

Rethinking Global Political Economy

Emerging issues, unfolding odysseys

Edited by Mary Ann Tetreault, Robert A. Denemark,
Kenneth P. Thomas and Kurt Burch

THE ROUTLEDGE / RIPE STUDIES IN GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Rethinking Global Political Economy

This important volume presents innovative approaches to fundamental issues in global political economy. Together they provide multiple arguments and avenues for rethinking global political economy in a time of turmoil and system transformation.

The authors collected here consider similar problems from a wide variety of perspectives. In particular, the authors survey the vicissitudes of globalization, the processes of global capitalism, and the building of progressive social theory, answering questions such as:

- What are the defining concepts in contemporary international political economy (IPE)?
- Why has mainstream theory in IPE so far failed to give rise to policies able to bring prosperity to more than a fraction of the world's people?
- How can we re-conceive these concepts to produce better theories and more equitable and effective policies?

Rethinking Global Political Economy contains analysis of history, linguistics, class, culture, empirical data, and normative concerns. It will appeal to those interested in seeing new perspectives and a healthy heterodoxy in the study of political economy.

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Emerging issues, unfolding odysseys

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Matthew Davies and Michael Niemann

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To our families, partners in our odysseys

Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	xi
<i>List of contributors</i>	xii
<i>Series editors' preface</i>	xv
PART I	
Introduction	1
1 New odysseys in global political economy: fundamentalist contention and economic conflict	3
MARY ANN TÊTREAUULT	
PART II	
Aids to navigation	21
2 Analytical advances to address new dynamics	23
V. SPIKE PETERSON	
3 Metageographical moments: a geohistorical interpretation of embedded statism and globalization	46
PETER J. TAYLOR	
4 Creating global hegemony: culture and the market	65
BARBARA JENKINS	
PART III	
Sacking the city	87
5 Globalization as global history: introducing a dialectical analysis	89
BARRY K. GILLS	

6 Mergers, stagflation, and the logic of globalization	109
JONATHAN NITZAN	
7 Global dreams and local anger: from structural to acute violence in a globalizing world	147
PETER UVIN	
PART IV	
Repair of the world	163
8 Globalization, “new” trade theory, and a Keynesian reformist project	165
HARTMUT EISENHANS	
9 Exploitation and solidarity: putting the political back into IPE	195
ALEJANDRO COLÁS	
10 The globalization of human affairs: a reconsideration of science, political economy, and world order	211
CLARK A. MILLER	
PART V	
Conclusion	227
11 Alternative directions in the study of the global political economy	229
ROBERT A. DENEMARK	
<i>Bibliography</i>	238
<i>Index</i>	285

Illustrations

Figures

3.1	The topological metageography of mercantile modernity	49
3.2	The centripetal metageography of industrial modernity	50
3.3	A putative future network metageography of cities	61
6.1	US employment, number of firms, and employment per firm	117
6.2	US accumulation: internal versus external breadth	119
6.3	<i>Tobin's Q</i>	123
6.4	G7 private investment flows as a percent of gross fixed capital formation	128
6.5	The globalization of US business: ownership versus trade	129
6.6	Differential depth and inflation	133
6.7	United States: long-term inflation and growth	136
6.8	Industrialized countries: long-term inflation and growth	136
6.9	Amalgamation and stagflation in the United States	138

Table

6.1	Regimes of differential accumulation	114
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Series editors' preface

Given the sea-changes that have been occurring in the study of International Political Economy (IPE) since the mid-1980s, it is hardly surprising that the discipline is now at a crossroad. For one thing, the political and geo-strategic map of the world has been drastically transformed. Major events such as the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the former Soviet Union, and the 1991 intervention in the Gulf War (under the auspices of the United Nations (UN)) were presented as the triumph of economic and political liberalism, the advent of a "New World Order."

How things have changed barely a decade later. The world has now been witness to three more military interventions, one in Kosovo, one in Afghanistan, and one in Iraq, which were not approved by the UN Security Council. The latter intervention appears to have further cemented a new geo-strategic divide; one that no longer finds the United States and the Soviet Union opposite each other but which seemingly confronts the West, in particular the United States, with the Islamic world. In political terms this new divide is being compounded by the fact that severe disagreements exist within the Atlantic Alliance.

These geo-strategic changes have not been happening in a political, economic, or sociocultural vacuum. Encapsulated by the term "globalization," a number of "sea changes" have been transforming both the practice and constitution of world (power) politics and many people's everyday lives. For all these reasons, the need to keep developing new analytical and theoretical frameworks for grasping these various transformations in IPE/Global Political Economy (GPE) has not lessened. In this regard this latest volume in the RIPE Series in GPE, *Rethinking Global Political Economy: Emerging Issues, Unfolding Odysseys* is a much needed contribution to the field.

The volume brings together a range of critical perspectives on the aforementioned "global shifts" from a variety of scholarly, political, and analytical perspectives. The volume editors have also opted to dispense altogether with the term "International Political Economy," substituting with that of "Global Political Economy." Reasons for this change in terminology is underscored in the contributing chapters' themes, which range from culture and the market, the role of environmental movements in civil society, structural, and acute violence, a new

class analysis, to an entirely different frame for understanding the GPE by way of the interconnection between reproductive, productive, and virtual economies. All the contributors show a healthy concern with the twin issues of injustice and inequality, two issues that are all too often swept under the carpet in the name of “scientific” rigour and “objective” analysis. Furthermore, the contributors all aim to rethink (the practice and study of) GPE by moving theory and research out from beyond the state/market dichotomy and by integrating analyses of the various dimensions of civil society.

