

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Preface

The 1984 election campaign in Israel and its outcome have highlighted among other things the difference of opinion among Israelis on the future of the Occupied Territories, on the desirable geographical dimensions of the country and on the possibility of Jewish-Arab coexistence in the various regions of the Land of Israel. At no other time in the history of the country has the population been so aware of territorial matters and their political significance. While in the 1920s and 1930s, under conditions of a State in the making without territorial sovereignty, territory and government were abstract concepts, today they have become very concrete and acquired great importance.

Politics, including its passing aspects, has become part of the people. Political information is speeded to it hourly, and the population's preoccupation with the many aspects of Israeli politics is one of its special attributes. The vast interest in local political matters is explained by their importance for the survival and future of the country; the combination of small territory, long borders, regional isolation, and a difficult security situation and regional strategic status results in a special situation that may well arouse the concern of every one of its citizens.

The outcome of the Six Day War and the activities of the Likud government in the seven years from 1977 to 1984 brought to the fore new political and territorial matters that the State was compelled to deal with. The conquest of territory and its occupation; the settlement of areas across the borders for the purpose of controlling them or turning them into a bargaining card in peace negotiations; the emergence of Jewish national and religious ties with the Greater Land of Israel Movement; all of the massive investment in the physical infrastructure of the new areas to the detriment of development in Israel within the so-called Green Line, that marked the boundary of Israel as determined by the Armistice Agreement of 1949; and certain political acts such as the creation of Greater Jerusalem, the settlement of and subsequent military withdrawal from Sinai or the annexation of the Golan Heights—all these exemplify how geography and politics interact in the current period.

Israel today is characterized by many unusual features, very different from those with which political leaders in the Western world have been familiar. Consequently most of them, contemplating Israeli politics and seeking to understand it, are surprised by the rapidly changing political situation.

Some of the factors contributing to Israel's special situation and having considerable political impact are extremely complex. Among them is the nature of the Jewish people and its long peculiar history, and the short history of the State and the consequent lack as yet of a governmental tradition. Characteristic of Israel are the many traumatic, dramatic, unexpected events the populaton has experienced. Three great traumas, each unique, underlay the establishment of Israel: the Holocaust; the actual establishment of the State and the years of the War of Independence; and, for most of the population, immigration to Israel. In addition there were among other things the outcome of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, Sadat's peace initiative, the political change in 1977, the rampant inflation, the bank share crisis, the Jewish terrorists, etc.

Now the result of such repeated traumatizaton is the disappointment of expectations previously relied on and a feeling of great confusion and helplessness, which lead to certain political developments: lack of confidence in the establishment, particularly in the parties believed responsible for the confusion, and loss of a sense of security; a search for an unambiguous message and doctrine supplying a clear solution to the confusion; a yearning for a strong leader the identification with whom might remove the feeling of helplessness; a search for scapegoats to blame; and withdrawal from societal concerns into immediate satisfactions, sometimes with political support.

Living with a feeling of constant danger leads to important political developments exemplified by the ecological anti-nuclear movements such as the 'Greens' of Germany, which arose against a background of the fear of ecological holocaust and nuclear war. In Israel the persistence of the conflict with the Arab countries in recurring confrontations, the reserve army service required of most of the population and the constant menace of terrorist acts combine to produce a feeling of constant danger presented by a definite outside enemy.

Such a feeling leads to hatred of the foe and a tendency to escape from reality, whether in the belief that a lasting peace can be speedily attained, or in the belief that absolute security can be ensured by military and settlement means and through the annexation of territories.

Despite the prominence of politics in Israeli life, it has not been properly taken into account from the professional geographical point of view. Social and economic matters have naturally been deemed more relevant to politics, but geography has not always constituted a recognized dimension. A study of political events against a spatial background and all that this implies has not so far been undertaken, and for that reason there is no period as fitted as the recent past to facilitate a proper investigation of this aspect of politics.

