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CITIZENSHIP AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN EUROPE



IRENEUSZ PAWEŁ KAROLEWSKI

Citizenship and Collective Identity in Europe

This book is the first monograph to systematically explore the relationship between citizenship and collective identity in the European Union, integrating two fields of research – citizenship and collective identity.

Karolewski argues that various types of citizenship correlate with differing collective identities and demonstrates the link between citizenship and collective identity. He constructs three generic models of citizenship including the republican, the liberal and the caesarean citizenship to which he ascribes types of collective identity. Using a multidisciplinary approach, the book integrates concepts, theories and empirical findings from sociology (in the field of citizenship research), social psychology (in the field of collective identity), legal studies (in the chapter on the European Charter of Fundamental Rights), security studies (in the chapter on the politics of insecurity) and philosophy (in the chapter on pathologies of deliberation) to examine the current trends of European citizenship and European identity politics.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, political theory, political philosophy, sociology and social psychology.

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For my son Adam

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Introduction

The issue of European citizenship has been subject to a heated debate in legal studies as well as in social sciences. The debate has covered several aspects. Originally, it began with the controversy of whether citizenship beyond the nation-state is possible at all.¹ Afterwards, some scholars focused on the limitations of European citizenship in comparison to national citizenship bemoaning the underdeveloped character of European citizenship,² whereas others highlighted the constructive potential of European citizenship for the future, grounding it in citizenship practice.³ The constructive potential of European citizenship was discussed particularly with respect to the concept of constitutionalism against the background of the European constitutionalization process⁴ and additionally as a specific form of social citizenship of the European Union.⁵ Moreover, the debate on European citizenship has spawned a sub-debate on the very concept of European citizenship. It has proceeded on three tracks. The first track covered the rather abstract issue of optimal citizenship for the EU as well as the instrumental function of citizenship, both analyzed from the perspective of political economy.⁶ The second track related to the issue of whether European citizenship is a mere derivative of the member states' citizenship. In this vein, some authors postulated extending European citizenship to cover European denizens (citizens of non-EU countries with residence in an EU member state), thus dislodging European citizenship from the national, which would make European citizenship an independent and recognizable construction. The third track referred to the controversy of whether citizenship indicates only legally institutionalized categories of rights and obligations or if it is also based on shared values and objectives.⁷ Recently, the rejection of the draft constitutional treaty has led to a critical assessment of European citizenship.⁸

This account is by no means exhaustive, as we can observe a growing complexity of the European citizenship discourse. Despite this complexity one issue seems to be particularly neglected in all the debates on European citizenship. Although a wealth of research exists on the issue of citizenship and collective identity,⁹ the link between the two phenomena in the European studies appears to be far from clarified.¹⁰ This is also visible from the perspective of the collective identity, which appears in different research contexts such as the politics of recognition¹¹ or dilemmas of collective action.¹² Here, the link between collective identity and citizenship also remains highly controversial. In general, we can distinguish *three methods* of conceptualizing it.

Firstly, some scholars regard the conceptual link between citizenship and collective identity as non-coincidental and to be realized solely in the framework of the nation-state. In this case, citizenship becomes absorbed by nationality, and only thus it can be a

basis for democratic politics, where majority decisions require a permanent integration into the context of the interests of the entire society. This perspective is relatively popular in the European studies, particularly concerning the democratic deficit of the EU.¹³ Collective identity is viewed as a necessary condition for democratic decision-making and stability of political regimes. However, this position tends to utilize the model of collective identity characteristic for nation-states with regard to the EU. It assumes that polities draw their collective identity in the main from a common history and from the memory of their common past as well as through communication with each other in an integrated common public space.¹⁴ Furthermore, it is frequently supposed to be not just any collective identity but a substantive, resilient feeling of commonness (in some cases even almost unconditional), which would not only cement the society in times of crisis but also make the political minority trust that the ruling majority would not exploit its privileged power position at the expense of the minority. The shortcoming of this approach consists in the fact that it is anchored in the model of nation-state, thus ignoring a variety of possible collective identities beyond the nation-state context. In this sense, it is semantically conservative and statist. While it negates the state character of the EU, it simultaneously requires from the EU the fulfilment of the main characteristics of the continental nation-states.

