Edited by **Richard J. Crisp**
and **Miles Hewstone**

Multiple Social Categorization

Processes, Models and Applications

Multiple Social Categorization

"Ethnic cleansing", "institutional racism", and "social exclusion" are just some of the terms used to describe one of the most pressing social issues facing today's societies: prejudice and intergroup discrimination. Invariably, these pervasive social problems can be traced back to differences in religion, ethnicity, or countless other bases of group membership: the social categories to which people belong.

Social categorization, how we classify ourselves and others, exerts a profound influence on our thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and behaviors. In this volume, Richard Crisp and Miles Hewstone bring together a selection of leading figures in the social sciences to focus on a rapidly emerging, but critically important, new question: how, when, and why do people classify others along multiple dimensions of social categorization? The volume also explores what this means for social behavior, and what implications multiple and complex perceptions of category membership might have for reducing prejudice, discrimination, and social exclusion.

Topics covered include:

- The cognitive, motivational, and affective implications of multiple categorization
- The crossed categorization and common ingroup methods of reducing prejudice and intergroup discrimination
- The nature of social categorization among multicultural, multiethnic, and multilingual individuals

Multiple Social Categorization: Processes, Models, and Applications addresses issues that are central to social psychology and will be of particular interest to those studying or researching in the fields of Group Processes and Intergroup Relations.

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Multiple Social Categorization
Processes, Models, and Applications

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To the memory of Brian Mullen (1955–2006)—a true scholar on multiple dimensions

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Preface

As we begin the 21st century, the arrival of global multiculturalism provides familiar old problems, but also new opportunities. While delineation of cultural and societal boundaries has undoubtedly enriched our social world, this same increased proximity of diverse ethnic, cultural, or religious groups has sometimes accentuated old problems of conflict and prejudice between social groups. Whether it is "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans or "institutional racism" in the UK, we have far from succeeded in banishing the specter of intergroup discrimination. When we examine instances of conflict a common link emerges: Almost universally these conflicts can be traced to differences in religion, ethnicity, or countless other bases for *group* membership; in other words, the *social categories* to which people belong. The role of social categorization in defining many previous, current, and probable future conflicts has long been a central concern for social psychologists (e.g., Allport, 1954). Fifty years of research has now established the psychological process of social categorization as an integral component in intergroup relations. In this edited book, leading figures in the social sciences focus on a set of rapidly emerging, but critically important, new questions in this field: how, when, and why do people classify others along *multiple* dimensions of social categorization? What does this mean for social behavior? What implications might multiple and complex perceptions of category membership have for understanding group processes, intergroup relations, and social systems?

How do we get from existing work on social categorization to our focus in this book on multiple social categorization? Social categorization is widely accepted as a key psychological determinant of social behavior and a substantive literature has emerged that has explored the effects and implications of the categorization process. Over the last 30 years a more "qualified" social psychological account of social categorization has emerged, which has taught us a great deal about when social categories become salient, and what underlying processes are involved. While situations involving just one (self-including) ingroup and one (self-excluding) outgroup may be common, recent work has found that in many cases people attend to more than one dimension of group membership. Thus, while a pervasive social distinction is made on the basis of ethnicity (e.g., Black, White, or Asian), this is by no

means the only possible way to categorize others. We are all also "female" or "male", "young" or "elderly", "liberal" or "conservative", even "Manchester United" or "Everton" football team supporters. The emerging findings that people can, and do, attend to more than one dimension of categorization at a time has profound implications for existing theories of group processes and intergroup relations. Work on multiple categorization is therefore an essential qualification to our current understanding of social categorization, and one which may radically change the extant theories of how group membership, identity, stereotyping, and prejudice interrelate and interact.

Collectively this wide variety of work—ranging from cognitive models of the categorization process, to interventions designed to promote social harmony, to complex social system analysis from the social sciences more broadly—focuses on multiple social categorization. This edited book brings together, for the first time, a collection of the most important and influential scholars in this area, to review past research and set the agenda for future work. We hope that it will not only help to illuminate the importance of considering the multitude of categorization opportunities available to perceivers, but also demonstrate how an integrative understanding of multiple categorization phenomena can have significant implications in today's increasingly multicultural, multiethnic, and multiracial societies.

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Part I

Introduction

1 Multiple social categorization

Context, process, and social consequences

Richard J. Crisp and Miles Hewstone

Think about how important your differences are to you. Think about how we all organise our lives in little boxes: man, woman, British, American, Muslim, Christian, Jew, Tory, Labour, New Labour . . . how could you navigate life if you didn't know the difference between a child and an adult, an African and an Indian, a scientist and a lawyer?