This book, dealing with geography and politics in Israel since 1967, is the first attempt of its kind to analyse current political events against the background of the geographical space in which they took place, and is based on a follow up, record and study of the events of recent years. The book highlights the physical background as a factor in the development of the political events as well as their relative importance. The various chapters therefore treat subjects of great interest and importance for life in Israel today, such as the future of Greater Jerusalem, the problematics of settlement in Judea-Samaria, the fate of the Gaza Strip and its relations with Israel, the status of the Golan Heights, the withdrawal from Sinai and establishment of the Shalom region, and also the problems within Israel proper: the Judaization of Galilee, the populating of the Negev, land as a political problem and border settlement in Israel.

CHAPTER ONE
The New Settlement Map of Israel

The boldest expression of the geographical-political changes taking place in Israel is undoubtedly the acceleration of settlement in the Occupied Territories. Since the accession of the Likud in 1977, the process has exemplified a number of the elements of geography and politics: the importance of territory as an arena for political confrontation; the application of political power for the realization of nationalist and religious interests; decision-making of dubious legitimacy in territorial issues; the influence of central government on accelerated development and implementation; emphasis on identifying religious and nationalist values with territory in order to attract people to deliberate action; and above all, the power of political decisions to create faits accomplis and change the geographical layout of territories.

The settlement map of Israel today is very different from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s, and it is continually being further altered by the development of additional new settlements throughout the area, by the internal migration of population to them, and by new priorities of regional development. No other period in the history of the State of Israel has witnessed such rapid and significant changes in the settlement map. The decade of the 1970s was perhaps crucial, for it was then that Israel's ties were strengthened with the occupied territories beyond its political borders—the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. A new map of Israel was drawn during that decade, influenced by the new political situation resulting from the Six Day War. Israel then gained control of territories of different economic, social, and demographic character, which for political and security reasons dictated a new settlement endeavour in the 'Green Line'* area and in particular beyond it.

This new geopolitical situation gives rise to a number of questions: how do settlement characteristics of the 1970s differ from those of the two preceding decades? How has settlement in Israel been affected by the establishment of new borders? Which regions were given preference for settlement in the 1970s, and which were not? Who authorised the settlement map during the decade? What is Israel's future settlement map likely to be in the wake of the political and settlement developments of recent years?

SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIRST TWO DECADES

In the 1950s, national goals revolved around absorbing thousands of new immigrants, settling and establishing them economically, and strengthening the security borders of the State. In the 1960s the goal became the consolidation of the economy and settlement pattern within the country's sovereign territory, which needed to be quickly populated and provided with a great many development projects, particularly in

*see Glossary of Terms

the arid Negev, mountainous Galilee, and the Jerusalem corridor, and along the meandering 'Green Line' that was the partition line agreed upon between Israel and Jordan, Syria and Egypt.

The measures adopted during these two decades to attain the national goals were, among others, the establishment of Nahal border settlements along the 'Green Line'; the organization of new development regions, such as the Lakhish, Besor, Ta'anach and Korazim regions; and the settlement of the Arava region, mainly for the purpose of reinforcing the border strips. At the same time, development towns were founded in peripheral areas in order to disperse the population throughout the country, to create an urban alternative to counter the attraction of the large cities, and to establish a new pattern for the distribution of population and settlements. These measures were in part meant to 'correct' the settlement geography of the country that had resulted from the pre-State British mandatory government's policy of freezing Jewish settlement, from the territorial consequences of the War of Independence, and from the need to provide a speedy solution to the settlement and security problems that arose when the State was established; and to find new and original settlement patterns befitting a sovereign state. These measures were adopted in response to the demographic changes that took place over the years of mass immigration to Israel, to the accompaniment of continual study and experiment with new ways of developing the country's infrastructure.

In the early 1970s, however, due to the outcome and achievements of the Six Day War, Israel's national goals changed. Mass immigration diminished, no longer creating demographic pressure. The development districts in outlying areas near the 'Green Line' lost much of their importance. They were now devoid of significance for security, and there was no need to set up more development towns, especially since the existing ones had not yet reached their planned population targets. In addition, priorities previously applied to the Negev and Galilee regarding development, settlement and investment in infrastructure gave way to new priorities related to the territories occupied in the Six Day War.

SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970s

The new geopolitical goals of the 1970s were: the occupation as rapidly as possible of areas beyond the 'Green Line' by the establishment of numerous settlements; the creation of new security belts beyond the 1967 borders; continued socioeconomic consolidation of previously established settlements within those borders; and further expansion of the infrastructure.

The ways in which these were to be achieved were basically unchanged. In this period too, border settlements were founded, although the borders were now in the Golan Heights, the Jordan Rift Valley and the northeast of the Sinai Peninsula. Development districts were set up on the Golan Heights, in the Rafah area, in the Jordan Valley, and at selected and more restricted spots between Elat and Sharm el-Sheikh. Now too new towns were established— Qatzrin on the Golan Heights, Yamit and Ofira in Sinai, and Qiryat Arba, Qarne Shomron, Ari'el, etc. in Judea and Samaria. All of them received priority in development and infrastructural investment.

Most of the development in this decade thus took place not within the sovereign domain of Israel, but far beyond it. This new development did not form a continuum with the settlement complexes established during the two previous decades. Moreover, the change in the priority in basic investment and the diversion of resources to the occupied territories left insufficient funds for the socioeconomic consolidation of the settlements established in the past. In the 1970s, in fact, a new settlement geography began to take shape, with comprehensive political and security interests beyond the original border. This peripheral area was triple the size of the State itself, GPI—B which was compelled to function as a small settlement and economic core for a large territory.

THE NEW GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF ISRAEL

The sovereign territory of Israel as established by the 1949 armistice amounted to 8,017 sq. miles. The zones occupied by Israel after the Six Day War added a periphery of 26,476 sq. miles, which is 3.3 times the area of Israel proper. After the withdrawal from Sinai there remained 2,854 sq. miles, or about one-third of the area of Israel.

Israel's territorial extension through the newly occupied territories can be summarised as follows: the Sinai peninsula (23,622 sq. miles)—very few rural and urban points, and no sovereignty over the area; the Golan Heights (444 sq. miles)—planning and implementation of regional settlement throughout the entire area, establishment of a new town and more than 30 new settlements, with Israeli law applied to the region in 1981; Judea and Samaria (2,270 sq. miles)—comprehensive, intensive rural and urban settlement against the background of a dense Arab settlement configuration, and without sovereignty over the area; the Gaza Strip (140 sq. miles) —limited Jewish settlement in the Qatif Bloc, against a background of a dense Arab population, and here too without sovereignty.

From north to south, Israel was 256 miles long before the Six Day War and 406 before the withdrawal from Sinai. Before 1967 there were 2,750,000 people in Israel with many areas sparsely populated, while today there are more than four million on territory just a third larger, with a distribution no better than the earlier one, and 1,340,000 additional Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Consequently the limited 'settlement energy' of Israel has been spread over a very large expanse, a situation not likely to ensure the consolidation and stabilization of a settlement pattern.

Furthermore, past settlement was organized in sovereign territory within fixed borders recognized internationally or according to the armistice lines which were about 625 miles long. The occupied territories created a border that is 1,349 miles long, 523 miles on land and 826 miles along water. This involved the elimination of the 'Green Line' which had been so dominant for 19 years, and Israel's unilateral recognition of the Jordan River as the eastern border, the unilateral conversion of the Golan Heights armistice line into a political border, and the creation of a de facto border between Israel and Lebanon along a narrow security zone beyond the recognized international border between the two countries. Thus since 1967 the settlements have been established within four types of borders: a recognized and accepted border (Sinai, the Arava), a unilaterally recognized border (the Jordan River), a border whose existence is disregarded (Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip), and a de facto border (southern Lebanon). No other country in the world has so many types of borders as Israel. It is hard to believe that such borders can create the proper conditions for the development of a stable settlement configuration.

