matter. In the classic

cases of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, the end of allied occupation, membership in international organizations and rapid economic growth during the early 1950s are commonly used markers. Since contemporary war-torn countries are rarely occupied, other markers of economic progress and political stability are often used (Berdal 2009: 20–4).

The case-study approach used in this volume does not require a definition with common cut-off points, and trying to construct a general definition of ‘the post-war period’ serves no purpose. Rather, the question of defining post-war violence becomes a matter of analytical perspective and methodology. One approach is simply to define a certain time period as ‘post-war’; all violence within this period then becomes *violence in the post-war state*. In quantitative studies, a common cut-off point is typically one five-year period (Archer and Gartner 1976) or two five-year periods (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This methodology records rape as ‘post-war rape’ if it occurred in, say, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) within five or ten years of the last war, but ‘just’ rape if it occurred 20 years after the last war (or in Tanzania, which has never had a civil war).

An explicitly causal approach, by contrast, seeks to trace the lineages of violence evident in the legacy of the war and the conditions of peace. Violence in this sense can linger, reproduce or transform itself long after the country has passed other milestones on the road to recovery and is no longer viewed as a post-war state. Contemporary racial violence in the United States, for instance, has roots in the civil war that ended more than 150 years ago and to that extent is *post-war violence*, even though the United States is no longer a post-war society in any meaningful sense of the word (at least in relation to that war).

Both the causal and the temporal approaches assume that post-war societies have particular features that may make them particularly vulnerable to violence as compared to the time before the war, or compared to states that have not experienced such wars.

Post-war environments I: Victor’s Peace and Loser’s Peace

As noted above, there is a tendency in the policy discussion as well as the academic literature to assume that there is one, predominant type of post-war situation, which has certain generic features that predispose it towards violence. Problems associated with a weak state, criminal elements generated by the war-time economy, demobilized but not demilitarized or reintegrated ex-combatants often feature in this discussion, as do frustrated expectations of rapid reconstruction and large-scale unemployment. These features are associated with some violence in some post-war situations, as the case studies in this volume show. More importantly, a main argument of this book is that features which constrain or encourage violence stack up in ways that create distinct types of post-war environment. Critical factors that shape the post-war environment in this respect lie in the war-to-peace transition itself, above all the outcome of the war in terms of military and political power and its relationship to social hierarchies of power, normative understandings of the

post-war order and the international context. Two strikingly different types of post-war environment in these respects are suggested by the two historical cases considered in this book – the Spanish Civil War and the American Civil War. The cases, analysed by Michael Richards and Michael Beaton in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, form the basis for the construction of two ‘ideal types’ of violent post-war environment. Both differ from contemporary notions of post-war violence arising from weak states unable to confront criminals, warlords and apolitical armed gangs. Rather, violence in these post-war environments is dominated by a political logic and purpose. We have called the two types ‘Victor’s Peace’ and ‘Loser’s Peace’.

Victor’s Peace

In Spain, the Nationalist forces under General Franco had systematically repressed or eliminated Republican forces and supporters as they advanced during the civil war (1936–9). After the Republican forces were decisively defeated, the Franco regime launched systematic purges – significantly called *limpieza* (cleansing) – to rid society of threats to the new order and its foundational principles. Violence became an integral part of the post-war order, in effect creating a ‘victor’s peace’ where – as in ‘victor’s justice’ – the reality is the opposite of the literal meaning of the last, defining term.

The violence orchestrated by the Francoist state, with the support of the army, the clergy and the landed propertied class, was directed against particular civilian segments such as trade unions, ‘reds’ and professionals. The terminology and practice of violence reflected a view of social conflict as absolute. The we/they distinction was laced with normative connotations of good and evil, permitting no compromise. Violence was most intense in the post-war decade examined by Richards, when it took the form of systematic purges, mass imprisonment and executions, but continued until Franco’s death in 1974. It was a case where post-war violence can be said to have outlasted the post-war period as defined by conventional markers. The regime also used indirect violence by regulating access to basic necessities (ration cards, employment, medical care and food in detention centres) so as to weaken ‘the enemy’ and reward regime supporters. Importantly, the violence proceeded without attracting much international concern, let alone effective restraint. With attention focusing on the escalating confrontation with Germany, other Western governments overlooked the excesses or considered the Franco regime a bulwark against Soviet-led communism. The Second World War soon overshadowed events in Spain and Franco’s anti-communist stance later played to his advantage in Western liberal democracies.

