



Handbook of Africa's International Relations

Edited by Tim Murithi

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Africa's international relations have often been defined and framed by the dominant international and geopolitical agendas of the day. In the aftermath of colonialism, the Cold War became a dominant paradigm that defined the nature of the continent's relations with the rest of the world. In the post-Cold War world, the contemporary forces of globalization are now exerting an undue influence and impact on Africa's international relations. Historically, the continent's ability and capacity to advance its interests has also been undermined by the lack of political will among African leaders to find ways to address their differences and collectively solve their problems. However, increasingly, Africa is emerging as a vocal and, in some respects, an influential actor in international relations. There is a paucity of analysis and research on Africa's international relations, and this timely book proposes to fill this analytical gap. It will appeal to undergraduates, postgraduate students, academics, policy makers and developmental practitioners who have an interest in Africa's emerging role in the international sphere.

The emerging political prominence of the African continent on the world stage is predicated on an evolving internal process of continental integration. In particular, there are normative and policy efforts to revive the spirit of Pan-Africanism and how it informs the continent's international relations. Consequently, this book will also engage with the emerging role of the African Union (AU) as an international actor. The book will assess a selection of institutional developments, issues and policy frameworks that the AU has adopted as a vehicle for Africa interests. In addition, the book will assess how global governance has impacted on Africa and will also consider the continent's evolving international partnerships.

The book is structured into five parts which include content on:

- Theories and the historical evolution of Africa's international relations
- Institutional developments relating to the African Union
- Issues and policy areas on Africa's international relations
- Global governance and Africa
- Africa and international partnerships.

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I sincerely hope that this book will encourage further analysis, debate and dialogue on Africa's international relations, with a view to improving the lives of all those who live on our continent. Our home!

Tim Murithi
Cape Town, South Africa
June 2013

Abbreviations

AAF-SAP	African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation
ABC	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
ACDEG	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
ACPMO	African Common Position on Migration and Development
AEZ	Agro-Ecological Zones model
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRICOM	US Africa Command
Afrocom	Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa
AG	African Group
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AIDS	acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AIR	African Institute for Remittances
AIR	Africa's International Relations
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AOA	Agreement on Agriculture
AOGCM	Atmosphere Ocean General Circulation Model
APF	African Peace Facility
APPER	Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APS	African Partnership Station
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM	al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb
ASA	Africa-South America
ASF	African Standby Force
ASPA	South America-Arab Countries
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
AUC	AU Commission
BCO	Bangkok Country Office
BINUB	UN Integrated Office in Burundi
BNI	Bureau of National Investigation
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, the People's Republic of China, South Africa
C2C	College-to-College

CA	Constitutive Act
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CAT	Convention Against Torture
CCCC	Chinese Communications Construction Company Ltd
CEDAW	Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CEEAC	Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique Centrale
CEMAC	Communauté Economique et Monétaire des Etats d'Afrique Centrale
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CENTCOM	Central Command
CERD	Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CGPP	Committee on Governance and Popular Participation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CNDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
Co.	Company
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRC	Committee on the Rights of the Child
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DoD	Department of Defense
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSB	dispute settlement body
EAC	East African Community
EACTI	East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative
EASBRICOM	Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
EASBRIG	Eastern African Standby Brigade
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECCASBRIG	ECCAS Brigade
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOBRIg	ECOWAS Brigade
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

Abbreviations

EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENSO	El Niño–Southern Oscillation
EO	Executive Outcomes
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
EUFOR	European Union Force
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FDI	foreign direct investment
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
FNDIC	Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities
FOCAC	Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
FOMUC	Force Multinationale en Centrafrique
FPLC	Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo
FRONTEX	Frontières extérieures
FTO	foreign terrorist organization
G8	Group of Eight governments of the world’s wealthiest countries
G20	Group of Twenty finance ministers and central bank governors
G77	Group of Seventy-seven developing nations
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCAR	Global Compact for Africa Recovery
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	gross domestic product
GHG	greenhouse gas
GIA	Islamic Armed Group
GIABA	Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa
GNI	gross national income
GPAD	governance and public administration
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HR&D	human rights and democracy
HRC	Human Rights Council
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSGIC	Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
HSGOC	Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa (Dialogue Forum)
ICC	International Coordinating Committee
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	information and communications technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	internally displaced person

IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGG	Inspector General of Government
IHL	international humanitarian law
IIASA	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
IIPE	illicit international political economy
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOR-CAR	Indian Ocean Rim Countries' Association for Regional Cooperation
IPCC	Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change
IPE	international political economy
IPEP	Independent Panel of Eminent Persons
IPOA	International Peace Operations Associate
IR	International Relations
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEG	Joint Expert Group
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force West
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JTF	Joint Military Task Force
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
km	kilometre(s)
LDC	least developed country
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LGBT	lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual
LOA	logic of appropriateness
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
Ltd	Limited
MAP	Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MFN	most favoured nation
MICG	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
MICOPAX	Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MISAB	Mission de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui
MIT	Movement of the Islamic Tendency
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MMEP	Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MoU	memorandum of understanding
MP	member of parliament
NACOB	Narcotics Control Board

Abbreviations

NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAI	New African Initiative
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAPAs	National Adaptation Programs of Action
NARC	North African Regional Capacity
NASBRIG	North African Standby Brigade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPVF	Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	non-governmental organization
NHRC	Nigerian Human Rights Commission
NHRI	national human rights institution
NMM	national monitoring mechanism
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency
NPM	national preventive mechanism
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
NWO	New World Order
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OBR	Ogoni Bill of Rights
ODA	official development assistance
ODA	overseas development aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commission for Human Rights
ONGC	Oil and Gas Corporation
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OP	Omega Plan
OPCAT	Optional Protocol to CAT
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSAA	Office of the Special Advisor on Africa
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PIAP	Parliamentary & International Affairs Programme
PILOT	Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations and Tactics
PJD	Justice and Development Party
PMC	private military company
PMSC	private military and security company
POC	protection of civilians
POLCIVEX	Police-Civilian Focused Exercise
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSC	private security company
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PTA	preferential trade agreement

R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCM	Regional Coordination Mechanism
REC	regional economic community
RM	Regional Mechanism (for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution)
RSLMF	Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
S&D	special and differential treatment
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	SADC Brigade
SADCC	Southern African Coordinating Conference
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SAP	structural adjustment programme
SCA	Sub-Committee for Accreditation
SCAAP	Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMPF	Strategic Migration Policy Framework
SPMH	Special Procedures Mandate Holder
SPS	Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary
sq	square
SSC	South-South Co-operation
SSR	security sector reform
STABEX	Stabilization of Export Receipts on Agricultural Products
SYSMIN	System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products
TBT	technical barriers to trade
TCC	troop-contributing country
TCG	Tunisian Combatant Group
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
TEAM-9	Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TOC	transnational organized crime
TRC	truth and reconciliation commission
TRIMs	Trade-related Investment Measures
TRIPS	Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TSCTI	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative
UHRC	Uganda Human Rights Commission
UN	United Nations
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Abbreviations

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women (now UN Women)
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UNPBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNPBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
UNPoA	United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
US(A)	United States (of America)
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminal
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWW	World Weather Watch
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African Nation Union-Patriotic Front
ZHRC	Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission
ZTE	Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipments Co. Ltd

Introduction

The evolution of Africa's international relations

Tim Murithi

Introduction

The African continent has always featured prominently in global relations. The ancient and historical interaction of the civilizations in Carthage, Egypt and Nuba with the Roman Empire are illustrations of this fact. The issue has been that Africa's international relations have not necessarily always been on its own terms. Africa's international relations have often been defined and oriented by the dominant international and geopolitical agendas of the day. As such, Africa has more often than not been the subject of international relations dictated by external actors. As a direct consequence of this fact, the chronicles of Africa's international relations are also dominated by the perspectives of those who have invaded, enslaved, colonized and exploited the continent. This book is a timely attempt to document Africa's international relations from a range of perspectives from authors based within the continent as well as outside the continent.