Bill Clinton, *The Dimbleby Lecture 2001*, 14 December 2001

At any one time we have access to many identities, including race, sexuality, gender, nationality, class and religion. Far from being neutral, these identities are rooted in material conditions that confer power and privilege in relation to one another. These power relations, however, are not fixed. They are fluid in character, dynamic by nature and, therefore, complex in practice. The decisions as to which identities we assert, when we want to assert them and what we want to do with them are ours. But those decisions do not take place in a vacuum. They are shaped by circumstance and sharpened by crisis. We have a choice about which identities to give the floor to; but at specific moments they may also choose us.

Gary Younge, *The Guardian*, 21 January 2005

Categorization is integral and essential to human social interaction (Allport, 1954; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). We classify and categorize without, for the most part, giving it a second thought—but it is crucial for our successful navigation of social life. As journalist Gary Younge notes above, our multiple identities are not simple, neutral, passive definitions of our existence; they are laden with implied status, power and value, and therefore of profound consequence for our lives. Categorization is dynamic and fluid—and we can both choose to be categorized, or categories can be chosen for us. Whether we are talking about being black or white, male or female, young or old, such social classifications have significant implications for how we think about ourselves and form impressions of others. In any given situation the categories that define ourselves, and others, can depend on various factors, such as context (e.g., Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991) and motivation (e.g., Sinclair & Kunda, 1999) and increasingly it is apparent that

in many contexts *multiple* bases for social categorization can be salient, combined and used simultaneously (e.g., see Brewer, Ho, Lee, & Miller, 1987; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992). This volume discusses how our classification of ourselves, and others, along these multiple criteria, can impact on psychological and social processes.

In the following chapters the authors discuss how social categorization—the classification of self and others into broad social groupings—has an impact on how we perceive, think, and behave. Social categories can be thought about with no reference to self-inclusion—Asian, British, young—or they can be classified by membership. That is, we can define social contexts by the groups to which we belong ("ingroups") and the groups to which we do not belong ("outgroups"). In such intergroup contexts, ingroup and outgroup membership can have significant implications for social judgment and behavior (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002) and the chapters in this volume discuss much about how categorization affects intergroup bias—the extent to which someone evaluates their own group more positively than other groups.

The term "multiple categorization" refers to any intergroup context that involves perceiving more than a single basis for social classification. Examples abound from everyday life. In the 1983 British General Election a Conservative Party poster depicted a young black man, with the caption "Labour says he's black. We say he's British." Writing about the debate within Britain on what it means to be "British", Home Secretary Jack Straw returned to this poster and wrote, "Their suggestion that one had to make a choice—that one could not be both—was absurd . . ." (Straw, 2000). More recently, Abdolkarim Sorush, a leading Iranian intellectual, offered the view that every Iranian has three identities: Shia, Persian, and Western.[1]

Research into multiple categorization is appealing because it qualifies and refines existing approaches to the study of social identification and social categorization. Typically, work in intergroup relations has focused on single ingroups and outgroups. In increasingly multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious societies, there are now, however, multiple ways in which we can be different from others. This complexity of intergroup affiliation presents an intriguing challenge to theoretical accounts of group processes and intergroup relations. In this introductory chapter, we provide a broad overview of the current state of research across these varied perspectives.

FOUNDATIONS

That people can be affiliated to multiple social categories is not a new idea, nor exclusively an idea explored by social psychologists. Anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists were the first to observe some unique

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1 Cited by Armstrong, K. (2003), "Faith and freedom". *The Guardian*, 8 May.

consequences associated with the apparent use of multiple categorization in societal contexts. Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Murphy (1957) both document cases of reduced conflict in cultures with cross-cutting social structures (see also Coser, 1956; Deutsch, 1973; Gluckman, 1955; Lipset, 1960; Rae & Taylor, 1970). LeVine and Campbell (1972) suggested that group members actively make use of cross-cutting affiliations because they ensure security and stability (it is more difficult, for instance, to have conflictual relations with a group based on territory that is simultaneously an ally according to common ancestry). In a famous example, sociologist Georg Simmel (1950) observed that in the Australian Aborigine culture the whole population is divided into five "gentes", with members of the various gentes found across many different tribes. Such cross-cutting contexts provide divergent bases for group membership—*tribe* does not correspond to *gente* (group memberships neither converge nor correlate).