The case lends itself to the construction of an ideal type. In schematic form, the preconditions for a Victor’s Peace and the nature of violence associated with it are as follows.

Enabling conditions

- Nature of the conflict – perceived as total in an ideological and/or social sense;
- Outcome of the war – total victory/total defeat;
- State power when war ends – unified: the victorious party has a monopoly of violence; supported by major social segments;
- Sovereignty – unconstrained by international law or international sanctions.

Nature of violence

- Purpose – consolidate victory and the new political order, prevent future opposition and ‘cleanse’ society to secure the new order;
- Target – social and political segments associated with ‘the enemy’ which threaten the new order by their very existence;
- Agent – the state and its apparatus of physical coercion (armed forces, police, prisons, court system), aided by individual denunciations for opportunistic and private purposes;
- Means – economic and physical (purges, executions, imprisonment).

Contemporary shades

There are few contemporary cases of a ‘Victor’s Peace’. Elements are recognizable in the Cambodian case study, presented by Sorpong Peou in Chapter 10 below. But even though the Hun Sen faction utilized the power advantages confirmed by the 1991 Paris peace agreement to suppress the internal political opposition ruthlessly, this was violence as commonly practised in conventional political autocracies. The government did not seek to eliminate, terrorize or disenfranchise an entire social segment in the name of a new order. Government involvement in later, spectacular cases of land-grabbing to promote international capital ventures in property development was part of a general, rent-seeking strategy.

Perhaps the clearest contemporary version of a Victor’s Peace after internal war is Rwanda after the genocide in 1994. As Trine Eide discusses in Chapter 14 below, post-genocide Rwanda has all the parameters of the Spanish classic case. The Rwandan case also has two unique features that set it apart from other contemporary post-war environments. First of all is the enormity of the genocide itself and the logic of total social conflict that it expressed. The victim-turned-victor (the Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF) subsequently resorted to targeted violence, followed by more subtle means of control to instil fear and silence among the ethnic ‘other’. The second distinguishing feature is the passivity in the international community towards the violence committed by the new Rwandan government. Although international human rights organizations reported violence within Rwanda and the UN issued investigative reports on the killings in neighbouring DRC, governments were mostly silent. As in post-war Spain, Rwandan sovereignty was in effect unconstrained. International passivity

reflected general reluctance to sanction a government that represented genocide victims as well as the paralysing memory of UN failure to prevent the massacres despite having been present on the ground with a peace-keeping force when the killings started.

Loser's Peace

The Loser's Peace is in important respects the mirror image of the Victor's Peace. While the latter signifies a violent consolidation of the post-war order, the former denotes violence unleashed to sabotage the new order. In this case, the party that lost the war retains the power to obstruct and sabotage and, if successful, can block the implementation of the post-war order in territory under its control. This happened in the ex-Confederate states of the United States during the post-civil war period known as Reconstruction (1865–77).

In Chapter 3 below, Michael Beaton discusses the origins, structure and purposes of the post-war violence in the states of the ex-Confederacy. As in the Victor's Peace, the purpose of the violence – in this case unleashed by 'the losers' in the civil war – was primarily political (to influence the post-war political order), but there were other important dimensions as well. Violent constraints on the mobility of blacks served to keep the cost of labour down, and violence along racial lines reinforced identity boundaries that were particularly important for poor whites, as Beaton notes. As in Franco's Spain, violence was targeted against particular social segments and political groups, often couched in the language of 'cleansing'.

While the state is the major agent of violence in the Victor's Peace, the Loser by necessity relies more on vigilante-type violence – or asymmetrical warfare in contemporary terminology. In the post-bellum Southern states, vigilante and paramilitary violence was tacitly backed by the local elites and by local political and law enforcement authorities as the 'redeemers' increasingly won political office.