In the aftermath of colonialism the Cold War became a dominant paradigm that defined the nature of the continent's relationship with the rest of the world. In the post-Cold War world, the contemporary forces of globalization are now exerting an undue influence and impact upon Africa's international relations. Historically, the continental ability and capacity to advance its interests has also been undermined by the lack of political will among African leaders to find ways to address their differences and collectively solve their problems. However, increasingly the African continent is emerging as a vocal and, in some respects, an influential actor in international relations. There is a paucity of analysis and research on this emerging trend. This timely book proposes to fill this analytical gap by engaging with a wide range of issues on which the African continent, and its constituent states, has expressed a position or advocated a set of specific policies. This introductory chapter will briefly discuss the evolution of Africa's international relations and outline the structure of the book.

The trajectory of Africa's international relations

The emerging political prominence of the African continent on the world stage is predicated on an evolving internal process of continental integration. In particular, there are normative and policy efforts to revive the spirit of pan-Africanism.¹ Pan-Africanism is the expression of this spirit of solidarity and co-operation among African countries and societies. The initial and primary aim of pan-Africanism was to end racial discrimination against people of African descent

including those in the diaspora. In the 20th century pan-Africanism was articulated by African intellectuals, scholars, politicians and citizens as a necessary prerequisite for creating the conditions that are vital to protect their right of Africans to take part and control their social, economic and political affairs, and achieve peace and development. The 21st century is witnessing the evolution of pan-Africanism, notably through the constitution and establishment of the African Union (AU), in 2002. Given the fact that there is a dearth of analysis on this phenomenon, this volume will also interrogate the notion of pan-Africanism through various lenses—notably peace and security, development, the environment and trade.

Consequently, this book will also engage with the emerging role of the AU as an international actor. The majority of Africa's common positions in the international forums have been expressed through the AU. These include the continent's positions on the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council; its position on climate change; its emerging controversial stand-off with the International Criminal Court (ICC); and its efforts to address the challenges of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Furthermore, the continent has adopted positions relating to development, international trade, the environment and public health issues. The continental body has a dual role of forging unity among its member states and advocating for their interests internationally. This book will assess how the AU's role as an international actor is complicated by the difficulty of promoting consensus among African states and then maintaining that consensus in the face of often divergent national interests. The book will assess a selection of issues that the AU has served as a rallying vehicle for Africa interests. In the field of peace and security, on development and trade issues as well as on climate change. This book will in part assess the role of the AU in articulating collective and joint policies and in making interventions in international decision- and policy-making circles. In addition, throughout the book the various chapters will touch upon how linkages between Africa's citizens have contributed towards continental integration and in confronting the challenges of globalization.

The colonial era in Africa

The territorial conquest of antiquity as well as the colonial empires in Africa were a form of international relations, albeit one premised on a master-slave relationship. European colonialism had the net effect of promoting development in Europe and fostering under-development in Africa, as well as other colonized regions of the world. From 1885, in what came to be known as 'the Scramble for Africa', European powers colonized African peoples and communities across the entire continent. The Belgians were in the Congo, the British in East, South, West and North Africa, the French in West, Central, North and East Africa. The Italians were in the present-day Somalia, the Portuguese in the present-day Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and Cape Verde. The Spanish colonized what is now Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea. The Germans, who later lost their colonies due to their defeat in the Second World War, had colonized present-day Tanzania and Namibia. The conquest and dominion of virtually the entire African continent during this colonial era persists as the real scar on the conscience of the world. The continent's erstwhile colonizers have not found an appropriate framework with which to engage the African continent. The relationship between Africa and its former colonial powers is still infused by a paternalistic attitude, informed by a need to civilize and discipline the continent, evident in some of the policy interventions which are generated by London, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, Madrid and Berlin. As a consequence, the African continent has not yet come to terms with the historical injustice which was generated by the legacy of colonialism. There has not been any forgiveness or reconciliation between Africa and her former European colonial powers. This factor continues to inform how Africa's leaders and citizens view Europe, with a complicated and

paradoxical mixture of admiration, suspicion and mistrust. This fact is for the most part lost on European governments, which still retain a 'messianic' attitude of going to save Africa and its people from themselves. The European engagement with Africa is also paradoxical in nature. On the one hand the superior European attitude of going to salvage Africa from the ravages and excesses of her leaders and governments still persists, whilst at the same time European governments and multinational companies are amongst some of the most corrupt and exploitative actors when it comes to extracting Africa's natural resources. It is these very natural resources that if genuinely utilized to benefit Africa's peoples, rather than a few political and business elites, could reframe the nature of the continent's relationship with her former colonizers.

The Cold War and Africa

At the height of the Cold War, the era of decolonization began in African countries. As African nation-states began to acquire independence in significant number, they concomitantly sought to organize themselves in a more co-ordinated manner with the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963. Africa, like the rest of the world, was caught up in the proxy battles that were fought during the Cold War. The playing out of superpower rivalries on the African continent had a destabilizing effect on peace and security on the continent. Whether it was through overt or covert support, governments and armed resistance movements could always find willing supporters from the Soviet or US geopolitical strategic camps.² As a result undemocratic leaders could always find the means to suppress their people and wage perpetual wars. The continental organization at the time, the OAU, was not effective in projecting stability or restraining the excesses of state power. During the Cold War African countries began to find that they could occasionally build consensus on a number of issues such as development, trade, debt cancellation, infectious diseases, small arms and light weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, climate negotiations, transnational crime prevention, and on the election of Africans to various UN activities and bodies. On other issues, particularly where there is a strong national interest, such as security issues and conflict situations, African countries have not always maintained a united position or a common front for negotiations and voting. The problems and competing state interests continue to pose a fundamental challenge towards the forging of a coherent continent posture towards the rest of the world.

The legacy of the Cold War has left behind instability which still prevails on the continent. Techniques of repression and suppression that were perfected during colonialism and the Cold War are still being used with impunity. Instability prevails in most of the regions of Africa. Illegitimate rulers and quasi-democrats have created conditions in which the rule of law is still being undermined. The net effect of all this is that the issue of conflict is still a dominant security challenge for a significant portion of the continent. Ongoing conflicts have ramifications beyond the borders of Africa. With the failure by Africa's erstwhile enslavers, colonizers and Cold War exploiters to acknowledge the political, social and economic exploitation and crimes committed during their reign and dominion of Africa, the continent's people will continue to harbour mistrust for the global North.