Research has confirmed that cross-cutting ties can be important on broad societal levels (Cairns & Mercer, 1984; Ross, 1985; see Phinney & Alipuria, this volume) and such category structures have emerged as an important concept for political scientists (see Horowitz, 1985; Wallace, 1973; see Carter, this volume). Based on these observations, models have been developed that focus on the *perception* and *use* of multiple categorization. Examples of work in this area focus on varied phenomena such as selection of multiple alternative categories in person perception (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; van Rijswijk & Ellemers, 2002), the emergence of novel stereotypes following category combinations (Smith & DeCoster, 1999), or the causal reasoning processes accompanying the emergence of those stereotypes (Kunda, Miller, and Claire, 1990). Other examples include the use of hierarchically ordered subtypes in memory (Stangor et al., 1992) or how multiple categories are represented and used in social judgment (Crisp, Ensari, Hewstone, & Miller, 2002; Klauer, Ehrenberg, & Wegener, 2003) as well as broader sociological, anthropological, and political science perspectives (e.g., Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Horowitz, 1985; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Murphy, 1957; Wallace, 1973). The chapters in this volume address these very issues.

There are now an increasing number of psychological perspectives on multiple categorization which range from accounts of categorical structuring of knowledge about different social groups (see McGarty, this volume), and the representation of stereotypic attributes and how these attributes are combined (see Smith, this volume), through to the implications of multiple categorization for social judgment (see chapters in this volume by Crisp; Dovidio et al.; Hogg & Hornsey; Miller et al.; Singh; and Vescio et al.). We briefly review these different models of category representation and evaluation in terms of two specific criteria: (a) in terms of the conjunctions formed by considering multiple criteria (i.e., "combined categories") and (b) in terms of the separable components of targets formed by considering multiple criteria (i.e., "constituent categories").

A TAXONOMY OF MULTIPLE CATEGORIZATION

There are many ways in which multiple social categories can be perceived, represented, and used. One of the key distinctions in the literature is between models of multiple categorization at varying levels of inclusiveness (where inclusiveness is defined as the property of one category, e.g., *European*, subsuming another, e.g., *Britain*). For instance, a considerable body of work has examined the effects on evaluations of making a superordinate social classification salient instead of, or in addition to, a subordinate intergroup dichotomy (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; see also Crisp; Hogg & Hornsey; and Dovidio et al., this volume). This experimental research has shown, beyond doubt, that the introduction of a superordinate categorization can reduce bias. Whether, or for how long, it does so, however, in extra-laboratory conflicts is another matter. National sporting success is sometimes seen as a means for superordinate national categorizations to dominate more conflictual subordinate ethnic groupings. Thus, when the Rwandan national football team beat favorite Uganda to qualify for the African Nations Cup in February 2003, the victory was seen as having significance way beyond the world of sport, because the Hutu and Tutsi communities (caught up in genocide in 1994) celebrated *together*. Yet the optimism surrounding South Africa's Rugby World Cup success in 1995 and France's Football World Cup victory in 1998 was only brief, despite initial celebrations. South Africa's sole black player, winger Chester Williams, opined that the "one team, one country" image was "a lie",[2] and one of France's star black players, Thierry Henry, expressed the view, just four year later, that "when we won the World Cup for three months everyone was French. No one was saying someone was black, white, Algerian. It was nice but of course it did not last."[3]

Studies of "crossed categorization" explore the effects on intergroup evaluations when two dichotomous dimensions of group membership are simultaneously salient (Brewer et al., 1987; Crisp & Hewstone, 2000a; 2001; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Ensari & Miller, 1998; Hewstone, Islam, & Judd, 1993; for reviews see Crisp & Hewstone, 1999a; 2000b; Migdal, Hewstone, & Mullen, 1998; Mullen, Migdal, & Hewstone, 2001; Urban & Miller, 1998). Although similar conceptually to the common ingroup identity model, work in crossed categorization makes no specification of the inclusiveness of the cross-cutting categorizations, and examines the effects of both convergent and divergent categorization. Convergent categorization refers to targets that are designated outgroup on multiple dimensions simultaneously. For example,

2   Colquhoun, A. (2003). Spokesman reignites Springbok race row". *The Guardian*, 3 September.
3   *The Independent*, 28 September 2002.

when gender and age dimensions are crossed, one of the composite groups created is convergent (young females are most different categorically from old males—from whom they differ according to two criteria). Divergent categorization refers to the comparison of two targets who share membership on one dimension, but who belong to different groups on another. At the time of Indian independence the philosopher Bertrand Russell said to Indian political leader Pandit Nehru that they had one thing in common, the fact that they were both atheists. "Yes," replied Nehru, "but never forget, Russell, that you are a Christian atheist, and I am a Hindu one." Like work on the common ingroup identity model, cross-cutting categorization has also been found to moderate evaluations (e.g., Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin., 2001; Vanbeselaere, 1987; 1991; see Singh; Miller et al. and Vescio et al., this volume).