SETTLEMENT PRIORITIES IN THE PAST

Before the establishment of the new national goals in the settlement of the occupied territories, another order of priority applied in Israel, which related mainly to the Negev, Galilee and Jerusalem. Yet it must be borne in mind that that priority notwithstanding, the desired goals have not yet been achieved. The settlement of the Negev is still in its inception, despite having been the focus of the national vision for many years. Many difficulties were encountered in overcoming the desert so far as water and soil are concerned, so that settlement in the Negev mountains, for instance, or in the Arava is quite sparse. The population increased in a number of urban locations in the northern Negev, especially in Beersheba which in 1987 had a population of about 120,000. A considerable scattering of settlements marks the northwestern Negev, which contains a concentration of new immigrant cooperative settlements (moshavim). All in all, however, the entire Negev and Judean desert, which constitutes 60 per cent of Israel, accounts for just 250,000 inhabitants, 6 per cent of the Israeli total. If that area had had any chance of developing in the future, this

was scotched by the Sinai expansion with the Rafah region, Yamit, Ofira and extensive military arrangements, which left the Negev and Judean desert area marking time. The hope that the withdrawal from the Sinai would restore its priority proved vain, for the redeployment of the army there did little to increase its population or settlements.

Recently there has been a tendency to favour the Galilee in the development initiative, because of the serious demographic problem presented by the constant diminution of the Jewish sector there compared with the Arab, in particular in mountainous central Galilee. Yet the aim of Judaizing Galilee has not been accomplished, the development towns still call out for settlers, and many of the rural settlements require economic assistance. For despite the admitted importance of developing Galilee, in the last decade priority has been accorded to the Golan Heights, and its reinforcement by a dense network of settlements to promote the security of the border with Syria.

Development priority has also been accorded to Jerusalem throughout the years, despite the 30 or so development towns founded when the State was established to attract urban settlers and scatter the population. The motivation was the desire to transform the city into a large capital, for nationalist and religious reasons, although this was not justified on objective geographical grounds. In most historical periods, Jerusalem was not a large city, and its mountainous location makes it unsuitable for a metropolis. Its mountainous environs make traffic difficult, its economic agricultural hinterland is quite limited, it is far from the centres of economic activity in the coastal plain, and any artificial enlargement of the city is likely to impair its special historical and architectural character. Throughout the years Jerusalem was favoured for development while most of the development towns did not receive the help and encouragement needed to establish them solidly, and old cities like Tiberias, Safed, Ramla, Lod and Acre did not develop at the expected pace. The change in Jerusalem's geopolitical status, due among other things to its location in the heart of Judea—Samaria, made the city even more important after the Six Day War. As a result, its priority (at the expense of the Negev and Galilee) was augmented for the purpose of making it a large metropolis, yet in a geographical situation which restricted its ability to function as a large city.

Thus development priorities within the 'Green Line' fluctuated from one pole to the other. Neither the Negev, Galilee, the Jerusalem corridor nor the southern lowland, not to speak of any region in the Arab sector, enjoyed any great development. In the 1970s they were all neglected, in favour at times of Sinai, at times of the Golan Heights, and at times of Judea and Samaria; and only Jerusalem was the gainer. The part of Israel within the 'Green Line' did not benefit from much investment on the regional level and, except for isolated places such as Ramat Hovav in the northern Negev or the Tefen region in Galilee, most of the settlements that flourished before 1967 did not make much progress.

ISRAEL CHANGES DIRECTION

Instead of solving substantive and physical problems within the sovereign territory of Israel, accelerated development activity is being directed to sites outside it. As the longitudinal dimension of the country was shortened, development activity turned in a new direction, on the east-west axis, given the political blockage to the north and to the south. In the wake of the frustrations of the withdrawal from Sinai, and the enforced territorial shrinkage, the declared policy of the government gave greater impetus to the east-west direction, turning its attention to the occupied territories for reasons of security, strategic depth, and territorial integrity. The three objectives of this expansion are naturally the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and Judea and Samaria. The Golan Heights have a great deal of unoccupied land and a small local population; the Gaza Strip has little unoccupied land and a large local population; while Judea and Samaria have both considerable unoccupied land and a large population. On the Golan Heights the acquisition of

physical control had been relatively easy and was already accomplished; in the Gaza Strip there is no possibility of expansion, because there are about 542,000 people in an area of 140 sq. miles, or 3,871 per sq. mile, one of the highest population densities in the world. There thus remains one possible objective for expansion—Judea and Samaria.