The post-Cold War world and the struggle for Africa's ascendancy

In the post-Cold War world, some would question whether African countries have sufficiently coalesced as a group and developed a coherent identity to influence effectively international policy development. With the acceleration of globalization the African continent remains a paradox as far as international engagement is concerned. On the one hand it remains one of the

most marginalized continents in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), which for Africa is currently about 5% of global investment. On the other hand a number of state actors and transnational corporations are scrambling to exploit Africa's resources and extend their influence over the politics and economics of the continent.

Externally driven hegemonic agendas continue to manifest in Africa's international relations, most notably due to the fact that the continent is one of the fastest growing oil exploration and production zones in the world and one of its last under-explored regions. Demand for oil in the world is increasing due to the instability that prevails in the Middle East. Since 2000, one-third of the world's new oil discoveries have been in Africa.³ The continent also possesses some of the wealthiest deposits of uranium, coltan, cassiterite, gold, copper and timber, and is endowed with fertile agricultural land, but its people are amongst the poorest in the world. These natural resources, some of which are utilized in the burgeoning mobile telephony and space technology industries, are not the causes of conflict but have proven to be a catalyst in fuelling conflict on the African continent. In addition, with the collusion of an unprincipled leadership in African countries, foreign state and transnational corporate actors are engaged in a 'New Scramble for Africa', to exploit these resources and secure mining and extraction concessions which funnel profits out of Africa rather than being utilized to promote education, provide health care and build infrastructure on the continent. The qualitative difference between this scramble for Africa and its historical antecedent in the 19th century, is that African leaders and governments are the primary agents and facilitators of this exploitation. This new scramble for Africa is therefore more akin to a 'self-imposed exploitation', as African political and business leaders have become co-opted as 'willing intermediaries' in the fleecing of their own continent.

Africa has become the terrain for global competition between the USA, the European Union (EU) and the People's Republic of China, as well as other emerging players like India. The changing international dynamics have witnessed the emergence of China and India as rivals to the USA and other Western countries for Africa's raw materials, markets and allegiances. Regrettably, the majority of trade and investment is 'focused on extracting natural resources rather than developing local economies'.⁴ The AU has also strengthened its links with emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil. The AU as an institution has benefited directly from these linkages and its new main headquarters, officially opened in January 2012, was built through a grant provided by China. There has been a Western backlash against the AU's overture towards emerging economies, in particular China. China's approach has been to de-link the issue of economic development from the promotion of political and civil liberties. Some commentators have argued that this has generated a sense in the West, particularly European former colonial powers, about its waning influence with African countries, due to the counter-balancing impact of Chinese resources particularly with regards to infrastructure development and mineral extraction. However, this may be more a case of perception rather than reality because Europe remains one of Africa's major trading partners.

Despite these challenges there is an emerging spirit of pan-Africanism within the Africa continent, which seeks to reverse the historical relationship between the continent from one of paternalism to genuine partnership. Paternalism can best be characterized as a top-down uni-directional relationship where one party establishes the framework and issues strictures for the development of a second party. Partnership on the other hand involves a mutually enriching relationship based on respect and collaboration established through dialogue.

The emergence of the African Union, in 2002, was the result of the logical progression of pan-Africanism and a realization by the continent's leaders and citizens of the need to adopt a policy platform to engage the world on a more equal footing. For example, in March 2005, the

AU issued a declaration known as *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus*, which was a statement in response to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued in December 2004. In this Common African Position the AU highlighted issues pertaining to HIV/AIDS and security, poverty, debt, environmental degradation, trade negotiations, the responsibility to protect, peace-keeping and peace-building.⁵ In addition, the AU issued a position on UN reform and in particular on the reform of the Security Council by noting that ‘in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position’.⁶ The AU goes on to state that ‘Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose’, furthermore noting that ‘Africa’s goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council’.⁷ At least on paper the AU was endeavouring to establish and maintain a common position. However, due to internal dissension some African countries, particularly Egypt and South Africa, effectively broke rank with the Ezulwini Consensus and sought ways individually to ascend to become permanent members of the Security Council. This in effect undermined efforts to demonstrate African ‘unity of purpose’. This is further reinforced by the fact that time and again African countries have shown that they are unlikely to vote as a collective on matters before, or pertaining to, the UN Security Council. Governments generally tend to adopt positions that best serve their interests or that enable them to receive certain benefits from more powerful countries that pick and choose with which African countries they want to work. Therefore, the logic of ‘national self-interest’ and political realism still prevails among African countries, and other member states, at the UN. This fact continues to deter the emergence of a coherent stance as a collective in terms of Africa’s international relations. So the paradox of Pan-Africanism is evident in that there is a willingness, at one level, to make the transition towards a unified African voice, but this is tempered by the enduring habits of national sovereignty and the reluctance to cede genuine power to a supranational entity to govern the affairs of the continent. In this sense, Africa’s international relations remain an enigma, which emphasizes the need for a book such as this one, to assist in deciphering the complexity of the continent’s engagement with the world.

The structure and outline of the book

The book is structured into five parts, namely:

- Theories and historical evolution
- Institutional developments
- Africa’s international relations: Issues and policy areas
- Global governance and Africa
- Africa and international partnerships

Theories and historical evolution

The African continent is engaged with the process of globalization but not on its own terms. The emergence of predatory economic globalization and the global business of profiting from countries, including those affected by war, suggests that the ‘New Scramble for Africa’ has pernicious side effects that have to be arrested if sustainable peace, security and development are to be achieved on the continent. This section delves into some of the existing theoretical

frameworks relating to Africa's international relations. In particular, Tieku, Ndlovu-Gatseni, Mesfin and Obi provide insightful analyses of the theoretical contexts of Africa's International Relations (IR), the emergence of pan-Africanism, and how the continent is constrained by globalization and the challenges to sovereignty.

Institutional developments

The second part of the books illustrates how the African Union has adopted a range of policy frameworks and operationalized institutions to govern its continental and international relations. Dersso discusses the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), while Karbo examines the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Akokpari and Ancas assess Africa's continental relations with a focus on regional economic communities (RECs). Affa'a Mindzie discusses the challenges of democracy and governance across the continent, while Opongo analyses the efforts to promote post-conflict reconstruction across the continent. Haastrup concludes this section of the book with a study of the AU's institutional framework relating to gender equality.

Africa's international relations: issues and policy areas

The third part of the book assesses a range of policy issues that remain a challenge for the continent to address. In particular, Esmenjaud discuss the ownership of Africa's peace and security interventions. Mengesha focuses on how international trade policy impacts on Africa, whilst Fernandez and Papagianni discuss the issues of migration and power sharing, respectively.

