


• David Robertson

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THIRD EDITION

Third Edition

First published 2002
by Europa Publications
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
(A member of Taylor & Francis Group)

Paperback edition published by Routledge 2004
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-3620-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-63766-6 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN 0-415-32377-0 (Print Edition)

for Jessica, Oliver and Giles

Preface

This book has been in print for nearly twenty years; this is the third edition. After that time there is, perhaps, only one thing of which I am sure—prefaces get harder to write. Whether this is merely a reflection of the uncertainties and intellectual modesty of middle age or also a reflection of the developments in politics over that time is unclear. Certainly nothing seems as clear about ‘modern’ politics now as it did in 1984, or even in 1992. Yet politics, perhaps no more than any aspect of social change, is a curious mixture of continuity, change, and repetition. In the 1992 preface I commented on the fact that the first preface had been written when ‘Ronald Reagan... was [still] the world’s foremost hawk, a true believer in Star Wars, rather than the man who signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty’. The current US President is the son of Reagan’s successor, and has re-energized Star Wars—and replaced Reagan’s old ‘Evil Empire’ with ‘The Axis of Evil’. Plus ça change?

British politics has changed, has it not? In 1992 the Conservative party was still in power, though without Margaret Thatcher. Since then the Labour party has won an unprecedented secure second term. But, as the entries for ‘New Labour’ and ‘Third Way’ suggest, the degree of substantive change in British politics may be less well indicated by that fact than by comparing what the Labour Party defeated in 1992 has in common with its victorious descendant of 1997 and 2001. Plus ça change?

But of course things do change, often irreversibly. This third edition reflects change, even if it has to be written with a stronger sense of the unpredictability of politics than its predecessor volumes. It reflects change in the large number of new entries and the much smaller number of entries dropped. It reflects change in the way that most continuing entries have been re-written at least slightly, and a good number significantly. The changes may be more in the way of continuation of the picture of 1992 rather than the sharp discontinuities between 1984 and 1992, but they are real. The whole geo-political story of Central Europe is to point, as is the huge transformation of the old European Community, or the further development of a consensus on economic policy in most advanced economies.

The changes since 1992 have been more incremental than the huge change, the end of the Cold War, that occurred between the first and second edition. But they have given us a world of such groping uncertainty that the need for a book like this is perhaps even greater. I have done my best to capture the crucial ideas and points of this political world, tentative and uncertain as it is both at the international level but also in the domestic politics of all nations.

What has not changed, because it defines the book and has well stood the test of time, is the expository technique. Unlike most such reference works it is single-authored, and consists not of a very large number of brief entries, but of around 500 short essays. This dual technique imposes its own constraints. There is much of technical importance that a reader will not find here—an encyclopedia should be consulted. What he or she will find is one man's attempt both to describe and evaluate many of the most important ideas that shape modern politics. Because this book is fundamentally about ideas. It is not restricted to '-isms', of course. But an important concept, idea, thought, view, ambition, lies behind every entry. People are in the book, relatively rarely, because of something they have stood for over and above their own political careers; events are in the book not because they were suddenly vitally important, but because they shape the way we come to think. So, for example, 11 September 2001 is here not because it was an undoubted tragedy, but because it is a symbol both for an actual problem and, more importantly, a way of thinking about that problem. Mrs Thatcher is in the book, though in many ways only another successful Tory leader, because a senior member of the 'New' Labour Party very recently thought it not only valid, but useful, to address a group of socialists with the message that 'we are all Thatcherite now'. For that matter 'class' might be said to be in the book more because the current 'New Labour' British Prime Minister once thought in intelligible to tell the his electorate that they were 'all middle-class now' as because class actually shapes politics—it clearly does not do so as much as when the first edition was published.

The underlying structure and the analytic approach are much the same as in the first edition. My initial enthusiasm for this project arose because of the countless times I have given students an essay topic and wanted to tell them to look up some key word in the title before starting their reading, to ensure that they got off on the right lines. Later I came to see a wider potential use. All political scientists have to live with the fact that any educated person believes him- or herself to know as much as they do about politics because, after all, we are (as Aristotle tells us) all political animals. Yet there *is* a professional vocabulary (as well as a lot of awful jargon) which is not part of common parlance. Increasingly these words ('charismatic' is an example—we were once told that Bill Clinton is charismatic, and nowadays that Berlusconi is) are expropriated and, too often, misused by the media, becoming a part of general discourse more likely to confuse than inform. And, of course, there are 'facts', 'ideas', 'concepts' about which any serious newspaper reader should be informed but, bluntly, usually is not.

Public policy concerns frequently make such technical terms vitally important, and ignorance of their meaning on the part both of journalists and readers

does not facilitate communication or opinion formation. No one should really form a conviction about the federal prospects for Europe if they are unsure about the meaning of federalism. More specifically, unless one understands the distinctions between ‘directives’, ‘direct applicability’, ‘regulations’ and ‘direct effect’, it is very hard to work out exactly what the European Union is actually doing. (And, by the way, it helps to understand the different roles of the Commission and the Council!) Similarly the language of ‘rights’ is even more important than it was twenty years ago, but then the United Kingdom had no Human Rights Act, and its court structure was much less amenable to ‘judicial review’. These are highly technical areas, as well as highly emotive ones, and clarity helps avoid emotiveness getting in the way of serious policy. Politics as an art (an indefinable art—there is no entry just on ‘politics’), and political science as a discipline, are overwhelmingly about words, shades of meaning, ideological linkages neither grammatically nor logically determined. Though she was talking of something else, the poet Elizabeth Jennings has the lines:

Since clarity suggests simplicity,
And since the simple thing is here inapt
We choose obscurities of tongue and touch,
The darker side of language,
Hinted at in conversations close to quarrel,
Conceived within the mind in aftermaths.

This dictionary is meant to penetrate some of the darkness, to reduce obscurity, to make the conversations less quarrelsome.

Some advice may be useful on using this book. Cross references are to be found in most entries, indicated in bold type. These are of two main sorts. The more obvious is where I use, in one entry, a word or concept which has an entry of its own elsewhere, and where a full understanding of the subject of the main entry requires an understanding of the highlighted entry. For example, the entry on Bentham refers to his views on **representative democracy** and the bold type thus indicates that there is a separate entry dealing with this concept. Other cross references are based on the idea that a reader interested in X is likely, independently, to be interested in Y, which has just been mentioned in passing, and should be informed that there is an entry on Y. Despite this, each entry is designed to be as self-contained as possible. Words in the title of an entry, may not correspond exactly to the words a reader has picked up and been curious about, but a little searching around should help. It might be said that the book has been designed and written with one eye to the fact that many people actually *enjoy reading reference books* and thus browsers are an important category of reader.

A book this long in print, after three editions, presents, finally, a tactical question about who the author should thank. Tact makes it imperative to decide whether to thank, truthfully, hundreds of people, or to go for simplicity and ignore them all. With two exceptions I opt for ignoring everyone, at least in

Preface

public. Paul Kelly, my editor—though he is much grander in the world of publishing now than when he started work on this book—remains that as well, has become almost a co-author, and I continue to grow in my gratitude and respect. Secondly the last preface mentioned a two-year-old who had eaten some of the drafts. She is now 12, and brings me political news. Perhaps I should have emulated her approach. Was not her summary of the first round of the recent French Presidential elections all that needed saying? ‘Oh Daddy, someone odd came second and people are crying in Paris.’ Perhaps I *have* emulated this approach—certainly I share her judgment of the ephemeral and have sought to follow it in selecting material. Or is it her four-year-old sister who cannot be bothered even to *eat* my work who should be emulated? My love to them, to my wife, and to my three older children to whom this book remains dedicated.

*David Robertson,
Oxford,
June 2002*

Abortion

Abortion is a politically controversial issue in many Western countries, mainly because it clashes with some Christian teachings on the sanctity of life. In the past, by contrast, some communist societies had made abortion so easy that, in the Soviet Union, for example, it was close to being the main method of birth control. It is still extensively, and often compulsorily, practised in the People's Republic of China. The controversy revolves around two issues: the first is one of **natural rights**, of a woman to decide whether she wants to give birth, and of an unborn child to have life; the second concerns the level of church interference in state policies. Although **Roman Catholicism** is often seen as having the most firm teachings against abortion, **anti-clerical** sentiments have usually predominated in Europe, so that even Italy has a fairly liberal abortion policy. Ireland, by contrast, with a tradition of state subservience to the church on matters of private morality, still denies abortion in most circumstances. The legalization of abortion more or less 'on demand' in Britain, in 1968, was relatively uncontroversial, being carried out by a private member's bill, with all parties allowing their members a free vote; subsequent attempts to reverse or substantially modify abortion legislation have been unsuccessful.

It is in the USA that abortion has been the most explosive political issue. Until 1974 there was no federal law on abortion, the issue being treated, as are most matters of private behaviour, as falling under the jurisdiction of the individual states, with consequent variation of policy throughout the country. In 1973 the Supreme Court, in its *Roe v. Wade* decision, ruled that the states could only regulate abortion in limited ways, depending mainly on the stage of pregnancy at which a woman sought an abortion. Arguments over the viability of a foetus have become more problematic since the ruling, as medical science continually lowers the age at which an infant might realistically hope to survive, and consequently also at which the states might seek to intervene. Both the Catholic Church and the increasingly politically-important Protestant **fundamentalist** movements have opposed the *Roe v. Wade* decision ever since, sometimes in violent ways. Anti-abortionists are particularly prominent in **new right** politics, but are present right across the political spectrum.

Candidates for electoral office have increasingly come under pressure to take a public stand on abortion from pressure groups on either side, and some state governments have continued to try to exceed the *Roe v. Wade* limits on state intervention. As the Supreme Court became more conservative over the years, as the result of appointments by more right-wing presidents, the liberal intentions of the Supreme Court's 1973 decision have been increasingly restricted in later rulings, but the basic principle has never been overturned. The issue has become important in the new democratic republics of Eastern Europe, and the **constitutional courts** of countries like Hungary have gone to great pains to find a balance between protecting women's rights and allowing the new governments to interfere without restrictions. Ireland apart, Germany is the only country in which a constitutional court has taken a firm anti-abortion position as a matter of outright principle, but even there abortion is relatively easily obtained. Islamic societies share much the same attitude as that of Christian pressure groups in the West, and abortion is largely banned.

Absolutism

Absolutism describes a political theory which became popular during the 17th century, its main theorists being Bodin (c. 1530–96) and **Hobbes**. An absolutist system is one in which there is no limitation on what a legitimate government may legally do, where authority is absolute and unchecked. This is not to say that a legitimate government can do anything whatsoever and get away with it, but rather an assertion that a duly constituted government has a right to absolute authority.

If, as some constitutional experts do, one takes the view that 'the Crown in Parliament' is a single entity, then the United Kingdom has an 'absolute' government. The USA is not absolutist because Congress and the presidency can check each other, and because the constitution prohibits certain executive and legislative acts. The UK has no effective **bill of rights** and no **separation of powers**, and so its government could be described as unlimited and therefore absolutist. However, recent developments, especially the UK's entry into the **European Union**, may have started a process of legal limitation on central government autonomy.

Another approach to absolutism is to ask whether the general ideology or justification to which the government owes its power imposes any limits on the use of that power. One might argue, with **Locke**, that as all rule is based on the consent of the governed, there cannot be unlimited, and therefore absolute, government. Other theories, especially some versions of Hobbesianism, would deny that citizens can regulate government, which must therefore be legitimate and absolutist.