In the absence of any international restraints, the only external limitation on violence came from the federal authorities. Yet federal troops stationed in the South during the period under consideration were far too few to prevent violence in a far-flung territory. Moreover, vigilante groups were careful not to attack the troops or other symbols of federal power directly and thereby provide a pretext for more direct intervention. The other federal agency with a specific justice-related mandate in the South was the Federal Freedman's Bureau, originally established by President Abraham Lincoln to help refugees from the civil war and freed slaves. The bureau maintained a record of human rights abuses, murders and lynchings, but, however admirable, did not prevent massive and sustained human rights abuse against blacks and their white sympathizers. Arguably, the minimal presence and de facto permissiveness of the federal state was a significant enabling condition of the violence characteristic of the Loser's Peace; 100 years later, it will be recalled, the deployment of federal troops to the South dramatically demonstrated the federal government's commitment to enforcing civil rights and helped change the situation.

Contemporary shades

A full-blown case of the Loser's Peace is difficult to find in contemporary post-war environments, but some elements are recognizable. The pattern of violence in post-war Guatemala – as outlined by John McNeish and Oscar López Rivera in Chapter 15 – suggests powerful forces at work to obstruct the sweeping reforms envisaged in the 1996 peace agreement. Yet it was a distinctly contemporary form of Loser's Peace in that it was based on a compromise settlement and showed the imprint of international constraints.

The Guatemalan war ended with no clear winners or losers. The armed forces, however, were set to lose in institutional and ideological terms. The peace agreement called for drastic cuts in the numbers and budgets for the military. Paramilitary forces would be disbanded and military intelligence services closed down. Politically, the peace accords were framed in terms of principles that the military had fought against during the long war as representing threats to the integrity of the state and the very fabric of the nation – social justice, indigenous rights, human rights and democratic participation. As a result, elements of the military used threats, political manipulation and violence in order to prevent the implementation of the peace agreement. Most famously, ex-military formed the core of the 'hidden powers' – an amorphous structure of networks with links deep into organized crime as well the state administration, the economic elite and the political establishment. Organized into groups with names such as *The Syndicate*, the 'hidden powers' resembled a conventional mafia operation, using violence to maximize profits and working with organized crime in a wide range of illegal operations (Peacock and Beltran 2003).

'The hidden powers' became a synonym for an invisible hand that appeared to facilitate the staggering level and variety of violence in post-war Guatemala. One study identified 70 different types in urban areas alone (Moser and McIlwaine 2001). The 'hidden powers' also had vested interests in a dysfunctional police and court system. Only some 2 per cent of the approximately 5,000 murders annually in the immediate post-war years were investigated by police, fewer arrests were made and the judiciary was impotent (Torres 2008). With general impunity for crimes of all kinds, violence seemed to have developed into a social norm.

The fact that the key structures behind this violence were hidden, operating outside the formal political process and not seeking to 'redeem' the past by challenging the principles of the peace agreement sets the post-war environment of Guatemala apart from the Loser's Peace modelled on the American Civil War. The forces that allowed the 'hidden powers' to stay hidden were mostly international in nature. The military had since the end of the Cold War gradually lost favour with its powerful North American patron and its appalling human rights record was internationally condemned. The peace agreement principles for a new and better post-war order were endorsed by the United Nations, which also established a sizable human rights verification mission on the ground two years before the final peace agreement and maintained it for a decade.

Towards the end of the first post-war decade, overtly political violence was a small category compared to other types of violence, which continued to make Guatemala one of the most violent societies in Latin America. Killings of women, adolescents and youth predominated, some of it associated with domestic violence and much of it attributed to Guatemala's infamous gangs – the *maras*. Apart from the *maras*, which had their own peculiar links to war-time migration, the violence seemed to reflect less the legacy of war than the pathologies of a development trajectory and a drug economy that continued to underwrite poverty, inequality and impunity, as McNeish and López discuss below.

The international context

As the Guatemalan case suggests, there are two main reasons why political violence characteristic of the Victor's Peace and the Loser's Peace modelled on the earlier historical cases rarely occurs in contemporary post-war environments. Most civil wars in recent years have ended in compromises, thus nullifying a critical enabling condition for both a Victor's Peace and a Loser's Peace.² Moreover, negotiation and implementation of peace agreements have taken place in an international context of UN-authorized peace operations designed to prevent renewed war and collective violence.