Moreover, this position tends to ignore the debate on the 'impending crisis of the hyphen' in the concept of the nation-state.¹⁵ As a consequence of globalization ever fewer societies can be described as nation-states.¹⁶ As the global economic dynamics transcend national borders and become less controllable for national governments, the autonomy and effectiveness of the nation-state is being increasingly questioned. This has implications for the nation-state ideology, which regards autonomous and homogeneous national cultures represented by distinct states as *natural* and *organic* entities. Although the ideology of homogeneous nations is always based on a myth, homogenization and the construction of national identity are at the core of every project of nation-building and nationalism. As national identities increasingly erode, not least as a result of the new waves of transnational migration, we face a spread of global values and a simultaneous reinvention of culture on sub-national levels. The new migration trend differs from historically similar phenomena in terms of quantities, global range and frequency. As a consequence, large numbers of migrants cannot be easily assimilated into the national population, since they come from increasingly distant regions and cultures.¹⁷ In a nutshell, the erosion of national sovereignty (but not its obliteration) entails parting of the hitherto overlapping cultural and political spheres of the nation and the state. The invalidation of the Gellnerian principle of integration between culture and political authority within the modern nation-state has the consequence that citizenship and collective identity are at the level of citizenship practice no longer intertwined.¹⁸ Therefore, today more than ever we might be confronted with citizenship without shared identity.¹⁹ The issue is, however, a stochastic one, since citizenship without shared identity does not necessarily replace citizenship with collective identity. Therefore, the question would rather pertain to which types of citizenship (with what collective identity) will be dominant in a given empirical context.

Secondly, an opposite method of linking citizenship and identity attempts to completely decouple collective identity from citizenship and to construct citizenship as an independent rights regime, which circumvents the nation-state and renders it obsolete.²⁰ Arguments used in favour of this position are both empirical and normative. The former relate to the structural change in the global capitalist mode of production as

well as to transnational migration, both of which put the nation-state and its territorial citizenship under increasing pressure. As a consequence, citizenship has to transform itself and to find a new form beyond the nation-state, liberating itself from the constraints of national identity.²¹ Particularly against the background of globalization, new approaches are developed that conceptualize citizenship not only without reference to shared identity, but also without relating it to nation-states. For example, Seyla Benhabib pleads for a 'republican federalism', which is expected to enhance popular sovereignty by perpetuating cosmopolitan norms such as those pertaining to refugee, immigrant and asylum status across the local, the national and the global levels. At the same time, Benhabib acknowledges that these norms challenge the nation-state by escaping from its control.²² Equally, in his account of European citizenship, Rainer Bauböck builds on a modification of Kant's model for a global confederation of republics, without recurring to collective identity. He focuses instead on institutional aspects of the architecture of citizenship such as the differentiation of citizenship statuses in Europe, the allocation of voting rights to these categories, and the rules for acquisition and loss of citizenship at various levels.²³ According to this position, European political community does not have to be based on a substantive and resilient collective identity, but rather on political rights reflecting universal moral entitlements. In the context of the European Union, this position finds its reflection to some extent in the doctrine of constitutional patriotism, which is deemed by its supporters an appropriate model for supranational political association in Europe. Consequently, the overlapping of citizenship and national identity is viewed as a contingent historical development, which can be overcome by the project of European constitution-making redirecting citizens' identities towards a new supranational polity. The European constitution-making is believed to remedy the democratic deficit of the EU, particularly its lack of demos, by establishing the terms and conditions for democratic negotiation and institutionalizing shared practices of law-making in the EU.²⁴

However, the decoupling strategy also has its limitations. The concept of citizenship reduced to rights and law-making suffers from neglecting the political requirements of citizenship, mainly its connection to the political authority, without which rights cannot be guaranteed. By decoupling citizenship and collective identity, a growing social and cultural heterogeneity transforms citizenship beyond the nation-states into an asymmetric and variable mechanism for political negotiations among groups and individuals.²⁵ Consequently, citizenship ceases to be an integrative mechanism for equal membership in a political community aspiring to collective exercise of political power and becomes either an ephemeron (encompassing rights that are non-judiciable) or becomes a description of a status (expressing asymmetrical privileges), and therefore can be viewed as a proxy for group specific rights in diverse and heterogeneous societies.²⁶ Furthermore, citizenship loses its specific political nature, since (political) rights grow to be indistinguishable from human rights with their cosmopolitan appeal.²⁷

Thirdly, a further strategy of conceptualizing citizenship and collective identity merges citizenship with individual or group identity. Here, subjective feelings of belonging are regarded as essential for citizenship, perhaps even more relevant than its legal dimension, thus leading us to the 'feeling of citizenship'.²⁸ In Christian Joppke's account, the citizenship becomes supplemented by identity politics, which endows citizenship with two possible meanings: the actual identity attitudes held by average citizens, and the official identity politics propagated by the government.²⁹ For Richard Bellamy, subjective feelings of belonging are regarded as essential for

citizenship, sometimes even more than its legal framework, whereas Antje Wiener extends the meaning of formal citizenship into the concept of shared values and common belonging.³⁰ Consequently, European citizenship is also expected to integrate the notion of identity, which enables the members of the community of the EU to identify each other as members of the same community within the political processes of European integration. In this manner, European citizenship becomes contextualized, since it is sensitive to specific conditions of individual citizens.³¹ This strategy, however, integrates two distinct concepts that need to be examined separately, even though they are connected to each other. It proceeds according to the same weakness as the first method, which merges nationalism with citizenship.³² Thus, it dilutes the semantic core of citizenship amalgamating it with different phenomena such as attitudes, perceptions and feelings of the citizens.