In practice, the reasons for justifying absolutism tend to be fear of the instability that might be caused by having more than one source of authority, or the use of a justifying theory (**theocracy** or **Marxism**, for example), in which rival views cannot be tolerated and some body or group has the absolute right to determine truth. Absolutism does not refer to the content of the laws, which could, in principle, be few and extremely liberal.

Accountability

Accountability in the modern state has two major meanings, which overlap. Firstly there is the standard meaning, common in democracies, that those who exercise power, whether as governments, as elected representatives or as appointed officials, are in a sense stewards and must be able to show that they have exercised their powers and discharged their duties properly. Secondly, accountability may refer to the arrangements made for securing conformity between the values of a delegating body and the person or persons to whom powers and responsibilities are delegated. Thus in the United Kingdom the government is said to be accountable to Parliament in the sense that it must answer questions about its policies and may ultimately be repudiated by Parliament. In 1979, for example, the Labour government headed by James Callaghan was defeated by a majority of one in a vote of no **confidence**, precipitating a general election. In the UK the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (popularly known as the **Ombudsman**) is thought to have improved the accountability of the administration by the scrutiny of administrative methods and inquiries into complaints against government departments. Ultimately, of course, governments in democracies are accountable to the people through the mechanism of elections.

Accountability is not confined to democratic forms of government, although it is in democracies that demands for greater accountability are generally heard. Any delegation of power will usually carry with it a requirement to report on how that power is exercised, and any institution seen as having power may be required to justify its operations to a superior authority. Thus it would be possible to speak of a **dictatorship** or of a **totalitarian** regime making the press, the universities or the trade union movement accountable to the government. With an increased interest in **human rights** and **democracy** throughout the world, and especially in the new Eastern European democracies, electorates desire accountability more than ever. It is often linked with the idea of 'transparency' in government, the ability to know exactly what elected officials are doing.

Additional Member System

The concern that systems of **proportional representation** can weaken the links of **representative democracy** between voters and legislators can be allayed by the additional member system, a version of which is used in Germany. Effectively, two sorts of candidates are elected. There are single-member constituencies in which candidates are elected either by a simple plurality system (see **voting systems**), or one of its modifications like the **second ballot** or **alternative vote** system. But in addition a number of parliamentary seats are not allocated to constituencies. These are allotted to parties according to the total number of votes they have received across all the constituencies, and bring their representation nearer to a fair proportion of all votes cast. How proportionate the system is depends on parameters such as the number of additional seats, and how they are allotted. The German system has equal numbers of seats of the two sorts, but a country would be free to set aside only a small number of additional seats, and thus to modify the initial constituency-based results only marginally. As in the example of Germany, it is also possible to set a minimum level of support, perhaps 5%, before a party is awarded seats. Commissions examining the idea of proportional representation for the United Kingdom usually favour some version of the additional member system. Probably the fairest version is to require voters to cast two votes, as in Germany, one for the individual representative which they prefer in their constituency, and one for the **party list** they prefer. This allows a voter to select on both personal grounds for their constituency, and for the overall party list which they prefer—the two votes can thus be split between parties. A version of this system was recommended for use in the United Kingdom in the report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System (the Jenkins Report of 1998).

Administration

This term may be used in a number of senses and the meanings are frequently blurred. It may refer simply to the political part of the **executive** branch and it is frequently so used in the USA, as in ‘the Bush administration’; this usage is becoming more common in the United Kingdom. In some countries where a sharper distinction is drawn between politicians and civil servants, the word may describe the **civil service** or **bureaucracy** alone; this is also common usage in the UK. The term also relates to the process of implementing decisions and organizing the government of a country, as in the administration of quasi-governmental agencies, nationalized industries and local authorities.

In recent years both active politicians and political scientists have become concerned with the problem of governmental overload and the inefficiencies which result from an executive which has too many responsibilities. One

solution which seemed possible for a time in the UK was **devolution**. A solution attempted under **Thatcherism**, apart from general **privatization**, was to allocate many functions of government to independent administrative agencies directly accountable to parliament.

In the USA the problem has to some extent been tackled by deregulation, which involves strict reviews of government rules and orders, and efforts to reduce or even remove government intervention and control. Other questions which arise in relation to administration are whether the administrative corps is either competent (see **maladministration**) or socially representative enough, and whether the administration can be effectively controlled by the politicians (see **accountability**).

Administrative Courts

Administrative courts comprise a distinct system of courts which exist to implement and develop public as opposed to private law, and which handle disputes in which the state is a party or has an interest. Many English jurists, such as A. V. Dicey (1835–1922), once considered administrative courts inimical to traditional ideas of liberty, assuming that they would apply standards unduly favourable to authority. More recently, however, opinion has tended to favour the establishment of such courts, partly because of the rapid extension of governmental activity (in, for example, the **welfare state**) and partly because a need has been felt for distinct principles of law which can be applied to protect the individual when coming into contact with governmental authority. It is still largely true that the **common law** jurisdictions have less clear and less powerful administrative courts than the **civil law** countries. Nothing exists in the USA or the United Kingdom, for example, with the authority and independence of the French Conseil d'Etat. Indeed, the **administrative law** judges in the USA are often seen, just as Dicey feared, to be clearly under the control of the government departments whose work they are supposed to regulate. In practice the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court has for a long time operated as an administrative court in the UK, specializing in such issues as appeals against the immigration service, and any of the multiplicity of **tribunals**. Nevertheless, the UK has no 'court of first instance' that operates purely for administrative law matters, and the legal rules applied in administrative law cases are developed from common law, rather than being seen as a distinct branch of law. This position is already changing with the implementation of the **Human Rights Act** (1998) and the impact of European ideas about public law coming from both the European Court of Human Rights and the **European Court of Justice**.

Administrative Élites

All countries need some sort of apolitical professional administrative group to carry out the policies proposed by the government and legitimized by the parliament (or whatever bodies carry out these functions). These administrative bodies are generally referred to as a **civil service** or **bureaucracy**, and usually employ a large number of people, although the boundaries of which state functions are seen as carried out by civil servants vary—in France and Germany schoolteachers and the police are included, but in the United Kingdom they are not. Most state employees purely carry out the job of applying government policy, but at the top of each civil service is a small body of highly-educated and talented administrators who do much more than administer. They advise their political superiors and often have as much influence over the shape of policy as government ministers. This group, the administrative élite, is small, in the UK numbering perhaps only 3,000 out of a civil service of millions.

Although all countries have such a body, the extent to which it is a real élite of talent and training, as compared to the élites in business, education, the media and so on varies enormously, largely as a consequence of both the social status and financial rewards of taking the posts. In the UK and France these higher status civil servants have traditionally been a real élite, the best graduates from the most respected universities. In France, for example, the graduates from the *École Nationale d'Administration*, called the 'énarques', are socially, intellectually and ultimately financially comparable with the graduates of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in the USA, while in the UK a disproportionate number of entrants into the upper reaches of the civil service still come from the universities of Oxford and Cambridge and, while the considerable financial rewards may not match the highest business salaries, a secure career and privileged position of influence and power is guaranteed. In some countries, however, a public service career is much less attractive. In the USA, for example, very few graduates of the leading universities join the federal or state civil services, partly because the positions with real influence are political appointments, changing with each administration (only about half of all ambassadorships, for example, go to career foreign service officers). In other countries the public esteem of government functionaries is so low that the talented prefer to make their way in the professions or in commerce. In Italy, for example, both the pay and status of the public administration is so poor that incompetence and inertia in public administration continues to be a major cause of the country's political problems (see **Italian Second Republic**). Where senior administrators are less genuinely élite they still exercise great power, but typically in a restrictive way through the insistence on formalities.

In all countries, however, the presence of a small group of powerful and secure civil servants, which may have developed their own set of priorities, can

make it very difficult to get a political decision implemented exactly as the government had intended. There are various systems, the French ministerial cabinet or the British political adviser being examples, to try and circumvent such an administrative élite.

Administrative Law

Administrative law is the legal code, or set of rules and precedents, governing relations between the individual citizen and the state. Many such interactions, for example a contractual dispute between the administration and a company supplying it services, naturally fall within ordinary **civil law**, but even in cases like this there may be special rules that would not apply in a conflict between two private companies. The extent to which administrative law is distinct from national civil law, and the mechanisms for handling disputes vary widely (see **administrative courts**). It is important to distinguish between administrative law and constitutional law because the former never deals with the legitimacy of legislation *per se*, but with that of administrative acts carried out under legislation. For this reason the central concept in all administrative law systems is that which is called in England the *ultra vires* doctrine. This is the process whereby a court decides whether or not a bureaucrat or minister is actually empowered to do something for which they claim to have statutory authority. Although it may seem a very obvious and simple question, modern legislation grants so much discretionary power to a government that it can be extremely difficult to decide whether or not the discretion was used as the framers of the legislation intended. The main contrast between European 'code law' countries and the **common law** world in administrative law concerns the extent to which a court will overrule an administrative act because the action itself is thought wrong, excessive or unfair, or will only overrule where it is procedurally improper. At least until recently, common law courts have tended sharply towards the latter position, while code law systems have allowed more substantive judgments. This latter position is likely to emerge in the United Kingdom as a result of the enactment of the **Human Rights Act**.

Affirmative Action

Affirmative action, also referred to as positive and reverse discrimination, describes the deliberate policy of giving preferential treatment to some groups in a society on the grounds that they have hitherto been disadvantaged either by governmental policies or as a result of popular prejudice. It has been used to help ethnic minorities and women (see **feminism**), and it is sometimes suggested that it should be used to help other kinds of minorities, for example **homosexuals** or the handicapped. The idea has been most extensively

translated into public policy in the USA, where the executive has encouraged the hiring and advancement of minorities by requiring, *inter alia*, that all organizations which have contracts with the federal government employ a given percentage of people belonging to a minority group. A policy of affirmative action has proved extremely controversial in relation to university and graduate school admissions, and one of the most celebrated constitutional cases of recent years (*Bakke v. Regents of the University of California*, 1978) set limits to the extent to which the policy could be used. Some US Supreme Court decisions of the late 1980s and early 1990s were clearly intended to limit the possibilities for affirmative action. At the same time, European law, especially under the influence of the **European Court of Justice**, was beginning to constrain discrimination, and may lead to a more positive approach along the lines of affirmative action.

Afghan War

After the creation of the independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947, Afghan foreign policy was dominated by close relations with the Soviet Union and tension with Pakistan, the latter caused by territorial disputes over Pashtun tribal lands on Pakistan's north-west frontier. In April 1978 the Afghan dictator Lt-Gen. Muhammad Daud (who had been prime minister between 1953 and 1963, and had overthrown the monarchy, although he was himself a member of the royal family, in 1973) was killed in a military **coup d'état**. The communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan took power, but, paradoxically, relations with the Soviet Union became strained as the revolutionary regime became increasingly torn by factional disputes and its inability to suppress the rebellion in the provinces led by the Muslim *Mujahidin* **guerrilla** forces. In December 1979, with the support of Soviet armed forces, the Afghan president, Hafizullah Amin, was killed in a further coup d'état, and replaced by Babrak Karmal.