This volume fits into the Routledge/RIPE Series in GPE very well in that it is one of the growing number of titles that actively look to radically rethink and reframe GPE. Even more importantly, *Odysseys* defies suggestions that there is also a growing Atlantic divide in academic scholarship. The volume editors show that scholars of many disciplinary and geographical hues can be, and still are engaged in constructive conversation and dialogue about contemporary issues and events in (the study of) world politics. By providing a refreshingly clear view in the field and by sidestepping many sacred cows, this passionate and pithy volume continues in the spirit of the RIPE Series in GPE.

Marianne Franklin, Otto Holman,
Marianne Marchand, and Henk Overbeek

Part I

Introduction

1 New odysseys in global political economy

Fundamentalist contention and economic conflict

Mary Ann Tétreault

This volume brings together a set of essays each of which seeks to launch or elaborate on innovative approaches to fundamental issues in global political economy. Half of them had their start in a series of International Studies Association panels that I organized over a five-year period along with Dimitris Stevis. The panels looked at shifting boundaries between actors and sites of interaction among a variety of participants in the post-Cold War global political economy. The various papers examined basic premises for conceiving and analyzing world systems and global governance. In addition to essays developed from these panels, this collection includes invited contributions from scholars whose substantive expertise complements and whose normative and theoretical interests parallel those of the boundaries group participants.

Taken together, the writers argue from different theoretical and normative points of view, and perhaps from different worldviews as well. Their chapters provide multiple arguments and avenues for rethinking global political economy at a time of turmoil and system transformation. What are the defining concepts in contemporary international political economy (IPE)? How should we frame the models we build from them? Spike Peterson (Chapter 2 this volume) finds recurrent patterns of domination along conventional boundary distinctions such as “first world/third world,” “capitalists/workers,” “male/female,” and “core/periphery,” and cross-cutting patterns signifying the drawing of less conventional lines. In several chapters, the “state” surrenders its centrality as an organizing concept, but for most it remains key whether it is explicitly addressed or not. “Hegemony” is another concept that appears in these chapters, most openly engaged as the contestation among ideas in theory and in policy (Jenkins, Chapter 4 this volume). Perhaps most significantly, these chapters reflect an enlarged vision of class and its priority as an independent variable, one that incorporates identity along with relations of production (Colás; Nitzan; Peterson; Uvin, this volume). Whether the construction (or perhaps the recognition) of identity owes more to agency, ontology, or contingency points up its plasticity and indicates a “Goldhagen problematique” for understanding its social production and reproduction (Goldhagen 1996; Uvin, Chapter 7 this volume).

Several chapters look explicitly at problems of justice and equality, reflecting the concerns of many contributors with the welfare and happiness of human

beings (especially Elsenhans; Peterson; Uvin, this volume), relations among persons and peoples (especially Colás; Uvin, this volume), and the troubling question of whether and how we can envision the joint survival of human beings and the rest of the planet over the long term (Miller, Chapter 10 this volume). As I discuss below, these concerns are becoming more salient, along with conflicts that don't quite fit into the old categories and problems that the crumbling "Washington Consensus" had promised to solve but merely made worse. The latter have reached such proportions that even neo-liberal Nobel laureates and famous financiers have begun to question this model as an appropriate template for guiding the global political economy (e.g. Soros 2002; Stiglitz 2002).

The relatively new interest in social justice from "enlightened" neo-liberals arises from empirical evidence that the implementation of globalization is destabilizing, and not only because of widening inequality between and within states. The most profound impact of globalization might well lie in its erasure of the boundaries that made control and containment of dissatisfaction and dissent easier to achieve before mass tourism, television, the Internet, and other democratizing technologies took "desire management" out of the hands of states. At the same time, the power of multinational firms and multilateral financial institutions to bestow wealth or inflict poverty on individuals, countries, and regions feeds perceptions that "the state" is an ineffective bulwark against the far greater power of "the market." Yet "the market" is, fundamentally, a construction of states – not "the state" in the sense of a disembodied unit composed of territory, a government, and "legitimate means of coercion," but governing units and elite groups, all composed of real human beings influencing and making decisions, and the many others carrying them out (Domhoff 1996; Panitch 1996; Nitzan, Chapter 6 this volume). Could what many interpret as state collapse actually be just state collusion or, more specifically, rent-seeking coalitions of government officials and owners of capital willing to sacrifice if not actually deny the existence of national interests in their pursuit of differential accumulation?

The most powerful coalitions between state agents and economic actors are found in liberal political economies (Lindblom 1977). The Soviet Union offered an alternative to capitalism that theoretically emphasized economic justice and material welfare, one that intertwined economic and political power even more closely together than elites are thought to be in liberal capitalist states. Even so, the power of the economic agents of the Soviet state was more structurally constrained than the power of capitalist states and their agents. The Soviets had fewer nonviolent means for siphoning resources from abroad and labored under excessive centralization and the limits imposed by pervasive top-down thinking and action on state policies. Unfortunately for the world's poor, the Soviet system collapsed during an era of especially rapacious capitalist excess – one also dominated by Neo-Liberal/Social-Darwinist theories in the social sciences. This accident of history fueled triumphalism in major capitalist democracies and a withering contempt for those who would try to tame "the market" rather than allowing it to regulate itself.