Furthermore, some authors attempt to enrich the meaning of citizenship (while using the term 'formal citizenship' as an opposition, which suggests its incompleteness) to fit a broader notion of shared values.³³ But by making identity a component of citizenship and opening it additionally to values and attitudes we amalgamate citizenship semantics with social practice. If one incorporates 'belonging' into the concept of citizenship, a merger of two different phenomena is conducted, preventing an exploration of their relationship. Consequently, if citizenship *is* belonging, then we cannot discuss for instance the issue of whether citizenship causes a feeling of belonging or whether collective identity is in turn a prerequisite of citizenship. Moreover, a merger between citizenship and collective identity deforms the concept of equality of citizens into a tautological construction in which citizenship practice is more highlighted than judiciable aspects of rights and obligations, thus claiming that citizenship is what citizens actually make of it. This amalgamation of citizenship and collective identity is unhelpful in analyzing the phenomenon of European citizenship, since it dilutes the difference between citizenship as a judiciable institution of equality, and the actual political activity of concrete citizens stemming from citizenship. Driving this position to the extreme, European citizenship would also encompass hearings and conferences organized by the European Commission (although practically inaccessible for the majority of citizens, but with a participation of some citizens/officials), the Commission's green and white papers (although uninfluenced by average citizens) or the activity of interest groups, even when these opportunity structures for citizens' participation are highly informal. The political activity of citizens and their actual utilization of opportunity structures is, however, highly asymmetrical, as it is dependent on the uneven distribution of information and power resources among citizens.³⁴ However, if collective identity was regarded as analytically differentiable from citizenship, we shall assume that both variables find themselves in a correlative or associative, rather than in a mutually inclusive, relationship. In this perspective, collective identity remains an autonomous phenomenon, separable from citizenship, even though in some cases it is closely associated with it. For instance, macro-sociological theories such as the civilizing process of Norbert Elias conceptualize collective identity as a variable of social change, rather than a component of specific institutional settings such as citizenship. According to Elias, societies run through a process of increasing interdependence and functional differentiation, which require a growing degree of drive and emotion control. Therefore, in less differentiated societies, individuals are subject to extrinsic and sanction-based drive control (stronger collectivistic), whereas in highly differentiated societies individuals rely on an intrinsic drive and emotion regulation (less collectivistic).³⁵ In this sense, citizenship might

entail cognitive and emotive aspects of belonging or identity. However, it is not the only device for establishing identity, nor is it always accompanied by collective identity. Consequently, a methodological disaggregation of citizenship and identity should be undertaken.³⁶

The three methods of conceptualizing citizenship and collective identity discussed above are mutually exclusive. However, a possibility of transcending them exists and will be attempted in this book. As an underlying principle we would differentiate the semantic dimension of analysis from the social practice. As pointed out above, treating actual participation of citizens or their belonging as aspects of citizenship dilutes the difference between the semantics of citizenship and the social practice. The practice theory describes 'practice' as a routinized type of behaviour that consists of interconnected elements of bodily and mental activities, knowledge, emotions and motivations.³⁷ In contrast, semantics pertain to analytical categories, for instance in the form of ideal types, which are pragmatic, value-free constructs and non-existent in the empirical reality, since their main function is to highlight their differences from reality. They isolate certain characteristics of social reality without assuming that they are empirically present. Therefore, the methodological function of ideal types, pure types or generic models is not to find their correspondence vis-à-vis the empirical reality, but to demonstrate to what extent they correspond to reality in order to grasp it using these analytical tools.³⁸

Against this background, the *first step* should be to determine the *semantic core* of citizenship irrespective of normative expectations, which would be of application in different empirical contexts. The localization of the semantic core of citizenship should allow it to be distinguished from other phenomena such as identification with the political community or the political process, even if belonging or identification appear to correlate with citizenship. The same applies to the notion of participation, which is regarded by some authors as a component of citizenship.³⁹ We would anchor participation in social practice, rather than in the semantic core of citizenship.

In the *second step*, we should generalize citizenship rather than contextualize it, thus escaping the idiosyncratic nature of specific feelings, perceptions and attitudes of citizens. Therefore, an analysis of citizenship has to escape the fallacies of the strategies discussed above: It cannot be locked up within the framework of the nation-state, and nor should it be indistinguishable from human rights by exhibiting its specific political character. The goal would be to develop an analytical framework that would shift the exploration of citizenship and collective identity beyond the semantic boundaries of nationalism and national identity and simultaneously regard the very notion of collective identity outside the nation-state as still applicable.