During the 1980s the civil war between the Afghan army (heavily supported by the Soviet army) and the *Mujahidin* rebels (supported by Pakistan, over whose border they could take refuge, and covertly but massively by the USA, who supplied arms) escalated. The Soviet Union, technically 'invited' to assist the Afghan army by Karmal, quickly became embroiled in what has frequently been described as its equivalent to the USA's **Vietnam War**. As in Vietnam the invading **superpower** was able to control the cities, but lost control of most of the countryside, and especially of the mountainous regions. The tactics applied were very similar, involving search and destroy missions and the emplacement of heavily defended outposts from which the Soviet troops could only venture at great risk.

The war seriously affected relations between the Soviet Union and the USA, making it impossible for President Jimmy Carter to obtain Senate ratification for the **SALT II** treaty, and contributing to a breakdown in the **détente** which had characterized most of the 1970s. The war dragged on in stalemate until 1989 when President Mikhail **Gorbachev** finally withdrew the last Soviet troops. As in Vietnam for the first few years after American withdrawal, the situation remained much the same. The pro-Soviet government, still very heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for supplies, continued to control some areas with their own troops, but had to accept that the various guerrilla bands could defy them throughout most of the provinces. Soviet involvement in the war was deeply unpopular in the Soviet Union, being fought largely by conscripts among whom there were many casualties, but it ended not so much because of popular discontent but because the military and financial drain on the Soviet Union was too great to be continued. Furthermore, the fear of Islamic **fundamentalism** spreading from Iran through Afghanistan and into the southern Soviet republics seemed to subside with the beginnings of moderation in Iranian politics in the late 1980s.

In 1991 the Soviet Union and the USA pledged to stop supplying arms to the combatants in the civil war. Eventually, and after the final demise of the Soviet Union itself, the communist regime in Afghanistan fell in 1992. However, civil war continued, but now between rival factions of the ever disparate *Mujahidin*. Peace of a sort was enforced in 1996, when a Pashtun-dominated Islamic fundamentalist group, the **Taliban**, largely created by Pakistani military intelligence, took control of two-thirds of the country and enforced a repressive version of Islamic law (see **Shari'a**). They were never able to eradicate opposition completely, however, and resistance remained strong in the north. After numerous international condemnations of their conduct, the Taliban were eventually defeated by a combination of US-led bombing raids and troop advances by the disparate *Mujahidin*-based Northern Alliance, following the beginning of the so-called 'War on Terrorism' in October 2001 (the Taliban were sympathetic to the aims of Osama bin Laden, the Islamist militant who was believed to have ordered the attacks on the USA in September from a base in Afghanistan). The broad-based government installed to replace the Taliban brought some peace to the country, although its effectiveness in controlling the whole of Afghanistan remained open to question in 2002.

Agrarian Parties

Agrarian parties are political parties chiefly representing the interests of peasants or, more broadly, the rural sector of society. The extent to which they are important, or whether they even exist, depends mainly on two factors.

One, obviously, is the size of an identifiable peasantry, or the size of the rural relative to the urban population. The other is a matter of social integration: for agrarian parties to be important, the representation of countryside or peasantry must not be integrated with the other major sections of society. Thus a country might possess a sizeable rural population, but have an economic system in which the interests of the voters were predominantly related to their incomes, not to their occupations or location; and in such a country the political system would be unlikely to include an important agrarian party. As agriculture has come to employ a progressively smaller percentage of Western populations, which concurrently become ever more urbanized, this sort of political party has tended either to decline in importance or to broaden its appeal by shifts in its policies. The politics of the **Third Republic** in France were, to a large extent, based on an urban/rural **cleavage** leading to at least semi-agrarian parties. These declined rapidly in the **Fourth Republic** and **Fifth Republic** as the predominantly rural population turned into a predominantly urban one. Similarly, the importance of agrarian parties in Scandinavian party systems, once great, has declined.

In some countries, for example the USA, separate agrarian parties do not exist because loose party structures have permitted the existence of identifiably agrarian wings within parties, developed around other cleavages. (However, in the 1880–1910 period some US states did have specific farmers' parties, and the Democratic Party in the state of Minnesota is still known as the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party.)

Some commentators think that agrarian parties may return to prominence as less developed economies integrate with highly urbanized economies in organizations like the **European Union**. Several agrarian parties were formed, or revived, in the new multi-party democracies of Eastern Europe, reflecting the larger agricultural labour forces and the relative lack of advanced methods in those countries. Because agrarian interests tend to come into conflict with more general economic policy, for example on questions of tariff levels and **free trade**, the agrarian vote cannot be disregarded by governments. On a global level, the problem of integrating primary producers with the largely tertiary economic sectors of advanced societies is becoming acute, as witnessed by problems in the **GATT** and **World Trade Organization** negotiations.

Aid to the Civil Power

This phrase is used to describe the role of the military in the United Kingdom when called upon by the government to help out in some domestic emergency. Such situations range along a spectrum from entirely peaceful to being close to civil war. At one end can be essentially humanitarian actions, as in providing emergency relief after a natural disaster. Somewhat in-between are

the occasional uses of troops when **strikes** stop essential public services such as the ambulance or fire brigade services. A more controversial case, which has sometimes been threatened by the government, would be the sending in of troops to run prisons during a prison officers' strike. The most serious cases, rare in recent history in mainland Britain, are when troops are used to back up **police** in controlling public disorder; the most celebrated example of this was during the General Strike of 1926. These situations are intensely disliked by the military because of the strains of loyalty placed on troops who may be ordered to fire on civilians with whom they have great sympathy. Aid to the civil power differs from **martial law** in that the civilian authorities retain legal control. The troops operate under instruction from civilian officials, most usually a senior police officer, and their conduct is regulated by ordinary civil and criminal law. Thus an officer might, for example, be charged with murder after giving an order to fire when it was later judged that a lesser degree of force would have sufficed. The long-term use of the army to assist in policing Northern Ireland is, in most respects, an example of troops being used in aid of the civil power, though with somewhat more autonomy from civilian instruction than is usual (see **IRA**).

AIDS

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), which is caused by contracting the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), was first recognized as a major problem in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It has become an important political issue in the USA and, to a lesser extent, in Europe for several reasons. Firstly, if some of the predictions of its likely rate of increase are true, AIDS will present an enormous strain on health service resources within a few years. Not only will the number of cases be very large, but the length of hospital care before eventual death, and the need for extreme caution to avoid infection, makes AIDS patients unusually expensive to treat. Secondly, fear of AIDS has led to demands for very intrusive testing and quarantine measures which are offensive in various degrees to many conceptions of **civil liberties**. All of these factors would apply whatever the cause of the disease. However, because AIDS is primarily a sexually contracted disease, and has disproportionately affected the male **homosexual** community, it has highlighted the ever ambiguous state of tolerance for alternative life styles. While some right-wing elements use the fear of AIDS to attack the legal tolerance of homosexuality, homosexuals themselves argue that governments would have been far more positive in dealing with the crisis were it more common among heterosexuals. Many policies to combat the spread of AIDS, as for example providing free hypodermic needles to drug users and urging the use of condoms, or even providing

them to adolescents, immediately trigger deeply held conservative instincts among sectors of society. There is felt to be a pressing need, especially in the USA, for legal enforcement of **civil rights** to those who, being known to be HIV positive or an AIDS sufferer, experience wide ranging **discrimination** at all levels of society, but with most practical significance from institutions such as insurance companies.

In some African countries, South Africa being a particular example, the pervasiveness of infection with HIV is far worse than in the USA and other Western countries, and the proportion of heterosexuals among those infected is far greater. Here, however, the level of treatment and the attempts at prevention are far less, and the social and economic consequences perhaps far worse.

Alienation

Alienation is a very widely, and loosely, used concept, which originates in its modern form with **Marx**, although he took the term from **Hegel**, and a similar usage can be found in **Rousseau**. In modern sociological analysis it has much in common with the Durkheimian concept of **anomie**. It is helpful to take an etymological approach in trying to define this important but sometimes obscure concept. In legal terms 'alienation' means giving up rights in property; analogously, political philosophers have used 'inalienable rights' to mean those rights which cannot be given up, and cannot ever legitimately be taken away. But the derivation, from alien, suggesting something other, foreign, distant, is also helpful.

For Marx, alienation is a condition occurring in pre-socialist societies, where the human nature of man is made other than, alien to, what man is really capable of being. This is also the sense in which Rousseau used it, though his view was that contemporary society had made man other, and more corrupt, than had once been so. Marx had a sophisticated theory of alienation, especially as it occurred in **capitalism**. People could be alienated firstly from their own selves (i.e. from their true nature), secondly from other people (absence of natural **fraternity**), thirdly from their working life (because it was meaningless and involved 'alienating', in a legal sense, their labour for the benefit of others), and fourthly from the product of their labour (because most industrial workers do not have the satisfaction of designing and creating an entire product through the exercise of their skills). All of these are interconnected, and for Marx they all stem from the capitalist productive system, and especially from its practice of **division of labour**.

This stress on human nature, and on the way in which man is turned into a wage slave, without respect for self, fellows or daily work, is much weakened in

the later and more economics-oriented work of Marx, but it has continued to be of vital interest and importance in social thought generally. It has often been applied far too loosely so that alienation frequently means no more than unhappiness; but some new applications are obviously legitimate extensions of Marx's usage, as when feminists argue that capitalist society, as part of its generally dehumanizing effect, alienates men from women. However, there are serious objections to the concept of alienation. Firstly, though Marx's writing is often highly persuasive in regard to the existence of the phenomenon, many critics hold that alienation is created by the division of labour endemic to any high-technology economy (perhaps even by the very nature of such economies) rather than by a particular system of property rights; and if this is so, alienation will remain a problem even under fully-developed **communism**. Secondly, the concept of alienation relies on the unprovable idea that a basic or true human nature exists. From a philosophical point of view the concept would be useful only if it could be shown (a) that man really would have certain characteristics under a different system, and (b) that these are in some sense 'natural'. Yet Marxists, and most others who make use of the concept, are strongly opposed to the idea that any basic human nature exists independently of social reality. Despite such problems, the concept retains its vigour and is widely used in social analysis.

Alternative Vote

The alternative vote is probably the simplest of all forms of **proportional representation**, though as a result it is not very proportional. It works by asking each voter to order their preferences among candidates. A candidate receiving a majority of first preferences is elected, giving the same result as under the plurality system (see **voting systems**). If no candidate gains a majority of first preferences, the least successful candidate is eliminated and the second preferences of their supporters allocated and added to the initial totals. If there is still no candidate with a majority of the new sum of first and second preferences, this procedure continues for as many rounds as are required to produce one. This system does help to increase the representation of parties which typically come second in seats where no majority occurs, but large degrees of misrepresentation can still survive. This method is, in fact, a simpler and automatic version of the **second ballot** system, though it is capable of modification in various ways. One sensible modification is to exclude not the candidate with least first preferences, but the candidate with most last preferences. This avoids the anomaly that a candidate who was every voter's second choice, and no voter's first choice, cannot be elected in the ordinary alternative vote system, because they will be eliminated after the first round.