The growth of the international peacebuilding regime in the past two decades has been remarkable by any standard. By 2008, the UN had more than 50 active peace operations around the world; other operations were coalitions of the willing authorized by the UN. Peace operations had become multidimensional, with economic, political human rights and military functions designed to secure a sustainable peace. As a result, international agencies and organizations moved in visibly and sometimes massively to help with economic, social and political reconstruction, spinning a dense web of monitoring, assistance and intervention in post-war environments.

The effects of this web on post-war violence are hard to assess. International peace operations can have unintended and counterproductive consequences. In general, there is a built-in contradiction between long-term development and short-term control. Large, international peace operations tend to undermine the development of effective and legitimate state power and institutions of justice that can defuse tension, address sources of conflict and restrain violence. On the other hand, the pervasive international presence in post-war environments has increased the awareness and monitoring of violence and thereby exposed those responsible to potential counter-intervention. The rapid expansion of the human rights regimes during the past two decades in particular has enormously increased the capacity to monitor violations, advocate political, legal or educational intervention and support local human rights organizations. Since the Rwandan genocide – where the UN system failed spectacularly – human rights field missions under the High Commissioner for Human Rights are routinely included in all UN peace operations.

International peacekeeping operations have made the use of collective violence to challenge or consolidate the post-war political order more risky and costly. Statistically speaking, the presence of international peacekeepers is likely to reduce the chances of renewed war as defined by battle-related deaths (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). The role of military peacekeepers or observers in preventing or reducing other forms of post-war violence is more uncertain. Peacekeepers can be in a situation resembling the federal troops in the post-bellum Southern states some 150 years ago – few in number, thinly stretched, and without a clear authorization to stop mob violence, riots or violence against civilians carried out by men armed with guns and political connections. In the DRC a UN peacekeeping force of almost 20,000 (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo peace operation, MONUC/ United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUSCO) was unable to prevent widespread attacks on civilians and systematic violence associated with the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the country's eastern provinces.

On the other hand, some peace operations take on unconventional tasks to reduce post-war violence. In Haiti, MINUSTAH cleaned out armed gangs in Port-au-Prince, with savoury effects that lasted for at least a couple of years until the massive earthquake of 2010 (Berdal 2009). In Liberia, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) troops defused tension and probably prevented violence when ex-combatants occupied rubber plantations. In the DRC, UN troops helped local police stop street fights during the 2006 elections that left more than a dozen dead in Kinshasa. In East Timor, it is often noted that violent street riots and fighting between factions of the police and army occurred after the UN peacekeepers had left and stopped when an international stabilization force was reintroduced.

While the international capacity to constrain those who control the means of violence in post-war environments has increased as a result of historical changes in the international system, other international developments tend to have the opposite effect. Unequal integration of post-war economies into the international economy has been associated with poverty, inequality and crime. Neoliberal economic reforms and political democratization in post-war societies can create a different set of tensions, as critics of 'the liberal peace' argue. More generally, some analysts note that some of the conditions that generate conflict and violence in post-war environments are in important respects related to the contemporary forces of globalization – an open international economic system permits easy flows of illegal transactions to sustain violent groups in post-war environments and migration flows reproduce social patterns associated with violent urban gangs (Duffield 2001; Zinecker 2006). In this perspective, the international context appears as a bundle of fundamental, internal contradictions where the right hand is trying to constrain the effects of what the left hand is doing. The situation resembles the analogy famously used by Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo to describe the lack of coordination between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions in constructing the international parameters for post-war El Salvador – 'as if a

patient lay on the operating table with the left and right sides of his body separated by a curtain and unrelated surgery being performed on each side' (1994: 74) In the radical critique, however, this situation is a result of structural contradictions that better coordination alone cannot resolve.

The contradictory effects of the international context on contemporary post-war environments are evident in many of the case studies included below. So are signs that the way these processes work themselves out depends heavily on the local context. In what follows we will consider two contemporary post-war environments that were both heavily circumscribed and influenced by an international presence, but differed in other important respects.