In the *third step*, citizenship has to be associated with collective identity, while these two phenomena are kept separate. Therefore, a more suitable approach would be to first examine various types of citizenship, before turning to the question of the corresponding collective identity. This would give us the opportunity to explore the relationship between different models of citizenship and various forms of collective identity. In other words, we would focus on variations of citizenship and their different configurations with collective identity.

In the *fourth step*, we can apply the semantic dimension of citizenship and collective identity to the social practice. The social practice of citizenship and collective identity refers to identity politics and identity technologies of political authorities such as governments or the European Union. As identity politics can be located in different

policy fields, their choice appears to be essential. At the empirical level, a mismatch can arise between the expected identity and the identity technologies associated with a specific form of citizenship. If different types of citizenship are associated with diverse collective identities, ill-conceived identity politics would generate an expectations–outcome gap, rather than produce stable collective identity.

In sum, this book represents an attempt to elucidate the relationship between citizenship and collective identity in the European Union. In Chapter 1 I will explore the conceptual dimension of citizenship. I will begin by discussing the variety of citizenship conceptions. Afterwards I will offer a conception of citizenship as a relational setting by disaggregating citizenship into the three components of rights, obligations and compliance. Following this, I will explore the linkage between the components of citizenship and will focus on the nexus between citizenship and collective identity. Chapter 2 will examine functions of collective identity such as the cognitive function, self-esteem booster function and political functions of collective identity. The debate on European identity will be depicted and organized in Chapter 3 according to the functions of collective identity.

Against this background, in Chapter 4 I will frame my argument. First, I will explore limitations of the approaches to collective identity discussed above. Next, I will argue that various types of citizenship (semantic ideal types) correlate with differing collective identities, which are consequential for the social practice. I will therefore establish the link between citizenship and collective identity. The disaggregation of citizenship into rights, obligations and compliance will serve here as a point of departure for the generic models of citizenship. I will use each of these components of citizenship to construct generic models of citizenship, to which I will ascribe types of collective identity. These three generic models of citizenship include the republican, the liberal and the caesarean citizenship.

Against this theoretical background I will explore the social practice of citizenship and identity politics in the European Union in Chapter 5. After a brief discussion of the developments of the EU's politics of citizenship up to now, I will focus on current trends of European citizenship and European identity politics. Here I will illustrate the EU's attempts to engage in discursive ethics within the convention method as a case of republican citizenship, the liberal model of European citizenship with regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and also current trends in the EU's caesarean citizenship regarding the development of the European Leviathan and the politics of insecurity. The concluding chapter will offer a recapitulation of the book's main findings and will propose final remarks.

1 The conceptual dimension of citizenship

Depending on the epistemological access to the notion of citizenship, scholars in general subscribe either to a normative account of citizenship or to the functionalist one.

Therefore, some scholars might be interested in an ideal of citizenship. Sometimes, this assumes a standard of citizenship referring to a lost ideal of Ancient Greece or the Roman Empire, where citizens were higher beings in ethical, ontological (Greek Polis) and legal terms (Roman Empire). Not only were they believed to make intelligent and purposive judgments, but also expected to pursue common goods. This view idealizes a specific historical form of citizenship by canonizing it into a universal standard of citizenship. It is usually accompanied by a critical stance towards contemporary types of citizenship bemoaning their liberal, thin or underdeveloped shape.¹ Further normative approaches to citizenship attempt to abstract from specific historical accounts of citizenship and anchor it in a system of liberty and equality. The realization of liberty and equality is therefore regarded as a prerequisite for citizenship in a democratic regime. Probably the most prominent thinker in this field was John Rawls, who viewed modern citizenship through a magnifying glass of societal justice. Against the background of the hypothetical veil of ignorance, a universal form of citizenship (attached to the principles of liberty and difference) is to be established. It is believed to reconcile conflicting interests and ideologies in a diverse society.²

In contrast, functional approaches to citizenship deal with the explanations of specific citizenship forms and their development as associated with functional requirements of societies such as military aspects of social life or the mode of economic activity. For instance, Max Weber explains the development of mass-based citizenship in medieval cities of the Western world as a result of the cities being organized as defence groups. Municipal communities had to rely on the participation of as many individuals as possible in the military activities of the city, thus having access to military training and being allowed to bear arms. In contrast, no participatory citizenship developed in the Eastern world of China, Egypt and India, since the survival of the local communities was dependent less on defence matters and more on the effectiveness of the irrigation system and water supply, which led to the rise of bureaucracy rather than citizenship. While in the Western world the ruler became dependent on the military capability of the individuals, in the Eastern world the individuals were dependent on the ruler in matters of water supply.³

In a similar functionalist vein, T. H. Marshall argues that the development of modern citizenship occurred in a three-tier process of expanding civil, political and social rights to large parts of modern society. However, the order of their expansion was not accidental. Civil rights were an epiphenomenon of industrialization and capitalism,

since rights of free contracting are essential for a proper functioning of the capitalist economy. Consequently, social change is the reason why the original amalgamate of civil, political and social rights for a small group of citizens in ancient and medieval times became functionally dissolved and civil rights expanded territorially to encompass larger strata of the society.⁴ Political rights have been introduced primarily as a functional requirement for participation of the masses in the warfare of the twentieth century.