In the context of what Craig Murphy (1994) named "liberal fundamentalism," explanations for the mechanisms driving the current widening of global inequality

vary. Some are so radically fundamentalist that they assert that rising inequality is the inevitable outcome of natural processes (e.g. Hernstein and Murray 1996). Others leave room for individual and institutional responsibility, arguing that states have surrendered their authority to protect their populations against the ravages of “the market” (e.g. Panitch 1996). Reasons range from shortages of analytical capacity (Elsenhans; Gills, this volume), to ethical obtuseness (Colás; Peterson; Uvin, this volume), and self-centered decisions of various kinds (Palen 1997; Jenkins; Miller; Nitzan, this volume). Globalization conceived in this larger context pervades the concerns of all the authors represented here.

Déjà vu all over again

The conventional wisdom, at least since Marx, envisions globalization as a development of “the market” in its incarnation as an element of modernity (Giddens 1990; Taylor 1999a and Chapter 3 this volume). Some go so far as to advise the governments and citizens of obsolescent states to stop trying to hold the tidal wave back, and just get out of the way (e.g. Ohmae 1996). Others have noted for some years that globalization also is a function of state–society relations. Rather than being overwhelmed by an automatic juggernaut, states choose globalization/“interdependence” as a preferred method for achieving status over “mercantilistic” approaches offering direct control over domestic production and employment (Gilpin 1981). Well before globalization became a household word, Jane Jacobs (1984), in her fine and undervalued *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, connected contemporary urban decay to *state-mediated* de-skilling of labor and dispersion of production processes by multinational firms. She showed how “normal” backward and forward linkages that underpin vibrant, multi-class urban neighborhoods and national economies are snapped or fail to form as various stages in production processes are spun off to low-wage, low-regulation jurisdictions. Americans have experienced this process domestically since World War I, when factory owners took the opportunity presented by the temporary replacement of skilled, male, union workers by less skilled, female, unorganized employees to Taylorize workplaces and begin a still-continuing process of de-skilling, reorganizing, and deregulating production (Greenwald 1980). This same pattern, including automation and the feminization of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, marks the strategies of giant international firms under globalization (Park 1994; Peterson, Chapter 2 this volume). It is reinforced by the eagerness of states to attract investment by following a kind of Gresham’s law of social policy, competing to offer the cheapest labor, the most “business-friendly” regulatory regimes, and even pieces of sovereignty itself (Palan *et al.* 1996; Palan 1997; Thomas 1997).

Yet the poor have their own optimistic visions of globalization, which helps to explain its pervasiveness and its myriad “bottom-up” qualities (Sen 2000; also Elsenhans; Taylor; Uvin, this volume). This vision includes the anticipated joys of rising material welfare – having plenty of “stuff.”¹ The desire for stuff is deeply human and widely shared. Jared Diamond (1997: 14) tells of the genesis of his book, *Guns, Germs, and Steel* in a query from Yali, a New Guinean friend of many years, who wanted to know why Diamond and his people had so much stuff while

he and his people had so little. Cargo cults (*ibid.*; see also Tierney 2000) are poignant evidence of the longing of the materially impoverished for stuff. Stuff is valued for more than material comfort. It may be the coin of status competition by the materially surfeited (e.g. Veblen 1934; Jardine and Brotton 2000), but it also is a means of self-expression (e.g. Fox and Lears, ed. 1983; Bordo 1993), self-respect (e.g. Appadurai, ed. 1996), and self-protection (Sen 2000; Elsenhans; Uvin, this volume). Attractive clothing, comfortable homes, nourishing and tasty food, books, art, and the gainful employment that make them possible preserve and enhance life, life chances, and life expectancies for people and their families.

Self-actualization and personal autonomy are top priorities on individual and family globalization agendas, and it is these aspects that are most vulnerable to structural and opportunistic derailment. Gilbert Rist (1997) notes that a majority of those living in low-capacity states which rely primarily on “the market” for “development” have experienced little, if any, of its promised benefits, whether or not they also receive state-of-the-art foreign assistance. Critics like Rist have come to doubt that significant improvement in the social, political, and psychological, much less the material conditions of life for most residents of presently un(der)developed areas is even possible. To attain that would require far stronger measures than unprotected exposure to “the market.” It would take policies able to halt if not actually reverse the net material resource flows to “Europe”² from the non-European world, a pattern that has characterized exchange between them for five hundred years (Wolf 1982; Blaut 1993; Gunder Frank 1996).

Yet it is precisely the continuation of this differential accumulation that lies at the core of the top-down globalization agendas of client entrepreneurs and their patron governments in dominant capitalist states (Nitzan, Chapter 6 this volume). Hartmut Elsenhans (Chapter 8 this volume) sees the ideological dominance of international economic policy by neo-liberal fundamentalists as the biggest threat to the achievement of decent living standards by the vast majority of the world’s poor. Others also note that among the stuff demanded by bottom-up globalizers is citizenship, an entitlement to democracy which includes rights to stuff along with more conventionally emphasized rights such as elections and civil liberties guarantees (Gould 1988). Yet democracy itself is attenuated by globalization, and not only in the developing world (Panitch 1996; Thomas and Tétreault, ed. 1999).