Other research has focused on the effects of "subgrouping" (considering multiple categories that are less inclusive than initial target groups; Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Maurer, Park, & Rothbart, 1995; Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992; for a review see Richards & Hewstone, 2001). For example, within universities there are typically subgroups that define different areas of study, such as natural sciences, humanities, etc. Within these broad groupings there are further subgroups, so within natural sciences one can study physics, chemistry, etc. Interestingly, while the common ingroup identity and crossed categorization models have focused on the shared and overlapping nature of multiple memberships, subgrouping research has been more concerned with *intra*group effects, and has not examined the *inter*category implications of shared and overlapping subgroup categorization. Whereas the common ingroup identity and crossed categorization models have been almost exclusively concerned with intergroup evaluations, work into subgrouping has been almost exclusively concerned with stereotyping (typically specific nonevaluative beliefs about groups) and perceived group variability (typically, the extent to which all members of a group are perceived as similar or different from one another; Park & Judd, 1990; Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991). Subgrouping not only has a moderating influence on stereotyping, but also seems the natural way people structure their intracategory representations (Park et al., 1992). Ingroup information can be organized into subgroups, which can be encoded, recalled, and applied easily and accurately, while there generally appears insufficient information to organize outgroup representations in the same way (see Richards & Hewstone, 2001). While subgrouping has beneficial effects on stereotyping and perceived group variability, its effects on broader positive or negative intergroup evaluations are relatively unexplored.

Although the differential inclusiveness of social categories has undoubtedly revealed distinct effects in the subgrouping compared to the common ingroup identity and crossed categorization literature, this appears to some extent to be due to the different *intra-* and *inter*group foci of the different research traditions (stereotyping versus evaluations, respectively). We have recently examined the predictive power of inclusiveness in differentiating

models of multiple categorization. We found common representational and evaluative consequences irrespective of whether categories combined were of different levels of inclusiveness (Crisp, Beck, & Hewstone, 2004). This suggests that, at least with respect to the phenomena considered in this volume, differential inclusiveness does not have a critical moderating role. More crucial is a focus on how categories are represented and used when perceived simultaneously, and it is this focus that we adopt.

REPRESENTING MULTIPLE CATEGORIES

Category conjunctions

When multiple dimensions of social categorization are simultaneously salient, one task for the social perceiver is to integrate the multiple sources of information to form a holistic impression of the target person. The first class of models we consider have explored the psychological processes and implications of such category conjunctions.

The first way that perceivers can deal with integrating multiple categories is, in fact, to avoid any integration at all and simply focus on a single basis for classification. Put another way, if one of the constituent categories is for some reason perceptually dominant, a second category will simply be ignored. It is well documented that when one category is more salient (e.g., Macrae et al., 1995), or more meaningful with respect to the context (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994), then that particular category will dominate the subsequently formed impressions. For instance, Van Twuyver and van Knippenberg (1999), using a memory-based paradigm ("who-said-what"; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), found evidence supportive of a "negative interdependence" between multiple categories applicable to particular targets (see also van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Specifically, the use of a gender categorization was *negatively correlated* with the use of a student/teacher categorization.

Such competitive activation of categories and stereotypes may be functional and meaningful in many situations (enabling efficiency gains in person perception; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998). Despite this apparent mutual exclusivity of category use in some contexts, this is not always the case. There is also evidence that people can and do process, represent, and use multiple dimensions of social categorization *simultaneously* in a variety of real intergroup settings. Importantly, it is in the absence of any contextual dominance of one category over the other that perceivers seem to notice and structure memory according to multiple criteria (Crisp & Hewstone, 2001; see also Brewer et al., 1981; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992). For example, we found that in Northern Ireland participants did not only spontaneously remember people's religion, but also their gender (Crisp, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2001), and in Bangladesh, both nationality and religion structured judgments about target persons (Hewstone et al., 1993; for a review see Crisp et al., 2002).