Beyond the normative and functionalist accounts of citizenship we are confronted with a plethora of conceptions of citizenship such as civic citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship, transnational citizenship, technological citizenship, sexual citizenship etc.⁵ These conceptions attach different meanings to citizenship and espouse frequently diverging implications for the social practice. My aim is, however, to find a way of examining citizenship despite all the conceptual variety and despite the discursive wave of citizenships with adjectives that sometimes blur the distinction between citizenship and other social phenomena. Therefore, I will discuss the *semantic core* of the concept of citizenship, which could be applicable in different institutional settings and cultural contexts.

The semantic core of citizenship

Three clarifications are necessary before we turn to the exploration of the semantic core of citizenship. The *first clarification* is conceptual in nature. Since we need a working definition of citizenship, a minimal definition would delineate citizenship as a shared membership in a political community.⁶ This definition is insensitive regarding the type of territoriality, since citizenship may be based in smaller territories of the cities or larger territories of nation-states or even federations.⁷ In addition, this parsimonious definition does not tell us anything about the *substance* of citizenship, but relates it to the political authority and the relationship among citizens by stressing the political nature of the membership. Consequently, it leaves the question of who belongs to a polity unanswered by treating it as a variable.⁸

The *second clarification* is methodological in nature. We need to distinguish between the concept of citizenship (semantic core) and the practice of citizenship (social practice), as already noted in the introduction. By practice of citizenship I mean everyday social and political experience, developed by social and political actors, as distinguished from the analytical categories used by social analysts.⁹ This reflects the approach of this book to first explore the semantic dimension of citizenship as well as the theoretical nexus between citizenship and collective identity. Only then will I analyze the social practice of citizenship and collective identity in the context of the European Union. Nonetheless, we should be aware that there is a close reciprocal connection and mutual influence between the concept of citizenship and the practice of citizenship. The ideal types stem from specific historical and social contexts, and they in turn are applied as instruments of the state-induced socialization upon individuals. The practice theory describes 'practice' as a patterned and repeated type of behaviour for the analysis of social reality and its feedback on the ideational constructs.¹⁰ The anchoring of citizenship in specific historical, social and cultural practices indicates that we deal with a 'momentum concept' that unfolds under the influence of social actors. This leads to a dynamic understanding of citizenship with a high potential for change.¹¹ Sometimes, the distinction between the concept of citizenship and the practice

of citizenship is shifted entirely into the empirical realm of analysis and denotes the difference between formal citizenship as stipulated legally and the so-called lived citizenship. In this case, we would move from the methodological distinction between the concept and the practice and are confronted with a rather activist understanding of citizenship as a lived experience, which not only cannot be divorced from its context, but also becomes a proxy for the everyday political activity of people who understand and negotiate rights, responsibilities and participation.¹²

The *third clarification* is theoretical in nature. Since citizenship relates the individual to a political collectivity, it is associated with collective identity of individuals. The type of collective identity strongly depends, however, on the form of citizenship at hand. To learn more about collective identity of individuals as members of a political community, we should ask about the type of citizenship. In this sense, citizenship is a regulative notion, which links an individual to the political community by both enabling and constraining him. As with every other institution, citizenship enables individuals by ascribing rights to them, and constrains them by requiring duties and compliance vis-à-vis the collectivity.¹³ Based on rights, obligations and compliance we can identify different types of citizenship and their corresponding collective identity.

Citizenship as a relational setting

The relational perspective on citizenship disaggregates it into categories and reconfigures these categories into relational clusters in which individuals, organizations, political authority and power are positioned and examined. In this sense, citizenship can be analyzed as a relational setting.¹⁴ A relational setting is a patterned matrix of relationships among citizenship components, among citizens and between citizens and political authority. Departing from a minimal definition of citizenship as a shared membership in a political community, we cannot explain the institutional specifics of citizenship, nor can we conclude on normatively proper courses of action. Consequently, in addition to citizenship as a reciprocal and horizontal relationship among citizens, it remains a relational phenomenon that is also determined through the relationship between the citizen and the political authority. This relational aspect does not explain much about the range of rights ascribed to citizens, nor does it say who is included into citizenship. It also ignores the allocation of territory vis-à-vis the citizens.¹⁵ Charles Tilly describes the relational nature of citizenship primarily with regard to political authority:

Citizenship designates a set of mutually enforceable claims relating categories of persons to agents of governments. Like relations between spouses, between co-authors, between workers and employers, citizenship has the character of a contract: variable in range, never completely specifiable, always depending on unstated assumptions about context, modified by practice, constrained by collective memory, yet ineluctably involving rights and obligations sufficiently defined that either party is likely to express indignation and take corrective action when the other fails to meet expectations built into the relationship.¹⁶

In sum, the relational perspective on citizenship is threefold. First, it delineates a relationship between citizens themselves, since they constitute a community as formally equal political actors. As mentioned above, this relationship links citizenship

to collective identity. Second, it describes the relationship between each individual citizen and the political authority.¹⁷ Third, the relational perspective pays attention to the relationship between the components of citizenship.