Global governance and Africa

The fourth part of the book looks at an extensive range of topics pertaining to global governance and how it impacts upon Africa. De Coning assess international peace operations, while Hansen debates issues pertaining to the ICC. Sansculotte-Greenidge looks at the continent's refugee challenge, while Branch and Lotze examine the emerging doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the protection of civilians, respectively. Sekaggya discusses human rights, while Lioubimtseva elaborates the challenges of climate change. Ettang engages with the global trade in illicit small arms and light weapons, and Maina assesses the role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa. Clements and Kieh analyse the Bretton Woods institutions and the issue of official development assistance. Aning and Bartolucci engage with issues pertaining to terrorism in Africa, while Selim explores the increasing role of private military companies across the continent.

Africa and international partnerships

The final part of the book looks at Africa's international partnerships with Sherriff and Kotso-poulos, Alusa and Omeje, and Fioramonti examining aspects of Africa's engagement with the EU. Melber discusses Africa's relationship with China, while Mangala explores the debate relating to the US Africa Command. Mampilly and Adem analyse Africa's engagement with India and Japan, respectively. De Carvalho, and Lechini and Giaccaglia engage with Africa's South-to-South relationship with an emphasis on Latin America. Finally, Warner and Gallo discuss the emerging relationship between Africa and Iran.

Conclusion

Africa's ascendancy is perhaps not at the pace that the majority of its citizens would like to see, but this does not negate the onward trajectory and generalized gradual improvement in the lives of Africa's people. This book reveals that there are at least three dimensions of Africa's international relations, notably the relations between: Africa's constituent nation-states; the African continent and the world; and Africa's citizens, the diaspora and the rest of the world. Each of these chapters relates to at least one of these dimensions, while some chapters cover more than one. However, the overriding conclusion that one draws from this timely collection is that there has been a perceptible shift in Africa's international relations. As far as Africa's ascendancy is concerned, it is no longer a question of if, but of when, the unfolding trajectory of the continent's international relations will empower its peoples to engage increasingly with the rest of the world on their own terms.

Notes

- 1 Tim Muriithi, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, 2.
- 2 Philip Nyinguro, 'Peace and Security in Post-Cold War Africa: Safeguarding the Future', *African Journal of Political Economy* (1993): 119–48.
- 3 J. Ghazvinian, *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil*, London: Harcourt, 2007.
- 4 R. Southall and H. Melber (eds), *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development*, Scottsville: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009.
- 5 African Union, *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus*, EXT/EX.CL/2 (VII), Addis Ababa: African Union, 7–8 March 2005, 1–7.
- 6 African Union, *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus*, 9.
- 7 Ibid.

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Part I

Theories and historical evolution

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Theoretical approaches to Africa's international relations

Thomas Kwasi Tieku

Introduction

How can we think theoretically about Africa's international relations? Can extant International Relations (IR) theories help us to understand Africa's international relations? Or do scholars of Africa's International Relations (AIR) need a new theory or theories to capture Africa's reality?¹ Discussions of these questions are long overdue, yet seldom explored.² This chapter seeks to provide a preliminary assessment of the above questions arguing that though mainstream IR theories provide useful pointers for studying and understanding Africa's international relations, the individualist worldviews that drive these theories constrain them from providing a comprehensive explanation of key aspects of Africa's international affairs.

To illustrate the above claims, the extant IR literature is divided into two categories: the rational utilitarian approaches and the sociological perspectives. Central claims made by the two approaches are assessed against empirical evidence from Africa. The chapter shows that the two perspectives are helpful in many ways but they are built on an individualist worldview which exaggerates the significance of competitive and self-centred international practices and experiences while simultaneously peripheralizing collectivist international life, such as consensual decision making, group preferences formation and solidarity behaviour, which are ubiquitous features of Africa's international life. The individualist orientations of both approaches, which normally render invisible the significance of international practices and experiences of Africans, prevent their derivative theories from providing clear answers, and in some cases are useful pointers to key questions in Africa's international relations.

A good theoretical account of Africa's international relations must at the very least recognize that Africa's international relations is distinct from international politics of the so-called great powers, which has been the main focus of traditional IR. It is distinct in the sense that it is not driven by power and individualist ideas. Africa's international relations is, however, not exceptional. Some of its key features are found elsewhere in the world though mainstream IR scholars have elected to peripheralize or ignore them in their account of what constitute international relations. For instance, consensual decision making is a common feature of international politics of Asian states, Latin American countries, the United Nations (UN) system, and even the politics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet few mainstream IR scholars recognize its existence, let alone examine its impact on politics. It is unlikely that deeper insights of Africa's international relations can be gained if you ignore the impact of consensual decision making. Indeed, any theory that will help answer key questions in Africa's

IR must accommodate at least three key collective traits—that is, group preferences formation, consensual decision-making procedures and the solidarity principle which are the central referent of Africa's international relations.

The rational utilitarian approach

The rational utilitarian approach explains international relations, including Africa's, with a core assumption that governments have similar preferences for material concerns, such as maintenance of territorial independence of their states, security guarantees, military power, international prestige and economic domination.³ These material preferences are almost fixed, and the goal of every public official is to ensure that their states achieve the optimal outcome of their material interests.

In order to ensure that their states maximize their preferences, governments engage in cost-benefit analysis. Since governments are utility maximizers, they always choose the option that provides the optimal means to these material ends.⁴ Therefore, the second key assumption of the rational utilitarian approach is that governments are efficient choosers which make decisions through a careful calculation and examination of different lines of action.⁵ In a technical sense, the utilitarian perspective suggests that governments are *homo economicus*, and act primarily to maximize their utility. In plain IR language, governments are rational egoistic actors which act principally to achieve their optimal material preferences.

Theorists of IR who employ the utilitarian logic also recognize that governments are aware that their states do not exist in isolation. As a result, utilitarian IR analysts also assume that governments pursue their material interests by taking into consideration the environment in which their states operate.⁶ Structural properties that most utilitarian scholars find useful are international anarchy (the absence of centralized international government), global market competition and transnational economic processes.

Based on the above insights, many utilitarian theorists suggest that theoretical analysis of international relations should begin with an examination of international configurations of powers, actors and institutions.⁷ For a majority of utilitarian theorists, the best way to understand international affairs of any continent is to look at it from the 'outside in'.⁸ The position in which it is located in the global power structure will determine its international relations. Actors embedded in peripheral regions such as those in Africa are acted upon and their behaviours are often dictated by actions of regions that house powerful actors in the international system.

There is, however, a disagreement in the literature over the exact material interests (i.e. the utility) that governments seek to maximize. While some theorists believe a desire for military power is the key causal variable, others emphasize economic interests. The disagreement has led to four major lines of theorizing: rational state power theories (the realist family—i.e. neo-realism, regime theory, hegemonic stability theory, voice opportunity theory); economic interests theories (the liberal family—i.e. neo-liberal institutionalism, transnational theory, and pluralist domestic interests theory); and preference convergence theory, or what some call liberal inter-governmental theory.⁹

The above theories offer informative pointers to the behaviour of African states especially during the Cold War but they are weak when it comes to explaining relations between African states themselves. Hierarchy of power is a determining factor in Africa's interactions with the rest of the world but it is not the most defining factor in inter-Africa relations. The pan-African national character rejects power as a basis for international relations. As I. William Zartman pointed out, the African ruling class not only 'rejects relations on the basis of power', but is also a national character of almost all African states to 'reject power as a basis for international

relations'.¹⁰ Besides, the principles of solidarity make it difficult for Africa's military and economic power houses such as South Africa to use them to lord it over other African countries. Indeed, South Africa is still considered a baby. The most effective power resource African states have is the power to persuade, not the carrot and stick power that utilitarian theorists highlight.