With this objective, an expansion in width was expressed in the junction of two longitudinal axes, that of the coastal plain and that of the Jordan Valley, by means of new cross-sections, exemplified in practice by a set of roads, such as the Samaria bisector, the Jerusalem-Ma'ale Edumim axis, the Judea bisector, in strengthening and 'thickening' the Etzion bloc, in the continued population increase in Qiryat Arba, in the establishment of new townlets, in the development of the industrial zone of Ma'ale Edumim, in the founding of dozens of holdings in reaction to political measures inconvenient to Israel, and in the widening of Jerusalem's periphery beyond the surroundings and the desert to the east.

It must be borne in mind that this latitudinal direction is beset with considerable difficulty, facing an 837, 000 strong Arab population in dense concentrations throughout Judea and Samaria, facing a continuum of villages and towns, facing difficulties in acquiring land, and facing a hostile population that does not make things at all easy for the civil administration in the areas.

This latitudinal expansion is based on a number of phenomena characteristic of the present-day Israeli population. The Jewish population has a definitely urban mentality and is therefore prepared for non-agricultural settlement involving industry and services; it is interested in places of residence of improved environmental quality devoid of pollution; and it wishes to abandon dis orderly urban crowding even for places beyond the 'Green Line'. The motivation derives from the fact that in Judea and Samaria it is possible to find relatively easy solutions to all the defects so glaring in Israel and for which no reasonable solutions were planned in a changing territorial situation. While in Israel proper building lots are extremely expensive, in Judea and Samaria they are almost gratis; in Israel housing is very costly, there it is for the most part subsidized. Here the roads are jammed, and there new wide roads are being constructed that bring every settlement closer to Israel territory and Jerusalem. Here urban pollution and overcrowding are on the increase, there development is implemented with priorities and preferential treatment. Here it may be hard to find a place for suburban living, but there every settler is eagerly awaited. Here space is unavailable for the expansion of various services, and there it is abundant. And finally, if in Israel the realization of nationalist goals no longer carries much weight, there everything becomes more pioneering, more Zionistic, more security-oriented, and even earns great admiration.

CONTRACTION VERSUS EXPANSION

The withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and civilian settlers from Sinai, which was the first territorial change since the faits accomplis following the Six Day War, created a new situation in the geography of Israel within the 'Green Line' which has affected those involved in planning and development who had considered Sinai a site for essential economic and military activity. The arena for action was now considerably reduced in both area and length compared with what the people of Israel had become accustomed to during the preceding 17 years.

The IDF withdrawal from Sinai, which entailed the transfer of many military installations to the Negev, the construction of camps and an airfield, and the reservation of new areas for training and manoeuvres, actually required the use of a third of the Negev area, especially from Mitzpe Ramon southwards, for military purposes. Thus another 1,367 sq. miles of territory—35 per cent of the Negev or 17 per cent of Israel within the 'Green Line'—was written off. In addition to all this, there was a change in the spatial configuration of certain functions; the Red Sea bathing beaches for tens of thousands of holiday-makers

were truncated, civilian air space was restricted in favour of the military, and pressures are growing regarding the use of the Mediterranean shore for port and fuel facilities, naval bases, power stations, etc. Thus in fact shrinkage and reduction of the country is even greater than its purely territorial limitation.