Bottom-up globalization as a psychological reality is a direct outgrowth of science and technology. This extends beyond the Internet, which is so widely touted as the primary substrate for the spontaneous development of a new “global civil society.” Other elements of globalizing technology are the graphic images of global integrity generated by widely distributed satellite photographs of the earth from space, impressions of participation in a global culture through mass media such as television and popular music, and the science that explains the systemic linkages that produce ecosystems transcending state boundaries and jurisdictions. As Barbara Jenkins, Peter Taylor, and Clark Miller emphasize in their contributions to this volume, these components of bottom-up globalization reflect an imaginary based on a “map” of the world differently organized from the neat, four-color

display of bounded nation-states. This new world map assumes greater mobility and also highlights global vulnerability, one reason why environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have assumed a prominent role among the most vigorous contemporary claimants of global civil society status (Miller, this volume; also Stevis and Assetto, ed. 2001). Their activities, usually devised and undertaken by small elite groups, illustrate both the growing authority of global civil society and the defects in its reach and capacity which arise from de-democratization. This erosion of democratic theory and practice – the “democratic deficit” – in the developed West has proceeded with little notice by triumphalists, although critical theorists and social activists are increasingly concerned by its deleterious effects. These range from rising economic inequality to bad social policy and, given the current level of “anti-terrorist” hysteria (actually orkheia, since the overwhelming majority so affected are men), a significant diminution of civil liberties and human rights. Yet attempts to reclaim popular agency by elements of civil society should not automatically be assumed to be benign or even democratic. Rather, each must be examined and evaluated individually.

Paths of resistance and retribution

In the West, civil society is conceived not in the Aristotelian sense of citizen membership of the state but as an independent social force (Keane 1988; but see Colás 2002 for a more fully developed model). Historically, the development of an oppositional civil society traced two different paths as Europe and its settler colonies made their collective though not always coordinated transitions to modernity. Less often analyzed in these terms, the first path was religious dissidence led by “saints” (Walzer 1965); the second, more frequently examined pathway was a class-based assertion of autonomy led by “entrepreneurs” (Keane 1988; also Habermas 1991; Murphy 1994). Claims to civil rights and protection were reactions to the concentration of power in states and the denial of political participation, economic and social protections and rights, and moral autonomy to citizens (Polanyi 1944; Goldberg 1992; Tétreault 1998). Called “the double movement” by Karl Polanyi (1944) in his analysis of reactions to globalization in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, today’s conflicts over the highly unequal results of globalization are occurring along similar lines of cleavage (see also Juergensmeyer 1993; James 2001). Once again, opposition focuses on the state as the dominant power-holder. In today’s civil society battles, however, both religious and entrepreneurial contenders fight for access to state-conferred power and wealth rather than asserting independence from the state. Also, in spite of their populist and/or libertarian rhetoric, both camps engage in significantly undemocratic and even anti-democratic practices. Secularist democrats also are visible, generally as a smaller “third force” in this conflict among leviathans, and find themselves pulled toward one or the other in an attempt to effect the changes they seek (e.g. Tétreault 2003). Even so, their efforts show that democratic mobilization against the excesses of globalization has plenty of space in which to make normative, structural, and practical claims (Colás; Uvin, this volume; also O’Brien *et al.* 2000).

Widespread concern that the impact of globalization on individuals and societies has been more harmful than not are supported by statistics showing that both the rate of globalization and measures of inequality have increased enormously since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the conventional dividing line between the Cold War and the new Age of Globalization. In his BBC Reith Lectures, Anthony Giddens (1999) notes that even more than rising levels of trade, exponentially increasing financial transactions are creating a world economy whose size and velocity have “no parallels in earlier times” (ibid.: 27; also Mittelman 1996; Soros 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Peterson, Chapter 2 this volume). The extent of global inequality is equally unprecedented. Between 1989 and 1998, “the share of the poorest fifth of the world’s population in global income has dropped” from 2.3 to 1.4 percent (Giddens 1999: 33). Twenty nations of sub-Saharan Africa have lower per capita incomes today than they had in the late 1970s (ibid.: 34), a time, not coincidentally, when most commodity price cycles were at close-to-historic highs and OPEC was basking in its apparent ability to set crude oil prices at whatever level its members pleased.

Reagan-era pressures supporting capital-led, top-down globalization were visible rhetorically and financially well before 1989, however, as a number of studies in a volume I coedited in the mid-1980s showed clearly (Tétreault and Abel, ed. 1986). But absent from these pressures and from elite responses to them was any effort to construct effective regimes willing and able to enforce regulatory standards on the growing volume and range of international transactions (Murphy 1994). The partial successes of sectorally and/or geographically limited institutions such as OPEC-member national oil companies (e.g. Tétreault 1995) and regimes such as the European Union’s regulations on automobile plant location (e.g. Thomas 1997) hint at what might have been achieved had there been visionary leadership and a commitment to global governance among elites in the developed world. Instead, the modest fire walls separating national economies from “the market,” already crumbling in the early 1970s, continue to disintegrate in big bangs and spectacular crashes, exposing us to stormy seas whose shoals few are equipped to navigate. In this volume, Alex Colás calls us to make equality the cornerstone of new, ethically informed theories of global political economy; Peter Uvin shows us what happens when such calls are ignored.