Citizenship components

We can map citizenship along the three criteria of rights, obligations and compliance. We identify these three criteria as components of citizenship. These components can assume different forms, different scope, different range as well as different degrees. In this sense, they are variables that can assume different values and should be viewed neither as constants nor as teleological categories that need to be fulfilled in order to claim the 'genuine' citizenship. The advantage of such a disaggregative and synthetic conception of citizenship is that by using rights, obligations and compliance we can examine any type of citizenship irrespective of its territorial range or its cultural background. Therefore, this approach is on the one hand synthetic, combining different aspects of citizenship as its components, and disaggregative on the other as we can examine the components of citizenship separately, thus disaggregating it along different analytical lines. Moreover, we can analyze the relation between the components as being, for instance, in tension with each other or strengthening one other. As the next step I will discuss the components of citizenship in more detail.

The rights component

Rights are an essential component of almost every conception of citizenship. Historically derived from the Roman concept of citizenship, in which citizenship was a legal status, rights are regarded as entitlements or privileges. In the legal sense, rights empower citizens to resolve their conflicts before courts. Therefore, citizenship protects from arbitrary political decisions and renders the citizens free. Citizens can sue in courts and involve a law that grants them rights. In the social sense, rights bestow a status or an honour, which associates citizenship with social esteem as a member of upper class vis-à-vis non-citizens.¹⁸ This view reflects the paradigm of 'possessive individualism', according to which rights are possessions of individuals and therefore can be extended or reduced.¹⁹

In the modern version of citizenship, T. H. Marshall presents an apogee of the rights-accentuated citizenship. He argues that citizenship is a unified pool of various types of citizenship rights including civil, political and social rights.²⁰ These rights are sustained in an interactive relationship, in which the exercise of one type of citizenship rights requires other citizenship rights. Once the principle is grounded in one area, such as the civil sphere, it spills over into the political and social spheres. The rights-orientated conception of citizenship is underpinned by two principles. It is the principle of legality that allows for judiciability of rights in the case of their violation by political or social actors. The other underlying principle of citizenship is the equality of status, which means that citizens cannot be excluded from entitlements enjoyed by other citizens. Moreover, the equality principle of citizenship makes citizenship attractive and desirable. While many social inequalities and differences between individuals are impossible to annihilate, it is citizenship that equalizes individuals by bestowing the same entitlements upon them. Marshall's account of the development of citizenship in Britain entails the power of citizenship rights to mitigate class divisions.

Evidently, Marshall's conception of citizenship espouses a telos of citizenship, according to which a fully fledged citizenship requires all three elements of civil, political and social rights. The equality of status in citizenship means that all types of citizenship rights are connected or unified. However, it is not the equality of outcome, but rather the equality with regard to the rights of citizenship as entitlements. This amounts to legal equality and is closely linked to liberty.

However, the rights-accentuated approach to citizenship can take an alternative turn to Marshall's equality of status. The special group rights approach points in the opposite direction. They all argue in favour of recognition of differences in status for minority groups in diverse societies in order to achieve the equality of the outcome.²¹ Since in their account equal treatment of individuals (in the sense of equal status) is 'difference-blind', it tends to perpetuate oppression or disadvantages.²² In this perspective, the procedural equality of status does not result in the substantive equality of the outcome. This position holds that a more substantive equality cannot be achieved without recognizing and valuing differences alongside individual rights. Consequently, the pursuit of equality should involve according differential rights on the basis of group membership to reduce potential vulnerability and disadvantage from majorities.²³ Irrespective of the aim of the citizenship rights (equality of status or equality of outcome), rights are believed to be the central regulative instrument in achieving citizenship.