How then are categories combined when there is no clearly dominant constituent? Some seminal work by Kunda and Hastie suggests an answer to this question. Kunda et al. (1990) used the example of a "Harvard-educated carpenter" and asked whether such a combination would be perceived as possessing characteristics associated with being "Harvard-educated" or characteristics associated with "carpenters", or some additive or interactive combination of these constituent categories (see also Hastie, Schroeder, & Weber, 1990). This research illustrated that when multiple categories are perceived, then the resulting representation can be either a simple additive, or more complex interactive, combination of the constituent category stereotypes. Whether it is additive or interactive depends on the nature of the context and the relationship between the categories involved.

An additive combination results in a representation based upon a simple linear combination of attributes associated with both constituents (see Anderson, 1965; Singh, Yeoh, Lim, & Lim, 1997). This appears to be the case particularly when the combination is unsurprising (e.g., a male mechanic). When, however, the combination is surprising (e.g., a *female* mechanic), there appears to be a more complex interactive process involved. The nature of a particular combination of social categories (surprising or unsurprising) can thus determine whether an additive or interactive combination of categories defines the resulting impression formed.

An interactive combination of categories is unique in that it results in the generation of "emergent attributes", which are characteristics applied to the combination that are not typically applied to either constituent in isolation (Hastie et al., 1990; Kunda et al., 1990). For example, a disabled athlete may be perceived as particularly headstrong, which may not be such a salient characteristic associated with either disabled people or athletes independently. Such a pattern may be likely when the attributes associated with the two constituents conflict with one another (Wilkenfield & Ward, 2001). Kunda et al. (1990), for example, suggested that a "Harvard-educated carpenter" might be perceived as "nonmaterialistic (an emergent attribute) because having attended Harvard conflicts with carpentry as a chosen occupation. The emergent attribute is thus the result of an attempt to resolve the conflict and create a coherent impression of the target person. This reasoning echoes in Uleman, Newman, and Moskowitz's (1996) suggestion that when information relating to a particular target is not already available from memory (which, by definition, it is not when perceiving surprising combinations), impressions will be constructed in a spontaneous manner.

Similar findings have also been observed in studies of combining *nonsocial* concepts; it is the *surprising* or incongruent nature of the perceived concepts that appears to produce emergent attributes (Hampton, 1997; Murphy, 1988; Wattenmaker, 1995; Wilkenfield & Ward, 2001). A further consequence of perceiving surprising combinations of social categories is an inhibition of constituent stereotypes that accompanies the generation of emergent attributes. For instance, Hutter and Crisp (2005) found that characteristics

associated with females and mechanics were perceived as *less applicable* to the combination "female mechanic" than when either females or mechanics were considered independently of one another. These findings illustrate how multiple categorization can have an impact not only on the way that categories are combined, but also on the representation of the constituents that comprise such combinations.

Category constituents

How does considering multiple criteria for social categorization affect the way we think about the categories that comprise any combination, independent of that combination? For example, if gender and age are salient, then a young female perceiver may think of others as a combination of categorizations along *both* salient criteria (e.g., comparing herself with an elderly male). However, what happens when context requires the perceiver to revert to focusing on the separable components of this combination (i.e., being either just young *or* just female)? Will there be any carry-over effects on the representation of social categories after one has become aware that people can be defined by multiple, cross-cutting categories and conjunctions of categories? Would our young female's perception of the elderly *per se* change after contact with an elderly *female* with whom she shares a group membership? These questions form the basis for work that has examined whether multiple categorization can change intergroup relations and reduce intergroup bias.

Doise's (1978) category differentiation model outlines the expected effects of multiple categorization on perceived similarity and differentiation (see also the meta-contrast process outlined by self-categorization theory; Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). This model suggests that considering multiple categories that cross-cut one another will lead to the operation of counteracting cognitive processes. The act of (simple) categorization leads to an accentuation of differences between, and similarities within, categories (Campbell, 1956; Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). However, in a context of crossed categorization, where the dimensions of categorization are diametrically and orthogonally opposed, these processes should work against one another (Deschamps & Doise, 1978). The accentuation of differences on an initial dimension of classification will be accompanied by a simultaneous and counteracting accentuation of similarities on a second salient classification. Thus, age can cause an accentuation of differences between young and elderly group members. When, however, the young and elderly group members are *also* female, then young (females) and elderly (females) will be perceived as more similar. These proposed differentiation-reducing effects of crossed categorization have been reliably demonstrated many times with respect to both non-social (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999b; Deschamps, 1977) and social (Arcuri, 1982; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; van Twuyver & van Knippenberg, 1999) stimuli.