The African region lacks secondary states (regional hegemonies) capable of providing sufficient incentives and/or threats to induce other African governments to act in a particular way.¹¹ None of the African states is influential enough to qualify as a secondary state, though some analysts of area studies occasionally engage in conceptual stretching by referring to relatively wealthy African states as hegemonies. The relatively well-endowed African states encounter great difficulties much of the time in turning their size and wealth into effective diplomatic influence.¹²

Two obvious reasons account for the inability of the relatively wealthy countries to have assertive influence over other African states, particularly in multilateral forums. First, besides the fact that the relatively wealthy and big states in Africa have their own serious internal political and social problems, none of the prospective hegemonies has the resources and clout to provide the incentives that regional hegemonies (secondary states) in Europe like Germany, France and Britain are able to give to their smaller counterparts. These African states have neither the economic resources to provide side payments and continental public goods, nor the required power to set, maintain and enforce regime rules. Second, and more importantly, due to the influence of colonialism, Cold War politics and the attraction of ideas about imperialism, resentment against powerful states runs deep in the thinking of elites in Africa. Not only does the resentment drive African ruling elites to mobilize often against any hegemonic seeker, but it makes it hard for relatively big and wealthy African states to get support for their positions. This manifested itself in the opposition to the former South Africa Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's candidacy for the Chair of the AU Commission in 2012. The only reason her candidacy was controversial was because she was a citizen of one of the big five African Union (AU) members. She was supremely qualified and better suited for the job, and even her most vocal critics admitted that her only problem was the South African connection.¹³

The near deterministic logic and the weak role accorded African agency in rationalist accounts raises more questions than it provides answers. A rational utilitarian approach tells us little about the formation of interests and preferences among African states. All the literature pre-socially assigned interests of African governments, but as many IR scholars have long maintained, the processes through which preferences are formed have enormous impact on the behaviour and actions of actors.¹⁴

A rational utilitarian approach de-emphasizes the role ideas play in Africa's international relations. This neglect is surprising for two reasons in particular, but mounting evidence in the social sciences (cognitive psychology, sociology and political science) literature shows that ideas have profound effects on the course of events. Empirical evidence emerging from the sociological strand of IR literature indicates that ideas that actors hold affect how they define their interests in the first place; ideas are also known to provide guidelines for human action and behaviour.¹⁵ They do so 'by stipulating causal patterns', by 'imply[ing] strategies for the attainment of goals', and 'by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for action'.¹⁶ Thus, in addition to providing lenses for actors to define and understand their interests, ideas show actors ways to pursue the interests they have identified.¹⁷ African leaders' perceptions of their interests are structured by ideas. Ideas may also provide the intellectual framework for African states to interpret the institutional choices available. These observations, however, lead me straight out of the rationalistic paradigm and into the complex web of sociological perspective.

The sociological perspective

The sociological perspective suggests two steps to explain Africa's international relations. The first component directs us to examine preference formation of actors in Africa's sub-system. Many sociological scholars pay attention to preference formation because they believe that the process through which actors construct their interests has enormous influence on their behaviours and political outcomes.¹⁸ The second aspect encourages us to look at the decision-making process.

The sociological literature contends that actors do not pursue extant interests that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, material conditions and unanticipated events. Rather, they are socially constructed.¹⁹ Preferences of political actors are constructed through social interactions. Although the concept of 'social interaction' is not without its substantive and operational imprecision, it is used analytically to mean a mutually oriented relationship between two or more people that takes the *other self* into account.²⁰ The phrase *social* is employed specifically to indicate that interactions mutually oriented towards each *others' selves* have meaningful causal influence on preference formation. Interactions that shape, define and redefine interests of agents are those that take account of each other's subjective experiences, emotions, thoughts and/or intentions.²¹

Social interactions influence preference formation in three major ways. It provides a place for social learning and socialization in addition to offering a forum for actors to develop inter-subjective understanding of meaning. For many (but certainly not all) sociological IR theorists, actors acquire new interests and preferences through social interactions even in the absence of obvious material incentives.²² Perhaps more important, social interactions generate ideas that help actors to understand their environment and to identify the different options available.²³

Actors' ability to identify various options and to select some as preferences is dependent on the stock of ideas they hold.²⁴ Ideas, defined as beliefs that actors hold, are of three kinds:²⁵ they are worldviews, principled ideas and causal ideas.²⁶ Worldviews are the taken-for-granted cognitive paradigms or axioms that enable actors to interpret events and to identify and perceive occurrences.²⁷ These ideas define the universe of possibilities for action. Causal ideas, which are lenses that organize and simplify experiences for actors, serve as guides to human action.²⁸ They guide human behaviour 'by stipulating causal patterns or causal road map', and by 'imply[ing] strategies for the attainment of goals'.²⁹ Principled ideas, which are referred to in the literature as norms, are shared standards of appropriate behaviour that a community of actors holds. Principled ideas 'distinguish right from wrong and just from unjust and also provide compelling ethical or moral motivations for action'.³⁰

Ideas, of course, 'do not float freely'; they require agents and a congenial environment to be causally effective.³¹ Ideas usually require political entrepreneurs to select and market them. In general, the literature suggests that ideas that are likely to have meaningful impacts on the preferences of actors are those that:³²

- resonate with widely accepted normative frameworks;
- demonstrate that adhering to them serves a broader goal of actors;
- show the existence of general incentives to comply;³³
- are presented to actors who are in a new environment, or are cognitively uncertain about the appropriate way to respond to a changing environment;
- are presented in front of small and private audiences;
- are presented by political entrepreneurs perceived as knowledgeable about an issue and whose intentions are perceived as trustworthy; and
- reinforce a belief of an actor or are consistent with prior evidence of which an actor is aware.

Based on the above insights, scholars who employ this perspective contend that actors are *homo sociologicus*, who are governed by 'a logic of appropriateness' (LOA) in their mode of action.³⁴ The logic of appropriateness means that actors are motivated by a desire to do the right thing. They take a particular course of action not because of external material sanctions and/or rewards, but rather they pursue the course of action because they think it is right. The LOA comprises three main ideas: situation, role/identity and rules. According to the LOA, actors ask a series of questions before taking a particular course of action. The questions are: What is my situation? Who am I? How appropriate are the different courses of actions for me? How is an actor in my role and with my identity supposed to act?

For the great majority of sociological scholars, actors are rule followers who act out of habit, and they usually choose the course of action that they consider appropriate. This is not to deny that preferences of actors are sometimes driven primarily by consequential reasons. The point is that, *all things being equal*, actors will usually opt for the appropriate course of action.