Post-war environments II: divided peace and pacified peace

The remaining contemporary cases included in this volume are diverse in terms of conflicts, war-to-peace transitions and post-war violence. Sorted according to a rough scale of post-war violence, Bosnia and Liberia appear overall towards the relatively peaceful end of the scale, while Kosovo and Timor Leste have both had violent episodes. Post-war Lebanon has seen continuing political assassinations and attack. Large parts of the DRC have been in a state of 'no war – no peace', despite a 2003 peace agreement. The short period in Afghanistan that can be called 'post-war' was marred by diverse and pervasive violence quite apart from the renewed fighting between the militant Islamists and the international forces. In this rough scale, Afghanistan and Liberia appear at different ends and thus as promising subjects for further examination.

Afghanistan may be a prototype of a violent post-war state in the period that arguably qualifies as 'post-war', that is, from late 2001, when the US-led intervention removed the Taliban regime, until early 2005 when mounting clashes between US-led forces and a revived insurgency had produced a de facto state of renewed war in much of the country. In Liberia, on the other hand, the post-war environment was relatively peaceful, despite a long and extremely brutal war. In both cases, the nature of the political transition and the role of the international presence help explain the patterns of post-war violence. We have called them respectively 'divided peace' and 'pacified peace'.

Divided peace in post-war Afghanistan (2001–5)

An underlying source of continuous conflict in Afghanistan's short post-war period was the sudden regime change, brought about primarily by US airpower, without any prior agreement on the basis for the post-war order. The main partner of the United States on the ground consisted of ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara) that before the US intervention controlled only about 10 per cent of the territory. The rest of the country had been controlled by the Taliban, mostly in alliance with local Pashtun leaders. The latter were not invited to the international conference in Bonn in December 2001 that adopted a transitional framework, and the Afghan factions that were invited were not in agreement either. Lasting

only about a week, the conference approved a two-and-a-half-year framework for transition drafted mainly by the UN Special Representative to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi.

The post-war period thus opened without an agreement among even the nominal victors on the substantive provisions for the new order or an authoritative distribution of power, only a schedule for a competitive process to settle these matters. The result was a ferocious stampede for power among the victors to determine what North *et al.* (2009) call a balance between the 'violence potential' of the elite and the distribution of rents between them. The struggle divided the participants according to clan, religious and political affiliation, with an overarching distinction between the Pashtun, who had traditionally ruled Afghanistan but were now politically weakened with the main factions in exile or associated with Taliban and the ethnic minorities who had partnered with the United States to defeat the Taliban. On the local level, new strongmen supported by Kabul and the international forces moved in to displace, harass and kill factions that had been aligned with the Taliban, adding another level of violence and laying the foundation for a revived insurgency.

The power struggle among the anti-Taliban factions – or what we elsewhere have called 'conflictual peacebuilding' – was fought in many arenas, sometimes with overt violence and almost always against the backdrop of threats of violence (Suhrke *et al.* 2004; Barnett and Zürcher 2009). The central government and the local strongmen struggled for control over revenue, territory and formal state power. Sometimes local rivals fought pitched battles (in the North), at other times US military force was used in support of the government to settle the score (in Herat). Military strongmen organized or facilitated violent riots to demonstrate their power vis-à-vis competing factions (in Kabul in and the provinces). By the time of the parliamentary elections in 2005, some types of 'armed politics' had become less visible due to co-optation, the UN disarmament programme, diversification of rent-seeking opportunities and political alignments, as Antonio Giustozzi discusses in Chapter 8 below. Meanwhile, the Taliban was recovering and regrouping to fight the new government and the international forces. Despite the targeted nature of the violence, the mounting warfare caused significant death and damage among civilians.

The intense, post-war struggle for power among the anti-Taliban factions made it difficult to recreate a central state that had been practically demolished over the past almost 25 years of revolutionary strife, foreign invasion, civil war and deliberate neglect. Attempts to reform the sub-national administration, the justice sector and the police – areas of critical importance for constraining violence – were opposed by entrenched and mostly armed Afghan leaders. Many had political backing from the internationals. While the major Western states and the UN were committed in principle to helping establish an effective and representative Afghan state, the parallel 'war on terror' fought by US-led forces on Afghan soil had profoundly distorting effects. The international community represented in Afghanistan was divided over whether to prioritize fighting the war or consolidating the peace, consequently also in their willingness to pressure Afghan parties to

disarm and reform. Governments that prioritized the war had no obvious interest in promoting an effective and accountable Afghan state that might be a less willing client rather than a highly dependent one. More directly, the United States and some of its allies armed and paid Afghan commanders to participate in the war, thereby strengthening armed factions and their reliance on violence to maintain themselves. The UN disarmament programme, as a result, was slow and incomplete.