Work on the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) has also outlined the differentiation-reducing properties of multiple categorization. Gaertner et al. (1990; 1993) specify how a range of causal factors can have implications for the cognitive representation of ingroups and outgroups (see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Goal relations and group interactions affect intergroup attitudes apparently by altering the salience of relevant category distinctions (Doise, 1978; Turner, 1982; Worchel, 1979). Cooperative interdependence (i.e., common task or fate; see Brown & Abrams, 1986; Brown & Wade, 1987; Gaertner et al., 1989; 1993; Sherif, 1966) can transform members' cognitive representation of group boundaries from "us" and "them" to a more inclusive "we".

In sum, multiple social categorization appears to have significant implications not only for how conjunctions of categories are represented, but also for the constituents that make up the combinations. In the next section we consider research that has focused on how these different representational consequences of multiple categorization affect social judgment and, in particular, intergroup *evaluations*.

EVALUATING MULTIPLE CATEGORIES

Category conjunctions

When categories are considered as combined entities, this leads to some interesting implications for intergroup evaluations. These effects have been examined specifically in the crossed categorization literature (see also work on simultaneous categorization related to the common ingroup identity model; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). In this paradigm (Deschamps & Doise, 1978), two orthogonal dimensions of categorization are crossed to form four new "crossed category" groups. Instead of considering only females versus males or young versus elderly, in crossed categorization situations perceivers evaluate targets with respect to both of these dimensions and respond to composite groups such as young females, young males, elderly females and elderly males. In terms of ingroup/outgroup relations there are four groups that are similar and different from the perceiver in distinct ways. If our perceiver is a young female, then other young females are double ingroup members (sharing group membership with the perceiver on both dimensions of categorization), young males and elderly females are mixed category members (being partially ingroup and partially outgroup), and elderly males are double outgroup members (being different from the perceiver on both dimensions of categorization).

How evaluations vary across the four category conjunctions formed by crossing categories has been the focus of several extensive research programs. A number of different patterns of evaluations across the composite groups have been observed (Brewer et al., 1987; Hewstone et al., 1993) and there are six main patterns that have been identified (see Table 1.1; also Miller et al. and

Table 1.1 A priori predictions of the six main outcome patterns of evaluation resulting from crossed categorization. (adapted from Crisp et al., (2002), reproduced with permission from Taylor & Francis)

Pattern	Dimension 1: Ingroup				Dimension 1: Outgroup			
	Dimension 2: Ingroup		Dimension 2: Outgroup		Dimension 2: Ingroup		Dimension 2: Outgroup	
1. Additive	ii	>	io	=	oi	>	oo	
2. Dominance	ii	=	io	>	oi	=	oo	
3. Social inclusion	ii	=	io	=	oi	>	oo	
4. Social exclusion	ii	>	io	=	oi	=	oo	
5. Hierarchical acceptance	ii	>	io	>	oi	=	oo	
6. Hierarchical rejection	ii	=	io	>	oi	>	oo	

Vescio et al., this volume, for more details). These patterns have been observed across a number of studies, and reviews of the literature have confirmed the most common among them in varied antecedent contexts (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999a; Migdal et al., 1998; Urban & Miller, 1998). Subsequent experimental work has also ascertained the moderating conditions that predict when different patterns will be observed (e.g., Crisp & Hewstone, 2000a; 2001; Crisp et al., 2003; Ensari & Miller, 1998; Kenworthy, Canales, Weaver, & Miller, 2003; Urada & Miller, 2000). Recently, Crisp et al. (2002) outlined a dual-route model to predict and explain the processes involved in evaluating category combinations.

Crisp et al.'s (2002) model of crossed categorization effects focuses on the apparent affective nature of ingroups and outgroups. Ingroup and outgroup membership seems to carry an acquired affective valence (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). Ingroup categories are inherently positive in connotation, and outgroup categories inherently negative. Whether this association develops via a process of associative learning with real groups over time (e.g., consistently hearing ingroups being referred to in positive terms, outgroups in negative terms, throughout development, Bargh, 1997; Perdue et al., 1990; see also Cacioppo, Marshall-Goodell, Tassinary, & Petty, 1992; Das & Nanda, 1963; Staats & Staats, 1958) or automatic generalization of self-positivity with novel groups (i.e., perceiving the ingroup to have positive traits because it includes the self; Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Otten & Wentura, 1999), there seems at least to be a strong positive default whereby ingroups are perceived as more positive than outgroups (Maass & Schaller, 1991) that can account for ingroup favoritism. Activation of positive and negative affect with respect

to the ingroup and outgroup respectively can be expected to influence judgments of ingroups and outgroups. A tendency to feel more positively toward ingroups (and more negatively toward outgroups) will lead to the baseline additive pattern (where evaluation occurs as a linear function of ingroup membership; see Table 1.1) in conjunctive category contexts.