Traditionally, rights reflect the ontological priority of the individual, and link the individual to a political community. At the same time, rights exclude non-members from the community by not ascribing these rights to them.²⁴ Therefore, rights integrate members of the community and 'close' the community socially. However, within the debate on group rights they become attributes of collectivities that seem to question the ontological priority of the individual, since individuals require their rights not as individuals in the political community, but are 'receivers' of privileges due to their membership in groups. Consequently, Kymlicka's labelling of his minority rights citizenship as liberal might appear inconsistent, as he individualizes cultures not individuals.²⁵

The obligations component

Next to rights we identify obligations as a further component of citizenship. The main thrust of the obligation-based component of citizenship is that civic virtues such as solidarity, loyalty or trust (moral resources) are necessary features of living in freedom.²⁶ This approach maintains that freedom is inextricably linked with political virtue and public service. It can assume at least two argumentative forms. There is an ethical understanding of citizenship as obligation and virtue. Its point of departure is frequently a critique of a liberal society and selfhood, which are supposed to be remedied with the Aristotelian conception of citizenship as civic friendship.²⁷ In this sense, 'genuine' citizens demonstrate altruistic features, since they are concerned with the welfare of their friends for their friends' sake, not merely for their own. The general bonds of civic friendship are a basis for a political community whose goal is to fulfil civic obligations towards each other.²⁸ Citizens who view one another as civic friends are likely to support a broad consensus on matters of public policy.²⁹

Beyond this virtue-accentuated and ethical account of citizenship, we can discern a rather instrumental view of civic obligations. This position argues first and foremost that potential threats to citizens' welfare and democracy exist whenever low levels of

participation, trust and solidarity occur, thus endangering the existence of the republic.³⁰ In addition, there exists an individually instrumental account of the obligation-accentuated approach to citizenship: individuals who neglect their civic duties face the risk of being marginalized by the political decision-making procedures, in which they tend to play an insignificant role.³¹ This position reverts to the observation of Tocqueville that the central ideal of democracy, which is citizens' equality, becomes threatened by the limitation of their political activity to the election of representatives. An average citizen ceases, then, to play an essential role in the processes of governance, which results in the erosion of democratic equality and potentially in the tyranny of majority.³²

In the obligations-centred approach to citizenship, deliberative norms assume a particularly outstanding position.³³ Most of the contemporary versions of obligation-based citizenship put an emphasis on deliberation processes and communicative norms, rather than demanding civic obligations in forms of the communal ethic of care or the obligation to participate fully in public life.³⁴ Meanwhile, these communicative norms are regarded as equally (or even more) relevant than many other conceptions of civic obligation, above all in their function as potential solutions to some of our most urgent contemporary political problems.³⁵ In this perspective, activating the deliberative capabilities of citizens becomes a political priority. Citizens must learn to give their fellow citizens (and expect to receive from them) reasonable accounts of their political preferences and be ready to accept the power of better argument relating to common goods. Communicative norms are therefore norms of truth- and consensus-seeking, transferable to any of the deliberative settings such as legislative sessions, court proceedings, and administrative hearings, as well as non-governmental associations.³⁶ These deliberative settings are rule-free, since the citizens' goal is not to exercise power *over* each other, but rather to exercise power *with* each. This discourse of ethics grounded in communicative norms can be derived from the Aristotelian concept of civic friendship, even though they can be practised, for instrumental reasons as well as normative ones.³⁷ Whatever the implications, the obligations-orientated component of citizenship highlights the necessity of an ethical underpinning of citizenship, be it for normative reasons or for instrumental ones. A mere status or rights limited citizenship is rejected, since such citizenship is not capable of guaranteeing stability and legitimacy of the political community.

The compliance component

Beyond the matrix of rights and obligations we identify a third component of citizenship, which is compliance. In this perspective, citizens are also defined as the subjects of political authority. This perspective merges the concept of the citizen as a free person and as the subject of political authority with an accentuation of the latter.³⁸ In this sense, the condition of liberty can only be reached when citizens are subject to political rule, which guarantees their survival in view of political conflicts.³⁹ However, it does not necessarily mean an arbitrary power or domination. Central to this understanding of citizenship is the relationship between the citizenship and the political authority, where the interventions of the political authority can be legitimate and reasonable. This legitimacy generates political rule according to collective interests of citizens, rather than to domination. In this perspective, citizens possess enough rationality to understand the necessity of compliance to political authority, without which there would be no civilized existence and therefore no citizenship. Citizens have the power to choose their leaders,

and the leaders in turn are obligated to consider citizens' will. Therefore, the goal of citizenship for the citizens is to be ruled, otherwise societies will end up in chaos and anarchy, which would endanger the survival of the citizens. The focus of this component of citizenship shifts towards the notion of power sovereignty and away from individual rights and obligations of citizens. However, it does not mean that citizens degenerate into slaves, serfs or subjects of authoritarian power. The political ruler can possess democratic legitimacy, since he is either elected by the citizens or the political decisions are accepted by them. In this sense, discussing citizenship as compliance relates rather to a question of final political authority, which does not reside with individual citizens.⁴⁰