The post-war Afghan government, then, was a loose coalition of armed, or partially disarmed, competing factions and foreign-supported technocrats. Collectively they lacked both capacity and incentives to create an effective and accountable state that could have constrained violence. Removing a local strongman who abused his power, for instance, or prosecuting an official involved in land-grabbing at gunpoint, was very difficult; a person with the capacity to inflict serious harm on others usually also had political protection higher up, often because he was useful in the war. Except for the poor and the powerless, impunity prevailed.

A small international 'security assistance' force (ISAF) was deployed to the capital, Kabul, where it helped deter open fighting and at least one planned military coup. However, the mission lacked the political support even to start addressing the security and order problems that plagued the immediate post-war period, including violence associated with the factional struggles for power and the drug economy, illegal confiscation of land, harassment and forced displacement of ethnic minorities, and the everyday human rights violations committed by local strongmen and government officials against the population. The UN Special Representative to Afghanistan described the situation in July 2003:

We continue to receive daily reports of abuses by gunmen against the population – armed gangs who establish illegal checkpoints, tax farmers and traders, intimidate, rob, rape and do so – all too often – while wielding the formal title of military commander, police or security chief.

(Cited in Suhrke *et al.* 2004: 45)

The political transition also encouraged opportunistic violence of a different kind. In the north, for instance, the fall of the Taliban encouraged opportunistic violence for economic gain against local Pashtun who in the late nineteenth century had been given government land grants in areas primarily settled by Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara. When the latter emerged as victors after the defeat of the Taliban, a forced reversal of landownership took place. Northern Pashtun were systematically harassed by armed gangs operating under the protective wing of local warlords. Land was seized, people killed and families threatened. With no national or international agency to protect them, northern Pashtun fled to the mainly Pashtun-populated south, most ending up in huge IDP camps supported by international aid agencies (Mundt and Schmeidl 2009).

In sum, the key factors that structured the 'divided peace' of the immediate post-Taliban order were defined by the contradictions of the trans-

ition. The political bargain reached in Bonn was inconclusive and did not reflect the balance of power on the ground, the parties to the bargain retained a capacity for armed action, the central state was weak yet strongly contested and the international intervention that had brought about the post-war state was inextricably linked to continued warfare in ways that sharpened political conflict and encouraged impunity for everyday violence. Even discounting the legacy of nearly 25 years of violent strife and displacement, these conditions formed an environment ripe for multifaceted and multidirectional violence. The potential for violence was not only embedded in the unresolved struggle among the victors. Local points of tension, such as disputes over land that in more benign environments could have been defused or restrained by relevant authorities, were joined to the broader conflict of the transition and allowed to run a violent course.

Pacified peace in Liberia

In Liberia's case, two important factors helped to define a very different post-war trajectory. First, peace negotiations involved all the relevant Liberian parties and in important respects reflected the military balance on the ground. Second, the UN and the major regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established an international presence in the country that was massive relative to Liberia's small size and population and had three main foci – the need to end the violence, implement the peace agreement and establish at least a minimally effective and accountable state.

When the final Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2003, the Liberian civil war had lasted for more than a decade, interspersed with short periods of relative calm and had been marked by several abortive ceasefires and previous negotiations. The protagonists were largely mobilized on ethnic/tribal grounds, with a changing list of rebel groups fighting the government forces, as Torunn Wimpelmann Chaudhary discusses in Chapter 13 below. The decisive break in the war came when the United States and neighbouring Guinea shifted their support from the government forces of Charles Taylor to rebel groups, enabling the main rebel group (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, LURD) to gain control of about 80 per cent of the country in 2002. Pressured by international forces, Taylor sued for peace in an agreement that led to his exile (and later arraignment before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague), but included other members of the government as well as the principal rebel groups in a transitional administration. The transitional administration established by the peace agreement was extraordinarily inclusive, with the factional distribution of 21 government departments, 22 public corporations and 22 autonomous agencies specified in the agreement. The transitional bargain held until the 2005 elections, when several former rebel commanders and faction leaders transited into the political arena through election or appointment by the new president, an internationally supported technocrat.