Amendment

An amendment is a change made to a bill, law, constitutional provision or regulation. The process of making such a change is also known as amendment. The provisions of some **constitutions** make constitutional amendment especially difficult, and these are known as entrenched constitutions. In some legal systems certain laws are thought to be of peculiar importance and are similarly protected—for example, laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of religion or other basic liberties. Where a constitution has been altered or supplemented, the amendments may become almost as important as the original text. This is the case in the USA, where the first ten amendments to the Constitution are collectively known as the **Bill of Rights**. They were ratified in 1791 and have since proved a major instrument for the protection of individual freedom in the USA as well as providing models for other countries. Of particular note because they have passed into the general political vocabulary are the First Amendment, guaranteeing freedom of speech, religion and thought, and the Fifth Amendment, which grants the individual protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings. The most important aspect of the Fifth Amendment is its guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without proper legal process (see **due process**); further guarantees are secured under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Since 1954 the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution has been used by the Supreme Court to promote both procedural and substantive equality in the USA in a way which has also served as a model for other jurisdictions (see **equal protection**).

Where ordinary rather than constitutional laws are concerned, the general assumption is that the stronger the **executive** and the weaker the **legislature**, the less likely are amendments offered in the latter to be successful. Thus in the French **Fifth Republic** it is rare for bills to be changed significantly during their passage through the National Assembly. In Britain, when the government has a working majority, amendments of substance are also rare, although the combined pressure of government back-benchers and opposition parties can sometimes lead to successful amendments.

Amnesty International

Amnesty International is pre-eminent among the many **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs) operating in the field of human rights. It was founded in 1961 by a British lawyer, Peter Benenson (1921–), principally to work for the release of ‘prisoners of conscience’ and political prisoners, the latter defined by Amnesty to mean those imprisoned for daring to state politically unpopular beliefs, provided they have neither practised nor advocated violence. Its original technique was to encourage the mass writing of letters to such people,

in part to bring comfort, but mainly to expose regimes practising such repression to international public opinion. More recently it has broadened both its range of concerns and its strategies, and has built a large and complex organization world-wide.

Amnesty's concerns now cover opposition to the death penalty, all forms of torture, the use of landmines in warfare and the general problems of refugee women and children. It even campaigns against female genital mutilation as a private rather than state practice. Similarly some of its definitions have widened, so that, for example, people imprisoned for homosexuality are now considered as political prisoners.

The original techniques of letter writing and petitions by individual members still continue, but Amnesty's international reputation has been established largely through its research activities. Where possible, teams of experts visit countries and write reports on the behaviour of the state. These reports have always been subject to scrupulous standards of verifiability and accuracy, and are widely recognized as reliable evidence. They have, for example, been relied on by courts dealing with political asylum cases, and in such cases are often regarded as more reliable than analyses by governments. In an attempt to keep itself strictly outside politics, traditionally, Amnesty has not lobbied national governments, but increasingly it lobbies and is taken seriously by international organizations such as the **United Nations (UN)**, the Council of Europe and the **European Union**. This independence means that it has to rely for funding on its very large international membership and general charitable collection, a reliance which has helped it build a large network world-wide. The respect in which Amnesty is held internationally was symbolized by it being awarded the Nobel Peace prize as early as 1977. An example of this respect was the British Law Lords allowing it to act as *amicus curiae* (literally, 'a friend of the court') during hearings related to the attempted extradition to Spain of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in 1999.

Anarchism

Anarchism is a political theory based on two propositions: that society does not need government, and that no government is legitimate unless truly, and in detail, consented to by the individuals governed. Its history is long and confused, and the other political attitudes held by anarchists have ranged from far right to far left in the political spectrum. The common denominator of anarchists is an alienation from the existing structures of government and society.

The earliest serious anarchist thinkers were 19th-century writers such as Proudhon (1809–65) and the French theoreticians of **syndicalism**, who began to develop ideas about founding a society without government. How-

ever, anarchist elements can be found in many social theorists. One good example is **Marx**, whose doctrine that the **state** will 'wither away' under **communism** has clear affinities with anarchist goals.

Theoretically, anarchism rests on the moral assumption that freedom is an absolute value and that no one should ever be obliged to obey authority without having freely consented to do so. Empirically it rests on a set of assumptions about the possibility of organizing genuine voluntary associations dedicated to co-operative work and mutual aid. These assumptions seem more plausible where no great degree of industrial sophistication is involved, and there has often been a rather idealistic aura of peaceful rurality about anarchist theories.

Despite this there are important connections between anarchist theory and the more general theories recommending **direct democracy** and **industrial democracy**. The sort of commitments to extreme egalitarianism and total liberty that characterize anarchism have been taken over by radical socialist and Marxist groups, or, in more moderate versions, by exponents of industrial democracy. Anarchism of a form has had a re-birth at the beginning of the 21st century as political activists in many Western countries have begun to demonstrate against **globalization** and **capitalism**, often using violent means. Much of the opposition is clearly anarchist in that it does not urge the creation of some rival, perhaps a socialist, economic system, but concentrates entirely negatively on attacking the existing forms. Anarchist groups have been prominent among those involved in sometimes violent protests during several international meetings of government leaders.

Anarcho-Syndicalism (see Syndicalism)

Anomie

Anomie is a sociological concept, originated by **Durkheim**, similar in scope to **Marx's** concept of **alienation**. Anomie is held to be present in a society where normative regulation, the common acceptance of value and rules, is weak, and it consists of feelings of individual isolation, loneliness and meaninglessness that manifest themselves in social disorder. Though there are many technical definitions, both by Durkheim and in later works, the basic meaning of anomie is contained in one of Durkheim's more poetic descriptions: it is 'the malady of infinite aspiration'. What Durkheim meant was that modern industrial society, which sometimes seems to lack any moral or ethical basis beyond **utilitarianism** or arguments based on rational expectation, cannot offer anyone a reason for not doing, or trying to get, anything they want, although ever-growing personal appetites cannot ultimately be satisfied. To

Durkheim this state of affairs was the result of the Industrial Revolution, which broke down the traditional pattern of existence that bound men together closely through deeply accepted cultural norms (see **corporatism**). The concept can be used to explain unrest and dissatisfaction in any sort of social system, though it is often used either loosely or even tautologously (for example, to mean no more than a state of lawlessness, despite the fact that the term is actually intended to explain the lawlessness). One may question the validity of Durkheim's contrast between anomic industrial societies and traditional societies where the malady is absent because all know and accept their role; but the concept of anomie itself, if used with care, can be illuminating.

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

As part of the **SALT I** process the USA and the Soviet Union negotiated an agreement severely restricting their entitlement to deploy missile systems intended to defend either centres of population or their own **ICBM** sites by shooting down incoming strategic missiles. This, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, also restricted the provision of radar systems intended for use with such defensive screens, and limited the testing of new forms of defence against ballistic missiles. The treaty was relatively easy to negotiate because, though both sides had begun to build and deploy such systems, it was widely agreed that any effective defence system against ballistic missiles would certainly be fantastically expensive to develop, and would be of very dubious reliability even if built. It was a classic example of an arms control agreement forbidding something no one really wanted, but which, if one side went ahead and tried to build it, the other would be forced to follow suit. The ABM Treaty was not only adhered to, but neither side even deployed all that they were allowed to. This situation, however, broke down when the US President Ronald Reagan decided to invest in the hugely expensive, and technologically nearly impossible, Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, popularly known as Star Wars (see also **Son of Star Wars**). It seems, with hindsight, that his decision perhaps had more to do with putting strain on the Soviet economy, even less able to bear the costs of such a scheme, and with forcing the Soviet Union into a negotiating position on reduction of strategic weapons, than with a serious intent to build what many experts thought impossible. The ABM Treaty was, at least, strained by the research into the SDI. Actually to deploy Star Wars weapons would certainly have been a major breach of the agreement, but it was widely interpreted that even testing the components was outlawed.

After the end of the cold war public attention drifted away from ballistic missile defence. Funding was reduced during the Clinton administrations

(1993–2001), and the research focus shifted to more modest systems which could track and destroy a few missiles launched by a terrorist organization or ‘rogue state’, and responsibility for strategic defence research was transferred from the SDI to the newly-created Ballistic Missile Defence Organization (BMDO). In 2001 the administration of President George W. Bush insisted that such a system be prepared for implementation, and increased funding to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), as the BMDO was re-named. The Bush presidency encountered severe international criticism, especially from Russia, but made it clear that the USA was prepared unilaterally to abrogate the Treaty, which it regarded as having no further international purpose or importance. A treaty on arms reduction signed by the US and Russian presidents in May 2002 was perceived as having superseded the ABM treaty.

Anti-Clerical

An anti-clerical political outlook is one which is strongly opposed to the churches wielding any direct political influence or power. Anti-clerical parties or politicians have had an important role in most Western societies at one time or another. Nowadays a clerical/anti-clerical **cleavage** still exists in Italy and, to a lesser extent, France. In France, during the period 1870–1958, important sections of the electorate would automatically back certain political parties because they could be relied upon to oppose any clerical influence in politics. As the principal political voice of the Roman Catholic church, the **Mouvement Républicaine Populaire**, ceased to be of influence early in the **Fifth Republic** the distinction became less vital. Other electors (nowadays especially the Christian Democrats in Italy) vote as they do precisely because they feel that churches *should* play a significant role in the state.

In general it has been **Roman Catholicism** that has been the focus of anti-clerical politics, largely because it has historically been associated with conservative values and therefore seen as supporting upper classes. In the Dutch party system, however, anti-clericalism applies to the general opposition to church influence in politics, especially since the development of inter-denominational political groupings (which was itself a sign of the declining influence of the churches in politics and society in general). As the Catholic Church has changed and, particularly in the Third World, been seen as ‘revolutionary’ and an advocate of **liberation theology**, the traditional basis for anti-clericalism has declined. The general **secularization** of modern society has further reduced concern about religious influence in the state. Thus some political parties (the German Christian Democrats, for example) have become pure conservative parties (see **conservatism**), with religious affiliation playing no role in their support or rejection. However, religious **fundamentalism** has become both stronger and politically more relevant since the 1970s, so there is

no guarantee that a form of opposition to religious involvement in politics, such as is already developing in USA, will not become important again. This opposition will probably not deserve the title of anti-clericalism as previously understood, because the fundamentalists' support is based in **populism** rather than, supposedly, the interests of the upper classes.

Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism, in political terms the discrimination against or persecution of Jews, is nowadays associated in most people's minds with **Hitler's** Germany. In fact it has a very much longer history, has had some political importance in most Western societies, and is by no means a spent force. The historical origins of anti-Semitism are complex and date back to the Middle Ages and beyond. Most European nations practised some form of discrimination against Jews, more or less intermittently and with varying degrees of clerical approval, for centuries before 19th-century anti-Semites, and later the **National Socialist** party, changed the emphasis of anti-Semitism from religious to racial hatred. To Hitler the Jews constituted an international conspiracy and exercised the real power in all the nations opposed to Germany, whether capitalist or communist.

Modern anti-Semitism is a common element in right-wing political creeds for a largely functional reason: such creeds base much of their appeal on **nationalism** and an ideal of national unity that denies the existence of important conflicts within the **nation**. It is a common feature of societies, from the level of the playground to international relations, to have a group of 'outsiders' against whom others can unite; **racism** often characterizes the selection of this group. In a political system such a group might be blamed for the social ills that might otherwise be attributed to the rulers or the social system. These reflexes can exist in both right-wing and left-wing systems, as evidenced by Nazi and Soviet anti-Semitism. Where a Christian tradition is an important part of the historic national identity, anti-Semitism is a peculiarly, if sadly, apt creed. Thus, for example, American right-wing movements such as the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan have tended to be most popular in parts of the American South where Christian **fundamentalism** is very strong; such movements have never omitted to add anti-Semitism to their anti-black stance, despite the integration of Jews into American society. From the 1980s onwards economic depression and increased **immigration**, particularly from the **Third World** and Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, led to a resurgence in support for **neo-fascism** in Europe; again, anti-Semitism was often a strong element of such political platforms, even though immigration of Jews was minimal. In the new Eastern European party systems, anti-Semitism was a feature of several right-wing nationalist parties. The **Arab-Israeli**

conflict, and anti-**Zionism** in the Arab states and elsewhere, are not primarily anti-Semitic phenomena, but it is hard to determine how much latent anti-Jewish sentiment lies behind the more objective problems of the existence of the State of Israel.