In contemporary accounts of citizenship the compliance-orientated citizenship is discussed mainly with regard to three aspects. *First*, there is the hypothesis of Albert O. Hirschman referring to shifting involvements of the citizens. Hirschman argues that people easily become disappointed with engagement in public affairs, which constitutes civic activity, and subsequently become involved in private activity instead, only to find that also to be disappointing.⁴¹ In this sense, we are confronted with cyclical shifts of political activity and political compliance of citizens. The former is associated with disappointment or boredom with politics, which leads to citizens' withdrawal and passivity with regard to political authority. If individuals are drawn to public activity it is because of expectations they have about the rewards of public service. However, if those expectations remain unfulfilled, they are likely to seek membership in organizations compatible with their private interests. However, this cycle has a useful function. Hirschman argues that there are phases in history where private activity is more useful than public activism.⁴² In his account, the realization of the postulate of a politically hyperactive citizen whose priority is to constantly and actively exercise his rights for public activity is even undesirable. Communities have to rely on periods of political inactivity and compliance in order to be able to address common concerns of the citizens or to tackle collective problems. Particularly in complex differentiated societies, periods of citizen passivity and compliance gain even more significance, as opposed to other regimes or less complex societies.

A similar argument has been formulated by Almond and Verba in their famous study on civic culture as the cultural underpinning of democratic regimes. They stressed that both the active and the compliant/obedient features of citizen behaviour are significant in keeping democratic regimes at work.⁴³ A permanent mobilization of political actors is typical for totalitarian regimes, rather than for democratic regimes. Since democratic regimes have to cope by definition with contestation and participation, too much of them might be destructive for democracies. In this sense, citizens have to be able to shift between their passive and their active roles and compliance becomes a relevant aspect of citizenship. Consequently, Almond's and Verba's argument refers to the compliance component of citizenship as one of functional requirements for democracy.

Second, Peter Wagner's account emphasizes both liberty and discipline as regulative principles of modernity.⁴⁴ Both are aspects of modern statehood and by the same token of modern citizenship. Wagner's approach is socio-historical in nature, since it focuses on the organizational practices of the modern state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even though liberty and discipline appear to be in opposition, they become integrated within the modern statehood and citizenship. According to Wagner, the disciplining activity of the modern state occurred in the name of collectivity, which promised collective liberation, as individual liberty found its governance limitations. The spread of collectivization processes within the modern nation-states enabled

individuals to partake in actions that could never be organized locally. However, this empowerment took place under the strict condition of following disciplined lines of behaviour.⁴⁵

Therefore, the goal of discipline is to assure governance of modern states that are characterized by complexity and functional differentiation. Consequently, modern states apply both techniques of rule (liberty and discipline) to politically integrate modern societies. In emphasizing the disciplining function of citizenship, Barry Hindess demonstrates an apotheosis of citizenship as a mode of modern governance. Hindess highlights the compliance aspect of citizenship with regard to the functional necessity of rendering the global population governable by dividing it into sub-populations consisting of discrete, politically independent and competing states.⁴⁶ In this sense, citizenship becomes an instrument of social closure, whose architect and guarantor is the modern nation-state, which routinized, standardized, and normalized the relationship between citizenship and territory.⁴⁷

Third, citizenship as compliance and citizen as the object of disciplinary policies becomes particularly relevant in the context of security-focused policies of the contemporary state. Inspired by the writings of Michel Foucault, surveillance practices of record-keeping and monitoring behaviour can be seen as defining features of modernity and citizenship.⁴⁸ Considering the emergence of 'disciplinary technologies', Foucault drew upon Jeremy Bentham's design of a prison (called panopticon), and used it as a model for his social analysis. The key element of panopticism is that citizens are never certain if they are being observed at any one particular moment by the state. Therefore, the rational citizen seeking to avoid punishment will act as if s/he were the object of constant surveillance.⁴⁹ This theoretical perspective has been reinvigorated particularly recently as a result of a growth in new communications technology and data processing systems.⁵⁰ It stresses that the state treats challenges to citizenship (defined through political freedom, equality and democratic accountability) posed by encroaching security measures as largely negligible in the face of indeterminable danger.⁵¹

However, this perspective cannot be simply described as a conspiracy of the state against its citizens. The growing acceptance and seeming inevitability of increased risk and uncertainty in social relationships helps to legitimize surveillance measures such as video monitoring, control of credit card transactions and email traffic. It results in the shift from the category of civil, political and social citizenship with their emphasis on rights and participation, to the citizenship of the risk society and to the neurotic citizen. The neurotic citizen becomes the object of government activity whose conduct is based not merely on calculating rationalities but also responds to the fears, anxieties and insecurities of citizens.⁵²

The relationship between the components of citizenship

All three components of citizenship can be found in most scholarly accounts of citizenship. Rights-based approaches to citizenship, even though they do not necessarily highlight duties and responsibilities (being relatively modest such as obeying the law and paying taxes), implicitly acknowledge their relevance.⁵³ Similarly, obligation-based approaches tend to regard rights as the reward for civic commitment of citizens, and therefore recognize their validity, even if they grant moral primacy to obligations.⁵⁴ In this perspective, political life is superior to the private concerns of family and profession