The political transition was supported by a huge international presence. The UN had authorized advance deployment of 3,500 ECOWAS troops to constrain the parties shortly before the peace agreement was signed. It was followed by a UN peacekeeping force of 15,000 troops, around 1,100 police (including armed police) and 250 military observers. For a country the size of Portugal, with a population just over 3 million, it meant a dense presence of soldiers with a broad mandate to maintain order and security, including providing security at government installations, ensuring freedom of movement, supporting the safe return of refugees and IDPs and 'protect[ing] civilians under imminent threat of physical violence' in areas around UN troops (Res. 1509/2003). UNMIL also supervised the disarmament and demobilization of rebel forces. The disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programme started immediately and, despite some snags, had by early 2005 completed the process for around 100,000 soldiers – just in time for the elections. Meanwhile, the army was restructured under the auspices of the United States.

The political bargain and UN-supervised disarmament of the rebels provided a reasonably stable framework for the post-war environment that helps explain why politically oriented and other forms of collective violence were quite limited, as Chaudhary discusses. This was so even in the absence of an effective and accountable Liberian state, which was much more difficult to establish and was not immediately in evidence. Institutions of justice and order, in particular the police, remained weak, creating concern about crime, gangs and vigilante justice, such as lynching. On the other hand, it is not clear against what standards to judge this level of post-war violence. There are no readily available records of pre-war crime and data from comparable post-war or no-war environments are non-existent or highly uncertain.³

Liberia, then, was demilitarized and to that extent 'pacified' by international forces in a way that Afghanistan obviously was not. This does not mean that a 'Liberian solution' in terms of a heavier international presence from the outset would have reduced post-war violence in Afghanistan. The international presence helped constrain post-war violence in Liberia for several reasons: the internationals had one common objective – making and consolidating peace; the local parties were amenable to negotiations; and Liberia was a small country where a favourable ratio of peacekeepers to population and territory was within the financial reach of the UN. None of these conditions applied in Afghanistan.

Points of vulnerability

Transitions from war to peace raise basic issues about access to political power in the post-war society. These are inherently conflictual and contested questions, particularly so in societies emerging from violent strife fought over the legitimacy or control of the state. Attempts to influence the political transition may in some cases lead to pervasive and politically-oriented post-war violence, as exemplified in the Victor's Peace; elsewhere, the transition may be contested with less violence, as in the Pacified Peace.

A war-to-peace transition involves many other changes and adjustments as well on both collective and individual levels. We can think of these as points of vulnerability that, as in all cases of social change, carry the potential for violence.

At least six such points of vulnerability can be readily identified; all are recognized in international peacebuilding programmes as areas requiring attention and assistance. They are:

- 1 *Demobilization and demilitarization; integration/restructuring of rebel and government armed forces.* Inadequate DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) programmes risk creating a recruiting pool for armed gangs, criminal elements and political conflict entrepreneurs. Short-term risks include violent protests and direct action by ex-combatants to press their demands.
- 2 *The illegal or 'shadow' economy* developed during the war. Profit-seeking structures may develop into organized crime and seek protection through political alliances. While not always overtly violent, illegal economic structures of this kind have historically used at least the threat of violence to maintain themselves.
- 3 *Property disputes.* Wars create forced population displacement and often conflicting property claims when displaced persons return. Incomplete administrative records and competing legal traditions typically complicate settlements.
- 4 *Justice sector.* Lack of accountability mechanisms for war-time criminal violence and human rights violations is often assumed to encourage continued impunity and post-war violence, but the empirical evidence overall is weak and inconclusive (Thoms *et al.* 2008). Ongoing and continuing impunity, however, clearly encourages vigilante justice, whether used politically to reverse the new order or to assert a community sense of justice (which happens in countries that have not experienced internal war as well).
- 5 *'Aftershocks'.* The end of the war can be followed by targeted violence that follows the war-time divisions but on a smaller scale, such as revenge or reprisal killings and social or ethnic cleansing.
- 6 *The peace dividend.* The end of a war encourages expectations of peace and prosperity. Contemporary post-war expectations are inflated by high-profile international pledging conferences and aid agencies arriving with ambitious reconstruction agendas. High post-war unemployment is particularly likely to create tension and a pool of potential recruits for conflict entrepreneurs and street politics.