Among the most crushing realities dashing the dreams of hopeful bottom-up globalizers are debt, devaluation, and restructuring. Nations throughout the world have experienced the devastation of these plagues, some repeatedly, and African nations suffering from the ravages of colonial and neocolonial exploitation have become the equivalents of poster children advertising the results. One is Rwanda, a country institutionally and normatively “racialized” by systems of colonial control whose effects persisted into the post-colonial era. In response to inexorable external pressures on the Hutu government to restructure, democratize, and seek accommodation with the Tutsi minority, Hutu clients of the political leadership orchestrated a campaign of genocide against the Tutsi as a people, along with Hutu opponents of the regime (Gourevitch 1998; Uvin 1998; Melvern 2000). Large portions of the Hutu population answered the call with their machetes. The vulnerability of these people to appeals to “exterminate” a dehumanized

Other is hauntingly familiar to the vulnerability of Germans to nearly identical calls by Hitler to exterminate Jews (Goldhagen 1996; also Kershaw 1998; and for fin-de-siècle Austria, see Schorske 1980). These responses, Uvin argues here, are not merely the result of economic insecurity or the commands of state-backed authorities. They are the despairing reactions of people who feel personally humiliated by devastating forces they cannot control or even confront directly.

Similarities among pathological social responses to severe political and economic pressures on populations, responses that include in addition to fascist and nationalistic genocidal social movements, a resurgence of violent religious revivalism, invite new approaches to understanding the operation of the world system as such. Here we offer a conceptually rich and ethically grounded approach to re-envisioning world system analysis. Departing from the Eurocentric approach that presents “capitalism” and the rise of “the West” as producing a unique moment in world history, Barry Gills discusses the direction of his current work which attempts to integrate the political economy of the Western-dominated “modern world system” with antecedent trading systems centered on other regions, seeking to relocate human beings in complexes of connections in addition to those generated by capitalist relations of production. Gills disagrees with Polanyi (1944) and others who believe that “pre-modern” relations of production were replaced by market society. Rather, he sees capitalist relations of production articulated in ways that can enhance or destroy the capacity of individuals and societies to sustain themselves (see also Wolf 1982; Ayubi 1995). Thus, Gills’s substantive and methodological concerns link those of Uvin, Colás, Elsenhans, Peterson, and Miller by integrating psychological, ethical, and ecological considerations with the macro social and macroeconomic models more conventionally applied at the world systems level of analysis.

Entrepreneurial cheerleaders

The most enthusiastic contemporary supporters of civil society and top-down globalization have been liberal governments, corporations, and wealthy individuals such as Bill Gates and George Soros (before his disenchantment), those whose ethical perspective is grounded in individualist values and negative liberty (Berlin 1969). Such “bourgeois” advocates of individual freedom from external constraints focus also on corporate bodies, especially firms and banks, and also voluntary organizations such as religious groups and other non-state and potentially anti-state institutions. In developed countries, their efforts tend toward delegitimizing regulation and taxation in a strategy aimed at achieving “smaller government” and “greater efficiency.” In former communist states, they provided lavish funding for social projects and NGOs intended to shelter nascent civil societies from surviving remnants of the old regime. Some achieved real victories in their efforts to extend individual freedom and human rights. Soros-supported NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, contributed significantly to protect dissidents and reconstruct social capacity destroyed under communism (e.g. Tétreault and Teske 1997).

Their international and transnational efforts were augmented by local action, particularly by religious groups and churches, unions, human rights and environmental groups, and political parties (*ibid.*). However, the material results of these efforts have proven to be both unstable and highly deficient, threatening the still wobbly democratic edifices they helped to erect. Extreme inequality, widespread poverty, unemployment, homelessness, addiction, official corruption, rising rates of sexually transmitted disease and organized crime (both of the latter connected to rising dependence on prostitution and trafficking in human beings for income and foreign exchange), are only some of the social pathologies that have gone hand-in-hand with economic and political liberalization. All are reducing life expectancies and some are erasing social capital almost as quickly as it is generated (e.g. Wedel 1998; Hall 2000; Jeffries 2000; also Peterson; Uvin, this volume). At the same time, foreign pressures to privatize national economies and open borders to trade and capital movements are far more intense than support for democratization, accountability, and economic assistance needed to ease the impact of transition on populations (e.g. Juris 1995; Kornai 1996; Wedel 1998; Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999). They are matched by domestic pressures from state and non-state elites in the actual (states) and virtual (international organizations and financial institutions) locations where globalization is generated. In this volume, Barbara Jenkins and Jonathan Nitzan trace the patterns of these elite pressures and report some of their effects on the exacerbation of inequality.

The relationship between social capital and state capacity is complex. Repressive regimes erase social capital as a matter of policy, and states with high capacity are more effective erasers than those without. Yet such “authoritarian high modernist” states often trip over their own self-images of invincibility,³ and also are exquisitely vulnerable to popular resistance and evasion (Gibson 1986; Scott 1998). Defects in state capacity open spaces for dissidents and grassroots civil society structures that support the delegitimation and possibly the demise of oppressive states by offering an alternative vision of sovereignty (e.g. Havel 1989; 1990). The result is “multiple sovereignty,” under which “contenders or coalitions of contenders [advance] ... alternative claims to control over the government” and seek a “commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population” (Tilly 1986: 53). In many countries today, the most prominent contenders and oppositional coalitions can be found in religious social movements (e.g. Juergensmeyer 1993; Marty and Appleby, ed. 1993; Tétreault and Denmark, forthcoming).