Apartheid

Apartheid was the official doctrine of the South African government, and the ruling National Party (NP), between 1948 and 1991. Meaning 'separateness', it was in practice nothing more than an excuse for domination by the white minority population of blacks and 'coloureds' (see **racism**). The word 'coloured' is used here in the South African legal sense as someone who cannot be classified as black, but is not 'purely' white. Apartheid consisted of a set of legal inequalities. Non-whites were restricted in the areas in which they could live, and had to carry 'passbooks' to prove they were entitled to enter white areas for purposes of work or whatever; this central element of apartheid was officially removed in 1986, when a uniform identity document for all races was introduced. Most publicly and privately provided facilities, from schools and transport to bathing beaches and public toilets, were racially segregated. There was, until 1985, a legal ban on marriage, and indeed extra-marital sexual intercourse, between members of different races. But above all blacks and, until 1983, coloureds, were not allowed to vote in national elections, so that there was absolutely no peaceful political route through which they could work to end apartheid. This naturally encouraged political activists into illegal channels, particularly the African National Congress (ANC) which was banned in the wake of demonstrations against the 'pass laws' in 1960, and remained so until 1990. In 1961 the ANC established a military wing, the **guerrilla** movement Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation).

As was inevitable in such circumstances, a whole set of other inequalities were perpetuated by apartheid even if they were not legally enshrined, so that on all indicators—income, job opportunities, poverty rates, health statistics, educational opportunities and attainment—the black, and to a lesser extent coloured, population was deeply exploited. After defying world opinion, and some economic pressure, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the NP government accepted the inevitability of change and began to remove the structures of apartheid. The formal legal expression of apartheid was abolished by 1991, and by 1993 multi-party negotiations on constitutional reform had been completed, with the first non-racial elections following in 1994. The NP participated in coalition governments until 1996, since when government membership has reflected the overwhelming black majority among the electorate. It will be several decades, however, before the accrued effects of inequality and racial **discrimination** evaporate.

Apparatchik

Apparatchik, properly speaking, means an employee of the *apparat*, perhaps best translated into English by the use of the modern Marxist term ‘state apparatus’, that is, any institution involved in the running of the state, whether formally part of the state or not. In the communist countries where the word was used, it meant in practice a member of the communist party who occupied an intermediate position in the bureaucracy. It is the *apparatchiki* who formed the bulk of the **new class** of **Djilas**. The term is sometimes used pejoratively of administrators and bureaucrats who bully those in their power and truckle to their superiors.

Aquinas

St Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) was one of the earliest Western thinkers to merge Aristotelian philosophy into the Christian political and philosophical heritage. Aquinas was primarily a theologian, but his writings had political significance since there was no clear-cut distinction between purely theological and political writing during the Middle Ages, when the Church was a major political and social force.

Like Aristotle, Aquinas regards **civil society**, or the political system, as a natural part of life. For Aquinas man cannot be truly human outside some sort of ordered society, and he conceives of the family as the basic political unit. (Aristotle too starts *The Politics* with an analysis of the domestic economy.) But Aquinas insists that such small units can never provide an ordered and secure social framework, and therefore sees full-scale political societies built up from the family as essential. The main purpose of such societies is to provide a framework within which man can develop his reason and moral sense, and thus come to live well and, specifically, to live as a Christian. On the all-important question of who should rule, Aquinas again follows Aristotle, arguing that though the best form of government, given the unequal reasoning powers of humans, would be a **monarchy** or **aristocracy**, these are too easily corrupted. Hence he too argues for a mixed constitution.

Aquinas’s main differences with Aristotle occur where Christian doctrines clash with pagan values. The most important area here is the definition of human nature. For Aquinas there is a crucial difference between the human nature of the Christian, influenced by baptism, and that of the pagan; and for this reason he did not expect that his political theory could be relevant to all people. Now that our culture is fully familiar with classical Greek thought, Thomism (the name for Aquinas’s doctrines) is often regarded as superfluous, although much of the political thinking of the Catholic Church even today is based on Thomist principles. Thomism, formulated at a period of increasing monarchical centralization, with its doctrine of mixed government and its stress

on reason rather than **authority**, had a radical aspect, and this is one of the reasons why Thomism remains most influential among Catholic clergy of a radical persuasion in areas such as Latin America, where elements in the Church practise **liberation theology**.

Arab–Israeli Conflict

Conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours started as soon as the **United Nations** gave the State of Israel official existence in 1948. Since then there have been three major wars, in 1956, 1967 and 1973, and a massive military intervention in Lebanon in 1982. More accurately though, there has never been a period of total peace between Israel and its neighbours since 1948, because **guerrilla** attacks by Palestinian groups and Israeli military strikes have been endemic. The original war in 1948 principally involved armed forces from Transjordan (which became Jordan in 1949), although troops from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria were also present, fighting a hastily-created Israeli military largely based on the **kibbutz** movement and the irregular armed movement that had been fighting the British (which had held a Mandate to administer Palestine since 1923). Israel extended its borders beyond those fixed by the UN as a result of this war, while the West Bank came under Jordanian control and Jerusalem was partitioned between Arab and Israeli control.

The next war, in 1956, was an invasion by Israeli forces in which they captured the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt. This war was fought as a result of a secret alliance with Britain and France, who wanted an opportunity to humiliate Egypt to force the country's president, Gamal Abd an-Nasser, to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal which had taken place earlier in the year. Israel had withdrawn from all territories occupied by early 1957, and the diplomatic losers of these incidents were clearly Israel, France and Britain, whose prime minister, Anthony Eden, was eventually obliged to resign.

In 1967 Israel was aware of an impending attack by Egypt, to be assisted by Jordan, Iraq and Syria, and won a brilliant and total victory in only six days (consequently the fighting is known as the 'Six-Day War'), largely because they launched a pre-emptive attack on the Arab air forces, effectively removing the ability of Egypt and Jordan to provide air cover for their ground troops. Israel took control of the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and, finally, the whole of Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan.

The 1973 'Yom Kippur' war, when Israel was attacked by Egypt and Syria, was vastly different. To start with the Egyptians and Syrians achieved tactical surprise, and the attacking Arab forces were much better trained and equipped. The Israelis did finally repulse the attacks, but at great cost, and in a way that

showed they could not expect easy victories in the future. The cease-fire was followed by extensive peace negotiations, led by the USA, and finally a formal peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979; this, however, led to Egypt being shunned elsewhere in the Arab world.

The wars were essentially caused by the unwillingness of Israel's neighbours to accept its legitimacy as a state at all, and were only made possible by massive military aid to Israel from the USA and to the Arab states from the Soviet Union. The basic principle of Israel's right to existence and within which borders, together with its treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and elsewhere, remain the main areas of conflict. It is improbable, however, that any further major wars will be fought between Arabs and Israelis, particularly as the end of the **cold war** and the collapse of the Soviet Union has left US influence in the **Middle East** essentially unchallenged. This was demonstrated when Iraq tried, by attacking Israel with missiles during the **Gulf War**, to raise the anti-Israel standard again, and the Arab members of the US-led United Nations action stayed loyal to the alliance. However, continual conflict with Palestinian movements (see **PLO**), will continue until a lasting settlement of these areas of dispute is achieved. Even the creation of a Palestinian National Authority in 1994, and the restricted independence given to parts of historic Palestine thereafter, has not brought peace. Continuing violence from militant Palestinian Islamist movements, and conflict over the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, have ensured that a state of tension amounting to near war continues in the area.

Arbitration

Arbitration is a method of conflict resolution which, with more or less formalized mechanisms, occurs in many political and legal spheres. There are two main characteristics to arbitration. The first is that it is a voluntary process under which two parties in conflict agree between themselves to be bound by the judgment of a third party which has no other authority over them; the judgment, however, is not legally binding. The second is that there is usually no clear body of law or set of rules that must apply; the arbitrator is free, subject to any prior agreement with the conflicting parties, to decide on whatever basis of justice is deemed suitable. Arbitration has been used successfully, for example, to decide on disputed borders between Israel and Egypt, where local history was a major part of the arbitrator's decision.

Although lacking a precise legal position, arbitration will often have a recognized place as a pre-legal procedure. For example labour relations laws in several countries make it compulsory for **trade unions** and employers to go to arbitration before a **strike** can be legal, and commercial contracts often

require arbitration before either side can sue the other. The political use of arbitration is that it can reduce tension, as well as being speedier and less formal than an orthodox court. Furthermore it is seen as less undignified to go to arbitration than to be legally forced into court, which in areas like labour relations law can be an advantage. The normal structure of an arbitral **tribunal** is to have each side appoint one or more arbitrators of its own choice, and for these two to appoint a neutral chairman, with the consequence that the chairman's view tends to dominate. The same principle applies in the International Court of Justice where, if the bench does not already contain a national from either of the contending countries, extra judges from the countries are appointed. It is through the use of arbitrators that much international private law is being built up, in the absence of a legally enforceable genuine **international law** in commercial matters, and through arbitration that a respect for basic principles in international public law is increasing.

Arendt

Hannah Arendt (1906–75) was one of the generation of German intellectuals who fled Nazi Germany and took up residence in the USA. When the Nazis took power in 1933 she initially went to live in Paris, until after the German invasion of 1940. Like many of this generation she taught in élite American universities, including the New School for Social Research in New York, along with many other émigré intellectuals. For want of a better label, she has to be characterized as a political theorist, though her major works do not fit easily into the dominant traditions of that field, and some, above all her most controversial book, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963), range far wider than political theory. In part this is because a dominant question throughout her work is precisely what 'the political' is. One of her major concerns was the way traditional political and social thought limited the range of that which is seen as political by an oversimplistic acceptance of the distinction between the **public** and **private spheres**.

Her own initial intellectual background, predominantly as a German theologian, led her to concentrate on the extensiveness of evil in modern society. For Arendt, modern society and social thought, by disaggregating individuals into different aspects of their being, and by downplaying the central idea of citizenship with its duties to others, has weakened social control against man's potential for evil. To a large extent, she argues, we are encouraged to see each other, and ourselves, as means to ends. The range of influences on her work is huge, and evokes such different thinkers as **Marx** and **Kant**. However, the most striking characteristic of her work is its insistence on looking afresh, and usually very critically, at traditional understandings. Thus one of her most

famous works, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), attacks **Rousseau**, otherwise seen as an exponent of democracy and an icon of the left since the French Revolution, as one of the sources of the 20th century's worst excesses. While many of her contemporaries, equally famous in their time, have not seemed relevant to contemporary social thought, Hannah Arendt's work, whether accepted or denounced, strikes readers as increasingly, rather than decreasingly, of concern.