The great merit of this aspect of the sociological literature is its ability to provide a framework for explaining preferences of actors and the light it sheds on the importance of worldview in IR scholarship. However, the IR sociological literature is silent on ideational effects on international institutional change.³⁵ The IR sociological research programme neglects to investigate why states create consequential international institutions in places other than Western Europe and the advanced industrial world. As Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein noted, the empirical research programme of mainstream IR theorists concentrates on 'a small pool of successful Western institutions, such as NAFTA [the North American Free Trade Agreement] and the EU'.³⁶

Besides, as reviewers of the literature correctly pointed out, the 'influence of ideational forces on actor preference formation ... remains vague ... [and] underspecified'.³⁷ There is also a dearth of literature that systematically demonstrates, in a concrete fashion, the specific ideas that animate preference formation. In other words, how exactly do ideas influence actors to choose, say, A over B? The sociological research programme has provided little that systematically tests the validity of this claim.³⁸ The few empirical works that have emerged are focused primarily either on the impact of international norms on domestic political outcomes, or on how domestic politics helps/impedes the diffusion of international norms.³⁹ Only a few of the mainstream IR sociological works even examine the impact of causal ideas on political outcomes.⁴⁰ The emphasis placed by analysts of the sociological approaches on international norms has led to the neglect of systematic analysis of the role of ideas that 'are deeply rooted in other types of social entities—regional ... and subnational groups'.⁴¹ Sociological scholars ignore ideas embedded in these entities because they see norms 'as ... global "oobleck" that covers the planet' and 'affects ... all [actors] in the same way'.⁴² The few ideational analysts who do not subscribe to the universalistic view are 'so concerned with detailing the variations in local reaction[s]' to international norms that they lose sight of regional and sub-regional ideational and normative fabrics.⁴³

Ingredients for theorizing Africa's IR

The neglect of regional normative fabrics limits the applicability of the sociological in the African context. Indeed, no theoretical account of Africa's international relations will be complete without taking into serious consideration a regional African norm called the pan-African solidarity norm. Briefly, the pan-African solidarity norm is a widespread belief among African ruling elites that the proper and ethically acceptable behaviour of Africa's political elites is to demonstrate a feeling of oneness and support towards other Africans, at least in public. This

feeling of 'we-ness', or public show of support, among African leaders goes 'beyond the merely rhetorical level' to impose 'on African rulers a sense that, at any rate, they *ought* to act in harmony'.⁴⁴ The solidarity norm not only discourages African leaders from disagreeing with each other in public, but also puts 'pressure on the rulers of individual African states not to step out of line over issues where a broad continental consensus had been established'.⁴⁵ The norm was developed at the first meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers, held in Lagos in 1963.

The norm has a profound impact on Africa's international relations. The norm's expectation that African political elites must at all times work together in harmony and co-operatively at the continental level put ethical pressure on African governments to seek a compromise position. African governments often sacrifice interests and preferences of their states in order to conform to the norm's expectation. Moreover, the norm usually provides a road map for appropriate and inappropriate courses of action. The norm not only encourages African political elites to show loyalty in public to continental unity, but also makes it hard for those elites to oppose openly an issue that commands broad support. Decision making is often made easy by the self-regulation of the norm. It is the powerful effect of the norm that allows African states to develop common positions on crucial international issues. It often encourages African governments to engage in bloc voting at international forums. Indeed, it dictates actions of African governments in international politics, especially in the absence of obvious material self-interest and concerns.

Though earlier IR sociological theorists highlighted the central role of worldview in IR scholarship, the sociological research programme has failed to examine the impact of worldview in international relations. Norms and causal ideas are the central referent of the sociological research programme. Like their utilitarian counterparts, leading IR sociological researchers are very American and European centric. The focus on a few Western empirical turfs where an individualist worldview dominates social structures and on norms and causal ideas has led to the neglect of the impacts of different worldviews.⁴⁶ Indeed, they treat all societies as if they were embedded in individual social milieux.

However, as many research works on personhood show, collectivism is the dominant worldview in Africa and any theory that neglects collectivist practices cannot account for Africa's IR. In African societies, and by extension Africa's IR, actors such as persons and states are not independent entities; rather, they are 'integral members of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity'.⁴⁷ The reason is that collectivist cultures prioritize the social over the personal and group preferences over individual interests and goals, and they peripheralize differentness, as well as uniqueness.⁴⁸ In such cultures, individuals are deemed interdependent, and their self is assumed to be inextricably linked with the selves of others.⁴⁹ The key identity markers are group membership and obligations. As a consequence, they cherish group harmony and the public show of unity by members of the in-group, however shallow that harmony might be. Indigenous African societies exhibit many features of collectivist cultures, as those who have closely studied the person in African society have noted. In the view of Stagner, many indigenous Africans 'show practically no self-awareness'.⁵⁰ Formal education has removed some of the collectivist traits from African political life, and made some of the political elites give away some of the collectivist behavioural persona. Almost all political elites in Africa show some form of self-awareness and self-interest. Nonetheless, remnants of collectivist cultural practices still dictate African politics in general, and interstate relations specifically. Unlike the individualist behavioural traits widely documented by IR scholars, many African elites do not see themselves as independent, atomistic, isolated and abstract entities, or think they just '*have*' relations with each other. Rather, they think they '*are*' relations.⁵¹ In other words, they think and behave in relational terms.

The relational behavioural pattern associated with collectivism often makes African governments seek a compromise position on major issues at regional, continental forums, and to a limited extent at the global level. African leaders' deference to compromise outcomes is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it encourages quick decision making among African leaders on key issues during meetings. The confrontation, open disagreement and sometimes complete inertia that usually characterize decision making of most international organizations are often absent at summit meetings of African leaders. On the other hand, the disdain for dissent has meant that African leaders often make decisions at summit meetings without any serious debate or analysis of the issue. The deference to compromise has on many occasions prevented African leaders from implementing decisions and policies that have a consequential impact on sitting African leaders. This is why although African multilateral institutions like the AU have some of the best international legal rules, policies, charters and institutions, many of them are inactive or yet to be translated into domestic laws.

The influence of collectivism means that key aspects of African international politics take place in informal settings. Formal structures may exist but the informal framework is often used to make critical decisions. For instance, agenda items for AU summits must formally be provided by the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Permanent Representative Committee, the AU Commission and other organs of the Union, or they must be proposed by member states and regional economic communities. Yet most agenda items for AU summits are provided by informal sectoral expert meetings invented by AU bureaucrats. Indeed, formal structures at the international level in Africa are mere rubber-stamping institutions. The informalization of Africa's international politics is obviously distinct from the formalized and legalistic international relations documented by mainstream IR scholars.

Conclusion

The chapter critically examined major IR theories with a view to finding out if they possess the key tools needed to study and understand Africa's international relations. The theories were grouped into rational utilitarian insights and sociological perspectives. Rational utilitarian theories are helpful in many ways. Some of the structural and material forces, such as the impact of the end of the Cold War and economic incentives, which underpin the work of rational utilitarian theorists, are useful background conditions for exploring interstate relations in Africa. These material forces are often used by agents to set the agenda for action, encourage African leaders to take certain steps, and they usually form the background conditions for preferences/interests of African governments. Power, which is the thread that binds rational utilitarian theories together and is highlighted by rationalists as the main instrument of international politics, is not the most important driver of Africa's international politics. The pan-African national character rejects power as a basis for Africa's international relations. The neglect of African input and agency in the account of rational utilitarian theorists further weakens the explanatory power of their theories. Most rational utilitarian theories lack the analytical tools to account for the formation of interests and preferences of African governments.