Curses from saints

Contemporary religious social movements worldwide are seen as only superficially analogous to the anti-modern, Protestant movements that sprang up in the 1920s in the United States where the term “fundamentalist” originates (Wills 1990; Marty and Appleby, ed. 1993). The earlier groups were primarily spiritual, nonviolent, and localized. Today’s religious social movements are fully imbricated in globalization. They are self-consciously political, socially complex, and many

are transnationally organized. Some of their leaders are educated and wealthy, men who themselves are socially disembedded and deracinated products of globalization (Roy 2001a,b). Their activities are financed not only by contributions from the religious masses but also from the coffers of high rollers, both those like the American Protestant Pat Robertson who shelters a complex of business and political interests under constitutionally protected subsidy, tax, and regulatory dispensations, and the Saudi Muslim Usama bin Laden, whose money comes from the investments of his very wealthy family. Their lavish resources enable such movements both to purchase weapons and to supply social welfare benefits that economically and ethically impoverished states and localities cannot afford. Their outward idealism allows them to proselytize effectively and mobilize political support, especially among those who share their cultural orientations. Rank-and-file members of saint-led movements tend to be young men with few social or economic resources whose ethical sensibilities are offended by political corruption and the various excesses of those profiting from the status quo (e.g. Roy 1994; Sells 1996; Tétreault forthcoming). Their constituents also include millions of religiously observant and/or culturally conservative persons who never would march in the streets or throw bombs but are deeply repelled and even frightened by unemployment, political corruption, state collapse, and the dissolving family and community ties that accompany rapid social change, itself seen as evidence of moral decline (e.g. Iannaccone 1993; Mayer 1993).

Unlike entrepreneurs who seek to shrink state capacity as a means to escape constraints on their negative liberty, saints wish to extend the state to enforce measures supporting positive liberty (Berlin 1968). Among the most radical of the positive liberties asserted by saints is their right to engage politically and even to overthrow the secular state and take over its machinery to impose religious norms and law on national populations (Juergensmeyer, 1994; Tétreault and Denmark, ed. forthcoming). Most saint-led movements are anti-minority (Mernissi 1992; see also the many post-11 September 2001 public statements of Christianist leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson in the United States). They advocate female subordination (Hawley, ed. 1994) even when they incorporate feminist dissidents (e.g. al-Mughni 2000; Gallaher forthcoming). Many also practice scapegoating: of women, homosexuals, foreigners, and religious and/or ethnic minorities (Bruce 1993; Hawley, ed. 1994). Some religious revivalists are associated with nationalist movements, raising the level of violence so often accompanying them (Girard 1979; Bruce 1993; Juergensmeyer 1994; Sells 1996). These characteristics make saints as much or more subversive of the liberty of “non-saints” as the entrepreneurs are of structurally disadvantaged persons and groups.

Third forces

Scientists also are active observers and even advocates of globalization. Their similarities to and differences from saints and entrepreneurs are instructive. All three groups see a kind of inevitability in the process, but what it means and how to deal with it are different for each. Like saints, scientists see danger in global

integration, not because it is evil but because the earth is a single ecological system within which people and their activities contribute substantially to expanding contacts among its constituent parts. In consequence, the entire planet is becoming increasingly vulnerable to the negative results of both thoughtless and malevolent behavior. Clark Miller shows, in Chapter 10 this volume, how the popularization of the vision of spaceship earth strengthens pressures from scientists for a unified planetary approach to the amelioration of global climate change. Even so, upon whom the benefits of global integration and the costs of adjustment respectively shall lie is so much a focal point of international and interindustry conflict that prospects for successful amelioration are uncertain (see also Stevis and Assetto, ed. 2001).

Scientists' visions of globalization seem to reflect not only a high modernist conception of science but also, as Jenkins argues here, elements of a global culture expressed in myriad social products in addition to science and technology. The impact of globalization and its associated culture on the least powerful citizens of this globalized world are examined in this volume by Peterson and by Uvin. Nitzan and Elsenhans concentrate on the motives and the methods of the most powerful and, with Gills, look at its effects on macro-social and economic system. Elsenhans argues passionately for combating ideologically driven micro-level theory with macro-level analyses, and for a Keynesian approach to raising living standards for labor as necessary for a vital capitalist system. His normative approach coincides substantially with that of Peter Taylor and, ironically, with the attempt of Alex Colás who, from a very different perspective, seeks to mobilize an ethical consensus for making the reduction of inequality a priority of social-movement activism. Gills speaks on these ethical and theoretical concerns, arguing for an analysis of trends in the global political economy that concentrates on links between the macro-economy and ethical concerns for human dignity, cultural diversity, and environmental protection.

Cosmopolitania, nova imperia, or back to the future?

The chapters in this volume focus attention on sites where intervention in political-economic structures and practices are occurring – and should occur differently. They are countered by politicians and scholars whose ideals are different and argue for different kinds of change. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, for example, US president George W. Bush repeatedly asserted that these events were motivated by a hatred of American values and must be countered by force. The same sentiment, if not quite the same recommended response, is echoed in a significant thread in the academic literature on globalization, perhaps best exemplified by the work of Harold James. James argues that globalization is threatened by “reactionary resentment” against “a new and unfamiliar international or cosmopolitan world” (2001: 1), and his detailed comparisons between today’s reactions and the politics of the era of the Great Depression are instructive. Unlike those who see

globalization primarily as economic integration, and resistance to marketization as a reasonable demand for protection from its worst effects – Polanyi’s “double movement” (1944) – James stresses psychological factors, chiefly envy, as the source of political pressure to halt globalization.