It was reasonable to assume that, in the wake of these changes in the geographical facts, the authorities would draw the logical conclusions and try to solve spatial problems within Israel's sovereign territory: prepare new bathing beaches for summer holiday-makers, develop new recreational facilities, improve and expand the road system to increase mobility in the increasingly crowded country, ameliorate the infrastructure in cities and towns to enable them to handle larger populations, encourage urban construction in height and depth to economize on land area, utilize unoccupied and uncultivated land more efficiently and to a greater extent, prepare development plans for new population concentrations around industrial projects, implement plans for public transport by train, in order to reduce road traffic, improve communication to eliminate unnecessary travel, put urban land to multi-purpose use, create new sources of employment near urban concentrations, promote regional development in settled areas on the basis of growth points and reciprocal relations between centre and periphery, and, in sum, adopt drastic measures to improve the environment and the quality of life in the centre of the country to make life easier for the population in conditions of increasing density and territorial diminution.

However, the authorities made a different response to the new geographical conditions. The changed direction they took disregarded the principles that had underlain the upbuilding of the country in the past. There is no doubt that the settlement map of the 1970s was influenced primarily by political, military and security factors, subject to pressure from the United States, Egypt and Syria which dictated various measures in Israel. Yet there were also various domestic nationalist motives and political party interests that contributed to the settlement activities and the change in the map of Israel. In the course of the process various social and economic pressure groups arose which were very much interested in having Israel change direction so that they could derive some benefit.

Thus the 1970s differ from all earlier decades in the emphasis on political motivation for settlement going beyond economic considerations, on mass settlement rural and urban, public and private, in areas whose ultimate fate is not yet known, involving the penetration of a crowded Arab settlement fabric, on new types of settlement—and all this with a daily political struggle. Israel's new borders led to a regrettable diffusion of the new settlements; it created too few consolidated areas such as the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley, and left many sparsely settled ones. In the past the Negev was chief focus of the settlement, later replaced by Galilee, and in the 1970s by Sinai, the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria, and the Jerusalem environs. The Likud government fostered extreme politicization in the settlement of Judea and Samaria, in order to change the map of the country within a short period and strengthen it toward the east. It is doubtful whether it is a map within which it will be possible to maintain uni-national sovereignty and a democratic society.

In any case, anyone interested in a different government and a different development policy based on the geographical structure of Israel and its sovereign area will have to take into account a different order of priorities in the development challenges, and to focus efforts internally so as to give the inhabitants of Israel a chance to enjoy a reasonable quality of life in a country whose geographical area contracted in the course of the 1970s.

CHAPTER TWO
Jerusalem as a Metropolitan City

Among the geopolitical changes that have taken place from the establishment of the State up to the present, those in Jerusalem are particularly salient; nowhere else have so many complicated political, security, planning, demographic, historic and architectural problems been combined as in that city. The special importance of Jerusalem for the Jewish people and the nations of the world set it in a different light from other cities, and therefore planning and construction for it have always been accompanied by sensitivity to public and international reaction.

This sensitivity grew after the Six Day War, when for the first time Israel had the opportunity to alter the geopolitical status of Jerusalem. The world followed what was being done in the city with concern for the fate of the holy places and the balance of political power that might develop between Jews, Arabs, the Christian minority and the Kingdom of Jordan. The Israeli government then adopted an unequivocal position, and with no differences of opinion a consensus developed in the nation regarding the need to unify Jerusalem and turn it into a large city populated mainly by Jews. Considerable resources were poured into the city in order to create in it, and in its environs, a new urban-political situation that would compensate for past frustrations and establish a new settlement fabric which it will be impossible to change. And indeed, since 1967, the city has experienced rapid, intensive construction against a political background both tacit and open, in the presence of an apprehensive Arab population. The signs of this accelerated construction are discernible in the formation of a very large urban system that does not exactly fit forms of construction in mountainous regions. As it looks to us today, Jerusalem is a tangled urban fabric, the result of historical, religious, nationalist and political desires imprinted on a given geographical expanse whose ability to encompass the new system in the making is doubtful.