Evidence that consideration of multiple social criteria can change evaluations of combined category targets comes from work showing that mood can moderate the pattern of crossed categorization observed. If in-/outgroup status has acquired affect (Otten & Wentura, 1999; Perdue et al., 1990), then positive or negative mood should lead to changes in the salience of the affective connotations of ingroup and outgroup membership. Urada and Miller (2000) suggest that positive mood will effectively cue positive material in memory (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Teasdale & Russell, 1983), and have a priming effect, whereby attention is directed primarily to other positive aspects in the environment (Higgins & King, 1981; see also Miller et al., this volume). Evaluations of combined groups will be modified in an affective context that enhances the positive (ingroup) characteristics of combined groups. There is indeed growing evidence that positive and negative mood can lead to shifts from the baseline additive pattern to more complex interactive patterns of evaluation (Crisp & Hewstone, 2000a; Ensari & Miller, 1998; Kenworthy et al., 2003; Urada & Miller, 2000). In sum, when people evaluate targets defined by a combination of categories, then intergroup evaluations appear to vary depending on the affect associated with the relative composition of ingroup (positive) and outgroup (negative) constituents.

Category constituents

As well as category combinations, from the work reviewed above it is apparent that multiple categorization can have an impact on whether constituent ingroups and outgroups are perceived to be similar or distinct, and we know from existing work on intergroup relations that similarity exerts a significant impact on evaluations. For instance, Tajfel's work with the minimal group paradigm (e.g., Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) illustrated how even with no prior contact, anonymity and, with meaningless social categories, the knowledge that "they" are different from "us" can translate into evaluative differentiation (see Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). In other words, similarity and differentiation can define intergroup attitudes.

Models have been proposed to explain the relationship between intergroup similarity and intergroup evaluation. The work discussed above by Campbell (1956) and Tajfel (1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) has been expanded in various theoretical accounts such as Doise's (1978) category differentiation model and Turner et al.'s (1987) self-categorization theory that we discussed earlier. While the emphasis of these accounts varies, what is common to all is the notion that categorization provides a psychological basis for understanding

"them" to be different from "us", and it is the emergence of this distinction between ingroups and outgroups that provides the prerequisite for intergroup discrimination. Deschamps and Doise argue that ingroup favoritism will be positively correlated with cognitive differentiation. Put another way, as groups become less different, they will also be evaluated less differently. Gaertner and Dovidio's work on the common ingroup identity model has provided an extensive program of empirical work supporting this idea (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) and there is consistent mediational evidence that the formation of a superordinate membership (Gaertner et al., 1989, 1990) and increased intergroup similarity (Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993) explain reductions in ingroup favoritism. As "us" and "them" psychologically merge into each other, the cognitive prerequisite for bias will be removed and evaluations of ingroups and outgroups will converge. In sum, similarity induced by considering shared categorizations appears to exert a moderating effect on evaluation (although this differentiation-discrimination link may not always be a simple one, see Crisp; Vescio et al., this volume).

INTEGRATION AND FRAMEWORK

From the above review we can summarize a broad framework that can provide a reference point when reading the chapters within this volume (see Table 1.2). We would argue that studies fall into two broad (and cross-cutting) bases for classification. First, most research has tended to focus either on *representation* or *evaluation*, that is, the implications of multiple categorization for how people think about, and use, social categories in social judgment. Second, work on the representation and evaluation of multiple categories can focus on the *conjunctions* formed by combining social categories, or the implications for individual *constituents* once devolved from any context that makes multiple categories temporarily salient. We can thus classify the extant approaches to the study of multiple categorization according to a focus on representation or evaluation, and, orthogonal to this, a focus on conjunctions or constituents.