Others too emphasize psychological factors, but in more complex ways. For example, Mark Juergensmeyer (1993), agrees that cosmopolitan values and lifeways are triggers of communal reactions to the spread of western culture. However, he interprets these reactions as a revulsion against secularization and the suppression of local lifeways rather than as the result of simple envy. Peter Uvin (Chapter 7 this volume) carries this analysis further. He distinguishes between cosmopolitanism as a set of values and lifeways, and those who monopolize the benefits they generate. Reactions are aimed primarily at the latter, or at scapegoats. This vision is reflected in the literature of fiction as well as in the literature of fact (Ash 2002: 60).

In Abdel Rahman al-Munif’s novel *Cities of Salt*, resentment among Arab villagers against foreign oil company workers is nourished by revulsion against the strangers’ incompatible codes of behavior – how they laugh, talk, and dress, the kinds of machines they use, and how little they seem to respect local lifeways. The sense that the strangers and their desires have superceded the local population and its needs – indeed, that the strangers have gulled the rulers themselves, whose own best interests are being undermined by their credulous cooperation – infuses Munif’s novel. The absence of mitigation of the economic upheaval the strangers create by bulldozing trees and houses and replacing them with a large industrial operation requiring that the residents abandon their homes and move elsewhere serves to create a smoldering resentment aimed at a wide array of targets (1989). A similarly textured and highly nuanced picture is drawn in Uvin’s *Aiding Violence* (1998) which describes the contribution of the “foreign aid enterprise” to the Rwanda genocide. Once again, an alien yet exciting set of lifeways appears in a community together with people and practices that contravene local values and customs. Poor Hutu farmers resent the natty outfits, boom boxes, and Land Rovers of foreign aid workers, their disdain for local lifeways, and their arrogant dismissal of local knowledge that contributes directly to the economic immiseration of rural residents. Adding to the Hutu sense of injustice is the favoritism that the foreigners appear to show to the Tutsi minority, whose very marginality contributes to their adaptability and thereby their desirability as employees of the foreigners, who pay very high wages. As in Munif’s story of the coming of oil to Saudi Arabia, political entrepreneurs were able to mobilize that popular resentment and use it as a weapon against their rivals.

In academic – and political – arguments against globalization’s critics, cosmopolitanism is presented as though it were some kind of universal culture (e.g. James 2001). Indeed, as it is used in these contexts, cosmopolitanism is pictured as culture-free. Even if we grant that this is so, it is not value-free. Cosmopolitan values are “worldly,” putting us at the very least in a materialist framework. In the examples I sketched above, the oil company and the foreign aid enterprise both sought the successful incorporation of subsistence communities into global systems of investment and trade. This implies “universality,” a universal culture, in

this case, capitalism. The commodification of land and its products, of human skills and talents, introduces market values into every society as it changes modalities of interpersonal and intergroup competition. Some people thrive under this new regime but to others it brings personal and collective insecurity. As both books show, such persons can be found in virtually every stratum of traditionally dominant social groups. Their now-uncompetitive members find that their former complaisance prevented them from learning the kind of cooperative behavior that, perhaps ironically, is so necessary if one is to be competitive. In the same (but opposite) way, marginality contributes to the competitiveness of minority group members whose survival attests to their capacity for flexibility and anticipatory adjustment.⁴

Worldliness is compatible with pre-capitalist and capitalist social formations. But cosmopolitanism also implies something less compatible with capitalism or with any other "ism" it is likely to encounter in the modern world. This is tolerance of difference. In consequence, although I can accept the idea that resentment and envy underlie some contemporary opposition to globalization, I do not accept the assumption that these are reactions against cosmopolitanism. To have a cosmopolitan society, tolerance must not only be widely shared but also, and even more importantly, institutionalized in a rule-governed regime, something that I would argue is at a very early stage of development in the contemporary world, and under attack almost everywhere. Here I want particularly to emphasize two things. One is the importance of rules and institutions of protection for the operation of a cosmopolitan regime of toleration. In their absence, the dominant will dominate and domineer, and thereby shrink or eliminate the social space available for dissent and innovation. The other is to distinguish between toleration and what passes for multiculturalism under capitalism: that is, homogenization. Toleration is similar to what Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) calls "transversalist politics," a coalition politics in which participants respect and celebrate rather than bury their differences in the process of achieving common goals. The aim is to achieve a practical accommodation that does not efface the identity or values of either partner. Thus, a regime of toleration resembles what María Rosa Menocal (2002) calls the "culture of tolerance" which she says governed relations among Jews, Christians, and Muslims in much of Spain during the medieval period. Here different cultures as expressions of the values and histories of ethno-religious groups were protected as self-defined collectivities. These are not universalist cultures. What is universal in such communities is a commitment to toleration as a primary value, one that assumes that other, different values will shape the beliefs and practices of different segments of their component populations. Toleration stands in sharp contrast to the homogeneous universalism which constitutes the basic value of monocultural hegemonies from "universal" religions and nationalisms to authoritarian high modernism as a state ideology (Scott 1998). I would argue that all of these monocultural regimes are anti-cosmopolitan precisely because they either erase or privatize difference rather than protecting and incorporating it into public life.