Aristocracy

Aristotle defined aristocracy, one of his three types of good government (see also **monarchy** and **democracy**), as the rule of the best in the public interest, and opposed it to **oligarchy**, the rule of a few in their own interest. In reality aristocracy has always been the rule of the rich, though often justified by ideologies which argued for the moral and intellectual superiority of the rulers, and which purported to show that the rule of a small hereditary élite was in the public interest. The origins of aristocracies have varied, but two elements are usually present. Firstly, aristocracies usually derive from war leaders who, in return for allegiance and material support from a population, undertake to protect them from violence by other groups. Secondly, aristocracies usually involve a connection to land, so that the descendants of the war-lords continue to hold the estates and the allegiance of the lower orders living on them.

The surviving European aristocracy derives from **feudalism**, in which a monarch granted lands to a nobleman in return for his military support and general obedience. In turn a great noble might grant subordinate lords smaller estates from his own holdings in return for an equivalent allegiance. As the Middle Ages gave way to modernity the nature of aristocracies changed considerably, with the noble titles of earl, count and others being granted for a wide range of support to European monarchs who were actively centralizing their **nations** and ruling in a much more direct and organized way. Many hereditary peerages in Britain date only from the 17th or 18th centuries, or even later, and were more likely to have been given, in reward for a variety of services, to men already rich and landed. The continued, if minor, constitutional role of the House of Lords means that a hereditary aristocracy, rather than just a rich élite, has retained some political power, although legislation passed in 1999 removing the right to a seat in the Lords of all but 92 hereditary peers, pending a definitive reform, eroded this further. In France two orders of nobility evolved, known as the 'sword', the traditional military aristocracy, and the 'robe', granted, for example, to leading civil servants and lawyers. Aristocracies everywhere have diminished in power either through actual revolutions, as in France and Russia, or through the impact of the

Industrial Revolution, as in Britain and Germany, where the rising capitalist **bourgeoisie** and the relative decline of agriculture as a source of wealth have made them largely irrelevant to a modern state. Nevertheless, there remains a self-conscious *élite* of hereditary aristocrats, often enormously wealthy, throughout Europe, even in countries like France and Italy where the state pays no formal recognition to aristocratic titles at all.

Aristotle

Aristotle (384–322 BC) was a thinker of the classical Greek period whose political theories, like those of **Plato**, set the bounds of political discourse throughout the Middle Ages; his work still exercises a profound influence on modern political and social thought. Aristotle's political ideas are more immediately acceptable to the modern Western mind than Plato's because he comes closer to approving of **democracy**. However, even Aristotle saw **direct democracy** as the least undesirable of existing types of government, rather than as the best obtainable form. Like most Greeks of his period he would have preferred a mixed government with important elements of aristocracy intermixed with popular rule. (In this context it should be remembered that the original meaning of 'aristocracy' is 'the rule of the best', not 'the rule of the well born'.)

An important aspect of Aristotle's thought, which derives from his interest in marine biology, was his use of biological analogies in discussing social life. Following Plato, he took an essentially **functionalist** approach to social and political institutions, believing that political life, being natural, takes certain natural forms, and that individuals therefore have natural and fitting places in society from which it would be both immoral and 'dysfunctional' for them to depart. Aristotle's direct impact on European social thought began with his reinterpretation by the late medieval Catholic church and **Aquinas's** development and interpretation of his ideas into the Catholic doctrine of **natural law**, from which our modern inheritance of **natural rights** derives. Aristotelian views appear in contemporary **moral philosophy**, with special emphasis on his concern for education and the training of moral instincts.

Armies

Armies (used here, for convenience, to include military forces of all types) are among the oldest of all organized social institutions, and have a correspondingly long history of political importance. However, this apparently trivial point needs expansion. All societies have had some system for organizing

military units for temporary or long-term defensive or offensive operations. Armies in a politically important sense are, with the exception of the Roman legionary army, products of the post-medieval era. As long as a nation relies on temporary, amateur troops, its army cannot be a threat to other social and political institutions (see **citizen soldier**). As soon as a permanent, bureaucratically organized, army comes into being, with its own legitimacy and power base, it becomes a potential contender for control of the state. Thus the Roman legions came to determine who should be emperor quite early in post-Republican times.

The earliest politically important armies in the modern world included the Cromwellian army in 17th-century England and the Napoleonic armies in France. The politicians' fear of the political power of standing armies is exemplified by British and American policies in the 18th and 19th centuries. As late as 1940 the USA kept its military establishment as small as possible. Later, after the huge increase in the size of the military machine during and after the Second World War, Dwight D. Eisenhower (who had been Allied Supreme Commander in 1945), warned the USA, in his farewell address as President, in 1961, of the potential threats posed to democracy by 'the military-industrial complex'. In Britain, the army was kept firmly under the political control of the ruling classes by restricting membership of the officer corps to those who could afford to buy their commissions from the Crown—a system that survived until a series of military blunders in the Crimean War (1853–56) forced a change of policy.

Nowadays armies tend to be of most importance in the politically undeveloped countries of the Third World, where military rule is a common feature. In such countries the army usually has a near-monopoly of bureaucratically efficient and disciplined personnel, often trained in the developed countries. As civil services develop and civilian governments acquire an aura of legitimacy, the fear of military **coups d'état** will diminish and armies will become servants rather than masters of the state.

Since the end of the **cold war**, both Western and Eastern states have begun to rethink their need for military forces, and a rich theoretical debate about the nature of defence forces and the function of armies has developed. Increasingly, military force is being thought of as addressed to new targets, for example international **terrorism** and drug dealing. The development of increasingly sophisticated and expensive high-technology weapons systems tends to conflict with an increased need for large numbers of basically trained infantrymen to carry out peace-keeping and **humanitarian intervention** tasks. The role of national military forces as part of international politics, through the **United Nations** and similar organizations, is becoming more important. The problem for Western military systems is to redefine strategy away from the classic idea of a **nation state** enemy which can be invaded and defeated.

Arms Control

While the idea of disarmament has been around, presumably, since the invention of the **nation state**, arms control is a more recent concept. This is largely because only a technological society can produce weapons sufficiently distinct from civilian uses to be covered by an international agreement. Furthermore the acceptance of the thesis that war is, partially, caused by armaments is itself a relatively modern idea. Although the First and Second International Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 made gestures towards the desirability of disarmament and limiting the size of armed forces, the first treaties to specifically control armaments were those of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments of 1921–22 and the London Naval Treaties of 1930, 1935 and 1936.

Arms control can mean one or more of three things. Quantitative arms control either limits or reduces the size of a nation's military capacity by restricting the number of troops and of weapons in general. Thus the **SALT I** agreement of 1972, which set maximum levels for nuclear missiles between the USA and Soviet Union, was an example of quantitative arms control. Qualitative arms control attempts to ban or restrict entire categories of weapons, without making any limitations on what else a nation might buy or develop to defend itself. The 1987 **Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty**, which banned all ground-launched nuclear missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometres from Europe, is a recent example of such an arrangement. The quantitative/qualitative distinction dates to the **League of Nations' World Disarmament Conference** of 1932–34, when attempts were made to eradicate the most feared weapons of the day, particularly bomber aircraft and submarines.

A third meaning to arms control can best be described as **behavioural**. This involves restrictions not on what a country can own in terms of military hardware, nor on how many soldiers it can put into uniform, but on what it can *do* with its capacity. The restrictions applying in this case govern troop movements, the size of exercises, requirement of notice before military movements occur and similar measures. The idea is to reduce the possibility of war by accident, when one country's apparently belligerent activities are taken to imply a threat to another, which then begins to respond. Consequently such arms control restrictions, best exemplified by the 1986 **Stockholm Declaration**, are usually described as confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Each form of arms control has its own peculiar difficulties, but they all share two general problems. The first is technical. No treaty is of great value unless each party can be sure that the others are keeping to it, and not secretly building forbidden weapons or making covert preparations for an attack. This is known as the verification problem, and has become increasingly fraught with modern weapons technology. Agreement in 1930 in London to restrict the

numbers of warships needed no particular verification system, because heavy naval ships were impossible to hide, and normal methods of espionage were enough to keep track of what countries were doing. But verification for a treaty restricting the size of nuclear warheads that can be fitted to a missile is impossible without allowing inspection of each country's missile sites, which is difficult to grant both for reasons of national secrecy and as a matter of sovereignty. The successful arms control agreements of the post-war years have been either those that required little 'intrusive' verification, or where breakthroughs in national attitudes to such modifications of national sovereignty have occurred. The second problem with arms control is that it involves extremely hard bargaining. Most nations will only accept a deal which, in their eyes, increases their national security, and often brings associated benefits. Arms control has little to do with moral stances or international public opinion, and everything to do with saving money without increasing vulnerability or giving up some technological advantage. Such deals, where two countries are both prepared to give up a particular weapon, are rare and are likely to succeed because neither independently had much use for the weapon in the first place. It is not unknown for a country to announce plans to build some weapon entirely in order to have something they do not need to surrender in future negotiations.

The most important arms control agreements of the post-war era have been the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) treaties of 1972 and 1979, the 1972 **Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty**, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, the **Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty** of 1990 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty of 1991. It was the end of the **cold war** which largely brought an end to arms control negotiations and treaties, because neither **NATO** nor the Warsaw Treaty Organization (see **Warsaw Pact**), while it still existed, could actually afford to deploy as many weapons systems as treaties allowed. Renewed interest in ballistic missile defence on the part of the USA, however, has created the possibility of serious international disharmony over its likely abrogation of the ABM Treaty (see **Son of Star Wars**).

Arms Races

There have been arms races several times in recent history, brought about by military equipment becoming highly dependent on technology. Perhaps the first important arms race was the competition between Britain and Germany at the turn of the century to build bigger and better battleships, the 'Dreadnoughts'. The major arms race since the Second World War has been the competition between the USA and the Soviet Union to build up more

powerful nuclear weaponry, especially **ICBMs** (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), in the hope of achieving a **first strike** capacity over the enemy. In more recent times the emphasis has shifted to competition for more and more sophisticated and accurate conventional weapons; it was these weapons which gave the US-led forces in the **Gulf War** overwhelming superiority over the Iraqi forces.

The arms race is a central part of **balance of power** theory: any technological advance by one side threatens the other, which then tries to build better weapons, forcing the first mover to improve its weapons, and so on. Often a new stage in the arms race may be launched by a relatively small development; for example, circular error probable (CEP—a measure of ballistic missile accuracy) improvements by the Soviet Union led in the early 1970s to extra investments by the USA, and the development of anti-ballistic missile systems by the USA in the 1960s, although defensive in themselves, were seen as a threat to the balance of power by the Russians, who therefore increased their weapons developments still further.

At a lower level, arms races clearly happen between any group of countries with potential conflicts, one of the best recorded being that between India and Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. There is considerable theoretical confusion about arms races: it is unclear, for example, whether actual or merely potential military capacity in one country spurs another to build up its forces. Similarly, many force enhancements seem to come about simply because the available technology makes a new weapon system possible, with no reference to any supposed threat elsewhere. It may be more sensible to see arms races as just one element in the overall **threat assessment** that any nation has to make.