As a caveat, it is notable that some recent work has focused on the simultaneous study of both representation and evaluation, and of both conjunctions and constituents, and this is reflected in some of the chapters in this volume. Each chapter does, however, focus on at least one of these four perspectives as summarized in Table 1.2. For instance, McGarty (Chapter 2) and Smith (Chapter 3) focus on the formation, representation, and use of multiple categorization. Dovidio et al. (Chapter 4), Crisp (Chapter 5), and Hogg and Hornsey (Chapter 6) all consider the implications of multiple categorization for constituent differentiation and evaluation. Vescio et al. (Chapter 7), Miller et al. (Chapter 8), and Singh (Chapter 9) consider how category conjunctions are evaluated. The final section of the book includes

Table 1.2 Multiple categorization: Current trends

	Outcome focus	
Categorization focus	Representation	Evaluation
Conjunctions	Chapter 2: McGarty Chapter 3: Smith Chapter 7: Vescio et al. Chapter 10: Phinney & Alipuria Chapter 11: Carter	Chapter 7: Vescio et al. Chapter 8: Miller et al. Chapter 9: Singh
Constituents	Chapter 4: Dovidio et al. Chapter 6: Hogg & Hornsey	Chapter 4: Dovidio et al. Chapter 5: Crisp Chapter 6: Hogg & Hornsey

two chapters in which the relevance of these foci in psychological work can be applied to wider societal issues. Phinney and Alipuria (Chapter 10) discuss the relevance of multiple categorization for sociological conceptualizations of multiculturalism, while Carter (Chapter 11) discusses how a focus on multiple categorization can contribute to a better understanding of political structures and processes. Both of these chapters consider how conjunctions of multiple categories are represented at broader societal levels.

Consideration of the full spectrum of work in multiple categorization is beyond the remit of one volume and we are concerned primarily with some specific consequences of considering multiple memberships. Although the above is but one possible framework for considering multiple categorization, it offers the potential for furthering integration of work on the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral consequences of such phenomena. We discuss the potential for such integration, and offer a future agenda, in the final chapter of this volume. In this final chapter we consider the research discussed in the preceding chapters, as it relates to recent developments within the social-psychological literature, as well as with other areas of psychology and indeed broader disciplines in the social sciences. For instance, we consider how Roccas and Brewer's (2002) concept of social identity complexity has elaborated on conceptualizations of multiple categorization and how work on essentialism, including judgments of ingroup homogeneity, group polarization, self-anchoring, and entitativity (see Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003; Yzerbyt, Estrada, Corneille, Seron, & Demoulin, 2004), has important implications for future studies of multiple categorization.

The final chapter further considers issues raised by Phinney and Alipuria (Chapter 10), and Carter (Chapter 11), and how multiple categorization can contribute to an understanding of biculturalism (see Berry, 1986; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Phinney, Lochner, & Murphy,

1990), a topic that has until recently received relatively little attention from social psychologists.

On the basis of these discussions the final chapter outlines seven themes that we believe underlie much of the thinking outlined in this volume. We note them only briefly here, as an appetizer, in order to prepare the reader for what we see as the most important issues arising from this work. We discuss how some of the basic principles of categorization theory link all the chapters: the assumption that categorization is necessary to function in a highly complex social world (theme 1), but also how categorization can involve either involuntarily classifying others, or unconsciously defining ourselves (theme 2). Categorization is not always implicit and involuntary; we can choose to self-categorize or categorize others to satisfy varied motives (theme 3). As well as the issue of choice, how we use categorization also changes over time, both within individuals and within cultures (theme 4). It is this dynamic, essential, and flexible quality of categorization that makes it both a cause and potential cure of intergroup discrimination (theme 5), and understanding the cognitive and motivational processes (theme 6) that determine and define our use of categories is already providing increasingly sophisticated means for attenuating intergroup bias. Finally, however, we must be careful not to equate the psychological definition of intergroup bias with the broader notion of intergroup conflict. The latter is more complex and requires a multidisciplinary focus. To tackle conflict we must be prepared to integrate work from diverse perspectives on multiple categorization, incorporating historical, political, sociological, and anthropological perspectives (theme 7).

Our social world is increasingly characterized by multiple and cross-cutting group affiliations, and, as such, the psychological processes and implications of such relations are becoming increasingly relevant. Work on multiple categorization has qualified in important ways our understanding of how social classification affects pressing social issues like prejudice and discrimination. Future and further clarification and refinement of the extant phenomena associated with such complex group affiliation will likely yield more insights. What we now understand of the intricate links between mental representation and evaluation of social groups is contributing to the development of prejudice reduction and conciliation strategies. This is one example of where the application of models of multiple categorization may provide a valuable contribution to our understanding of social issues, and indeed, the means to tackle a pervasive social problem. We believe there may be many more, and we hope that the chapters in this volume will provide the grounding for multiple (and perhaps cross-cutting) research agendas for future work into these exciting and important social phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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