Types of violence. Post-war environments also seem vulnerable to particular forms of violence. A spike in homicides is one. Although variations in crime rates are notoriously difficult to explain the much-cited case of El Salvador prominently reflects the virtual absence of a national police for almost the entire first two years of the post-war period. The 1992 peace agreement stipulated the dissolution of the previous police forces (three different branches) and the constitution of a new force. The first unit of

the new police (PNC) was deployed in March 1993 and national deployment was not completed until 1994 (Call 2007: 37–8). The reintroduction of police clearly helped to bring crime down to ‘normal’ levels. The subsequent rise has been attributed to broader social dysfunctional developments of inequality, poverty and social exclusion, combined with repressive policing (*mano duro*) that backfired.

Violence against women can also be understood at least in part as a direct legacy of the war in cases where sexual violence has been widespread or used instrumentally during the conflict, as in Guatemala. The extremely high murder rate of women in post-war Guatemala – around 4,000 were killed in the period 2000–8 alone – is often interpreted this way (GHRC 2008). But the extreme violence against women a decade after the war reflected other factors as well. Human rights activists pointed to the near total impunity for such crimes. Intense lobbying by rights activists led to the recognition of murder of women as a special category under the law – *femicide* – which obligated the state to follow special procedures of investigation and impose severe punishment. The conditions were incorporated in the Law against Femicide and other Forms of Violence against Women passed by the Guatemalan Parliament in April 2008.

How these conflict dynamics develop will depend on the capacities of a given post-war environment to constrain or manage the potential for violence. Institutions that can address claims of injustice and grievances and defuse tension are central to this process, but so, as *ultima ratio*, is the coercive capacity of the state. The conflict dynamics are heavily context-dependent but some general features can be suggested.

The role of the state or an equivalent agent is critically important in constraining or managing the potential for social violence and post-war environments can here differ markedly. A post-war situation structured in the logic of the Victor’s Peace is marked by a strong but deeply partisan state. This state is able to deal decisively with a range of post-war vulnerabilities, but in a post-war and still divided society this is likely to entail a great deal of state violence and state-directed deprivation, and to encourage private violence under cover of political denunciations. In a Loser’s Peace, certain kinds of bottom-up violence are welcomed and used strategically by local elites to capture or control the state; issues of justice, the peace dividend and property claims will depend heavily upon the relationship to the dominant power structure. In the Divided Peace, the state remains strongly contested yet weak and the protagonists have few incentives to disarm. Contentious issues relating to post-war transitions are settled in the context of a privatization of security and violence, and a state captured by factions. International peace operations can to some extent modify the use of violence to assert claims or resolve disputes associated with the transition in all these cases. In certain situations, a unified and coherent international peace operation can virtually substitute for a weak or dysfunctional state, at least in the short run, as in the Pacified Peace.

The case study chapters that follow explore a range of conflict dynamics in post-war environments. They are selected to demonstrate the range and variety – tragically, the richness – of the phenomenon. After the two ‘classic’ cases of ‘Victor’s Peace’ and ‘Loser’s Peace’ in an earlier historical period, the current cases are grouped according to geographical region where contemporary versions of all four sociological types are found.

Notes

- 1 I wish to thank Torunn Wimpelmann Chaudhary and Ingrid Samset at the Chr. Michelsen Institute for contributions and comments to this chapter.
- 2 Note that compromise peace settlements are more prone to collapse in renewed war than conflicts which end in total victory/defeat; this has been an argument for letting wars be fought out to the bitter end. If the purpose is to reduce violence, however, the possibility of massive post-war violence after total victory must be included in the calculus.
- 3 The closest is probably a study by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) of victimization surveys in 13 African nations (not including Liberia) for the period 1992–2002 (Naude *et al.*, 2006).

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