The tools and clues for explaining preference formation of actors in Africa's international relations can be found in the sociological perspective. Indeed, the sociological theories offer an appropriate framework to explore Africa's international relations. They draw attention to ideational variables such as norms which are extremely important in the African context. However, the exact influence of ideational forces on actor preference formation is underspecified and largely untested. The approach that English-speaking IR sociological scholars employ to study the effects of ideas is so universalistic that they tend to ignore the effects of norms embedded in regional and sub-national

entities. The few ideational analysts who do not subscribe to the universalistic view are so interested in capturing variations in local reactions to international ideas that they lose sight of regional and sub-regional ideational fabrics. However, no account of Africa's international relations will be complete without consideration of regional and sub-regional ideational forces. The existence of a plethora of regional and sub-regional institutions in Africa and African leaders' penchant for multilateral politics makes regional and sub-regional fabrics an indispensable part of African politics in general and Africa's international relations in particular. It is simply not possible to understand Africa's international relations if you neglect regional and sub-regional factors.

More fundamentally, the two perspectives use an individualist worldview to examine international relations. On one hand an individualist worldview exaggerates the significance of competitive and self-centred international practices and experiences such as competitive voting, pursuit of national interests, threats, side payments, material rewards and punishment. On the other hand, it peripheralizes collectivist international life, such as consensual decision making, group preference formation and solidarity behaviour, which are a ubiquitous feature of Africa's international life. The stranglehold that the individualist orientations have over the two perspectives render invisible the significance of international practices and experiences of Africans and at the same time prevent their derivative theories from providing clear answers and, in some cases, useful pointers to key questions in Africa's international relations.

With the above limitations of mainstream IR theories in mind, the penultimate section of the chapter outlined key ingredients for theorizing international relations of Africa. Four mutually reinforcing elements of Africa-centric mid-range theory were highlighted. It called for the use of a mild version of collectivist lenses. This is meant to reflect the fact that African actors are embedded in collectivist cultural milieux. Thus, unlike mainstream theories, an Africa-centred IR theory directs attention to social behaviours rather than self- or individual centred actions, group preferences instead of individual state interests, and it puts students of IR in a position to understand common rather than unique international practices. The emphasis on the social and collective helps us to understand the relational dimension of international politics and why African governments tend to pursue compromised outcomes at the international level. Rather than caricature African actors as atomistic and egoistic players in the international system, relational thinking helps us to understand collective actions such as the common African positions and, in particular, why and how 54 different African states with supposedly distinct national interests are able to develop a common position on critical international issues without the usual rancour and inertia that characterize decision making of large groups. In addition, the chapter drew attention to the importance of African region-wide norms such as pan-African solidarity, which has become a central pillar of Africa's international relations. Lastly, it was noted that an African-centred theory should not prioritize formal institutions and structures over informal ones. Indeed, paying attention to informal processes and institutions may provide more insights into Africa's international relations than focusing on formal structures.

Notes

- 1 I used the uncapped phrase Africa's international relations to mean the object of study and its capped version Africa's International Relations (AIR) to mean the field of study.
- 2 The exceptions are Kevin Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001; Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru and Timothy M. Shaw, *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century*, London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012; Douglas Lemke, 'Intra-national IR in Africa', *Review of International Studies* 37:1 (2011); William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), *African Agency in International Politics*, London: Routledge, 2013.
- 3 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979; Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987; John Gerard

- Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, New York: Routledge Press, 1998; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment', in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds) *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
- 4 Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
 - 5 Ibid.
 - 6 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.
 - 7 Andrew Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds) *Regionalism in World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 3–73.
 - 8 Iver B. Neumann, 'A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe', *Review of International Studies* 20:1 (1994): 53–74.
 - 9 I omitted functionalism/neo-functionalism and its spill over hypothesis from the review because the theory was not developed to answer questions the chapter seeks to answer. The theory primarily seeks to help us understand increases in supranational authority. Some IR scholars have caricatured and manipulated the theory in order to make their case. I eliminated it from the review to avoid the temptation of falling prey to such an exercise.
 - 10 For a discussion of how a 'rejection of power' forms the bedrock of international relations in Africa, see William Zartman, 'Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations', *International Organization* 21:4 (1967): 545–64.
 - 11 Hegemon used here refers to a dominant state(s).
 - 12 See, for instance, Christopher S. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Zartman, 'Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations'.
 - 13 For detailed discussion, see Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 'South Africa and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolt', paper presented at the 2012 Nordic Africa Institute (NAI)—Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) Lecture Series, Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency, 26 September 2012.
 - 14 Jeffery W. Legro, 'Culture and Preferences in the Inter-state Cooperation Two-Step', *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 118–37.
 - 15 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46: 2 (1989): 391–425; Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
 - 16 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993.
 - 17 For a review of this literature, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 391–416.
 - 18 Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*.
 - 19 Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*; Onuf, *World of Our Making*; Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it'; Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*.
 - 20 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "'Going Native" in Europe?' *Comparative Political Science Studies* 36: 1 (2003): 209–31.
 - 21 Rudolf J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976.
 - 22 Note, however, that these scholars concede that the social as well as the material forces shape political outcome. J. Checkel, 'Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change', *International Organization* 55 (2001): 553–88.
 - 23 Goldstein and Keohane (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*; Steven Bernstein, 'Ideas, Social Structure and the Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism', *European Journal of International Relations* 6:4 (2000): 464–512.
 - 24 Kathryn Sikkink and Margaret Keck, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
 - 25 Goldstein and Keohane (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.
 - 26 Ibid.
 - 27 Kate O'Neill, Jörg Balsiger and Stacy D. VanDeveer, 'Actors, Norms and Impact', *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (2004): 149–75.