Assembly

An assembly is a collection of people who either directly comprise, or represent, a political or social entity. The common example of a school assembly helps to explain the concept. In this case the entire body of people, pupils and staff, who make up the social group of the school, assemble together to discuss or to hear rules, information or instructions. In a political sense assemblies are decision-making or rule-passing groups. In many cases there is no real difference between an assembly and a **parliament**, house of representatives, chamber of **deputies**, or whatever the local terminology of the political system may be. Whereas the terms parliament and **congress** can be used to refer to both houses of a bicameral system, although the meaning is more often the lower chamber which does most of the legislative work, assembly always means just the lower chamber or the single chamber in a unicameral system (see **second chamber**).

There remains a shade of difference in the implication, however. Because a full assembly (as in the school example) implies that *all* relevant people are present, calling some body an assembly implies less a meeting of representatives, perhaps with freedom of action, than a direct collection of all parties. In the **United Nations**, for example, the General Assembly contains all the member states, in contrast to the Security Council which has only a few members. The **authority** of an assembly is accordingly greater than that of a council or set of representatives. The example of the French National Assembly is to the point: the theory of direct representation of the will of the people, which permeates French democratic thought from **Rousseau** onwards, leads to a preference for thinking that elected members somehow stand in for the physical impossibility of collecting the whole population of France into a true general assembly.

Association

An association is a group of people united to pursue a common cause. The right to associate politically is fundamental to **civil liberties** because without it political activity would be largely ineffective. The rights and capacities of political associations vary considerably from one society to another (see **interest groups**).

On an international level, many countries form associations to advance their mutual interests; the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, exists to promote co-operation in that region.

Augustine

St Augustine (354–430) was the Bishop of the diocese of Hippo in North Africa, and one of the earliest systematic Christian theologians. He was certainly the first to grapple with the question of what should be the proper relationship between the **state** and the Christian religion. In discussing this he was more aware of the value of pre-Christian political philosophy than any thinker before St Thomas **Aquinas**, and much of his doctrine, where it is not specifically Christian, derives from classical political thought, especially from **Plato** and the Roman orator-writer Cicero. Like his classical forebears, Augustine stresses the ‘naturalness’ of **civil society**, which he regards as an association of men united by a common set of interests and a common sense of justice. Indeed, for Augustine, justice, which he tends to define in a rather Platonic way as the ‘ordering’ of people in their proper station and the regularizing of their relations, should be the cornerstone of society. Like many later thinkers he is in fact sceptical about human nature, and believes that this

idealized civil society is rather unlikely to occur because of man's innate wickedness. This of course reflects his Christian belief in Original Sin, rather than a view based on observation, as, for example, in the work of **Hobbes**. Nevertheless, Augustine argues that Christians will make better citizens than pagans.

Like Plato, Augustine sees it as the function of the state to enforce a moral code, but being a Christian he interprets this role in a subtly but significantly different way. For Plato, simply doing what is right is what matters. For Augustine, state coercion cannot really create good people because it can only direct their external behaviour, whereas it is the desire to be good that marks out the Christian. Politics, then, is a necessary but negative force. Hence Augustine's distinction between the 'two cities' in his most famous work, *The City of God*. The earthly city is the actual political system in which a person lives; the heavenly city is the metaphysical unity of all true Christians. The political relations between these two remain unclear. Indeed Augustine never does produce any definite theory about the proper relations between the secular and the spiritual powers in society. As a Roman citizen, and one who admired much of the past glory of Rome, he would have found this difficult. Living at a time of political collapse many of his contemporaries believed that the Christianization of the Empire had contributed to its weakness, and Augustine is therefore at pains to demonstrate that a Christian could also be a loyal and effective citizen. Had the power of the centralized Christian church been more assured at the time, and had Augustine not been so keen to use any power, secular if necessary, fighting campaigns against heresy, he might have developed a more satisfactory theory on this matter. However, a more 'satisfactory' theory from the viewpoint of the church would not, in all probability, have been well received at this stage by the political rulers. His thought, including both his positive ideas and his omissions, was to influence relations between church and state for centuries.

Authoritarian Personality

The idea of the authoritarian personality was developed by social psychologists of the **Marxist** inclined Frankfurt School during the late 1930s and 1940s. The original researchers, under the leadership of Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) and Theodor Adorno (1903–69, author of a book called *The Authoritarian Personality*), emigrated to the USA in 1935 to avoid Nazi persecution. The theory attempted to explain the ease with which **totalitarianism** finds support, and with which such regimes manage to recruit into even the most repressive and violent of their institutions. It also has a much wider ranging application, in understanding the working of almost any highly hierarchically

structured institution, as, for example, an army, and in explaining the attraction of political movements characterized by their **authoritarianism** and inegalitarianism. The mark of an authoritarian personality is that while such a person enjoys the use of **power** and having obedient underlings, they are also happiest when themselves subject to firm authority from someone hierarchically superior who can command unquestioning obedience. There are many roots to this personality syndrome and many ways in which it expresses itself. Perhaps the most crucial is that the personality type suffers from extreme insecurity in any decision-making context and requires absolute clarity and certainty about their obligations as well as their rights. One definition puts it that the authoritarian personality suffers from an 'extreme intolerance of ambiguity'. It is an aspect of personality common to most people, in varying degree, making some susceptible to certain political faiths when the authoritarian aspects predominate unusually.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism, rather like **totalitarianism**, is perhaps more of a technical term in political science than one in ordinary political usage. An authoritarian system need not, strictly speaking, be a **dictatorship**, and may well not be totalitarian. The essential element is that it is one in which stern and forceful control is exercised over the population, with no particular concern for their preferences or for public opinion. The justification for the rule may come from any one of a number of ideologies, but it will not be a democratic ideology, and ideas of **natural rights** or **civil liberties** will be rejected in favour of the government's right to rule by command, backed by all the force it needs. It is very much tied to the idea of command and obedience, of inflexible rule, and a denial of the legitimacy of opposition or even counter-argument.

Because it is such a broad term, it is, in a way, 'value-free': it is equally sensible to talk of left and right, of communist, capitalist, even religiously-based, authoritarian governments. (This is also true of totalitarianism.) Neither is it limited to describing political systems or faiths. One of the most influential works ever written on the subject was in social psychology by Theodor Adorno *et al.*, entitled *The Authoritarian Personality*. It is an attempt to discover the personality traits encouraged by, and found among, those who most readily fit into an authoritarian system. The stress here tends to be on characteristics such as a perfect willingness to obey orders from above, combined with a ruthless intolerance of disobedience from those below, an unquestioning attitude to the justifying ideology, and associated psychological attributes such as 'a low tolerance for ambiguity'. It is unsurprising that psychologists have usually found the personality profile of authoritarianism

among the military, though any highly structured profession or society is likely to demonstrate it. The real opposition to authoritarianism is **liberalism**, or even **pluralism**. The term can also be used as an epithet not only to political creeds, but of a particular politician's assumed character or aims. Like all the most useful terms of political analysis, it can be applied to micro politics as well as macro—thus it can be useful to describe certain industrial managements as more or less authoritarian in nature, or indeed methods of organizing classroom behaviour in a primary school, though clearly it would make little sense to see a voluntary organization in such terms.

Authoritarianism as a characteristic of actual modern political regimes is frequently tied to religious **fundamentalism**, and has been apparent in such states as **Taliban** Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where Islamic theology has a major impact on political thought. Some of the new East European democracies (see **democratic transition**), especially the less well-developed economically, like Bulgaria and Romania, are sometimes considered to be vulnerable to a resurgence of populist authoritarianism partly because the older population seek comfort from the stresses of capitalist development in the authoritarianism they were accustomed to during the communist period.

Authority

Authority means the right to give an order, which will be obeyed with no question as to that right, or, if not an order, the right to evoke legitimate power in support of a decision. Thus someone may have the authority to instruct soldiers to fire on a crowd, the authority to sign a binding legal document, or the authority to pass a security perimeter or frontier.

In the sociology of politics authority is contrasted with mere **power**; authority is being in a position to give an order that will be obeyed because its **legitimacy** is accepted by those to whom the order is addressed, rather than simply being a command which is backed up by coercion, bribery, persuasion, etc. Exactly what it is that gives authority, and what are the sources of legitimacy in politics, is more complicated. The best thinker on the matter is Max **Weber**. He distinguished, broadly, three kinds of authority. The most relevant to the modern day is 'rational-legal' authority, which stems from an overall social view that a system of power is legitimate because it is justified by a general view that it maximizes efficient running of society. A second vital source of legitimate authority is the 'traditional' mode of 'domination' (to use Weber's own language). This is based on the assumption that citizens learn that there are accepted ways of running a society and that any rule enshrined in the tradition should be obeyed simply because it always has been so obeyed.

Finally, but seldom of relevance today, is the **charismatic** mode of legitimate authority, the idea that a command should be obeyed because of the overwhelming personal attributes of the person who gives the order.

Authority will always be a predominantly legal concept, but its roots are much deeper. A person is often referred to as being ‘an authority’ on, for example, the poetry of Donne, if they are in an unquestioned position of claiming special knowledge and expertise—authority—on the subject. From this can be developed the political usage, that the ideology of the person or institution in question is formed from a position of superior knowledge and expertise, justifying their authority.

Ayatollahs

Ayatollahs are spiritual leaders of the Shi‘ite Muslim minority sect. **Islam** is very much less institutionalized and hierarchically ordered than most Christian denominations, and it is not possible to make a direct equivalent to the role of, for example, a bishop or cardinal. A closer analogy, though still not a good one, is to the rabbi in Judaism. Certainly the stress on religious leadership being in part a matter of excellence in scholarship and learning, and therefore in teaching, is important. Because Islam does not grant to any one person or body a decisive authority over matters of faith, as with the pope in **Roman Catholicism** or the synod in some Protestant churches, there is no clear way in which any particular ayatollah can be seen as either institutionally senior to others, or possessing a special right to lay down correct belief on any matter. Furthermore, the divisions between Sunni and Shi‘ite Muslims are at least as important as those between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Christianity. Ayatollahs have political importance because the state, according to Islam, is a religious institution (see **Shari‘a**) and should be governed accordingly, and because of their particular role in guiding the Islamic **fundamentalist** movements which have so strongly affected world politics since the 1970s. After the Muslim factions in the Iranian revolution of 1979 gained control over the secular radical wing, and thus over Iran, the ayatollahs came to be the effective government, with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini accepted consensually as the leading spiritual guide, being at first the *de facto* and later the *de jure* head of government. However, his authority was never completely institutionalized, nor even necessarily completely effective. Much of the revolution in Iran, and especially the enforcement of Islamic law and ethics, was carried out under the collective authority of a large number of ayatollahs, especially in their role as members of religious courts, or because they also held posts as members of the Iranian parliament. Divisions did occur among this collective body, and after Khomeini’s death in 1989 there was no one who had a personal religious

authority in the same way, and therefore no possibility of a routine transfer of power. Ayatollahs will continue to exercise enormous authority both in Iran and among fundamentalist Muslim groups elsewhere, and official political leaders will frequently be able to claim this title, although their actual power will increasingly come from more secular bases. In this context it might be noted that Khomeini's initial authority over his fellow ayatollahs derived more from his long-term political opposition to the Shah, symbolized by his lengthy exile, than from any special position he held in terms of his spiritual distinction.