Different views of cosmopolitanism underpin different contemporary visions of empire. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) argue that the “Empire” that is taking shape from the shards and detritus of the short – and violent – twentieth century is a novel structure. In the past, precapitalist modes of production, a lack of state capacity, and an appreciation of diversity as “ornament” (also Menocal 2002) maintained and even cultivated difference. Difference was a resource for constructing systems of divide-and-rule that operated by fostering competition among the ruled and thus their dependence on the ruler. Consequently, the construction and maintenance of boundaries was a primary task of traditional imperial powers (e.g. Mernissi 1992: 6–7). Hardt and Negri see contemporary Empire differently. Like Michel Foucault (1995), they suggest that discipline is superior to punishment as a form of social control and, like Marx, they argue that state capacity is attenuated by capitalism which is the fountainhead of discipline in a globalizing world. In their analysis of Empire, Hardt and Negri move beyond discipline, however, arguing that in addition to intensified and generalized “normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices ... this control extends well outside the structure sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks” (2000: 23). The distinction between the old system controlled by discipline and what Hardt and Negri see as a qualitatively new Empire controlled by “biopower,” a “techie” version of the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock 1979), is its comprehensiveness. Discipline in Foucault requires an outside and an inside, and thus carries a sense of an agent shaping an object. In contrast, biopower is both more “democratic” and more totalizing in that everything, including the brains and bodies of persons connected through machines and systems, is inside. Thus “[b]iopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior” (ibid.).

The totality of biopower means that the power structure of Empire subsumes its own resistance, a situation that Hardt and Negri view optimistically – as the democratization of power through local assertions of autonomy. Here, following Homi Babha, they imagine the spontaneous formation of utopian communities through which they understand locality as a network concept describing affinity groups that are “hybrids” of persons and communities that can be and likely are widely dispersed geographically.

The utopia Babha points toward after the binary and totalizing structures of power have been fractured and displaced is not an isolated and fragmentary existence but a new form of community, a community of the “unhomely,” a new internationalism, a gathering of people in the diaspora. ... “To live in the unhomely world, to find its ambivalences and ambiguities enacted in the house of fiction, or its sundering and splitting performed in the work of art, is also to affirm a profound desire for social solidarity.” The seeds of the alternative community ... arise out of close attention to the locality of culture, its hybridity, and its resistance to the binary structuring of social hierarchy. ... Hybridity itself is a realized politics of difference, setting differences to play

across boundaries ... so that the mere fact of hybridity has the power to destroy hierarchy *tout court*.

(Hardt and Negri 2000: 145; quote from Babha 1994: 18)

Hardt and Negri project a benign picture of a “multitude” that comes together to “[configure] its own constitution” and exercise its right to reappropriate the means of production through its acquisition of “free access to and control over knowledge, information, communication, and affects. ... The right to reappropriation is really the multitude’s right to self-control and autonomous self-production” (406–7). They adopt the term “posse” to denote “the multitude in its political autonomy” and although they note in passing the use of this term in rap music and in “American fantas[ies] of vigilantes and outlaws” (407–8), they dismiss such images of skinheads and casual communal violence, replacing them with “singular subjectivity. ... [I]like the Renaissance ‘posse,’ which was traversed by knowledge and resided at the metaphysical root of being” (408). In this, they forget Lord Acton and what he learned in his conflict with Pio Nono over the declaration of Papal infallibility: that absolute power is a recipe for totalitarian corruption (Wills 2000).

The practical difficulty of separating “good” biopower from “bad” constitutes much of the message in the burgeoning literature on terrorist networks. There, the proliferation of terrorist activities employing biopower suggests that dystopia is as likely to describe the communities of the globalized world as eutopia. Indeed, analysts of terrorist organizations employ the same concepts as Homi Babha, although not in the same way, to describe the manufacture of terrorists and their deployment in networks of violent resistance to Empire. Olivier Roy (2001a,b) talks about the “deracination” of members of terrorist organizations, the attenuation of ties that occurs when idealists leave home for distant and dangerous parts in search of a community united by an idealism that is simultaneously exhilarating and terrifying. Perhaps the best contemporary examples are the so-called Arab Afghans, young men from Algeria, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states who went not only to Afghanistan but also to Bosnia and Chechnya to become soldiers of God. Gathering in places removed from the disciplining hierarchies of locality and family, these now-deterritorialized activists acquired hybrid identities constructed around charismatic and often authoritarian leaders who tapped into their religious idealism to transform them into “holy warriors.” Their biopower was concentrated through military training reaffirming their social solidarity in a fight against a satanic adversary. Combat experience reinforced group loyalty, not only because of the transformative power of collective violence but also because combat creates dead and wounded comrades in whose memory survivors must redouble their efforts (e.g. Shay 1994).

Where is toleration in biopower resistance? Like the contrast between the homogeneous capitalist cosmopolitanism of globalization and the transversalist cosmopolitanism of particular communities negotiating their differences, the distinction lies in nonviolence – which, after all, has long been the primary objective of toleration: a *modus vivendi* removing first the threat of annihilation and then of