- 28 Andrew D. Marble, 'The "Taiwan Threat Hypothesis": Ideas, Values, and Foreign Policy Preferences in the United States', *Issues & Studies* 38: 1 (2002): 165–99.
- 29 Goldstein and Keohane (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Persuasion in International Institutions', 20 January 2002, www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_14.htm (accessed 20 November 2010).
- 32 The information below is drawn from Checkel, 'Persuasion in International Institutions'; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet?', *European Union Politics* 2:2 (2001): 226–40.
- 33 Checkel, 'Why Comply?'; Jeffrey Checkel, 'Social Construction and Integration', *ARENA Working Papers* WP 98/14 (2000), www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98 (accessed 20 March 2003).
- 34 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1989.
- 35 The ongoing collaborative works by Thomas Riise, Richard Herrmann and Marilyn Brewer (eds), *Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the European Union* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004; the exception are Checkel's works on the EU and that of R. Kathleen McNamara, *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- 36 Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism', *International Organization* 56: 3 (2002).
- 37 O'Neill *et al.*, 'Actors, Norms and Impact'.
- 38 Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller, 'Theoretical Paradise—Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas', *Review of International Studies* 31: 1 (2005): 167–79.
- 39 Checkel, "Going Native" in Europe?
- 40 Marble, 'The "Taiwan Threat Hypothesis"'.
- 41 Amitay Acharya, 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism', *International Organization* 58 (2004): 239–75.
- 42 Sikkink and Keck, *Activists Beyond Borders*.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 This understanding of the solidarity norm comes from Christopher Clapham's discussion of politics of solidarity and Ali Mazrui's analysis of the concept of 'we are all Africans'. Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Ali Mazrui, 'On the Concept of "We Are All Africans"', *The American Political Science Review* LVII: 1 (March 1963): 88–97; and Ali Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- 45 Clapham, *Africa and the International System*.
- 46 This should not be misconstrued to mean that the individualist worldview is exclusive to the 'West' or global North and that collectivist practices are only found elsewhere. While it is certainly the case that formal education encourages individualist practices and the high level of literacy in the 'West' has made the individualist worldview the mainstream way of looking at the world, the general view amongst informed observers of personhood is that both practices are common in both locales. In the same way that there are many Africans who are hardcore individualists, many people in the West still hold on to their collectivist orientations.
- 47 Obinna Okere, 'The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems', *Human Rights Quarterly* 6: 2 (1984): 148. For a detailed discussion of the person in Africa, see Paul Riesman, 'The Person and the Life Cycle in African Social Life and Thought', *African Studies Review* 29: 2 (1986): 71–198.
- 48 Daniel Oyserman, 'The Lens of Personhood: Viewing the Self and Others in a Multicultural Society', *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 65 (1993): 993–1009; Daphna Oyserman, Heather M. Coon and Markus Kemmelmeier, 'Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-analyses', *Psychological Bulletin* 128 (2002): 3–72; Daphna Oyserman and Harry Markus, 'The Sociocultural Self', *Psychological Perspectives on the Self* 4 (1993): 187–220.
- 49 Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Personality*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961; Harry C. Triandis, 'Individualism-Collectivism and Personality', *Journal of Personality* 69 (2001): 907–24.
- 50 Stagner, *Psychology of Personality*, 184.
- 51 Charles Piot, *Remotely Global: Village Modernity in West Africa*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Pan-Africanism and the international system

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Introduction

Pan-Africanism is, above all, an international phenomenon and, as such, it should deal with power and interest and their dynamics in the international arena: international political forums and international political economy.¹

This chapter fills a yawning gap in studies of the international system through analysis of pan-Africanism as a worldview that played a major role in shaping the direction of global politics since the end of the 19th century. Of course, pan-Africanism is more than a simple worldview and this chapter will engage with its multifaceted meanings within global politics and its shifting character across time since 1900. Broadly speaking, pan-Africanism is about black race consciousness; self-determination of the black race; unity of the African people, including those in the diaspora; economic development of African people; and finding a dignified niche for Africans within the international system.

The re-emergence of pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism is re-emerging as a discourse within the global South, which offers a counter worldview to the dominant hegemonic Eurocentric worldview. Pan-Africanism recognizes, defines and interprets the current modern international system as a racially hierarchized, patriarchal, imperial, colonial, heteronormative and capitalist global social order.² According to Ramon Grosfoguel at the apex of this truncated and 'Eurocentric universalism' and global social order is the USA and the rest of the Western world, and at the subaltern bottom is the global South in general and the African continent in particular.³

At the centre of this modern international system is 'coloniality', defined as one of the key constitutive elements that entrench the worldview defined by a Eurocentric global social order that was constructed during the time of colonial encounters between Europe and Africa. In this context, Anibal Quijano defined and articulated 'coloniality' as a Eurocentric project based on the imposition of a racial, ethnic and gender classification of the global population as the cornerstone and defining element of the modern international system.⁴

One of the main consequences of 'coloniality' was the Berlin Conference of 1884 where the African continent was approached as a land of material and human opportunities for reaping and sharing among Europeans.⁵ According to the imperatives of the 'Berlin consensus' the African

continent was nothing but 'a philosophical, historical, and cultural vacuum' and a 'dark continent' that had to be 'penetrated' and 'civilized' by white races.⁶ Adekeye Adebajo wrote about the 'curse of Berlin' to encapsulate a single global event, the historical and structural impact of which continues to shape and affect Africa's place in contemporary international relations.⁷

The modern international system is therefore rooted in racial articulation of global social identities into white and black, and geocultural demarcations of the world into Europe, America, Asia and Africa. This invention of the modern world that was permeated through by Eurocentrism was not only informed by a conception and differentiation of humanity into 'inferior and superior, irrational and rational, primitive and civilized, traditional and modern', but also by capitalist imperatives that unleashed such 'darker' aspects of modernity as mercantilism, the slave trade, so-called 'legitimate trade', imperialism, colonialism, apartheid and globalization on the African world.⁸

Pan-Africanism emerged as a response to the manifestations of the 'darker' aspects of modernity, particularly the slave trade which constituted one of the most inhuman elements of the unfolding and expansion of modernity into areas outside of Europe and America. Locksley Edmondson argued that:

Pan-Africanism, however articulated or conceptualized, whatever its functional scope or operational habitat, is by definition an international relations phenomenon. The essential aspect of pan-Africanism, indeed its distinctive characteristic within the complex of black racial expressions, is that it necessarily transcends territorial political boundaries. And when, in its most expansive manifestation, pan-Africanism embraces a range of transcontinental relations, international relations analysis necessarily bears profoundly on the elucidation of that phenomenon.⁹

The slave trade that adversely affected Africans was not an aberration of modernity, but a logical consequence of the mercantile, imperial and colonial imperatives that emerged from the 15th century onwards. This imperative was part of what Quijano has described as a 'colonial matrix of power' that entailed control over labour and its products; nature and its productive resources; gender and its products, including the reproduction of the species; subjectivity, including its material and intersubjective products such as knowledge; and authority and its instruments, including coercion.¹⁰

Epistemologically speaking, pan-Africanism can best be described as a world view emerging from the subaltern world, that is, a world inhabited by what Frantz Fanon termed the 'wretched of the earth'.¹¹ The 'wretched of the earth' included those who experienced the slave trade, colonialism and apartheid, whose life experiences invoked a spirit of resistance and rebellion against the debilitating aspects of a racially hierarchized, patriarchal, imperial, colonial and capitalist modern global social order which authorized and enabled the dominant powers of the West to enslave and colonize black races.¹² The genealogy of pan-Africanism is located within the experience of oppression which inevitably provoked resistance. Thus, pan-Africanism is ontologically a resistance movement and a terrain of struggles for black human dignity and human rights, confirming Mahmood Mamdani's analysis that 'without the fact of oppression, there can be no practice of resistance and no notion of rights'.¹³

International Relations and pan-Africanism

What is surprising is that in mainstream studies of International Relations (IR), pan-Africanism is not included as one of the important worldviews. Pan-Africanism, which arose as part of black racial consciousness, unfolded as a movement and worldview that questioned and indicted the dominant Eurocentric conceptions of the world, thus contributing towards visibilization of black identity as dominated, oppressed, abused and exploited by white races. The issue of race