Balance of Power

Balance-of-power theory rests on the idea that peace is more likely where potential combatants are of equal military, and sometimes political or economic, power. In the classic period of balance of power, which ran roughly from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the beginning of the First World War, there were always several countries of roughly equal power, none of which could guarantee to defeat a coalition of the others. The key to the balance of power maintaining international stability was that there were no ideological or other constraints on which powers could join others: any coalition was possible because all the members of the system, principally France, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, had essentially similar internal politics and general ideologies. Thus if any one country became ambitious, or seemed to be enhancing its power, others would shift alliances to redress this potential imbalance. It should be noted that advocates of the balance of power never thought it would prevent war altogether, the intention was more that wars, if they broke out, would be fought in a limited way until the balance was restored. It was the preservation of the system, and of the identity and autonomy of the actors, that was the aim. Thus the problem of the First World War was not that it occurred, but that it was fought in such a way, and for so long, that it destroyed, rather than preserved, the system.

The **cold war**, by dividing countries between capitalist and communist, made this shifting of alliances impossible. To keep the theory alive refinements were made to the theory. Balance was still possible in a two-headed, or **bipolar**, system, mainly because the development of weapons of awesome destruction had led to a 'balance of terror'. **Arms races** become particularly characteristic of bipolar balances of power, as the fluid system of offsetting alliances is removed. The development of blocs of countries around the two **superpowers**, particularly in Eastern and Western Europe, was supported by the introduction of a further refinement, multipolarity. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, the diminution of the power of the Soviet Union itself and the possible diminishing role of the USA in the defence of

Western Europe balance-of-power theories are likely to return to favour not only as explanations, but also as prescriptions.

Balkans

The viewing of the Balkans as a region of political instability, corruption, economic and social backwardness, and irreconcilable internal social schisms based on religious or ethnic rivalry, is not a recent one. In the late 19th century it was the Balkans which were, rightly as it turned out, regarded as the powder keg which could ignite Europe; they did, in August 1914. In geopolitical terms the Balkans refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and the remainder of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. It is, indeed, a socially divided region, with Roman Catholic and Orthodox **Christianity**, and **Islam**, all much more powerful as motivating forces than religion is in most of the rest of Europe. There are at least eight major languages spoken in the region. It is a very poor region, not only because it failed to keep up with the technical changes that Europe underwent from the 19th century onwards, but because it suffered even more than other regions that fell under communist domination after 1947. In many ways the Balkans today are in a time warp. Authoritarian control of one political colour or another has been dominant ever since the First World War, and little development of the social or cultural fabric often called **civil society**—thought to be required for liberal democracy—took place until the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989. It remains an area of fierce **nationalism** and cultural enmity, with an alienated and suspicious populace lacking almost all faith in politics of any kind. Polls regularly find a complete lack of trust in political institutions or the State. What all the Balkan countries have in common is a lengthy period of rule by the Ottoman Empire from roughly the 15th century until the end of the 19th century. During this period, when other European countries were slowly developing the institutions and cultures of liberal politics, no intellectual or social progress took place, except among very small Westernized élites. Nor was there industrial change: until at least the 1960s these societies were entirely agrarian-based.

Not surprisingly, there is a tendency today to deny that the Balkans as so portrayed ever existed, to insist that it is a Western conception which covers great diversity and presents a simplistic analysis. Consequently the very label is becoming unfashionable, to be replaced with 'South-East Europe'. Nevertheless, much of the Western conception is well founded; the area has, indeed, given us a classic analytic term in international relations—'balkanization'—to refer to the break-up of an area into small feuding units which makes progress and development extremely difficult.

Ballot

Ballots are votes cast in an election contested by two or more individuals or parties. By extension the *ballot box* is the box into which the votes are put, and *to ballot* denotes the process of voting. There are many different kinds of voting procedure (see **voting systems**). In modern democracies ballots must be cast in secret and an effective and impartial machinery must be established to prevent any tampering with the ballot (see **ballot-rigging**).

Ballot-rigging

Ballot-rigging describes any fraudulent, illicit or underhand interference with the voting procedure, the intention being to falsify the result or to make sure of electoral victory in advance. It used to be common in many countries, but systematic attempts to eliminate corruption have generally been successful in most Western states. In 1960, during the US presidential election, there was a strong suspicion that illegalities had occurred in connection with the ballot in Cook County, Illinois; and Chicago's mayoralty election of 1983 also witnessed attempts to inflate the number of eligible voters by false registrations. Allegations that some voters were prevented from registration in Florida surfaced after the US presidential election in 2000; the dispute surrounding the result of the election in that state made the allegations more significant. Similarly, after the Spanish general election of 1989 a number of irregularities were reported and the court rulings on these results were particularly momentous owing to the narrowness of the socialist party's majority. In Ireland there is a saying 'vote early, vote often', referring to the alleged custom of personation—the illegal casting of the votes of people on the electoral register who have died or moved from the district. (See also **gerrymandering**.)

Baltic States

The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, share a common history of suppressed nationhood, having been largely under either Tsarist or Soviet Russian control since the 18th century. There was one brief period of independent statehood for each of them, between 1920 and 1940, but they put up no real resistance to Soviet annexation in 1940, faced with the alternative of subjection to Hitler's Germany. However, despite concerted attempts by Soviet regimes to destroy separate identities and indigenous culture, all three states managed to keep their languages and culture alive, and were among the first to grasp the opportunities presented by Mikhail **Gorbachev's** policy of **glasnost**. This is perhaps even more remarkable in view of the population movements imposed by the Soviet regimes. Not only did deportation by order of the Soviet government and wartime deaths reduce

the total number of Baltic nationals, but Soviet industrialization policies led to huge numbers of Russians moving into these countries.

The opportunity to re-assert their identities came from two sources: the Helsinki Final Act (see **Helsinki process**) of 1975, and enthusiastic support for the liberalizing policies of Gorbachev, in particular the idea of glasnost. By the time of the attempted coup against Gorbachev in 1991, popular feeling was so intense, and Western support so strong, that the collapsing Soviet Union was in no position to oppose their demand for independence. Although these countries have experienced all the problems that the larger and more established Central and Eastern European countries had to go through after their own revolutions in 1989, they have managed the transition to liberal democracy remarkably painlessly—unlike, for example, in the **Balkans**. Each has set up a parliamentary form of government with competitive political parties, written constitutions and human rights protection. They have been especially eager to join Western Europe at the institutional level, and have above all sought to become members of **NATO**, though this as yet unachieved goal has more to do with establishing a Western identity than any actual defence need. Their economies have become modernized relatively rapidly, helped in part by the fact that the Soviet Union had itself relied heavily on them for its own economic needs, and had invested relatively generously. The real key to their political success, however, has been the uniformity of their culture, lacking any serious social, linguistic or religious **cleavages**, itself in part a reflection of the long-maintained covert **nationalism**. It may be significant that, after the Second World War, they continued to have at least *de jure* existence because the Western nations never formally accepted their annexation by the Soviet Union. In this sense, at least, they felt less deserted and more respected than some areas controlled from Moscow.

Behavioural

Behavioural approaches in **political science** became important in post-war America and spread to some university departments in Europe. Technically, a behavioural approach is one that concentrates on explaining overt political or social behaviour in terms of other overt or express phenomena. For example, when considering **voting** the only part of the process which can be subjected to a behavioural study is the actual casting of the vote, which can be observed externally and objectively; the ideology of the voter cannot be studied as here more subjective matters are involved. Other objective factors, such as class, religion, region and age can be taken into consideration when describing the voting process, but individual policy preferences or attitudes to issues are much more difficult to study. More generally, however, behaviouralism has come to mean a rather naïve distinction between the more apparently 'science-like' part

of political science, concerned with measuring and statistical analysis, and the more traditional aspects, like **political theory** or political history, or institutional/descriptive studies. These barriers are increasingly tending to break down, partly as a result of a revival in political theory, and partly because the skills and techniques used by behaviouralists are coming to be more widely available and to be used by those with no theoretical preference for a behavioural position in general.

Bentham

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is deservedly known as the founding father of **utilitarianism**, although its seeds can be found in the writings of **Hobbes** and **Hume**. Bentham's work, much of it done in collaboration with James **Mill**, was wide-ranging, covering political and **moral philosophy**, jurisprudence, and even practical topics such as prison reform. In jurisprudence he was an early legal **positivist**; in politics he was associated with **Liberalism**, but his utilitarian position was most fully developed in his political theory and moral philosophy. His general argument was that pain and pleasure were the two driving forces of mankind, and that moral or political values had to be translated into these terms. Treating man as mainly selfish, Bentham argued that the only way to judge political institutions was to discover whether they tended to produce a positive or negative balance of pleasure over pain. Strongly influenced by natural science, he believed that such things should be capable of precise measurement, and he proposed the construction of measuring devices and their application, through what he called the 'felicific calculus', to both constitutional engineering and detailed policy-making. James Mill developed the more purely political aspects of this position into a rather limited defence of **representative democracy** with more or less manhood suffrage. Bentham attached great importance to the political role of the middle class (as, for similar reasons, had **Aristotle**), which he believed less likely to push for policies of extreme self-interest than either the aristocracy or the working class. No separate value was given to any of the now-standard liberal democratic values such as **civil liberties**; indeed, Bentham scornfully dismissed all talk about **natural rights** as 'nonsense on stilts'. Bentham and James Mill represent the coldest and least attractive version of utilitarianism, though in practice their basic position was a radical one, far closer to egalitarian and democratic values than any of the orthodox political creeds of their time.

Bentley

Arthur Bentley (1870–1957) was an influential American political scientist of the inter-war period. Methodologically he was a precursor of the **behavioural**

movement of the post-war period, while theoretically he was one of the founders of **pluralism**. His main contribution to the analysis of political systems was his **group theory**. Bentley held that the traditional distinctions drawn in political science between democratic and dictatorial systems were largely superficial. He argued that all political systems really consisted of a number of separate groups competing with one another for influence over policy. The role of the government was essentially that of political broker, responding to the demands and influence of different groups and distributing 'goods' (in the form of policies) in response. In many respects this approach represented a development of ideas expressed by the European school of **élitism**, and resembled modifications of earlier ideas made by people such as **Schumpeter**. Like many theories of its period, Bentley's was largely intended to strip away what he saw as an artificial shell of respectability surrounding democratic theory, many elements within which he regarded as no more than myths.

Bill of Rights

Many **constitutions** have bills of rights, often under different names, protecting certain vital **civil liberties**. The most imitated bills of rights are the 1789 French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, which has survived into the constitution of the **Fifth Republic**, and the first ten amendments to the US Constitution ratified in 1791, although the English bill of rights, enacted in 1689 to establish Parliament's sovereignty in relation to the monarchy, is earlier. A typical bill of rights will contain provisions guaranteeing the basic **natural rights**, such as the freedoms of speech, religion and assembly and the right to own property. It will usually also contain a set of more legalistic **civil rights**, including, for example, the right to a fair trial, perhaps by jury and with legal representation, prohibitions on cruel and excessive punishment and protection against double jeopardy (being tried twice for the same offence). Many modern bills of rights may also try to guarantee substantive rights such as those to education or employment; these, however, cannot be fully operational, because while a government can, clearly, be stopped from doing something, it cannot be forced to provide a specific good irrespective of the state of the economic or political situation. The constitutions of the new Eastern European democracies, in particular, contain such 'positive rights', and their **constitutional courts** have often enforced them against governments. Their ability to do this stems from the fact that, whatever else may have been lacking in the communist predecessor states, they all had effective welfare systems.

The effect of a bill of rights depends on other aspects of a country's legal system. In the USA, with its written constitution and powerful independent