Jerusalem as an urban-geographical phenomenon differs from every other city. There are some 180 capitals in the world today, and, not surprisingly most are not at a great topographic elevation, most are not contiguous with a desert, and most are not away from the centres of economic activity and population concentrations in their countries, as Jerusalem is. Only 25 (14 per cent) of capitals are situated, like Jerusalem, 2,400 feet or more above sea level; of these, only 15 (8 per cent) have populations of more than 300,000; and only seven (4 per cent), such as Mexico City, Nairobi, Salisbury and Kampala, for example, have suburbs around them. Thus a mountain capital at a considerable elevation, with suburbs around it, is not at all a normal urban situation. Capitals tend to be located on plains, or near sea coasts, with the possibility of industrial development, an agricultural hinterland and convenient transportation arteries.

Furthermore, in addition to this unusual urban manifestation, in the course of the past 40 years Jerusalem has undergone serious vicissitudes in planning and construction; it has functioned as a city divided between two nations, and subsequently has become an expanded city, encouraged increased population, had government institutions transferred to it, developed new roads, absorbed an Arab population constituting 28. 4 per cent of its total—all projects that require many decades in an ordinary city. The constant political

changes, the desire to avert any future division of the city, the fear of its again becoming a city at the end of a corridor, the goal of achieving a Jewish majority within it and the aspiration to maintain its status as the national capital are what seem to have led to such intensive development and construction that there has been no opportunity to formulate a conception regarding its structure and nature. Taking action has often preceded overall planning, so that basic problems still remain unsolved. Should its centre be developed rather than the periphery? Is the aim a consolidated Jerusalem or a spread out one? Jewish or mixed? A union of sub-cities, or a continuous agglomeration? Development toward the east, north or south? In a continuous ring or in separated holdings? Clearly, in the absence of a basic infrastructure for a large Jerusalem, and so long as no clear policy has been formulated regarding the crucial questions, accelerated development is being carried out extending towards the city outskirts in difficult topography, far from the centre and in inconvenient geographical conditions eastward and westward, colliding with existing Arab towns to the north and south and constituting a sporadic urban structure which has no relation to the organic construction of a mountain city.

Up to now the establishment has not considered Jerusalem's spatial ring in any systematic manner. Various approaches on what should be done in the space have been proffered intermittently by planners, but most have not yet been approved.

The development of Jerusalem actually reflects the conflict between the political-nationalist approach that favours a metropolitan Jerusalem, and the local objective approach which sees in the geographical conditions a chance for a medium-sized city, with special characteristics unsuited for a metropolis. We shall, therefore, endeavour to analyse the features of Jerusalem as a future metropolis based on the various political approaches to this matter.

JERUSALEM AT THE END OF THE SIX DAY WAR

The development of Jerusalem after 1967 was considerably influenced by political decisions that led to the establishment of new neighbourhoods in the areas added to it, which were thenceforth included in the municipal domain, now totalling 27,025 acres compared with the previous 9,525 acres. The location of the neighbourhoods was determined primarily by political factors, intended to demonstrate Israeli control of the close environs of the city.

The two parts of the city were united by a government decree that extended Israeli jurisdiction and administration to east Jerusalem. This was supplemented by a government decision to begin to settle Jews beyond the 1967 borders. These measures could be interpreted as correcting the distortion produced during the War of Independence (1948) when the Jewish quarter in the Old City fell, Mount Scopus was isolated, and Jerusalem divided between Israel and Jordan. Israel's response to that situation was the creation of a series of housing projects between Jerusalem and Mount Scopus, and the construction of the neighbourhoods of Ramot Eshkol, Givat Hamivtar and Ma'alot Daphna. The neighbourhoods filled up rapidly because they enabled many Israelis to improve their living conditions. Talpiyot to the east and Gilo to the south were also targets for increased population. In addition, Neve Ya'aqov was established to create a continuum of buildings between Jerusalem and the Atarot airfield. With the construction of these neighbourhoods, each containing between 300 and 5,000 units, Jerusalem diverged for the first time from the compact historical structure it had been in the past. Here the Ministry of Housing and Construction was the executive arm of the government, which favoured rapid construction, despite objections by elements in the Jerusalem municipality and other planning institutions who urged limiting construction so as not to damage the architectural and aesthetic values of the city (Figure 1).